A POLITICAL
TREATISE - Part 3
Introductions: Durant:650,
Hampshire:179, Nadler:342.
Posthumously Published - 1677
Part 1 - Preface
- Table
of Contents - Chapters I to V
Part 2 - Table of Contents - Chapters VI and VII
Part 3 - Table of Contents
- Chapters VIII to XI
1. For the kind permission to
use the text see Page
1.
JBY added sentence numbers.
2. [8:4] - Chapter Number:Paragraph Number.
Sentence numbers, added by JBY,
are shown thus (zz:yy:xx).
zz = Chapter Number.
yy = Paragraph Number.
xx = Sentence Number.
3. Page numbers are those of Book II.
4. Citation
abbreviations.
5. (Footnote or the Latin word),
{JBY Comment
or endnote}.
6. Please e-mail
errors, clarification requests, disagreement,
or suggestions to
josephb@yesselman.com.
7. There is much in this work
that you will not agree
with or even
think nonsensealthough
keep in mind that it was
written 300
years ago. The
work is hopelessly outdated; its main value is that it
Bk.XII:310-
312.
shows Spinozistic
ideas at play in the formation of advanced modern Hobbes:
Leviathan.
governments and how
they cope with the passions
of men. Partake
of the work (and my
commentaries) as you would a
pomegranate;
relish the flesh, but
spit-out the pits. See Introductions
listed above.
8. Where applicable,
I think it appropriate
to substitute the term "State"
for "Clan"
or "City" so as to understand
the idea in today's terms.
Likewise, where
applicable, substitute "Country" for "Dominion" and
"Congress" or "Parliament"
for "Council." For antecedents to the USA
Constitution see 8:29,
and 9:1ff.
9. Spinoza's purpose in writing
the Treatise is to design a
govern-
ment that will
best cope with the passions
of men; but for these
passions there
would be no need for
political parties, only
administrative officesrunning
the Post Office. See also Title Page,
[7:2],
and Self-interest.
| Part 1 | I | II | III | IV | V |
| Part 2 | VI | VII | |||
| Part 3 | VIII | IX | X | XI |
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Part
3: BkII:
PAGE 285
CHAPTER VIII OF ARISTOCRACY. PAGE 345 Source Text |
Para. Nos. |
BkII:
Page Nos. |
| What aristocracy is. Patricians. | 8:1 | 345 |
| An aristocracy should consist of a large number of patricians. | 8:2 | 345 |
| Difference between monarchy and aristocracy. | 8:3 | 346 |
| Aristocracy approaches nearer to absolutism than monarchy. | 8:4, 5, 6. | 347 |
| Is also fitter to maintain liberty. Foundations of an
aristocracy where one city is head of a whole dominion. |
8:7 | 348 |
| Of fortifying towns. | 8:8 | 348 |
| Of the military and its leaders. | 8:9 | 349 |
| Of the sale of lands and farms. | 8:10 | 350 |
| Of the supreme council of patricians. | 8:11 | 350 |
| Of the causes of the destruction of an aristocracy. | 8:12 | 351 |
| The primary law of this dominion, to prevent its
lapsing into oligarchy. |
8:13 | 351 |
| Patricians to be chosen out of certain families. | 8:14, 15. | 352 |
| Of the place and time of assembling. | 8:16 | 352 |
| Of the supreme council's functions. | 8:17 | 353 |
| Of the ruler or chief of the council. | 8:18 | 353 |
| Equality to be observed among patricians. | 8:19 | 353 |
| Of the syndics and their functions. | 8:20, 21,
8:22, 23, 8:24, 25. |
354 |
| Of the ministers of the dominion. | 8:26, 27. | 356 |
| Voting to be by ballot. | 8:28 | 357 |
| Of the senate or second council. | 8:29, 30
8:31, 32, 8:33. |
358 |
| Of the presidents of the senate and their deputies. Consuls. | 8:34, 35,
8:36. |
361 |
| Of the bench or college of judges. | 8:37, 38,
8:39, 40, 8:41. |
363 |
| Governors of cities and provinces. Right of the
neighbouring cities. |
8:42 | 366 |
| Judges to be appointed in every city. | 8:43 | 367 |
| Ministers of dominion to be chosen from the commons. | 8:44 | 367 |
| Of the tribunes of the treasury. | 8:45 | 368 |
| Of freedom of worship and speech. | 8:46 | 368 |
| Of the bearing and state of the patricians. | 8:47 | 368 |
| Of the oath. | 8:48 | 369 |
| Of academies and liberty of teaching. |
8:49 | 369 |
CHAPTER IX. OF ARISTOCRACY. CONTINUATION. |
370 |
|
| Of the aristocratic dominion held by more than one city. | 9:1 | 370 |
| Confederate cities. | 9:2 | 370 |
| Of points common to both kinds of aristocracy. | 9:3 | 370 |
| Of the common bond of the cities by a senate and tribunal. | 9:4 | 371 |
| Supreme council and senate. | 9:5 | 371 |
| Of assembling this council, of choosing generals and
ambassadors, of the presidents of the orders, judges, &c. |
9:6 | 372 |
| Of commanders of battalions and military tribunes. | 9:7 | 373 |
| Of tributes. | 9:8 | 373 |
| Of the senators' emoluments and place of meeting. | 9:9 | 374 |
| Of the councils and syndics of the separate cities. | 9:10 | 374 |
| Consuls of cities. | 9:11 | 374 |
| Judges of cities. | 9:12 | 375 |
| Of dependent cities. | 9:13 | 375 |
| This kind of aristocracy to be preferred to the other.
|
9:14, 15. | 375 |
CHAPTER X. OF ARISTOCRACY. CONCLUSION. |
378 |
|
| Primary cause, why aristocracies are dissolved. Of a dictator. | 10:1 | 378 |
| Of the supreme council. | 10:2 | 379 |
| Of the tribunes of the commons among the Romans. | 10:3 | 380 |
| Of the authority of the syndics. | 10:4 | 380 |
| Sumptuary laws. | 10:5 | 381 |
| Vices not to be forbidden directly, but indirectly. | 10:6, 7. | 381 |
| Honours and rewards rejected. | 10:8 | 382 |
| An aristocracy may be stable. | 10:9, 10. | 383 |
CHAPTER XI. OF DEMOCRACY. |
385 |
|
| Difference between democracy and aristocracy. | 11:1, 2. | 385 |
| Of the nature of democracy. | 11:3 | 386 |
| Women to be excluded from government. |
11:4 | 386 |
A Political Treatise - Part 1 , Part 2 , Part 3.
Author's Notes to the Treatise
CHAPTER VIII - OF ARISTOCRACY.
[8:1] (8:1:1) So far of monarchy. (8:1:2) But now we will say, on what plan
an aristocracy is to be framed, so that it may be lasting. (8:1:3) We have
defined an aristocratic dominion as that, which is held not by one man,
but by certain persons chosen
out of the multitude, whom we shall
{ USA
Congressman or Senators }
henceforth call patricians.
(8:1:4) I say
expressly, "that which is held by
certain persons
chosen." (8:1:5) For
the chief difference between this and
{ semantic
confusion }
a democracy is, that the right of governing
depends in an aristocracy on
election only, but in a democracy for the most part on some right either
congenital or acquired by fortune (as we shall explain in its place); and
therefore, although in any dominion the entire multitude be received into
the number of the patricians, provided that right of theirs is not inherited,
and does not descend by some law to others, the dominion will for all
that be quite an aristocracy, because none are received into the number
of the patricians save by express election. (8:1:6) But if these chosen
persons were but two, each of them will try to be more powerful than the
other, and from the too great power of each, the dominion will easily be
split into two factions; and in like manner into three, four, or five factions,
if three, four, or five persons were put into possession of it. (8:1:7) But
the factions will be the weaker, the more there are to whom the domin-
ion was delegated. (8:1:8) And hence it follows, that to secure the
stability of an aristocracy, it is necessary
to consider the proportionate
Bk.XIB:153132.
size of the actual dominion,
in order to determine the minimum number
of patricians.
[8:2] (8:2:1) Let
it be supposed, then, that for a dominion of moderate
size
it suffices to be allowed a hundred of the best men, and that upon them
has been conferred the supreme authority of the dominion, and that
they have consequently the right to elect their patrician colleagues,
when any of PAGE 346 the number die. (8:2:2) These men will certainly
endeavour to secure their succession to their children or next in blood.
(8:2:3) And thus the supreme authority of the dominion will always be with
those, whom fortune has made children or kinsmen to patricians.
(8:2:4) And, as out of a hundred men who rise to office by fortune, hardly
three are found that excel in knowledge and counsel, it will thus come to
pass, that the authority of the dominion will rest, not with a hundred,
but only with two or three who excel by vigour of mind, and who will
easily draw to themselves everything, and each of them, as is the wont
of human greed, will be able to prepare the way to a monarchy.
(8:2:5) And so, if we make a right calculation, it is necessary, that the
supreme authority of a dominion, whose size requires at least a hundred
first-rate men, should be conferred on not less than five thousand.
(8:2:6) For by this proportion it will never fail, but a hundred shall be found
excelling in mental vigour, that is, on the hypothesis that, out of fifty that
seek and obtain office, one will always be found not less than first-rate,
besides others that imitate the virtues of the first-rate, and are therefore
worthy to rule.
[8:3] (8:3:1) The
patricians are most commonly citizens of
one city, which
Bk.XIB:167.
is the head of the whole
PAGE 349
dominion, so that the commonwealth or
republic has its name from it, as once that of Rome, and now those of
Venice, Genoa, etc. (8:3:2) But the republic of the Dutch has its name
from an entire province, whence it arises, that the subjects of this
dominion enjoy a greater liberty. (8:3:3) Now, before we can determine
the foundations on which this aristocratic dominion ought to rest, we
must observe a very great difference, which exists between the
dominion which is conferred on one man and that which is conferred on
a sufficiently large council. (8:3:4) For, in the first place, the power of one
man is (as we said, 6:5) very inadequate to support the entire dominion;
but this no one, without manifest absurdity, can affirm of a sufficiently
large council. (8:3:5) For, in declaring the council to be sufficiently large,
one at the same time denies, that it is inadequate to support the
dominion. (8:3:6) A king, therefore, is altogether in need of counsellors,
but a council like this is not so in the least. (8:3:7) In the second place,
kings are mortal, but councils are everlasting. (8:3:8) And so the power
PAGE 347 of the dominion which has once been transferred to a large
enough council never reverts to the multitude. (8:3:9) But this is otherwise
in a monarchy, as we showed (7:25). (8:3:10) Thirdly, a king's dominion is
often on sufferance, whether from his minority, sickness, or old age, or
from other causes; but the power of a council of this kind, on the con-
trary, remains always one and the same. (8:3:11) In the fourth place, one
man's will is very fluctuating and inconstant; and, therefore, in a mon-
archy, all law is, indeed, the explicit will of the king (as we said. 7:1), but
not every will of the king ought to be law; but this cannot be said of the
will of a sufficiently numerous council. (8:3:1)2 For since the council itself,
as we have just shown, needs no counsellors, its every explicit will
ought to be law. (8:3:13) And hence we conclude, that the dominion con-
ferred upon a large enough council is absolute, or approaches nearest
to the absolute. (8:3:14) For if there be any absolute dominion, it is, in fact,
that which is held by an entire multitude.
[8:4] (8:4:1) Yet
in so far as this aristocratic dominion never (as
has just
been shown) reverts to the multitude, and there is under it no consulta-
tion with the multitude, but, without qualification, every will of the council
is law, it must be considered as quite absolute, and therefore its founda-
tions ought to rest only on the will and judgment
of the said council, and
Bk.XIB:16148.
not on the watchfulness
of the multitude, since the latter is excluded
from giving its advice or its vote. (8:4:2) The reason, then, why in practice
aristocracy is not absolute, is that the multitude is a cause of fear to the
rulers, and therefore succeeds in retaining for itself some liberty, which
it asserts and holds as its own, if not by an express law, yet on a tacit
understanding.
[8:5] (8:5:1) And
thus it is manifest that this kind of dominion will be in the
best possible condition, if its institutions are such that it most nearly
approaches the absolute that is, that the multitude is as little as
possible a cause of fear, and retains no liberty, but such as must neces-
sarily be assigned it by the law of the dominion itself, and is therefore
not so much a right of the multitude as of the whole dominion, asserted
and maintained by the aristocrats only as their own. (8:5:2) For thus prac-
tice agrees best with theory, as appears from the last section, and is
also self-evident. PAGE 348 (8:5:3) For we cannot doubt that the dominion
rests the less with the patricians, the more rights the commons assert
for themselves, such as those
which the corporations of artisans in
Bk.XIB:16148.
Lower Germany, commonly called Guilds,
generally possess.
[8:6] (8:6:1) But
the commons need not apprehend any danger of a hateful
slavery from this form of dominion, merely because it is conferred on the
council absolutely. (8:6:2) For the will of so large a council cannot be so
much determined by lust as by reason; because men are drawn asun-
der by an evil passion, and cannot be guided, as it were, by one mind,
except so far as they desire things honourable, or that have at least an
honourable appearance.
[8:7] (8:7:1) In
determining, then, the foundations of an
aristocracy, it is
above all to be observed, that they should rest on the sole will and
power of the supreme council, so that it may be as independent as
possible, and be in no danger from the multitude. (8:7:2) In order to deter-
mine these foundations, which are to rest, I say, upon the sole will and
power of the council, let us see what foundations of peace are peculiar
to monarchy, and unsuited to this form of dominion. (8:7:3) For if we sub-
stitute for these equivalent foundations fit for an aristocracy, and leave
the rest, as they are already laid, we shall have removed without doubt
every cause of seditions; or, at least, this kind of dominion will be no
less safe than the monarchical, but, on the contrary, so much the more
so, and of so much better a condition, as, without danger to peace and
liberty, it approaches nearer than monarchy to the absolute (8:3, 8:6).
(8:7:4) For the greater the right of the supreme authority, the more the form
of dominion agrees with the dictate of reason (3:5 , Ought not this reference
to be to 3:6 ?),
and, therefore, the fitter it is to maintain peace and liberty.
(8:7:5) Let us run
through, therefore, the points we stated
in our sixth
chapter, beginning with the ninth section, that we may reject what is
unfit for this kind
of dominion, and see
what agrees with it.
[8:8] (8:8:1) That
it is necessary, in the first place, to found and fortify one
or more cities, no one can doubt. (8:8:2) But that city is above all to be
fortified, which is the head of the whole dominion, and also those that
are on its frontiers. (8:8:3) For that which is the head of the whole domin-
ion, and has the supreme right, ought to be more powerful than the rest.
(8:8:4) But under this kind of dominion it is quite unnecessary to divide all
the inhabitants into clans.
[8:9] (8:9:1) As
for the military, since under this dominion equality is not to
be looked for among all, but between the patricians only, and, in partic-
ular, the power of the patricians is greater than that of the commons, it
is certain that it makes no difference to the laws or fundamental prin-
ciples of this dominion,
that the military be formed
of others besides
Bk.XIB:163.
subjects (Cf. 6:10).
(8:9:2) But it
is of the
first importance that no one be
admitted into the number of the patricians, that has not a proper know-
ledge of the art of war. (8:9:3) But for the subjects to be excluded, as
some would have it, from military service, is surely folly. (8:9:4) For
besides that the military pay given to subjects remains within the realm,
whereas, on the contrary, what is paid to a foreign soldiery is altogether
lost, the greatest strength of the dominion is also thereby weakened.
(8:9:5) For it is certain that those fight with peculiar valour who fight for
altar and hearth. (8:9:6) Whence, also, it is manifest that those are no less
wrong, who lay down that military commanders, tribunes, centurions,
etc., should be chosen from among the patricians only. (8:9:7) For with
what courage will those soldiers fight who are deprived of all hope of
gaining glory and advancement? (8:9:8) But, on the other hand, to estab-
lish a law forbidding the patricians to hire foreign soldiers when circum-
stances require it, whether to defend themselves, and suppress sedi-
tions, or for any other reason,
besides being inconsiderate, would also
Bk.XIB:16454.
be repugnant to the
supreme right of the patricians, concerning which
see 8:3, 8:4, 8:5 . (8:9:9) But the general of a single army, or of the entire
military, is to be chosen but in time of war, and among the patricians
only, and is to hold the command for a year at most, without power of
being continued therein, or afterwards reappointed. (8:9:10) For this law,
necessary as it is under a monarchy, is so above all under this kind of
dominion. (8:9:11) For although it is much easier, as we have said above,
to transfer the dominion PAGE 350 from one man to another than from a
free council to one man; yet it does often happen, that patricians are
subdued by their own generals, and that to the much greater harm of
the commonwealth. (8:9:12) For when a monarch is removed, it is but a
change of tyrant, not of the form of dominion; but, under an aristocracy,
this cannot happen, without an upsetting of the form of dominion, and a
slaughter of the greatest men. (8:9:13) Of which thing Rome has offered
the most mournful examples. (8:9:14) But our reason for saying that, under
a monarchy, the militia should serve without pay, is here inapplicable.
(8:9:15) For since the subjects are excluded from giving their advice or
votes, they are to be reckoned as foreigners, and are, therefore, to be
hired for service on no worse terms than foreigners. (8:9:16) And there is
in this case no danger of their being distinguished above the rest by the
patricians: nay, further, to avoid the partial judgment which everyone is
apt to form of his own exploits, it is wiser for the patricians to assign a
fixed payment to the soldiers for their service.
[8:10] (8:10:1) Furthermore,
for this same reason, that all but the patricians
are foreigners, it cannot be without danger to the whole dominion, that
the lands and houses and the whole soil should remain public property,
and be let to the inhabitants at a yearly rent. (8:10:2) For the subjects
having no part in the dominion would easily, in bad times, all forsake
their cities, if they could
carry where they pleased what
goods they
Bk.XIB:16350.
possess. (8:10:3)
And, therefore, lands and
farms are not to be let, but
sold to the subjects, yet on condition that they pay every year an
aliquot part of the year's produce, etc., as is done in
Holland.
[8:11] (8:11:1) These
points considered, I proceed to the foundations
on
{ all
patricians }
which the supreme council
should rest and be
established. (8:11:2) We
have shown (8:2) that, in a moderate-sized dominion, this council ought
to have about five thousand members. (8:11:3) And so we must look for
means of preventing the dominion
from gradually getting into
fewer
Bk.XIB:160.
hands, and
of insuring, on the contrary, that the number of members
be
increased in proportion to the growth of the dominion itself; and, next,
that between the patricians, equality be as far as possible maintained;
and, further, that there may be speed and expedition in their counsels,
and that they PAGE 351 tend to the general good; and, lastly, that the
power of the patricians or council exceed the power of the multitude,
yet so that the multitude suffer no harm thereby.
[8:12] (8:12:1) But
jealousy causes a great difficulty
in maintaining our first
{ In
a jungle
}
point. (8:12:2) For
men are, as we have said, by nature enemies, so that
however they be associated, and
bound together by laws, they still
{ because it
is still a part-jungle }
retain their nature. (8:12:3)
And hence I think it is, that democracies
change
into aristocracies, and these at length into monarchies. (8:12:4) For I am
fully persuaded that most aristocracies were formerly democracies.
(8:12:5) For when a given multitude,
in search of fresh territories, has found
Bk.XIB:162.
and cultivated them,
it retains, as a whole, its equal right of dominion,
because no man gives dominion to another spontaneously. (8:12:6) But
although every one of them thinks it fair, that he should have the same
right against another that that other has against him, he yet thinks it
unfair, that the foreigners that join them should have equal right in the
dominion with themselves, who sought it by
their own toil, and won it at
{ How
little have things changed. }
the price of their own blood. (8:12:7)
And this not even the foreigners them-
selves deny, for, of course, they migrate thither, not to hold dominion,
but for the benefit of their own private business, and are quite satisfied if
they are but allowed the liberty of transacting that business in safety.
(8:12:8) But meanwhile the multitude is augmented by the influx of foreign-
ers, who gradually acquire the national manners, until at last they are
distinguished by no other difference than that of incapacity to get office;
and while their number daily increases, that of the citizens, on the con-
trary, is by many causes diminished. (8:12:9) For families often die out,
and some persons are disqualified for their crimes, and a great many
are driven by domestic poverty to neglect affairs of state, and mean-
while the more powerful aim
at nothing else, but to govern alone; and
Bk.XIB:16046.
thus the dominion is
gradually limited to a few, and at length by faction
to one. (8:12:10) And here we might add other causes that destroy domin-
ions of this sort; but as they are well known, I pass them by, and pro-
ceed now to state the laws by which this dominion, of which we are
treating, ought to be maintained.
[8:13] (8:13:1) The
primary law of this dominion ought
to be that which
determines the proportionate numbers of patricians PAGE 352 and multi-
tude. (8:13:2) For a proportion (8:1) ought to be maintained between the
multitude and the patricians, so that with the increase of the former the
number of the latter should be raised. (8:13:3) And this proportion (in
accordance with our remarks
in the second section) ought to
be about
Bk.XIB:16046.
fifty to one, that is,
the inequality between the members of each should
never be greater. (8:13:4) For (8:1) without destroying the form of dominion,
the number of patricians may be greater than the number of the multi-
tude. (8:13:5) But there is no danger except in the smallness of their num-
ber. (8:13:6) But how it is to be provided that this law be kept unbroken,
I will presently show in its own place.
[8:14] (8:14:1) Patricians,
in some places, are chosen only out of particular
families. (8:14:2) But it is ruinous to lay this down expressly by law.
(8:14:3) For not to mention that families often die out, and that the other
families can never be excluded without
disgrace, it is also repugnant to
Bk.XIB:17475.
the form of this
dominion, that the dignity
of patrician should be heredi-
tary (8:1). (8:14:4) But on this system a dominion seems rather a democ-
racy, such as we have described in 8:12, that is in the hands of very
few citizens. (8:14:5) But, on the other hand, to provide against the patri-
cians choosing their own sons and kinsmen, and thereby against the
right of dominion remaining in particular families, is impossible, and
indeed absurd, as I shall show (8:39). (8:14:6) But provided that they hold
that right by no express law, and that the rest (I mean, such as are born
within the dominion, and use the vulgar tongue, and have not a foreign
wife, and are not infamous, nor servants, nor earning their living by any
servile trade, among which are to be reckoned those of a wine-merchant,
or brewer) are not excluded, the form of the dominion will, notwithstand-
ing, be retained, and it will be possible to maintain the proportion
between the patricians and the multitude.
[8:15] (8:15:1) But
if it be further by law appointed that no
young men be
chosen, it will never happen that a
few families hold the right of govern-
Bk.XIB:160.
ment in their hands.
(8:15:2) And, therefore,
be it by law appointed, that
no man that has not reached his thirtieth year be put on the list of
candidates.
[8:16] (8:16:1) Thirdly,
it is next to be ordained, that all the patricians must
be assembled at certain fixed times in a particular part of the city, and
that whoever does not attend the council, unless he be hindered by
illness or some public business, shall be fined some considerable
amount. (8:16:2) For, were it otherwise, most of them would neglect the
public, for the sake of their own private affairs.
[8:17] (8:17:1) Let
this council's functions be to pass and repeal laws, and
to choose their patrician colleagues, and all the ministers of the domin-
ion. (8:17:2) For he, that has supreme right, as we have decided that this
council has, cannot give to anyone authority to pass and repeal laws,
without at the same time abdicating his own right, and transferring it to
him, to whom he gives that power. (8:17:3) For he, that has but for one
day only authority to pass and repeal laws, is able to change the entire
form of the dominion. (8:17:4) But one can, without forfeiting one's
supreme right, temporarily entrust to others the daily business of domin-
ion to be administered according to the established laws. (8:17:5) Further-
more, if the ministers of dominion were chosen by any other but this
council, then its members would be more properly called wards than
patricians.
[8:18] (8:18:1) Hence
some are accustomed to create for the
council a
ruler or prince, either for life, as the Venetians, or for a time, as the
Genoese; but yet with such great precautions, as make it clear enough,
that it is not done without
great risk. (8:18:2) And
assuredly we cannot
Bk.XIB:16455.
doubt but that the
dominion thereby approaches the monarchical form,
and as far as we can conjecture from their histories, it was done for no
other reason, than that before the institution of these councils they had
lived under a ruler, or doge, as under a king. (8:18:3) And so the creation
of a ruler is a necessary requisite indeed for the particular nation, but
not for the aristocratic dominion considered
in itself.
[8:19] (8:19:1) But,
inasmuch as the supreme authority of
this dominion
rests with this council as a whole, not with every individual member of it
(for otherwise it would be but the gathering of an undisciplined mob),
it is, therefore, necessary that all the patricians be so bound by the laws
as to form, as it were, one body governed by one mind. (8:19:2) But the
laws by themselves alone are weak and easily broken, when their
vindicators are the very persons who PAGE 354 are able to transgress
them, and the only ones who are to take warning by the punishment,
and must punish their colleagues in order by fear of the same punish-
ment to restrain their own desire: for all this involves a great absurdity.
(8:19:3) And, therefore, means must be sought to preserve order in this
supreme council and keep unbroken the constitution of the dominion,
so that yet the greatest possible
equality may exist between patricians.
[20] (8:20:1) But
since, from a single ruler or prince, able also to vote in the
debates, there must necessarily arise a great inequality, especially on
account of the power, which must of necessity be granted him, in order
to enable him to discharge his
duty in safety; therefore, if we consider
the whole matter aright, nothing
can be devised more useful to the
general welfare than the institution of another council of certain patri-
cians subordinate to the supreme council, whose only duty should be to
see that the constitution, as far as it concerns the councils and ministers
of the dominion, be kept
unbroken, and who should, therefore, have
{ USA
Supreme Court }
authority to summon to judgment and,
in conformity with established law,
to condemn any delinquent who, as a minister of the dominion, has
transgressed the laws
concerning his office. (8:20:2)
And these patricians
Bk.XIB:165.
we shall hereafter call syndics.
[8:21] (8:210:1) And
they are to be chosen for life. (8:210:2)
For, were they to
be chosen for a time, so that they should afterwards be eligible for other
offices in the dominion, we should fall into the very absurdity which we
have just pointed out in the nineteenth section. (8:210:3) But lest they
should become quite haughty by very long rule, none are to be elected
to this office, but those who have reached their sixtieth year or more,
and have discharged the duties of senator, of which below.
[8:22] (8:22:1) Of
these, too, we shall easily determine the number,
if we
consider that these syndics stand to the patricians in the same relation
as the whole body of patricians together does to the multitude, which
they cannot govern, if they are fewer than a proper number. (8:22:2) And,
therefore, the number of the syndics should be to that of patricians as
their number is to that of the multitude, that is (8:13),
as one to fifty.
[8:23] (8:23:1) Moreover,
that this council may discharge its
functions
PAGE 355 in security, some portion of the soldiery must be assigned to it,
and be subject to its orders.
[8:24] (8:24:1) The
syndics and other ministers
of state are to have no
salary, but such emoluments, that they cannot maladminister affairs of
state without great loss to themselves. (8:24:2) For we cannot doubt that it
is fair, that the ministers of this kind of dominion should be awarded a
recompense for their time, since the commons are the majority in this
dominion, and the patricians look after their safety, while they them-
selves have no trouble with affairs of state, but only with their own
private ones. (8:24:3) But since, on the other hand, no man (7:4) defends
another's cause, save in so far as he thereby hopes to establish his own
interest, things must, of necessity, be so ordered that the ministers, who
have charge of affairs of state, should most pursue their own interest,
when they are most watchful for the general good.
[8:25] (8:25:1) To
the syndics then, whose duty, as we
said, it is to see
that the constitution is kept unbroken, the following emoluments are to
be awarded: namely, that every householder that inhabits any place in
the dominion, be bound to pay every year a coin of small value, say a
quarter of an ounce of silver, to the syndics, that thus they may know
the number of inhabitants, and so observe what proportion of them the
patricians constitute; and next that every new patrician on his election
must pay the syndics some large sum, for instance, twenty or twenty-five
pounds of silver. (8:25:2) Moreover, that money, in which the absent patri-
cians (I mean those who have failed to attend the meeting of the council)
are condemned, is also to be awarded to the syndics; and a part, too,
of the goods of defaulting ministers, who are bound to abide their judg-
ment, and who are fined a certain sum of money, or have their goods
confiscated, should be devoted to them, not to all indeed, but to those
only who sit daily, and whose duty it is to summon the council of syndics,
concerning whom see 8:28. (8:25:3) But, in order that the council of syndics
may always be maintained at its full number, before all other business in
the supreme council, when it is assembled at the usual time, inquiry is to
be made about this. (8:25:4) Which, if the syndics neglect, let it then
devolve upon the president PAGE 356 of the senate (concerning which we
shall soon have occasion to speak), to admonish the supreme council
on this head, to demand of the president of the syndics the reason of
his silence, and to inquire what is the supreme council's opinion in the
matter. (8:25:5) But if the president of the senate is likewise silent, let the
case be taken up by the president of the supreme court of justice, or if
he too is silent by some other patrician, and let him demand an explana-
tion of their silence from the presidents of the senate and the court of
justice, as well as from the president of the syndics. (8:25:6) Lastly, that
that law, whereby young men are excluded, may likewise be strictly
observed, it is to be appointed that all who have reached the thirtieth
year of their age, and who are not by express law excluded, are to have
their names inscribed on a list, in presence of the syndics, and to
receive from them, at a fixed price, some sign of the honour conferred
on them, namely, that they may be allowed to wear a particular orna-
ment only permitted to them,
to distinguish them and make them to be
Bk.XIB:17271.
had in honour by
the rest; and, at the same time, be it ordained, that
in
elections none may nominate as patrician anyone whose name is not
inscribed on the general list, and that under a heavy penalty. (8:25:7) And,
further, let no one be allowed to refuse the burden of a duty or office,
which he is chosen to bear. (8:25:8) Lastly, that all the absolutely funda-
mental laws of the dominion may be everlasting, it must be ordained that
if anyone in the supreme council raise a question about any funda-
ental law, as of prolonging the command of any general of an army,
or of diminishing the number of patricians, or the like, he is guilty of
treason, and not only is he to be condemned to death, and his goods
confiscated, but some sign of
his punishment is to remain visible in
Bk.XIB:165.
public for an eternal
memorial of the event. (8:25:9) But
for the confirming
of the other general rights of the dominion, it is enough, if it be only
ordained, that no law can be repealed nor new law passed, unless first
the college of syndics,
and then three-fourths or four-fifths of
the
Bk.XIB:165.
supreme council agree
thereto.
[8:26] (8:26:1) Let
the right also of summoning the supreme
council and
proposing the matters to be decided in it, rest with the syndics, and let
them likewise be given the first place in PAGE 357 the council, but without
the right to vote. (8:26:2) But before they take their seats, they must swear
by the safety of that supreme council and by the public liberty, that they
will strive with the utmost zeal to preserve unbroken the ancient laws.
and to consult the general good. (8:26:3) After which let them through their
secretary open in order the subjects of discussion.
Bk.XIB:16046.
[8:27] (8:27:1)
But that all the
patricians may have equal authority
in
making decrees and electing the ministers of the dominion, and that
speed and expedition in all matters may be possible, the order
observed by the Venetians is altogether to be approved, for they
appoint by lot a certain number of the council to name the ministers,
and when these have named in order the candidates for office, every
patrician signifies by ballot his opinion, approving or rejecting the candi-
date in question, so that it is not afterwards known, who voted in this or
that sense. (8:27:2) Whereby it is contrived, not only that the authority of
all the patricians in the decision is equal, and that business is quickly
despatched, but also, that everyone has absolute liberty (which is
of the first necessity in councils) to give his opinion without danger of
unpopularity.
[8:28] (8:28:1) But
in the councils of syndics and the
other councils, the
same order is to be observed, that voting is to be by ballot. (8:28:2) But
the right of convoking the council of syndics and of proposing the
matters to be decided in the same ought to belong to their president,
who is to sit every day with ten or more other syndics, to hear the
complaints and secret accusations of the commons against the ministers,
and to look after the accusers, if circumstances require, and to summon
the supreme council even before the appointed time, if any of them
judge that there is danger in the delay. (8:28:3) Now this president and
those who meet with him every day are to be appointed by the supreme
council and out of the number of syndics, not indeed for life, but for six
months, and they must not have their term renewed but after the lapse
of three or four years. (8:28:4) And these, as we said above, are to be
awarded the goods that are confiscated and the pecuniary fines,
or some part of them. (8:28:5) The remaining points which concern the
syndics we will mention in their proper places.
PAGE 358
Bk.XIB:166. {
a subcommitee of }
[8:29] (8:29:1)
The second council, which
is subordinate to
the supreme
one, we will call the senate,
and let its duty be to transact public busi-
ness, for instance, to publish the laws of the dominion, to order the forti-
fications of the cities according to law, to confer military commissions,
to impose taxes on the subjects and apply the same, to answer foreign
embassies, and decide where embassies are to be sent. (8:29:2) But let
the actual appointment of ambassadors be the duty of the supreme
council. (8:29:3) For it is of the greatest consequence to see that no patri-
cian be called to any office in the dominion but by the supreme council
itself, lest the patricians themselves should try to curry favour with the
senate. (8:29:4) Secondly, all matters are to be referred to the supreme
council, which in any way
alter the existing state of things,
as the
Bk.XIB:16657.
deciding on
peace and war. (8:29:5)
Wherefore, that the senate's decrees
concerning peace and war may be valid, they must be confirmed by the
supreme council. (8:29:6)
And therefore I should say,
that it belonged to
{ all
patricians } {
USA House of Representatives
}
the supreme council
only, not to the senate,
to impose new taxes.
[8:30] (8:30:1) In
determining the number of senators these points are
to be
taken into consideration: first, that all the patricians should have an
equal hope of gaining senatorial rank; secondly, that notwithstanding
the same senators, whose time (for which they were elected) is elapsed,
may be continued after a short interval, that so the dominion may always
be governed by skilled and experienced men; and lastly, that among the
senators many may be found illustrious for wisdom and virtue. (8:30:2) But
to secure all these conditions, there can be no other means devised,
than that it should be by law appointed, that no one who has not
reached his fiftieth year, be
received into the number of senators, and
Bk.XIB:166.
that four hundred, that
is about a twelfth part of the
patricians, be
appointed for a year, and that two years after that year has elapsed,
the same be capable of re-appointment. (8:30:3) For in this manner about
a twelfth part of the patricians will be constantly engaged in the duty of
senator, with only short intervening periods; and this number surely,
together with that made up by the syndics, will be little less than the
number of patricians that have attained their fiftieth year. (8:30:4) And so
all the patricians will always have a great hope of gaining the rank
PAGE 359 of senator or syndic, and yet notwithstanding, the same patri-
cians, at only short intervals, will always hold senatorial rank, and
(according to what we said, 8:2) there will never be wanting in the
senate distinguished men, excelling in counsel and skill. (8:30:5) And
because this law cannot be
broken without exciting great jealousy on
Bk.XIB:16046.
the part of many patricians,
it needs no other safeguard for its constant
validity, than that every patrician who has reached the age we men-
tioned, should offer the proof thereof to the syndics, who shall put his
name on the list of candidates for the senatorial duties, and read the
name before the supreme council, so that he may occupy, with the rest
of the same rank, a place set apart in this supreme council for his
fellows, next to the place of the senators.
[8:31] (8:31:1) The
emoluments of the senators should be of such a
kind,
that their profit is greater from peace than from war. (8:31:2) And therefore
let there be awarded to them a hundredth or a fiftieth part of the
merchandise exported abroad from the dominion, or imported into it
from abroad. (8:31:3) For we cannot doubt, that by this means they will,
as far as they can, preserve peace, and never desire to protract war.
(8:31:4) And from this duty not even the senators themselves, if any of
them are merchants, ought to be exempt; for such an immunity cannot
be granted without great risk to trade, as I think no one is ignorant.
(8:31:5) Nay, on the contrary, it must be by law ordained, that no senator
or ex-senator may fill any military post; and further, that no one may be
declared general or praetor, which officers we said (8:9) were to be
only appointed in time of war, whose father or grandfather is a senator,
or has held the dignity of senator within two years. (8:31:6) Which laws
we cannot doubt, that the patricians outside the senate will defend with
all their might: and so it will be the case, that the senators will always
have more profit from peace than from war, and will, therefore, never
advise war, except the utmost need of the dominion compels them.
(8:31:7) But it may be objected to us, that on this system, if, that is, syndics
and senators are to be allowed so great profits, an aristocracy will be as
burdensome to the subjects as any monarchy. (8:31:8) But not to mention
that royal courts require larger expenditure, and are yet not provided in
order to secure peace, PAGE 360 and that peace can never be bought too
dear; it is to be added, first, that all that under a monarchy is conferred
on one or a few, is here conferred upon very many. (8:31:9) Next kings
and their ministers do not bear the burden of the dominion with the
subjects, but under this form of dominion it is just the reverse; for the
patricians,
who are always chosen from the rich, bear the
largest share
Bk.XIB:159.
of the weight of
the commonwealth. (8:31:10) Lastly,
the burdens of a
monarchy spring not so much from its king's expenditure, as from its
secret policy. (8:31:11) For those burdens of a dominion, that are imposed
on the citizens in order to secure peace and liberty, great though they
be, are yet supported
and lightened
by the usefulness of peace.
Bk.XIB:16352.
(8:31:12) What
nation ever had to pay so many and so heavy taxes as the
Dutch? (8:31:13) Yet it not only has not been exhausted, but, on the con-
trary, has been so mighty by its wealth, that all envied its good fortune.
(8:31:14) If therefore the burdens of a monarchy were imposed for the sake
of peace, they would not oppress the citizens; but, as I have said, it is
from the secret policy of that sort of dominion, that the subjects faint
under their lord; that is, because the virtue of kings counts for more in
time of war than in time of peace, and because they, who would reign
by themselves, ought above
all to try and have their subjects poor; not
Bk.XIB:2143,
44. (Note
1, 360)
to mention other things,
which that most prudent Dutchman V. H.
formerly remarked, because they do not concern my design,
which is only to describe
the best state of every kind of dominion.
[8:32] (8:32:1) Of
the syndics chosen by the supreme council, some should
sit in the senate, but without the right of voting, so that they may see
whether the laws concerning that assembly be duly observed, and may
have the supreme council convoked, when anything is to be referred to
it from the senate. (8:32:2) For the supreme right of convoking this council,
and proposing to it subjects of discussion, is, as we have already said,
with the syndics. (8:32:3) But before the votes of the contemporaries of
the senators be taken, the president PAGE 361 of the senate for the time
being shall explain the state of affairs, and what the senate's own
opinion is on the matter in question, and why; after which the votes
shall be collected in the accustomed order.
[8:33] (8:33:1) The
entire senate ought not to meet every
day, but, like all
great councils, at a certain fixed time. (8:33:2) But as in the mean time the
business of the dominion must be executed, it is, therefore, necessary
that some part of the senators be chosen, who, on the dismissal of the
senate, shall supply its place, and whose duty it shall be to summon the
senate itself, when need is; to execute its orders about affairs of state;
to read letters written to the senate and supreme council; and, lastly,
to consult about the matters to be proposed in the senate. (8:33:3) But
that all these points, and the order of this assembly, as a whole, may be
more easily conceived, I
will describe the whole matter more precisely.
[8:34] (8:34:1) The
senators who, as we have said already,
are to be
chosen for a year, are to be divided into four or six series, of which let
the first have the first seat in the senate for the first three or two months
in the year; and at the expiration of this time, let the second series take
the place of the first, and so on, observing their turns, so that that
series which was first in the first months may be last in the second
period. (8:34:2) Furthermore, there are to be appointed as many presi-
dents as there are series, and the same number of vice-presidents to
fill their places when required that is, two are to be chosen out of
every series, one to be its president, the other its vice-president.
(8:34:3) And let the president of the first series preside in the senate also,
for the first months; or, in his absence, let his vice-president fill his
place; and so on with the rest, observing the same order as above.
(8:34:4) Next, out of the first series, some are to be chosen by vote or lot
to fill the place of the senate, when it is dismissed, in conjunction with
the president and vice-president of the same series; and that, for the
same space of time, as the said series occupies the first place in the
senate; and thus, when that tim