Posthumously Published - 1677
 

Benedict de Spinoza

1632 - 1677

JBY Notes:

1.  For  the kind  permission  to  use  the  text  see  Page 1.
     JBY added sentence numbers. 

2.  [8:4] - Chapter Number:Paragraph Number.
     Sentence numbers, added by JBY, are shown thus (zz:yy:xx). 
               zz = Chapter Number. 
            yy = Paragraph Number. 
            xx = Sentence Number. 

3.  Page  numbers  are  those  of  Book II.

4.  Citation abbreviations.

5.  (Footnote or the Latin word),
     {JBY Comment or endnote}. 

6.  Please   e-mail   errors,   clarification  requests,  disagreement,
     or  suggestions  to  josephb@yesselman.com. 

7.  There  is  much  in  this  work  that  you  will  not agree with  or  even
     think   nonsense—although   keep  in  mind  that  it  was  written  300
     years ago.  The  work  is hopelessly outdated; its main value is that it       Bk.XII:310- 312.
     shows  Spinozistic ideas at play in the formation of advanced modern      Hobbes: Leviathan.       
     governments  and  how  they cope with the passions of men. Partake  
     of  the  work  (and my commentaries)  as  you  would a pomegranate;
     relish  the  flesh,  but  spit-out the pits. See Introductions listed above. 

8.  Where  applicable,  I think it appropriate to substitute the term "State"
     for  "Clan"  or  "City"  so  as  to  understand  the idea in today's terms. 
     Likewise,  where  applicable, substitute "Country" for "Dominion" and 
     "Congress" or "Parliament" for "Council." For antecedents to the USA 
     Constitution see 8:29, and 9:1ff. 

9.  Spinoza's  purpose  in  writing  the  Treatise  is  to  design  a  govern-
     ment  that  will  best  cope with  the  passions   of  men;  but for these 
     passions   there   would   be   no   need   for   political   parties,   only 
     administrative offices—running the Post Office.   See also Title Page, 
     [7:2], and Self-interest. 
  
 

   Part                Chapters  

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Part 3:   BkII: PAGE 285
 

A  Political  Treatise  -  Part 1 , Part 2 , Part 3.

Author's Notes to the Treatise
 
 

CHAPTER VIII - OF ARISTOCRACY.

[8:1] (8:1:1)  So  far  of  monarchy.  (8:1:2)   But  now we will say, on what plan

an  aristocracy  is  to be framed, so that it may be lasting.  (8:1:3)  We have

defined  an  aristocratic  dominion as that, which is held not by one man,

but  by  certain  persons  chosen  out  of  the  multitude,  whom we shall
 { USA Congressman or Senators }
henceforth  call  patricians.  (8:1:4)  I  say  expressly,  "that which is held by

certain  persons chosen."  (8:1:5)  For the chief difference between this and
{ semantic confusion }
a democracy is, that the right of governing depends in an aristocracy on

election  only,  but in a democracy for the most part on some right either

congenital  or  acquired by fortune (as we shall explain in its place); and

therefore, although in any dominion the entire multitude be received into

the  number of the patricians, provided that right of theirs is not inherited,

and  does  not  descend  by  some law to others, the dominion will for all

that be quite an aristocracy, because none are received into the number

of  the  patricians  save  by  express  election.  (8:1:6)  But  if  these chosen

persons were but two, each of them will try to be more powerful than the

other,  and  from the too great power of each, the dominion will easily be

split into two factions; and in like manner into three, four, or five factions,

if  three,  four,  or  five  persons  were put into possession of it.  (8:1:7)  But

the  factions  will  be  the weaker, the more there are to whom the domin-

ion   was  delegated.    (8:1:8)    And  hence  it  follows,  that  to  secure  the

stability  of  an  aristocracy, it is necessary to consider the proportionate
                                                                                           Bk.XIB:153132.
size  of  the  actual dominion, in order to determine the minimum number

of patricians.
 
 

[8:2] (8:2:1)  Let  it be supposed, then, that for a dominion of moderate size

it  suffices to be allowed a hundred of the best men, and that upon them

has  been  conferred  the  supreme  authority  of  the dominion, and that

they  have  consequently  the  right  to  elect  their  patrician  colleagues,

when  any  of PAGE 346 the  number  die.  (8:2:2)  These  men  will  certainly

endeavour  to  secure  their succession to their children or next in blood.

(8:2:3)  And  thus the supreme authority of the dominion will always be with

those,   whom   fortune   has  made  children  or  kinsmen  to  patricians.

(8:2:4)  And,  as  out of a hundred men who rise to office by fortune, hardly

three are found that excel in knowledge and counsel, it will thus come to

pass,  that  the  authority  of  the  dominion  will rest, not with a hundred,

but  only  with  two  or  three  who  excel by vigour of mind, and who will

easily  draw  to themselves everything, and each of them, as is the wont

of   human   greed,   will  be  able  to  prepare  the  way  to  a  monarchy.

(8:2:5)  And  so,  if  we  make  a  right  calculation,  it  is necessary, that the

supreme authority of a dominion, whose size requires at least a hundred

first-rate  men,  should  be  conferred  on  not  less  than  five  thousand.

(8:2:6)   For by this proportion it will never fail, but a hundred shall be found

excelling in mental vigour, that is, on the hypothesis that, out of fifty that

seek  and  obtain office, one will always be found not less than first-rate,

besides others that imitate the virtues of the first-rate, and are therefore

worthy to rule.
 
 

[8:3] (8:3:1)  The  patricians  are  most commonly citizens of one city, which
                                                    Bk.XIB:167.
is the head of the whole PAGE 349 dominion, so that the commonwealth or

republic  has  its  name  from it, as once that of Rome, and now those of

Venice,  Genoa,  etc.  (8:3:2)  But  the  republic  of  the  Dutch has its name

from  an  entire  province,  whence  it  arises,  that  the  subjects  of  this

dominion  enjoy  a  greater  liberty.  (8:3:3)  Now,  before we can determine

the  foundations  on  which  this  aristocratic  dominion ought to rest, we

must   observe   a   very   great   difference,  which  exists  between  the

dominion  which is conferred on one man and that which is conferred on

a  sufficiently large council.  (8:3:4)  For, in the first place, the power of one

man is (as we said, 6:5) very inadequate to support the entire dominion;

but  this  no  one,  without manifest absurdity, can affirm of a sufficiently

large  council.  (8:3:5)  For,  in  declaring the council to be sufficiently large,

one  at  the  same  time  denies,  that  it  is  inadequate  to  support  the

dominion.  (8:3:6)  A  king,  therefore,  is  altogether  in need of counsellors,

but  a  council  like  this  is  not  so in the least.  (8:3:7)  In the second place,

kings  are  mortal,  but  councils  are everlasting.  (8:3:8)  And so the power

PAGE 347 of  the  dominion  which  has  once  been  transferred to a large

enough council never reverts to the multitude.  (8:3:9)  But this is otherwise

in  a monarchy, as we showed (7:25).  (8:3:10)  Thirdly, a king's dominion is

often  on  sufferance, whether from his minority, sickness, or old age, or

from  other  causes;  but  the  power of a council of this kind, on the con-

trary,  remains  always  one and the same.  (8:3:11)  In the fourth place, one

man's  will  is  very  fluctuating  and inconstant; and, therefore, in a mon-

archy, all law is, indeed, the explicit will of the king (as we said. 7:1), but

not  every  will of the king ought to be law; but this cannot be said of the

will  of  a sufficiently numerous council.  (8:3:1)2  For since the council itself,

as  we  have  just  shown,  needs  no  counsellors,  its every explicit will

ought  to  be  law.   (8:3:13)  And hence we conclude, that the dominion con-

ferred  upon  a large enough council is absolute, or approaches nearest

to  the absolute.  (8:3:14)  For if there be any absolute dominion, it is, in fact,

that which is held by an entire multitude.
 
 

[8:4] (8:4:1)  Yet  in  so  far  as  this aristocratic dominion never (as has just

been  shown)  reverts  to the multitude, and there is under it no consulta-

tion with the multitude, but, without qualification, every will of the council

is  law, it must be considered as quite absolute, and therefore its founda-

tions  ought to rest only on the will and judgment of the said council, and
                                              Bk.XIB:16148. 
not  on  the  watchfulness  of  the  multitude,  since the latter is excluded

from  giving its advice or its vote.  (8:4:2)  The reason, then, why in practice

aristocracy  is not absolute, is that the multitude is a cause of fear to the

rulers,  and  therefore succeeds in retaining for itself some liberty, which

it  asserts  and  holds  as  its own, if not by an express law, yet on a tacit

understanding.
 
 

[8:5] (8:5:1)  And  thus  it  is manifest that this kind of dominion will be in the

best  possible  condition,  if  its  institutions  are  such that it most nearly

approaches  the  absolute — that  is,  that  the  multitude  is  as  little  as

possible  a cause of fear, and retains no liberty, but such as must neces-

sarily  be  assigned  it  by  the law of the dominion itself, and is therefore

not  so  much a right of the multitude as of the whole dominion, asserted

and  maintained  by the aristocrats only as their own.  (8:5:2)  For thus prac-

tice  agrees  best  with  theory,  as  appears from the last section, and is

also  self-evident. PAGE 348  (8:5:3)  For  we  cannot  doubt that the dominion

rests  the  less  with  the  patricians, the more rights the commons assert

for  themselves,  such  as  those  which  the  corporations  of  artisans in
                                                                       Bk.XIB:16148. 
Lower Germany, commonly called Guilds, generally possess.
 
 

[8:6]  (8:6:1)  But the commons need not apprehend any danger of a hateful

slavery  from this form of dominion, merely because it is conferred on the

council  absolutely.  (8:6:2)  For  the  will  of so large a council cannot be so

much  determined  by  lust  as  by reason; because men are drawn asun-

der  by  an evil passion,  and  cannot be guided, as it were, by one mind,

except  so  far  as they desire things honourable, or that have at least an

honourable appearance.
 
 

[8:7] (8:7:1)  In  determining,  then,  the  foundations  of  an aristocracy, it is

above  all  to  be  observed,  that  they  should  rest  on the sole will and

power  of  the  supreme  council,  so  that  it  may  be as independent as

possible,  and  be in no danger from the multitude.  (8:7:2)  In order to deter-

mine  these  foundations,  which are to rest, I say, upon the sole will and

power  of  the council, let us see what foundations of peace are peculiar

to  monarchy,  and  unsuited to this form of dominion.  (8:7:3)  For if we sub-

stitute  for  these  equivalent foundations fit for an aristocracy, and leave

the  rest,  as  they are already laid, we shall have removed without doubt

every  cause  of  seditions;  or,  at  least, this kind of dominion will be no

less  safe  than  the monarchical, but, on the contrary, so much the more

so,  and  of  so much better a condition, as, without danger to peace and

liberty,  it  approaches  nearer  than  monarchy to the absolute (8:3, 8:6).

(8:7:4)  For the greater the right of the supreme authority, the more the form

of dominion agrees with the dictate of reason (3:5 , Ought not this reference

to be to 3:6 ?),  and,  therefore, the fitter it is to maintain peace and liberty.

(8:7:5)  Let  us  run  through,  therefore,  the  points  we  stated  in our sixth

chapter,  beginning  with  the  ninth  section,  that  we may reject what is

unfit   for   this   kind   of   dominion,    and   see   what   agrees   with   it.
 
 

[8:8] (8:8:1)  That  it  is necessary, in the first place, to found and fortify one

or  more  cities,  no  one  can  doubt.  (8:8:2)  But that city is above all to be

fortified,  which  is  the  head  of the whole dominion, and also those that

are  on  its  frontiers.  (8:8:3)  For that which is the head of the whole domin-

ion,  and has the supreme right, ought to be more powerful than the rest.

(8:8:4)  But  under  this kind of dominion it is quite unnecessary to divide all

the inhabitants into clans.
 
 

[8:9] (8:9:1)  As  for  the military, since under this dominion equality is not to

be  looked  for  among all, but between the patricians only, and, in partic-

ular,  the  power  of the patricians is greater than that of the commons, it

is  certain  that  it  makes  no  difference  to the laws or fundamental prin-

ciples  of  this  dominion,  that  the  military  be  formed of others besides
 Bk.XIB:163.
subjects (Cf. 6:10).  (8:9:2)  But  it  is  of  the first importance that no one be

admitted  into  the  number  of the patricians, that has not a proper know-

ledge  of  the  art  of  war.  (8:9:3)  But  for  the  subjects  to be excluded, as

some   would   have  it,  from  military  service,  is  surely  folly.   (8:9:4)  For

besides  that  the  military pay given to subjects remains within the realm,

whereas,  on the contrary, what is paid to a foreign soldiery is altogether

lost,  the  greatest  strength  of  the  dominion  is also thereby weakened.

 (8:9:5)  For  it  is  certain  that  those  fight with peculiar valour who fight for

altar and hearth.  (8:9:6)  Whence, also, it is manifest that those are no less

wrong,  who  lay  down  that  military  commanders,  tribunes, centurions,

etc.,  should  be  chosen  from  among  the patricians only.  (8:9:7)  For with

what  courage  will  those  soldiers  fight  who are deprived of all hope of

gaining  glory  and  advancement?  (8:9:8)  But, on the other hand, to estab-

lish  a  law  forbidding the patricians to hire foreign soldiers when circum-

stances  require  it,  whether  to  defend  themselves, and suppress sedi-

tions,  or  for  any other reason, besides being inconsiderate, would also
                                                                 Bk.XIB:16454.
be  repugnant  to  the  supreme right of the patricians, concerning which

see  8:3,  8:4, 8:5 .  (8:9:9)  But the general of a single army, or of the entire

military,  is  to  be  chosen  but  in  time of war, and among the patricians

only,  and  is  to  hold  the command for a year at most, without power of

being  continued  therein,  or  afterwards reappointed.  (8:9:10)  For this law,

necessary  as  it  is  under a monarchy, is so above all under this kind of

dominion.  (8:9:11)  For  although  it  is much easier, as we have said above,

to  transfer  the  dominion PAGE 350 from  one  man to another than from a

free  council  to  one  man;  yet  it  does often happen, that patricians are

subdued  by  their  own  generals,  and that to the much greater harm of

the  commonwealth.  (8:9:12)  For  when  a  monarch  is  removed, it is but a

change  of  tyrant,  not of the form of dominion; but, under an aristocracy,

this  cannot  happen, without an upsetting of the form of dominion, and a

slaughter  of  the  greatest  men.  (8:9:13)  Of which thing Rome has offered

the most mournful examples.  (8:9:14)  But our reason for saying that, under

a  monarchy,  the  militia  should  serve  without pay, is here inapplicable.

(8:9:15)  For  since  the  subjects  are  excluded  from  giving their advice or

votes,  they  are  to  be reckoned as foreigners, and are, therefore, to be

hired  for  service  on no worse terms than foreigners.  (8:9:16)  And there is

in  this case no danger of their being distinguished above the rest by the

patricians:  nay,  further, to avoid the partial judgment which everyone is

apt  to  form  of  his  own exploits, it is wiser for the patricians to assign a

fixed payment to the soldiers for their service.
 
 

[8:10]  (8:10:1)  Furthermore, for this same reason, that all but the patricians

are  foreigners,  it  cannot be without danger to the whole dominion, that

the  lands  and houses and the whole soil should remain public property,

and  be  let  to  the  inhabitants  at  a  yearly rent.  (8:10:2)  For the subjects

having  no  part  in  the  dominion  would easily, in bad times, all forsake

their  cities,  if  they  could  carry  where  they  pleased  what goods they
 Bk.XIB:16350.
possess.  (8:10:3)  And,  therefore,  lands  and  farms  are  not  to be let, but

sold  to  the  subjects,  yet  on  condition  that  they  pay  every  year  an

aliquot part of the year's produce, etc., as is done in Holland.
 
 

[8:11] (8:11:1)  These  points  considered,  I  proceed  to the foundations on
                     { all patricians }
which  the  supreme  council  should  rest  and be established.  (8:11:2)  We

have  shown (8:2) that, in a moderate-sized dominion, this council ought

to  have  about  five  thousand  members.  (8:11:3)  And so we must look for

means  of  preventing  the  dominion  from  gradually  getting  into  fewer
 Bk.XIB:160.
hands,  and  of insuring, on the contrary, that the number of members be

increased  in  proportion  to  the  growth of the dominion itself; and, next,

that  between  the  patricians,  equality be as far as possible maintained;

and,  further,  that  there  may be speed and expedition in their counsels,

and  that  they PAGE 351 tend  to  the  general  good;  and,  lastly, that the

power  of  the  patricians  or  council  exceed  the power of the multitude,

yet so that the multitude suffer no harm thereby.
 
 

[8:12] (8:12:1)  But  jealousy  causes a great difficulty in maintaining our first
                                                                               { In a jungle }
point.  (8:12:2)  For  men  are,  as  we have said, by nature enemies, so that

however  they  be  associated,  and  bound  together  by  laws, they still
{ because it is still a part-jungle }
retain their nature. (8:12:3)  And hence I think it is, that democracies change

into  aristocracies,  and  these  at length into monarchies.  (8:12:4)  For I am

fully   persuaded   that  most  aristocracies  were  formerly  democracies.

(8:12:5)  For when a given multitude, in search of fresh territories, has found
              Bk.XIB:162.
and  cultivated  them,  it  retains,  as  a whole, its equal right of dominion,

because  no  man  gives  dominion  to another spontaneously.  (8:12:6)  But

although  every  one  of them thinks it fair, that he should have the same

right  against  another  that  that  other  has  against  him, he yet thinks it

unfair,  that  the  foreigners  that join them should have equal right in the

dominion  with  themselves, who sought it by their own toil, and won it at
                                                      { How little have things changed. }
the price of their own blood.  (8:12:7)  And this not even the foreigners them-

selves  deny,  for,  of  course,  they  migrate thither, not to hold dominion,

but for the benefit of their own private business, and are quite satisfied if

they  are  but  allowed  the  liberty  of  transacting that business in safety.

(8:12:8)  But  meanwhile  the  multitude is augmented by the influx of foreign-

ers,  who  gradually  acquire  the  national manners, until at last they are

distinguished  by  no  other difference than that of incapacity to get office;

and  while  their  number  daily increases, that of the citizens, on the con-

trary,  is  by  many  causes  diminished.  (8:12:9)  For  families  often  die out,

and  some  persons  are  disqualified  for  their crimes, and a great many

are  driven  by  domestic  poverty  to  neglect  affairs  of state, and mean-

while  the  more  powerful  aim  at nothing else, but to govern alone; and
                                                      Bk.XIB:16046. 
thus  the  dominion  is gradually limited to a few, and at length by faction

to  one.  (8:12:10)  And  here  we might add other causes that destroy domin-

ions  of  this  sort;  but  as  they  are well known, I pass them by, and pro-

ceed  now  to state  the  laws  by  which  this  dominion, of which we are

treating, ought to be maintained.
 
 

[8:13] (8:13:1)  The  primary  law  of  this  dominion  ought  to  be that which

determines  the  proportionate  numbers  of  patricians PAGE 352 and multi-

tude.  (8:13:2)  For  a  proportion  (8:1)  ought to be maintained between the

multitude  and  the  patricians, so that with the increase of the former the

number  of  the  latter  should  be  raised.  (8:13:3)  And  this  proportion  (in

accordance  with  our  remarks  in the second section) ought to be about
  Bk.XIB:16046. 
fifty  to  one,  that is, the inequality between the members of each should

never be greater.  (8:13:4)  For (8:1) without destroying the form of dominion,

the  number  of  patricians  may  be  greater than the number of the multi-

tude.  (8:13:5)  But  there  is  no  danger except in the smallness of their num-

ber.  (8:13:6)  But  how  it  is  to  be  provided that this law be kept unbroken,

I will presently show in its own place.
 
 

[8:14]  (8:14:1)  Patricians, in some places, are chosen only out of particular

families.    (8:14:2)    But  it  is  ruinous  to  lay  this  down  expressly  by  law.

(8:14:3)  For  not  to  mention  that  families  often  die out, and that the other

families  can  never  be excluded without disgrace, it is also repugnant to
                                                                                               Bk.XIB:17475.
the  form  of  this  dominion,  that the dignity of patrician should be heredi-

tary (8:1).  (8:14:4)  But  on  this  system  a  dominion seems rather a democ-

racy,  such  as  we  have  described  in  8:12, that is in the hands of very

few  citizens.  (8:14:5)  But,  on  the  other  hand, to provide against the patri-

cians  choosing  their  own  sons  and  kinsmen, and thereby against the

right  of  dominion  remaining  in  particular  families,  is  impossible,  and

indeed  absurd,  as I shall show (8:39).  (8:14:6)  But provided that they hold

that  right  by no express law, and that the rest (I mean, such as are born

within  the  dominion,  and use the vulgar tongue, and have not a foreign

wife,  and  are not infamous, nor servants, nor earning their living by any

servile trade, among which are to be reckoned those of a wine-merchant,

or  brewer)  are  not excluded, the form of the dominion will, notwithstand-

ing,   be  retained,   and  it  will  be  possible  to  maintain  the  proportion

between the patricians and the multitude.
 
 

[8:15] (8:15:1)  But  if  it  be  further  by  law appointed that no young men be

chosen,  it  will  never happen that a few families hold the right of govern-
                Bk.XIB:160.
ment  in  their  hands.   (8:15:2)  And,  therefore,  be it by law appointed, that

no  man  that  has  not  reached  his  thirtieth  year  be  put  on the list of

candidates.
 
 

[8:16] (8:16:1)  Thirdly,  it  is  next to be ordained, that all the patricians must

be  assembled  at  certain  fixed  times in a particular part of the city, and

that  whoever  does  not  attend  the council,  unless  he  be hindered by

illness   or   some   public  business,  shall  be  fined  some  considerable

amount.  (8:16:2)  For,  were  it  otherwise,  most  of  them would neglect the

public, for the sake of their own private affairs.
 
 

[8:17] (8:17:1)  Let  this  council's  functions be to pass and repeal laws, and

to  choose  their  patrician  colleagues, and all the ministers of the domin-

ion.  (8:17:2)  For  he,  that  has  supreme right, as we have decided that this

council  has,  cannot  give  to  anyone  authority to pass and repeal laws,

without  at  the  same  time abdicating his own right, and transferring it to

him,  to  whom  he  gives  that  power.  (8:17:3)  For  he, that has but for one

day  only  authority  to pass and repeal laws, is able to change the entire

form   of   the   dominion.  (8:17:4)  But   one   can,   without  forfeiting  one's

supreme  right,  temporarily entrust to others the daily business of domin-

ion  to be  administered  according to the established laws.  (8:17:5)  Further-

more,  if  the  ministers  of  dominion  were  chosen  by any other but this

council,  then  its  members  would  be  more  properly called wards than

patricians.
 
 

[8:18] (8:18:1)  Hence  some  are  accustomed  to  create  for  the  council a

ruler  or  prince,  either  for  life,  as  the  Venetians,  or for a time, as the

Genoese;  but  yet  with such great precautions, as make it clear enough,

that  it  is  not  done  without  great  risk.  (8:18:2)  And  assuredly we cannot
                                                                                              Bk.XIB:16455.
doubt  but  that  the  dominion thereby approaches the monarchical form,

and  as  far  as  we can conjecture from their histories, it was done for no

other  reason,  than  that before the institution of these councils they had

lived  under  a  ruler, or doge, as under a king.  (8:18:3)  And so the creation

of  a  ruler  is  a  necessary  requisite indeed for the particular nation, but

not for the aristocratic dominion considered in itself.
 
 

[8:19] (8:19:1)  But,  inasmuch  as  the  supreme  authority  of  this  dominion

rests  with  this council as a whole, not with every individual member of it

(for  otherwise  it  would  be  but  the  gathering of an undisciplined mob),

it  is, therefore, necessary that all the patricians be so bound by the laws

as  to  form,  as  it  were,  one body governed by one mind.  (8:19:2)  But the

laws  by  themselves  alone  are  weak  and  easily  broken,   when  their

vindicators  are  the  very  persons  who PAGE 354 are  able  to transgress

them,  and  the  only  ones  who  are  to take warning by the punishment,

and  must  punish  their  colleagues  in  order by fear of the same punish-

ment  to  restrain  their  own  desire: for all this involves a great absurdity.

(8:19:3)  And,  therefore,  means  must  be  sought  to  preserve order in this

supreme  council  and  keep  unbroken  the  constitution of the dominion,

so  that  yet  the  greatest possible equality may exist between patricians.
 
 

[20] (8:20:1)  But  since, from a single ruler or prince, able also to vote in the

debates,  there  must  necessarily  arise a great inequality, especially on

account  of  the  power, which must of necessity be granted him, in order

to  enable  him  to discharge  his  duty in safety; therefore, if we consider

the  whole  matter  aright,  nothing  can  be  devised  more  useful  to the

general  welfare  than  the  institution  of  another  council of certain patri-

cians  subordinate to the supreme council, whose only duty should be to

see  that the constitution, as far as it concerns the councils and ministers

of  the  dominion,  be  kept  unbroken,  and  who  should, therefore, have
                          { USA Supreme Court }
authority  to summon to judgment and, in conformity with established law,

to  condemn  any  delinquent  who,  as  a  minister  of  the dominion, has

transgressed  the  laws  concerning his office.  (8:20:2)  And these patricians
                                        Bk.XIB:165.
we shall hereafter call syndics.
 
 

[8:21] (8:210:1)  And  they  are  to be chosen for life.  (8:210:2)  For, were they to

be  chosen for a time, so that they should afterwards be eligible for other

offices  in  the  dominion, we should fall into the very absurdity which we

have  just  pointed  out  in  the  nineteenth  section.  (8:210:3)  But  lest  they

should  become  quite  haughty by very long rule, none are to be elected

to  this  office,  but  those  who  have  reached their sixtieth year or more,

and have discharged the duties of senator, of which below.
 
 

[8:22] (8:22:1)  Of  these,  too,  we  shall  easily determine the number, if we

consider  that  these  syndics stand to the patricians in the same relation

as  the  whole  body  of  patricians  together does to the multitude, which

they  cannot  govern,  if  they are fewer than a proper number.  (8:22:2)  And,

therefore,  the  number  of  the  syndics should be to that of patricians as

their number is to that of the multitude, that is (8:13), as one to fifty.
 
 

[8:23]  (8:23:1)   Moreover,   that  this  council  may  discharge  its  functions

PAGE 355  in  security,  some portion of the soldiery must be assigned to it,

and be subject to its orders.
 
 

[8:24] (8:24:1)  The  syndics  and  other  ministers  of  state  are  to  have no

salary,  but  such  emoluments,  that they cannot maladminister affairs of

state  without great loss to themselves.  (8:24:2)  For we cannot doubt that it

is  fair,  that  the  ministers  of this kind of dominion should be awarded a

recompense  for  their  time,  since  the  commons are the majority in this

dominion,  and  the  patricians  look  after  their  safety,  while  they them-

selves  have  no  trouble  with  affairs  of  state,  but  only  with  their own

private  ones.  (8:24:3)  But  since,  on the other hand, no man (7:4) defends

another's cause, save in so far as he thereby hopes to establish his own

interest,  things must, of necessity, be so ordered that the ministers, who

have  charge  of  affairs  of  state,  should most pursue their own interest,

when they are most watchful for the general good.
 
 

[8:25] (8:25:1)  To  the  syndics  then,  whose  duty,  as  we said, it is to see

that  the  constitution  is  kept unbroken, the following emoluments are to

be  awarded:  namely,  that every householder that inhabits any place in

the  dominion,  be  bound  to  pay every year a coin of small value, say a

quarter  of  an  ounce  of  silver,  to the syndics, that thus they may know

the  number  of  inhabitants,  and so observe what proportion of them the

patricians  constitute;  and  next  that  every new patrician on his election

must pay the syndics some large sum, for instance, twenty or twenty-five

pounds  of  silver.  (8:25:2)  Moreover, that money, in which the absent patri-

cians (I mean those who have failed to attend the meeting of the council)

are  condemned,  is  also  to  be  awarded to the syndics; and a part, too,

of  the  goods  of  defaulting ministers, who are bound to abide their judg-

ment,  and  who  are  fined  a  certain sum of money, or have their goods

confiscated,  should  be  devoted  to  them, not to all indeed, but to those

only who sit daily, and whose duty it is to summon the council of syndics,

concerning whom see 8:28. (8:25:3)  But, in order that the council of syndics

may always be maintained at its full number, before all other business in

the supreme council, when it is assembled at the usual time, inquiry is to

be  made  about  this.   (8:25:4)  Which,  if  the  syndics  neglect,  let  it  then

devolve  upon the president PAGE 356 of the senate (concerning which we

shall  soon  have  occasion  to  speak), to admonish the supreme council

on  this  head,  to  demand  of  the president of the syndics the reason of

his  silence,  and  to  inquire  what is the supreme council's opinion in the

matter.  (8:25:5)  But  if  the  president  of the senate is likewise silent, let the

case  be  taken  up  by the president of the supreme court of justice, or if

he  too  is silent by some other patrician, and let him demand an explana-

tion  of  their  silence  from  the  presidents of the senate and the court of

justice,  as  well  as  from  the  president of the syndics.  (8:25:6)  Lastly, that

that  law,  whereby  young  men  are  excluded,  may  likewise  be strictly

observed,  it  is  to  be  appointed  that all who have reached the thirtieth

year  of  their age, and who are not by express law excluded, are to have

their  names  inscribed  on  a  list,  in  presence  of  the  syndics,  and  to

receive  from  them,  at  a  fixed price, some sign of the honour conferred

on  them,  namely,  that  they  may  be  allowed to wear a particular orna-

ment  only  permitted  to  them,  to distinguish them and make them to be
                           Bk.XIB:17271.
had  in  honour  by  the rest; and, at the same time, be it ordained, that in

elections  none  may  nominate  as  patrician anyone whose name is not

inscribed  on  the general list, and that under a heavy penalty.  (8:25:7)  And,

further,  let  no  one  be  allowed  to  refuse the burden of a duty or office,

which  he  is  chosen  to  bear.  (8:25:8)  Lastly,  that all the absolutely funda-

mental laws of the dominion may be everlasting, it must be ordained that

if  anyone  in  the  supreme  council  raise  a  question  about  any funda-

ental  law,  as  of  prolonging  the  command  of  any  general of an army,

or  of  diminishing  the  number  of  patricians,  or  the  like, he is guilty of

treason,  and  not  only  is  he  to be condemned to death, and his goods

confiscated,  but  some  sign  of  his  punishment  is  to  remain visible in
                                                       Bk.XIB:165.
public  for  an  eternal memorial of the event.  (8:25:9)  But for the confirming

of  the  other  general  rights  of  the  dominion,  it  is enough, if it be only

ordained,  that  no  law can be repealed nor new law passed, unless first

the   college   of   syndics,   and  then  three-fourths  or  four-fifths  of the
                              Bk.XIB:165.
supreme council agree thereto.
 
 

[8:26] (8:26:1)  Let  the  right  also  of  summoning  the  supreme council and

proposing  the  matters  to  be decided in it, rest with the syndics, and let

them  likewise  be given the first place in PAGE 357 the council, but without

the  right to vote.  (8:26:2)  But before they take their seats, they must swear

by  the  safety of that supreme council and by the public liberty, that they

will  strive  with  the  utmost  zeal  to preserve unbroken the ancient laws.

and  to consult the general good.  (8:26:3)  After which let them through their

secretary open in order the subjects of discussion.
 

                                                              Bk.XIB:16046. 
[8:27]  (8:27:1)  But   that   all  the  patricians  may  have  equal  authority  in

making  decrees  and  electing  the  ministers  of  the  dominion, and that

speed   and   expedition   in   all   matters   may  be  possible,  the  order

observed   by   the   Venetians  is  altogether  to  be  approved,  for  they

appoint  by  lot  a  certain  number  of  the  council to name the ministers,

and  when  these  have  named  in  order the candidates for office, every

patrician  signifies  by  ballot his opinion, approving or rejecting the candi-

date  in  question, so that it is not afterwards known, who voted in this or

that  sense.  (8:27:2)  Whereby  it  is  contrived, not only that the authority of

all  the  patricians  in  the  decision  is equal, and that business is quickly

despatched,   but   also,  that  everyone  has  absolute  liberty  (which  is

of  the  first   necessity  in  councils) to give his opinion without danger of

unpopularity.
 
 

[8:28] (8:28:1)  But  in  the  councils  of  syndics  and  the other councils, the

same  order  is  to  be  observed,  that voting is to be by ballot.  (8:28:2)  But

the   right  of  convoking  the  council  of  syndics  and  of  proposing  the

matters  to  be  decided  in  the  same  ought to belong to their president,

who  is  to  sit  every  day  with  ten  or  more  other  syndics,  to hear the

complaints and secret accusations of the commons against the ministers,

and  to  look after the accusers, if circumstances require, and to summon

the  supreme  council  even  before  the  appointed  time,  if  any of them

judge  that  there  is  danger  in  the  delay.  (8:28:3)  Now this president and

those  who  meet with him every day are to be appointed by the supreme

council  and  out  of  the number of syndics, not indeed for life, but for six

months,  and  they  must  not have their term renewed but after the lapse

of  three  or  four  years.  (8:28:4)  And  these,  as  we  said above, are to be

awarded   the   goods   that   are   confiscated  and  the  pecuniary  fines,

or  some  part  of  them.  (8:28:5)  The  remaining  points  which concern the

syndics we will mention in their proper places.

PAGE 358
                                       Bk.XIB:166.                              { a subcommitee of }
[8:29] (8:29:1)  The  second  council,  which  is  subordinate  to the supreme
  
one,  we  will  call  the  senate,  and let its duty be to transact public busi-

ness,  for  instance, to publish the laws of the dominion, to order the forti-

fications  of  the  cities  according  to  law, to confer military commissions,

to  impose  taxes  on the subjects and apply the same, to answer foreign

embassies,  and  decide  where  embassies  are to be sent.  (8:29:2)  But let

the  actual  appointment  of  ambassadors  be  the  duty  of  the supreme

council.  (8:29:3)  For  it  is  of the greatest consequence to see that no patri-

cian  be  called  to  any office in the dominion but by the supreme council

itself,  lest  the  patricians  themselves  should try to curry favour with the

senate.  (8:29:4)  Secondly,  all  matters  are  to  be  referred to the supreme

council,  which  in  any  way  alter  the  existing  state  of  things,  as  the
                          Bk.XIB:16657.
deciding  on  peace and war.  (8:29:5)  Wherefore, that the senate's decrees

concerning  peace  and war may be valid, they must be confirmed by the

supreme  council.  (8:29:6)  And  therefore  I  should  say, that it belonged to
         { all patricians }                                           { USA House of Representatives }
the  supreme  council  only,  not  to  the  senate,  to  impose  new  taxes.
 
 

[8:30]  (8:30:1)  In determining the number of senators these points are to be

taken  into  consideration:  first,  that  all  the  patricians  should  have an

equal  hope  of  gaining  senatorial  rank;  secondly, that notwithstanding

the  same senators, whose time (for which they were elected) is elapsed,

may be continued after a short interval, that so the dominion may always

be  governed by skilled and experienced men; and lastly, that among the

senators  many may be found illustrious for wisdom and virtue.  (8:30:2)  But

to  secure  all  these  conditions,  there  can  be no other means devised,

than  that  it  should  be  by  law  appointed,  that  no  one  who  has  not

reached  his  fiftieth  year,  be  received into the number of senators, and
          Bk.XIB:166.
that  four  hundred,  that  is  about  a  twelfth  part  of  the  patricians,  be

appointed  for  a  year,  and  that  two  years  after that year has elapsed,

the  same  be  capable of re-appointment.  (8:30:3)  For in this manner about

a  twelfth  part  of the patricians will be constantly engaged in the duty of

senator,  with  only  short  intervening  periods;  and  this  number surely,

together  with  that  made  up  by  the  syndics,  will be little less than the

number  of  patricians  that  have attained their fiftieth year.  (8:30:4)  And so

all  the  patricians  will  always  have  a  great  hope  of  gaining  the rank

PAGE 359 of  senator  or  syndic,  and  yet  notwithstanding, the same patri-

cians,   at  only  short  intervals,  will  always  hold  senatorial  rank,  and

(according  to  what  we  said,  8:2)  there  will  never  be  wanting  in the

senate   distinguished  men,  excelling  in  counsel  and  skill.   (8:30:5)   And

because  this  law  cannot  be  broken  without exciting great jealousy on
                        Bk.XIB:16046. 
the  part  of  many patricians, it needs no other safeguard for its constant

validity,  than  that  every  patrician  who  has  reached  the  age we men-

tioned,  should  offer  the  proof  thereof to the syndics, who shall put his

name  on  the  list  of  candidates  for the senatorial duties, and read the

name  before  the  supreme council, so that he may occupy, with the rest

of  the  same  rank,  a  place  set  apart  in  this  supreme  council  for his

fellows, next to the place of the senators.
 
 

[8:31] (8:31:1)  The  emoluments  of  the  senators  should be of such a kind,

that  their profit is greater from peace than from war.  (8:31:2)  And therefore

let   there  be  awarded  to  them  a  hundredth  or  a  fiftieth  part  of  the

merchandise  exported  abroad  from  the  dominion,  or  imported  into  it

from  abroad.  (8:31:3)   For  we  cannot  doubt,  that  by this means they will,

as  far  as  they  can,  preserve  peace,  and never desire to protract war.

(8:31:4)  And  from  this  duty  not  even  the  senators  themselves, if any of

them  are  merchants,  ought  to  be exempt; for such an immunity cannot

be  granted  without  great  risk  to  trade,  as  I  think  no  one is ignorant.

(8:31:5)  Nay,  on  the  contrary,  it  must be by law ordained, that no senator

or  ex-senator  may  fill any military post; and further, that no one may be

declared  general  or  praetor,  which  officers  we  said  (8:9) were to be

only  appointed  in  time of war, whose father or grandfather is a senator,

or  has  held  the  dignity  of  senator  within two years.  (8:31:6)  Which laws

we  cannot  doubt, that the patricians outside the senate will defend with

all  their  might:  and  so  it  will be the case, that the senators will always

have  more  profit  from  peace  than  from war, and will, therefore, never

advise  war,  except  the  utmost  need  of  the  dominion  compels  them.

(8:31:7)  But  it may be objected to us, that on this system, if, that is, syndics

and  senators are to be allowed so great profits, an aristocracy will be as

burdensome  to  the  subjects as any monarchy.  (8:31:8)  But not to mention

that  royal  courts  require larger expenditure, and are yet not provided in

order  to secure peace, PAGE 360 and that peace can never be bought too

dear;  it  is  to be added, first, that all that under a monarchy is conferred

on  one  or  a  few,  is  here  conferred upon very many.  (8:31:9)  Next kings

and  their  ministers  do  not  bear  the  burden  of  the  dominion with the

subjects,  but  under  this  form  of  dominion it is just the reverse; for the

patricians,   who  are always chosen from the rich, bear the largest share
                                          Bk.XIB:159.
of   the  weight  of  the  commonwealth.  (8:31:10)  Lastly,  the  burdens  of  a

monarchy  spring  not  so  much  from  its  king's  expenditure, as from its

secret  policy.   (8:31:11)  For those burdens of a dominion, that are imposed

on  the  citizens  in  order  to secure peace and liberty, great though they

be,   are   yet   supported   and   lightened  by  the  usefulness  of  peace.
                                                                                        Bk.XIB:16352.
(8:31:12)  What  nation  ever  had to pay so many and so heavy taxes as the

Dutch?  (8:31:13)  Yet  it  not  only  has  not been exhausted, but, on the con-

trary,  has  been  so  mighty by its wealth, that all envied its good fortune.

(8:31:14)  If  therefore the burdens of a monarchy were imposed for the sake

of  peace,  they  would  not  oppress the citizens; but, as I have said, it is

from  the  secret  policy  of  that  sort  of  dominion, that the subjects faint

under  their  lord;  that  is,  because the virtue of kings counts for more in

time  of  war  than  in  time of peace, and because they, who would reign

by  themselves,  ought  above  all to try and have their subjects poor; not
                                                                           Bk.XIB:2143, 44. (Note 1, 360)
to   mention   other   things,  which  that  most  prudent  Dutchman  V. H.

formerly    remarked,    because   they   do   not   concern    my    design,

which   is  only  to  describe  the  best  state  of  every  kind  of dominion.
 
 

[8:32]  (8:32:1)  Of the syndics chosen by the supreme council, some should

sit  in  the  senate,  but  without  the  right of voting, so that they may see

whether  the  laws concerning that assembly be duly observed, and may

have  the  supreme council convoked, when anything is to be referred to

it  from the senate.  (8:32:2)  For the supreme right of convoking this council,

and  proposing  to  it subjects of discussion, is, as we have already said,

with  the  syndics.  (8:32:3)   But  before  the  votes of the contemporaries of

the  senators  be  taken, the president  PAGE 361 of the senate for the time

being   shall  explain  the  state  of  affairs,  and  what  the  senate's own

opinion  is  on  the  matter  in  question,  and  why;  after which the votes

shall be collected in the accustomed order.
 
 

[8:33] (8:33:1)  The  entire  senate  ought  not to meet every day, but, like all

great  councils,  at a certain fixed time.  (8:33:2)  But as in the mean time the

business  of  the  dominion  must be executed, it is, therefore, necessary

that  some  part  of  the senators be chosen, who, on the dismissal of the

senate,  shall supply its place, and whose duty it shall be to summon the

senate  itself,  when  need  is; to execute its orders about affairs of state;

to  read  letters  written  to  the  senate  and supreme council; and, lastly,

to  consult  about  the  matters  to  be  proposed in the senate.  (8:33:3)  But

that  all these points, and the order of this assembly, as a whole, may be

more  easily  conceived,  I  will  describe the whole matter more precisely.
 
 

[8:34] (8:34:1)  The  senators  who,  as  we  have  said  already,  are  to  be

chosen  for  a  year,  are to be divided into four or six series, of which let

the  first have the first seat in the senate for the first three or two months

in  the  year; and at the expiration of this time, let the second series take

the  place  of  the  first,  and  so  on,  observing  their  turns,  so that that

series  which  was  first  in  the  first  months  may  be  last in the second

period.  (8:34:2)  Furthermore,  there  are  to  be  appointed  as  many  presi-

dents  as  there  are  series,  and  the same number of vice-presidents to

fill  their  places  when  required — that  is,  two  are to be chosen out of

every   series,   one   to   be  its  president,  the  other  its  vice-president.

(8:34:3)  And  let  the  president  of the first series preside in the senate also,

for  the  first  months;  or,  in  his  absence,  let  his  vice-president fill his

place;  and  so  on  with  the  rest,  observing  the  same  order as above.

(8:34:4)  Next,  out  of  the  first  series, some are to be chosen by vote or lot

to  fill  the  place  of  the senate, when it is dismissed, in conjunction with

the  president  and  vice-president  of  the  same series; and that, for the

same  space  of  time,  as  the  said  series occupies the first place in the

senate;  and  thus,  when  that  time  is  past,  as  many  are  again to be

chosen  out  of  the  second  series,  by  vote  or lot, to fill, in conjunction

with  their  president and vice-president, the place of the first series, and

supply   the  lack PAGE 362 of a senate; and so on with the rest.  (8:34:5)  And

there  is  no  need  that  the  election of these men — I mean those that I

have  said  are  to be chosen for periods of three or two months, by vote

or  lot — should  be  made by the supreme council.  (8:34:6)  For the reason

which  we  gave  in the twenty-ninth section is not here applicable, much

less  the  reason stated in the seventeenth. It suffices, then, that they be

elected    by    the   senate   and   the   syndics   present   at  its  meeting.
 
 

[8:35] (8:35:1)  But  of  these  persons  we cannot so precisely ascertain the

number.  (8:35:2)  However,  this  is certain, that they must be too numerous

to  be  easily  susceptible  of  corruption.  (8:35:3)  For  though  they  can by

themselves  determine  nothing  concerning affairs of state, yet they can

delay  the  senate,  or,  what  would  be  worst  of all, delude it by putting

forward  matters  of  no  importance,  and keeping back those that are of

greater — not  to  mention  that, if they were too few, the absence of one

or  two  might delay public business.  (8:35:4)  But as, on the contrary, these

consuls  are  for  that  very  reason  appointed,  because   great  councils

cannot  devote  themselves every day to public business, a remedy must

be  looked  for  necessarily  here,  and  their  inadequacy  of   number be

made  up  for  by  the  shortness  of  their  term of office.  (8:35:5)  And  thus,

if  only  thirteen or so be chosen for two or three months, they will be too

many  to  be corrupted in this short period.  (8:35:6)  And for this cause, also,

did    I   recommend   that   their   successors   should  by  no  means  be

appointed,  except  at  the  very  time  when  they  do  succeed,  and  the

others go away.
 
 

[8:36] (8:36:1)  We  have  said,  that  it  is  also  their duty, when any, though

few,  of  them  think it needful, to convoke the senate, to put before it the

matters  to  be  decided,  to  dismiss  it,  and  to  execute its orders about

public  business.  (8:36:2)  But  I  will now briefly state the order in which this

ought  to  be  done,  so  that  business  may  not  be  long  protracted by

useless   questions.  (8:36:3)  Let,   then,   the   consuls   consult  about  the

matter  to  be  proposed  in  the  senate, and what is required to be done;

and,  if  they  are  all  of  one  mind  about  it,  then  let them convoke the

senate,  and,  having duly explained the question, let them set forth what

their  opinion  is,  and,  without  waiting  for another's opinion, collect the

votes  in  their  order.  (8:36:4)  But  if  the  consuls  support  more  than one

opinion, PAGE 363 then,  in  the  senate, that opinion is first to be stated on

the  question  proposed,  which  was  supported by the larger number of

consuls.  (8:36:5)  And  if the same is not approved by the majority of senate

and  consuls, but the waverers and opponents together are in a majority,

which  is  to  be  determined  by  ballot,  as  we  have already mentioned,

then  let  them  set  forth the second opinion, which had fewer votes than

the  former  among  the  consuls,  and  so  on  with  the rest.  (8:36:6)  But if

none  be  approved  by  a  majority  of the whole senate, the senate is to

be  adjourned  to the next day, or for a short time, that the consuls mean-

while  may  see,  if  they  can  find other means, that may give more satis-

faction.  (8:36:7)  But  if they do not succeed in finding other means, or if the

majority  of the senate refuses to approve such as they have found, then

the  opinion  of  every  senator  is  to  be  heard; and if the majority of the

senate  also  refuses  to  support  any  of these, then the votes are to be

taken  again  on  every  opinion,  and  not  only  the affirmative votes, as

hitherto,  but  the  doubtful  and  negative are to be counted.  (8:36:8)  And if

the  affirmative prove more numerous than the doubtful or negative, then

that  opinion  is  to hold good; but, on the contrary, to be lost, if the nega-

tive  prove  more  numerous  than the doubtful or affirmative.  (8:36:9)  But if

on  every  opinion  there  is  a  greater number of doubters than of voters

for  and  against, then let the council of syndics join the senate, and vote

with  the  senators,  with  only  affirmative  and  negative  votes,  omitting

those  that  signify  a hesitating mind.  (8:36:10)  And the same order is to be

observed  about  matters  referred  by the senate to the supreme council.

(8:36:11)  So much for the senate.
 
 

[8:37] (8:37:1)  As  for  the  court  of justice or bench, it cannot rest upon the

same   foundations   as   that   which   exists  under  a  monarch,  as  we

described  it  in  6:26,  and  following.  (8:37:2)   For (8:14) it agrees not with

the  foundations  of  our  present dominion, that any account be made of

families  or  clans.  (8:37:3)  And there must be a further difference, because

judges  chosen  from  the  patricians  only might indeed be restrained by

the  fear  of  their  patrician  successors,   from  pronouncing  any  unjust

judgment  against  any  of  the  patricians,  and,  perhaps,  would  hardly

have  the  courage  to  punish  them after their deserts; but they PAGE 364

would,  on  the  other  hand,  dare everything against the commons, and

daily  carry  off  the  rich  among  them for a prey. I know that the plan of

the  Genoese  is  therefore  approved  by  many,  for  they  choose  their

judges  not  among  the  patricians,  but among foreigners.  (8:37:4)  But this

seems  to  me,  considering the matter in the abstract, absurdly ordained,

that  foreigners  and  not  patricians  should  be  called in to interpret the

laws. (8:37:5)  For  what are judges but interpreters of the laws?  (8:37:6)  And I

am  therefore  persuaded that herein also the Genoese have had regard

rather  to  the  genius  of  their  own  race, than to the very nature of this

kind  of dominion.  (8:37:7)  We must, therefore, by considering the matter in

the  abstract,  devise  the  means  which  best agree with the form of this

government.
 
 

[8:38] (8:38:1)  But  as  far  as  regards the number of the judges, the theory

of  this  constitution  requires no peculiar number; but as under monarch-

ical  dominion,  so  under this, it suffices that they be too numerous to be

corrupted   by   a   private  man.  (8:38:2)  For  their  duty  is  but  to  provide

against  one  private  person  doing  wrong  to  another, and therefore to

decide    disputes   between   private   persons,   as   well  patricians  as

commons,   and  to  exact  penalties  from  delinquents,  and  even  from

patricians,  syndics,  and senators, as far as they have offended against

the  laws,  whereby  all  are  bound.  (8:38:3)   But  disputes  that  may arise
         Bk.XIB:167.
between  cities that are subject to the dominion, are to be decided in the

supreme council.
 
 

[8:39] (8:39:1)  Furthermore  the  principle  regulating  the time, for which the

judges  should  be  appointed,  is  the  same in both dominions, and also

the  principle  of  a  certain  part  of  them  retiring every year; and, lastly,

although  it  is  not  necessary  for  every one of them to be of a different

family,  yet it is necessary that two related by blood should not sit on the

same  bench together.  (8:39:2)  And this last point is to be observed also in

the  other  councils,  except  the  supreme one, in which it is enough, if it

be  only  provided  by  law  that in elections no man may nominate a rela-

tion,  nor  vote  upon  his  nomination  by another, and also that two rela-

tions  may  not  draw  lots from the urn for the nomination of any minister
           Bk.XIB:17475.
of  the  dominion.  (8:39:3)  This,  I  say,  is sufficient in a council that is com-

posed  of so large a number of men, and has no special profits assigned

to  it.  (8:39:4)  And  so  utterly unharmed PAGE 365 will the dominion be in this

quarter,  that  it  is  absurd  to  pass  a  law  excluding  from the supreme

council  the  relations  of  all  the  patricians, as we said in the fourteenth

section.  (8:39:5)  But  that  it  is absurd is manifest.  (8:39:6)  For that law could

not  be  instituted  by  the patricians themselves, without their thereby all

absolutely  abdicating  their  own  right,  and  therefore not the patricians

themselves  but  the  commons  would  defend  this law, which is directly

contrary  to  what  we  proved  in  8:5  and  8:6.   (8:39:7)  But that law of the

dominion,  whereby  it  is  ordained  that  the same uniform proportion be

maintained  between  the  numbers  of  the  patricians  and the multitude,

chiefly  contemplates  this  end  of  preserving  the  patricians'  right  and

power,  that  is,  provides  against  their  becoming  too few to be able to

govern the multitude.
 
 

[8:40] (8:40:1)  But  the judges are to be chosen by the supreme council out

of  the patricians only, that is (8:17) out of the actual authors of the laws,

and  the  judgments they pass, as well in civil as criminal cases, shall be

valid,  if they were pronounced in due course of justice and without parti-

ality;  into  which matter the syndics shall be by law authorized to inquire,

and to judge and determine thereof.
 
 

[8:41] (8:41:1)  The  judges'  emoluments  ought to be the same, as we men-

tioned  in  the twenty-ninth section of the sixth chapter; namely, that they

receive  from  the  losing  party  upon every judgment which they pass in

civil  cases,  an  aliquot  part  of  the whole sum at stake.  (8:41:2)  But as to

their  sentences  in  criminal cases, let there be here this difference only,

that  the  goods  which  they  confiscate,  and every fine whereby lesser

crimes  are  punished,  be  assigned  to themselves only, yet on this con-

dition,  that  they  may  never  compel  anyone to confess by torture, and

thus,  precaution  enough  will  be  taken against their being unfair to the

commons,  and  through  fear  too  lenient  to  the  patricians.   (8:41:3)   For

besides  that  this  fear  is  tempered  by  avarice  itself,  and  that veiled

under  the  specious  name  of justice, they are also numerous, and vote,

not  openly,  but  by  ballot,  so that a man may be indignant at losing his

case,   but   can  have  no  reason  to  impute  it  to  a  particular  person.

(8:41:4)  Moreover  the  fear  of  the  syndics will restrain them from pronoun-

cing  an  inequitable, or at least absurd sentence, or from acting PAGE 366

any  of  them  treacherously, besides that in so large a number of judges

there   will   always   be  one  or  two,  that  the  unfair  stand  in  awe  of.

(8:41:5)  Lastly,  as  far  as  the  commons  are  concerned,  they also will be

adequately  secured  if  they  are  allowed  to appeal to the syndics, who,

as  I  have  said,  are  by law authorized to inquire, judge, and determine

about  the  conduct  of  the judges.  (8:41:6)  For it is certain that the syndics

will  not  be able to escape the hatred of the patricians, and on the other

hand,  will  always  be most popular with the commons, whose applause
                                                       Bk.XIB:17885.
they  will  try  as  far  as  they  can  to bid for.  (8:41:7)  To which end, oppor-

tunity  being  given  them,  they  will  not  fail  to  reverse  sentences pro-

nounced  against  the  laws  of the court, and to examine any judge, and

to  punish  those  that are partial, for nothing moves the hearts of a multi-

tude  more than this.  (8:41:8)  Nor is it an objection, but, on the contrary, an

advantage,  that  such  examples  can  but  rarely occur.  (8:41:9)  For not to

mention  that that commonwealth is ill ordered where examples are daily

made  of  criminals  ( as  we  showed  5:2),  those events must surely be

very rare that are most renowned by fame.
 
 

[8:42] (8:42:1)  Those  who  are  sent  as  governors  to cities and provinces

ought  to  be  chosen  out  of  the rank of senators, because it is the duty

of  senators  to  look  after  the  fortifications  of  cities,  the  treasury, the

military,  etc.   (8:42:2)   But   those,   who   were  sent  to  somewhat  distant

regions,  would  be  unable  to  attend  the  senate, and, therefore, those

only  are  to  be  summoned  from  the  senate itself, who are destined to

cities  founded  on  their native soil; but those whom they wish to send to

places  more  remote are to be chosen out of those, whose age is consis-

tent  with  senatorial  rank.  (8:42:3)  But  not  even  thus  do  I  think that the

peace  of  the  dominion  will  be  sufficiently  provided  for,  that is, if the

neighbouring  cities  are  altogether denied the right of vote, unless they

are  so  weak,  that  they  can  be  openly  set  at  naught,  which cannot

surely  be supposed.  (8:42:4)  And so it is necessary, that the neighbouring

cities  be  granted  the  right  of  citizenship,  and  that from every one of

them  twenty,  or  thirty,  or  forty chosen citizens (for the number should

vary  with  the  size  of  the city) be enrolled among the patricians, out of

whom  three,  four,  or five ought to be yearly elected to be of the senate,

and  one  for  life  to be a syndic.  (8:42:5)  And let PAGE 367 those who are of

the  senate be sent with their syndic, to govern the city out of which they

were chosen.
 
 

[8:43] (8:43:1)  Moreover, judges are to be established in every city, chosen

out of the patricians of that city.  (8:43:2)  But of these I think it unnecessary

to  treat  at length, because they concern not the foundations of this sort

of dominion in particular.
 
 

[8:44] (8:44:1)  In  every  council  the  secretaries  and  other  officials of this

kind,  as  they  have  not  the  right  of voting, should be chosen from the

commons.  (8:44:2)  But  as  these,  by  their  long  practice  of business, are

the  most conversant with the affairs to be transacted, it often arises that

more  deference than right is shown to their advice, and that the state of

the  whole  dominion depends chiefly on their guidance: which thing has
  Bk.XIB:158.
been  fatal  to  the  Dutch.   (8:44:3)  For this cannot happen without exciting

the  jealousy  of  many  of the noblest.  (8:44:4)  And surely we cannot doubt,

that  a senate, whose wisdom is derived from the advice, not of senators,

but  of  officials,  will  be  most frequented by the sluggish, and the condi-

tion  of  this  sort  of  dominion will be little better than that of a monarchy

directed  by  a few counsellors of the king. (6:5, 6:6, 6:7).  (8:44:5)  However,

to  this  evil  the  dominion will be more or less liable, according as it was

well  or  ill founded.  (8:44:6)  For the liberty of a dominion is never defended

without  risk,  if it has not firm enough foundations; and, to avoid that risk,

patricians   choose   from  the  commons  ambitious  ministers,  who  are

slaughtered  as  victims  to appease the wrath of those, who are plotting

against  liberty.   (8:44:7)  But  where  liberty  has  firm  enough  foundations,

there  the  patricians  themselves  vie  for the honour of defending it, and

are  anxious  that  prudence  in  the  conduct  of  affairs should flow from

their  own  advice only; and in laying the foundations of this dominion we

have  studied  above  all  these  two  points, namely, to exclude the com-

mons  from  giving advice as much as from giving votes (Secs. 3, 4), and,

therefore,  to  place  the  whole  authority of the dominion with the whole

body  of  patricians,  but  its  exercise  with  the syndics and senate, and,

lastly,   the   right   of   convoking  the  senate,  and  treating  of  matters

affecting  the  common  welfare  with  consuls  chosen  from  the  senate

itself.  (8:44:8)  But,  if  it  is  further  ordained  that the secretary, whether in

PAGE 368  the  senate  or  in  other  councils,  be appointed for four or five

years   at   most,   and   have   attached  to  him  an  assistant-secretary

appointed  for  the same period, to bear part of the work during that time,

or  that  the senate have not one, but several secretaries, employed one

in  one  department,  and  another  in  another, the power of the officials

will never become of any consequence.
 
 

[8:45] (8:45:1)  Treasurers  are  likewise  to  be  chosen  from the commons,

and  are  to  be bound to submit the treasury accounts to the syndics as

well as to the senate.
 
 

[8:46] (8:46:1)  Matters  concerning  religion  we  have  set  forth at sufficient

length  in  our  Theologico-Political Treatise.   (8:46:2)  Yet certain points we

then  omitted,  of  which  it  was  not there the place to treat; for instance,

that  all  the  patricians  must be of the same religion, that is, of that most
                            Bk.XIB:17578.                                       { JBY Note 1 }
simple   and   general   religion,   which   in   that  treatise  we  described.

(8:46:3)  For  it  is  above  all  to  be  avoided, that the patricians themselves

should  be  divided into sects, and show favour, some to this, and others

to  that,  and thence become mastered by superstition, and try to deprive

the  subjects  of  the  liberty  of  speaking  out their opinions.  (8:46:4)  In the

second  place,  though  everyone  is  to  be given liberty to speak out his
                                                           Bk.XIB:17680.
opinion,  yet great conventicles are to be forbidden.  (8:46:5)  And, therefore,

those  that  are attached to another religion are, indeed, to be allowed to

build  as  many  temples  as  they  please; yet these are to be small, and

limited  to  a  certain standard of size, and on sites at some little distance

one  from  another.   (8:46:6)  But it is very important, that the temples conse-

crated  to  the  national religion should be large and costly, and that only

patricians  or  senators should be allowed to administer its principal rites,

and  thus that patricians only be suffered to baptize, celebrate marriages,

and  lay  on hands, and that in general they be recognized as the priests
                                                                                              Bk.XIB:17681.
of  the  temples  and  the  champions and interpreters of the national reli-

gion.  (8:46:7)  But,  for  preaching,  and  to manage the church treasury and

its  daily  business,  let  some  persons  be chosen from the commons by

the  senate  itself, to be, as it were, the senate's deputies, and, therefore,

bound to render it account of everything.
 
 

[8:47] (8:47:1)  And  these  are  points  that  concern  the foundations of this

sort  of  dominion;  to  which  I  will  add  some  few  PAGE 369  others less

essential  indeed,  but  yet  of  great  importance.  (8:47:2)  Namely, that the

patricians,  when  they  walk,  should  be  distinguished by some special

garment,  or  dress,  and be saluted by some special title; and that every

man  of  the commons should give way to them; and that, if any patrician

has  lost  his  property  by  some  unavoidable  misfortune, he should be
                                                                    Bk.XIB:173.
restored  to  his  old  condition  at  the  public expense; but if, on the con-

trary,  it  be  proved  that he has spent the same in presents, ostentation,

gaming,  debauchery,  &c.,  or  that  he  is  insolvent,  he  must  lose  his

dignity,  and  be  held unworthy of every honour and office.  (8:47:3)  For he,

that  cannot govern himself and his own private affairs, will much less be

able to advise on public affairs.
 
 

[8:48]  (8:48:1)  Those, whom the law compels to take an oath, will be much

more  cautious  of  perjury,  if  they are bidden to swear by the country's

safety  and  liberty  and  by  the supreme council, than if they are told to
    Bk.XIB:5659.
swear  by  God.  (8:48:2)  For he who swears by God, gives as surety some

private  advantage  to  himself,  whereof  he is judge; but he, who by his

oath  gives  as  surety his country's liberty and safety, swears by what is

the   common  advantage  of  all,  whereof  he  is  not  judge,  and  if  he

perjures   himself,   thereby   declares  that  he  is  his  country's  enemy.
 
 

[8:49]  (8:49:1)  Academies,  that  are  founded  at  the  public  expense, are

instituted  not  so  much  to cultivate men's natural abilities as to restrain

them.  (8:49:2)  But  in  a  free commonwealth arts and sciences will be best

cultivated  to  the  full,  if  everyone  that  asks  leave is allowed to teach

publicly,  and  that at his own cost and risk.  (8:49:3)   But these and the like
             Bk.XIB:17986.      Note 1 - PAGE 369
points  I  reserve  for   another   place.   (8:49:4)   For  here  I  determined  to

treat    only   such   matters  as  concern  an  aristocratic  dominion  only.

 
 

CHAPTER IX.— OF ARISTOCRACY.  CONTINUATION
 

[9:1]  (9:1:1)  HITHERTO  we  have  considered  an  aristocracy, so far as it

takes  its  name  from  one  city, which is the head of the whole dominion.

(9:1:2)  It  is now time to treat of that, which is in the hands of more than one
                                                                 Bk.XIB:167.
city,  and  which  I  think  preferable  to  the  former.  (9:1:3) But that we may

notice its difference and its superiority, we will pass in review the founda-

tions  of  dominion,  one  by  one,  rejecting those foundations, which are

unsuited  to the present kind, and laying in their place others for it to rest

upon.
 
 

[9:2]  (9:2:1)  The  cities,  then,  which  enjoy the right of citizenship, must be

so  built  and  fortified,  that,  on  the one hand, each city by itself may be

unable  to subsist without the rest, and that yet, on the other hand, it can-

not  desert  the  rest without great harm to the whole dominion.   (9:2:2)  For

thus  they  will  always  remain  united.   (9:2:3) But cities, which are so con-

stituted,  that  they can neither maintain themselves, nor be dangerous to

the  rest,  are  clearly  not independent, but absolutely subject to the rest.
 
 

[9:3]  (9:3:1)  But  the  contents  of  the  ninth  and  tenth sections of the last

chapter  are  deduced from the general nature of aristocracy, as are also

the  proportion  between  the numbers of the patricians and the multitude,

and the proper age and condition of those that are to be made patricians;

so that on these points no difference can arise, whether the dominion be

in  the  hands  of  one  or more cities.  (9:3:2)  But the supreme council must

here  be  on  a different footing.   (9:3:3)  For if any city of the dominion were

assigned  for  the  meeting  of  this supreme council, it would in reality be

the  head  of the dominion; and, therefore, either they would have to take

turns,  or a place would have to be assigned for this council, that has not
                                                                   { Washington, D.C. }
the right of citizenship, and belongs PAGE 371 equally to all. (9:3:4)  But either

alternative is as difficult to effect, as it is easy to state; I mean, either that

so  many  thousands  of  men should have to go often outside their cities,

or  that  they  should  have  to  assemble  sometimes  in one place, some-

times in another.
 
 

[9:4]  (9:4:1)  But  that  we  may conclude aright what should be done in this

matter,  and  on  what  plan  the  councils  of  this  dominion  ought  to be

formed,  from  its  own  very  nature and condition, these points are to be

considered;  namely,  that  every  city  has so much more right than a pri-

vate  man,  as  it  excels  him in power (2:4), and consequently that every

city  of  this dominion has as much right within its walls, or the limits of its

jurisdiction,  as  it has power; and, in the next place, that all the cities are

mutually  associated  and  united,  not  as  under a treaty, but as forming

one  dominion,  yet  so  that every city has so much more right as against

the  dominion than the others, as it exceeds the others in power.  (9:4:2) For

he  who  seeks equality between unequals, seeks an absurdity.  (9:4:3)  Citi-

zens,  indeed,  are  rightly  esteemed  equal, because the power of each,

compared  with  that  of  the  whole  dominion,  is of no account.  (9:4:4)  But

each  city's  power  constitutes  a  large part of the power of the dominion

itself, and so much the larger, as the city itself is greater.  (9:4:5)  And, there-

fore,  the  cities  cannot all be held equal.  (9:4:6)  But, as the power of each,

so  also  its  right  should  be estimated by its greatness.  (9:4:7)  The bonds,

however,  by  which  they should be bound into one dominion, are above
                                { USA Supreme Court }
all  a  senate  and  a  court  of justice (4:1).  (9:4:8)  But how by these bonds

they  are  all  to be so united, that each of them may yet remain, as far as

possible, independent, I will here briefly show.
 
 

[9:5]  (9:5:1)  I  suppose  then,  that the patricians of every city, who, accord-

ing  to  its  size, should be more, or fewer (9:3), have supreme right over

their   own   city,  and  that,  in  that  city's  supreme  council,  they  have

supreme  authority  to  fortify  the  city  and  enlarge  its  walls, to impose

taxes,  to  pass  and repeal laws, and, in general, to do everything which
                                                                                                    Bk.XX:34759. 
they  judge necessary to their city's preservation and increase.   (9:5:2) But

to  manage  the  common  business  of  the  dominion,  a senate is to be

created  on  just  the  same  footing  as we described in the last chapter,

so  that  there  be PAGE 372 between  this  senate and the former no differ-

ence,  except  that  this  has also authority to decide the disputes, which

may  arise  between   cities.   (9:5:3)  For  in  this dominion, of which no city

is   head,   it   cannot   be   done  by  the  supreme  council.  (See 6:38.)
 
 

[9:6]  (9:6:1)  But,  in  this  dominion, the supreme council is not to be called

together,  unless  there is need to alter the form of the dominion itself, or

on  some difficult business, to which the senators shall think themselves

unequal; and so it will very rarely happen, that all the patricians are sum-

moned  to council.  (9:6:2)  For we have said (8:17), that the supreme coun-

cil's  function  is to pass and repeal laws, and to choose the ministers of

the  dominion.  (9:6:3)  But  the  laws,  or  general  constitution of the whole

dominion,  ought  not  to  be changed as soon as instituted.  (9:6:4)  If, how-

ever,  time  and  occasion suggest the institution of some new law or the

change  of  one already ordained, the question may first be discussed in

the  senate, and after the agreement of the senate in the matter, then let

envoys  next  be sent to the cities by the senate itself, to inform the patri-

cians  of every city of the opinion of the senate, and lastly, if the majority

of  the  cities follow that opinion, it shall then remain good, but otherwise
           Bk.XIB:168.
be  of  no effect.  (9:6:5)  And this same order may be observed in choosing

the  generals  of  the  army  and  the  ambassadors  to  be  sent to other

realms,  as  also  about decrees concerning the making of war or accept-

ing  conditions  of  peace.  (9:6:6)  But  in choosing the other public officials,

since  (as  we  showed  in  9:4)  every  city,  as  far  as  can be, ought to

remain  independent,  and to have as much more right than the others in

the  dominion,  as  it  exceeds  them  in  power,  the following order must

necessarily  be  observed.   (9:6:7)  The  senators  are to be chosen by the

patricians  of  each  city;  that  is, the patricians of one city are to elect in

their  own  council  a  fixed  number  of senators from their colleagues of

their  own city, which number is to be to that of the patricians of that city

as  one  to twelve (8:30); and they are to designate whom they will to be

of  the  first,  second,  third,  or other series; and in like manner the patri-

cians  of  the  other  cities,  in  proportion to their number, are to choose

more  or  fewer  senators,  and  distribute  them among the series, into a

certain  number  of PAGE 373 which  we  have  said  the  senate  is  to  be

divided.  (8:34.)  (9:6:8)  By  which  means  it will result, that in every series

of  senators  there  will  be  found  senators  of every city, more or fewer,

according to its size.   (9:6:9)  But the presidents and vice-presidents of the

series, being fewer in number than the cities, are to be chosen by lot by

the  senate  out of the consuls, who are to be appointed first.   (9:6:10)  The

same  order is to be maintained in appointing the supreme judges of the

dominion,  namely, that the patricians of every city are to elect from their

colleagues  in proportion to their number more or fewer judges. (9:6:11) And

so  it  will be the case, that every city in choosing officials will be as inde-

pendent  as possible, and that each, in proportion to its power, will have

the  more  right  alike  in  the  senate and the court of justice; supposing,

that  is,  that  the  order observed by senate and court in deciding public

affairs,  and  settling  disputes  is  such  in  all  respects,  as we have de-

scribed  it  in  8:33  and 8:34 of the last chapter. (Note 1, Page 373: So the

text:   but   the   court   of   justice  is  not described  till 8:37  and  following  sections

of Chap. VIII.)
 
 

[9:7]  (9:7:1)  Next,  the  commanders  of battalions and military tribunes are

also  to  be  chosen  from  the patricians.  (9:7:2) For as it is fair, that every

city  in proportion to its size should be bound to levy a certain number of

soldiers  for  the general safety of the whole dominion, it is also fair, that

from the patricians of every city in proportion to the number of regiments,

which  they  are  bound  to maintain, they may appoint so many tribunes,

captains,  ensigns,  etc.,  as are needed to discipline that part of the mili-

tary, which they supply to the dominion.
 
 

[9:8]  (9:8:1)  No  taxes  are  to  be  imposed  by the senate on the subjects;

but to meet the expenditure, which by decree of the senate is necessary

to  carry  on  public business, not the subjects, but the cities themselves

are  to  be  called to assessment by the senate, so that every city, in pro-

portion  to  its  size,  should pay a larger or smaller share of the expense.

 (9:8:2)  And  this  share  indeed  is to be exacted by the patricians of every

city  from  their  own  citizens  in what way they please, either by compel-

ling  them  to an assessment, or, as is much fairer, by imposing taxes on

them.
 
 

PAGE 374

[9:9]  (9:9:1) Further,  although  all  the  cities of this dominion are not mari-

time,  nor the senators summoned from the maritime cities only, yet may

the  same  emoluments be awarded to the senators, as we mentioned in

8:31  of  the last chapter.  (9:9:2) To which end it will be possible to devise

means, varying with the composition of the dominion, to link the cities to

one  another  more  closely.  (9:9:3) But  the  other  points  concerning the

senate  and  the  court  of  justice  and  the  whole  dominion  in general,

which  I  delivered  in the last chapter, are to be applied to this dominion

also.  (9:9:4)  And  so  we  see,  that  in a dominion which is in the hands of

several  cities,  it will not be necessary to assign a fixed time or place for

assembling  the  supreme  council.  (9:9:5) But  for the senate and court of

justice  a  place  is  to  be appointed in a village, or in a city, that has not

the  right  of  voting.  (9:9:6) But I return to those points, which concern the

cities taken by themselves.
 
 

[9:10]  (9:10:1)  The  order  to  be  observed  by  the  supreme  council  of a

single  city,  in  choosing  officials  of the dominion and of the city, and in

making  decrees,  should  be  the same that I have delivered in 8:27 and

8:36  of  the last chapter.  (9:10:2) For the policy is the same here as it was

there.  (9:10:3)  Next  a  council  of  syndics  is  to be formed, subordinate to

the  council  of  the city, and having the same relation to it as the council

of  syndics  of  the  last chapter had to the council of the entire dominion,

and  let its functions within the limits of the city be also the same, and let

it  enjoy  the same emoluments.  (9:10:4) But if a city, and consequently the

number  of  its patricians be so small that it cannot create more than one

syndic  or  two,  which  two  are  not  enough to make a council, then the

supreme  council  of  the city is to appoint judges to assist the syndics in

trials  according  to  the  matter  at  issue, or else the dispute must be re-

ferred to the supreme council of syndics.  (9:10:5) For from every city some

also  out of the syndics are to be sent to the place where the senate sits,

to see that the constitution of the whole dominion is preserved unbroken,

and they are to sit in the senate without the right of voting.
 
 

[9:11]  (9:11:1)  The  consuls  of  the  cities are likewise to be chosen by the

patricians  of  their  city,  and  are  to  constitute  a  sort  of  senate  for it.

 (9:11:2)  But  their  number  I cannot determine, PAGE 375 nor yet do I think it

necessary,  since  the  city's  business of great importance is transacted

by  its  supreme  council, and matters concerning the whole dominion by

the  great  senate.  (9:11:3) But if they be few, it will be necessary that they

give  their  votes  in  their  council  openly,  and not by ballot, as in large

councils.  (9:11:4)  For  in  small  councils,  when  votes  are  given secretly,

by  a  little  extra  cunning one can easily detect the author of every vote,

and in many ways deceive the less attentive.
 
 

[9:12] (9:12:1)  Besides,  in  every  city  judges  are  to  be  appointed  by its

supreme  council,  from  whose  sentence, however, let everyone but an

openly  convicted  criminal or confessed debtor have a right of appeal to

the  supreme  court  of justice of the dominion. (9:12:2)  But this need not be

pursued further.
 
 

[9:13]  (9:13:1)  It  remains,  therefore,  to  speak  of  the cities which are not

independent.  (9:13:2)  If  these  were  founded  in  an actual province or dis-

trict  of  the  dominion,  and  their inhabitants are of the same nation and

language, they ought of necessity, like villages, to be esteemed parts of

the  neighbouring  cities,  so  that each of them should be under the gov-

ernment  of  this or that independent city.  (9:13:3) And the reason of this is,

that  the  patricians are chosen by the supreme council, not of the domin-

ion,  but  of  every  city,  and  in  every city are more or fewer, according

to  the  number  of  inhabitants  within  the  limits  of  its jurisdiction (9:5).

(9:13:4)  And  so  it  is  necessary, that the multitude of the city, which is not

independent, be referred to the census of another which is independent,

and  depend  upon  the latter's government.  (9:13:5) But cities captured by

right  of  war,  and  annexed  to  the dominion, are either to be esteemed

associates  in  the dominion, and though conquered put under an obliga-

tion  by  that  benefit,  or  else  colonies  to  enjoy the right of citizenship

are  to  be  sent  thither,  and  the  natives removed elsewhere or utterly

destroyed.
 
 

[9:14]  (9:14:1)  And  these  are  the  things,  which touch the foundations of

the  dominion.  (9:14:2)  But  that  its  condition is better than that of the aris-

tocracy,  which  is called after one city only, I conclude from this, namely,

that  the  patricians  of  every city, after the manner of human desire, will

be  eager  to  keep,  and if possible increase their right, both in their city

and  in  the  senate;  and  therefore  will  try,  as far as PAGE 376 possible,

to  attract  the  multitude to themselves, and consequently to make a stir

in the dominion by good deeds rather than by fear, and to increase their

own  number;  because the more numerous they are, the more senators

they will choose out of their own council (9:6), and hence the more right

(9:6) they will possess in the dominion.   (9:14:3) Nor is it an objection, that

while  every  city  is  consulting  its  own interest and suspecting the rest,

they  more often quarrel among themselves, and waste time in disputing.
                                                                               ( Note1, 376 )
(9:14:4)  For  if,  while  the  Romans  are  debating, Saguntum is lost: on the

other  hand,  while a few are deciding everything in conformity with their

own  passions  only,  liberty  and  the  general  good  are lost.  (9:14:5) For

men's  natural  abilities  are  too  dull  to see through everything at once;

but  by  consulting,  listening,  and  debating, they grow more acute, and

while  they  are  trying  all means, they at last discover those which they

want,  which  all  approve,  but  no one would have thought of in the first
 Bk.XIB:169.
instance.  (9:14:6)  But  if  anyone  retorts,  that  the  dominion  of the Dutch

has  not  long  endured  without  a  count  or  one to fill his place, let him

have  this  reply,  that  the  Dutch thought, that to maintain their liberty it

was  enough  to  abandon  their  count,  and to behead the body of their

dominion,  but  never  thought of remoulding it, and left its limbs, just as

they  had  been  first  constituted,  so that the county of Holland has re-

mained without a count, like a headless body, and the actual dominion

has lasted on without the name.  (9:14:7) And so it is no wonder that most
                                                                                                                      Bk.XX:34760. 
of its subjects have not known, with whom the authority of the dominion

lay.   (9:14:8)   And  even  had  this been otherwise, yet those who actually

held  dominion  were  far too few to govern the multitude and suppress

their powerful adversaries.  (9:14:9) Whence it has come to pass, that the

latter  have  often  been able to plot against them with impunity, and at

last to overthrow them.  (9:14:10) And so the sudden overthrow of the said
( Note2, 376 )
republic  has  not  arisen  from a useless waste of time in debates, but
                                                                                                              Bk.XIB:15332, 154.
from  the  misformed  state of the said dominion and the fewness of its

rulers.
 
 

PAGE 377

[9:15]  (9:15:1) This  aristocracy in the hands of several cities is also prefer-

able  to  the  other,  because it is not necessary, as in the first described,

to  provide  against  its  whole supreme council being overpowered by a

sudden  attack,  since  (9:9) no time or place is appointed for its meeting.

(9:15:2)  Moreover,  powerful  citizens in this dominion are less to be feared.

(9:15:3)  For  where several cities enjoy liberty, it is not enough for him, who

is  making  ready  his way to dominion, to seize one city, in order to hold
                     Bk.XIB:16964.
dominion  over  the  rest.  (9:15:4) And, lastly, liberty under this dominion is

common  to  more.  (9:15:5) For  where  one city reigns alone, there the ad-

vantage  of  the  rest is only so far considered, as suits that reigning city.
 
 

CHAPTER X.— OF ARISTOCRACY.  CONCLUSION.
 
 

[10:1]  (10:1:1)  HAVING  explained  and  made  proof  of  the foundations of

both  kinds  of  aristocracy,  it  remains  to  inquire  whether by reason of

any  fault  they  are  liable  to  be dissolved or changed into another form.

(10:1:2)  The  primary  cause,  by which dominions of this kind are dissolved,

is  that,  which  that  most acute Florentine ( Machiavelli ) observes in his

"Discourses  on  Livy" (Bk. iii. Chap. I.),  namely,  that like a human body,

"a  dominion  has  daily  added to it something that at some time or other

needs  to  be  remedied."  (10:1:3)  And so, he says, it is necessary for some-

thing  occasionally  to  occur,  to bring back the dominion to that first prin-

ciple,  on  which  it  was  in  the  beginning  established.  (10:1:4)  And if this

does  not  take  place  within the necessary time, its blemishes will go on

increasing,  till  they  cannot  be  removed,  but  with  the  dominion itself.

(10:1:5)  And  this  restoration,  he  says, may either happen accidentally, or

by  the  design  and  forethought of the laws or of a man of extraordinary

virtue.  (10:1:6)  And  we  cannot  doubt, that this matter is of the greatest im-

portance,  and  that,  where  provision has not been made against this in-

convenience,  the  dominion  will  not be able to endure by its own excell-

ence,  but only by good fortune; and on the other hand that, where a pro-

per  remedy  has  been  applied to this evil, it will not be possible for it to

fall  by  its  own  fault,  but  only  by some inevitable fate, as we shall pre-

sently  show  more  clearly.  (10:1:7)  The  first remedy, that suggested itself

for  this  evil,  was  to appoint every five years a supreme dictator for one

or  two  months,  who  should have the right to inquire, decide, and make

ordinances  concerning  the  acts  of  the  senators  and  of every official,

and  PAGE 379 thereby  to  bring  back  the  dominion  to  its  first  principle.

(10:1:8)  But  he who studies to avoid the inconveniences, to which a domin-

ion  is  liable,  must  apply  remedies  that  suit  its nature, and can be de-

rived  from  its own foundations; otherwise in his wish to avoid Charybdis

he  falls  upon  Scylla.  (10:1:9)  It  is,  indeed,  true  that all, as well rulers as

ruled,  ought  to be restrained by fear of punishment or loss, so that they

may  not  do  wrong  with  impunity  or even advantage; but, on the other

hand,  it  is  certain,  that  if  this fear becomes common to good and bad

men  alike,  the  dominion  must  be  in the utmost danger.  (10:1:10)  Now as

the  authority  of  a  dictator  is  absolute, it cannot fail to be a terror to all,

especially  if,  as  is  here  required,  he  were  appointed at a stated time,

because  in  that  case every ambitious man would pursue this office with

the utmost energy; and it is certain that in time of peace virtue is thought

less  of  than  wealth,  so  that  the  more  haughty a man he is, the more

easily  he  will  get  office.  (10:1:11)  And  this  perhaps  is  why the Romans

used  to  make  a  dictator  at  no  fixed time, but under pressure of some

accidental  necessity.  (10:1:12) Though  for all that, to quote Cicero's words,
     (Note 1, 379)
"the  tumour  of a dictator was displeasing to the good."   (10:1:13)  And to be

sure,  as  this  authority  of a dictator is quite royal, it is impossible for the

dominion  to  change  into  a monarchy without great peril to the republic,

although  it  happen  for  ever  so  short a time.  (10:1:14)  Furthermore, if no

fixed time were appointed for creating a dictator, no notice would be paid

to  the interval between one dictator and another, which is the very thing

that  we  said  was  most  to  be observed; and the whole thing would be

exceedingly  vague,  and therefore easily neglected.  (10:1:15)  Unless, then,
                             Bk.XIB:170.
this  authority of a dictator be eternal and fixed, and therefore impossible

to  be conferred on one man without destroying the form of dominion, the

dictatorial  authority  itself, and consequently the safety and preservation

of the republic will be very uncertain.
 
 

[10:2]  (10:2:1)  But,  on  the  other  hand, we cannot doubt (6:3), that, if with-

out  destroying  the  form  of dominion, the sword of the dictator might be

permanent,  and  only  PAGE 380  terrible  to  the  wicked,  evils  will  never

grow   to   such  a  pitch,  that  they  cannot  be  eradicated  or  amended.

(10:2:2)  In  order,  therefore,  to  secure  all  these  conditions, we have said,

that  there is to be a council of syndics subordinate to the supreme coun-`

cil,  to  the  end that the sword of the dictator should be permanent in the

hands  not  of  any natural person, but of a civil person, whose members

are  too  numerous to divide the dominion amongst themselves (9:1, 9:2),
                                        Bk.XIB:17066.
or  to  combine  in  any  wickedness.  (10:2:3)  To which is to be added, that

they  are  forbidden  to  fill any other office in the dominion, that they are

not  the paymasters of the soldiery, and, lastly, that they are of an age to

prefer  actual  security  to  things  new and perilous.  (10:2:4)  Wherefore the

dominion  is in no danger from them, and consequently they cannot, and

in  fact  will  not be a terror to the good, but only to the wicked.  (10:2:5)  For

as  they  are  less  powerful  to  accomplish criminal designs, so are they

more  so  to  restrain wickedness.  (10:2:6)  For, not to mention that they can

resist  it  in  its beginnings (since the council lasts for ever), they are also

sufficiently  numerous  to  dare  to accuse and condemn this or that influ-

ential  man  without  fear  of  his enmity; especially as they vote by ballot,

and  the  sentence  is  pronounced  in  the  name  of  the  entire  council.
 
 

[10:3]  (10:3:1)  But  the  tribunes  of  the  commons  at  Rome were likewise

regularly  appointed;  but  they  were too weak to restrain the power of a

Scipio, and had besides to submit to the senate their plans for the public
 ( Note 1, 380 )
welfare,  which  also  frequently  eluded them, by contriving that the one

whom  the senators were least afraid of should be most popular with the

commons.  (10:3:2)  Besides  which,  the  tribunes'  authority was supported

against the patricians by the favour of the commons. and whenever they

convoked  the  commons,  it  looked  as  if  they  were  raising a sedition

rather  than  assembling  a  council.   (10:3:3)  Which  inconveniences  have

certainly  no  place  in  the dominion which we have described in the last

two chapters.
 
 

[10:4]  (10:4:1)  However,  this  authority  of  the syndics will only be PAGE 381

able  to  secure the preservation of the form of the dominion, and thus to

prevent  the  laws  from  being  broken,  or anyone from gaining by trans-

gressing;  but  will  by  no  means  suffice  to prevent the growth of vices,

which  cannot  be  forbidden by  law,  such  as those  into which men fall

from excess of leisure, and from which the ruin of a dominion not uncom-

monly  follows.  (10:4:2)  For  men  in time of peace lay aside fear, and grad-

ually  from  being  fierce  savages become civilized or humane, and from

being humane become soft and sluggish, and seek to excel one another

not  in  virtue,  but in ostentation and luxury.  (10:4:3)  And hence they begin

to  put  off  their  native  manners  and  to  put  on  foreign  ones,  that is,

to become slaves.
 

                                     Bk.XIA:165103.
[10:5]  (10:5:1)  To avoid these evils many have tried to establish sumptuary

laws;  but  in  vain.  (10:5:2)  For  all  laws  which can be broken without any

injury  to  another, are counted but a laughing-stock, and are so far from

bridling  the desires and lusts of men, that on the contrary they stimulate

them.  (10:5:3)  For  "we  are  ever eager for forbidden fruit, and desire what

is  denied"  (Ovid, "Amores," III. iv. 17).   (10:5:4)  Nor  do  idle men ever lack

ability  to  elude the laws which are instituted about things, which cannot

absolutely  be  forbidden,  as  banquets,  plays,  ornaments, and the like,

of  which  only  the  excess  is bad; and that is to be judged according to

the  individual's  fortune,  so that it cannot be determined by any general

law.
 
 

[10:6]  (10:6:1)  I  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  common vices of peace, of

which  we  are  here  speaking, are never to be directly, but indirectly for-

bidden;  that  is,  by  laying  such foundations of dominion, that the result

may  be, that the majority, I do not say are anxious to live wisely (for that

is  impossible),  but  are  guided  by those passions whence the republic

has  most  advantage.   (10:6:2)  And  therefore the chief point to be studied
                                                                          Bk.XIA:165104.
is, that the rich may be, if not thrifty, yet avaricious.  (10:6:3)  For there is no

doubt,  that,  if  this  passion  of avarice, which is general and lasting, be

encouraged  by  the  desire  of  glory,  most people would set their chief

affection  upon  increasing  their  property  without  disgrace,  in order to

acquire  honours,  while  avoiding  extreme  infamy.  (10:6:4)  If then we exa-

mine  the  foundations  of both kinds of aristocracy PAGE 382 which I have

explained  in  the  last  two  chapters,  we  shall see, that this very result

follows  from  them.  (10:6:5)  For  the  number  of  rulers  in both is so large,

that  most  of  the  rich  have access to government and to the offices of
                        Bk.XIB:17168.
the dominion open to them.
 
 

[10:7]  (10:7:1)  But  if  it  be  further  ordained  (as we said, 8:47),  that patri-

cians  who  are insolvent be deposed from patrician rank, and that those

who  have  lost  their  property  by misfortune be restored to their former

position, there is no doubt that all will try their best to keep their property.

(10:7:2)  Moreover,  they  will  never  desire  foreign  costumes,  nor disdain

their native ones, if it is by law appointed, that patricians and candidates

for  office  should  be  distinguished by a special robe, concerning which

see 8:25 &  8:47.  (10:7:3)   And  besides  these,  other  means  may  be  de-

vised  in  every  dominion agreeable to the nature of its situation and the

national  genius,  and  herein  it  is  above all to be studied, that the sub-
                                 Bk.XIB:17783.
jects may do their duty rather spontaneously than under pressure of the

law.
 
 

[10:8]  (10:8:1)  For  a  dominion,  that  looks  no farther than to lead men by

fear,  will  be  rather free from vices, than possessed of virtue.  (10:8:2)  But

men are so to be led, that they may think that they are not led, but living

after  their  own  mind,  and  according to their free decision; and so that

they  are  restrained  only  by  love of liberty, desire to increase their pro-

perty,  and  hope  of  gaining  the honours of the dominion.  (10:8:3)  But effi-

gies,  triumphs,  and  other  incitements  to virtue, are signs rather of sla-

very  than  liberty.  (10:8:4)  For  rewards of virtue are granted to slaves, not

freemen.  (10:8:5)  I  admit,  indeed,  that  men  are very much stimulated by

these  incitements;  but,  as  in  the  first  instance,  they  are awarded to

great  men,  so  afterwards,  with the growth of envy, they are granted to

cowards  and  men  swollen  with  the extent of their wealth, to the great

indignation  of  all  good  men.  (10:8:6)  Secondly, those, who boast of their

ancestors'  effigies  and triumphs, think they are wronged, if they are not

preferred  to  others.  (10:8:7)  Lastly,  not  to  mention other objections, it is

certain  that  equality,  which once cast off the general liberty is lost, can

by  no  means be maintained, from the time that peculiar honours are by

public law decreed to any man renowned for his virtue.
 
 

PAGE 383

[10:9]  (10:9:1)  After  which  premisses,  let  us now see whether dominions

of  this  kind  can  be  destroyed  by  any cause to which blame attaches.

(10:9:2)  But  if  any dominion can be everlasting, that will necessarily be so,

whose   constitution   being   once  rightly  instituted  remains  unbroken.

(10:9:3)  For  the  constitution is the soul of a dominion.  (10:9:4)  Therefore, if it

is  preserved, so is the dominion.  (10:9:5)  But a constitution cannot remain

unconquered, unless it is defended alike by reason and common human

passion:  otherwise,  if  it  relies only on the help of reason, it is certainly

weak  and  easily  overcome.   (10:9:6)  Now since the fundamental constitu-

tion  of  both  kinds  of aristocracy has been shown to agree with reason
                                   { love }
and  common  human passion, we can therefore assert that these, if any

kinds  of  dominion,  will  be  eternal, in other words, that they cannot be

destroyed  by  any  cause  to  which  blame  attaches,  but only by some

inevitable fate.
 
 

[10:10]  (10:10:1)   But it may still be objected to us, that, although the consti-

tution  of  dominion  above  set forth is defended by reason and common

human  passion,  yet  for  all  that  it  may  at some time be overpowered.

(10:10:2)  For  there  is no passion, that is not sometimes overpowered, by a

stronger  contrary  one;  for  we  frequently  see  the  fear  of death over-

powered  by  the  greed  for another's property.  (10:10:3)  Men, who are run-

ning  away  in  panic fear from the enemy, can be stopped by the fear of

nothing  else,  but  throw  themselves  into  rivers, or rush into fire, to es-

cape the enemy's steel.  (10:10:4)  In whatever degree, therefore, a common-

wealth  is rightly ordered, and its laws well made; yet in the extreme diffi-

culties  of  a dominion, when all, as sometimes happens, are seized by a

sort  of panic terror, all, without regard to the future or the laws, approve

only  that  which their actual fear suggests, all turn towards the man who

is  renowned for his victories, and set him free from the laws, and (estab-

lishing  thereby the worst of precedents), continue him in command, and
                                            Bk.XX:34861. 
entrust  to  his  fidelity all affairs of state: and this was, in fact, the cause
                                                 Bk.XIB:17169.
of  the  destruction  of  the  Roman  dominion.  (10:10:5)  But  to  answer this

objection,  I  say,  first,  that  in  a rightly  constituted republic such terror

does  not arise but from a due cause.  (10:10:6)  And so such terror and con-

sequent  confusion  can  be  attributed  to no cause avoidable by human

foresight.   (10:10:7)  In the next place, it is to be observed, that in a republic

such  as  PAGE 384 we have above described, it is impossible (8:9 & 8:25)

for  this  or  that  man  so to distinguish himself by the report of his virtue,

as  to  turn  towards  himself  the attention of all, but he must have many

rivals favoured by others.  (10:10:8)  And so, although from terror there arise

some  confusion  in the republic, yet no one will be able to elude the law

and  declare  the  election of anyone to an illegal military command, with-

out  its being immediately disputed by other candidates; and to settle the

dispute, it will, in the end, be necessary to have recourse to the constitu-

tion  ordained  once  for all, and approved by all, and to order the affairs

of  the  dominion  according  to  the  existing laws.  (10:10:9)  I may therefore

absolutely  assert,  that  as  the aristocracy, which is in the hands of one

city  only,  so especially that which is in the hands of several, is everlast-

ing,  or,  in  other  words, can be dissolved or changed into another form

by no internal cause.
 

CHAPTER XI.— OF DEMOCRACY.  Bk.XX:344. 
 

[11:1]  (11:1:1) I   PASS,   at   length,  to  the  third  and  perfectly  absolute
                                          Bk.XIB:196.
dominion,  which we call democracy.   (11:1:2) The difference between this

and  aristocracy  consists, we have said, chiefly in this, that in an aristoc-

racy  it  depends on the supreme council's will and free choice only, that

this  or  that man is made a patrician, so that no one has the right to vote

or  fill  public offices by inheritance, and that no one can by right demand

this  right,  as  is  the  case in the dominion, whereof we are now treating.

(11:1:3)  For  all,  who  are  born  of  citizen  parents,  or  on  the  soil  of the

country,  or  who  have  deserved  well  of  the  republic, or have accom-

plished  any  other  conditions  upon which the law grants to a man right

of  citizenship;  they all, I say, have a right to demand for themselves the

right  to  vote  in  the  supreme  council  and to fill public offices, nor can

they be refused it, but for crime or infamy.
 
 

[11:2] (11:2:1)  If,  then,  it  is  by  a  law  appointed, that the elder men only,

who  have  reached  a certain year of their age, or the first-born only, as

soon  as  their  age  allows,  or  those  who  contribute  to the republic a

certain  sum  of  money,  shall  have  the  right  of voting  in the supreme

council  and  managing  the business of the dominion; then, although on

this  system  the  result  might  be,  that  the  supreme  council would be

composed  of  fewer  citizens  than  that  of  the  aristocracy of which we

treated  above,  yet,  for  all that, dominions of this kind should be called

democracies,   because   in   them   the  citizens,  who  are  destined  to

manage  affairs  of  state,  are  not  chosen  as  the best by the supreme

council,  but  are  destined  to  it  by  a  law.  (11:2:2)  And  although  for this

reason dominions of this kind, that is, where not the best, but those who

happen  by  chance  to  be  rich,  or  who  are  born  PAGE 386 eldest, are

destined  to  govern,  are  thought  inferior  to  an  aristocracy;  yet, if we

reflect  on the practice or general condition of mankind, the result in both

cases  will come to the same thing. (11:2:3)   For patricians will always think

those  the best, who are rich, or related to themselves in blood, or allied
       Bk.XIB:173.
by  friendship.  (11:2:4)  And,  indeed,  if  such were the nature of patricians,

that  they  were  free  from  all  passion, and guided by mere zeal for the

public  welfare in choosing their patrician colleagues, no dominion could
                                                                                     Bk.XIB:196112.
be  compared  with  aristocracy.  (11:2:5) But  experience  itself teaches us

only  too  well,  that things pass in quite a contrary manner, above all, in

oligarchies,  where  the  will  of the patricians, from the absence of rivals,

is  most  free  from  the  law.  (11:2:6) For  there  the patricians intentionally

keep  away  the  best  men  from  the  council,  and seek for themselves

such  colleagues  in  it,  as  hang  upon  their  words,  so  that  in such a

dominion  things  are  in  a  much  more unhappy condition, because the

choice  of  patricians  depends  entirely  upon  the  arbitrary will of a few,

which is free or unrestrained by any law.  (11:2:7)  But I return to my subject.
 
 

[11:3] (11:3:1)  From  what  has  been  said in the last section, it is manifest

that  we  can  conceive  of  various  kinds  of  democracy.  (11:3:2)  But  my

intention  is  not  to  treat  of  every  kind,  but  of  that  only, "wherein all,

without  exception,  who  owe  allegiance to the laws of the country only,

and  are  further  independent  and  of  respectable life, have the right of

voting  in  the  supreme council and of filling the offices of the dominion."

(11:3:3)  I  say  expressly, "who  owe  allegiance  to  the laws of the country

only,"  to  exclude  foreigners,  who are treated as being under another's

dominion.  (11:3:4)  I  added,  besides,  "who are independent," except in so

far  as  they are under allegiance to the laws of the dominion, to exclude

women  and  slaves,  who  are  under  the authority of men and masters,

and  also  children and wards, as long as they are under the authority of

parents  and  guardians.  (11:3:5) I  said, lastly, "and of respectable life," to

exclude,   above   all,   those   that  are  infamous  from  crime,  or  some

disgraceful means of livelihood.
 
 

[11:4] (11:4:1)  But,  perhaps,  someone will ask, whether women are under

men's authority by nature or institution?  (11:4:2) For if it has been by mere

institution,  then  we   had   no   reason  compelling  page 387 us to exclude             Durant [10]175

women  from  government.  (11:4:3) But  if  we consult experience itself, we

shall  find  that  the  origin  of it is in their weakness.  (11:4:4)  For there has

never  been  a  case of men and women reigning together, but wherever

on  the  earth  men  are  found,  there we see that men rule, and women

are  ruled,  and  that  on this plan, both sexes live in harmony.  (11:4:5)  But

on  the  other  hand, the Amazons, who are reported to have held rule of

old,  did  not  suffer  men  to  stop  in  their country, but reared only their

female   children,   killing   the  males  to  whom  they  gave  birth (Justin,

Histories, ii. 4.).  (11:4:6)  But  if  by  nature women were equal to men, and

were  equally  distinguished  by  force  of  character and ability, in which

human  power  and  therefore human right chiefly consist; surely among

nations  so  many and different some would be found, where both sexes

rule  alike,  and  others, where men are ruled by women, and so brought

up,  that they can make less use of their abilities.  (11:4:7) And since this is

nowhere  the  case,  one  may  assert with perfect propriety, that women

have  not  by  nature equal right with men: but that they necessarily give

way  to men, and that thus it cannot happen, that both sexes should rule
                                                                    Bk.XX:34862. 
alike,  much  less  that  men  should  be ruled by women.  (11:4:8)  But if we

further  reflect  upon  human  passions,  how men, in fact, generally love

women  merely  from  the  passion  of  lust, and esteem their cleverness

and  wisdom  in  proportion  to  the  excellence  of their beauty, and also

how  very  ill-disposed  men  are  to suffer the women they love to show

any  sort  of favour to others, and other facts of this kind, we shall easily

see  that  men  and women cannot rule alike without great hurt to peace.

(11:4:9)  But of this enough.

{ The Political Treatise is unfinished.  L(84):357 }
         Bk.XIII:357399. 
 
 

Note 1 - PAGE 360             Bk.XIB:191105; Bk.XX:14480, 25832,33, 26772.
"This  V. H.  is  Pieter  de  la Court (1618-85), an eminent publicist, who
wrote  under  the  initials  D. C.  (De la Court), V. H. (Van den Hove, the 
Dutch equivalent).  He was a friend of John de Witt, and opposed to the 
party   of    the   Statholders." — POLLOCK'S  Life  and  Philosophy  of  
Spinoza, Book XII Page 338.  

JBY Note 1 - PAGE 368 
For   the   dogmas   of   the  "simple  and  general  religion"  see  TTP3:XIV[28]:186. 
I conjecture what is meant is something like "Universal Religion" and "Holiday." 
Spinoza seems to imply a modified "Theocracy."    TTP3:Bk.XIA:139; Bk.XIB:17783. 
                            civil theology—Bk.XIA:15344.

Note 1 - PAGE 369 
This  promise  is  not kept by the author, no doubt owing to his not living
to finish the work. 

Note 1 - PAGE 376  
Livy, "Hist.," Bk. xxi. Chaps. VI. and following.

Note 2 - PAGE 376                             Bk.XIB:157, 182.
A.D. 1672.  William  Henry,  Prince  of  Orange, afterwards William III. of  
England,  was  made  Statholder  by a popular insurrection, consequent 
on the invasion of the French. 

Note 1 - PAGE 379
Cic. ad Quint. Grat. iii. 8, 4. The better reading is "rumour," not "tumour."  
"The good" in such a passage means the aristocratic party. 

Note 1 - PAGE 380
Not  by  law, except before B.C. 287 and in the interval between the dic-  
tatorship of Sulla and the consulship of Pompey and Crassus. But in the 
golden age of the republic the senate in fact controlled the tribunes. 

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Since August 12, 1998  PT Part 3 hits. 

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