Posthumously Published - 1677
 

Benedict de Spinoza

1632 - 1677

JBY Notes:

1.  For  the kind  permission  to  use  the  text  see  Page 1.
     JBY added sentence numbers. 

2.  [8:4] - Chapter Number:Paragraph Number.
     Sentence numbers, added by JBY, are shown thus (zz:yy:xx). 
               zz = Chapter Number. 
            yy = Paragraph Number. 
            xx = Sentence Number. 

3.  Page  numbers  are  those  of  Book II.

4.  Citation abbreviations.

5.  (Footnote or the Latin word),
     {JBY Comment or endnote}. 

6.  Please   e-mail   errors,   clarification  requests,  disagreement,
     or  suggestions  to  josephb@yesselman.com. 

7.  There  is  much  in  this  work  that  you  will  not agree with  or  even
     think   nonsense—although   keep  in  mind  that  it  was  written  300
     years ago.  The  work  is hopelessly outdated; its main value is that it       Bk.XII:310- 312.
     shows  Spinozistic ideas at play in the formation of advanced modern      Hobbes: Leviathan.       
     governments  and  how  they cope with the passions of men. Partake  
     of  the  work  (and my commentaries)  as  you  would a pomegranate;
     relish  the  flesh,  but  spit-out the pits. See Introductions listed above. 

8.  Where  applicable,  I think it appropriate to substitute the term "State"
     for  "Clan"  or  "City"  so  as  to  understand  the idea in today's terms. 
     Likewise,  where  applicable, substitute "Country" for "Dominion" and 
     "Congress" or "Parliament" for "Council." For antecedents to the USA 
     Constitution see 8:29, and 9:1ff. 

9.  Spinoza's  purpose  in  writing  the  Treatise  is  to  design  a  govern-
     ment  that  will  best  cope with  the  passions   of  men;  but for these 
     passions   there   would   be   no   need   for   political   parties,   only 
     administrative offices—running the Post Office.   See also Title Page, 
     [7:2], and Self-interest. 
  
 

   Part                Chapters  

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Part 3:   BkII: PAGE 285
 

A  Political  Treatise  -  Part 1 , Part 2 , Part 3.

Author's Notes to the Treatise
 
 

CHAPTER VIII - OF ARISTOCRACY.

[8:1] (8:1:1)  So  far  of  monarchy.  (8:1:2)   But  now we will say, on what plan

an  aristocracy  is  to be framed, so that it may be lasting.  (8:1:3)  We have

defined  an  aristocratic  dominion as that, which is held not by one man,

but  by  certain  persons  chosen  out  of  the  multitude,  whom we shall
 { USA Congressman or Senators }
henceforth  call  patricians.  (8:1:4)  I  say  expressly,  "that which is held by

certain  persons chosen."  (8:1:5)  For the chief difference between this and
{ semantic confusion }
a democracy is, that the right of governing depends in an aristocracy on

election  only,  but in a democracy for the most part on some right either

congenital  or  acquired by fortune (as we shall explain in its place); and

therefore, although in any dominion the entire multitude be received into

the  number of the patricians, provided that right of theirs is not inherited,

and  does  not  descend  by  some law to others, the dominion will for all

that be quite an aristocracy, because none are received into the number

of  the  patricians  save  by  express  election.  (8:1:6)  But  if  these chosen

persons were but two, each of them will try to be more powerful than the

other,  and  from the too great power of each, the dominion will easily be

split into two factions; and in like manner into three, four, or five factions,

if  three,  four,  or  five  persons  were put into possession of it.  (8:1:7)  But

the  factions  will  be  the weaker, the more there are to whom the domin-

ion   was  delegated.    (8:1:8)    And  hence  it  follows,  that  to  secure  the

stability  of  an  aristocracy, it is necessary to consider the proportionate
                                                                                           Bk.XIB:153132.
size  of  the  actual dominion, in order to determine the minimum number

of patricians.
 
 

[8:2] (8:2:1)  Let  it be supposed, then, that for a dominion of moderate size

it  suffices to be allowed a hundred of the best men, and that upon them

has  been  conferred  the  supreme  authority  of  the dominion, and that

they  have  consequently  the  right  to  elect  their  patrician  colleagues,

when  any  of PAGE 346 the  number  die.  (8:2:2)  These  men  will  certainly

endeavour  to  secure  their succession to their children or next in blood.

(8:2:3)  And  thus the supreme authority of the dominion will always be with

those,   whom   fortune   has  made  children  or  kinsmen  to  patricians.

(8:2:4)  And,  as  out of a hundred men who rise to office by fortune, hardly

three are found that excel in knowledge and counsel, it will thus come to

pass,  that  the  authority  of  the  dominion  will rest, not with a hundred,

but  only  with  two  or  three  who  excel by vigour of mind, and who will

easily  draw  to themselves everything, and each of them, as is the wont

of   human   greed,   will  be  able  to  prepare  the  way  to  a  monarchy.

(8:2:5)  And  so,  if  we  make  a  right  calculation,  it  is necessary, that the

supreme authority of a dominion, whose size requires at least a hundred

first-rate  men,  should  be  conferred  on  not  less  than  five  thousand.

(8:2:6)   For by this proportion it will never fail, but a hundred shall be found

excelling in mental vigour, that is, on the hypothesis that, out of fifty that

seek  and  obtain office, one will always be found not less than first-rate,

besides others that imitate the virtues of the first-rate, and are therefore

worthy to rule.
 
 

[8:3] (8:3:1)  The  patricians  are  most commonly citizens of one city, which
                                                    Bk.XIB:167.
is the head of the whole PAGE 349 dominion, so that the commonwealth or

republic  has  its  name  from it, as once that of Rome, and now those of

Venice,  Genoa,  etc.  (8:3:2)  But  the  republic  of  the  Dutch has its name

from  an  entire  province,  whence  it  arises,  that  the  subjects  of  this

dominion  enjoy  a  greater  liberty.  (8:3:3)  Now,  before we can determine

the  foundations  on  which  this  aristocratic  dominion ought to rest, we

must   observe   a   very   great   difference,  which  exists  between  the

dominion  which is conferred on one man and that which is conferred on

a  sufficiently large council.  (8:3:4)  For, in the first place, the power of one

man is (as we said, 6:5) very inadequate to support the entire dominion;

but  this  no  one,  without manifest absurdity, can affirm of a sufficiently

large  council.  (8:3:5)  For,  in  declaring the council to be sufficiently large,

one  at  the  same  time  denies,  that  it  is  inadequate  to  support  the

dominion.  (8:3:6)  A  king,  therefore,  is  altogether  in need of counsellors,

but  a  council  like  this  is  not  so in the least.  (8:3:7)  In the second place,

kings  are  mortal,  but  councils  are everlasting.  (8:3:8)  And so the power

PAGE 347 of  the  dominion  which  has  once  been  transferred to a large

enough council never reverts to the multitude.  (8:3:9)  But this is otherwise

in  a monarchy, as we showed (7:25).  (8:3:10)  Thirdly, a king's dominion is

often  on  sufferance, whether from his minority, sickness, or old age, or

from  other  causes;  but  the  power of a council of this kind, on the con-

trary,  remains  always  one and the same.  (8:3:11)  In the fourth place, one

man's  will  is  very  fluctuating  and inconstant; and, therefore, in a mon-

archy, all law is, indeed, the explicit will of the king (as we said. 7:1), but

not  every  will of the king ought to be law; but this cannot be said of the

will  of  a sufficiently numerous council.  (8:3:1)2  For since the council itself,

as  we  have  just  shown,  needs  no  counsellors,  its every explicit will

ought  to  be  law.   (8:3:13)  And hence we conclude, that the dominion con-

ferred  upon  a large enough council is absolute, or approaches nearest

to  the absolute.  (8:3:14)  For if there be any absolute dominion, it is, in fact,

that which is held by an entire multitude.
 
 

[8:4] (8:4:1)  Yet  in  so  far  as  this aristocratic dominion never (as has just

been  shown)  reverts  to the multitude, and there is under it no consulta-

tion with the multitude, but, without qualification, every will of the council

is  law, it must be considered as quite absolute, and therefore its founda-

tions  ought to rest only on the will and judgment of the said council, and
                                              Bk.XIB:16148. 
not  on  the  watchfulness  of  the  multitude,  since the latter is excluded

from  giving its advice or its vote.  (8:4:2)  The reason, then, why in practice

aristocracy  is not absolute, is that the multitude is a cause of fear to the

rulers,  and  therefore succeeds in retaining for itself some liberty, which

it  asserts  and  holds  as  its own, if not by an express law, yet on a tacit

understanding.
 
 

[8:5] (8:5:1)  And  thus  it  is manifest that this kind of dominion will be in the

best  possible  condition,  if  its  institutions  are  such that it most nearly

approaches  the  absolute — that  is,  that  the  multitude  is  as  little  as

possible  a cause of fear, and retains no liberty, but such as must neces-

sarily  be  assigned  it  by  the law of the dominion itself, and is therefore

not  so  much a right of the multitude as of the whole dominion, asserted

and  maintained  by the aristocrats only as their own.  (8:5:2)  For thus prac-

tice  agrees  best  with  theory,  as  appears from the last section, and is

also  self-evident. PAGE 348  (8:5:3)  For  we  cannot  doubt that the dominion

rests  the  less  with  the  patricians, the more rights the commons assert

for  themselves,  such  as  those  which  the  corporations  of  artisans in
                                                                       Bk.XIB:16148. 
Lower Germany, commonly called Guilds, generally possess.
 
 

[8:6]  (8:6:1)  But the commons need not apprehend any danger of a hateful

slavery  from this form of dominion, merely because it is conferred on the

council  absolutely.  (8:6:2)  For  the  will  of so large a council cannot be so

much  determined  by  lust  as  by reason; because men are drawn asun-

der  by  an evil passion,  and  cannot be guided, as it were, by one mind,

except  so  far  as they desire things honourable, or that have at least an

honourable appearance.
 
 

[8:7] (8:7:1)  In  determining,  then,  the  foundations  of  an aristocracy, it is

above  all  to  be  observed,  that  they  should  rest  on the sole will and

power  of  the  supreme  council,  so  that  it  may  be as independent as

possible,  and  be in no danger from the multitude.  (8:7:2)  In order to deter-

mine  these  foundations,  which are to rest, I say, upon the sole will and

power  of  the council, let us see what foundations of peace are peculiar

to  monarchy,  and  unsuited to this form of dominion.  (8:7:3)  For if we sub-

stitute  for  these  equivalent foundations fit for an aristocracy, and leave

the  rest,  as  they are already laid, we shall have removed without doubt

every  cause  of  seditions;  or,  at  least, this kind of dominion will be no

less  safe  than  the monarchical, but, on the contrary, so much the more

so,  and  of  so much better a condition, as, without danger to peace and

liberty,  it  approaches  nearer  than  monarchy to the absolute (8:3, 8:6).

(8:7:4)  For the greater the right of the supreme authority, the more the form

of dominion agrees with the dictate of reason (3:5 , Ought not this reference

to be to 3:6 ?),  and,  therefore, the fitter it is to maintain peace and liberty.

(8:7:5)  Let  us  run  through,  therefore,  the  points  we  stated  in our sixth

chapter,  beginning  with  the  ninth  section,  that  we may reject what is

unfit   for   this   kind   of   dominion,    and   see   what   agrees   with   it.
 
 

[8:8] (8:8:1)  That  it  is necessary, in the first place, to found and fortify one

or  more  cities,  no  one  can  doubt.  (8:8:2)  But that city is above all to be

fortified,  which  is  the  head  of the whole dominion, and also those that

are  on  its  frontiers.  (8:8:3)  For that which is the head of the whole domin-

ion,  and has the supreme right, ought to be more powerful than the rest.

(8:8:4)  But  under  this kind of dominion it is quite unnecessary to divide all

the inhabitants into clans.
 
 

[8:9] (8:9:1)  As  for  the military, since under this dominion equality is not to

be  looked  for  among all, but between the patricians only, and, in partic-

ular,  the  power  of the patricians is greater than that of the commons, it

is  certain  that  it  makes  no  difference  to the laws or fundamental prin-

ciples  of  this  dominion,  that  the  military  be  formed of others besides
 Bk.XIB:163.
subjects (Cf. 6:10).  (8:9:2)  But  it  is  of  the first importance that no one be

admitted  into  the  number  of the patricians, that has not a proper know-

ledge  of  the  art  of  war.  (8:9:3)  But  for  the  subjects  to be excluded, as

some   would   have  it,  from  military  service,  is  surely  folly.   (8:9:4)  For

besides  that  the  military pay given to subjects remains within the realm,

whereas,  on the contrary, what is paid to a foreign soldiery is altogether

lost,  the  greatest  strength  of  the  dominion  is also thereby weakened.

 (8:9:5)  For  it  is  certain  that  those  fight with peculiar valour who fight for

altar and hearth.  (8:9:6)  Whence, also, it is manifest that those are no less

wrong,  who  lay  down  that  military  commanders,  tribunes, centurions,

etc.,  should  be  chosen  from  among  the patricians only.  (8:9:7)  For with

what  courage  will  those  soldiers  fight  who are deprived of all hope of

gaining  glory  and  advancement?  (8:9:8)  But, on the other hand, to estab-

lish  a  law  forbidding the patricians to hire foreign soldiers when circum-

stances  require  it,  whether  to  defend  themselves, and suppress sedi-

tions,  or  for  any other reason, besides being inconsiderate, would also
                                                                 Bk.XIB:16454.
be  repugnant  to  the  supreme right of the patricians, concerning which

see  8:3,  8:4, 8:5 .  (8:9:9)  But the general of a single army, or of the entire

military,  is  to  be  chosen  but  in  time of war, and among the patricians

only,  and  is  to  hold  the command for a year at most, without power of

being  continued  therein,  or  afterwards reappointed.  (8:9:10)  For this law,

necessary  as  it  is  under a monarchy, is so above all under this kind of

dominion.  (8:9:11)  For  although  it  is much easier, as we have said above,

to  transfer  the  dominion PAGE 350 from  one  man to another than from a

free  council  to  one  man;  yet  it  does often happen, that patricians are

subdued  by  their  own  generals,  and that to the much greater harm of

the  commonwealth.  (8:9:12)  For  when  a  monarch  is  removed, it is but a

change  of  tyrant,  not of the form of dominion; but, under an aristocracy,

this  cannot  happen, without an upsetting of the form of dominion, and a

slaughter  of  the  greatest  men.  (8:9:13)  Of which thing Rome has offered

the most mournful examples.  (8:9:14)  But our reason for saying that, under

a  monarchy,  the  militia  should  serve  without pay, is here inapplicable.

(8:9:15)  For  since  the  subjects  are  excluded  from  giving their advice or

votes,  they  are  to  be reckoned as foreigners, and are, therefore, to be

hired  for  service  on no worse terms than foreigners.  (8:9:16)  And there is

in  this case no danger of their being distinguished above the rest by the

patricians:  nay,  further, to avoid the partial judgment which everyone is

apt  to  form  of  his  own exploits, it is wiser for the patricians to assign a

fixed payment to the soldiers for their service.
 
 

[8:10]  (8:10:1)  Furthermore, for this same reason, that all but the patricians

are  foreigners,  it  cannot be without danger to the whole dominion, that

the  lands  and houses and the whole soil should remain public property,

and  be  let  to  the  inhabitants  at  a  yearly rent.  (8:10:2)  For the subjects

having  no  part  in  the  dominion  would easily, in bad times, all forsake

their  cities,  if  they  could  carry  where  they  pleased  what goods they
 Bk.XIB:16350.
possess.  (8:10:3)  And,  therefore,  lands  and  farms  are  not  to be let, but

sold  to  the  subjects,  yet  on  condition  that  they  pay  every  year  an

aliquot part of the year's produce, etc., as is done in Holland.
 
 

[8:11] (8:11:1)  These  points  considered,  I  proceed  to the foundations on
                     { all patricians }
which  the  supreme  council  should  rest  and be established.  (8:11:2)  We

have  shown (8:2) that, in a moderate-sized dominion, this council ought

to  have  about  five  thousand  members.  (8:11:3)  And so we must look for

means  of  preventing  the  dominion  from  gradually  getting  into  fewer
 Bk.XIB:160.
hands,  and  of insuring, on the contrary, that the number of members be

increased  in  proportion  to  the  growth of the dominion itself; and, next,

that  between  the  patricians,  equality be as far as possible maintained;

and,  further,  that  there  may be speed and expedition in their counsels,

and  that  they PAGE 351 tend  to  the  general  good;  and,  lastly, that the

power  of  the  patricians  or  council  exceed  the power of the multitude,

yet so that the multitude suffer no harm thereby.
 
 

[8:12] (8:12:1)  But  jealousy  causes a great difficulty in maintaining our first
                                                                               { In a jungle }
point.  (8:12:2)  For  men  are,  as  we have said, by nature enemies, so that

however  they  be  associated,  and  bound  together  by  laws, they still
{ because it is still a part-jungle }
retain their nature. (8:12:3)  And hence I think it is, that democracies change

into  aristocracies,  and  these  at length into monarchies.  (8:12:4)  For I am

fully   persuaded   that  most  aristocracies  were  formerly  democracies.

(8:12:5)  For when a given multitude, in search of fresh territories, has found
              Bk.XIB:162.
and  cultivated  them,  it  retains,  as  a whole, its equal right of dominion,

because  no  man  gives  dominion  to another spontaneously.  (8:12:6)  But

although  every  one  of them thinks it fair, that he should have the same

right  against  another  that  that  other  has  against  him, he yet thinks it

unfair,  that  the  foreigners  that join them should have equal right in the

dominion  with  themselves, who sought it by their own toil, and won it at
                                                      { How little have things changed. }
the price of their own blood.  (8:12:7)  And this not even the foreigners them-

selves  deny,  for,  of  course,  they  migrate thither, not to hold dominion,

but for the benefit of their own private business, and are quite satisfied if

they  are  but  allowed  the  liberty  of  transacting that business in safety.

(8:12:8)  But  meanwhile  the  multitude is augmented by the influx of foreign-

ers,  who  gradually  acquire  the  national manners, until at last they are

distinguished  by  no  other difference than that of incapacity to get office;

and  while  their  number  daily increases, that of the citizens, on the con-

trary,  is  by  many  causes  diminished.  (8:12:9)  For  families  often  die out,

and  some  persons  are  disqualified  for  their crimes, and a great many

are  driven  by  domestic  poverty  to  neglect  affairs  of state, and mean-

while  the  more  powerful  aim  at nothing else, but to govern alone; and
                                                      Bk.XIB:16046. 
thus  the  dominion  is gradually limited to a few, and at length by faction

to  one.  (8:12:10)  And  here  we might add other causes that destroy domin-

ions  of  this  sort;  but  as  they  are well known, I pass them by, and pro-

ceed  now  to state  the  laws  by  which  this  dominion, of which we are

treating, ought to be maintained.
 
 

[8:13] (8:13:1)  The  primary  law  of  this  dominion  ought  to  be that which

determines  the  proportionate  numbers  of  patricians PAGE 352 and multi-

tude.  (8:13:2)  For  a  proportion  (8:1)  ought to be maintained between the

multitude  and  the  patricians, so that with the increase of the former the

number  of  the  latter  should  be  raised.  (8:13:3)  And  this  proportion  (in

accordance  with  our  remarks  in the second section) ought to be about
  Bk.XIB:16046. 
fifty  to  one,  that is, the inequality between the members of each should

never be greater.  (8:13:4)  For (8:1) without destroying the form of dominion,

the  number  of  patricians  may  be  greater than the number of the multi-

tude.  (8:13:5)  But  there  is  no  danger except in the smallness of their num-

ber.  (8:13:6)  But  how  it  is  to  be  provided that this law be kept unbroken,

I will presently show in its own place.
 
 

[8:14]  (8:14:1)  Patricians, in some places, are chosen only out of particular

families.    (8:14:2)    But  it  is  ruinous  to  lay  this  down  expressly  by  law.

(8:14:3)  For  not  to  mention  that  families  often  die out, and that the other

families  can  never  be excluded without disgrace, it is also repugnant to
                                                                                               Bk.XIB:17475.
the  form  of  this  dominion,  that the dignity of patrician should be heredi-

tary (8:1).  (8:14:4)  But  on  this  system  a  dominion seems rather a democ-

racy,  such  as  we  have  described  in  8:12, that is in the hands of very

few  citizens.  (8:14:5)  But,  on  the  other  hand, to provide against the patri-

cians  choosing  their  own  sons  and  kinsmen, and thereby against the

right  of  dominion  remaining  in  particular  families,  is  impossible,  and

indeed  absurd,  as I shall show (8:39).  (8:14:6)  But provided that they hold

that  right  by no express law, and that the rest (I mean, such as are born

within  the  dominion,  and use the vulgar tongue, and have not a foreign

wife,  and  are not infamous, nor servants, nor earning their living by any

servile trade, among which are to be reckoned those of a wine-merchant,

or  brewer)  are  not excluded, the form of the dominion will, notwithstand-

ing,   be  retained,   and  it  will  be  possible  to  maintain  the  proportion

between the patricians and the multitude.
 
 

[8:15] (8:15:1)  But  if  it  be  further  by  law appointed that no young men be

chosen,  it  will  never happen that a few families hold the right of govern-
                Bk.XIB:160.
ment  in  their  hands.   (8:15:2)  And,  therefore,  be it by law appointed, that

no  man  that  has  not  reached  his  thirtieth  year  be  put  on the list of

candidates.
 
 

[8:16] (8:16:1)  Thirdly,  it  is  next to be ordained, that all the patricians must

be  assembled  at  certain  fixed  times in a particular part of the city, and

that  whoever  does  not  attend  the council,  unless  he  be hindered by

illness   or   some   public  business,  shall  be  fined  some  considerable

amount.  (8:16:2)  For,  were  it  otherwise,  most  of  them would neglect the

public, for the sake of their own private affairs.
 
 

[8:17] (8:17:1)  Let  this  council's  functions be to pass and repeal laws, and

to  choose  their  patrician  colleagues, and all the ministers of the domin-

ion.  (8:17:2)  For  he,  that  has  supreme right, as we have decided that this

council  has,  cannot  give  to  anyone  authority to pass and repeal laws,

without  at  the  same  time abdicating his own right, and transferring it to

him,  to  whom  he  gives  that  power.  (8:17:3)  For  he, that has but for one

day  only  authority  to pass and repeal laws, is able to change the entire

form   of   the   dominion.  (8:17:4)  But   one   can,   without  forfeiting  one's

supreme  right,  temporarily entrust to others the daily business of domin-

ion  to be  administered  according to the established laws.  (8:17:5)  Further-

more,  if  the  ministers  of  dominion  were  chosen  by any other but this

council,  then  its  members  would  be  more  properly called wards than

patricians.
 
 

[8:18] (8:18:1)  Hence  some  are  accustomed  to  create  for  the  council a

ruler  or  prince,  either  for  life,  as  the  Venetians,  or for a time, as the

Genoese;  but  yet  with such great precautions, as make it clear enough,

that  it  is  not  done  without  great  risk.  (8:18:2)  And  assuredly we cannot
                                                                                              Bk.XIB:16455.
doubt  but  that  the  dominion thereby approaches the monarchical form,

and  as  far  as  we can conjecture from their histories, it was done for no

other  reason,  than  that before the institution of these councils they had

lived  under  a  ruler, or doge, as under a king.  (8:18:3)  And so the creation

of  a  ruler  is  a  necessary  requisite indeed for the particular nation, but

not for the aristocratic dominion considered in itself.
 
 

[8:19] (8:19:1)  But,  inasmuch  as  the  supreme  authority  of  this  dominion

rests  with  this council as a whole, not with every individual member of it

(for  otherwise  it  would  be  but  the  gathering of an undisciplined mob),

it  is, therefore, necessary that all the patricians be so bound by the laws

as  to  form,  as  it  were,  one body governed by one mind.  (8:19:2)  But the

laws  by  themselves  alone  are  weak  and  easily  broken,   when  their

vindicators  are  the  very  persons  who PAGE 354 are  able  to transgress

them,  and  the  only  ones  who  are  to take warning by the punishment,

and  must  punish  their  colleagues  in  order by fear of the same punish-

ment  to  restrain  their  own  desire: for all this involves a great absurdity.

(8:19:3)  And,  therefore,  means  must  be  sought  to  preserve order in this

supreme  council  and  keep  unbroken  the  constitution of the dominion,

so  that  yet  the  greatest possible equality may exist between patricians.
 
 

[20] (8:20:1)  But  since, from a single ruler or prince, able also to vote in the

debates,  there  must  necessarily  arise a great inequality, especially on

account  of  the  power, which must of necessity be granted him, in order

to  enable  him  to discharge  his  duty in safety; therefore, if we consider

the  whole  matter  aright,  nothing  can  be  devised  more  useful  to the

general  welfare  than  the  institution  of  another  council of certain patri-

cians  subordinate to the supreme council, whose only duty should be to

see  that the constitution, as far as it concerns the councils and ministers

of  the  dominion,  be  kept  unbroken,  and  who  should, therefore, have
                          { USA Supreme Court }
authority  to summon to judgment and, in conformity with established law,

to  condemn  any  delinquent  who,  as  a  minister  of  the dominion, has

transgressed  the  laws  concerning his office.  (8:20:2)  And these patricians
                                        Bk.XIB:165.
we shall hereafter call syndics.
 
 

[8:21] (8:210:1)  And  they  are  to be chosen for life.  (8:210:2)  For, were they to

be  chosen for a time, so that they should afterwards be eligible for other

offices  in  the  dominion, we should fall into the very absurdity which we

have  just  pointed  out  in  the  nineteenth  section.  (8:210:3)  But  lest  they

should  become  quite  haughty by very long rule, none are to be elected

to  this  office,  but  those  who  have  reached their sixtieth year or more,

and have discharged the duties of senator, of which below.
 
 

[8:22] (8:22:1)  Of  these,  too,  we  shall  easily determine the number, if we

consider  that  these  syndics stand to the patricians in the same relation

as  the  whole  body  of  patricians  together does to the multitude, which

they  cannot  govern,  if  they are fewer than a proper number.  (8:22:2)  And,

therefore,  the  number  of  the  syndics should be to that of patricians as

their number is to that of the multitude, that is (8:13), as one to fifty.
 
 

[8:23]  (8:23:1)   Moreover,   that  this  council  may  discharge  its  functions

PAGE 355  in  security,  some portion of the soldiery must be assigned to it,

and be subject to its orders.
 
 

[8:24] (8:24:1)  The  syndics  and  other  ministers  of  state  are  to  have no

salary,  but  such  emoluments,  that they cannot maladminister affairs of

state  without great loss to themselves.  (8:24:2)  For we cannot doubt that it

is  fair,  that  the  ministers  of this kind of dominion should be awarded a

recompense  for  their  time,  since  the  commons are the majority in this

dominion,  and  the  patricians  look  after  their  safety,  while  they them-

selves  have  no  trouble  with  affairs  of  state,  but  only  with  their own

private  ones.  (8:24:3)  But  since,  on the other hand, no man (7:4) defends

another's cause, save in so far as he thereby hopes to establish his own

interest,  things must, of necessity, be so ordered that the ministers, who

have  charge  of  affairs  of  state,  should most pursue their own interest,

when they are most watchful for the general good.
 
 

[8:25] (8:25:1)  To  the  syndics  then,  whose  duty,  as  we said, it is to see

that  the  constitution  is  kept unbroken, the following emoluments are to

be  awarded:  namely,  that every householder that inhabits any place in

the  dominion,  be  bound  to  pay every year a coin of small value, say a

quarter  of  an  ounce  of  silver,  to the syndics, that thus they may know

the  number  of  inhabitants,  and so observe what proportion of them the

patricians  constitute;  and  next  that  every new patrician on his election

must pay the syndics some large sum, for instance, twenty or twenty-five

pounds  of  silver.  (8:25:2)  Moreover, that money, in which the absent patri-

cians (I mean those who have failed to attend the meeting of the council)

are  condemned,  is  also  to  be  awarded to the syndics; and a part, too,

of  the  goods  of  defaulting ministers, who are bound to abide their judg-

ment,  and  who  are  fined  a  certain sum of money, or have their goods

confiscated,  should  be  devoted  to  them, not to all indeed, but to those

only who sit daily, and whose duty it is to summon the council of syndics,

concerning whom see 8:28. (8:25:3)  But, in order that the council of syndics

may always be maintained at its full number, before all other business in

the supreme council, when it is assembled at the usual time, inquiry is to

be  made  about  this.   (8:25:4)  Which,  if  the  syndics  neglect,  let  it  then

devolve  upon the president PAGE 356 of the senate (concerning which we

shall  soon  have  occasion  to  speak), to admonish the supreme council

on  this  head,  to  demand  of  the president of the syndics the reason of

his  silence,  and  to  inquire  what is the supreme council's opinion in the

matter.  (8:25:5)  But  if  the  president  of the senate is likewise silent, let the

case  be  taken  up  by the president of the supreme court of justice, or if

he  too  is silent by some other patrician, and let him demand an explana-

tion  of  their  silence  from  the  presidents of the senate and the court of

justice,  as  well  as  from  the  president of the syndics.  (8:25:6)  Lastly, that

that  law,  whereby  young  men  are  excluded,  may  likewise  be strictly

observed,  it  is  to  be  appointed  that all who have reached the thirtieth

year  of  their age, and who are not by express law excluded, are to have

their  names  inscribed  on  a  list,  in  presence  of  the  syndics,  and  to

receive  from  them,  at  a  fixed price, some sign of the honour conferred

on  them,  namely,  that  they  may  be  allowed to wear a particular orna-

ment  only  permitted  to  them,  to distinguish them and make them to be
                           Bk.XIB:17271.
had  in  honour  by  the rest; and, at the same time, be it ordained, that in

elections  none  may  nominate  as  patrician anyone whose name is not

inscribed  on  the general list, and that under a heavy penalty.  (8:25:7)  And,

further,  let  no  one  be  allowed  to  refuse the burden of a duty or office,

which  he  is  chosen  to  bear.  (8:25:8)  Lastly,  that all the absolutely funda-

mental laws of the dominion may be everlasting, it must be ordained that

if  anyone  in  the  supreme  council  raise  a  question  about  any funda-

ental  law,  as  of  prolonging  the  command  of  any  general of an army,

or  of  diminishing  the  number  of  patricians,  or  the  like, he is guilty of

treason,  and  not  only  is  he  to be condemned to death, and his goods

confiscated,  but  some  sign  of  his  punishment  is  to  remain visible in
                                                       Bk.XIB:165.
public  for  an  eternal memorial of the event.  (8:25:9)  But for the confirming

of  the  other  general  rights  of  the  dominion,  it  is enough, if it be only

ordained,  that  no  law can be repealed nor new law passed, unless first

the   college   of   syndics,   and  then  three-fourths  or  four-fifths  of the
                              Bk.XIB:165.
supreme council agree thereto.
 
 

[8:26] (8:26:1)  Let  the  right  also  of  summoning  the  supreme council and

proposing  the  matters  to  be decided in it, rest with the syndics, and let

them  likewise  be given the first place in PAGE 357 the council, but without

the  right to vote.  (8:26:2)  But before they take their seats, they must swear

by  the  safety of that supreme council and by the public liberty, that they

will  strive  with  the  utmost  zeal  to preserve unbroken the ancient laws.

and  to consult the general good.  (8:26:3)  After which let them through their

secretary open in order the subjects of discussion.
 

                                                              Bk.XIB:16046. 
[8:27]  (8:27:1)  But   that   all  the  patricians  may  have  equal  authority  in

making  decrees  and  electing  the  ministers  of  the  dominion, and that

speed   and   expedition   in   all   matters   may  be  possible,  the  order

observed   by   the   Venetians  is  altogether  to  be  approved,  for  they

appoint  by  lot  a  certain  number  of  the  council to name the ministers,

and  when  these  have  named  in  order the candidates for office, every

patrician  signifies  by  ballot his opinion, approving or rejecting the candi-

date  in  question, so that it is not afterwards known, who voted in this or

that  sense.  (8:27:2)  Whereby  it  is  contrived, not only that the authority of

all  the  patricians  in  the  decision  is equal, and that business is quickly

despatched,   but   also,  that  everyone  has  absolute  liberty  (which  is

of  the  first   necessity  in  councils) to give his opinion without danger of

unpopularity.
 
 

[8:28] (8:28:1)  But  in  the  councils  of  syndics  and  the other councils, the

same  order  is  to  be  observed,  that voting is to be by ballot.  (8:28:2)  But

the   right  of  convoking  the  council  of  syndics  and  of  proposing  the

matters  to  be  decided  in  the  same  ought to belong to their president,

who  is  to  sit  every  day  with  ten  or  more  other  syndics,  to hear the

complaints and secret accusations of the commons against the ministers,

and  to  look after the accusers, if circumstances require, and to summon

the  supreme  council  even  before  the  appointed  time,  if  any of them

judge  that  there  is  danger  in  the  delay.  (8:28:3)  Now this president and

those  who  meet with him every day are to be appointed by the supreme

council  and  out  of  the number of syndics, not indeed for life, but for six

months,  and  they  must  not have their term renewed but after the lapse

of  three  or  four  years.  (8:28:4)  And  these,  as  we  said above, are to be

awarded   the   goods   that   are   confiscated  and  the  pecuniary  fines,

or  some  part  of  them.  (8:28:5)  The  remaining  points  which concern the

syndics we will mention in their proper places.

PAGE 358
                                       Bk.XIB:166.                              { a subcommitee of }
[8:29] (8:29:1)  The  second  council,  which  is  subordinate  to the supreme
  
one,  we  will  call  the  senate,  and let its duty be to transact public busi-

ness,  for  instance, to publish the laws of the dominion, to order the forti-

fications  of  the  cities  according  to  law, to confer military commissions,

to  impose  taxes  on the subjects and apply the same, to answer foreign

embassies,  and  decide  where  embassies  are to be sent.  (8:29:2)  But let

the  actual  appointment  of  ambassadors  be  the  duty  of  the supreme

council.  (8:29:3)  For  it  is  of the greatest consequence to see that no patri-

cian  be  called  to  any office in the dominion but by the supreme council

itself,  lest  the  patricians  themselves  should try to curry favour with the

senate.  (8:29:4)  Secondly,  all  matters  are  to  be  referred to the supreme

council,  which  in  any  way  alter  the  existing  state  of  things,  as  the
                          Bk.XIB:16657.
deciding  on  peace and war.  (8:29:5)  Wherefore, that the senate's decrees

concerning  peace  and war may be valid, they must be confirmed by the

supreme  council.  (8:29:6)  And  therefore  I  should  say, that it belonged to
         { all patricians }                                           { USA House of Representatives }
the  supreme  council  only,  not  to  the  senate,  to  impose  new  taxes.
 
 

[8:30]  (8:30:1)  In determining the number of senators these points are to be

taken  into  consideration:  first,  that  all  the  patricians  should  have an

equal  hope  of  gaining  senatorial  rank;  secondly, that notwithstanding

the  same senators, whose time (for which they were elected) is elapsed,

may be continued after a short interval, that so the dominion may always

be  governed by skilled and experienced men; and lastly, that among the

senators  many may be found illustrious for wisdom and virtue.  (8:30:2)  But

to  secure  all  these  conditions,  there  can  be no other means devised,

than  that  it  should  be  by  law  appointed,  that  no  one  who  has  not

reached  his  fiftieth  year,  be  received into the number of senators, and
          Bk.XIB:166.
that  four  hundred,  that  is  about  a  twelfth  part  of  the  patricians,  be

appointed  for  a  year,  and  that  two  years  after that year has elapsed,

the  same  be  capable of re-appointment.  (8:30:3)  For in this manner about

a  twelfth  part  of the patricians will be constantly engaged in the duty of

senator,  with  only  short  intervening  periods;  and  this  number surely,

together  with  that  made  up  by  the  syndics,  will be little less than the

number  of  patricians  that  have attained their fiftieth year.  (8:30:4)  And so

all  the  patricians  will  always  have  a  great  hope  of  gaining  the rank

PAGE 359 of  senator  or  syndic,  and  yet  notwithstanding, the same patri-

cians,   at  only  short  intervals,  will  always  hold  senatorial  rank,  and

(according  to  what  we  said,  8:2)  there  will  never  be  wanting  in the

senate   distinguished  men,  excelling  in  counsel  and  skill.   (8:30:5)   And

because  this  law  cannot  be  broken  without exciting great jealousy on
                        Bk.XIB:16046. 
the  part  of  many patricians, it needs no other safeguard for its constant

validity,  than  that  every  patrician  who  has  reached  the  age we men-

tioned,  should  offer  the  proof  thereof to the syndics, who shall put his

name  on  the  list  of  candidates  for the senatorial duties, and read the

name  before  the  supreme council, so that he may occupy, with the rest

of  the  same  rank,  a  place  set  apart  in  this  supreme  council  for his

fellows, next to the place of the senators.
 
 

[8:31] (8:31:1)  The  emoluments  of  the  senators  should be of such a kind,

that  their profit is greater from peace than from war.  (8:31:2)  And therefore

let   there  be  awarded  to  them  a  hundredth  or  a  fiftieth  part  of  the

merchandise  exported  abroad  from  the  dominion,  or  imported  into  it

from  abroad.  (8:31:3)   For  we  cannot  doubt,  that  by this means they will,

as  far  as  they  can,  preserve  peace,  and never desire to protract war.

(8:31:4)  And  from  this  duty  not  even  the  senators  themselves, if any of

them  are  merchants,  ought  to  be exempt; for such an immunity cannot

be  granted  without  great  risk  to  trade,  as  I  think  no  one is ignorant.

(8:31:5)  Nay,  on  the  contrary,  it  must be by law ordained, that no senator

or  ex-senator  may  fill any military post; and further, that no one may be

declared  general  or  praetor,  which  officers  we  said  (8:9) were to be

only  appointed  in  time of war, whose father or grandfather is a senator,

or  has  held  the  dignity  of  senator  within two years.  (8:31:6)  Which laws

we  cannot  doubt, that the patricians outside the senate will defend with

all  their  might:  and  so  it  will be the case, that the senators will always

have  more  profit  from  peace  than  from war, and will, therefore, never

advise  war,  except  the  utmost  need  of  the  dominion  compels  them.

(8:31:7)  But  it may be objected to us, that on this system, if, that is, syndics

and  senators are to be allowed so great profits, an aristocracy will be as

burdensome  to  the  subjects as any monarchy.  (8:31:8)  But not to mention

that  royal  courts  require larger expenditure, and are yet not provided in

order  to secure peace, PAGE 360 and that peace can never be bought too

dear;  it  is  to be added, first, that all that under a monarchy is conferred

on  one  or  a  few,  is  here  conferred upon very many.  (8:31:9)  Next kings

and  their  ministers  do  not  bear  the  burden  of  the  dominion with the

subjects,  but  under  this  form  of  dominion it is just the reverse; for the

patricians,   who  are always chosen from the rich, bear the largest share
                                          Bk.XIB:159.
of   the  weight  of  the  commonwealth.  (8:31:10)  Lastly,  the  burdens  of  a

monarchy  spring  not  so  much  from  its  king's  expenditure, as from its

secret  policy.   (8:31:11)  For those burdens of a dominion, that are imposed

on  the  citizens  in  order  to secure peace and liberty, great though they

be,   are   yet   supported   and   lightened  by  the  usefulness  of  peace.
                                                                                        Bk.XIB:16352.
(8:31:12)  What  nation  ever  had to pay so many and so heavy taxes as the

Dutch?  (8:31:13)  Yet  it  not  only  has  not been exhausted, but, on the con-

trary,  has  been  so  mighty by its wealth, that all envied its good fortune.

(8:31:14)  If  therefore the burdens of a monarchy were imposed for the sake

of  peace,  they  would  not  oppress the citizens; but, as I have said, it is

from  the  secret  policy  of  that  sort  of  dominion, that the subjects faint

under  their  lord;  that  is,  because the virtue of kings counts for more in

time  of  war  than  in  time of peace, and because they, who would reign

by  themselves,  ought  above  all to try and have their subjects poor; not
                                                                           Bk.XIB:2143, 44. (Note 1, 360)
to   mention   other   things,  which  that  most  prudent  Dutchman  V. H.

formerly    remarked,    because   they   do   not   concern    my    design,

which   is  only  to  describe  the  best  state  of  every  kind  of dominion.
 
 

[8:32]  (8:32:1)  Of the syndics chosen by the supreme council, some should

sit  in  the  senate,  but  without  the  right of voting, so that they may see

whether  the  laws concerning that assembly be duly observed, and may

have  the  supreme council convoked, when anything is to be referred to

it  from the senate.  (8:32:2)  For the supreme right of convoking this council,

and  proposing  to  it subjects of discussion, is, as we have already said,

with  the  syndics.  (8:32:3)   But  before  the  votes of the contemporaries of

the  senators  be  taken, the president  PAGE 361 of the senate for the time

being   shall  explain  the  state  of  affairs,  and  what  the  senate's own

opinion  is  on  the  matter  in  question,  and  why;  after which the votes

shall be collected in the accustomed order.
 
 

[8:33] (8:33:1)  The  entire  senate  ought  not to meet every day, but, like all

great  councils,  at a certain fixed time.  (8:33:2)  But as in the mean time the

business  of  the  dominion  must be executed, it is, therefore, necessary

that  some  part  of  the senators be chosen, who, on the dismissal of the

senate,  shall supply its place, and whose duty it shall be to summon the

senate  itself,  when  need  is; to execute its orders about affairs of state;

to  read  letters  written  to  the  senate  and supreme council; and, lastly,

to  consult  about  the  matters  to  be  proposed in the senate.  (8:33:3)  But

that  all these points, and the order of this assembly, as a whole, may be

more  easily  conceived,  I  will  describe the whole matter more precisely.
 
 

[8:34] (8:34:1)  The  senators  who,  as  we  have  said  already,  are  to  be

chosen  for  a  year,  are to be divided into four or six series, of which let

the  first have the first seat in the senate for the first three or two months

in  the  year; and at the expiration of this time, let the second series take

the  place  of  the  first,  and  so  on,  observing  their  turns,  so that that

series  which  was  first  in  the  first  months  may  be  last in the second

period.  (8:34:2)  Furthermore,  there  are  to  be  appointed  as  many  presi-

dents  as  there  are  series,  and  the same number of vice-presidents to

fill  their  places  when  required — that  is,  two  are to be chosen out of

every   series,   one   to   be  its  president,  the  other  its  vice-president.

(8:34:3)  And  let  the  president  of the first series preside in the senate also,

for  the  first  months;  or,  in  his  absence,  let  his  vice-president fill his

place;  and  so  on  with  the  rest,  observing  the  same  order as above.

(8:34:4)  Next,  out  of  the  first  series, some are to be chosen by vote or lot

to  fill  the  place  of  the senate, when it is dismissed, in conjunction with

the  president  and  vice-president  of  the  same series; and that, for the

same  space  of  time,  as  the  said  series occupies the first place in the

senate;  and  thus,  when  that  tim