Short Treatise on G-D
Man and his well-being.
 
 

Benedict de Spinoza
 
 
  HISTORY OF THE SHORT TREATISE

Notes - Table of Contents

Glossary and Index - Spinozistic Ideas - Mark Twain and Spinoza
 
 





Notes by JBY:

1.  The text was taken from Book XXII. Page Numbers given below (except for the      Commentaries from Book XXIII) refer to Bk. XXII. The frontispiece of the book is shown      below. The translation of the ST was by Dr. A Wolf. I conjecture that Runes heavily edited      Wolf's translation for it differs (briefer and rearranged) from the version given in Note 2.      Compare Runes' and Wolf's "Tables of Contents."  

     I express my appreciation to Philosophical Library, Inc., who published "The Book of God" 
     in 1958. I have not been able to find them to ask for permission to scan the book. 
     I assume it is in the public domain. 
 
2.  For the full version of Dr. A. Wolf's Short Treatise translation, see Terry Neff's Web Site. 
     Dr. Wolf's translation was published in 1910 in Book XXIII. 
     Dr. Wolf's Commentaries from Book XXIII are given herein. 
     Dr. Wolf's Introduction to Book XXIII is given here.  

     For a translation and commentary of the Short Treatise by Edwin Curley see Bk.VIII:46.  

     These translations more closely follow the Spinoza's Latin manuscript of 
     "Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being" than that in Note 1. 
 
3.Symbols:


4.  I have made the following changes in Dr. Wolf's spellings (not consistently) of God to reflect, in my opinion, Spinoza's 1D6; his working hypothesis of G-D:  
          god(s) Polytheistic; Pagan, Idolatry, Myth.  
          God     Monotheistic; Judaeo-Christian-Islamic, Anthropomorphic, Transcendent God.  
             Durant5                     Re-interpret all anthropomorphisms in accordance with TTP1:3:13. 
          G-D or G-d
Monotheistic; Spinoza's Immanent, Indwelling G-D/Nature.      Durant
           
 ^ spelling ^ not consistently                                      James Hall:51 
          'G-D' and 'Nature' are interchangeable. Deus sive Natura. Term G-D.       Spinoza's Religion
           
'G-d' and 'nature' are interchangeable.      Pantheism 

The above stages show the constant evolution of Religion's hypotheses. G-D is a synthesis of god(s) and God. See Dialectics and Holidays.  

Paradoxically, Spinoza's G-D has much in common with the Pagan gods. Spinoza treats all things as Holy and as organically interdependent; whereas the Pagan treats things as independent separates--standing alone. The cash value of Spinoza's hypothesis of 'G-D' is that it establishes the logic for the Golden Rule. See Analogy. 

     The importance of Spinoza's hypothesis 'G-D' is that it posits all as one interdependent 
     organism and gives the logic for the Golden Rule. See Analogy.  


5.  Make my following emendations throughout the Work: 
          soul, [vital] spirits           change to         mind, thought, life, or consciousness. 
         
 
6.   Partake of the Work (and my comments) as you would a pomegranaterelish 
      the flesh and spit-out the pits—things out-of-date; things you disagree with; and 
      things incomprehensible.  

7.   For less commentary and a format suitable for e-book conversion see the Essay. 
 
 
 
 




Copyright, 1958, by Philosophical Library, Inc., 15 East 40th
Street, New York 16, N. Y. The present edition is
based on the text Spinoza's Short Treatise on God, Man
and His Well-Being, translated by Dr. A. Wolf from the
Dutch Korte Verhandeling van God, den Mensch,
en deszelfs Welstand. Revisions were made, consulting both
available Dutch versions. The Wolf text was originally pub-
lished in 1910 by Adam and Charles Black, of London.

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be
reprinted without written authorization.
 
 
 



{Runes'} Table of Contents {of Book XXII} {Compare with Wolf's}  

Chapter   i.   IntroductionWord to the Reader 
Chapter  1.  G-D Exists 
Chapter  2.  On Divine Providence 
Chapter  3.  On Natura Naturans 
Chapter  4.  On Natura Naturata 
Chapter  5.  What Good and Evil Are 
Chapter  6.  G-D and Man 
Chapter  7.  On Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge 
Chapter  8.  On Passion 
Chapter  9.  The Good in Man 
Chapter 10.  On Love 
Chapter 11.  On Hate 
Chapter 12.  On Joy and Sorrow 
Chapter 13.  On Esteem and Contempt, Etc. 
Chapter 14.  On Hope and Fear 
Chapter 15.  On Remorse and Repentance 
Chapter 16.  On Derision and Jesting 
Chapter 17.  On Glory and Shame 
Chapter 18.  On Gratitude 
Chapter 19.  On Grief 
Chapter 20.  On the True and the False 
Chapter 21.  On the Will 
Chapter 22.  On Will and Desire 
Chapter 23.  On Our Happiness 
Chapter 24.  On Reason 
Chapter 25.  On True Knowledge 
Chapter 26.  On the Immortality of the Soul 
Chapter 27.  On G-D's Love of Man 
Chapter 28.  On Devils {Omitted in Bk. XXII; I have added it from Bk. XXIII. }
Chapter 29.  On True Freedom  

 



Page 1
Runes's Introduction—A Word to the Reader
 
 

[i-1]    OUR SAGES say that the good Lord devised a way of keeping

the  unprepared  from  entering terra sancta—He placed before it an

enticing  anteroom.  Thus,  astronomy  has  its  astrology; religion its              Idolatry

theology;    history    its   mythology;    mysticism    its    superstition;

philosophy  its  mathematical  byplay.
 
 

[i-2]    Many  of  the  casual  readers  of  Spinoza become so involved

with   his   geometrical   prolegomena   that   they   never  reach  the

wide-open   plains   of   the   grandiose   simplicity  of  his  thoughts.          Spinozistic Ideas
 
 

[i-3]    Spinoza's  use of the mathematical shield as well as the termin-

ology  of an already obsolete scholasticism was based on good and

valid  reasons.  While  he  was  shunned  by  some  of  the  fanatical

elements among his coreligionists, whom he never deserted, he was

also  incessantly  maligned  and  abused  by leaders of his Christian

contemporaries. Only an early death saved him from severe examin-

ation at their hands.
 
 

[i-4]    It  is not surprising to note Spinoza closing this page 2 little Book

on  G-D  with  an admonition to his student readers to exercise great       Mark Twain's "Little Story" 

caution in discussion of its theories.
 

                         *  *  *

[i-5]    Spinoza's  reputation  was  most  seriously  damaged during his

lifetime.  For  a  hundred years after his death Christian philosophers

as  well  as  theologians  reacted  to  "that  man  of  the  Hague" with

derogation or silence. The shining era of 18th century enlightenment

opened  its  heart  to  the forgotten recluse. As the decades went by,

and  reason succeeded in lifting the leaden curtains of prejudice and

superstition,  the  great  and very great began in increasing numbers

to  pay  homage  to  the  philosophers'  philosopher.  Spinoza  is con-

sidered  today  the  Philosopher  of Modern Times, as Aristotle stood

as the Philosopher of Antiquity.
 
 

[i-6]    Still,  Spinoza  is  the  best  known  and  least  read of the great

thinkers.

                            *  *  *

[i-7]    The  small  book  before us, rarely mentioned in early literature,
                                      {about 1858}
came  to light only a hundred years ago in two slightly varying Dutch

manuscripts  entitled:  Korte  Verhandeling  van  God,  den  Mensch,

en deszelfs Welstand [Short treatise of God, man, and his beatitude].

It  is  unevenly  written within the framework of a logico-mathematical

thesis,  through page 3 which, ever so often, breaks the benign light of

incomparable wisdom.
 

                           *   *   *

[i-8]    The  author  of  this  book, the young Spinoza, lived in turbulent

times.  Europe  was  torn  by  civil  and religious strife: church bullies,

bigots  and  pseudo-prophets vied for the ear of a fearful people, and

while  the  voices of reason were already audible, the crackling of the

burning faggots under the feet of whimpering victims was gruesomely

louder, no less among Protestants than among Catholics.
 

                           *   *   *

[i-9]    Spinoza's  youth  was  dedicated  to  study  of the Hebrew scrip-

tures—the Torah, Talmud, and Cabbalah. Preparing for a Rabbinical                 Important

career,  he  spent  his nights in the perusal of early wisdom literature,

but  in  the  days  following he was a horrified witness to the religious

savagery  of  his  period  with  all its bestial implements of torture and

auto-da-fé.
 
 

[i-10]    Priestly  pretensions  drove  him  from  the  dogmas; and man's

inhumanity  to  man,  from  society.  When  he  was  only  twenty-four,

he  withdrew  into himself. The condemnation by Jews and Christians                 Bk.XX:116ff.

was  a  natural  sequence  of  his  refusal  to  submit  to  either public

observance or at least silence.
 
 

[i-11]    The  heretic  they  expelled  was  a mere youth, but one whose

sagacity was a thorn in the side of a bigoted world.
 

Page 4
[i-12 ]    While  Europe  was  in  uproar  over  the right  church, Spinoza

was seeking for the right G-D.
 
 

[i-13]    The  book  before  us  is  the  first  known report of his findings.
 

                           *   *   *

[i-14]    They  called  him an atheist because he denied that G-D lived in

a church;  they  called him a pantheist because he claimed that ALL is              JBY added

in G-D;  they  called him Anti-Christ because he said G-D is indwelling                Logos
                                                                [i-14a]
either  in  all  men,  or  in none.  They painted ugly pictures of him and

named  him  only  in contempt—this was done not by the Jews, but by

the  Christians  of  his  days and after. All this because he preached a
                                          {organic interdependence}
sermon  that G-D be Love and man's love to man be the very same as             Golden Rule
                                                                          ^ need}
his  love  to  G-D;  a  displeasing  thought  indeed to the professionals

who  held  up  the  crucifix with the right hand and the rack-screw with

the left.

                           *   *   *

[i-15]    Spinoza's  message  is  not  new.  It  was  heard  by  the  men of

Abraham  and  the  men  of  Moses It was written out by the two great                  { Read "Gifts of

kings  of antiquity, David and Solomon. It is found in the teachings and                  the Jews" Pg. 156

legends  of  the  Talmudic sages;  it  is hidden like a buried treasure in                           and

the   dreamy symbolism  of  the  Cabbalah—it  is  the  essence  of  the             Jews, God and History }

testaments of all the prophets of all nations and times.
 

                           *   *   *

[i-16]    Spinoza  was  not  an  academic  philosopher;  he  was  page 5  a

teacher  as  well  as  writer  of  the people. His talks and theories were

circulated  among  scholars  and students for many decades and, with

one exception, were not published until after his death.
 
 

[i-17]    The  Book  of  G-D,  appearing like a draft for his later Ethics, is

a  Guide  for  the  Bewildered.  Those  who see in philosophy no more

than  an  intellectual  byplay in humanities will soon turn away, but the

serious  and  sincere who are imbued with the longing for a better and

freer life,  a  life  of  intuitive  beatitude, will find here a most rewarding

fountain of faith.


                                                                              Dagobert D. Runes
 
                                                                                                              1958 
 
 



Page 7 of Bk.XXII
Chapter 1 - G-D Exists                                                                                             P15

< As regards the first, namely, whether there is a G-D , this we say, can be proved.

*I.* In the first place, a priori (innate, born-with) thus:                                                                    P15, L5
 

[1-1]    WHATEVER  WE  clearly  and  distinctly  know  to  belong to the            P15, L6ff

nature  of  a  thing,  we  can also truly affirm of that thing. Now we can              P15, L7

know clearly and distinctly that existence belongs to the nature of G-D.
 

The  essence  of things are from all eternity, and unto all eternity shall               P15, L13

remain immutable.
 

The existence of G-D is essence.                                                                                       P15, L16
 
 

                           *   *   *

[1-2]    We  say  that  G-D is a being of whom all or infinite attributes are
   {posited}
predicated  of which attributes every one is infinitely perfect in its kind.

Now,  in  order  to  express  our views clearly, we shall premise the four

following propositions: 

Page 8
[1-3]    The  reasons  why  we  said  that all these attributes, which are in Nature,

are  but  one  single  being,  and by no means different things (although we can         analogy
                                                        {    for analysis only       }
know them clearly and distinctly the one without the other, and the other without

another), are these:

Page 9
[1-4]    From  all  that  we  have so far said it is evident, then, that we posit

extension  as an attribute of G-D; and this seems not at all appropriate to

a  perfect  being:  for since extension is divisible, the perfect being would

have  to  consist  of  parts,  and  this  is  altogether  inapplicable  to  G-D,            Inseparable  

because  He  is a simple being. Moreover, when extension is divided it is

passive,  and with G-D (who is never passive, and cannot be affected by

any  other being, because He is the first efficient cause of all) this can by

no means be the case.
 
 

[1-5]    To  this  we  reply:  (1)  that  "part"  and  "whole" are not true or real

entities,  but  only  "things of perception,''  and  consequently there are in

Nature  neither  whole  nor  parts. (2) A thing composed of different parts

must  be  such that the parts thereof, taken separately, can be conceived

and understood one without another. Take, for instance, a clock which is

composed  of  many  different wheels, cords, and other things; in it, I say,

each  wheel,  cord,  etc.,  can  be  conceived and understood separately,

without  the  composite  whole  being necessary thereto. Similarly also in

the  case  of  water, which consists of straight oblong particles, each part

thereof  can  be  conceived  and  understood,  and  can  exist without the

whole;  but  extension, being a substance, one cannot say of it that it has

parts,  since  it  can  neither  diminish  nor increase, and no parts thereof

can  be  understood  apart,  because by its nature it must be infinite. And

that  it page 10  must  be  such, follows from this, namely, because if it were

not such, but consisted of parts, then it would not be infinite by its nature,

as  it  is  said  to  be;  and  it  is impossible to conceive parts in an infinite

nature,  since  by  their  nature  all  parts  are  finite.  Add  to  this still: if it

consisted  of  different  parts  then  it should be intelligible that supposing
                                         [destroyed]
some parts thereof to be annihilated, extension might remain all the same,

and  not be annihilated together with the annihilation of some of its parts;

this  is  clearly  contradictory  in what is infinite by its own nature and can

never  be,  or  be  conceived,  as  limited or finite. Further, as regards the

parts  in Nature, we maintain that division, as has also been said already

before,  never takes place in substance, but always and only in the mode

of  substance. Thus,  if  I  want  to  divide water, I only divide the mode of

substance,  and  not  substance  itself.  And  whether this mode is that of

water or something else it is always the same.
 
 

[1-6]    Division,  then,  or  passivity,  always takes place in the mode; thus

when  we  say  that man passes away or is annihilated, then this is under

stood  to  apply  to  man  only  in  so far as he is such a composite being,

and  a  mode of substance, and not the substance on which he depends.
 
 

[1-7]    Moreover,  we  have  already  stated,  and  we  shall  repeat it later,

that  outside  G-D  there  is  nothing  at  all,  and  that He is an Immanent
                                                                                            [one acted on]
Cause.   Now,   passivity,   whenever  the  agent  and  the  passivum  are

different page 11  entities, is a palpable imperfection, because the passivum

must  necessarily  be  dependent  on that which has caused the passivity

from  outside;  it  has,  therefore, no place in G-D, who is perfect. Further-

more,  of  such  an  agent who acts in himself it can never be said that he
                                                  [one acted on]
has  the  imperfection  of  a  passivum,  because he is not affected by an-

other;  such,  for  instance,  is the case with the understanding, which, as

the philosophers also assert, is the cause of its ideas.  Since, however, it

is  an  immanent  cause,  what  right,  has  one  to  say that it is imperfect,

howsoever  frequently  it  is  affected by itself? Lastly, since substance is

[the cause]  and the origin of all its modes, it may with far greater right be

called  acting  than  passive.  And  with  these  remarks  we  consider  all

adequately answered.
 
 

[1-8]    It  is  further  objected,  that  there  must necessarily be a first cause

which  sets  body  in motion, because when at rest it is impossible for it to

set  itself  in  motion.  And  since it is clearly manifest that rest and motion

exist  in  Nature,  these  must, they think, necessarily result from an exter-

nal  cause.  But  it  is  easy  for  us to reply, to this; for we concede that if

body  were  a  thing  existing  through  itself,  and  had no other attributes

than  length, breadth, and depth, then, if it really rested there would be in

it  no  cause  whereby to begin to move itself; but we have already stated

before  that  Nature is a being of which all attributes are predicated, and

this  being  so,  it  can  be page 12  lacking in nothing wherewith to produce

all that there is to be produced.
 
 

[1-9]    Having  so far discussed what G-D is, we shall say but a word, as it

were,  about  His  attributes:  that those which are known to us consist of

two  only,  namely,  Thought  and  Extension;  for  here  we speak only of

attributes  which  might  be  called  the  proper  attributes of G-D, through

which we come to know Him [as He is] in Himself, and not [merely] as He

acts  [towards things]  outside  Himself. All else, then, that men ascribe to

G-D beyond these two at tributes,  all that (if it otherwise pertains to Him)

must  be  either  an  "extraneous denomination,"  such  as  that He exists

through Himself, is Eternal, One, Immutable, etc., or, I say, has reference

to  His  activity,  such  as  that  He  is  a cause, predestines, and rules all

things:  all  which  are  properties of G-D, but give us no information as to

what He is.
 
 

[1-10]   G-D  is  a  being  of  whom  all attributes are predicated; whence it

clearly  follows  that  all  other  things  can  by no means be, or be under-

stood,  apart  from or outside Him. Wherefore we may say with all reason

that G-D is a cause of all things.
 
 

[1-11]    That  G-D  alone  is  the only free cause is clear not only from what

has  just  been  said,  but  also from this, namely, that there is no external

cause  outside  Him  to force or constrain Him; all this is not the case with

created things.
 
 
 



Page 13
Chapter 2 - On Divine Providence
 

[2-1]   PROVIDENCE  IS nothing else than the striving which we find in the              P47, L4-6

whole  of  Nature  and  in  individual things to maintain and preserve their            self-interest

own  existence.  For  it  is  manifest  that  no  thing could, through its own

nature,  seek  its  own  annihilation,  but, on the contrary, that every thing
                                                                        {if rational}
has  in  itself  a striving  to preserve its condition ^ ,  and to improve itself.

Following  these  definitions  of  ours we, therefore, posit a general and a

special  providence.  The  general  [providence] is that through which all

things  are  produced  and  sustained  in  so  far  as  they are parts of the

whole  of  Nature.  The  special  providence  is  the striving of each thing

separately  to  preserve  its  existence  [each  thing,  that  is  to say], con-

sidered  not  as  a  part  of  Nature,  but  as  a  whole  [by  itself].  This  is

explained  by  the  following  example:  All  the  limbs of man are provided

for,  and  cared  for,  in  so  far  as  they  are parts of man, this is general              analogy

providence;  while  special  [providence]  is  the striving of each separate

limb  (as  a  whole  in  itself,  and  not  as  a  part of man) to preserve and

maintain its own well-being.

[2-3]    Against all this others object:  how is it possible that God, who is

said  to  be  supremely perfect, and the sole cause, disposer, and pro-

vider of  all,  nevertheless  permits  such  confusion to  be seen every-

where  in  Nature?  Also,  why  has  He not made man so as not to be

able to sin?
 
 

[2-4]    Now,  in the first place, it cannot be rightly said that there is con-

fusion in Nature, since nobody knows all the causes of things so as to

be  able  to  judge  accordingly.  This objection, however, originates in

this  kind  of  ignorance,  namely,  that they have set up general Ideas,

with  which,  they  think,  particular  things must agree if they are to be

perfect.  These  Ideas, they state, are in the understanding of G-D, as

many  of Plato's followers have said, namely, that these general Ideas

(such  as  Rational,  Animal,  and  the like) have been created by G-D;             P50, L14ff

and  although  those who follow Aristotle say, indeed, that these things

are  not  real  things, only things of the mind, they nevertheless regard

them  frequently  as  [real] things, since they have clearly said that His

providence  does  not  extend to particular things, but only to kinds; for
                                                                                      {Alexander's horse}
example,  G-d  has  never  exercised His providence over Bucephalus,              P50, L21-27

etc.,  but  only  over  page 15  the whole genus Horse. They say also that
                                                                   [corruptible]
G-D  has  no  knowledge  of particular and transient things, but only of

the  general,  which,  in their opinion, are imperishable. We have, how-

ever,  rightly  considered this to be due to their ignorance. For it is pre-

cisely the particular things, and they alone, that have a cause, and not

the general, because they are nothing.
 
 

[2-5]    G-D  then  is the cause of, and providence over, particular things

only.  If  particular  things  had  to  conform  to some other Nature, then

they  could  not  conform  to  their own, and consequently could not be

what  they  truly  are.  For example, if G-D had made all human beings

like  Adam  before  the  fall,  then  indeed  He would only have created

Adam,  and  no  Paul  or  Peter; but no, it is just perfection in G-D, that

He gives to all things, from the greatest to the least,  their essence, or,

to   express   it   better,   that  He  has  all  things  perfectly  in  himself.
 
 

[2-6]    As  regards  the  other  [objection],  why G-D has not made man-

kind  so  that  they  should  not sin, to this it may serve [as an answer],
                                                                                {our own data base}
that  whatever  is  said  about sin is only said with reference to us, that

is,  as  when  we compare two things with each other, or [consider one

thing]  from  different  points  of  view.  For  instance,  if  some one has

made  a  clock  precisely  in order to strike and to show the hours, and

the mechanism quite fulfills the aims of its maker, then we say that it is

good,  but  if  it  does  not  do  so,  then  we  say that it is bad, notwith-

standing that even then  page 16  it might still be good if only it had been

His   intention   to   make   it  irregular  and  to  strike  at  wrong  times.
 
 

[2-7]    We  say  then,  in  conclusion,  that Peter must, as is necessary,

conform  to  the  Idea  of  Peter,  and not to the Idea of Man; good and

evil,  or  sin,  these  are only modes of thought, and by no means real,

or  any  thing  that  has  reality,  as  we shall very likely show yet more

fully  in  what follows. For all things and works which are in Nature are

perfect.
 
 
 




Page 17   
Chapter 3 - On Natura Naturans                                                       Deus sive Natura
                                                                                                                                                          G-D
 

[3-1]    WE  SHALL  briefly  divide  the  whole  of  Nature—namely,  into                P56

Natura Naturans  and  Natura naturata. By Natura Naturans we under-             1P29n

stand  a  being  that  we  conceive clearly and distinctly through itself,

and without needing anything beside itself (like all the attributes which  

we have so far described), that is, G-D.
 
 

[3-2]    The Natura  naturata  we shall divide into two, a general, and a               P56, L12ff

particular.  The general consists of all attributes which depend immed-

iately  on  G-D,  of  which  we  shall  treat  in the following chapter; the

particular  consists  of  all  the particular things which are produced by

the   general   mode.   So   that   the  Natura  naturata  requires  some

substance in order to be well understood.
 
 
 




Page 19
Chapter 4 - On Natura Naturata                                                                          G-d 
 
 

[4-1]    Now,  as  regards  the  general  Natura  naturata,  or  attributes,  or

creations  which  depend  on, or have been created by, G-D immediately,
                                                                             {body-extension}
of  these  we  know  no more than two, namely, motion in matter, and the
       {thought}
understanding in the thinking thing. These, then, we say, have been from

all eternity and to all eternity will remain immutable. A work truly as great

as becomes the greatness of the work's master.
 
 

[4-2]    All that specially concerns Motion, such as that it has been from all

eternity,  and  to all eternity will remain immutable; that it is infinite in its           P57, L21

kind;  that  it can neither be, nor be understood through itself, but only by

means   of  Extension,—all  this,  I  say,  since  it  [Motion]  more  properly

belongs  to  a  treatise  on Natural Science rather than here, we shall not

consider  in  this place, but we shall only say this about it, that it is a Son,

Product, or Effect created immediately by G-D.
 
 

[4-3]    As  regards  the  Understanding  in  the  thinking thing, this, like the
{Motion}  
first,    is    also   a Son,  Product,  or  immediate  Creation  of  G-D,  also
          P57, L18, 20

created  by   Him  page 20  from  all  eternity, and remaining immutable to all

eternity.  It  has   but  one  function,  namely,  to  understand  clearly  and

 distinctly all things  at  all  times;  which produces invariably an infinite or

most   perfect   satisfaction,    which   cannot   omit   to  do  what  it  does.        Endnote 2P49.0a
 
 
 



Page 21
Chapter 5 - What Good and Evil Are
 

[5-1]    SOME THINGS are in our understanding and not in Nature, and so

they  are  also  only our own creation, and their purpose is to understand

things  distinctly:  among these we include all relations, which have refer-
                                                                                                      [beings of
ence  to  different  things,  and  these  we  call  Entia  Rationis  [things of
  reason]
thought].  Now  the  question  is,  whether  good  and  evil  belong  to the

Entia  Rationis  or  to  the  Entia Realia [real things]. But since good and

evil are only relations, it is beyond doubt that they must be placed among

the  Entia Rationis;  for  we never say that something is good except with
 [respects]
reference  to  something  else  which is not so good, or is not so useful to

us  as  some  other thing. Thus we say that a man is bad, only in compar-

ison  with  one  who  is better, or also that an apple is bad, in comparison

with another which is good or better.
 
 

[5-2]    All  this could not possibly be said, if that which is better or good, in

comparison with which it [the bad] is so called, did not exist.
 
 

[5-3]    Therefore, when we say that something is good, we only mean that
                                       [universal]
it  conforms  well  to  the general Idea which we have of such things. But,

as  we  have  already said before, the things must agree with their  page 22
                                        [being]
particular Ideas, whose essence must be a perfect essence, and not with

the general [Ideas], since in that case they would not exist.
 
 

[5-4]    As to confirming what we have just said, the thing is dear to us; but

still, to conclude our remarks, we will add yet the following proofs:
 
 

[5-5]    All  things  which  are  in  Nature,  are either things or actions. Now
 {Subjective Terms}
good and evil  are neither things nor actions.  Therefore good and evil do 

not exist in Nature.
 
 
                                                       Objective Terms  }
[5-6]    For,  if  good  and  evil  are  things  or actions,  then they must have

their  definitions.  But  good  and  evil  (as,  for example,  the goodness of

Peter  and  the  wickedness  of Judas)  have no definitions apart from the
[particular]
^
 essence of Judas or Peter, because this alone exists in Nature, and they

cannot be defined without their essence.  Therefore, as above—it follows
                                                                               [are]
that good and evil are not things or actions which exist in Nature.
 
 
 



Page 23 of Book xxii
Chapter 6 - G-D and Man.
 

[6-1]    HAVING,  in  the  first part, discoursed on G-D and on the universal

and infinite things, we shall proceed now, in the second part, to the treat-

ment  of  particular  and  finite  things;  though  not  of  all,  since they are

innumerable,  but we shall only treat of those which concern man; and, in

the  first  place,  we  shall consider here what man is, in so far as he con-

sists  of  certain modes (contained in the two attributes, things and ideas,

which  we  have  remarked  in  G-D).  I  say  of  certain modes, for I by no

means think that man, in so far as he consists of spirit, soul, or body, is a
   {he is but a mode of substance}
real  substance.  Because,  already  at  the  beginning  of  this  book, we

proved  (1)  that  no  real  substance  can  have  a beginning; (2) that one

substance  cannot  produce  another;  and lastly (3), that there cannot be

two like substances.
 
 

[6-2]    As  man has not been in existence from eternity, is finite, and is like

many  men,  he  can  be  no  real  substance;  so  that  all  that he has of

thought are only modes of the attribute thought which we have attributed

to  G-D.  And, again, all that he has of form, motion, and other things, are

likewise [modes] of the other attribute which is attributed by us to G-D.
 
 

[6-3]    And although from this, [namely,] that the nature of man can neither

be,  nor  be  understood without the page 24  attributes which we ourselves

admit to constitute substance, some try to prove that man is a substance,

yet this has no other ground than false supposition. For, since the nature

of matter or body existed before the form of this human body existed, that

nature  cannot  be  peculiar  to  the  human  body, because it is clear that

during the time when man was not,  it could never belong to the nature of

man.
 
 

[6-4]    And what they set up as a fundamental principle, [namely,] that that

pertains  to  the nature of a thing, without which the thing can neither be,

nor  be  understood,  we  deny.  For  we have already shown that without

G-D  no  thing can be or be understood. That is, G-D must first be and be

understood before these particular things can be and be understood.  We

have also shown that genera do not belong to the nature of definition, but

that  only  such  things  as  cannot  exist  without  others,  can also not be

understood  without  these.  This  being  so,  what  kind of a rule shall we,

then,  state,  whereby  it  shall  be  known what belongs to the nature of a

thing?
 
 

[6-5]    Well,  the  rule is this: That belongs to the nature of a thing, without

which  the  thing  can  neither be, nor be understood; not merely so, how-            P66, L1- 5

ever,  but in such wise that the judgment must be convertible, that is, that

the  predicate  can  neither  be,  nor  be  understood without the thing. Of

these  modes,  then,  of which man consists, we shall begin to treat at the

commencement of the following first chapter.
 
 
 



Page 25                           {Imagination}    {Reason}                  {Intuition}                        In the Ethics
Chapter 7 - On Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge.
                                                                                                   [Science] {hypothesis}
 

[7-1]    To  BEGIN  our  consideration  of the modes of which man consists,

we shall state (1) what they are, (2) their effects, and (3) their cause.
 
 

[7-2]    As  regards  the  first, let us begin with those that are first known to
                           [ perceptions ]
us: namely, certain ideas or the consciousness of the knowledge of our-              P67, L7f

selves, and of the things which are outside us.

                                                                                                                                                        P67, L10ff
[7-3]
    Now  we  get  these  ideas  (1)  either  merely through belief (which             P67, L11  
                                                                         { Imagination }                                  
belief  arises  either  from  experience,  or  from  hearsay),  (2)  or,  in the              P67, L13
                                                                     Reason  }
second place, we acquire them by way of a true belief,  (3) or, thirdly, we              P67, L14
                                            {               Intuition               }
have them as the result of clear and distinct conception.                                    
 
 

[7-4]    The first is commonly subject to error.                                                                          2P41             
 
 

[7-5]    The  second  and  third,  however,  although  they  differ  from  one  

another, cannot err.
 
 

[7-6]    To  make  all  this  somewhat clearer and more intelligible, we shall

give the following illustration taken from the Rule of Three.
 
 

[7-7]    Someone  has  just  heard  it  said  that if, in the Rule of Three, the

second  number  is multiplied by the third, and then divided by the first, a

fourth  number  will  then  be obtained which has the same relation to the

third  as  the  second  has  to  the  first.  And  notwithstanding  page 26   the

possibility  that  he who put this before him might have been lying, he still

made   his   calculations   accordingly,   and   he  did  so  without  having

acquired any more knowledge of the Rule of Three than a blind man has

of color,  so that whatever he may have said about it, he simply repeated

as a parrot repeats what it has been taught.
 
 

[7-8]    Another, having a more active intelligence, is not so easily satisfied

with mere hearsay, but tests it by some actual calculations, and when he

find  they  agree  with it, then he gives credence to it. But we have rightly

said  that  this  one  also  is  subject  to  error; for how can he possibly be

sure  that  his  experience of a few particulars can serve him as a rule for

all?
 
 

[7-9]    A  third,  who is not satisfied with hearsay, because it may deceive,

nor  with  experience  of  a  few particulars, because this cannot possibly

serve  as  a  rule,  examines  it  in  the  light of true Reason, which, when

properly applied, has never deceived. This then tells him that on account
          [ property ]
of  the  nature  of  the  proportion  in  these  numbers it had to be so, and

could not happen otherwise.
 
 

[7-10]    A  fourth,  however,  having  the clearest knowledge of all, has no

need  of  hearsay, or experience, or the art of reasoning, because by his
                                                                        [ calculations ]
penetration he sees the proportion in all such cogitations intuitively.                     E2:XL(24)
 
 

[7-11]    We  come  now  to  the consideration of the effects of the different
                                                                                            [ paragraph ]
grades  of  knowledge, of which we spoke in the preceding chapter, and,

in  passing  as it  were,  page 27 we shall explain what Opinion, Belief, and

clear Knowledge are.
 

                                                                                {Imagination}
[7-12]    The  first  [kind of knowledge],  then,  we call Opinion, the second
{Reason}                                                 {Intuition}
Belief, but the third is what we call clear Knowledge.
 

                          {Imagination}
[7-13]    We  call it Opinion because it is subject to error, and has no place

when we are sure of anything,  but only in those cases when we are said
                           [speculate]                                {Reason}
to  guess  and to surmise. The second we call Belief, because the things
            [grasp]
we  apprehend  only  with  our  reason  are  not  seen by us, but are only
                                                                         [intellect]
known  to  us  through the conviction of our understanding that it must be
                                                                       {Intuition}
so  and  not  otherwise.  But  we  call that clear Knowledge which comes,
                                                                                        [being aware of]
not  from  our  being  convinced  by  reasons,  but  from  our  feeling  and

enjoying the thing itself, and it surpasses the others by far.                                   Posit Deus
 
 

[7-14]    After  these preliminary remarks let us now turn to their effects. Of
                                                        {Imagination}
these  we  say  this, namely, that from the first proceed all the "passions"             Elwes[59]
                                                                   {
Reason}
which  are  opposed  to good reason; from the second, the good desires;                P69, L22ff
                  {Intuition}               [genuine] {Understanding}
and from the third, true and sincere Love, with all its offshoots.
 

                                             {lack of}
[7-15]    We  thus  maintain that ^ Knowledge  is  the proximate cause of all                P69, L26ff

the  "passions" in the soul. For we consider it once for all impossible that

anyone,  who  neither thinks nor knows in any of the preceding ways and
                                                                                 [moved]
manners,  should  be  capable  of  being  incited to Love or Desire or any
              [modes of will]
other mode of emotion.
 
 
 



Page 29
Chapter 8 - On Passion.
 

[8-1]   HERE,  THEN,  let  us  see  how,  as  we  have  said,  the passions              Elwes
                                {
Imagination}
derive  their  origin from opinion. To do this well and intelligently we shall                    P70

take  some  special  ones,  and  prove  what  we  say  by  using these as

illustration.
 
 
                    [Wonder]
[8-2]   Let  Surprise,  then,  be  the first. This is found in one who knows a                P70, L8ff
                              {         Imagination         }
thing  after  the  first  manner [of knowledge]; for, since from a few partic-
                                                                                         [astonished]
ulars he draws a conclusion which is general, he stands surprised when-

ever  he  sees  anything  that  goes against his conclusion; like one who,

having  never  seen any sheep except with short tails, is surprised at the

sheep  from Morocco which have long ones. So it is related of a peasant
                        [deluded]
that  he  had  persuaded  himself  that  beyond  his  fields  there were no

others,  but  when he happened to miss a cow, and was compelled to go

and look for her far away, he was surprised at the great number of fields

that there were beyond his few acres.  And, to be sure, this must also be

the   case  with  many  Philosophers  who  have  persuaded  themselves

beyond  this  field  or  little  globe,  on  which they are, there are no more
                                                                                   [wonder]
[worlds]  (because they have seen no others).  But  surprise  is never felt

by him who draws true inferences. This is the first.
 
 

Page 30                           {of G-D}
[8-3]    The  second  is  Love.  Since  this  arises either from true ideas, or                  posit

from  opinions,  or,  lastly,  from  hearsay  only,  we  shall  see  first  how

[it arises]  from  opinion, then how [it arises] from [true] ideas; for the first
                                                                                    [salvation]
tends  to  our  ruin,  and the second to our supreme happiness; and then

[we shall see how it arises] from the last.
 
 

[8-4]   As  regards  the  first,  it  is  certain  that  whenever anyone sees, or

thinks  he  sees,  something  good,  he is always inclined to unite himself

with  it,  and,  for  the  sake  of  the  good  which  he  discerns therein, he

chooses  it  as  the  best,  outside which he then knows nothing better or

more  agreeable.  Yet  if  ever  it  happens  (as  it  mostly does happen in        Life's roller-coaster 

these  things)  that  he  gets  to  know  something better than this good at

present  known  to  him,  then his love changes immediately from the one

(first)  to  the other (second). All this we shall show more clearly when we

treat of the freedom of man.
 
 

[8-5]  As  to  love  from true ideas, since this is not the place to speak of it,

we  shall  pass  it  over now, and speak of the third, and last, namely, the

Love  that  comes  from  hearsay  only.  This we generally observe in the

attitude of children to their father: because their father tells them that this

or  that  is  good  they  incline  towards it, without knowing anything more

about  it.  We  see  it  also  in those who from Love give their lives for the

Fatherland,  and  also in those who from hearsay about some thing fall in

love with it.
 

Page 31
[8-6]   Next,  Hatred, the exact opposite of Love, arises from error which is

the  outcome  of opinion. For when someone has come to the conclusion

that  a certain thing is good, and another happens to do something to the

detriment of the same thing, then there arises in him a hatred against the

one  who  did  it,  and  this,  as  we  shall explain afterwards, could never

happen  if  the  true  good  were  known. For, in comparison with the true

good,  all  indeed  that  is,  or  is  conceived,  is naught but wretchedness

itself;  and  is  not such a lover of what is wretched much more deserving

of pity than of hatred?
 
 

[8-7]   Hatred,  lastly,  comes  also  from mere hearsay, as we see it in the

Moslems  against Jews and Christians, in the Jews against the Moslems

and  Christians,  in  the  Christians against  the  Jews and Moslems, etc.

For,  among  all  these,  how  ignorant is the one multitude of the religion
      [customs]
and morals of the others!
 
 
                                                                                                       [appetite]
[8-8]   Desire.  Whether  (as some will have it)  it consists only in a longing                 P73, L4

or inclination to obtain what is wanting, or (as others will have it) to retain

the  things  which we already enjoy, it is certain that it cannot be found to

have  come  upon  any  one  except  for  an apparent good. It is therefore

clear  that  Desire, as also Love which we have already discussed, is the

outcome  of  the  first  kind  of knowledge. For if anyone has heard that a

certain  thing  is good, he feels a longing and inclination for the same, as

may  be  seen  in  the  case of an invalid who, through hearing page 32  the

doctor  say  that  such  or  such a remedy is good for his ailment, at once

longs for the same, and feels a desire for it.
 
 

[8-9]   Desire  arises also from experience, as may be seen in the practice

of  doctors,  who  when  they  have found a certain remedy good several

times are wont to regard it as something unfailing.
 
 

[8-10]   All that we have just said of these, the same we can say of all other

passions, as is clear to everyone. And as, in what follows, we shall begin

to inquire which of them are rational, and which of them are irrational, we

shall leave the subject now, and say no more about it.
 
 

[8-11]   What  has  now  been  said  of  these  few  though  most  important

[passions]  can  also  be  said of all others; and with this we conclude the

subject of the Passions which arise from Opinion.
 
 
 



Page 33
Chapter 9 - The Good in Man
 

[9-1]   SINCE WE have shown in the preceding chapter how the Passions

arise from the error of Opinion, let us now see here the effects of the two
              [ways]
other  modes  of  Knowing.  And  first  of  all, [the effect] of what we have
             {Reason}
called True Belief.
 
 

[9-2]   This  shows  us,  indeed,  what  a  thing  ought to be, but not what it               P74, L9f

really  is.  And  this is the reason why it can never unite us with the object

of  our  belief.  I  say, then, that it only teaches us what the thing ought to

be, and not what it is; between these two there is a great difference. For,

as  we  remarked  with  reference  to  the example taken from the Rule of

Three,  when  anyone  can, by the aid of proportion, find a fourth number

that shall be related to the third as the second is to the first, then (having

used  division  and  multiplication) he can say that the four numbers must

be proportional;  and although that is so, he speaks of it none the less as
                              [outside]
of  a  thing  that is beyond him. But when he comes to see the proportion

in  the  way  which  we  have  shown  in the fourth example, then he says

with  truth  that  the  thing is so, because then it is in him and not beyond

him. Let this suffice as regards the first [effect].
 

Page 34
[9-3]   The  second  effect  of  true  belief  is  that  it  brings  us to a clearer

understanding,  through  which  we  love G-D, and thus it makes us intel-
                                                                                    {objective}
lectually aware of the things which are not in us, but outside us.
 
 
                                                                                                                  {Subjective Terms}
[9-4]   The  third  effect  is, that it gives us the knowledge of good and evil,

and  shows  us  all the passions which should be suppressed. And as we

have  already  said  that the passions which come from opinion are liable

to  great  evil, it is worth the pains to see how these also are sifted out by

this  second  kind  of  knowledge,  so  that  we may see what is good and

what is bad in them.
 
 

[9-5]   To  do  so  conveniently,  let  us, using the same method as before,

look  at  them  closely,  so  that  we  may  know  through it which of them

should  be  chosen and which rejected. But, before proceeding to this, let

us first state briefly what is the good and evil of man.
 
 

[9-6]   We  have  already  said  before  that all things are necessarily what              P75, L23ff

they  are,  and  that in Nature there is no good and no evil. So that what-

ever  we  want  man to be [in this respect] must refer to his kind, which is

nothing else than a thing of thought. And when we have conceived in our

mind  an Idea of a perfect man, it should make us look (when we examine
                                                                                                       
 {°P}
ourselves)  to
 see whether we any means of attaining to such perfection.
 

                                                {°JOY}
[9-7]   Hence,  then,  whatever  advances  us  towards  perfection, we call
                                                                {°SORROW}
good,  and,  on  the  contrary, what  page 35 hinders, or also what does not

advance us toward it, bad.
 
 

[9-8]   I  must  therefore,  I  say,  conceive  a perfect man, if I want to assert

anything  concerning  the  good and evil of man, because if I were to con-

sider  the  good  and  evil  of  some  individual  man,  say,  e.g., of  Adam,

I  should be confusing a real thing with a thing of imagination, which must

be  most  scrupulously  avoided  by  an upright  Philosopher,  for reasons

which we shall state in the sequel, or on another occasion.  Furthermore,

since  the  destiny  of  Adam,  or  of  any  other  individual creature, is not

known to us except through the result,  so it follows that what we can say

even  of  the  destiny of man must be based on the idea which our under-

standing  forms  of  a  perfect  man,  which  destiny,  since  it is a thing of
           {and not necessarily real}
Reason ^, we may well know; so also, as already remarked, are good and
                             {subjective}
evil, which are only modes of thinking.
 
 

[9-9]   To come gradually to the point: We have already pointed out before
                 [emotions]
how  the  movement, passions, and activities of the soul arise from ideas,

and these ideas we have divided into four kinds, namely, [according they
                         {                Imagination,                reason,         intuition.     }                     In the Ethics 
are  based  on]  mere  hearsay,  experience, belief, clear knowledge. And

from  what  we  have now seen of the effects of all these, it is evident that

the fourth, namely, clear knowledge, is the most perfect of all. For opinion

often  leads us into error. True belief is good only because it is the way to
                                                                                                   {useful}                  Pragmatism 
true  knowledge,  and  awakens  us  to things which are really lovable. So               P76, L26ff 

that  the  final  end  that  we seek, and page 36  the highest that we know, is

true knowledge. But even this true knowledge varies with the objects that

come  before  it:  the  better  the  object  is  with which it happens to unite

itself,  so  much the better also is this knowledge. And, for this reason, he

is  the  most  perfect man who is united with G-D (who is the most perfect
                                {achieves PcM}
being of all), and so enjoys Him.
 
 
                                                                                                    [Passions]
[9-10]   Now,  in  order  to  find  out  what  is good and bad in the affects or

passions,  let  us,  as  suggested,  take them one by one.  [And first, Wonder.

Because  this  arises  either  from  ignorance  or  from prejudice, it is an imperfection in the

man who is subject to this emotion. I say imperfection, because Wonder through itself does

not lead to any evil. ]
 
 
 



Page 37
Chapter 10 - On Love                                                                                                        P78

                                                                                {need}                                        Organic
[10-1]   LOVE,  WHICH  is  nothing  else than the enjoyment of a thing and

union  therewith,  we  shall  divide  according to the qualities of its object;

the  object,  that  is,  which man seeks to enjoy, and to unite himself with.
 
 
                                                                      [corruptible]
[10-2]   Now  some objects are in themselves transient; others, indeed, are

not  transient  by  virtue  of their cause. There is yet a third that is eternal              Deus

and imperishable through its own power and might.
 
 
                                                           {modes
[10-3]   The  transient  are  all the particular things which did not exist from

all time, or have had a beginning.
 
 

[10-4]   The  others  are  all  those  modes  which we have stated to be the

cause of the particular modes.
 
 

[10-5]   But  the  third  is  G-D,  or,  what  we  regard as one and the same,         Deus sive Natura

Truth.                                                                                                                                                  P78, L15f

 

[10-6]   Love,  then,  arises from the idea and knowledge that we have of a           P78, L17f
                                                                                                       {useful}
thing;  and according as the thing shows itself greater and more glorious,

so also is our love greater.



[10-7]   In  two  ways  it  is  possible  to  free  ourselves from love: either by              P78, L20ff

getting to know something better, or by discovering that the loved object,

which  is held by us to be something great and glorious, brings in its train            AA Creed
        [
misery]
much woe and disaster.
 

Page 38
[10-8]   It  is  also characteristic of love that we never think of emancipating

ourselves  from  it  (as from surprise and other passions); and this for the
                                            {because there is no free will}
following  two  reasons:  (1)  because  it  is  impossible,  (2)  because it is           Mark Twain
                 [
i.e., we are not free.]
necessary that we should not be released from the same.
 
 

[10-9]   It  is  impossible  because it does not depend on us, but only on the
   {                  what is in our data base                   }
good and useful which we discern in the object; it is necessary that these

should  never  have  become  known  to us, if we would not or should not

love it;  and this is not a matter of our free choice, or dependent on us, for

if we knew nothing, it is certain that we should also be nothing.
 
 
                                                                              [free]
[10-10]   It  is  necessary  that  we should not be released from it, because,             P79, L8ff 

owing to the weakness of our nature, we could not exist without enjoying
                           {      for example; our food        }
something  with  which  we  become  united,  and  from  which  we  draw

strength.
 
 

[10-11]   Now  which  of these three kinds of objects are we to choose or to

reject?
 

                                    {fame, riches}
[10-12]   As  regards  the  transient  (since, as remarked, we must, owing to

the  weakness  of  our  nature,  necessarily  love  something and become

united  with  it  in  order  to  exist),  it  is  certain  that  our nature becomes

nowise   strengthened  through  our  loving,   and  becoming  united  with,

these,  for  they  are  weak  themselves, and the one cripple cannot carry

the  other.  And  not  only  do  they  not advance  us,  but  they  are  even
                                                                       {need}
harmful to us. For we have said that love is a union with  page 39  the object
            {rational}                                                        {useful}
which our ^ understanding judges to be good and glorious; and by this we

we mean such a union whereby both the lover and what is loved become

one  and the same thing, or together constitute one whole. He, therefore,
                                                                                           [corruptible]
is   indeed  always  wretched  who is united to transient things. For, since

these   are   beyond   his  power,  and  subject  to  many  accidents,  it  is

impossible  that,  when  they  are  affected,  he  should be free from these

effects.  And,  consequently,  we  conclude:  If  those  who  love  transient

things  that have some measure of reality are so wretched, how wretched
                                                                     [sensual]
must  they  be  who  love  honor,  riches,  and ^ pleasures, which have no

reality whatever!
 
 

[10-13]   Let  this  suffice to show us how Reason teaches us to keep away             Elwes
                         [corruptible]
from  things  so  fleeting. For what we have just said shows us clearly the

poison  and  the evil which lurk concealed in the love of these things. But

we   see   this  yet  incomparably  clearer  when  we  observe  from  what
 [magnificient]
glorious  and  excellent  a  good we are kept away through the enjoyment

of this.
 
 
                                                                                              [corruptible]
[10-14]   We  said before that the things which are transient are beyond our

power.  But  let us be well understood; we do not mean to say that we are

free  cause  depending upon nothing else; only when we say that some

things are in, others beyond our Power, we mean by those that are in our

power  such  as  we  can  produce  through  the  order of or together with

Nature, of which we are a part; by those which are not in our power, such

as,  being  outside  us,  are not liable page 40  to suffer any change through

us,  because  they  are  very  far  removed  from our real essence as thus

fashioned by Nature.
 
 

[10-15]   To  proceed,  we  come  now  to the second kind of objects, which
                                          [incorruptible]
though  eternal  and imperishable, are not such through their own power.

However,  if  we  institute  a  brief  inquiry  here,  we become immediately

aware  that  these  are  only  mere  modes  which depend immediately on

G-D.  And since the nature of these is such, they cannot be conceived by

us  unless  we, at the same time, have a conception of G-D. In this, since
                                        {faith}
He  is  perfect,  our  Love  must  necessarily  rest.  And,  to express it in a
                                              [intellect]
word,  if we use our understanding aright it will be impossible for us not to

love G-D.
 
 

[10-16]   The Reasons why, are clear. First of all, because we find that G-D
                       [being]
alone has essence only, and all other things are not essences but modes.

And  since  the  modes cannot be rightly understood without the entity on

which  they  immediately depend; and [as] we have already shown before

that  if,  when  loving  something,  we  get to know a better thing than that

which we then love, we always prefer it immediately, and forsake the first;

it  follows,  therefore, incontrovertibly that when we get to know G-D, who

has all perfection in Himself, we must necessarily love Him.
 
 

[10-17]   Secondly,  if  we  use  our understanding well in acquiring a know-

ledge of things, then we must know page 41  them in [relation to] their causes.

Now  then,  since  G-D  is  a first cause of all other things, therefore, from

the  nature  of  the  case (ex rerum natura), the knowledge of G-D is, and

remains,  before  the  knowledge  of  all  other  things: because the know-

ledge  of  all  other  things  must  follow  from  the  knowledge  of  the first

cause.  And  true love results always from the knowledge that the thing is

glorious and good.  What else, then, can follow but that it can be lavished              P81, L15ff

upon  no  one  more  ardently than upon the Lord our G-D? For He alone       G-D intoxicated man

glorious, and a perfect good.
 
 

[10-18]   So  we  see  now,  how  we can make love strong, and also how it

must rest only in G-D.
 
 

[10-19]   What  more we had still to say about love, we shall bear in mind to

say  it  when we consider the last kind of knowledge. In what follows here

we  shall  inquire, as we promised before, as to which of the passions we
               [accept]
are to entertain, which we are to reject.
 
 

 



Page 43
Chapter 11 - On Hate
 

[11-1]   HATRED  is  an  inclination  to  ward  off  from  us  that  which  has                3Def.7

caused  us  some  harm.  Now  it  is  to  be remarked that we perform our

actions in two ways, namely, either with or without passion. With passion,

as  is  commonly  seen in the [conduct of] masters towards their servants

who  have  done  sornething  amiss.  Without  passion,  as  is  related  of

Socrates,  who,  when  he  was  compelled  to  chastise his slave for [the

latter's own] good, never did so when he felt that he was enraged against

his slave.
 
 

[11-2]   Now  that  we  see  that our actions are performed by us either with

or without passion,  we think that it is clear that those things which hinder

or  have  hindered  us  can  be  removed,  when  necessary,  without any
   [emotion]                                                                                            [shun]
perturbation   on  our  part.  And  so,  which  is better: that we should flee

the  things  with aversion and hatred, or that, with the strength of reason,
                                                                                            [    emotion     ]
we  should  (for we think it possible) endure them without loss of temper?

First  of  all,  it  is  certain  that  when  we  do what we have to do without

passion,  then  no  evil  can result therefrom. And, since there is no mean

between  good  and  evil,  we  see  that,  as  it  is  bad to do anything in a

passion, so it must be good to act without it.
 

Page 44
[11-3]   But let us examine whether there is any harm in fleeing from things

with hatred and aversion.
 
 

[11-4]   As regards the hatred which comes from opinion it is certain that it

should  have  no  place  in  us,  because we know that one and the same

thing  is  good  for us at one time, bad for us at another time, as is aIways

the case with medicínal herbs.
 
 

[11-5]   It  therefore  depends,  in  the  end, on whether the hatred arises in

us  only  through  opinion,  and  not  also  through  true  reasoning. But to

ascertain  this  properly  we deem it right to explaín distinctly what hatred

is, and to distinguish it from aversion.

  
                                                       {         loss of PcM            caused by }
[11-6]   Now  I  say  that  Hatred is a perturbation of the soul against some-

one  who  has done some ill to us willíngly and knowingly. But aversion is

the  perturbation  which  arises  in  us against a thing on account of some

infirmity  or  injury  which  we  either know or think is in it by nature. I say,

by nature;  for when we do not suppose or think that it is so, then, even if

we  have  suffered some hindrance or injury from it, we have no aversion

for  it,  because we may, on the contrary, expect something useful from it.

Thus,  when  someone  is  hurt by a stone or a knife, he does not on that              P83, L16ff 

account feel any aversion for the same.



[11-7]   After  these  observatíons  let  us  now  briefly  consider  the conse-
                                              {     From sorrow there ensues hatred      }
quences  of  both  of  them.  From hatred there ensues sorrow; and when              P83, L20ff 

the  hatred  is great, it produces anger, which not only, like hatred, seeks                P83, L21 

to  page 45 flee  from  what  is  hated,  but  also  to annihilate it, when that is

practicable:  from  this  great  hatred  comes also envy. But from aversion                P83, L24 

there  comes  a  certain  sorrow,  because  we  consider  ourselves to be

deprived  of  something  whích,  since  it  is  real,  must  aIways  have  its

essence and perfection.
 
 

[11-8]   From  what  has  just  been said it may be easily understood that, if

we  use  our  Reason  aright,  we  can  feel no hatred or aversion for any-
                                                 [deprive]
thing,  because,  if  we do, we deceive ourselves of that perfection which

is  to  be  found  in  everything.  We see likewise with our Reason that we

can   never   reasonably   feel   any   hatred  whatever  against  anybody,         Spinoza's Dictum

because  whatsoever  exists  in  Nature,  if we entertain any wish about it,

then  we  must  aIways  improve it, whether for our sake or for the sake of

the  thing  itself.  And  since  a perfect man is the best thing for us that we           4P18n, 35c137.

know  of  all  that  we  have  around  us or before our eyes, it is by far the

best  both  for us and for all people individually that we should at all times

seek  to  educate  them  to  this  perfect  state. For only then can we reap
        {   self-interest    }
the  greatest  benefit  from them, and they from us. The means thereto is,             organic
       [       
treat        ]
to  give  regard  to them always in the manner in which we are constantly

taught  and  exhorted  to  do  by  our  good  Conscience;   for  this  never
                                                                          [            salvation               ]
prompts  us  to  our undoing, but aIways to our happiness and well-being.         Peace-of-Mind
 
 

[11-9]   In  conclusion,  we  say  that  Hatred  and  Aversion  page 46  have  in                 4P45  

them  as  many  imperfections  as Love, on the contrary, has perfections.

For  this  always  produces  improvement,  invigoration, and enlargement,

which  constitute  perfection; while Hatred, on the contrary, always makes

for desolation,  enervation, and annihilation, which constitute imperfection

itself.
 
 
 



Page 47
Chapter 12 - On Joy and Sorrow                                                                     P85
 

[12-1]   HAVING  SEEN  that  Hatred  and  Aversion  are such that we may

freely  say,  that  they  can  have  no  place in those who use their under-

standing  as  they  should,  we  shall now proceed in the same manner to

speak  of  the  other  passions.  To begin with, Desire and joy shall come

first.  Since  these  arise  from  the same causes from which love ensues,              P85, L8

we  shall  only  say  concerning them, that we must remember and call to

mind what we then said; and with this we leave the subject.
 


[12-2]   We  turn  next  to  Sorrow,  of  which we may say that it arises only            P85, L12f  

from  opinion  and  imagination which follows therefrom: for it comes from

the loss of some good.
 
 

[12-3]   Now  we  have  already  remarked  above,  that  whatsoever we do

should  tend  towards  progress and amelioration. But ít is certain that so
                                                                           [incapable]
long  as  we  are  sorrowing we render ourselves unfit to act thus; on this             P85, L17ff 

account  it  is  necessary  that  we should free ourselves from it . This we

can  do by thinking of the means whereby we may recover what we have
                                                                                                    {    was     }
lost,  if  it is in our power to do so. If not, [we must reflect] that it is just as
                  {and}
necessary ^ to  make  an  end  of  page 48 it,  lest  we  fall  a  prey to all the            leap of faith

miseries  and  disasters  which sorrow necessarily brings in its train. And

either  course  must  be  adopted  with joy; for it is foolish to try to restore

and make good a lost good by means of a self-sought and provoked evil.
 
 
                                                                          [intellect]
[12-4]   Lastly,  he  who  uses  his  understanding  aright must necessarily

know G-D first. Now G-D, as we have shown, is the highest good and all               P86, L2f  

that  is  good.  Hence  it  follows  incontrovertibly,  that  one who uses his

understanding  aright can fall a prey to no sorrow. How should he? since
                     {PcM}
he  finds  repose in that good which is all that is good, and in which there     G-D intoxicated man
                                               [satisfaction]                                                                  P86, L7
is the fullness of all joy and contentment.                                                       
Isaac Bashevis Singer
 

                              { not always—hunger is hunger }
[12-5]   Sorrow,  then,  comes  from  opinion  or  want of understanding, as
                                                                           {    causes lose of PcM   }
explained.
 
 

 



Page 49
Chapter 13 - On Esteem and Contempt, Etc.
 
                                                                                                                        [Disdain]
[13-1]   WE  SHALL  now  proceed  to  speak  of  Esteem and Contempt, of
                                                                [Pride]             [Self-depreciation]
Self-respect  and  Humility,  of  Conceit  and  Culpable Humility. We shall

take  them  in  the  above  order, and try to distinguish accurately what is

good and what is bad in them.
 
 

[13-2]   Esteem  and  Contempt  are  felt in so far as we know a thing to be               P87, L7-9  

something  great  or  small, be this great or little thing in us or outside us.
 
 
            [Legitimate]
[13-3]   Self-respect  does  not  extend [to anything] outside us, and is only                P87, L10

attributed  to  one who knows the real worth of his perfection, dispassion-

ately and without seeking esteem for himself.
 
 

[13-4]   Humility  is  felt  when anyone knows his own imperfection, without

regard  to  the  contempt  [of others] for himself; so that Humility does not

refer to anything outside the humble man.
 
 
             [Pride]
[13-5]   Conceit  is  this,  when  someone  attributes to himself a perfection                P87, L18 

which is not to be found in him.
 
 
            [Self-depreciation]
[13-6]   Culpable  humility  is  this,  when some one attributes to himself an                P87, L20 

imperfection  which  he  has  not.  I  am  not speaking of those hypocrites

who,  without  meaning  it, humble themselves in order to deceive others;

but only of those who really think they have the imperfections which they

attribute to themselves.
 

Page 50
[13-7]   From  these  observations  it  is  sufficiently evident what good and
                                                                                           [Legitimate]
evil  there  is in each of these passions. For, as regards Self-respect and

Humility,  these  show  their  excellence  through  themselves. For we say               P88, L6ff

that  the  possessor  thereof  knows  his  perfection  and imperfection for

what  it  is.  And  this,  according to what Reason teaches us, is the most

important  thing  for the attainment of our perfection. Because if we know

exactly  our  powers  and perfection, we see thereby clearly what it is we

have  to do in order to attain our good end.  And, on the other hand, if we

know our fault and frailty, then we know what we have to avoid.
 
 
                                [pride]             [self-depreciation]
[13-8]   As  regards  Conceit  and  Culpable Humility, the definition of them
                                                                                             [error]
already  shows  sufficiently  that they arise from a certain opinion; for we

said  that it [conceit] is attributed to one who ascribes to himself a certain

perfection,  although  he does not possess it, and culpable humility is the

precise opposite.
 
 

[13-9]   From  what  has  just  been  said  it  is  evident,  then,  that  just as

Self-respect  and  True  Humility  are  good and salutary, so, on the con-
                                                                                  [destructive]
trary,  Conceit  and  Culpable Humility are bad and pernicious. For those

[Self-respect  and  True Humility] not only put theír possessor into a very
             [state]
good   attitude,  but  are  also,  besides,  the  right  ladder  by  which  we
          [highest salvation]
rise to supreme bliss. But these [Conceit and Culpable Humility] not only

prevent  us from attaining to our perfection, but also lead us to utter ruin.

Culpable  page 51 Humility  is  what  prevents  us from doing that which we

should otherwise have to do in order to become perfect;  we see this, for

instance,  in  the  case  of the Skeptics, who, just because they deny that

man can attain to any truth, deprive themselves thereof through this very

denial.  Conceit on  the  other  hand  is  what makes  us undertake things

which tend straight to our ruin; as is seen in the case of all those who had

the conceit, and have the conceit, that they stood, and stand, wondrously

well  in  the  opinion of G-D,  and consequently brave fire and water. and

thus,  avoiding no danger, and facing every risk, they die most miserably.
 
 

[13-10]   As  regards  Esteem  and  Contempt,  there  is no more to be said

about them, we have only to recall to memory what we said before about             P89, L10f 

Love.
 
 



Page 53
Chapter 14 - On Hope and Fear
 

[14-1]   WE  SHALL  now begin to speak of Hope and Fear, of Confidence,
                                                              [Tenacity]
Despair,  and  Vacillation, of Courage, Boldness and Emulation, of Pusil-
[Cowardice]   [Consternation]
lanimity and Timidity and lastly of Jealousy, and, as is our wont, we shall

take  them  one  by  one, and then indicate which of these can hinder us,

and which can profit us. We shall be able to do all this very easily, if only

we  attend  closely  to the thoughts that we can have about a thing that is
       {
doubt}
yet to come, be it good, be it had.
 
 

[14-2]   The ideas which we have about things have reference either                        P90, L12ff 


[14-3]   The ideas that we have as regards the thing itself are these, either
                                                        [contingent]
the  thing  is  regarded  by  us  as  accidental, that is as something which               P48, L10

may come  or  may not come, or [we think] that it necessarily must come.

So much as regards the thing itself.
 
 

[14-4]   Next,   as  regards  him who thinks about the thing, the case is this:

he  must  do something either in order to advance the thing, or in order to

prevent it.  Now  from these thoughts all these passions result as follows:

when  we  think  that  a  certain  thing  which is  page 54  yet to come is good
                                            {mind}
and  that  it  can  happen,  the soul assumes, in consequence of this, that

form  which  we call hope, which is nothing else than a certain kind of joy,              P90, L27 
              {because of the doubt}
though mingled with some sorrow.
 
 

[14-5]   And,  on  the other hand, if we judge that that which may be coming
                                                         {mind}
is bad, then that form enters into our soul which we call fear.                                          P91, L2 
 
 

[14-6]   If,  however,  the  thing is regarded by us as good, and, at the same

time, as something that necessarily must come, then there comes into the
{mind}     {peace of mind}
soul  that  repose  which  we  call  confidence;  which  is  a certain joy not               P91, L3ff 

mingled with sorrow, as hope is.
 
 

[14-7]   But when we think that the thing is bad, and that it necessarily must

come,  then  despair  enters  into  the soul;  which  is  nothing else than a                P91, L8f 

certain kind of sorrow.
 
 

[14-8]   So  far  we have spoken of the passions considered in this chapter,
                 [affirmative]
and  given  positive  definitions  of  the  same, and have thus stated what

each  of  them is; we may now proceed in a converse manner, and define

them  negatively.  We  hope  that  the  evil may not come, we fear lest the

good  should  not  come,  we are confident that the evil will not come, we

despair because the good will not come.
 
 

[14-9]   Having  said  this  much  about  the passions in so far as they arise

from  our  thoughts  concerning  the thing itself, we have now to speak of

those  which  arise from the thoughts relating to him who thinks about the

thing; namely:



Page 55
[14-10]   If  something  must  be  done in order to bring the thing about, and

we  come  to  no  decision  concerning it, then the soul receives that form

which  we  call vacillation. But when it makes a manly resolve to produce            P91, L23ff 
                                                                                                  [tenacity]
the  thing, and this can be brought about, then that is called intrepidity or            P91, L27ff 

bravery.
 
 

[14-11]   When,  however, someone decides to do a thing because another

(who had done it first)  has  met  with  success, then we call it emulation.             P91, L30ff 

Lastly,
 
 

[14-12]   If  anyone knows what he must decide to do in order to advance a

good  thing,  and  to  hinder  a  bad one, and yet does not do so, then we
                <cowardice>
call  it  pusillanimity;  and when the same is very great, we call it timidity.             P91, L33ff 

Lastly,  jealousness  or jalousie is the anxiety which we feel that we may                P92, L1 

have  the sole enjoyment and possession of something already acquired.               P92, L2 
 
 

[14-13]   Since  we  know  now  whence  these passions originate, it will be

very  easy  for  us  to  show  which  of them are good, and which are bad.
 
 

[14-14]   As  regards  Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair,  and Jealousy, it is              P92, L8ff 

certain  that  they  arise  from  a   wrong opinion. For, as we have already

shown  above,  all  things have their necessary causes, and must neces-

sarily  happen  just  as  they  do  happen.  And  although  Confidence and

Despair  seem  to  have  a  place  in the inviolable order and sequence of

causes  or to confirm the same, yet (when the truth of the matter is rightly

looked into)  that  is far from being the case. For Confidence and Despair

never  arise,  unless  Hope  and  page 56  Fear  (from which they derive their

being)  have  preceded  them.  For  example,  if  anyone  thinks that some

thing,  for  which  he  still  has to wait, is good, he receives that form in his

soul  which  we call Hope; and when he is confident about the acquisition

of  the  supposed  good,  his  soul  gains that repose which we call Confi-

dence.  What  we  are  now saying about confidence, the same must also

be  said  about  Despair. But, according to that which we have said about
        [passion]
Love,  this  also  can  have  no  place in a perfect man: because they pre-
                                                         [subject to change]
suppose  things  which,  owing  to the mutability to which they are subject

(as remarked in our account of Love),  we  must not  become attached to;

nor  (as shown in our account of Hatred)  may we even have an aversion

to them. The man, however, who persists in these passions is at all times

subject to such attachment and aversion.
 
 
                                                    [Cowardice]          [Consternation]
[14-15]   As  regards  Vacillation,  Pusillanimity,  and  Timidity, these betray

their  imperfection  through  their  very  character and nature: for whatso-

ever  they  do to our advantage comes only negatively from the effects of

nature.  For  example,  someone  hopes  for something which he thinks is

good,  although  it is not good yet, owing to his vacillation or pusillanimity
                                    [strength of character]
he  happens  to  lack  the  courage necessary for its realization, and so it
                                                                       [chance]
comes  about  that  he  is  negatively  or  by  accident saved from the evil

which  he  thought was good. These Passions, therefore, can  page 57 also

have no place whatever in the man who is guided by true Reason.
 
 

[14-16]   Lastly,   as  regards   Courage,  Boldness,  and  Emulation,  about

these  there  is  nothing  else  to be said than that which we have already

said about Love and Hatred.
 
 
 



Page 59
Chapter 15 - On Remorse and Repentance
 

[15-1]   ON  THE  present  occasion  we  shall speak, though briefly, about

remorse and repentance. These never arise except as the result of rash-               P94, L5ff 
[surprise—because of a miscalculation regarding good and evil.]
ness;  because  remorse  comes  only  from  this,  that  we do something

about which we are then in doubt whether it is good, or whether it is bad;

and  repentance,  from  this,  that we have done something which is bad.                P94, L7f 
 
 

[15-2]   And since many people (who use their understanding aright) some-  
                                                        [    discipline    ]
times  (because  they  lack  that  habitual  readiness  which is required in

order  that  the  understanding may at all times be used aright) go astray,

it might perchance be thought that such Remorse and Repentance might

soon  set  them  right again, and thence it might he inferred, as the whole

world  does  infer,  that  they  are good.  If,  however, we will get a proper              P94, L18ff

insight  into  them,  we  shall find that they are not only not good, but that
                                         injurious ]
they are,
on the contrary, pernicious, and that they are consequently bad.

For  it  is obvious that we always succeed better through Reason and the

love of truth than through remorse and sorrow. They are, therefore, harm-

ful  and  bad,  because  they  are  a  certain  page 60  kind  of  sorrow, which

[sorrow]  we  have  already  shown  above  to be injurious, and which, for

that  reason,  we  must  try to avert as an evil, and consequently we must

likewise shun and flee from these also, which are like it.
 
 
 
 



page 61
                                                  [Mockery]                     [Ridicule]
Chapter 16 - On Derision and Jesting                                P95
 

[16-1]   DERISION AND jesting rest on a false opinion and betray an imper-

fection in him who derides and jests.
 
 

[16-2]   The opinion on which they rest is false, because it is supposed that              P95, L5ff

he who is derided is the first cause of the effects which he produces, and

that  they  do  not  necessarily (like the other things in Nature) depend on

G-D.  They  betray  an  imperfection  in  the  Derider; because  either that

which  is  derided  is  such  that  it  is  derisible, or it is not such. If it is not

such,  then  it  shows  bad  manners,  to  deride  that  which  is  not  to be

derided;  if  it  is  such,  then  they  [who deride it]  show thereby that they

recognize  some  imperfection in that which they deride, which they ought              P95, L15

to remedy, not by derision, but much rather by good reasoning.
 
 

[16-3]   Laughter  does  not  refer  to  another,  but only to the man who ob-

serves some good in himself; and since it is a certain kind of Joy, there is

nothing  else  to  be  said about it than what has already been said about

Joy.  I  speak  of  such  laughter as is caused by a certain Idea which pro-             P95, L18f 

vokes  one to it, and not at all of such laughter as is caused by the move-
                      {      ?      }
ment  of  the  [vitalspirits;  as  to this (since it has no reference  page 62  to              P95, L22 
                             [ ^ animal]                                                                                         P95, L22ff 
good
or to evil) we had no intention to speak of it here.
 
 

[16-4]   As  to  EnvyAngerIndignation,  we shall say nothing about them            P95, L25 

here,  but  only  just  refer  back  to  what  we  have  already  said   above

concerning  hatred.
 
 
 



Page 63
Chapter 17 - On Glory and Shame                                                                P96
 
                                                                    [love of esteem]
[17-1]   WE  SHALL  now  also  briefly  consider glory, shame, and shame-

lessness.  The  first  is  a  certain  kind  of  Joy  everyone feels in himself

whenever  he  becomes aware that his conduct is esteemed and praised

by  others,  without  regard  to  any  other  advantage or profit which they

may have in view.
 
 

[17-2]   Shame  is  a  certain  kind  of  sorrow  which arises in one when he

happens  to  see that his conduct is despised by others, without regard to

any other disadvantage or injury that they may have in view.
 


[17-3]   Shamelessness  is  nothing  else  than  a  want,  or  shaking  off, of

shame,  not  through  Reason,  but either from innocence of shame, as is

the  case  with  children,  savage people,  etc., or  because,  having been

held  in  great  contempt,  one  goes  now to any length without regard for

anything.
 
 

[17-4]   Now  that  we  know  these  passions,  we  also  know, at the same
                                                                                               [love of esteem]
time,  the vanity and imperfection which they have in them. For Glory and                P96, L20ff 

Shame are not only of no advantage, because of what we have observed

in  their  definitions,  but  also  (inasmuch  as they are based on self-love,
                                              { how can he when he has no free will }                               Mark Twain
and  on the opinion that man is the first cause of his action, and therefore
                                                      {consequently}
page 64  deserving  of  praise and blame)  they  are  harmful  and  must  be

rejected.
 
 

[17-5]   I  will  not,  however,  say  that  one  ought to live among men in the

same  way  that one would live away from them, where Glory and Shame

have  no  place;  quite  the  contrary,  I  admit  that we are not only free to

utilize  them,  when  we apply them in the service of mankind and for their

amelioration,  but  that  we  may  even  do so at the price of curtailing our

own  (otherwise  perfect  and legitimate) freedom. For example: if anyone

wears  costly  clothes  in  order  to  be respected, he seeks a Glory which

results  from  his  self-love  without  any  consideration for his fellow-men;

but  when  someone  observes  that  his wisdom (wherewith he can be of

service  to  his  neighbors)  is  despised  and  trampled  under foot simply

because  he is dressed in shabby clothes, then he will do well if (from the            P97, L11f

motive  to  help  them)  he  provides  himself  with  clothes  to  which they

cannot take exception, thereby becoming like his fellow-man in order that

he may win over his fellow-man [and help them].
 
 

[17-6]   Further,  as  regards  Shamelessness,  this shows itself to be such

that  in  order  to see its deformity all that we need is merely its definition,

and that will be enough for us.
 
 
 



Page 65
Chapter 18 - On Gratitude                                                                                        P98
 

[18-1]   NOW FOLLOWS  [the consideration] of favor, gratitude, and ingrat-

itude.  As  regards  the first  two,  they  are the inclinations which the soul

has  to  wish  and  to do some good to one's neighbor. I say, to wish, [this

happens]  when  good is returned to one who has done some good; I say,

to  do,  [this is the case]  when  we  ourselves  have obtained or received

some good.
 
 

[18-2]   I  well  aware  that  almost  all  people  consider  these effects to be

good;  but,  notwithstanding  this,  I  venture  to say that they can have no

place in a perfect man. For a perfect man is moved to help his fellow-man
     {just as one lung helps the other collapsed lung}
by  sheer  necessity only, and by no other cause, and therefore he feels it

all  the  more  to  be  his duty  to  help  the  most  godless,  seeing that his

misery and need are so much greater.
 
 
                                       [disdain]
[18-3]   Ingratitude  is  a  disregard  or  shaking  off of Gratitude, as Shame-

lessness  is of Shame, and that without any rational ground, but solely as

the result either of greed or of immoderate self-love; and that is why it can

have no place in a perfect man.
 
 
 



Page 67
Chapter 19 - On Grief   (Desiderium)  {Regret}                                                           P99
 
         [Longing]
[19-1]   GRIEF  SHALL be the last of which we shall speak in our treatment
          
of  the  passions,  and with it we will conclude. Now grief is a certain kind

of  sorrow  arising  from  the  contemplation of some good which we have

lost, and [lost] in such a way that there is no hope of recovering the same.

It  makes  its  imperfection so manifest that as soon as we only examine it

we  think  it  bad.  For we have already shown above that it is bad to bind

and  link  ourselves  to  things  which  may easily, or at some time, fail us,

and  which  we cannot have when we want them. And since it is a certain

kind  of  sorrow, we have to shun it, as we have already remarked above,

when we were treating of sorrow.
 


[19-2]   I  think,  now, that  I have already shown and proved sufficiently that              P99, L15ff 

it  is  only  True Belief  or  Reason that leads us to the knowledge of good               P99, L16 
                                                                     {lack of}
and  evil. And so when we come to prove that ^ Knowledge is the first and               P99, L18f 

principal  cause  of  all these passions, it will be clearly manifest that if we

use  our  understanding and Reason aright, it should he impossible for us               P99, L20ff 

ever  to  fall  a  prey  to  one  of  these passions which we ought to reject.
                    [Intellect]                                                         {see leap of faith}
I say our Understanding,  page 68  because I do not think that Reason alone

is  competent  to free us from all these: as we shall afterwards show in its

proper place.
 
 

[19-3]   We  must,  however,  note  here  as  an  excellent  thing  about  the

passions,  that  we  see and find that all the passions which are good are

of  such kind and nature that we cannot be or exist without them, and that

they  belong,  as  it  were,  to  our  essence;  such  is  the case with Love,
                              [is proper]
Desire, and all that pertains to love.
 


[19-4]   But  the  case  is  altogether  different with those which are bad and             P100, L5f

must  be  rejected  by us; seeing that we can not only exist very well with-

out  these,  but  even  that  only then, when we have freed ourselves from

them, are we really what we ought to be.
 


[19-5]   To  give  still greater clearness to all this, it is useful to note that the             P100, L11ff 

foundation  of  all  good and evil is Love bestowed on a certain object: for

if we do not love that object which alone is worthy of being loved, namely,

G-D,  as  we  have  said  before, but things which through their very char-
                                  [corruptible]
acter  and  nature are transient, then (since the object is liable to so many

accidents,  aye,  even  to  annihilation)   there  necessarily  result  hatred,

sorrow,  etc.,  according to the changes in the object loved. Hatred, when

anyone  deprives him of what he loves. Sorrow, when he happens to lose

it.  Glory, when he leans on self-love. Favor and Gratitude, when he does
  { analogy—all parts of you love each-other for your sake }
not  love  his  fellow-man  for  the  sake  of  G-D.
 
 

[19-6]   But,  in contrast with all these, when man comes to  page 69  love G-D
                                           {unchangeable}
who  always is and remains immutable, then it is impossible for him to fall
                [bog]
into  this welter of passions. And for this reason we state it as a fixed and

immovable  principle  that  G-D  is the first and only cause of all our good
         [frees]
and delivers us from all our evil.
 
 

[19-7]   Hence it is also to be noted lastly, that only Love, etc., are limitless:              P100, L29ff 

namely,  that  as it increases more and more, so also it grows more excel-
                                                                            { G-D and brings PcM }                       Religion
lent,  because  it is bestowed on an object which is infinite, and can there-

fore  always  go  on increasing, which can happen in the case of no other

thing  except  this  alone.  And,  maybe,  this  will  afterwards  give  us the                EL:[60]

material from which we shall prove the immortality of the soul, and how or           E5:Bk.XV:283169

in what way this is possible.                                                                                                     E5:Bk.VIII:60613
 
 
 



Page 71
Chapter Part 20 - On the True and the False
 

[20-1]   LET  US  now  examine  the true and the false, which indicate to us             Cash Value
                                                              {
reason}
the  fourth,  and last, consequence of true belief. Now, in order to do this,

we  shall  first state the definitions of Truth and Falsity. Truth is an affirm-              P102, L6ff 

ation  (or a denial)  made  about  a  certain  thing,  which agrees with that

same thing; and Falsity is an affirmation (or a denial) about a thing, which

does  not  agree with the thing itself. But this being so, it may appear that              P102, L10ff 

there  is  no  difference  between the false and the true Idea, or, since the
                                                                                         [thinking]
[affirmation or]  denial  of this or that are mere modes of thought, and [the

true  and  the false Idea] differ in no other way except that the one agrees              

with  the  thing, and the other does not, that they are therefore, not really,               P102, L15 

but  only  logically  different;  and if this should be so, one may justly ask,

what  advantage  has  the  one  from  his  Truth, and what harm does the

other  incur  through his falsity? and how shall the one know that his con-

ception  or  Idea  agrees  with  the thing more than the other does? lastly,               P102, L20f 

whence does it come that the one errs, and the other does not?
 
 

[20-2]   To  this  it may, in the first place, serve as an answer that the clear-

est  things  of  all  make  known  both  page 72  themselves  and also what is             P102, L23f

false,  in such a manner that it would be a great folly to ask how we are to

become  aware of them: for, since they are said to be clearest of all, there

can  never  be  any  other  clearness  through  which  they might be made                posit
[
explained]
clear;  it  follows,  therefore,  that  truth is made clear through truth. that is

through  itself; and through it also is falsity made clear; but falsity is never

revealed and made manifest through itself. So that anyone who is posses-

sion of the truth cannot doubt that he possesses it, while one who is sunk

in  falsity  or  in error can well suppose that he has got at the truth; just as

someone who is dreaming can well think that he is awake, but one who is             P103, L12ff

actually awake can never think that he is dreaming.
 
 

[20-3]   These  remarks  also  explain  to  some  extent  what we said about              P78, L15f

G-D being the Truth, or that the Truth is G-D Himself.                                             posit
 
 

[20-4]   Now the reason why the one is more conscious of his truth than the            P103, L18-21 

other  is, is because the Idea of [his] affirmation (or denial) entirely agrees             Computer

with  the  nature of the thing, and consequently has more essence. It may

help   some  to  grasp  this  better  if  it  be  observed  that  Understanding
                                                                                         {subjectivity}
(although the word does not sound like it) is a mere or pure passivity; that                P103, L24 
                  {mind}
is,  that  our soul is changed in such a way that it receives other modes of

thought,  which  it  did  not  have  before.  Now  when someone, in conse-

quence  of  the  whole  object having acted upon him, receives  page 73  cor-

responding  forms  or modes of thought, then it is clear that he receives a

totally  different  feeling  of  the  form  or character of the object than does

another who has not had so many causes [acting upon him], and is there-

fore moved to make an affirmation or denial about that thing by a different
                                                            <Text imperfect. See Commentary.>                                   P104, L1ff 
and  slighter  action (because he becomes aware of it only through a few,    

or  the  less  important,  of  its attributes). From this, then, we see the per-

fection  of  one  who  takes  his  stand upon Truth, as contrasted with one

who  does  not take his stand upon it. Since the one changes easily, while

the  other  does  not  change  easily,  it follows therefrom that the one has

more  stability  and essence than the other has: likewise, since the modes

of  thought  which agree with the thing have had more causes [to produce

them]  they have also more stability and essence in them: and, since they

entirely  agree  with the thing, it is impossible that they should after a time

be  made  different  or  undergo some change, all the less so because we

have  already  seen  before  that  the essence of a thing is unchangeable.

Such  is  not  the  case  with  falsity. And with these remarks all the above

questions will be sufficiently answered.
 
 
 



Page 75
Chapter 21 - On the Will                                                                                              P105
 

[21-1]   NOW  THAT  we  know  the  nature  of  Good  and  EvilTruth  and

Falsity,  and  also  wherein  the  well-being  of a perfect man consists, it is

time  to begin to examine ourselves,  and to see whether we attain to such
                     [freely]
well-belng voluntarily or of necessity.
 
  

[21-2]   To  this  end  it is necessary to inquire what the Will is, according to             Mark Twain

those  who  posit  a Will and wherein it is different from Desire. Desire, we              P105, L10

have  said,  is the inclination which the soul has towards something which

it  chooses  as  a  good;  whence  it follows that before our desire inclines

towards  something  outside, we have already inwardly decided that such

a  thing  is good, and this affirmation, or, stated more generally, the power

to affirm and to deny, is called the Will.
 
 

[21-3]   It  thus  turns  on  the  question  whether our  Affirmations  are made

voluntarily  or  necessarily,  that  is, whether we can make any affirmation
                                                                  {Data Base}
or  denial  about  a thing without some external cause compelling us to do

so.  Now  we  have  already  shown  that  a  thing  which  is not explained

through  itself,  or  whose  existence does not pertain to its essence, must

necessarily  have  an  external  cause; and that a cause which  page 76  is to

produce  something  must  produce  it  necessarily;  it  must therefore also

follow  that  each  separate act of willing this or that, each separate act of

affirming  or  denying  this  or that of a thing, these, I say, must also result

from some external cause: so also the definition which we have given of a

cause is, that it cannot be free.
 
 

[21-4]   Possibly  this  will  not  satisfy  some  who  are  accustomed to keep
                                                                                   <Reason>
their  understanding  busy with things of imagination more than with Parti-

cular things which really exist in Nature; and, through doing so, they come
                                       <Reason>
to regard a thing of thought not as such, but as a real thing. For, because            2P48 and 49

man  has  now  this, now that volition, he forms in his soul a general mode

which  he  calls Will,  just as from this man and that man he also forms the

Idea  of  man;  and  because  he  does not adequately distinguish the real

things from the things of imagination, he comes to regard the things of the

mind  as  things which really exist in Nature, and so he regards himself as

a cause of some things. This happens not infrequently in the treatment of

the  subject  about  which  we  are  speaking.  For if anyone is asked why

people  want  this or that, the answer usually given is, because they have

a  will.  But,  since  the Will, as we have said, is only an Idea of our willing             P108, L1
                                                                                                                            <Reason>
this  or  that, and therefore only a mode of thought, a thing of imagination,

and not a real thing,  nothing can be caused by it {until a "go-to"};  for out of

nothing,  nothing comes. And so, as we have shown that the  page 77  will is

not a thing in Nature,  but only in fancy,  I also think it unnecessary to ask

whether the will is free or not free.
 
 

[21-5]   I  say  this not [only] of will in general, which we have shown to be a

mode of thought,  but also of the particular act of willing this or that, which

act  of  willing  some  have  identified with affirmation and denial. Now this

should  be  clearly evident to everyone who only attends to what we have

already  said.  For  we have said that the understanding is purely passive;

it is an awareness,  in the soul,  of the essence and existence of things; so

that  it  is  never  we  who  affirm or deny something of a thing, but it is the            P103, L24

thing itself that affirms or denies, in us, something of itself. {We know sugar is

sweet from our data base—experience.}
 
 

[21-6]   Possibly  some  will  not  admit  this,  because  it seems to them that             P109, L6ff

they  are  well  able  to  affirm  or  to  deny of the thing something different

from  what  they  know about the thing. But this is only because they have

no  idea  of  the  conception  which  the soul has of the thing apart from or

without  the  words [in  which  it  is  expressed].  It  is quite true that (when

there are reasons which prompt us to do so) we can, in words or by some

other  means,  represent the thing to others differently from what we know

it  to  be;  but we can never bring it so far, either by words or by any other

means,  that  we should feel about the things differently from what we feel

about  them;  this  is  impossible, and clearly so to all who have for  page 78

once  attended to their understanding itself apart from the use of words or

other significant signs.
 
  

[21-7]   Against  this,  however, some perchance may say: If it is not we, but

the  thing  itself,  that  makes  the  affirmation and denial about itself in us,

then  nothing  can be affirmed or denied except what is in agreement with

the  thing;  and  consequently  there  is  no  falsity.  For we have said that

falsity  consists  in  affirming  (or denying) aught of a thing which does not

accord  with  that  thing;  that  is,  what  the  thing  does not affirm or deny

about  itself.  I  think, however, that if only we consider well what we have

already said about Truth and Falsity, then we shall see at once that these

objections  have  already  been  sufficiently  answered.  For we have said

that the object is the cause of what is affirmed or denied thereof, be it true

or  false:  falsity arising thus, namely, because, when we happen to know

something  or a part of an object, we imagine that the object (although we

only know very little of it)  nevertheless affirms or denies that of itself as a

whole; this takes place mostly in feeble souls, which receive very easily a

mode or an idea through a slight action of the object, and make no further

affirmation or denial apart from this.
 
 

[21-8]   Lastly,  it  might  also  be objected that there are many things which

we sometimes want and [sometimes also] do not want, as, for example, to

assert  something  about  a  thing  or  not  to  assert it, to speak  page 79 the

truth,  and  not  to speak it, and so forth. But this results from the fact that

Desire  is  not  adequately distinguished from Will. For the Will, according

to those who maintain that there is a Will,  is onIy the activity of the under-

standing  whereby we affirm or deny something about a thing, with regard

to  good or evil. Desire, however, is the disposition of the soul to obtain or

to  do  something for the sake of the good or evil that is discerned therein;

so  that even after we have made an affirmation or denial  about the thing,

Desire  still  remains,  namely, when we have ascertained or affirmed that

the  thing  is  good;  such  is  the Will, according to their statements, while

desire  is the inclination, which we only subsequently feel, to advance it

so  that,  even  according  to their own statements, the Will may well exist

without  the  Desire,  but  not the Desire without the Will, which must have

preceded it.
 
 

[21-9]   All  the  activities,  therefore, which we have discussed above (since

they  are  carried  out  through the mind under the appearance of good, or

are  hindered  by  thought  under the appearance of evil) can only be sub-

sumed  under  that  inclination  which  is  called  Desire and by no means

under the designation of Will, which is altogether inappropriate.
 
 
 



Page 81
Chapter 22 - On Will and Desire
 

[22-1]   NOW  THAT  it is known that we have no free will to make an affirm-

ation  or  a  denial,  let  us  just  see  what is the correct and true distinction

between will and desire.
 
 

[22-2]   According   to  Aristotle's  definition,  Desire  appears  to  be a genus

containing  two  species.  For  he  says that the Will is the longing or incli-

nation  which  one  feels towards  that  which  is  or seems good. Whence

appears to me that by Desire he means any inclination, be it towards good,

be it towards evil;  but the inclination is only towards what is or appears to

be  good,  or  when  the  man  who  has  such inclination, has it under the

appearance  of  good,  then  he  calls  it good will; while, if it is bad, that is,

when  we  observe  in  another  an  inclination towards something which is

bad,  he  calls  that bad will. So that the inclination of the soul is not some-

thing  whereby  affirmations  or denials are made, but only an inclination to

obtain   something   which  appears  to  be  good,  and  to  flee  from  what

appears to be bad.
 
 

[22-3]   It  therefore, remains to inquire now whether the Desire is free or not

free.  In  addition to what we already said, namely, that Desire depends on

page 82  the  idea  of  its  objects, and  that  this understanding must have an

external  cause, and in addition also to what we have said about the will, it

still  remains  to  prove that Desire is not free. Many people, although they

see  quite  well  that  the  knowledge  which man has of various things is a

medium  through  which  his  longing  or  inclination  passes over from one

thing  to  another, yet fail to observe what that may be which thus lures the
 [appetite]
inclination from the one to the other.
 
 

[22-4]   However,  to  show  that this inclination of ours is not of our own free

will  (and in order to present vividly before our eyes what it is to pass over,

and  to  be  drawn,  from  one  thing  to  another),  we shall imagine a child

becoming  aware of something for the first time. For example, I hold before

him  a  little  bell, which produces a pleasant sound for his ears, so that he

conceives  a  longing  for  it;  consider  now  whether  he  could really help

feeling  this  longing  or  desire.  If  you  say,  Yes, then I ask, how, through

what  cause  is  this to happen? Certainly not through something which he

knows  to  be  better, because this is all that he knows; nor, again, through

its  appearing  to  be  bad  to  him,  for  he  knows  nothing  else,  and  this

pleasure is the very best that has ever come to him. But perchance he has

the  freedom  to  banish  from  him  the  longing  which  he feels; whence it

would  follow that this longing may well arise in us without our free will, but

that  all  the  same  we  have  in us the  page 83  freedom to banish it from us.

This  freedom,  however, will not bear examination; for what, indeed, might
                                         [ destroy   the    appetite 
it be that shall be able to annihilate the longing? The longing itself? Surely

no,  for there is nothing that through its own nature seeks its own undoing.               conatus

What  then  might  it  ultimately  be  that shall be able to wean him from his

longing?  Nothing  else,  forsooth,  except  that  in  the  natural  order  and

course of things he is affected by something which he finds more pleasant

than  the  first.  And, therefore, just as, when we were considering the Will,

we  said  that  the  human Will is nothing but this and that Volition, so also                2P49

man  has  no  other  than  this and that Desire which is caused by this and

that idea; Desire [in the abstract] is not anything actually existing in Nature,

but  is  only  an  abstraction from the particular acts of desiring this or that.

Desire,  then,  as  it  is  not  really  anything, can also not really cause any-

thing.  So  that  when we say that Desire is free, it is just as much as if' we

said that this or that Desire is its own cause that is, that before it existed

it  had  already  arranged  that it should exist; which is absurdity itself, and

cannot be.
 
 

[22-5]   Thus  we  see now that man, being a part of the whole of Nature, on              Mysticism

which  he  depends,  and  by which also he is governed, cannot of himself
                                             [salvation]               {PcM}
do  anything  for  his  happiness and well-being; let us, then, just see what

[advantages]
Uses we can derive from these propositions  page 84  of ours. And this [is] all

the  more  [necessary] because we have no doubt that they will appear not
            [shocking]                                                                                                  Spinoza's Daring
a little offensive to some.
 
 

[22-6]   In  the first place, it follows therefrom that we are truly servants, aye,            P115, L10ff

slaves, of G-D, and that it is our greatest perfection to be such necessarily.

For,  if  we  were  thrown back upon ourselves, and thus not dependent on

G-D,  we  should  be  able  to  accomplish  very  little,  or nothing, and that

would  justly  give us cause to lament our lot; especially so in contrast with

what  we  now  see,  namely,  that  we  are  dependent on that which is the

most  perfect of all, in such a way that we exist also as a part of the whole,           Organic

that  is,  of Him; and we contribute, so to say, also our share to the realiza-

tion of so many skillfully ordered and perfect works, which depend on Him.           Micah 6:8
 
 

[22-7]   Secondly,  this  knowledge brings it about that we do not grow proud

when  we  have accomplished something excellent (which pride causes us

to  come  to  a  standstill,  because we think that we are already great, and

that  we  need  do  nothing  further; thereby militating precisely against our

own  perfection, which consists in thisthat we must at all times endeavor

to  advance  further  and  further); but that, on the contrary, we attribute all        Conclusion

that  we  do  to  G-D, who is the first and only cause of all that we accomp-

lish and succeed in effecting.
 
 

[22-8]   Thirdly,  in  addition to the fact that this knowledge inspires us with a
              {Golden Rule}
real  love of our neighbor,  it  page 85  shapes  us  so  that we never hate him,      Spinoza's Dictum

nor  are  we  angry  with  him, but love to help him, and to improve hIs con-

dition.  All  these  are  the  actions of such men as have great perfection or

essence.
 
 

[22-9]   Fourthly,   this   knowledge   also   serves   to  promote  the  greatest

Common  Good,  because through it a judge can never side with one party

more  than  with  the  other, and when compelled to punish the one, and to
                                                      [insight]
reward the other, he will do it with a view to help and to improve the one as

much as the other.
 
 

[22-10]   Fifthly,  this  knowledge  frees  us  from  Sorrow, from Despair, from

Envy,  from  Terror,  and  other evil passions, which, as we shall presently

say, constitute the real hell itself.
 
 

[22-11]   Sixthly,  this  knowledge  brings us so far that we (cease to stand in
[fear]
awe of G-D, as others do of the devil (whom they imagine), lest He should

do  them  harm.  For  why  indeed  should  we fear G-D, who is the highest       Deus sive Natura

good  itself,  through  whom  all things are what they are, and also we who             P116, L26ff 

live in Him?
 
 

[22-12]   Seventhly,  this knowledge also brings us so far that we attribute all

to  G-D,  love Him  alone  because  He  is  the  most glorious and the most

perfect,  and  thus  offer  ourselves  up entirely to Him; for these really con-
                                                                                           {    better PcM    }
stitute   both   the   true service  of  G-D  and  our  own  eternal  happiness

and  bliss. For the sole perfection and the final end of a slave and of a tool

is  this,  that  they  duly  fulfill the task  imposed  on them. For example, if a

carpenter,   while  doing  some  page 86  work,  finds  his hatchet  of excellent

service, then this hatchet has thereby attained its end and perfection; but if

he  should  think:  this  hatchet  has  rendered  me such good service now,

therefore  I  shall  let  it  rest,  and exact no further service from it, then pre-

cisely  this  hatchet  would  fail  of its end, and be a hatchet no more. Thus
                                                                       { G-D  }
also is it with man, so long as he is a part of Nature he must follow the laws
     G-D  }
of  Nature,  and this is divine service; and so long as he does this, it is well

with  him.  But  if  G-D should (so to say) will that man should serve Him no

more,  that  would  be  equivalent  to  depriving  him  of  his well-being and

annihilating him; because all that he is consists in this, that he serves G-D.           Analogy
 
 
 



Page 87                                                  [Blessedness]
Chapter 23 - On Our Happiness

                                                                     { Reason }
[23-1]   NOW  THAT  we  have  seen  the  advantages  of this True Belief, we

shall  endeavor  to  fulfill  the  promise  we  have  made,  namely,  to inquire

whether  through  the  knowledge  which  we  already  have  (as  to  what is

good,  what  is  evil,  what  truth is, and what falsity is, and what, in general,

the  uses of all these are), whether, I say, we can thereby attain to our well­

being,   namely,  the  Love  of  G-D  (which  we  have  remarked  to  be  our
   {    better PcM    }
supreme  happiness),  and also in what way we can free ourselves from the

passions which we have judged to be bad.
 
 

[23-2]   To  begin  with  the  consideration of the last, namely, of the liberation

from the passions,  I say that,  if we suppose that they have no other causes
                                                             [       posited        ]
than  those  which  we  have  assigned  to them, then, provided only we use
                                    {objectively}
our  understanding  aright,  as  we  can  do  very easily (now that we have a

criterion to truth and falsity), we shall never fall into them.
 
 

[23-3]   But what we have now to prove is that they have no other causes;  for

this,  methinks,  it  is required that we should study ourselves in our entirety,
                                                                { Mind }
having regard to the body as well as to the spirit.                                                    [vital] spirit
 
 

[23-4]   And  first  [we have]  to  show  that  in Nature  there   page 88   is  a  body

through  whose form and activities we are affected, and thus become aware

of it. And the reason why we do this is, because when we get an insight into

the  activities  of the body and the effects which they produce, then we shall

also  discover the first and foremost cause of all those passions; and, at the

same  time, also that through which all those passions might be annihilated.

From this we shall then also be able to see whether it is possible to do such

a  thing  by  the  aid of  Reason.  And  then  we  shall also proceed to speak

about our love of G-D.
 
 

[23-5]   Now  to  prove  that  there  is a body in Nature, can be no difficult task            JBY added

for  us,  now  that  we already  know that G-D is, and what G-D is; whom we

have  defined  as  a  being  of infinite attributes, each of which is infinite and             ID6

perfect.  And since extension,  or thing, is an attribute which we have shown

to  be  infinite in its kind, it must therefore also necessarily be an attribute of

that  infinite  being.  And  as  we  have  also  already  demonstrated that this

infinite being exists, it follows at once that this attribute also exists.
 
 

[23-6]   Moreover,  since  we  have  also proved, that outside Nature, which is

infinite,  there  is,  and  can be, no being, it is clearly manifest that this effect

of  body  through  which  we  become aware [of it] can proceed from nothing

else than from extension itself, and by no means from something else which

(as some will have it) has extension in an eminent degree:  for (as  page 89 we

have already shown in the first chapter) there is no such thing.
 
 

[23-7]   We  have  to  remark,  therefore,  that all the effects which are seen to

depend  necessarily  on  extension  or  things must be attributed to this attri-

bute;  such  as  Motion  and  Rest. For if the power to produce these did not

exist  in  Nature,  then  (even  though it [Nature] might have many other attri-

butes)  it  would  be impossible  that  these  should  exist.  For if a thing is to

produce something then there must be that in it through which it, rather than           immanent

another, can produce that something.
 
 

[23-8]   What  we  have just said here about extension, the same we also wish

to  be  regarded as though it had been said about thought, and further about

all that is.
 
 

[23-9]   It  is  to  be  observed further,  that there is nothing whatever in us, but

we  have  the  power  to  become  aware  of  it:  so that if we find that there is

nothing  else  in  us  except  the  effects  of  the  thinking  thing  and those of

extension,  then  we  may  say  with certainty that there is nothing else in us.
 
 

[23-10]   In  order  that  the  workings of both these may be clearly understood,

we  shall take them up first each by itself only, and afterwards both together;

as also the effects of both the one and the other.
 
 

[23-11]   Now  when  we  consider extension or bodies alone, then we become

aware  of  nothing  else  in  it  except  Motion  and  Rest, from which we then

discover  all  page 90  the  effects  that result therefrom. And these two forms of

body  are  such  that  it  is  impossible  for  any  other  thing  to change them,

except  only  themselves. Thus, for example, when a stone lies still, then it is

impossible that it should be moved by the power of thought or anything else,

but  [it may]  well  [be moved]  by  motion,  as  when  another  stone,  having

greater  motion  than  this has rest, makes it move. Likewise also the moving

stone will not be made to rest except through something else which has less

motion.  It  follows,  accordingly, that no mode of thought can bring motion or

rest into a body. In accordance, however, with what we observe in ourselves,

it  may  well  happen  that  a  body which is moving now in one direction may

nevertheless  turn  aside  in  another direction; as when I stretch out my arm

and  thereby  bring  it about that the [vital] spirits which were already moving

in  a  different  direction, nevertheless move now in this direction, though not

always,  but according to the disposition of the [vital] spirits, as will be stated

presently.
 

                                                                                         { Mind }
[23-12]  The cause of this can be none other than that the soul, being an Idea         Mark Twain

of  this  body,  is united  with  it  in  such  a  way  that  it and this body, thus          2P1 & 2P2

constituted, together form a whole.
 
 

[23-13]   The  most  important effect of the other or thinking attribute is an Idea

of  things,  which  is  such  that,  according  to the manner in which it appre-

hends  them,  there  arises  either  Love  or  Hatred,  etc.  This  page 91  effect,

then,  as  it  implies  no  extension,  can  also  not  be attributed to the same,

but only to thought;  so that, whatever the changes which happen to arise in

this  mode,  their  cause  must on no account be sought for in extension, but

only in the thinking thing.  We can see this, for instance, in the case of Love,

which,  whether  it is to be suppressed or whether it is to be awakened, can

only  be  thus affected through the idea itself, and this happens, as we have

already  remarked,  either  because something bad is perceived to be in the

object,  or  because  something  better  comes to be known. Now whenever

these attributes happen to act the one on the other, there results a passivity

which one suffers from the other; namely [in the case of extension],  through

the determination of movements  which we have the power to direct in what-

ever direction we please.  The process, then, whereby the one comes to be

passively affected by the other, is this:  namely, the soul in the body, as has

already  been  remarked, can well bring it about that the [vital] spirits, which

would otherwise move in the one direction, should nevertheless move in the

other  direction;  and  since  these  [vital] spirits  can also be made to move,

and  therefore  directed,  by  the  body, it may frequently happen that, when

the  body  directs their movements towards one place, while the soul directs

them  towards  another  place,  they  bring  about  and occasion in us those
                [     anxieties      ]
peculiar  fits of depression which we sometimes feel without  Page 92  knowing

the  reasons  why  we  have  them. For otherwise the reasons are generally

well known to us.


                                                                 { Mind }                         { The Master }
[23-14]   Furthermore,  the power which the soul has to move the [vital] spirits

may  well  be  hindered also either because the motion of the [vital] spirits is

much  diminished,  or  because  it  is much increased. Diminished, as when,            Training

having  run  much,  we bring it about that the [vital] spirits, owing to this run-

ning,  impart  to  the  body  much  more  than  the  usual  amount  of motion,

by  losing  this [motion] they  are necessarily that much weakened; this may

also  happen  through taking all too little food. Increased, as when, by drink-

ing too much wine or other strong drink, we thereby become either merry or
                                                                                       {? less}
drunk,  and  bring  it  about  that the soul has  no  power to control the body.
 
 

[23-15]   Having said thus much about the influences which the soul exercises

on  the  body,  let  us  now  consider  the influences of the body on the soul.

The  most  important  of  these,  we  maintain,  is  that  it  causes the soul to

become  aware   of it, and through it also of other bodies. This is effected by

Motion  and  Rest  conjointly,  and by nothing else: for the body has nothing

else  than  these  wherewith  to operate; so that whatever else comes to the

soul,  besides  this  awareness, cannot be caused through the body. And as

the  first  thing  which the soul gets to know is the body, the result is that the

soul  loves   it so, and becomes united with it. But since, as we have already

page 93   said  before,  the  cause  of  Love,  Hatred,  and  Sorrow  must not be

sought  for  in  the  body but only in the soul (because all the activities of the

body  must  proceed  from  motion  and  rest),  and since we see clearly and

distinctly  that  one  love  comes  to  an  end  as  soon  as we come to know

something  else  that  is better, it follows clearly from all this that, If once we

get  to  know G-D, at least with a knowledge as clear as that with which we

also  know  own  body,  then  we  must become united with Him even more

closely  than  we  are  with  our body, and be, as it were, released from the

body.  I  say  more  closely,  because  we  have  already proved before that

without  Him  we  can  neither  be,  nor be known and this is so because we

know  and  must  know Him, not through something else, as is the case with

all  other  things,  but only through Himself, as we have already said before.

Indeed,  we  know  Him better even than we know ourselves, because with-          Analogy

out Him we could not know ourselves at all.
 
 

[23-16]   From  what  we  have  said  so  far  it is easily gathered which are the

chief  causes  of  the  passions.  For,  as  regards  the  Body with its effects,

Motion  and  Rest,  these  cannot  affect  the  soul otherwise except so as to

make  themselves  known to it as objects; and according to the appearances

which  they  present  to  it,  that is according as they appear good or bad, so

also  is the soul affected by them, and that [happens] not inasmuch as it is a

body (for then the body would  page 94  be the principal cause of the passions),

but  inasmuch  as  it is an object like all other things, which would also act in

the same way if they happened to reveal themselves to the soul in the same

way.  (By  this,  however,  I  do  not  mean  to say that the Love, Hatred, and

Sorrow  which proceed from the contemplation of incorporeal things produce

the  same  effects  as  those which arise from the contemplation of corporeal

things; for, as we shall presently say, these have yet other effects according

to  the  nature  of the thing through the apprehension of which Love, Hatred,

and  Sorrow,  etc.,   are   awakened   in   the  soul  which  contemplates  the

incorporeal  things.)  So  that,  to return to our previous subject, if something

else  should appear to the soul to be more glorious than the body really is, it

is  certain  that  the body would then have no power to produce such effects

as  it  certainly  does  now.  Whence it follows, not alone that the body is not

the  principal  cause  of  the  passions, but also that even if there were in us

something  else  besides  what  we  have  just  stated  to  be capable, in our

opinion,  of  producing  the  passions, such  a thing, even if there were such,

could  likewise  affect  the  soul  neither  more  nor  differently than the body

does in fact now.  For it could never be anything else than such an object as

would  once  for all be different from the soul, and would consequently show

itself  to  be such and no other, as we have likewise stated also  page 95  of the

body.  So  that  we may,  with truth, conclude that Love, Hatred, Sorrow, and

other  passions  are  produced  in  the soul in various forms according to the

kind  of  knowledge  which, from time to time, it happens to have of the thing;

and  consequently,  if  once  it  can  come  to know the most glorious of all, it      Deus sive Natura

should  be  impossible for any of these passions to succeed in causing it the
         { loss of PcM }
least perturbation.
 
 
                                                                                                                {Note 2 Edition}
[23-17]   Now,  as  regards  what  we  have  said  in the preceding chapter, the

following difficulties might be raised by way of objection.
 
 

[23-18]   First, if motion is not the cause of the passions then why is it possible,

nevertheless,  to banish sorrow by the aid of certain means, as is often done

by means of wine? To this it serves [as an answer] that a distinction must be

made  between  the  soul's  awareness,  when  it  first becomes aware of the

body,  and  the  judgment which it presently comes to form as to whether it is

good or bad for it.
 
 

[23-19]   Now  the  soul,  being  such  as  just  stated, has, as we have already

shown  before,  the power to move the [vital] spirits whithersoever it pleases;            Training

but  this  power may, nevertheless, be taken away from it, as when, owing to

other  causes  [arising out]  of  the  body generally, their form, constituted by

certain proportions [of motion and rest], disappears or is changed; and when

it  becomes  aware  of  this  [change]  in it,  there arises sorrow, which varies

with page 96  the  change  which  the  [vitaI] spirits undergo. This sorrow results
          { no, conatus }
from its love for, and union with, the body.
                                         { need }
 

[23-20]   That  this  is  so  may be easily deduced from the fact that this sorrow

can  be  alleviated  in  one  of  these  two  ways; either by restoring the [vital]

spirits  to  their  original  form, that is by relieving him of the pain, or by being
                                                             a leap-of-faith  }
persuaded  by  good  reasons  to  make  no  ado about this body. The first is
                                                                                 faith in Deus sive Natura  }                    posit
temporary,  and  [the sorrow]  is  liable  to  return;  but  the second is eternal,

  [constant]
permanent, and unchangeable.
 
 

[23-21]   The  second  objection may be this: as we see that the soul, although

it  has nothing in common with the body, can yet bring it about that the [vital]

spirits,  although  they  were  about  to  move  in one  direction, nevertheless

move  now in the other direction, why should it not also be able to effect that

a  body  which  is  perfectly  still  and  at  rest  should  begin  to  move itself?

Likewise,  why  should  it  not  also  be  able  to move in whatever direction it

pleases all other bodies which are already in motion?
 
 

[23-22]   But  if  we  recall  what  we  have  already said before concerning the

thinking  thing,  it  can  remove  this  difficulty for us quite easily. Namely, we

then  said  that although Nature has various attributes, it is, all the same, but
                                                                              {affirmed}
one only Being,  of which all these attributes are predicated. Besides this we           Disclaimer

have  also  said  that  the thinking thing, too, was but one only  page 97  thing in

Nature,  and  is  expressed  in  infinite  Ideas,  in accordance with the infinite

things  which  exist  in  Nature;  for  if  the body receives such a mode as, for

example,  the  body of Peter, and again another such as is the body of Paul,

the  result  of  this  is  that  there are in the thinking thing two different Ideas:

namely,  one  idea  of the body of Peter, which constitutes the Soul of Peter,

and  another  of  [the body of] Paul, which constitutes the Soul of Paul. Now

the  thinking  thing  can well move the body of Peter by means of the Idea of

the  body  of Peter, but not by means of the Idea of the body of Paul; so that

the  soul  of  Paul  can  well  move  its  own  body,  but  by no means that of

another,  such  as  that  of  Peter.  And  for this reason also it cannot move a

stone  which rests or lies still: because the stone, again, makes another Idea

in  the  Soul.  Hence  also it is no less clear that it is impossible that a stone,

which  is  perfectly at rest and still, should be made to move by any mode of

thought, for the same reasons as above.
 
 

[23-23]   The  third  objection  may  be  this: We seem to be able to see clearly
                                                                            [rest]
that we can,  nevertheless, produce a certain stillness in the body. For, after

we  have  kept  moving  our  [vital] spirits for a long time, we find that we are

tired;  which,  assuredly,  is  nothing else than a certain stillness in the [vital]

spirits  brought about by ourselves. We answer, however, that it is quite true

that the soul is a cause of this stillness, but  page 98  only indirectly; for it puts a

stop to the movement not directly, but only through other bodies which it has

moved,  and  which  must  then  necessarily  have  lost as much as they had

imparted  to  the  [vital] spirits.  It is therefore clear on all sides that in Nature

there is only one and the same kind of motion.
 
 
 



Page 99
Chapter 24 - On Reason                                                                                                  P131
 

[24-1]   AT  PRESENT  we  have  to  inquire  why it happens that sometimes,

although we see that a certain thing is good or bad, we nevertheless do not          Mark Twain

find  in  us  the  power  either to do the good or to abstain from the bad, and

sometimes,  however,  we  do  indeed  [find this power in us].  This  we  can

easily  understand  if  we  consider the causes that we assigned to opinions

which we stated to be the causes of all effects.  These, we then said, [arise]

either  from  hearsay,  or  from  experience. And since all that we find in our-

selves has greater power over us than that which comes to us from outside,
                                                                                                        [destruction]
it   certainly   follows   that   Reason   can   be  the  cause  of  the  extinction

of  opinions  which  we  have  got from hearsay only (and this is so because

reason  has  not  like  these  come  to  us from outside), but by no means of

those  which  we  have  got  from  experience. For the power which the thing

itself  gives  us  is  always  greater  than that which we obtain by way of con-

sequence  through  a second thing; we noted this difference when speaking

of  reasoning  and  of  clear  understanding,  and we did so with the Rule of

Three  as  an  illustration.  For  more  power  comes  to  us  from  the under-

standing  of  proportion itself, than  page 100  from the understanding of the rule

of  proportion.  And  it  is  for this reason that we have said so often that one

love  may  be  extinguished  by  another  which is greater, because in saying

this  we  do  not, by any means, intend to refer to desire which does not, like

love, come from true knowledge, but comes from opinion.
 
 
 



Page 101
Chapter 25 - On True Knowledge
 

[25-1]   SINCE  MERE  comprehension  has no power to lead us to the attain-         Reason hits,
                                                                                                                               sooner or later,   
ment  of  our  well-being,  it  remains for us to inquire whether we can attain           a brick wall. }
                                {third in the Ethics}
it  through  the  fourth,  and  last, kind of knowledge. Now we have said that

this  kind  of  knowledge  does  not  result  from  something else,  but from a
    [immediate manifestation]                                                                         {G-D}
direct  revelation  of  the object itself to the understanding. And if that object
   [magnificent]
is  glorious  and  good,  then the soul becomes necessarily united with it, as

we  have  also  remarked with reference to our body. Hence it follows incon-

trovertibly  that it is this knowledge which evokes love. So that when we get
              {Nature}
to  know  G-D  after  this  manner  then  (as  He  cannot  reveal Himself, nor

become known to us otherwise than as the most glorious and best of all) we

must  necessarily  become  united  with  Him.  And  only in this union, as we

have already remarked, does our blessedness consist.
 
 

[25-2]   I  do not say that we must know Him just as He is, or adequately, for it

is  sufficient  for  us  to  know  Him to some extent, in order to be united with

Him.  For  even  the knowledge that we have of the body is not such that we

know  it  just  as  it  is,  or  perfectly;  and  yet,  what  a  union!  what a love!
 

Page 102
[25-3]   That  this  fourth  [kind of] knowledge, which is the knowledge of G-D,

is  not  the  consequence  of something else, but immediate, is evident from

what we have proved before, [namely] that He is the cause of all knowledge
                        {a priori , innate, born-with. }
that  is  acquired through itself alone, and through no other thing; moreover,

also from this,  that we are so united with Him by nature that without Him we

can  neither  be,  nor  be  known.  And  for this reason, since there is such a

close  union  between  G-D  and  us,  it  is evident that we cannot know Him          Analogy

except directly.
 
 

[25-4]   We   shall  endeavor  to  explain,  next,  this  union  of  ours  with  Him
                               {need}
through nature and love.
 
 

[25-5]   We  said  before  that  in  Nature  there  can be nothing of which there

should  not be  an  Idea  in the soul of that same thing. And according as the

thing  is either more or less perfect, so also is the union and the influence of

the  Idea with the thing, or with G-D himself, less or more perfect. For as the

whole  of  Nature  is  but  one  only  substance,  and  one whose essence is             1D6

infinite,  all  things  are  united  through Nature, and they are united into one

[being],  namely,  G-D.  And  now, as the body is the very first thing of which

our  soul  becomes aware (because as already remarked, no thing can exist

in  Nature,  the  Idea  of which is not in the thinking thing, this Idea being the

soul  of  that  thing)  so  that  thing must necessarily be the first cause of the

Idea.
 

Page 103
[25-6]   But,  as  this  Idea  can  by no means find rest in the knowledge of the

body  without  passing  on  to  the knowledge of that without which the body

and  Idea  could  neither  be,  nor  be understood, so (after knowing it first) it

becomes united with it immediately through love.  This union is better under-

stood,  and  one  may  gather  what  it  must  be  like, from its action with the

body,  in  which  we  see  how  through  knowledge of, and feelings towards             Analogy

corporeal  things,  there  arise  in  us  all the effects which we are constantly

becoming aware of in the body,  through the movements of the [vital] spirits;

and  therefore  (if  once our knowledge and love come to embrace that with-

out  which  we  can  neither  be,  nor be understood, and which is in no way

corporeal)  how  incomparably  greater  and  more  glorious will and must be

the  kind  of  effects  resulting  from this union; for these must necessarily be

commensurate  with  the  thing with which it is united. And when we become

aware  of  these  excellent effects, then we may say with truth, that we have

been born again. For our first birth took place when we were united with the

body,  through  which the activities and movements of the [vital] spirits have

arisen;  but  this  our other or second birth will take place when we become

aware  in  us  of  entirely  different  effects  of  love, commensurate with the

knowledge  of  this  incorporeal object, and as different from the first as the

corporeal  is  different  from  the  page 104  incorporeal,  spirit  from flesh. And
                                                                                                       [Rebirth]
this  may,  therefore,  all  the  more  justly and truly be called Regeneration,       ST:Bk.XIV:2:3113.

inasmuch as only from this love and union does Eternal and unchangeable

existence ensue, as we shall prove.
 
 
 



Page 105
Chapter 26 - On the Immortality of the Soul                                          EL:[60]
 
 

[26-1]   IF  ONLY  we  consider  attentively  what  the  Soul is, and  whence its

change  and  duration originate, then we shall easily see whether it is mortal         E5:Endnote 21

or immortal.
 
 

[26-2]   Now  we  have  said  that  the  Soul  is an Idea which is in the thinking

thing,  arising  from  the  reality  of  a thing which exists in Nature. Whence it

follows  that  according to the duration and change of the thing, so must also

be  the  duration  and  change  of  the Soul. We remarked, at the same time,

that  the Soul can become united either with the body of which it is the Idea,

or with G-D, without whom it can neither be, nor be known.
 
 

[26-3]   From  this,  then,  it  can  easily be seen, (1) that, if it is united with the

body  alone,  and  that  body happens to perish, then it must perish also; for

when  it  is  deprived  of  the body, which is the foundation of its love, it must

perish with it. But (2) if it becomes united with some other thing which is and

remains unchangeable, then, on the contrary, it must also remain unchange-

able  and  lasting. For, in that case, through what shall it be possible for it to

perish?  Not through itself; for as little as it could begin to exist through itself

when  it did not yet exist, so little  page106  also can it change or perish through

itself, now that it does exist.
 
 

[26-4]   Consequently,  that  thing  which  alone  is  the cause of its existence,

must  also  (when it is about to perish)  be  the  cause  of  its non-existence,

because it happens to change itself or to perish.
 
 
 



Page 107
Chapter 27 - On G-D's Love of Man                                                 Calculus:4.4
 

[27-1]   THUS  FAR  we  have  shown  sufficiently,  we  think, what our love of

G-D  is,  also  its  consequences, namely, our eternal duration. So we do not

think  it  necessary  here  to  say  anything about other things, such as joy in

G-Dpeace of mind, etc.,  as from what has been said it may easily be seen

what  there  is  to  or  should  be  said about them. Thus (as we have, so far,

only  considered  our love of G-D) it still remains to be seen whether there is

also  a  divine  love  of us,  that is, whether G-D also loves mankind, namely,

when  they  love  Him.  Now,  in  the first place, we have said that to G-D no          5P17 & 19 

modes  of  thought can be ascribed except those which are in His creatures;
                  {   C:4.7    }
therefore,  it  cannot  be  said  that  G-D loves mankind, much less [can it be       E5:Bk.III:257- 8

said]  that  He  should  love  them  because  they  love  Him,   or  hate  them

because  they  hate  Him.  For  in that case we should have to suppose that

people  do  so  of  their  own free will, and that they do not depend on a first

cause;  which  we  have  already  before  proved  to  be  false. Besides, this

would  necessarily involve nothing less than a great mutability on the part of

G-D,  who,  though  He  neither  loved  nor hated before, would now have to

begin  to  love  and  page 108  to hate,  and  would be induced or made to do so

by  something  supposed  to  be  outside  Him;   but  this  is  absurdity  itself.
 
 

[27-2]   Still,  when  we  say  that  G-D  does  not  love  man, this must not be           P138, L27ff 

taken  to  mean  that  He  (so to say)  leaves  man  to  pursue his course all

alone,  but  only  that  because  man  together  with all that is, are in G-D in

such  a  way,  and  G-D  consists  of  all  these  in  such  a  way,  therefore,

properly  speaking,  there  can  be  in Him no love for something else: since

all form only one thing, which is G-D Himself.
 
 


[27-3]   From  this  it  follows  also that G-D gives no laws to mankind so as to      TTP: IV, XVI, XIX. 

reward  them  when  they  fulfill  them [and to punish them  when they trans-

gress them]  or,  to  state  it  more clearly,  that G-D's laws are not of such a

nature  that  they  could  be  transgressed.  For  the regulations imposed by
{ Deus sive Natura }
G-D on Nature,   according  to  which  all  things  come  into  existence  and
                                                                { Divine Laws }
continue  to  exist,   these,  if  we  will call them laws, are such that they can

never  be  transgressed;  such,  for  instance,  is  [the law]  that the weakest

must  yield  to  the  strongest,  that  no cause can produce more than it con-

tains in itself, and the like, which are of such a kind that they never change,

and  never  had  a beginning, but all things are subjected and subordinated

to  them.  And,  to  say briefly something about them: all laws that cannot be

transgressed,  are  divine laws;  the  reason  [is this],  because  whatsoever

happens,   is   not   contrary  to,  but  in  accordance  page 109   with,  His  own

decision.  All  laws  that  can  be  transgressed  are human laws; the reason

[is this],  because  all that people decide upon for their own well-being does

not necessarily,  on that account, tend also to the well-being of the whole of
                                                                               [destruction]
Nature,  but  may,  on  the  contrary,  tend  to the annihilation of many other        Calculus:3.1c

things.
 
 

[27-4]   When  the  laws  of  Nature  are  stronger, the  laws  of men are made

null;  the  divine laws  are  the final end for the sake of which they exist, and

not  subordinate;  human  [laws]  are  not.  Still, notwithstanding the fact that

men  make  laws  for  their  own  well-being,  and  have no other end in view

except  to  promote  their own well-being by them, this end of theirs may yet

(in  so  far as it is subordinate to other ends which another has in view, who

is  above  them,  and  lets  them  act thus as parts of Nature) serve that end

[which]  coincides  with  the  eternal  laws  established by G-D from eternity,

and   so,   together   with   all  others,  help  to  accomplish  everything.  For

example,  although  the  bees,  in  all  their  work  and  the  orderly discipline

which  they  maintain  among themselves, have no other end in view than to

make  certain  provisions  for  themselves  for  the  winter,  still,  man who is

above  them,  has  an  entirely  different end in view when he maintains and

tends  them,  namely,  to obtain honey for himself. So also [is it with] man, in

so  far  as  he  is an individual thing and looks no further than his finite char-

acter  can  reach;  but,  in  page 110  so  far  as  he is also a part and tool of the

whole   of   Nature,  this  end  of  man  cannot  be  the  final  end  of  Nature,

because  she  is  infinite,  and  must  make  use of him, together also with all

other things, as an instrument.
 
 

[27-5]   Thus  far  [we have been speaking]  of  the  law  imposed by G-D; it is      Deus sive Natura

now  to  be  remarked  also  that  man  is  aware  of two kinds of law even in

himself;  I  mean such a man who uses his understanding aright, and attains            P140, L21ff

to  the  knowledge  of  G-D;  and  these  [two  kinds  of  law]  result  from his

fellowship  with  G-D,  and  from his fellowship with the modes of Nature. Of

these  the  one  is  necessary,  and  the other is not. For, as regards the law

which results from his fellowship with G-D,  since he can never be otherwise

but  must  always  necessarily  be  united  with  Him,  therefore  he has, and

always  must  have  before  his  eyes the laws by which he must live for and

with  G-D.  But  as regards the law which results from his fellowship with the

modes,  since  he  can  separate himself from men, this is not so necessary.           Analogy
 
 

[27-6]   Now, since we posit such a fellowship between G-D and men, it might         TTP:I, VI, XIII. 

justly  be  asked,  how  G-D  can  make Himself known to men, and whether

this  happens,  or  could  have  happened,  by  means  of  spoken words, or

directly   through   Himself,   without   using  any  other  thing  to  do  it  with.
 
 

[27-7]   We  answer,  not by means of words, in any case; for in that case man

must  have  known  the  signification  page 111  of  the  words  before they were

spoken  to  him. For example, if G-D had said to the Israelites, I am Jehovah

your  G-D,  then  they would have had to know first, apart from these words,

that  G-D  existed, before they could be assured thereby that it was He [who

was speaking to them]. For they already knew quite well then that the voice,

thunder  and  lightning  were  not  G-D, although the voice proclaimed that it

was  G-D.  And  the  same  that  we  say here about words, we also mean to

hold good of all external signs.
 
 

[27-8]   We  consider  it,   therefore,  impossible that G-D should make Himself

known to men by means of external signs.
 
 

[27-9]   And  we  consider  it  to be unnecessary that it should happen through
                                                                                                   [intellect]
any  other  thing  than  the  mere  essence  of G-D and the understanding of

man;  for, as the Understanding is that in us which must know G-D, and as it

stands  in  such  immediate  union  with  Him  that  it  can  neither  be, nor be

understood  without  Him,  it is incontrovertibly evident from this that no thing

can  ever  come  into  such close touch with the Understanding as G-D Him-

self  can.  It  is  also  impossible to get to know G-D through something else.

[27-12]   We therefore conclude, finally, that, in order to make Himself known

to  men,  G-D  can and need use neither words, nor miracles, nor any other

created thing, but only Himself.
 
 
 



Page 113
Chapter 28 - On Devils                                                      TTP:ii, P143
 
 

[28-1]   WE  SHALL  now  briefly  say  something  about  devils,  whether they

exist or do not exist, and it is this:
 
 

[28-2]   If  the  Devil  is  a  thing  that  is  once for all opposed to G-D, and has

absolutely  nothing  from  G-D,  then  he  is  precisely identical with Nothing,

which we have already discussed before.
 
 

[28-3]   If,  with  some,  we  represent  him  as  a  thinking thing that absolutely

neither  wills  nor  does  any  good, and so sets himself, once for all, in oppo-

sition  to  G-D,  then  surely  he  is very wretched, and, if prayers could help,

then one ought to pray for his conversion.
 
 

[28-4]   But  let us just see whether such a wretched thing could even exist for

a single moment.  And,  if we do so, we shall immediately find out that it can-

not;  for  whatever duration a thing has results entirely from the perfection of

the  thing,  and  the  more  essence and godliness things possess, the more           P143, L15ff 

lasting  are  they:  therefore, as the Devil has not the least perfection in him,

how  should  he  then, I think to myself, be able to exist? Add to this, that the

persistence  or duration of a mode of the thinking thing only results from the
                                                  { needorganic interdependence }
union  in  which  such a mode is, through love, joined to G-D. As the precise

opposite   page 114   of  this  union  is  supposed in the case of the Devils, they

cannot possibly exist.
 
 

[28-5]   As,  however,  there is no necessity whatever why we should posit the

existence of Devils, why then should they be posited? For we need not, like

others,  posit  Devils  in  order  to  find  [in them the cause of Hatred, Envy,

Wrath, and such-like passions, since we have found this sufficiently, without

such fictions.
 
 
 



Page 115
Chapter 29 - On True Freedom
 

[29-1]   BY  THE  assertion  of  what  precedes  we  not  only  wanted to make

known  that  there  are  no  Devils,  but  also,  indeed, that the causes (or, to

express  it  better,  what  we  call  Sins)  which hinder us in the attainment of
                         {  
is our data base.  }
our  perfection  are  in ourselves.  We have also shown already, in what pre-

cedes,  how  and in what manner, through reason as also through the fourth

kind   of   knowledge,   we  must  attain  to  our  blessedness,  and  how  the

passions  which  are  bad  and should be banished must be done away with:

not  as  is  commonly urged, namely, that these [passions] must first be sub-

dued  before  we can attain to the knowledge, and consequently to the love,

of G-D.  That  would  be just like insisting that someone who is ignorant must

first  forsake  his  ignorance before he can attain to knowledge. But [the truth

is]  this,  that  only  knowledge  can cause the disappearance thereofas is

evident  from all that we have said. Similarly, it may also be clearly gathered

from  the  above that without Virtue, or (to express it better) without the guid-        P144, L18ff 

ance  of  the  Understanding,  all tends to ruin, so that we can enjoy no rest,

and  we live, as it were, outside  our element. So that even if from the power        P144, L22ff

 page 116   of  knowledge  and  divine  love  there accrued to the understanding

not  an  eternal  rest, such as we have shown, but only a temporary one, it is

our  duty  to seek even this, since this also is such that if once we taste it we

would exchange it for nothing else in the world.
 
 

[29-2]   This being so,  we may, with reason, regard as a great absurdity what

many,  who  are  otherwise  esteemed as great theologians, assert, namely,

that  if  no  eternal  life  resulted  from the love of G-D, then they would seek

what  is  best  for themselves: as though they could discover anything better

than  G-D!  This  is  just  as silly as if a fish (for which, of course, it is impos-         P145, L8ff 

sible  to  live  out  of  the water) were to say: if no eternal life is to follow this

life  in  the  water,  then I will leave the water for the land; what else, indeed,

can they say to us who do not know G-D?
 
 

[29-3]   Thus  we  see,  therefore, that in order to arrive at the truth of what we
                                                                              {
PcM}
assert  for  sure  concerning our happiness and repose, we require no other 
                                                                                            {
true}                             { True is what
principles except only this, namely, to take to heart our own ^ interest, which       perpetuates you. }
                                                                                       { ^
Ayn Rand }
is  very  natural in all things. And since we find that, when we pursue sensu-

ousness,  pleasures,  and  worldly  things,  we  do  not find our happiness in

them,  but,  on  the  contrary,  our ruin, we therefore choose the guidance of

our  understanding.  As,  however,  this can make no progress, unless it has

first  attained  to  the  knowledge  and  love  of  G-Dpage 117  therefore it was

highly  necessary  to  seek this (G-D); and as (after the foregoing reflections

and  considerations) we have discovered that He is the best good of all that

is  good,
 we are compelled to stop and to rest here. For we have seen that,
                                                                                    
salvation  ]                           
outside  Him,  there  is  nothing  that  can give us any happiness. And it is a

true  freedom to be, and to remain, bound with the loving chains of His love.        P145, L28f 

 
 
[29-4]   Lastly,  we  see  also that reasoning is not the principal thing in us, but

only  like a staircase by which we can climb up to the desired place, or like a

good  genius  which, without any falsity or deception, brings us tidings of the

highest good  in  order  thereby  to  stimulate  us to pursue it, and to become

united with it; which union is our supreme happiness and bliss.                           Isaac Bashevis Singer
 
 

[29-5]   So,  to  bring  this  work  to  a  conclusion, it remains to indicate briefly

what  human  freedom  is,  and  wherein  it  consists. For this purpose I shall

make  use  of  these  following propositions, as things which are certain and

demonstrated.
 
 

[29-11]   Now  let  us  just  see  what  we must concede from the above propo-

sitions. In the first place, then,
 

 

[29-16]   From  all  that  has  been said it may now be very easily conceived

what  is  human  freedom,  which  I  define  to  be  this: it is, namely, a firm
                                                                                                          { posit }
reality  which  our  understanding  acquires through direct union with G-D,              WHY?

so  that  it  can  bring  forth  ideas  itself, and effects outside itself, in com-

plete  harmony  with  its  nature;  without,  however,  its effects being sub-              Freedom

jected  to  any  external  causes,  so as to be capable of being changed or

transformed  by  them. Thus it is, at the same time, evident from what has

been  said,  what  things there are that are in our power, and are not sub-

jected  to  any  external  causes;  we have likewise also proved here, and

that  in  a different way from before, the eternal and lasting duration of our

understanding;  and, lastly, which effects it is that we have to value above

all others.
 
 

[29-17]   So,  to  make  an end of all this, it only remains for me still to say to            Wolf:H5-2 

my friends to whom I write this:

Page 121 Be  not  astonished  at  these  novelties;  for it is very well known to

you  that  a  thing  does  not  therefore  cease  to be true because it is not

accepted by many.  And also, as the character of the age in which we live

is  not  unknown  to  you,  I  would  beg  of  you  most earnestly to be very

careful  about  the communication  of these things to others. I do not want

to  say  that  you should absolutely keep them to yourselves, but only that

if  ever  you begin to communicate them to anybody, then let no other aim
                                                         { Peace of Mind }                                                          Mark Twain
prompt  you  except  only  the  happiness  of  your  neighbor, being at the  

same  time clearly assured by him that the reward will not disappoint your

labor.  Lastly,  if  on reading this through, you should meet with some diffi-

culty  about  what  I  state  as  certain I  beseech you that you should not

therefore  hasten  at  once  to  refute  it, before you have pondered it long

enough  and  thoughtfully  enough,  and  if  you do this I feel sure that you
                                                                                             G-D }
will  attain  to  the  enjoyment  of  the  fruits of this tree which you promise

yourselves. 
 
                                                          { Etz Chaim hi l'machazikim bah
                                                            It's a living tree of life for those who hold fast to it.
}
 


 
                                                                                          


 




Commentary from Book XXIII
Adapted to Book XXII

[The page numbers refer to Book XXIII; 
the line number, if given, is of the given page. 
Paragraph numbers shown thus [x-x] refer to Book XXII ] 


Page 165
P4
      THE Preface on the title-page of Codex A must have been written by an ardent follower of Spinoza, not by Spinoza himself. Hence Monnikhoff felt justified in substituting a new title-page (Pg. 6), not offensive to the theologians. The engraved portrait in A (which is reproduced here) is the same as 'that found in some copies of the Opera Posthuma, and was probably inserted in A by Monnikhoff, who also wrote the verses facing it. It is uncertain whether the portrait was engraved during the life-time of Spinoza. According to Rieuwertsz, as reported by Dr. Hallmann in 1704 (see Introduction, p. civ.), it was engraved some three or four years after the death of Spinoza, probably from the Wolfenbüttel portrait (see p. xcvii.).

The verses facing the portrait have been rendered by Dr. Willis as follows:

"Here Art presents us with Spinoza's face,          
Wherein deep lines of sober thought we trace;
 
Yet is the mental likeness better shown             
   To those who read and make his works their own.


Page165
P15
 
      The First Part is devoted to the consideration of G-D, His existence, attributes, &c. The same ground was subsequently covered in the First Part of the Ethics (De Deo). This and other resemblances to the Ethics naturally suggested that the Short Treatise was an early draft of the Ethics. Monnikhoff actually put Ethica on the title-page of Codex B, and the Short Treatise is sometimes referred to as the "small Ethics."


Page 166
P15
 
      The opening is remarkably abrupt. The expression "as regards the first" suggests a preceding enumeration of topics about to be discussed, but no such enumeration is given, unless it be on title-page of the Treatise, namely, God, Man, &c. Monnikhoff tried to avoid this crudity by substituting "this" for "the first." But the abruptness remains, and is the more striking because so many of the other chapters begin with an enumeration of the topics to be discussed. Freudenthal has suggested that the original opening may have been as follows: "Man has an idea of G-D as a Being consisting of infinite attributes, each of which is infinitely perfect in its kind. First, we will show that such a Being exists, and then we shall give our views as to what He is. As regards the first . . ."
       It is noteworthy that Spinoza begins with proofs that G-D is, and only then proceeds to determine what He is. The reason may have been this. He was teaching people who were already fairly familiar with the fundamentals of the Cartesian philosophy. He therefore commenced with the Cartesian proofs of G-D's existence, and gradually led up to his own comparatively strange conception of G-D. This kind of pedagogic method is not uncommon in the history of philosophy. Kant, e.g., started from the then current psychology and gradually led up to very different, almost startling results.
      The proofs themselves are mainly (though not altogether) Cartesian. (See Meditations, III. and V., and the Appendix in the translation of Descartes' Method, &c., by John Veitch). Unlike Descartes, however, Spinoza attaches the greatest weight to the a priori (innate, born-with) arguments.


Page 167
P15, L5
 
      A priori {existing in the mind independent of experience, innate, born-with}. An argument is said to be a priori when it proceeds from the character of a thing to its implications, from conditions to consequences, or from causes to effects. It is said to be a posteriori {not existing in the mind prior to or apart from experience} when it proceeds from consequences to conditions, or from effects to causes. These terms also have other meanings, but not in Spinoza.


Page 167
P15, L6ff
 
      The underlying thought is expressed in Spinoza's Principia Philosophia Cartesianæ, I. Def. ix. "When we say that something is contained in the nature or concept of a certain thing, that is the same as saying that it is true of that thing, or that it can be truly affirmed of that thing."


Page 167
P15, L7
 
      The word "nature" here means "character" or "essence." More commonly it means the material world, or (in Spinoza and Bruno, e.g.) even the entire universe.


Page 167
P15, L13
 
      "Essence" is one of the most difficult terms in Spinoza's vocabulary. In the Cogitata Metaphysica it is said to be "nothing else than that mode by which created objects are comprehended in the attributes of G-D." Briefly, the essence of a thing is its share of, or participation in, ultimate reality. In the case of G-D, essence and existence coincide. In the case of other things their existence as relatively independent entities is distinct from their essence.
      "Eternity," in its stricter sense, does not mean "incessant duration in time,"
but reality independently of time or beyond it.


Page 167
P15, L16
 
      "The existence of G-D is essence." Compare Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed, I. lvii.—" It is known that existence is an accident {something which may come or may not come} [= quality] appertaining to all Page 168  things, and therefore an element superadded to their essence. This must evidently be the case as regards everything the existence of which is due to some cause; its existence is an element superadded to its essence. But as regards a being whose existence is not due to any cause—God alone is that being, for His existence, as we have said, is absolute—existence and essence are perfectly identical. He is not a substance to which existence is joined as an accident, as an additional element. His existence is always absolute, and has never been a new element or an accident in Him" (Friedländer's translation, 2nd ed., p. 80).


Page 196
P47, L4-6 [2-1]
 
      This striving is described, in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (cap. xvi.), as the highest law of Nature, and (ibid. cap. vi.) Providence is identified with the ordo Naturæ. For Spinoza's (later) explanation of this striving, see Ethics, III. iv. vi. vii.


Page 196
P48, L10 [14-3]
 
      "Accidental " = that which is neither necessary nor impossible. In the passages referred to above, Spinoza distinguishes between the "contingent" and the "possible," which may be regarded as the two species of the "accidental.'' The main point is that according to him nothing really is "accidental," only some things are regarded as accidental on account of our ignorance of the causes or their operation.


Page 197
P50, L14ff [2-4]
 
      Cf. Maimonides (Guide, III. xviii.): "It is an established fact that species have no existence except in our own minds. Species and other classes are merely ideas formed in our minds, while everything in real existence is an individual object, or an aggregate of individual objects. ..... It is wrong to say that divine providence extends only to the species, and not to individual beings, as some of the philosophers teach. For only individual beings have real existence."


Page 197
P50, L21-27 [2-4]
 
      Compare Cogitata Metaphysica (I I. vii.): "What, indeed, is more absurd than to exclude from G-D's knowledge individual things, which could not exist for a moment without the concurrence of G-D? And then they maintain that God is ignorant of actually existing things, while they ascribe to God a knowledge of universals, which do not exist and have no essence apart from that of the individual things. We, on the contrary, attribute to God the knowledge of individual things, and not of universals, except in so far as He knows human minds."


Page 199
P56 [3-1]
 
      The distinction between Natura naturans and natura naturata may be traced back to Aristotle's distinction between the Unmoved (Mover) and the Moved. In the writings of Augustine (354-430) the Aristotelian division is developed into a threefold distinction, namely, (1) a Creator who was not created, (2) the created which also creates, and (3) that which has been created but does not create. Scotus Erigena added a fourth distinction (so as to complete the dichotomous scheme), namely, (4) that which neither creates nor has been created (= nothing). Scotus Erigena (ninth century) already maintained that God and the Universe are identical; Nature regarded as a creating totality being the same as God, while Nature regarded as a multiplicity of created things is what is called the world. This mode of thought was developed more fully by Averroes (1126-1198), the chief of the Arabian Aristotelians.


Page 200
P56, L12ff [3-2]
 
      Cf. Ethics, 1P28Schol., where the division of Natura naturata into "general" and "particular" is replaced by that into things produced by God "immediately, and "mediately." 


Page 200
P57, L2-8 [3-2]
 
      Probably for the reasons stated in lines 7, 8, understanding and Motion are referred to in the Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding as res fixæ et æternæ. They are also commonly referred to as the "infinite modes." Cf. Letter LXIV. 


Page 200
P57, L18, 20 [4-3]
 
      It seems strange that Motion should be described as a "Son of God." But its correspondence or parallelism with Understanding, in Spinoza's scheme, compelled him to predicate of Motion whatever he affirmed of the Understanding by way of epithets indicating position in the scheme. And to describe Understanding as the "Son of God" was, of course, Biblical—1 Cor. 1. 24: Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God. It was, no doubt, with reference to this Scriptural passage that Spinoza wrote in Letter LXXIII.: "I do not think it at all necessary for one's salvation to know Christ according to the flesh; but as regards the eternal Son of God, that is, G-D's eternal wisdom, which has manifested itself in all things, especially in the human mind, and most of all in Christ Jesus, one must think otherwise. For without this no one can attain to a state of bliss, because it alone shows what is true or false, good or evil."


Page 201
P57, L21 [4-2]
 
      The expression "created . . . from all eternity" amounts to a denial of "creation" in its usual sense. Spinoza makes this quite clear in Cogitata Metaphysica, II. x.: "Neither was the Son of God created, He was eternal like the Father. When, therefore, we say that the Father had begotten the Son from eternity, we only mean that the Father has always shared His eternity with the Son."


Page 203
P66, L1- 5 [6-5]
 
      According to the reservation here made, G-D or Substance is no part of the nature of man, because although man could not be, or be conceived without G-D, yet G-D could well be, and be conceived without man {there are no ends, man could become extinct}. Cf. Ethics, I I., Definition ii., and prop. x.


Page 203
P67, L7f [7-2]
 
      The meaning is clear, namely, the modes to be considered first are the modes of thought, because these are known or experienced more immediately than the modes of extension (i.e., material objects, including human bodies), our knowledge of all modes of extension being, of course, included among the modes of cognition {something known or perceived}. The language, however, is rather obscure. What is "the consciousness of the knowledge of ourselves"? It has been suggested by Freudenthal that the original Latin may have been,..... misconstrued. In accordance with this plausible emendation we should read here: "... certain ideas or our knowledge, and then we shall treat of the things which are outside us."


Page 204
P67, L10ff [7-3]
 
      Here we have a threefold classification of the different kinds of knowledge, which is developed into a fourfold scheme by subdividing the first kind of knowledge. .....
In the Tractatus de Intelectus Emendatione [19] we find the fourfold scheme,
while in the
Ethics, II. xl. Schol. 2, Spinoza returns to the threefold scheme. .....


Page 204
P67, L11 [7-3]
 
      The first kind of knowledge (in the threefold scheme of the Ethics) is here called "belief," but elsewhere "opinion." The Latin was probably the same in all cases, namely, opinio. In English also" belief" is sometimes used for "opinion"; e.g., "I am not sure, but that is my belief" (or "I believe so ").


Page 205
P67, L13 [7-3]
 
      The second kind of knowledge, here called "true belief" (on Bk. XXIII, p. 69, line 14, simply "Belief"), is described on P. 74, line 19, as "a strong proof based on reasons." The distinction between "Opinion" and "True Belief" therefore recalls the Platonic (or even pre-Platonic) distinction. "Belief" (or "true belief ") seems a strange designation for reasoned or discursive {proceeding by reasoning or argument rather than intuition} knowledge. Spinoza himself substituted "Reason" afterwards (see, e.g., p. 99, line 16—"True Belief or Reason"). Joel, however, has pointed out that Crescas employed the term "Belief "in the same sense. The expression "true belief" may have been suggested by the following passage from Maimonides' Guide (1. 1.): "Belief . . . is the conviction that what is apprehended {to grasp the meaning of; understand, esp. intuitively; perceive.} exists outside the mind exactly as it is conceived in the mind. If in addition we are convinced that the thing cannot be different in any way from what we believe it to be . . . then the belief is true."


Page 205
P67, L14 [7-3]
 
      Sigwart has pointed out that the distinction between what is here called "clear and distinct conception'' (or immediate intuition) and "true belief" (or discursive reasoning) is also found in Descartes (especially in the Regulæ ad directionem ingenii, which, however, was only published in 1701, and was therefore unknown to Spinoza). But Descartes laid no such stress on the distinction, and also conceived it rather differently. Descartes' "immediate intuition" was mathematical in character and referred to the apprehension of the truth of certain propositions, especially the cogito ergo sum; Spinoza's "clear and distinct knowledge" is mystical in character, and referred to the apprehension {the faculty or act of understanding or perceiving} of objects, especially of G-D.


Page 206
P69, L22ff [7-14]
 
      Cf. Ethics, IV. Appendix, iii.: "Our actions, that is to say, those desires which are determined by man's power or reason, are always good; the others may be good or evil." Cf. also
Ethics, III. iii.

      "Passion" (= passio, affectus, or perturbatio) was used in the time of Spinoza, and even later, in a much wider sense than at present. It denoted not the violent emotions only, but all feelings, sentiments, and desires, as so many ways in which the mind "suffers" or "is affected" by external things.


Page 206
P69, L26ff [7-15]
 
      Cf. Ethics, II. Axiom iii.: "Such modes of thought as love, desire . . . do not arise unless there is also, in the same individual, an idea of the thing loved, desired, &c. But the idea may be there even when no other mode of thought is present." The view that "knowledge is the proximate {forthcoming; imminent} cause of all the passions" is opposed to the Cartesian view, according to which the passions "are produced, sustained, and strengthened by some movement of the animal spirits" (De Passionibus Animæ, I. 27). Spinoza assigns a purely mental origin to the passions, while Descartes ascribed them in large measure to physiological {consistent with the normal functioning of an organism} causes.


Page 206
P70 [8-1]
 
      In his treatment of the passions in this and the following chapters Spinoza follows closely Descartes' order of exposition in his De Passionibus Animæ, Parts II. and III. (This was already noticed by Boehmer when he published the Outline of the Short Treatise.) ......
      As regards details, there are numerous important differences between Spinoza's and Descartes' views on the passions.


Page 208
P70, L8ff [8-2]
 
      Spinoza's account of "surprise" is original. Descartes simply described it as evoked by "things rare and extraordinary," but he did not explain it.


Page 208
P73, L4 [8-8]
 
      The account here given of Desire is reversed in Ethics, III. ix. Schol., where it is maintained that we do not "desire anything because we think it is good, but, on the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we . . . desire it."


Page 208
P74, L9f [9-2]
 
      In geometry, e.g., we reason that such and such a figure must have such and such properties; but we do not prove thereby that such a figure actually exists.


Page 209
P75, L23ff [9-6]
 
      Cf. Ethics, IV., Preface, Def. i. and ii., and Appendix, § v


Page 209
P76, L26ff [9-9]
 
      The new point of view is noteworthy. So far the passions were judged by the kind of knowledge which produced them; we now observe a new criterion, namely, the character of the objects which are loved, &c.


Page 209
P78 [10-1]
 
      Love, it should be noted, is here distinguished according to the character of its objects, not according to the kind of cognition {something known or perceived} from which it results, which was the mode of procedure suggested at the beginning of Chapter viii. of Bk. XXII. Descartes, it may be remarked, rather disparaged any such distinctions based on the character of the objects loved (De Pass. An. II. 82)


Page 210
P78, L15f [10-5]
 
      "God, or . . . Truth." Cf. [20-3]—G-D is Truth, Truth is G-D. Because by "Truth" Spinoza means "the real essence of things as thought" (Martineau).


Page 210
P78, L17f [10-6]
 
      According to this, love is always "intellectual." Descartes had distinguished between amor intelectualis and amor sensitivus, the latter of which was supposed to be due entirely to physiological {consistent with the normal functioning of an organism} causes.


Page 210
P78, L20ff [10-7]
 
      In the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, cap. xvi., Spinoza speaks of it as "a universal law of human nature" that we can only relinquish what we think good in one of the two ways stated here.


Page 210
P79, L8ff [10-10]
 
      This explanation of love appears to be original; it is not in Descartes.


Page 210
P81, L15ff [10-17]
 
      On the "intellectual love of God" (Arnor Dei intellectualis) see Ethics, V. xxxii.f.


Page 210
P83, L16ff [11-6]
 
      Here things which are the "accidental" causes of injury are excluded from among the objects of "aversion"; in Ethics, III. Def. ix. of the Affects, aversion is defined as "sorrow with the accompanying idea of some object as the accidental cause of the sorrow."


Page 210
P83, L20ff [11-7]
 
      Here "sorrow" is described as an effect of hatred, &c.; in the above definitions (from the Ethics) hatred and aversion are described as species of sorrow. We thus seem to have here an identification of causa proxima with genus proximum {Genus = a class}.


Page 211
P83, L21 [11-7]
 
      Anger is accordingly defined in Ethics, III. Def. xxxvi., as "the desire by which we are impelled, through hatred, to injure those whom we hate."


Page 211
P83, L24 [11-7]
 
      Envy is defined in Ethics, III. Def. xxiii., as "hatred in so far as it affects a man so that he is sad at the good fortune of another person, and is glad when some evil befalls him."


Page 211
P85 [12]
 
      "Joy and Sorrow" are used in a very wide sense. almost as the equivalents of "Pleasure and Pain." They play a more important rôle in the Ethics than they do here.


Page 211
P85, L8 [12-1]
 
      "The same causes "—that is, the idea that a certain thing is good.


Page 211
P85, L12f [12-2]
 
      The definition here given of Sorrow is the same as that of Grief, [19-1]. In the Ethics (III. Def. iii. of the Affects) Sorrow (Tristitia) is defined as "man's transition from greater to lesser perfection {and therefore less able to perpetuate himself}." Descartes had defined it as the effect of a present evil.


Page 211
P85, L17ff [12-3]
 
      Cf. Ethics, IV. xli., where Spinoza says that Joy is in itself good, and Sorrow evil, because Joy increases the body's power of action {to perpetuate itself}, while Sorrow diminishes it.


Page 211
P86, L2f [12-4]
 
      Cf. Tract. de Int. Em. (p. 5), where Spinoza says that strife, hatred, sorrow, jealousy, and other evil passions arise from the love of the transient {corruptible} only, "but love for an object eternal and infinite feeds the mind with unmixed joy." Cf. Ethics, V. xx.


Page 211
P86, L7 [12-4]
 
      Reminiscent of Psalm xvi. ii:

      {I reminisce of Psalm 92:13, 14, & 15:


Page 212
P87, L7-9 [13-1]
 
      In the Ethics (III. Def. Aff. xxi. xxii.) Existimatio and Despectus are conceived so as to contain an element of bias. Existimatio (over-esteem) "consists in thinking too highly of some one in consequence of our love for him; Despectus "consists in thinking too little of some one in consequence of our hatred against him." 


Page 212
P87, L10 [13-3]
 
      "Self-respect." The Dutch is Edelmoedigheid, which generally means "noble bearing" or "generosity." Generositas, however, is defined in Ethics, III. Iix. Schol., as "the desire by which from the dictates of reason alone each person endeavours to help other people and to join them to himself in friendship." This is very unlike what is described here. 


Page 212
P87, L18 [13-5]
 
      "Conceit" (Verwaantheid) = Superbia (Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxviii.), "undue self-esteem prompted by self-love." 


Page 212
P87, L20 [13-6]
 
      "Culpable humility" (strafbare nedrigheid) = ? Abjectio, which is defined in Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxix., as "thinking too little of oneself, through sorrow."  


Page 212
P88, L6ff [13-7]
 
      In the Ethics (IV. liii.) Spinoza says that "Humility is not a virtue," because the rational man should think of what he can do, not of what he cannot do. Moreover, Humility is a species of sorrow, and sorrow is always bad. Apparently the good side of "true humility" has been joined to "self-respect" to constitute acquiescentia in se ipso, the contentment resulting from a just estimate of one's powers. 


Page 212
P88, L32 [13-9]
 
      Scepticism {maintains that real knowledge of things is impossible; doubt or unbelief regarding religion.} had a certain vogue in the time of Spinoza, and rationalist philosophies were often confounded with it. Hence philosophers like Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza felt it necessary to break a lance with Scepticism so as to make it clear that they were no Sceptics. In the Tract. de'Int. Em. [47] Spinoza remarks of the Sceptics: "They say that they know nothing; and they say that even this, namely, that they know nothing, they also do not know; nor can they say even that much absolutely: for they are afraid to admit that they exist, seeing that they know nothing; they should really be dumb, lest perchance they suggest something that may savour of truth .... They must consequently be regarded as automata, altogether devoid of mind." Further in [77] he dismisses such Scepticism as "belonging to an inquiry on obstinacy" rather than to an inquiry on Method.


Page 213
P89, L10f [13-10]
 
      Namely, that G-D is the highest and worthiest object of our esteem, as of our love (p. 81, line 13ff.).


Page 213
P90, L12ff [14-2]
 
      The way in which Spinoza here divides the passions appears to be original.


Page 213
P90, L27 [14-4]
 
      In Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xii., Hope is defined as "an inconstant joy arising from the idea of something future or past about the issue of which we have some doubt." Cl. also Ethics, III. xviii. Schol. 2


Page 213
P91, L2 [14-5]
 
      Ethics, III. Aff. Det. xiii.: "Fear [metus, not timor] is a wavering sorrow arising from the idea of something future or past about the issue of which we have some doubt." Cf. III. xviii. Schol. 2.


Page 213
P91, L3ff [14-6]
 
      Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xiv.: "Confidence is joy arising from the idea of something future or past concerning which all cause for doubt has been removed."


Page 213
P91, L8f [14-7]
 
      Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xv.: "Despair is sorrow arising from the idea of something future or past concerning which all cause for doubt has been removed."


Page 213
P91, L23ff [14-10]
 
      "Vacillation of mind" is treated from a different point of view in the Ethics (III. xvii. Schol., xxxi.), where it is described as the result of loving and hating the same thing at once, or (Aff. Def. xlii.) from a choice of evils.


Page 214
P91, L27ff [14-10]
 
      Ethics, III. Ii. Schol.: "I will call that man brave (intrepidum) who despises an evil which I usually fear." Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xl.: "Boldness (Audacia) is a desire by which one is incited to do something perilous which his fellows fear to attempt."


Page 214
P91, L30ff [14-11]
 
      Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxxiii.: "Emulation consists in feeling a desire for something because we imagine that others have the same desire."


Page 214
P91, L33ff [14-12]
 
      Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xli.: "Pusillanimity [or Cowardice] is attributed to one whose desire [to do something] is checked by the fear (timor) of a danger which his fellows are not afraid to face."


Page 214
P92, L1 [14-12]
 
      Ethics, III. li. Schol.; "The man who fears an evil which I usually despise will appear timid" (timidus).


Page 214
P92, L2 [14-12]
 
      "Jalousie" is given in the MSS. as the (French) equivalent for "Belgzucht"; apparently the translator was not sure how to translate zelotypia. According to Ethics, III. xxxv. Schol., Jealousy is "a vacillation of mind arising from a feeling of both love and hatred [for a certain object], accompanied by the idea of another person who is hated [because he has supplanted us]."


Page 214
P92, L8ff [4-14]
 
      On Hope, Fear, and their effects, see Ethics, IV. xlvii, lxiii.; on Confidence and Despair, Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xv.


Page 214
P94, L5ff [15-1]
 
      Remorse (Knaging) is conceived somewhat differently in the Ethics (III. Aff. Def. xvii.), where it (Conscientice morsus) is defined as "sorrow accompanied by the idea of something past which happened unexpectedly" (? contrary to expectations). This is Disappointment rather than Remorse. Verrassing (rashness) usually means surprise.


Page 215
P94, L7f [15-1]
 
      Repentance (Berouw). In Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxvii., Pænitentia is defined as "sorrow accompanied by the idea of something done, which we believe that we did by a free decision of the mind."


Page 215
P94, L18ff [15-2]
 
      The definitions of "Remorse" and "Repentance'' given here (in the Short Treatise) are the same as those given by Descartes (De Pass. An. III. 177, 191). But Spinoza's estimate of them is altogether opposed to that of Descartes, who considers remorse "useful" as tending to make people more cautious in future, and repentance as "most useful" because leading to an improvement in conduct. In Ethics, IV. liv. Schol., Spinoza makes a note worthy concession. "If men impotent in mind . . . were ashamed of nothing, and feared nothing, how could they be united or restrained? The mob inspires fear when it feels none. No wonder, therefore, that the Prophets, who were concerned about the welfare, not of the few, but of the community, commended Humility, Repentance, and Reverence so greatly. And indeed those who are subject to these feelings can be led much more easily than others, so as to live eventually by the guidance of Reason, that is, to be free, and live the life of the blessed."


Page 215
P95 [16-1]
 
      Cf. Ethics, III. Iii. Schol. :"Derision (Irrisio) springs from our contempt for a thing which we hate or fear, Scorn (Dedignatio), from the contempt of folly." 


Page 215
P95, L5ff [16-2]
 
      Cf. Ethics, IV. l. Schol.: "He who knows rightly that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and come to pass according to the eternal laws and rules of Nature, will forsooth find nothing deserving of Hatred, Laughter, or Contempt." (Cf. George Eliot: "To understand everything would be to pardon everything.") {Chain of Natural Events


Page 214
P95, L15 [16-2]
 
      This was probably directed against the view of Descartes (De Pass. An. III. 180) that a judicious use of derision might diminish vice by making it appear ridiculous.


Page 216
P95, L18f [16-3]
 
      Cf. Ethics, IV. liii. Schol.: "I see a great difference between Derision (which . . I stated to be bad) and laughter. For laughter, and jesting (focus) likewise, is sheer Joy; and is therefore good in itself, provided it be not excessive. Nothing, surely, but a gloomy and sad superstition forbids enjoyment."


Page 216
P95, L22 [16-3]
 
      "Spirits." The allusion is to the spiritus animales, the vital or animal spirits. The doctrine of spiritus animales is found already in the writings of the ancient Stoics and the medieval Scholastics, but was developed more fully by Descartes. Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood encouraged Descartes in the working out of his conception of the automatic character of animal organisms. His dualism—that is, his view that mind and body were entirely different substances which could not directly influence each other—made it necessary for him to explain all physiological processes by the principles of mechanics. The human body was accordingly regarded by him as a cleverly contrived machine {a new simplistic conception—a computerized machine}, all the parts of which (heart, lungs, brain, nerves, muscles, &c.) co-operated, or acted on each other, through the mediation of the blood which circulated all over the body. Now in passing through the heart the blood (it was said) becomes heated, its finest particles thereupon separate from the coarser ones, and rise to the brain, while the rest of the blood, which is too thick for the arteries leading to the brain, circulates through the other parts of body. It was this this very fine part of the blood, which alone had access to the brain, that Descartes called "spirits" (spiritus or esprits animaux = spiritus animales). Moreover, he regarded the "pineal gland" in the brain to be the "seat" of the Soul, and (deviating from the requirements of his dualistic philosophy), he maintained that the soul could influence the body, not indeed by setting in motion, but by directing the motion of the "vital spirits," in the same way, say, as a horseman directs the movements of his horse, which is not thereby carried by him, but actually carries him. Descartes endeavoured to minimise this infringement against his dualism by attenuating the material aspect of his "spirits" as much as possible. In the Discourse on Method, v., he says that "the animal spirits are like a very subtle wind, or rather a very pure and vivid flame." They play a very important rôle in his explanation of the passions. Spinoza was opposed to this causal mingling of the mental with the physical, which he criticised severely in his Ethics (Preface to Part V.). And this same difference of attitude constitutes a fundamental difference between Spinoza's and Descartes' account of the "passions."


Page 217
P95, L22ff [16-3]
 
      Because such laughter is only a physiological process, not a mental process or feeling.


Page 217
P95, L25 [16-4]
 
      "Indignation is hatred towards those who have injured others" (Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xx.), and "is necessarily evil" (IV. Ii. Schol.). 


Page 217
P96 [17-1]
 
      "Glory." The Dutch Eere generally means "honour," and this will do if understood in the sense of "feeling honoured"; but "honour" is too ambiguous to stand alone. The definition given of it here agrees with that of Gloria in Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxx., and although "Glory" is not a very satisfactory rendering, it has the merit of suggesting the Latin original. 


Page 217
P96, L20ff [17-4]
 
      Spinoza opposes the view of Descartes (De Pass. An. III. 206) that Glory and Shame tend to encourage virtue, the one through fear, the other through hope. In the Ethics (IV. lviii.) Spinoza allows that "Glory [as distinguished from "vainglory"] is not opposed to reason, and may even spring from it"; and (IV. Appendix, § xxiii.) that "Shame also helps towards concord, though only as regards such things as cannot be concealed." 


Page 218
P97, L11f [17-5]
 
      When Descartes refers to the good side of Glory and Shame he means "good for the person who has these feelings." Spinoza here makes a very different suggestion, namely, how such a person may thus be enabled to do good to others, who might otherwise not come under his influence.
      It is interesting to compare Spinoza's "philosophy of clothes" with what his biographers relate of him. Lucas (the earliest biographer of Spinoza) says that Spinoza himself was always careful to be dressed neatly when he went out, and strongly condemned deliberate negligence, saying, "It is not a dirty and negligent appearance that makes one learned." Colerus, on the other hand, relates that Spinoza was dressed no better than one of the meanest citizens; that a certain eminent Councillor of State while visiting Spinoza one day found him in a slovenly morning-gown, and when blamed for it Spinoza replied that "a man is not made better by having a finer gown," and that "it is unreasonable to wrap up things of little or no value in a precious cover" (see Pollock's Spinoza, 2nd ed. p. 394). The two accounts are not necessarily incompatible.


Page 218
P98, [18]
 
      Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xix.: "Favour is love towards one who has done good to another"; xxxiv.: "Gratitude (Gratia or Gratitudo) is the desire or endeavour of love with which we try to do good to one who from a similar feeling of love has conferred some benefit on us." 
      Spinoza here opposes the view of Descartes, who (De Pass. An. III. 194) considered gratitude "always virtuous as one of the chief bonds of human society." In the Ethics (IV. Ii.) Spinoza says that "Favour is not opposed to reason, but may agree with it, and arise from it"; and (IV. lxxi.) that "only those who are free are most grateful to one another."


Page 219
P99 [19]
 
      Ethics, III. Aff. Def. xxxii.: "Grief (Desiderium) is the desire or longing to possess something, which [desire] is fostered by the memory of the thing, and at the same time restrained by the memory of other things which exclude the existence of the thing longed for."


Page 219
P99, L15ff [19-2]
 
      This was most probably meant to be a new chapter, dealing with the feelings, generally from Spinoza's own peculiar point of view.


Page 219
P99, L16 [19-2]
 
      Note the equivalence of "True Belief" and "Reason."


Page 219
P99, L18f [19-2]
 
      Spinoza here repeats his protest against the Cartesian view that the passions are determined by the movements of the "vital spirits." Cf. [7-15]. 


Page 219
P99, L20ff [19-2]
 
      This is also in opposition to Descartes, who denied that the soul had any direct control over the passions (De Pass. An. I. 45). Cf. Ethics, V. xx. Schol.: "The power of the mind is determined solely by knowledge, while its impotence or passion is measured solely by the privation of knowledge"; and the knowledge of G-D (Spinoza adds) enables us to reduce the passions to a minimum, if not to destroy them. 


Page 219
P100, L5f [19-4]
 
      According to Descartes (ibid. III. 211), "all passions are by nature good"; it is only their abuse that is bad.


Page 219
P100, L11ff [19-5]
 
      Tract. de Intel. Emend. [9]: "All happiness or unhappiness depends on this alone, namely, on the kind of object to which we are attached by love. For on account of that which is not loved no strife will ever arise, there will be no sorrow if it perishes, no jealousy if it is possessed by another, no fear, no hatred, and, in a word, no mental commotion; all which arise, indeed, when we love what is perishable .... But love for an object eternal and infinite {G-D the totality of all things} feeds the mind with unmixed joy."


Page 220
P100, L29ff [19-7]
 
      Cf. Ethics, V. xx. Schol.: "Love towards an object immutable and eternal" "can always become greater and greater, and occupy the greatest part of the mind, and affect it through and through."


Page 220
P102, L6ff [20-1]
 
      Truth and Falsity are similarly defined in Cog. Metaph. I. vi., and in Ethics, I. Ax. 6. In the Tract. de Intel. Emend. [50], however, a different view of Truth appears, in which no reference is made to "agreement" or "correspondence'' with things. To have a true idea is to 'have objective the essentia formalis of the thing thought about (the ideatum). This view is developed also in Ethics, II. xxxiv., &c., where "true" ideas are identified with "adequate" ideas, "false" ideas with "inadequate" ones. Cf. Ethics, II. xliii.


Page 220
P102, L10ff [20-1]
 
      Cf. Descartes, Med. III. (Veitch, p. 118): "With respect to ideas, if these are considered only in themselves, and are not referred to any object beyond them, they cannot, properly speaking, be false; for, whether I imagine a goat or a chimera, it is not less true that I imagine the one than the other."


Page 220
P102, L15 [20-1]
 
      Descartes (Princ. Phil. I. lx.-lxii.—Veitch, pp. 219ff.) speaks of three kinds of Distinctions, namely, real, modal, and logical. A real distinction is that between two substances; a modal distinction is "that between the mode properly so called and the substance of which it is a mode, or that between two modes of the same substance"; while a logical distinction, or a distinction of reason, "is that between a substance and some one of its attributes . . • or between two such attributes of a common substance, the one of which we essay to think without the other"—" for example, duration is distinct from substance only in thought (ratione), because a substance which ceases to endure ceases also to exist."


Page 221
P102, L20f [20-1]
 
      This question, it may be noted at once, is not answered in this chapter, but in the next [21-7]. Most probably the passage containing the answer was intended to come at the end of this chapter.


Page 221
P102, L23f [20-2]
 
      Cf. Ethics, II. xliii. Schol.: "Just as light reveals both itself and the darkness, so truth is the standard of itself and of the false". Compare also Tr. de Intel. Em. [36]: "To be sure of a truth no sign is necessary, only just the possession of the true idea: for, as we have shown, in order that I may know, it is not necessary for me to know that I know."


Page 221
P103, L12ff [20-2]
 
      The same thought recurs in the Tr. de Intel. Em. [50?], where it is even more evident that Spinoza is thinking of Descartes, who (Med. III.— Veitch, p. 99) made the occurrence of dreams a ground for his preliminary scepticism.


Page 221
P103, L18-21 [20-4]
 
      The falsity of an idea, according to Spinoza, is not due to any positive element, but to the "inadequacy" or fragmentariness of the idea; the true or "adequate" idea is therefore richer, or has more essence, than the false one.


Page 221
P103, L24 [20-4]
 
      The expression "passivity" must not be taken too literally here. The explanation which follows immediately seems to suggest that what Spinoza meant was simply that the sequence of our ideas is not due to any arbitrary volition on our part, but is necessary. It is true that the sentence beginning "Now [20-4]" appears to suggest a kind of sensationalist view, namely, that the things outside us produce the ideas in us; and there are similar passages (see [affirm 21-5]). On the other hand, the explanation of error in (namely [21-7]) shows a very different view of human knowledge, a view more like that explained in the Ethics, where he insists on the spontaneity of ideation, in opposition to the view that ideas are "dumb pictures on a tablet" (II. xlix. Schol.). Possibly Spinoza may have been thinking of the immanent necessity in the sequence of our ideas or judgments. And in the case of immanent causality the usual distinction between activity and passivity disappears. See what he actually says on "Agent [1-7]". It is, of course, quite easy to suppose that Spinoza's theory of knowledge went through a complete change—that he began by conceiving knowledge to be merely passive, and ended by regarding it as eminently active. But the easier interpretation is not always the more accurate one. What Spinoza really intended to oppose was, I think, the Cartesian conception of judgment as an arbitrary act of volition (Med. IV.). On "some [21-6]", Spinoza seems to be dealing expressly with this view of Descartes.


Page 222
P104, L1ff [20-4]
 
      The sentence in brackets presents some difficulty. The Dutch is "(als door weinige of minder toevoeginge in [Codex B: toevoegingen van dien] 't zelve gewaar wordende)." The word "toevoeginge" seems hardly appropriate in any case. Sigwart translates it "Affectionen," Schaarschmidt "Anregungen." This is quite plausible, inasmuch as "toevoegen" is used for "addressing some one," and it may accordingly be rendered by "stimuli." This translation, however, makes the word "in" in Codex A wrong, while the sentence in brackets is a mere repetition of what precedes. But as "toevoegen" literally means "to add," it seems quite possible that "toevoeginge" may have been a rather clumsy translation of attributa or accidentia in the wider sense of "qualities." If so, the passage can be rendered thus: "(as becoming aware of it only through a few or the less important of the attributes in it [or "of its attributes"])." Dr. W. Meyer has paraphrased this passage in the same way, taking toevoeging as = toeeigening, or attribute.


Page 223
P105 [21]
 
      According to Freudenthal this Chapter [21] is misplaced. The substance of one part of it—namely, "Against [21-7]" to "this" at end of paragraph—should have been given at the end of Chapter [20]., as containing the answer to the question raised on "does [20-1]". {For the rest of this comment see Bk. XXIII, Page 223, Note P105; it was too convoluted, given that I was working with the Bk. XXII text.}


Page 224
P105, L10 [21-2]
 
      Desire: see [8-8]. In Ethics, III. ix. Schol., Desire is defined as "appetite"; in short (III. Afl. Def. i.), Desire denotes "all the strivings, impulses, appetites, and volitions of man."


Page 224
P108, L1 [21-4]
 
      "Idea"--that is, a general idea or abstraction derived from particular acts of volition {exercise of the will: She left of her own volition.}{Judging "Yes-true(1)' or "No-false(0)-" based on data in her data-base.}


Page 221
P109, L6ff [21-6]
 
      Spinoza is probably referring here to the Cartesian view that to have an idea is one thing, to make an affirmation or denial about it is another and depends on our free will. Spinoza identifies volition with affirmation and denial, but denies that it is free. The 'ideas necessitate certain affirmations or denials. Thinking is thus identified with judging. Cf. Ethics, II. xlix. Schol.


Page 225
P115, L10ff [22-6]
 
      Cf. Ethics, II. xlix. Schol.
      Trendelenburg has pointed out that in Plato's Euthyphron man is similarly described as the slave of God. There is a vast difference, however. In Plato's dialogue it is only "the ministration called holiness" (that is, sacrificing and praying to the Gods, as distinguished from justice, which is service to men) that is described as "of the same nature as that which slaves render to their master." Spinoza is not thinking at all of such restricted "divine service," but of the whole life and conduct of man.


Page 225
P116, L26ff [22-11]
 
      Probably an allusion to 1 John, iv. 13: "Hereby know we that we dwell in Him, and He in us, because He hath given us o[ His spirit." This verse was subsequently put by Spinoza on the title-page of his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.


Page 230
P131 [24]
 
      The views found in the present Chapter are developed much more fully in Ethics IV. ix.-xvii.


Page 233
P138, L27ff [27-2]
 
      Cf. Ethics, V. xxxvi, and xl. Schol.: "... Our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of Thought, which is determined by another mode of Thought, and this again by another, et sic in infinitum; so that all taken together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God."


Page 233
P140, L21ff [27-5]
 
      The following passage from Maimonides (Guide, III. ltv. p. 395) throws some light on this paragraph (and also on parts of Chapter 26.): "Even this [moral perfection] is only a preparation for another perfection, and is not sought for its own sake. For all moral principles concern the relation of man to his neighbour .... Imagine a person being all alone, and . , . all his good moral principles . . . are not required .... These principles are only necessary and useful when man comes in contact with others. The fourth kind of perfection is the true perfection of man; the possession of the highest intellectual faculties; the possession of , . . true metaphysical notions concerning God. With this perfection man attains to his final end; .. . . it gives him immortality; and makes him what is (properly) called Man."


Page 234
P143 [28]
 
      Cf. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, ii. As already stated in the Introduction, this chapter on Devils played an important role in the recovery of the Short Treatise. Kindness shown even to the devil is not wasted. Devils and spirits of all sorts and conditions were very real things in those days; Spinoza's quiet humour is much in advance of his time. In an earlier draft of the Treatise this chapter may have had a different place, for it is referred to as chapter xxi. by Hallmann.


Page 234
P143, L15ff [28-4]
 
      In Ethics, II. xxx., Spinoza says, on the contrary, that "the duration of our body does not depend upon its essence . . . but . . . upon the common order of nature and the constitution of things."


Page 234
P144, L18ff [29-1]
 
      Cf. Ethics, V. xlii: "Blessedness is not virtue's reward, but virtue itself .... The more a mind delights in the love of God . . . the more does it understand, that is, the greater power has it over its feelings, and the less does it suffer from evil passions."


Page 234
P144, L22ff [29-1]
 
      Cf. Ethics, V. xli: "Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal we should still hold Piety and Religion to be of first importance .... The creed of the multitude appears to be different. For most people seem to believe that they are free only in so far as they are permitted to indulge in lustfulness "Piety and Religion . . . they believe to be burdens." It is only the hope of reward and the fear of punishment after death that induce them to submit to the divine law. If they believed that minds perish with the body they would follow their own sweet will, and obey chance desires rather than themselves. But "this seems to be no less absurd than the conduct of a man who, because he does not believe that he can feed his body with good food to all eternity, decides to stuff himself with poisonous and deadly drugs; or because he sees that the mind is not eternal or immortal, therefore prefers to be mad and live without reason."


Page 235
P145, L8ff [29-2]
 
      The parable of the fish (as Joel has pointed out) was probably suggested to Spinoza by the following Talmudical legend (Babylonian Talmud, Berachot, 61b--quoted by Joel). In the reign of Hadrian the Romans prohibited the Jews to study the Law. Rabbi Akiba, however, persisted in studying and teaching it. And when a certain Pappos warned him of the danger that threatened him, he replied with the following parable: A fox on the banks of a river saw many fishes hurrying away from a certain spot. Asking them why they fled, he was told that they were afraid of the nets which had just been spread for them. "Come, then," suggested the fox, "come out, and let us live together on land, even as our forefathers did." "What!" exclaimed the fishes, "if even in our own element we can only live in fear and dread, what shall we do on land, which to us spells death?" Even so, said Rabbi Akiba, is it with the Jews. The Law is our element, for it is written, "It is thy life and the length of thy days." If danger lurks in the study of the Law, a yet greater danger lurks in the neglect thereof.


Page 235
P145, L28f [29-3]
 
      Cf. Hosea, xi. 4: "I drew them . . . with bands of love."
      In the Ethics, V. xxxvi. Schol., Spinoza says that human Salvation, or Blessedness or       Freedom, consists in "a constant and eternal love towards God."


Page 235
P146, L11f [29-6]
 
      Cf. Ethics, V. xl.: "The more perfect a thing is the more reality it possesses, and consequently acts more and suffers less."


Page 236
P147, L9ff [29-12]
 
      Cf. Ethics, V. xxxviii, xl. Here it is maintained that the greater our union with G-D is, the greater is our activity; in the Ethics we see the converse of this, namely, the more active we are (or the more we understand) the more are we united with G-D.
 
 



JBY NOTES:


Page 103
[25-6]

From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:2:3113.Born AgainRegeneration.

           Short Treatise, II, 22, #7.  These four terms, {salvation (salus), blessedness (beatitudo), liberty (libertas), or regeneration (Wedergeboorte)}, three in Latin and one in Dutch, are traceable to the New Testament, from which I have taken the Greek equivalents reproduced in the text. The Latin terms agree with those used in the Vulgate.  Cf. Luke 19:9; Romans 4:6; James 1:25; Matthew 19:28, It is interesting to note that Maimonides, too, gives a list of terms by which the state of immortality is designated in The Hebrew Bible: "This future blessedness is referred to by many names, as, for instance, 'the mountain of the Lord,' 'His holy place,' 'the way of holiness,' 'the courts of the Lord,' 'the graciousness of the Lord,' 'the tabernacle of the Lord,' 'the temple of the Lord,' 'the house of the Lord,' and 'the gate of the Lord.' Among the rabbis this blessedness which is in store for the righteous is referred to metaphorically as a 'feast'; but more frequently they refer to it as 'the world to come"' (Mishneh Torah, Teshubah, VIII, 4).

  

End


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