Notes by JBY:

1.  The text was taken from Book XXII. Page Numbers given below (except for the      Commentaries from Book XXIII) refer to Bk. XXII. The frontispiece of the book is shown      below. The translation of the ST was by Dr. A Wolf. I conjecture that Runes heavily edited      Wolf's translation for it differs (briefer and rearranged) from the version given in Note 2.      Compare Runes' and Wolf's "Tables of Contents."  

     I express my appreciation to Philosophical Library, Inc., who published "The Book of God" 
     in 1958. I have not been able to find them to ask for permission to scan the book. 
     I assume it is in the public domain. 
 
2.  For the full version of Dr. A. Wolf's Short Treatise translation, see Terry Neff's Web Site. 
     Dr. Wolf's translation was published in 1910 in Book XXIII. 
     Dr. Wolf's Commentaries from Book XXIII are given herein. 
     Dr. Wolf's Introduction to Book XXIII is given here.  

     For a translation and commentary of the Short Treatise by Edwin Curley see Bk.VIII:46.  

     These translations more closely follow the Spinoza's Latin manuscript of 
     "Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being" than that in Note 1. 
 
3.Symbols:

[ Commentary by translator, Dr. A Wolf ], I conjecture; there is no note to that effect. 
[ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ], 
< Wolf's commentary from Book XXIII > 
{ Commentary by Joseph B. Yesselman } 
All comments in right-hand margin are by Dr. A. Wolf's Bk. XXIII unless noted.  

4.  I have made the following changes in Dr. Wolf's spellings (not consistently) of God to reflect, in my opinion, Spinoza's 1D6; his working hypothesis of G-D:  
          god(s) — Polytheistic; Pagan, Idolatry, Myth.  
          God    — Monotheistic; Judaeo-Christian-Islamic, Anthropomorphic, Transcendent God.  
             Durant5                     Re-interpret all anthropomorphisms in accordance with TTP1:3:13. 
          G-D or G-d— Monotheistic; Spinoza's Immanent, Indwelling G-D/Nature.      Durant
            ^ spelling ^ not consistently                                      James Hall:51 
          'G-D' and 'Nature' are interchangeable. Deus sive Natura. Term G-D.       Spinoza's Religion
            'G-d' and 'nature' are interchangeable.      Pantheism 

The above stages show the constant evolution of Religion's hypotheses. G-D is a synthesis of god(s) and God. See Dialectics and Holidays.  

Paradoxically, Spinoza's G-D has much in common with the Pagan gods. Spinoza treats all things as Holy and as organically interdependent; whereas the Pagan treats things as independent separates--standing alone. The cash value of Spinoza's hypothesis of 'G-D' is that it establishes the logic for the Golden Rule. See Analogy. 

     The importance of Spinoza's hypothesis 'G-D' is that it posits all as one interdependent 
     organism and gives the logic for the Golden Rule. See Analogy.  

5.  Make my following emendations throughout the Work: 
          soul, [vital] spirits           change to         mind, thought, life, or consciousness. 
         
 
6.   Partake of the Work (and my comments) as you would a pomegranate—relish 
      the flesh and spit-out the pits—things out-of-date; things you disagree with; and 
      things incomprehensible.  

7.   For less commentary and a format suitable for e-book conversion see the Essay. 
 
 
 
 

{Runes'} Table of Contents {of Book XXII} {Compare with Wolf's}  

Chapter   i.   Introduction—Word to the Reader 
Chapter  1.  G-D Exists 
Chapter  2.  On Divine Providence 
Chapter  3.  On Natura Naturans 
Chapter  4.  On Natura Naturata 
Chapter  5.  What Good and Evil Are 
Chapter  6.  G-D and Man 
Chapter  7.  On Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge 
Chapter  8.  On Passion 
Chapter  9.  The Good in Man 
Chapter 10.  On Love 
Chapter 11.  On Hate 
Chapter 12.  On Joy and Sorrow 
Chapter 13.  On Esteem and Contempt, Etc. 
Chapter 14.  On Hope and Fear 
Chapter 15.  On Remorse and Repentance 
Chapter 16.  On Derision and Jesting 
Chapter 17.  On Glory and Shame 
Chapter 18.  On Gratitude 
Chapter 19.  On Grief 
Chapter 20.  On the True and the False 
Chapter 21.  On the Will 
Chapter 22.  On Will and Desire 
Chapter 23.  On Our Happiness 
Chapter 24.  On Reason 
Chapter 25.  On True Knowledge 
Chapter 26.  On the Immortality of the Soul 
Chapter 27.  On G-D's Love of Man 
Chapter 28.  On Devils {Omitted in Bk. XXII; I have added it from Bk. XXIII. }
Chapter 29.  On True Freedom  

Page 1
Runes's Introduction—A Word to the Reader
 
 

[i-1]    OUR SAGES say that the good Lord devised a way of keeping

the  unprepared  from  entering terra sancta—He placed before it an

enticing  anteroom.  Thus,  astronomy  has  its  astrology; religion its              Idolatry

theology;    history    its   mythology;    mysticism    its    superstition;

philosophy  its  mathematical  byplay.
 
 

[i-2]    Many  of  the  casual  readers  of  Spinoza become so involved

with   his   geometrical   prolegomena   that   they   never  reach  the

wide-open   plains   of   the   grandiose   simplicity  of  his  thoughts.          Spinozistic Ideas
 
 

[i-3]    Spinoza's  use of the mathematical shield as well as the termin-

ology  of an already obsolete scholasticism was based on good and

valid  reasons.  While  he  was  shunned  by  some  of  the  fanatical

elements among his coreligionists, whom he never deserted, he was

also  incessantly  maligned  and  abused  by leaders of his Christian

contemporaries. Only an early death saved him from severe examin-

ation at their hands.
 
 

[i-4]    It  is not surprising to note Spinoza closing this page 2 little Book

on  G-D  with  an admonition to his student readers to exercise great       Mark Twain's "Little Story" 

caution in discussion of its theories.
 

                         *  *  *

[i-5]    Spinoza's  reputation  was  most  seriously  damaged during his

lifetime.  For  a  hundred years after his death Christian philosophers

as  well  as  theologians  reacted  to  "that  man  of  the  Hague" with

derogation or silence. The shining era of 18th century enlightenment

opened  its  heart  to  the forgotten recluse. As the decades went by,

and  reason succeeded in lifting the leaden curtains of prejudice and

superstition,  the  great  and very great began in increasing numbers

to  pay  homage  to  the  philosophers'  philosopher.  Spinoza  is con-

sidered  today  the  Philosopher  of Modern Times, as Aristotle stood

as the Philosopher of Antiquity.
 
 

[i-6]    Still,  Spinoza  is  the  best  known  and  least  read of the great

thinkers.

                            *  *  *

[i-7]    The  small  book  before us, rarely mentioned in early literature,
                                      {about 1858}
came  to light only a hundred years ago in two slightly varying Dutch

manuscripts  entitled:  Korte  Verhandeling  van  God,  den  Mensch,

en deszelfs Welstand [Short treatise of God, man, and his beatitude].

It  is  unevenly  written within the framework of a logico-mathematical

thesis,  through page 3 which, ever so often, breaks the benign light of

incomparable wisdom.
 

                           *   *   *

[i-8]    The  author  of  this  book, the young Spinoza, lived in turbulent

times.  Europe  was  torn  by  civil  and religious strife: church bullies,

bigots  and  pseudo-prophets vied for the ear of a fearful people, and

while  the  voices of reason were already audible, the crackling of the

burning faggots under the feet of whimpering victims was gruesomely

louder, no less among Protestants than among Catholics.
 

                           *   *   *

[i-9]    Spinoza's  youth  was  dedicated  to  study  of the Hebrew scrip-

tures—the Torah, Talmud, and Cabbalah. Preparing for a Rabbinical                 Important

career,  he  spent  his nights in the perusal of early wisdom literature,

but  in  the  days  following he was a horrified witness to the religious

savagery  of  his  period  with  all its bestial implements of torture and

auto-da-fé.
 
 

[i-10]    Priestly  pretensions  drove  him  from  the  dogmas; and man's

inhumanity  to  man,  from  society.  When  he  was  only  twenty-four,

he  withdrew  into himself. The condemnation by Jews and Christians                 Bk.XX:116ff.

was  a  natural  sequence  of  his  refusal  to  submit  to  either public

observance or at least silence.
 
 

[i-11]    The  heretic  they  expelled  was  a mere youth, but one whose

sagacity was a thorn in the side of a bigoted world.
 

Page 4
[i-12 ]    While  Europe  was  in  uproar  over  the right  church, Spinoza

was seeking for the right G-D.
 
 

[i-13]    The  book  before  us  is  the  first  known report of his findings.
 

                           *   *   *

[i-14]    They  called  him an atheist because he denied that G-D lived in

a church;  they  called him a pantheist because he claimed that ALL is              JBY added

in G-D;  they  called him Anti-Christ because he said G-D is indwelling                Logos
                                                                [i-14a]
either  in  all  men,  or  in none.  They painted ugly pictures of him and

named  him  only  in contempt—this was done not by the Jews, but by

the  Christians  of  his  days and after. All this because he preached a
                                          {organic interdependence}
sermon  that G-D be Love and man's love to man be the very same as             Golden Rule
                                                                          { ^ need}
his  love  to  G-D;  a  displeasing  thought  indeed to the professionals

who  held  up  the  crucifix with the right hand and the rack-screw with

the left.

                           *   *   *

[i-15]    Spinoza's  message  is  not  new.  It  was  heard  by  the  men of

Abraham  and  the  men  of  Moses.  It was written out by the two great                  { Read "Gifts of

kings  of antiquity, David and Solomon. It is found in the teachings and                  the Jews" Pg. 156

legends  of  the  Talmudic sages;  it  is hidden like a buried treasure in                           and

the   dreamy symbolism  of  the  Cabbalah—it  is  the  essence  of  the             Jews, God and History }

testaments of all the prophets of all nations and times.
 

                           *   *   *

[i-16]    Spinoza  was  not  an  academic  philosopher;  he  was  page 5  a

teacher  as  well  as  writer  of  the people. His talks and theories were

circulated  among  scholars  and students for many decades and, with

one exception, were not published until after his death.
 
 

[i-17]    The  Book  of  G-D,  appearing like a draft for his later Ethics, is

a  Guide  for  the  Bewildered.  Those  who see in philosophy no more

than  an  intellectual  byplay in humanities will soon turn away, but the

serious  and  sincere who are imbued with the longing for a better and

freer life,  a  life  of  intuitive  beatitude, will find here a most rewarding

fountain of faith.


                                                                              Dagobert D. Runes 
                                                                                                              1958 
 
 

Page 7 of Bk.XXII
Chapter 1 - G-D Exists                                                                                             P15

< As regards the first, namely, whether there is a G-D , this we say, can be proved.

*I.* In the first place, a priori (innate, born-with) thus:>                                                                     P15, L5
 

[1-1]    WHATEVER  WE  clearly  and  distinctly  know  to  belong to the            P15, L6ff

nature  of  a  thing,  we  can also truly affirm of that thing. Now we can              P15, L7

know clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to the nature of G-D.
 

The  essence  of things are from all eternity, and unto all eternity shall               P15, L13

remain immutable.
 

The existence of G-D is essence.                                                                                       P15, L16
 
 

                           *   *   *

[1-2]    We  say  that  G-D is a being of whom all or infinite attributes are
   {posited}
predicated  of which attributes every one is infinitely perfect in its kind.

Now,  in  order  to  express  our views clearly, we shall premise the four

following propositions: 

1. That there is no finite substance, but that every substance 
    must  be  infinitely  perfect  in its kind, that is to say, that in 
    the  infinite  understanding  of  G-D  no  substance can be 
    more  perfect  than  that  which  already  exists  in  Nature.             Deus sive Natura

2. That there are not two like substances.                                                       1P5

3. That one substance cannot produce another.                                             1P6

4. That in the infinite understanding of G-D there is no other
    substance than that which is formaliter {objective} in Nature. 

Page 8
[1-3]    The  reasons  why  we  said  that all these attributes, which are in Nature,

are  but  one  single  being,  and by no means different things (although we can         analogy
                                                        {    for analysis only       }
know them clearly and distinctly the one without the other, and the other without

another), are these:

1. Because we have found already before that there must be an infinite

and  perfect  being,  by  which  nothing  else can be meant than such a
                                                    {affirmed}
being of which all in all must be predicated. Why? [Because] to a being

which  has  any  essence  attributes  must  be  referred,  and  the more

essence  one  ascribes  to  it, the more attributes also must one ascribe

to  it,  and consequently if a being is infinite then its attributes also must

be infinite, and this is just what we call a perfect being.
 
 

2. Because  of  the  unity  which  we see everywhere in Nature. If there

were  different  beings in it then it would be impossible for them to unite              1P2 & 1P3

with one another.
 
 

3. Because  although  one  substance cannot produce another, and if a

substance  does not exist it is impossible for it to begin to exist, we see,

nevertheless,  that  in  no  substance  (which  we none the less know to

exist  in  Nature), when considered separately, is there any necessity to

be  real,  since existence does not pertain to its separate essence. So it

must  necessarily follow that Nature, which results from no causes, and

which  we  nevertheless  know  to  exist,  must  necessarily be a perfect

being to which existence belongs.
 
 

Page 9
[1-4]    From  all  that  we  have so far said it is evident, then, that we posit

extension  as an attribute of G-D; and this seems not at all appropriate to

a  perfect  being:  for since extension is divisible, the perfect being would

have  to  consist  of  parts,  and  this  is  altogether  inapplicable  to  G-D,            Inseparable  

because  He  is a simple being. Moreover, when extension is divided it is

passive,  and with G-D (who is never passive, and cannot be affected by

any  other being, because He is the first efficient cause of all) this can by

no means be the case.
 
 

[1-5]    To  this  we  reply:  (1)  that  "part"  and  "whole" are not true or real

entities,  but  only  "things of perception,''  and  consequently there are in

Nature  neither  whole  nor  parts. (2) A thing composed of different parts

must  be  such that the parts thereof, taken separately, can be conceived

and understood one without another. Take, for instance, a clock which is

composed  of  many  different wheels, cords, and other things; in it, I say,

each  wheel,  cord,  etc.,  can  be  conceived and understood separately,

without  the  composite  whole  being necessary thereto. Similarly also in

the  case  of  water, which consists of straight oblong particles, each part

thereof  can  be  conceived  and  understood,  and  can  exist without the

whole;  but  extension, being a substance, one cannot say of it that it has

parts,  since  it  can  neither  diminish  nor increase, and no parts thereof

can  be  understood  apart,  because by its nature it must be infinite. And

that  it page 10  must  be  such, follows from this, namely, because if it were

not such, but consisted of parts, then it would not be infinite by its nature,

as  it  is  said  to  be;  and  it  is impossible to conceive parts in an infinite

nature,  since  by  their  nature  all  parts  are  finite.  Add  to  this still: if it

consisted  of  different  parts  then  it should be intelligible that supposing
                                         [destroyed]
some parts thereof to be annihilated, extension might remain all the same,

and  not be annihilated together with the annihilation of some of its parts;

this  is  clearly  contradictory  in what is infinite by its own nature and can

never  be,  or  be  conceived,  as  limited or finite. Further, as regards the

parts  in Nature, we maintain that division, as has also been said already

before,  never takes place in substance, but always and only in the mode

of  substance. Thus,  if  I  want  to  divide water, I only divide the mode of

substance,  and  not  substance  itself.  And  whether this mode is that of

water or something else it is always the same.
 
 

[1-6]    Division,  then,  or  passivity,  always takes place in the mode; thus

when  we  say  that man passes away or is annihilated, then this is under

stood  to  apply  to  man  only  in  so far as he is such a composite being,

and  a  mode of substance, and not the substance on which he depends.
 
 

[1-7]    Moreover,  we  have  already  stated,  and  we  shall  repeat it later,

that  outside  G-D  there  is  nothing  at  all,  and  that He is an Immanent
                                                                                            [one acted on]
Cause.   Now,   passivity,   whenever  the  agent  and  the  passivum  are

different page 11  entities, is a palpable imperfection, because the passivum

must  necessarily  be  dependent  on that which has caused the passivity

from  outside;  it  has,  therefore, no place in G-D, who is perfect. Further-

more,  of  such  an  agent who acts in himself it can never be said that he
                                                  [one acted on]
has  the  imperfection  of  a  passivum,  because he is not affected by an-

other;  such,  for  instance,  is the case with the understanding, which, as

the philosophers also assert, is the cause of its ideas.  Since, however, it

is  an  immanent  cause,  what  right,  has  one  to  say that it is imperfect,

howsoever  frequently  it  is  affected by itself? Lastly, since substance is

[the cause]  and the origin of all its modes, it may with far greater right be

called  acting  than  passive.  And  with  these  remarks  we  consider  all

adequately answered.
 
 

[1-8]    It  is  further  objected,  that  there  must necessarily be a first cause

which  sets  body  in motion, because when at rest it is impossible for it to

set  itself  in  motion.  And  since it is clearly manifest that rest and motion

exist  in  Nature,  these  must, they think, necessarily result from an exter-

nal  cause.  But  it  is  easy  for  us to reply, to this; for we concede that if

body  were  a  thing  existing  through  itself,  and  had no other attributes

than  length, breadth, and depth, then, if it really rested there would be in

it  no  cause  whereby to begin to move itself; but we have already stated

before  that  Nature is a being of which all attributes are predicated, and

this  being  so,  it  can  be page 12  lacking in nothing wherewith to produce

all that there is to be produced.
 
 

[1-9]    Having  so far discussed what G-D is, we shall say but a word, as it

were,  about  His  attributes:  that those which are known to us consist of

two  only,  namely,  Thought  and  Extension;  for  here  we speak only of

attributes  which  might  be  called  the  proper  attributes of G-D, through

which we come to know Him [as He is] in Himself, and not [merely] as He

acts  [towards things]  outside  Himself. All else, then, that men ascribe to

G-D beyond these two at tributes,  all that (if it otherwise pertains to Him)

must  be  either  an  "extraneous denomination,"  such  as  that He exists

through Himself, is Eternal, One, Immutable, etc., or, I say, has reference

to  His  activity,  such  as  that  He  is  a cause, predestines, and rules all

things:  all  which  are  properties of G-D, but give us no information as to

what He is.
 
 

[1-10]   G-D  is  a  being  of  whom  all attributes are predicated; whence it

clearly  follows  that  all  other  things  can  by no means be, or be under-

stood,  apart  from or outside Him. Wherefore we may say with all reason

that G-D is a cause of all things.
 
 

[1-11]    That  G-D  alone  is  the only free cause is clear not only from what

has  just  been  said,  but  also from this, namely, that there is no external

cause  outside  Him  to force or constrain Him; all this is not the case with

created things.
 
 
 

Page 13
Chapter 2 - On Divine Providence
 

[2-1]   PROVIDENCE  IS nothing else than the striving which we find in the              P47, L4-6

whole  of  Nature  and  in  individual things to maintain and preserve their            self-interest

own  existence.  For  it  is  manifest  that  no  thing could, through its own

nature,  seek  its  own  annihilation,  but, on the contrary, that every thing
                                                                        {if rational}
has  in  itself  a striving  to preserve its condition ^ ,  and to improve itself.

Following  these  definitions  of  ours we, therefore, posit a general and a

special  providence.  The  general  [providence] is that through which all

things  are  produced  and  sustained  in  so  far  as  they are parts of the

whole  of  Nature.  The  special  providence  is  the striving of each thing

separately  to  preserve  its  existence  [each  thing,  that  is  to say], con-

sidered  not  as  a  part  of  Nature,  but  as  a  whole  [by  itself].  This  is

explained  by  the  following  example:  All  the  limbs of man are provided

for,  and  cared  for,  in  so  far  as  they  are parts of man, this is general              analogy

providence;  while  special  [providence]  is  the striving of each separate

limb  (as  a  whole  in  itself,  and  not  as  a  part of man) to preserve and

maintain its own well-being.

1. [2-2]     G-D cannot omit to do what He does; He has, page 14                     1P33
              namely,  made  everything so perfect that it cannot be
              more perfect.

2. [2-2a]    And, at the same time, without Him no thing can be, or
              be conceived.

 

[2-3]    Against all this others object:  how is it possible that God, who is

said  to  be  supremely perfect, and the sole cause, disposer, and pro-

vider of  all,  nevertheless  permits  such  confusion to  be seen every-

where  in  Nature?  Also,  why  has  He not made man so as not to be

able to sin?
 
 

[2-4]    Now,  in the first place, it cannot be rightly said that there is con-

fusion in Nature, since nobody knows all the causes of things so as to

be  able  to  judge  accordingly.  This objection, however, originates in

this  kind  of  ignorance,  namely,  that they have set up general Ideas,

with  which,  they  think,  particular  things must agree if they are to be

perfect.  These  Ideas, they state, are in the understanding of G-D, as

many  of Plato's followers have said, namely, that these general Ideas

(such  as  Rational,  Animal,  and  the like) have been created by G-D;             P50, L14ff

and  although  those who follow Aristotle say, indeed, that these things

are  not  real  things, only things of the mind, they nevertheless regard

them  frequently  as  [real] things, since they have clearly said that His

providence  does  not  extend to particular things, but only to kinds; for
                                                                                      {Alexander's horse}
example,  G-d  has  never  exercised His providence over Bucephalus,              P50, L21-27

etc.,  but  only  over  page 15  the whole genus Horse. They say also that
                                                                   [corruptible]
G-D  has  no  knowledge  of particular and transient things, but only of

the  general,  which,  in their opinion, are imperishable. We have, how-

ever,  rightly  considered this to be due to their ignorance. For it is pre-

cisely the particular things, and they alone, that have a cause, and not

the general, because they are nothing.
 
 

[2-5]    G-D  then  is the cause of, and providence over, particular things

only.  If  particular  things  had  to  conform  to some other Nature, then

they  could  not  conform  to  their own, and consequently could not be

what  they  truly  are.  For example, if G-D had made all human beings

like  Adam  before  the  fall,  then  indeed  He would only have created

Adam,  and  no  Paul  or  Peter; but no, it is just perfection in G-D, that

He gives to all things, from the greatest to the least,  their essence, or,

to   express   it   better,   that  He  has  all  things  perfectly  in  himself.
 
 

[2-6]    As  regards  the  other  [objection],  why G-D has not made man-

kind  so  that  they  should  not sin, to this it may serve [as an answer],
                                                                                {our own data base}
that  whatever  is  said  about sin is only said with reference to us, that

is,  as  when  we compare two things with each other, or [consider one

thing]  from  different  points  of  view.  For  instance,  if  some one has

made  a  clock  precisely  in order to strike and to show the hours, and

the mechanism quite fulfills the aims of its maker, then we say that it is

good,  but  if  it  does  not  do  so,  then  we  say that it is bad, notwith-

standing that even then  page 16  it might still be good if only it had been

His   intention   to   make   it  irregular  and  to  strike  at  wrong  times.
 
 

[2-7]    We  say  then,  in  conclusion,  that Peter must, as is necessary,

conform  to  the  Idea  of  Peter,  and not to the Idea of Man; good and

evil,  or  sin,  these  are only modes of thought, and by no means real,

or  any  thing  that  has  reality,  as  we shall very likely show yet more

fully  in  what follows. For all things and works which are in Nature are

perfect.
 
 
 

[3-1]    WE  SHALL  briefly  divide  the  whole  of  Nature—namely,  into                P56

Natura Naturans  and  Natura naturata. By Natura Naturans we under-             1P29n

stand  a  being  that  we  conceive clearly and distinctly through itself,

and without needing anything beside itself (like all the attributes which  

we have so far described), that is, G-D.
 
 

[3-2]    The Natura  naturata  we shall divide into two, a general, and a               P56, L12ff

particular.  The general consists of all attributes which depend immed-

iately  on  G-D,  of  which  we  shall  treat  in the following chapter; the

particular  consists  of  all  the particular things which are produced by

the   general   mode.   So   that   the  Natura  naturata  requires  some

substance in order to be well understood.
 
 
 

[4-1]    Now,  as  regards  the  general  Natura  naturata,  or  attributes,  or

creations  which  depend  on, or have been created by, G-D immediately,
                                                                             {body-extension}
of  these  we  know  no more than two, namely, motion in matter, and the
       {thought}
understanding in the thinking thing. These, then, we say, have been from

all eternity,  and to all eternity will remain immutable. A work truly as great

as becomes the greatness of the work's master.
 
 

[4-2]    All that specially concerns Motion, such as that it has been from all

eternity,  and  to all eternity will remain immutable; that it is infinite in its           P57, L21

kind;  that  it can neither be, nor be understood through itself, but only by

means   of  Extension,—all  this,  I  say,  since  it  [Motion]  more  properly

belongs  to  a  treatise  on Natural Science rather than here, we shall not

consider  in  this place, but we shall only say this about it, that it is a Son,

Product, or Effect created immediately by G-D.
 
 

[4-3]    As  regards  the  Understanding  in  the  thinking thing, this, like the
{Motion}  
first,    is    also   a Son,  Product,  or  immediate  Creation  of  G-D,  also           P57, L18, 20

created  by   Him  page 20  from  all  eternity, and remaining immutable to all

eternity.  It  has   but  one  function,  namely,  to  understand  clearly  and

 distinctly all things  at  all  times;  which produces invariably an infinite or

most   perfect   satisfaction,    which   cannot   omit   to  do  what  it  does.        Endnote 2P49.0a
 
 
 

Page 21
Chapter 5 - What Good and Evil Are
 

[5-1]    SOME THINGS are in our understanding and not in Nature, and so

they  are  also  only our own creation, and their purpose is to understand

things  distinctly:  among these we include all relations, which have refer-
                                                                                                      [beings of
ence  to  different  things,  and  these  we  call  Entia  Rationis  [things of
  reason]
thought].  Now  the  question  is,  whether  good  and  evil  belong  to the

Entia  Rationis  or  to  the  Entia Realia [real things]. But since good and

evil are only relations, it is beyond doubt that they must be placed among

the  Entia Rationis;  for  we never say that something is good except with
 [respects]
reference  to  something  else  which is not so good, or is not so useful to

us  as  some  other thing. Thus we say that a man is bad, only in compar-

ison  with  one  who  is better, or also that an apple is bad, in comparison

with another which is good or better.
 
 

[5-2]    All  this could not possibly be said, if that which is better or good, in

comparison with which it [the bad] is so called, did not exist.
 
 

[5-3]    Therefore, when we say that something is good, we only mean that
                                       [universal]
it  conforms  well  to  the general Idea which we have of such things. But,

as  we  have  already said before, the things must agree with their  page 22
                                        [being]
particular Ideas, whose essence must be a perfect essence, and not with

the general [Ideas], since in that case they would not exist.
 
 

[5-4]    As to confirming what we have just said, the thing is dear to us; but

still, to conclude our remarks, we will add yet the following proofs:
 
 

[5-5]    All  things  which  are  in  Nature,  are either things or actions. Now
 {Subjective Terms}
good and evil  are neither things nor actions.  Therefore good and evil do 

not exist in Nature.
 
 
                                                       { Objective Terms  }
[5-6]    For,  if  good  and  evil  are  things  or actions,  then they must have

their  definitions.  But  good  and  evil  (as,  for example,  the goodness of

Peter  and  the  wickedness  of Judas)  have no definitions apart from the
[particular]
^ essence of Judas or Peter, because this alone exists in Nature, and they

cannot be defined without their essence.  Therefore, as above—it follows
                                                                               [are]
that good and evil are not things or actions which exist in Nature.
 
 
 

Page 23 of Book xxii
Chapter 6 - G-D and Man.
 

[6-1]    HAVING,  in  the  first part, discoursed on G-D and on the universal

and infinite things, we shall proceed now, in the second part, to the treat-

ment  of  particular  and  finite  things;  though  not  of  all,  since they are

innumerable,  but we shall only treat of those which concern man; and, in

the  first  place,  we  shall consider here what man is, in so far as he con-

sists  of  certain modes (contained in the two attributes, things and ideas,

which  we  have  remarked  in  G-D).  I  say  of  certain modes, for I by no

means think that man, in so far as he consists of spirit, soul, or body, is a
   {he is but a mode of substance}
real  substance.  Because,  already  at  the  beginning  of  this  book, we

proved  (1)  that  no  real  substance  can  have  a beginning; (2) that one

substance  cannot  produce  another;  and lastly (3), that there cannot be

two like substances.
 
 

[6-2]    As  man has not been in existence from eternity, is finite, and is like

many  men,  he  can  be  no  real  substance;  so  that  all  that he has of

thought are only modes of the attribute thought which we have attributed

to  G-D.  And, again, all that he has of form, motion, and other things, are

likewise [modes] of the other attribute which is attributed by us to G-D.
 
 

[6-3]    And although from this, [namely,] that the nature of man can neither

be,  nor  be  understood without the page 24  attributes which we ourselves

admit to constitute substance, some try to prove that man is a substance,

yet this has no other ground than false supposition. For, since the nature

of matter or body existed before the form of this human body existed, that

nature  cannot  be  peculiar  to  the  human  body, because it is clear that

during the time when man was not,  it could never belong to the nature of

man.
 
 

[6-4]    And what they set up as a fundamental principle, [namely,] that that

pertains  to  the nature of a thing, without which the thing can neither be,

nor  be  understood,  we  deny.  For  we have already shown that without

G-D  no  thing can be or be understood. That is, G-D must first be and be

understood before these particular things can be and be understood.  We

have also shown that genera do not belong to the nature of definition, but

that  only  such  things  as  cannot  exist  without  others,  can also not be

understood  without  these.  This  being  so,  what  kind of a rule shall we,

then,  state,  whereby  it  shall  be  known what belongs to the nature of a

thing?
 
 

[6-5]    Well,  the  rule is this: That belongs to the nature of a thing, without

which  the  thing  can  neither be, nor be understood; not merely so, how-            P66, L1- 5

ever,  but in such wise that the judgment must be convertible, that is, that

the  predicate  can  neither  be,  nor  be  understood without the thing. Of

these  modes,  then,  of which man consists, we shall begin to treat at the

commencement of the following first chapter.
 
 
 

Page 25                           {Imagination}    {Reason}                  {Intuition}                        In the Ethics
Chapter 7 - On Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge.
                                                                                                   [Science] {hypothesis}
 

[7-1]    To  BEGIN  our  consideration  of the modes of which man consists,

we shall state (1) what they are, (2) their effects, and (3) their cause.
 
 

[7-2]    As  regards  the  first, let us begin with those that are first known to
                           [ perceptions ]
us: namely, certain ideas or the consciousness of the knowledge of our-              P67, L7f

selves, and of the things which are outside us.

                                                                                                                                                        P67, L10ff
[7-3]    Now  we  get  these  ideas  (1)  either  merely through belief (which             P67, L11  
                                                                         { Imagination }                                  
belief  arises  either  from  experience,  or  from  hearsay),  (2)  or,  in the              P67, L13
                                                                     {  Reason  }
second place, we acquire them by way of a true belief,  (3) or, thirdly, we              P67, L14
                                            {               Intuition               }
have them as the result of clear and distinct conception.                                    
 
 

[7-4]    The first is commonly subject to error.                                                                          2P41             
 
 

[7-5]    The  second  and  third,  however,  although  they  differ  from  one  

another, cannot err.
 
 

[7-6]    To  make  all  this  somewhat clearer and more intelligible, we shall

give the following illustration taken from the Rule of Three.
 
 

[7-7]    Someone  has  just  heard  it  said  that if, in the Rule of Three, the

second  number  is multiplied by the third, and then divided by the first, a

fourth  number  will  then  be obtained which has the same relation to the

third  as  the  second  has  to  the  first.  And  notwithstanding  page 26   the

possibility  that  he who put this before him might have been lying, he still

made   his   calculations   accordingly,   and   he  did  so  without  having

acquired any more knowledge of the Rule of Three than a blind man has

of color,  so that whatever he may have said about it, he simply repeated

as a parrot repeats what it has been taught.
 
 

[7-8]    Another, having a more active intelligence, is not so easily satisfied

with mere hearsay, but tests it by some actual calculations, and when he

find  they  agree  with it, then he gives credence to it. But we have rightly

said  that  this  one  also  is  subject  to  error; for how can he possibly be

sure  that  his  experience of a few particulars can serve him as a rule for

all?
 
 

[7-9]    A  third,  who is not satisfied with hearsay, because it may deceive,

nor  with  experience  of  a  few particulars, because this cannot possibly

serve  as  a  rule,  examines  it  in  the  light of true Reason, which, when

properly applied, has never deceived. This then tells him that on account
          [ property ]
of  the  nature  of  the  proportion  in  these  numbers it had to be so, and

could not happen otherwise.
 
 

[7-10]    A  fourth,  however,  having  the clearest knowledge of all, has no

need  of  hearsay, or experience, or the art of reasoning, because by his
                                                                        [ calculations ]
penetration he sees the proportion in all such cogitations intuitively.                     E2:XL(24)
 
 

[7-11]    We  come  now  to  the consideration of the effects of the different
                                                                                            [ paragraph ]
grades  of  knowledge, of which we spoke in the preceding chapter, and,

in  passing  as it  were,  page 27 we shall explain what Opinion, Belief, and

clear Knowledge are.
 

                                                                                {Imagination}
[7-12]    The  first  [kind of knowledge],  then,  we call Opinion, the second
{Reason}                                                 {Intuition}
Belief, but the third is what we call clear Knowledge.
 

                          {Imagination}
[7-13]    We  call it Opinion because it is subject to error, and has no place

when we are sure of anything,  but only in those cases when we are said
                           [speculate]                                {Reason}
to  guess  and to surmise. The second we call Belief, because the things
            [grasp]
we  apprehend  only  with  our  reason  are  not  seen by us, but are only
                                                                         [intellect]
known  to  us  through the conviction of our understanding that it must be
                                                                       {Intuition}
so  and  not  otherwise.  But  we  call that clear Knowledge which comes,
                                                                                        [being aware of]
not  from  our  being  convinced  by  reasons,  but  from  our  feeling  and

enjoying the thing itself, and it surpasses the others by far.                                   Posit Deus
 
 

[7-14]    After  these preliminary remarks let us now turn to their effects. Of
                                                        {Imagination}
these  we  say  this, namely, that from the first proceed all the "passions"             Elwes[59]
                                                                   {Reason}
which  are  opposed  to good reason; from the second, the good desires;                P69, L22ff
                  {Intuition}