A POLITICAL TREATISE (TP) -  Part 1
Introductions:  Durant:650, Hampshire:179, Nadler:342, Cambridge:762. 
 
Posthumously Published - 1677

Benedict de Spinoza 

1632 - 1677

Title Page - Bk II:279.
 

BENEDICT DE SPINOZA'S POLITICAL TREATISE,

WHEREIN IS DEMONSTRATED, HOW THE SOCIETY IN
WHICH MONARCHICAL DOMINION FINDS PLACE, 
AS ALSO THAT IN WHICH THE DOMINION 
IS ARISTOCRATIC, SHOULD BE ORDERED, 
SO AS NOT TO LAPSE INTO A 
TYRANNY, BUT TO PRESERVE 
INVIOLATE THE PEACE 
AND FREEDOM OF 
THE CITIZENS. 

[TRACTATUS POLITICUS.]

Edited with an Introduction
by R. H. M. Elwes
Translated by A. H. Gosset
Published by G. Bell & Son
London
1883

Rendered into HTML and Text
by Jon Roland of the Constitution Society 
1998 

JBY Notes:

1.  For  the kind  permission  to  use  the  text  see  above.   JBY added
     sentence numbers.

2.  [2:4] - Chapter Number:Paragraph Number.
     Sentence numbers, added by JBY, are shown thus (zz:yy:xx).
               zz = Chapter Number.
            yy = Paragraph Number.
            xx = Sentence Number.

3.  Page  numbers  are  those  of  Book II.

4.  Citation abbreviations.

5.  (Footnote or the Latin word),
     {JBY Comment or endnote}.
 
6.  Please   e-mail   errors,   clarification  requests,  disagreement, or
     suggestions  to  josephb@yesselman.com.

7.  There  is  much  in  this  work  that  you  will  not agree with  or  even
     think   nonsense—although   keep  in  mind  that  it  was  written  300
     years ago.  The  work  is hopelessly outdated; its main value is that it      Bk.XII:310- 312.
     shows  Spinozistic ideas at play in the formation of advanced modern     Hobbes: Leviathan.       
     governments  and  how  they cope with the passions of men. Partake  
     of  the  work  (and my commentaries)  as  you  would a pomegranate;
     relish  the  flesh,  but  spit-out  the  pits.  See Introductions by Durant,
     Hampshire, and Nadler. 

8.  Spinoza's  purpose  in  writing  the  Treatise  is  to  design  a  govern- 
     ment  that  will  best  cope with  the  passions   of  men;  but for these
     passions   there   would   be   no   need   for   political   parties,   only
     administrative offices—running the Post Office.   See also Title Page,
     [7:2], and Self-interest.

9.  For  a  review  of  Spinoza's  "A Political Treatise"  see  F. POLLOCK'S
     "Life and Philosophy of Spinoza"  (1880),  Book XII,  Chap X,  Pg. 310.
     See also Elwes's Introduction EL:[66 & 67]:xxxii.

10. Where  applicable, I think it appropriate to substitute the term "State"
     for  "Clan"  or  "City"  so  as  to  understand  the idea in today's terms.
     Likewise,  where  applicable, substitute "Country" for "Dominion" and
     "Congress" or "Parliament" for "Council." For antecedents to the USA
     Constitution see 8:29, and 9:1ff.

Durant's Introduction to The Political Treatise. 
From Will and Ariel Durant's "The Story of Civilization: Part VIII",
Chapter XXII - Spinoza. ISBN: 0671012150,1963, Pages 650-653.
 
{I have changed Durant's spelling of God in accordance with SpinScript, Note 4.}

page 650
                                                VIII. THE STATE

[1]  Perhaps, when Spinoza had finished the Ethics, he felt that, like most Christian saints, he had formulated a philosophy for the use and salvation of the individual rather than for the guidance of citizens in a state. So, toward 1675, he set himself to consider man as a "political animal," and to apply reason to the problems of society. He began his fragmentary Tractatus politicus with the same resolve that he had made in analyzing the passions—to be as objective as a geometer or a physicist:  

That I might investigate the subject matter of this science with the same freedom of spirit as we generally use in mathematics, I have labored carefully not to mock, lament, or execrate human actions, but to understand them; and to this end I have looked upon passions, such as love, hatred, anger, envy, ambition, pity, and the other perturbations {agitations} of the mind, not in the light of vices of human nature, but as properties just as pertinent to it as are heat, cold, storm, thunder, and the like to the nature of the atmosphere. (162)

[2]  Since human nature is the material of politics, Spinoza felt that a study of the state should begin by considering the basic character of man. We might understand this better if we could imagine man before social organization modified his conduct by force, morality, and law; and if we would remember that underneath his general and reluctant submission to these socializing influences he is still agitated by the lawless impulses that in the "state of nature" were restrained only by fear of hostile power. Spinoza follows Hobbes and many others in supposing that man once existed in such a condition, and his picture of this hypothetical savage is almost as page 651 dark as in The Leviathan. In that Garden of Evil the might of the individual was the only right; nothing was a crime, because there was no law; and nothing was just or unjust, right or wrong, because there was no moral code. Consequently "the law and ordinance of Nature.., forbids nothing •.. and is not opposed to strife, hatred, anger, treachery, or in general anything that appetite suggests." (163) By "natural right," then—i.e., by the operations of "Nature" as distinct from the rules and laws of society—every man is entitled to whatever he is strong enough to get and to hold; and this is still assumed between species and between states; (164 +1) hence man has a "natural right" to use animals for his service or his food. (165)

[3]  Spinoza moderates this savage picture by suggesting that man, even in his first appearance on the earth, may have been already living in social groups. "Since fear of solitude exists in all men—because no one in solitude is strong enough to defend himself and procure the necessaries of life—it follows that men by nature tend towards social organization." (166) Men, then, have social as well as individualistic instincts, and society and the state have some roots in the nature of man. However and whenever it came about, men and families united in groups, and the "natural fight" or might of the individual was now limited by the right or might of the community. Doubtless men accepted these restrictions reluctantly, but they accepted them when they, learned that social organization was their most powerful tool for individual survival and development. So the definition of virtue as any quality that makes for survival—as "the endeavor to preserve oneself' (167+P22) —has to be enlarged to include any quality that makes for the survival of the group. Social organization, the state despite its restraints, civilization despite its artifices—these are the greatest inventions that man has made for his preservation and development.  
 
[4]  Therefore Spinoza anticipates Voltaire's answer to Rousseau: 

Let satirists laugh to their hearts' content at human affairs, let theologians revile them, let the melancholy praise as much as they can the rude and barbarous isolated life, let them despise men and admire the brutes; despite all this, men will find that they can prepare with mutual aid far more easily what they need .... A man who is guided by reason is freer in a state where he lives according to common law than in solitude where he is subject to no law. (168)

[5]  And Spinoza rejects also the other end of the law-less dream—the utopia of the philosophical anarchist: 

Reason, can, indeed, do much to restrain and moderate the passions, but we saw.., that the road which reason herself points out is very steep; so that such as persuade themselves that the multitude.., can page 652 ever be induced to live according to the bare dictates of reason must be dreaming of the poetic golden age, or of some stage play" (169) 

[6]  The purpose and function of the state should be to enable its members to live the life of reason.  

The last end of the state is not to dominate men, nor to restrain them by fear; rather it is to set free each man from fear, that he may live and act with full security and without injury to himself or his neighbor. The end of the state.., is not to make rational beings into brute beasts and machines [as in war]; it is to enable their bodies and their minds to function safely. It is to lead men to live by, and to exercise, a true reason .... The end of the state is really liberty? (170) 

[7]  Consequently Spinoza renews his plea for freedom of speech, or at least of thought. But yielding, like Hobbes, to fear of theological fanaticism and strife, he proposes not merely to subject the church to state control, but to have the state determine what religious doctrines shall be taught to the people. Quandoque dormitat Homerus.

[8]  He proceeds to discuss the traditional forms of government. As became a Dutch patriot resenting the invasion of Holland by Louis XIV, he had no admiration for monarchy, and he sharply counters Hobbes's absolutism: 

Experience is supposed to teach that it makes for peace and concord when all authority is conferred upon one man. For no political order has stood so long without notable change as that of the Turks, while none have been so short-lived, nay, so vexed by seditions, as popular or democratic states. But if slavery, barbarism, and desolation are to be called peace, then peace is the worst misfortune that can befall a state .... Slavery, not peace, comes from the giving of all power to one man. For peace consists not in the absence of war, but in a union and harmony of men's souls. (171)

[9]  Aristocracy, as "government by the best," would be fine if the best were not subject to class spirit, violent faction, and individual or family greed. "If patricians.., were free from all passion, and guided by mere zeal for the public welfare..., no dominion could be compared with aristocracy. But experience itself teaches us only too well that things pass in quite a contrary manner." (172)

[10]  And so Spinoza, in his dying days, began to outline his hopes for democracy. He who had loved the mob-murdered de Witt had no delusions about the multitude. "Those who have had experience of how changeful the temper of the people is, are almost in despair. For the populace is governed not by reason but by emotion; it is headlong in everything, and easily corrupted page 653 by avarice and luxury" (173) Yet "I believe democracy to be of all forms of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual liberty. In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs; he only hands it over to the majority." (174) Spinoza proposed to admit to the suffrage all males except minors, criminals, and slaves. He excluded women because he judged them by their nature and their burdens to be less fit than men for deliberation and government. (175) He thought that ruling officials would be encouraged to good behavior and peaceful policies if "the militia should be composed of the citizens only, and none of them be exempted; for an armed man is more independent than a man unarmed. (176) The care of the poor, he felt, was an obligation incumbent on the society as a whole. (177) And there should be but a single tax: 

The fields, and the whole soil, and, if it can be managed, the houses, should be public property, that is, the property of him who holds the right of the commonwealth; and let him lease them at a yearly rent to the citizens .... With this exception, let them all be free and exempt from every kind of taxation in time of peace. (178)

[11]  Then, just as he was entering upon the most precious part of his treatise, death took the pen from his hand.
 

Endnote TP1 - From Book 32; Hampshire:179-189—Politics and Religion:

Introduction to The Political Treatise:

[1]  In histories of political theory, particularly in English histories, he is often overshadowed by Hobbes, and sometimes appears only as the pupil of Hobbes. The extent of Hobbes' direct influence on him is a matter of inconclusive and largely unprofitable dispute; it was not the practice in the seventeenth century, as it is to-day, always to quote sources and influences (other than sacred or classical authorities), or to provide bibliographies; Hobbes is mentioned by name in the Letters, and his works were in Spinoza's library. It can be taken for certain that Spinoza read Hobbes carefully. It is equally certain that, however similar their conclusions in political theory, these conclusions were independently deduced from very different premises. They both argued that all men necessarily seek their own preservation {self-interest} and the indefinite extension of their power and liberty, and they both insisted that this proposition must be the starting-point of political theory; they both regarded peace and security as the end which all men pursue in political associations; peace and security can be maintained, and a war of all against all avoided, only by the vesting of superior power and superior means of coercion in some particular person or group of persons. Power, and not some moral notion {Golden Rule}, must be the fundamental concept in the study of societies and of the causes of their decline; all political policies must be judged by their effects on the distribution of power within the state, and by the effect of any particular page 180 distribution of power in avoiding anarchy, which is always for all men the greatest of evils. In recommending this amoral or naturalistic {Ayn Rand} approach to all political problems as the only possible approach, Hobbes and Spinoza are so far in complete agreement; to both of them appeals to ultimate moral notions {Ridley's Altruism} or to supernatural sanctions seemed a superstitious or dishonest playing with words. It is strictly meaningless to suppose that men have moral rights or duties, when men are conceived as natural objects {having no free-will} and without relation to the particular societies of which they are members; conceived as natural objects, each necessarily pursuing what seems to him the means of his preservation and liberty, they can only be said to have the right to do whatever they have the power to do. If we refuse to acknowledge their right to do something which they are able to do, the refusal is to be justified only by reference to the conventions {constitution} of their particular state or society; and their submission to these conventions in its turn will be justified by their overriding interest in the maintenance of society and in the avoidance of anarchy. To justify any moral or political decision to anyone must always be to show that the decision makes for his safety and happiness, either immediately or in the long run; no other kind of argument could be relevant.

[2]  So far Hobbes and Spinoza are in agreement; they were neither the first nor the last to argue that moral precepts and supernatural sanctions can and should be excluded from political arguments, and that all men in the last resort pursue what they conceive to be their interest, however  page 181 deviously and ignorantly; this is one of the permanent or recurrent patterns of political theory; it is a point of view represented by sophists {reasoning adroitly and deceptively attractively rather than soundly} and sceptics in Plato's dialogues and more than ever commonplace in the twentieth century. What is more distinctive of Hobbes and Spinoza is the argument that political consent and obedience can be justified as rational self-interest if, and only if, obedience {to a constitution} can be shown to be the acceptance of the lesser of two evils, anarchy and insecurity being always the greater evil. All rational political argument must involve the calculation of the lesser of two or more evils from among the practical possibilities; the fundamental mistake of theorists and ideologues is to look for absolute justifications and immutable principles; the defence of abstract principles, whether religious or purely moral, leads to irresoluble conflicts, but rationally self-seeking men can achieve peace by realistic compromises based on a clear estimate of the strength of their rivals; and peace is the supreme end of political associations. But at this point the agreement between Hobbes and Spinoza ceases; for the reasons, expressed and unexpressed, which led them to make a condition of peace the supreme criterion in all political decisions, were largely different {a remarkable twist}, following the differences in their logic and general philosophy; and the meaning which they attached to 'freedom', and the emphasis they placed upon it, was very different. According to Hobbes a man is free in so far as he can in fact satisfy his desires, whatever these desires may be; to be free is to do what one wants, desires and impulses being mechanically {deterministically, no free-will} page182 or physiologically {pineal gland} determined; the negation of freedom is frustration, whether the frustration is the result of natural causes or is caused by other men {both are natural causes}. Intelligence in practical matters is simply the calculation of the most efficient means to the satisfaction of natural needs; reason must always be the slave of the passions, which are the effects of physical causes. Both as metaphysician and political theorist, Hobbes was a pessimist, and his philosophy provides no visions of salvation or of the good life; the most that can be achieved by prudence and clear thinking is some temporary shelter from pain and fear; and peace and security is no more than the negative condition of not being persecuted or destroyed. Hobbes generally appears as the pessimistic philosopher of realistic conservatism, the defender of the established order, whatever it may be, against the restless claims of individual ambition and conscience; he upholds order and central organization, so that competition shall not lead to war and death.

[3]  The practical tendency of Spinoza's naturalistic approach to politics is so different as to be almost diametrically opposed to Hobbes'. They can be grouped together only so long as one chooses to separate their political from their general philosophy. For Spinoza the exercise of reason is not merely the means to self-preservation and the satisfaction of desire, but constitutes in itself the supreme end to which everything else must be a means; and reason is not, as in Hobbes, the empirical calculation of probabilities, but the reconstruction by logical reasoning of the necessary order of the universe {to know G-D}. The criterion by which page 183 a political organization is to be judged is whether it impedes or makes possible the free man's rational love and understanding of Nature. This is a much wider criterion than Hobbes', involving a less negative conception of security and freedom, and it associated Spinoza with the enemies of authoritarianism. As the necessary consequence of his general philosophy, he was an early advocate of the great liberal conception of toleration and freedom of thought. In interpreting Spinoza's political theory, as in interpreting his moral theory, one must both maintain the balance and show the connexion between his harshly scientific and amoral starting-point and his idealistic vision of a free society; there is always a tendency for the determinist to obscure the idealist, or for the idealist to obscure the determinist.

[4]  All men are striving to increase their own pleasure and vitality, but they must recognize that mutual aid is necessary for their survival; nothing is so useful to a man as other men. They therefore find themselves entering into the written and unwritten compacts which are the cement of society. Any law or social convention {Constitution} can, in the nature of things, be observed and obeyed only as long as it seems expedient to the people concerned to obey it; its claim to my allegiance disappears as soon as it ceases to contribute, directly or indirectly, to my safety and happiness. A society remains safe as long as the persons having an interest in supporting its laws or conventions are, or seem to be, more powerful than those having an interest in overthrowing page 184 them. The mere existence of a social convention or law cannot either add to or subtract from my natural right, founded on the most elementary necessity of nature, to consult only my own safety and happiness. Spinoza at this point goes even further than Hobbes in refusing to attach any meaning to the words 'right' and 'duty' in their purely moral sense; he is more consistent in regarding the laws and conventions of a society or state as deriving their authority and claim to obedience solely from their usefulness in serving the essential interests of the individuals concerned; as soon as a particular law or convention ceases to safeguard, or begins to threaten, the safety or happiness of a particular individual, that individual is thereby released from any obligation to conform to it; the mere fact that he had previously undertaken to conform to it does not constitute a binding obligation which overrides his personal needs and interests; for nothing can ever, either in principle or in practice, override these needs and interests.

[5]  Spinoza's analysis of political consent is easily misunderstood because he persists in using words like 'right' and 'obligation' in a purely non-moral, and therefore unfamiliar, sense; it is paradoxical to say that everyone has a right to disregard a contract solemnly made as soon as it becomes disadvantageous; according to some well-established uses of 'right', this statement is a contradiction in terms. It must be remembered that no moral terms, in the ordinary sense of 'moral', have any place in Spinoza's terminology, since such moral terms in their ordinary connotation are applicable only to human beings, conceived page 185 as free agents and not as causally determined natural objects. His analysis is less misleadingly expressed when the word 'right', with its obstinately moral associations, is omitted altogether, and 'power' is substituted; for, although he explicitly defines 'right' in terms of 'power', it is very easy to overlook this re-definition, simply because it is contrary to ordinary usage; as soon as 'right' is replaced by 'power', the argument becomes a clear positivistic {a philosophical system concerned with positive facts and phenomena, and excluding speculation upon ultimate causes or origins} analysis of the reasons for obedience to authority. 

[6]  Contracts, treaties, promises, and oaths of allegiance are in themselves no more than words; but, in any state or organized society, there will necessarily be individuals who possess certain powers of coercion and enforcement; unless someone actually possesses the means of coercion and can in fact make his will effective against all opposition, there must be a state of anarchy and no stable society exists. The actual testable power of this sovereign person, or group of persons, is the sole and sufficient justification of his or their authority and of their claim to obedience. As soon as it is shown in experience that the sovereign authority has in fact lost its power to subdue opposition and to make its will effective, it thereby forfeits its authority as sovereign; all appeals to constitutions or to contracts are irrelevant; the legitimacy of an authority cannot be separated from its effectiveness in action. The sovereign serves my interests as a member of society simply because he is sovereign in fact and action, and only as long as he remains so; he serves my interest, because the fact of his overwhelming power
page 186 prevents anarchy and insecurity. In the natural state of anarchy and outside an organized society, my power and freedom are limited by my fear of attack by others, and by my natural inability to supply all my own needs and wants; I in effect choose the lesser evil, a smaller loss of power and freedom, when within a civil society I submit to the restraints imposed by the sovereign authority. Within an organized society I am protected against violence and, by mutual aid and the proper division of labour, my natural needs and wants are supplied. Only under extreme provocation can it be reasonable to revolt against the civil authority in defence of my personal interests or loyalties; for the loss of the peace and security of civil society nearly always involves a greater loss of my power and freedom than is involved in any possible alter- native, however disagreeable. There may be extreme cases in which the sovereign power tries to coerce me into doing 'things abhorrent to human nature' and in which it directly threatens my life; under such conditions revolt may be the lesser evil. But the ordinary limitations on my power and freedom, which the law with its threats and penalties imposes, are accepted by the reasonable man, as long as the authority imposing the laws proves itself effective in eliminating armed opposition and in keeping the peace. The person or persons who possess sovereign power will naturally seek to extend their power and liberty of action as far as they can without provoking a revolt powerful enough to dislodge them; if they are reasonable men, they will calculate at what point they must restrain the exercise page 187 of their power in order not to provoke an effective body of their subjects into revolt; this is the proper art of government. When the sovereign authority becomes so oppressive as to create sufficiently numerous and powerful enemies, it will in fact have ceased to be the sovereign authority; a landslide of disobedience will begin, as the members of the society observe that effective power is beginning to pass into other hands.

[7]  The argument by which Spinoza justifies obedience to civil or state authority as reasonable is essentially the same argument as that by which in this century {millennium} obedience to international authority is generally commended; it is the familiar argument of 'collective security', which is an appeal to enlightened self-interest. The only method of avoiding war, whether between individuals or nations, is to gather a group of individuals or of nations, which will in fact possess sufficient force to deter any potential aggressor. The internationalists who used this argument assumed that all nations in fact pursue the indefinite extension of their own power and freedom of action; their starting point was the same as Spinoza's. It is in the interest of any nation to accept the decisions of the international authority, even if this involves some sacrifice of national sovereignty and independence, in order to avoid the greater loss of power and freedom which is involved in war and in the fear of way. Therefore the first aim of a rational foreign policy must be to ally oneself with that group of nations which is powerful enough, if acting together, to constitute an international authority; and generally one must page 188 uphold its decisions, even when, considered individually and on their merits, its decisions are repugnant; for anything is better than a relapse into war and the fear of war. It is irrational to resist the edicts of the international authority, even when they involve some limitation of purely national sovereignty, except in the extreme case of these edicts threatening the very survival of the nation.

[8]  This familiar and respectable argument is pure Spinozism, applied to international society instead of to civil society. The old contrast between the state of nature and civil society seems remote and artificial to modern readers, because the central power of the nation-state is now generally taken for granted as necessary and unavoidable. The problem of sovereignty, and of the justification of surrendering power to a central authority, comes alive again as soon as it is transposed into terms of international politics; the same egotistic or amoral calculations of profit and loss in the surrender of freedom are invoked, as were formerly invoked in the justification of the authority of the nation-state. The strength of this form of political argument is that it does not rest on changing and disputable moral notions, and can therefore be used persuasively in all circumstances and at all times.

[9]  It was Spinoza's purpose to persuade people to think realistically and rationally about political problems, and to discard moral and religious prejudices. He was not analysing how the ordinary man does in fact make political decisions, but recommending a scientific method, which in fact only the relatively rational man actually uses. It is page 189 irrelevant to object, as so many commentators have objected, that his political philosophy is not in accordance with ordinary language or with our established ways of thinking about politics; so far from being an objection, this would seem to Spinoza a confirmation. Most men are necessarily governed by passive emotion; they have no clear and objective understanding of the laws which govern the behaviour of human beings in society; if they in fact had such an understanding, positive coercion and the concentration of power in the hands of the government (imperium) would be unnecessary {only running the Post Office}, because it is only their passive emotions which lead men into conflict with each other. 
 

Endnote TP1 - From Nadler's Book XX:342—
Introduction to The Political Treatise:  

[1]  The Political Treatise is, in some respects, a sequel to the Theological- Political Treatise. If the 1670 treatise establishes the basic foundations and most general principles of civil society, regardless of the form which sovereignty takes in the state (whether it be a monarchy; an aristocracy, or a democracy), the new work concerns more particularly how states of different constitutions can be made to function well. Spinoza also intended—an intention that remained unfulfilled—to show that, of all constitutions, the democratic one is to be preferred. No less than the Theological-Political Treatise, the composition of the Political Treatise is intimately related to the contemporary political scene in the Dutch Republic. Spinoza treats a number of universal political-philosophical themes with an immediate historical relevance, even urgency.

[2]  The Political Treatise is a very concrete work. Spinoza begins, in fact, by dismissing utopian schemes and idealistic hopes for a society of individuals leading the life of reason. "Those who persuade themselves that the multitude or people distracted by politics can ever be induced to live according to the bare dictate of reason must be dreaming of the golden age of the Poets, or some fable". (53) Any useful political science must start, instead, from a realistic assessment of human nature and its passions considered as natural, necessary phenomena—in other words, from the egoistic {self-interest} psychology of the Ethics. Only then can one deduce political principles that, in accordance with experience, will best serve as the foundation of a polity.  

Nadler then quotes TP:1:4:1-2, same as Durant above.

From "Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy"; Cambridge University Press;
        ISBN: 052148328X; Page 762—Politics and philosophical theology. 

Spinoza's political theory, like that of Hobbes, treats rights and power as equivalent. Citizens give up rights to the state for the sake of the protection state can provide. Hobbes, however, regards this social contract as nearly absolute, one in which citizens give up all of their rights except to resist death. Spinoza, in contrast, emphasizes that citizens cannot give up the right to pursue their own advantage as they see it, in its full generality; and hence that the power, and right, of any actual state is always limited by the state's practical ability to enforce its dictates so as to alter the citizens' continuing perception of their own advantage. Furthermore, he has a more extensive conception of the nature of an individual's own advantage than Hobbes, since for him one's own true advantage lies not merely in fending off death and pursuing pleasure, but in achieving the adequate knowledge that brings blessedness and allows one to participate in that which is eternal. In consequence Spinoza, unlike Hobbes, recommends a limited, constitutional state that encourages freedom of expression and religious toleration. Such a state — itself a kind of individual — best preserves its own being, and provides both the most stable and the most beneficial form of government for its citizens.

PAGE 281
FROM THE EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE
POSTHUMOUS WORKS OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. 

OUR  author  composed  the  Political  Treatise  shortly before his death
[in 1677].   Its  reasonings  are  exact,  its  style  clear.   Abandoning  the
opinions  of  many  political writers, he most firmly propounds therein his
own judgment; and throughout draws his conclusions from his premisses.
In the first five chapters, he treats of political science in general — in the
sixth  and  seventh,  of  monarchy;  in the eighth, ninth, and tenth, of aris-
tocracy; lastly, the eleventh begins the subject of democratic government.
But  his  untimely death was the reason that he did not finish this treatise,
and  that  he  did  not  deal  with the subject of laws, nor with the various
questions about politics, as may be seen from the following "Letter of the
Author  to  a  Friend,  which  may  properly  be  prefixed  to  this  Political
Treatise, and serve it for a Preface:" —  Letter (84):357; Bk.XIB:15130; Bk.XII:311.  

"Dear Friend, — Your welcome letter was delivered to me
yesterday.  I  heartily  thank  you  for the kind interest you
take  in  me.   I would not miss this opportunity, were I not
engaged  in  something,  which  I  think  more useful, and
which,  I believe, will please you more — that is, in prepar-
ing  a  Political  Treatise,  which  I  began some time since,
upon   your   advice.   Of  this  treatise,  six  chapters  are
already  finished.  The  first contains a kind of introduction
to  the  actual  work; the second treats of natural right; the
third,  of  the  right  of  supreme  authorities.  In the fourth,
I inquire, what political matters are subject to the direction
of  supreme  authorities;  in  the  fifth,  what is the ultimate
and highest end which a society can contemplate; and, in
the sixth, how a monarchy should be ordered, so as not to
lapse  into  a tyranny.  I  am at present writing the seventh
chapter,  wherein I make a regular demonstration of all the
heads of my preceding sixth chapter, concerning the order-
ing  of  a  well-regulated monarchy. I shall afterwards pass
to  the  subjects  of aristocratic and popular dominion, and,
lastly,  to  that of laws and other particular questions about
politics. And so, farewell."       [The Hague, 1676]   

The author's aim appears clearly from this letter; but being hindered by
illness, and snatched away by death, he was unable, as the reader will
find  for  himself,  to  continue  this  work  further  than to the end of the
subject of aristocracy.     Bk.XIII:357399.
 
 
 

   Part                Chapters

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Part 1:    BkII: PAGE 283

   
A  Political  Treatise - Part 1 , Part 2 , Part 3

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION.

              Bk.XIA:3557. 
[I:1] (1:1:1)  PHILOSOPHERS conceive of the passions which harass us as

vices  into  which  men  fall  by  their own fault, and, therefore, generally

deride,  bewail,  or  blame  them,  or execrate them, if they wish to seem

unusually pious. (1:1:2) And so they think they are doing something wonder-

ful,  and reaching the pinnacle of learning, when they are clever enough

to  bestow  manifold  praise  on such human nature, as is nowhere to be

found, and  to make verbal attacks on that which, in fact, exists. (1:1:3)  For

they  conceive  of  men,  not  as  they are, but as they themselves would
          Bk.XI:1441.  
like  them to be.  (1:1:4)  Whence it has come to pass that, instead of ethics,

they  have  generally written satire, and that they have never conceived
                                                              Bk.XIA:3451. 
a  theory  of politics, which could be turned to use, but such as might be
                    Bk.XIB:15231.
taken  for  a  chimera,  or  might  have  been formed in Utopia, or in that
                       Bk.XX:34253. 
golden  age  of  the  poets  when,  to be sure, there was least need of it.

(1:1:5)  Accordingly,  as  in all sciences, which have a useful application, so

especially  in  that  of  politics, theory is supposed to be at variance with

practice;  and  no  men  are esteemed less fit to direct public affairs than
                      Bk.XIA:3557. 
theorists or philosophers.


                        Bk.XIA:105113.
[1:2]  (1:2:1) But  statesmen,  on  the  other hand, are suspected of plotting

against  mankind, rather  than  consulting  their  page 288 interests, and are
                                          Bk.XIA:3658. 
esteemed  more  crafty  than  learned. (!:2:2)  No  doubt  nature has taught

them, that vices will exist, while men do. (1:2:3)  And so, while they study to

anticipate  human  wickedness,  and that by arts, which experience and

long practice have taught, and which men generally use under the guid-

ance  more  of  fear  than  of  reason, they are thought to be enemies of

religion,  especially  by  divines,  who  believe  that  supreme authorities

should  handle  public affairs in accordance with the same rules of piety,

as  bind a private individual.  (1:2:4)  Yet there can be no doubt, that states-

men  have  written  about  politics  far  more  happily  than philosophers.

(2:5)  For,  as  they  had  experience for their mistress, they taught nothing

that  was  inconsistent  with  practice.



[1:3] (1:3:1) And, certainly, I am fully persuaded that experience has revealed
                                           Bk.XIB:188.
all  conceivable sorts of commonwealth, which are consistent with men's

living  in  unity,  and  likewise  the means by which the multitude may be

guided or kept within fixed bounds. (1:3:2)  So that I do not believe that we

can  by  meditation  discover  in  this  matter  anything  not  yet tried and

ascertained,   which  shall  be  consistent  with  experience  or  practice.

(3:3)  For  men are so situated, that they cannot live without some general

law.  (1:3:4) But general laws and public affairs are ordained and managed

by  men of the utmost acuteness, or, if you like, of great cunning or craft.

(1:3:5) And  so  it  is hardly credible, that we should be able to conceive of

anything  serviceable  to a general society, that occasion or chance has

not  offered,  or that men, intent upon their common affairs, and seeking

their  own  safety,  have  not  seen  for  themselves.



[1:4]  (1:4:1) Therefore, on applying my mind  to politics, I have resolved to:

demonstrate  by  a  certain  and  undoubted  course  of  argument, or to

deduce  from  the  very condition of human nature, not what is new and

unheard  of,  but only such things as agree best with practice. (1:4:2)  And

that  I  might investigate the subject-matter of this science with the same         Lewis S. Feuer
                                                                      Bk.XIA:3552. 
freedom  of  spirit  as  we generally use in mathematics, I have laboured         Durant:650[1[162 
         { E2:XLIX(69):126; Spinozistic meaning—D2:Bk.III:235 }; Bk.XII:323.
carefully,  not  to  mock,  lament,  or  execrate, but to understand human          Mark Twain 
                                                               ^ {abominate}
actions;  and  to  this  end  I  have  looked  upon passions, such as love,        TPI:Bk.XIB:157 
  < E1:Endnote 49, Bk.XV:26849 >; Bk.XIV:2:2882.                         {agitations}
hatred,  anger,  envy,  ambition,  pity, and the other perturbations of the            Purpose 

mind, not in the light of vices of human nature, but as properties,  page 289 

just as pertinent  to  it,  as are heat, cold, storm, thunder, and the like to          Durant650[1]162 

the nature  of the atmosphere, which phenomena, though inconvenient,

are  yet   necessary,   and   have   fixed  causes,  by means of which we
                           Bk.XX:34354. 
endeavour  to  understand  their  nature, and the mind has just as much

pleasure in viewing them aright, as in knowing such things as flatter the
Bk.XIB:15842. 
senses.

[1:5] (1:5:1)  For  this is certain, and we have proved its truth in our E4:IV(9)c:

194; E3:XXXI(5)n:152; E3:XXXII(3)n:152, that men are of necessity liable

to  passions,  and  so  constituted  as  to pity those who are ill, and envy

those  who  are  well  off;  and  to  be prone  to  vengeance more than to

mercy:  and  moreover,  that  every individual wishes the rest to live after

his  own  mind,  and  to  approve  what  he approves, and reject what he

rejects.   (1:5:2)   And so it comes to pass, that, as all are equally eager to be

first,  they  fall  to  strife,  and  do  their  utmost  mutually  to oppress one
 Bk.XI:1543.  
another; and he who comes out conqueror is more proud of the harm he

has done to the other, than of the good he has done to himself. (1:5:3)  And

although  all are persuaded, that religion, on the contrary, teaches every

man  to  love  his  neighbour  as  himself, that is to defend another's right

just  as  much  as  his  own,  yet we showed that this persuasion has too

little power over the passions.  (1:5:4)  It avails, indeed, in the hour of death,

when  disease  has  subdued the very passions, and man lies inert, or in

temples,  where  men  hold  no  traffic,  but  least  of  all, where it is most

needed, in the law-court or the palace. (1:5:5)  We showed too, that reason

can,  indeed,  do  much  to  restrain  and moderate the passions, but we          Durant:652[5]169 

saw  at  the  same  time,  that  the  road, which reason herself points out,

is  very  steep,  E5:XLII(5)n:270;  so  that  such as persuade themselves,

that  the  multitude  or  men distracted by politics can ever be induced to

live  according  to  the  bare  dictate  of reason, must be dreaming of the

poetic golden age, or of a stage-play.

[1:6]  (1:6:1)  A  dominion  then,  whose  well-being depends on any man's

good  faith,  and  whose affairs cannot be properly administered, unless

those  who  are  engaged in them will act honestly, will be very unstable.

 (1:6:2)  On the contrary, to insure its permanence, its public affairs should

be  so  page 290  ordered, that those who administer them, whether guided

by  reason  or  passion,  cannot  be  led  to  act treacherously or basely.

 (1:6:3)  Nor  does it matter to the security of a dominion, in what spirit men

are  led  to  rightly  administer  its  affairs.   (1:6:4)  For liberality of spirit, or
                                                                                              Bk.XIA:3765.
courage,  is  a  private  virtue;  but  the  virtue  of  a  state  is its security.

[1:7]  (1:7:1)  Lastly,  inasmuch  as  all men, whether barbarous or civilized,

everywhere  frame  customs,  and form some kind of civil state, we must

not,  therefore,  look  to  proofs  of  reason  for  the  causes  and natural

bases  of  dominion, but derive them from the general nature or position

of mankind, as I mean to do in the next chapter.

CHAPTER II. -  OF NATURAL RIGHT.

[2:1] (2:1:1) IN our Theologico-Political Treatise we have treated of natural

and  civil  right,  TTP4:(68):207,  and  in  our  Ethics  have explained the
                                      Bk.XIV:2:241; Bk.XIX:26630. 
nature of wrong-doing, merit, justice, injustice, E4:XXXVII(18)n2:213, and

lastly,  of  human  liberty,  E2:XLVIII:119, E2:XLIX:120, E2:XLIX(13)n:121.

(2:1:2)  Yet,  lest  the  readers  of  the  present treatise should have to seek

elsewhere  those  points,  which especially concern it, I have determined

to   explain   them   here   again,  and  give  a  deductive  proof  of  them.

[2:2]   (2:2:1)   Any  natural  thing  whatever  can  be  just as well conceived,

whether  it  exists  or  does  not  exist.   (2:2:2)  As then the beginning of the

existence  of  natural  things  cannot  be  inferred from their definition, so
                                                                                     Bk.XIV:2:1991. 
neither  can  their  continuing to exist.  (2:2:3)  For their ideal essence is the

same,  after  they  have  begun  to  exist,  as  it  was before they existed.

(2:2:4) As then their beginning to exist cannot be inferred from their essence,

so neither can their continuing to exist; but they need the same power to

enable  them  to  go  on  existing,  as  to  enable  them  to  begin to exist.

 (2:2:5)   From  which it follows, that the power, by which natural things exist,

and  therefore  that  by  which  they  operate,  can  be  no other than the
 external—Bk.XIV:2:1984; Bk.XIA:12313; Bk.XIX:9119. 
eternal power of G-D itself. (2:2:6)  For were it another and a created power,

it  could  not preserve  itself,  much  less natural things, but it would itself,

in  order  to continue  to  exist,  have  need  of  the  same  power which it

needed to be created.

[2:3]  (2:3:1)   From  this  fact  therefore,  that  is,  that  the  power whereby
                                                                               Bk.XIA:12312.
natural  things  exist  and  operate  is  the  very  power of G-D itself, we

easily  understand  what  natural right is.  (2:3:2)  For as G-D has a right to

everything,  and  G-D's  right  is  nothing else, but his very power, as far

as  the  latter  is  considered  page 292 to be absolutely free; it follows from

this,  that  every  natural  thing  has  by  nature  as  much right, as it has

power  to  exist  and  operate;  since  the  natural power of every natural

thing,  whereby  it  exists  and operates, is nothing else but the power of

G-D, which is absolutely free.

[2:4]   (2:4:1)   And so by natural right I understand the very laws or rules of

nature, in accordance with which everything takes place, in other words,
             Bk.XIA:12415.
the  power  of  nature  itself.  (2:4:2)  And  so  the  natural  right of universal

nature,  and consequently of every individual thing, extends as far as its         Durant:651[2a]164 

power:  and  accordingly,  whatever  any  man does after the laws of his

nature,  he  does  by the highest natural right, and he has as much right
     Bk.XII:324, 325—good and bad.
over nature as he has power.

[2:5]   (2:5:1)   If  then  human  nature  had  been  so  constituted,  that men

should live according to the mere dictate of reason, and attempt nothing

inconsistent  therewith,  in that case natural right, considered as special

to mankind, would be determined by the power of reason only.  (2:5:2)  But

men  are  more  led  by  blind  desire, than by reason: and therefore the

natural power or right of human beings should be limited, not by reason,

but  by  every  appetite, whereby they are determined to action, or seek

their  own  preservation.  (2:5:3)   I,  for  my  part,  admit, that those desires,

which  arise  not  from  reason,  are  not  so  much  actions  as  passive

affections  of  man.   (2:5:4)   But  as  we  are  treating here of the universal

power  or  right  of  nature,  we  cannot  here  recognize  any  distinction

between  desires,  which  are  engendered  in  us  by reason, and those

which  are  engendered  by  other  causes;  since the latter, as much as

the  former,  are  effects  of  nature,  and display the natural impulse, by

which man strives to continue in existence. (2:5:5)  For man, be he learned

or  ignorant,  is  part  of  nature,  and  everything,  by  which  any man is

determined to action, ought to be referred to the power of nature, that is,

to  that  power,  as it is limited by the nature of this or that man.  (2:5:6)  For
         Bk.XIA:12416.
man,  whether  guided  by  reason  or mere desire, does nothing save in

accordance  with  the  laws  and  rules of nature, that is, by natural right.

( [2:4] )

[2:6]   (2:6:1)  But most people believe, that the ignorant rather disturb than

follow  the  course  of nature, and conceive of  page 293 mankind, in nature

as  of  one  dominion  within  another.   (2:6:2)   For  they maintain, that the

human  mind  is  produced by no natural causes, but created directly by

G-D,  and  is  so  independent  of  other  things,  that  it has an absolute

power  to  determine  itself, and make a right use of reason.  (2:6:3)  Experi-

ence,  however,  teaches  us but too well, that it is no more in our power

to  have  a  sound  mind,  than  a  sound  body.   (2:6:4)  Next, inasmuch as

everything whatever, as far as in it lies, strives to preserve its own exist-

ence, we cannot at all doubt, that, were it as much in our power to live

after the dictate of reason, as to be led by blind desire, all would be led

by reason, and order their lives wisely; which is very far from being the

case.   (2:6:5)   For

          "Each is attracted by his own delight."  ( Virgil, Ecl. ii. 65.)

(2:6:6)   Nor  do  divines remove this difficulty, at least not by deciding, that

the  cause  of  this  want  of  power  is  a  vice  or  sin  in  human nature,
                                                   Bk.XIB:20521.
deriving  its  origin  from  our  first parents' fall.  (2:6:7)  For if it was even in

the  first man's power as much to stand as to fall, and he was in posses-

sion of his senses, and had his nature unimpaired, how could it be, that

he  fell  in  spite of his knowledge and foresight?  (2:6:8)  But they say, that

he  was  deceived by the devil.  (2:6:9)  Who then was it, that deceived the

devil himself?  (2:6:10)  Who, I say, so maddened the very being that excell-

ed all other created intelligences, that he wished to be greater than God?

(2:6:11)   For  was  not  his  effort  too,  supposing  him  of  sound  mind,  to

preserve  himself and his existence, as far as in him lay?  (2:6:12)  Besides,

how could it happen, that the first man himself, being in his senses, and

master  of  his  own  will,  should  be  led astray, and suffer himself to be

taken  mentally  captive?  (2:6:13)   For  if  he h