Mark
Twain and Spinoza
(1835
-1910)
(1632-1677)
A Spinozistic Commentary on
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JBY Notes:
1. WHAT IS MAN? by Mark Twain
was taken with kind permission from a free e-Book
download from CyberRead;
June, 1993 [Etext #70]. To them I express my thanks and
appreciation.
2. I chanced upon Mark Twain's What is Man?
and was startled to see how many Spinozistic
Ideas he expressed—so
much so, that I was moved to write this commentary.
I was
surprised to learn later that no Spinoza
books were found in Mark Twain's
personal library.
"Sreedhar" made an email reply 1/26/05 to the above Note 2.
I am an Indian, currently at Stanford Univ. I am very interested in spirituality (Advaita, Ramana Maharshi, Spinoza). I saw Note 2 on your Mark Twain webpage:
I believe I understand how Mark Twain would express so many ideas similar to Spinoza without having read/known about him. I believe Mark Twain was very much influenced by Indian (Hindu) philosophy, esp. Advaita.
And upon reading Spinoza I have been struck how close to the Hindu Advaita Masters his teachings are. (I suppose all Gnanis or Enlightened Beings have the same thing to say.)
Regards,
Sreedhar
I was aware of the many similarities between Spinozism and Buddhism; I tried to sum them-up in Buddhism and Spinoza and Suffering. I did not make the jump that Mark Twain may have deeply read Hindu and Buddhist sources.
3. This unabridged HTML
version is available, abridged and formatted,
for conversion to an
eBook. The
abridged version is available to be read on
various eBook Readers.
4. Links are by JBY.
5.
{Comment by
JBY}.
CONTENTS:
I. a) Man
the {Computerized}
Machine
b) Personal
Merit
II. Man's Sole
Impulse—
the
Securing of His Own Approval
A
Little Story
III. Instances in
Point
Further
Instances
IV. Training
Admonition
A
Parable
V. More About the Machine
More
About the Machine
After
an Interval of Days
The
Thinking-Process
VI. Instinct and Thought
Free
Will
Not
Two Values, but Only One
A
Difficult Question
The
Master Passion
Conclusion
TP1:(1:4:2):288—TPI:Bk.XIB:157:
Spinoza's Dictum:
"I have made a ceaseless effort not to ridicule,
not to bewail, {no
praise/no blame - Ryle:20}
not to scorn human
actions, but to understand them." {including
your own actions}
Stace:125
A
Sort of Computer—ROM and RAM, Dawkins:276,
Parallel Computers,
Genomes—Hardware—Aging;
Experience—Software,
The Gene Book—Spirituality.
1a.
Man the {Computerized}
Machine, { A
robot caused
by G-D. } :
See
Robot Rat—Nazi-German—a
watch. Watts consumed.
{ Helps
to understand human
actions. }
Boeing
747—Consciousness—Music
Appreciation { See
Letter 62—Even a stone. }
Is
Consciousness Computable? Is
the Brain a Digital Computer? Dawkins:276,
Stace:125, Ridley:49,
[The Old Man and the Young Man had been conversing.
The Old Man had asserted that the human being is merely
a machine, and nothing more.
The Young Man objected, and asked him to go into particulars
and furnish his reasons for his position.]
Dawkins2:Genes
Mark
Twain 1907; as an old man; three years before he died.
Old Man. What are the materials
of which a steam-engine is made? Potter's
clay.
Mark
Twain as a younger man.
Young Man. Iron, steel, brass,
white-metal, and so on.
O.M. Where are these found?
Y.M. In the rocks.
O.M. In a pure state?
Y.M. No—in ores.
O.M. Are the metals suddenly deposited in the ores?
Y.M. No—it is the patient work of countless ages.
O.M. You could make the engine out of the rocks themselves? {Julien Offroy de La Mettrie}
Y.M. Yes, a brittle one and not valuable.
O.M. You would not require much, of such an engine as that?
Y.M. No—substantially nothing.
O.M. To make a fine and capable engine, how would you proceed?
Y.M. Drive tunnels and shafts into the hills; blast
out the iron ore; crush it, smelt
it, reduce it to
pig-iron;
put some of it through the Bessemer process and make steel of it. Mine
and treat
and
combine several metals of which brass is made.
O.M. Then?
Y.M. Out of the perfected result, build the fine engine.
O.M. You would require much of this one?
Y.M. Oh, indeed yes.
O.M. It could drive lathes, drills, planers, punches,
polishers, in a word all the cunning
machines of
a great factory?
Y.M. It could.
O.M. What could the stone engine do?
Y.M. Drive a sewing-machine, possibly—nothing more, perhaps.
O.M. Men would admire the other engine and rapturously praise it?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. But not the stone one?
Y.M. No.
O.M. The merits of the metal machine would be far above those of
the stone one?
Y.M. Of course.
1b. Personal
Merit: Hampshire—libido
and conatus, no
praise / no blame.
O.M. Personal
merits?
Y.M. PERSONAL merits? How do you mean? {Would you praise or blame a robot?} Popkin:71
O.M. It would be personally entitled to the credit of its own performance?
Y.M. The engine? Certainly not.
O.M. Why not?
Y.M. Because its performance is not
personal. It is the result
of the law of construction. It is
not
a MERIT that it does the things
which it is set to do—it can't HELP doing them.
O.M. And it is not a personal demerit in the stone machine that it does so little? {Sin}
Y.M. Certainly not. It
does no more and no less than the law of its make permits and compels
"working
up to the matter" is it your idea to work up to the proposition that
man and a
machine
are about the same thing, and
that there is no personal merit in the performance
of
either?
{JBY: In like fashion, a man is a sophisticated robot;
both, made-up of hardware and software.
Y. M. That is disgustedly
outrageous, how can you say that?
Robinson5:14,
Is consciousness computable?
JBY: I say it as an analogy
and only as an analogy. His hardware
is his genes, high or low
I.Q., he is skinny or fat, tall
or short, he runs fast or slow, etc.—heredity.
His software is
his culture,
language, training, religion, prejudices,
reading, experiences, etc.—
environment.
Heredity and environment, like hardware and
software, each is nothing
without
the other. Language
is software (a wordprocessor language) used on his
born-with
hardware. Take a look at Dennett,
pages 433 and 302. Likewise
accounting is
software
(a spread-sheet) used with his born-with hardware.
Functionalism, Storage
Technologies, Genes and Memes,
Y. M. I think I see what you mean, give me another example.
JBY:
Take these twins; assume they have the
same genes, I.Q., built,
athletic ability,
etc.—hardware.
One was given as a child to a college professor to raise;
the other to a
gangster—software,
how they were programmed, their databases.
Y. M. Yes. OK.
JBY: The first turns out to be a college professor; the second a gangster.
Y. M. It could be the opposite.
JBY: True. }
O.M. Yes—but do not be offended; I am meaning no offense.
What makes the grand difference
between
the stone engine and the steel one? Shall
we call it training, education? Shall
we
call the stone engine a savage and the steel one a civilized man? The original
rock
contained
the stuff of which the steel one was built—but along with a lot of
sulphur and
stone
and other obstructing inborn heredities, brought down from the old
geologic ages—
prejudices,
let us call them. Prejudices
which nothing within the rock itself had either
POWER
to remove or any DESIRE to remove. Will
you take note of that phrase?
Y.M. Yes. I have written it down; "Prejudices
which nothing within the rock itself had either
power
to remove or any desire to remove." Go on.
O.M. Prejudices must be removed by OUTSIDE INFLUENCES or not at all. Put that down.
Y.M. Very well; "Must be removed by outside influences or not at all." Go on. {TEI:[47]}
O.M. The iron's prejudice against ridding itself
of the cumbering rock. To make
it more exact,
the
iron's absolute INDIFFERENCE as to whether the rock be removed or not.
Then
comes
the OUTSIDE INFLUENCE and grinds the rock
to powder and sets the ore free.
The IRON
in the ore is still captive. An OUTSIDE INFLUENCE smelts it free of the
clogging ore.
The iron is emancipated iron, now, but indifferent to further progress.
An
OUTSIDE INFLUENCE
beguiles it into the Bessemer furnace and
refines it into steel
of the
first quality. It is educated,
now —its training is complete. And it has reached its
limit.
By no possible process can it be educated into GOLD.
Will you set that down?
Y.M. Yes. "Everything has its limit—iron ore cannot be educated into gold."
O.M. There are gold men, and tin men, and copper
men, and leaden mean, and steel
men,
and
so on—and each has the limitations of his nature, his heredities,
his training, and his
environment.
You can build engines out of each of these metals,
and they will all perform,
but
you must not require the weak ones to do equal work with the strong ones.
In each
case,
to get the best results, you must free the metal from its obstructing prejudicial
ones
by
education— smelting, refining, and so forth.
Y.M. You have arrived at man, now?
O.M. Yes. Man the machine—man the impersonal engine.
Whatsoever a man is, is due to his
MAKE,
and to the INFLUENCES brought to bear upon
it by his heredities, his habitat,
his
associations.
He is moved, directed, COMMANDED, by EXTERIOR
influences—-he
ORIGINATES
nothing, not even a thought.
Y.M. Oh, come! Where did I get my opinion that this which you are talking is all foolishness?
O.M. It is a quite natural opinion—indeed an inevitable
opinion—but YOU did not create
the
materials
out of which it is formed. They
are odds and ends of thoughts, impressions,
feelings,
gathered unconsciously from a thousand books, a thousand conversations,
and
from
streams of thought and feeling which have flowed down into your heart and
brain
out
of the hearts and brains of centuries of ancestors.
PERSONALLY you did not create
even
the smallest microscopic fragment of the materials out of which your opinion
is
made;
and personally you cannot claim even the slender merit
of PUTTING THE
BORROWED MATERIALS
TOGETHER. That was done AUTOMATICALLY—by
your
mental
machinery, in strict accordance with the law of that machinery's construction.
And
you
not only did not make that machinery yourself, but
you have NOT EVEN ANY
COMMAND
OVER IT.
Y.M. This is too much. You think I could have formed no opinion but that one?
O.M. Spontaneously? No. And YOU DID NOT FORM THAT
ONE; your machinery did it for
you—automatically
and instantly, without reflection
or the need of it.
Y.M. Suppose I had reflected? How then?
O.M. Suppose you try?
Y.M. (AFTER A QUARTER OF AN HOUR.) I have reflected.
O.M. You mean you have tried to change your opinion—as an experiment?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. With success?
Y.M. No. It remains the same; it is impossible
to change it.
O.M. I am sorry, but you see, yourself, that your mind
is merely a machine, nothing more. You
have
no command over it,
it has no command over itself—it is worked SOLELY
FROM
THE OUTSIDE.
That is the law of its make; it is the law of all machines.
Y.M. Can't I EVER change one of these automatic opinions {paradigms,
world-view}?
O.M. No. You can't yourself, but random EXTERIOR INFLUENCES can do it. TEI:[47]
Y.M. And exterior ones ONLY?
O.M. Yes—exterior ones only.
Y.M. That position is untenable—I may say ludicrously untenable.
O.M. What makes you think so?
Y.M. I don't merely think it, I know it.
Suppose I resolve to enter upon a course of thought,
and
study,
and reading, with the deliberate purpose of changing that opinion;
and suppose I
succeed.
THAT is not the work of an exterior impulse, the whole
of it is mine and
personal; for
I originated the project.
O.M. Not a shred of it. IT GREW OUT OF THIS TALK
WITH ME. But for that it would
not
have
occurred to you. No man ever
originates anything. All his thoughts, all his impulses,
come
FROM THE OUTSIDE.
Y.M. It's an exasperating subject.
The FIRST man had original thoughts, anyway; there
was
nobody
to draw from.
O.M. It is a mistake. Adam's thoughts came to him
from the outside. YOU have a
fear of death.
You
did not invent that—you got it from outside, from talking and teaching.
Adam had no
fear
of death—none in the world.
Y.M. Yes, he had.
O.M. When he was created?
Y.M. No.
O.M. When, then?
Y.M. When he was threatened with it.
O.M. Then it came from OUTSIDE. Adam
is quite big enough; let us not try to make a god
of
him.
NONE BUT GODS HAVE EVER HAD A THOUGHT WHICH DID NOT
COME
FROM THE OUTSIDE.
Adam probably had a good head, but it was
of no sort of use to
him
until it was filled up FROM THE OUTSIDE. He
was not able to invent the triflingest
little
thing with it. He had not a shadow of a notion of the difference
between good and
evil—he
had to get the idea FROM THE OUTSIDE. Neither
he nor Eve was able to
originate
the idea that it was immodest to go naked; the knowledge came in with the
apple FROM
THE OUTSIDE. A man's brain is
so constructed that IT CAN ORIGINATE
NOTHING
WHATSOEVER. It can only use material
obtained OUTSIDE. It is merely a
machine;
and it works automatically, not by will-power. IT
HAS NO COMMAND OVER
ITSELF,
ITS OWNER HAS NO COMMAND OVER IT.
Y.M. Well, never mind Adam: but certainly Shakespeare's creations—
O.M. No, you mean Shakespeare's IMITATIONS. Shakespeare
created nothing. He correctly
observed,
and he marvelously painted. He
exactly portrayed people whom G-D had
created; but
he created none himself. Let
us spare him the slander of charging him with
trying.
Shakespeare could not create. HE
WAS A MACHINE, AND MACHINES DO NOT
CREATE.
Y.M. Where WAS his excellence, then?
O.M. In this. He
was not a sewing-machine, like you and me; he was a Gobelin loom. The
threads and
the colors came into him FROM THE OUTSIDE; outside
influences,
suggestions,
EXPERIENCES (reading, seeing plays, playing plays, borrowing ideas, and
so on),
framed the patterns in his mind and started up his
complex and admirable
machinery,
and IT AUTOMATICALLY turned out
that pictured and gorgeous fabric which
still compels
the astonishment of the world. If
Shakespeare had been born and bred on a
barren and
unvisited rock in the ocean his
mighty intellect would have had no OUTSIDE
MATERIAL
to work with, and could have invented none; and NO
OUTSIDE
INFLUENCES,
teachings, moldings, persuasions, inspirations, of
a valuable sort, and
could have
invented none; and so Shakespeare
would have produced nothing. In
Turkey
he would have
produced something—something up to
the highest limit of Turkish
influences,
associations, and training. In
France he would have produced something
better—something
up to the highest limit of the French influences and
training. In
England he
rose to the highest limit attainable through
the OUTSIDE HELPS
AFFORDED BY
THAT LAND'S IDEALS, INFLUENCES, AND
TRAINING. You and I are
but sewing-machines.
We must turn out what we can; we must do our endeavor
and care
nothing at
all when the unthinking reproach us for not turning out Gobelins.
Y.M. And so we are mere machines! And
machines may not boast, nor feel proud of their
performance, nor
claim personal merit for it, nor
applause and praise.
It is an infamous
doctrine.
O.M. It isn't a doctrine, it is merely a fact.
Y.M. I suppose, then, there is no more merit in being brave than in being a coward?
O.M. PERSONAL merit? No. A brave man does not CREATE
his bravery. He is entitled to
no
personal
credit for possessing it. It is born to him. A baby born with a billion
dollars—where
is the personal merit in that? A
baby born with nothing—where is the
personal demerit
in that? The one is fawned upon, admired, worshiped, by sycophants,
the other is neglected and despised— where is the sense in it?
Y.M. Sometimes a timid man sets himself the task
of conquering his cowardice and
becoming
brave—and
succeeds. What do you say to that?
O.M. That it shows the value
of TRAINING IN RIGHT DIRECTIONS OVER TRAINING IN
WRONG ONES.
Inestimably valuable is training,
influence, education, in right
directions—TRAINING
ONE'S SELF-APPROBATION TO ELEVATE ITS IDEALS.
Y.M. But as to merit—the personal merit of the victorious coward's project and achievement?
O.M. There isn't any. In the world's view he is
a worthier man than he was before, but HE
didn't achieve
the change—the merit of it is not his.
Y.M. Whose, then?
O.M. His MAKE, and the influences which wrought upon it from the outside.
Y.M. His make?
O.M. To start with, he was NOT utterly and completely
a coward, or the influences would
have had nothing
to work upon. He was not afraid
of a cow, though perhaps of a bull:
not afraid
of a woman, but afraid of a man. There
was something to build upon. There
was a
SEED. No seed, no plant. Did
he make that seed himself, or was it born in him? It
was no
merit of HIS that the seed was there.
Y.M. Well, anyway, the idea of CULTIVATING it,
the resolution to cultivate it, was meritorious,
and he originated
that.
O.M. He did nothing of the kind.
It came whence ALL impulses, good or bad, come—from
OUTSIDE.
If that timid man had lived all his life in a community
of human rabbits, had
never read of brave
deeds, had never heard speak
of them, had never heard any one
praise
them nor express envy of the heroes that had done them,
he would have had no
more idea of bravery
than Adam had of modesty, and
it could never by any possibility
have occurred to
him to RESOLVE to become brave. He
COULD NOT ORIGINATE THE
IDEA—it had to come
to him from the OUTSIDE. And
so, when he heard bravery extolled
and cowardice derided,
it woke him up. He was ashamed. Perhaps
his sweetheart turned
up her nose and said,
"I am told that you are a coward!" It
was not HE that turned over the
new leaf—she did
it for him. HE must not strut around in the merit of it—it is not his.
{Determinism,
Free Will, Free
Choice, Ridley:309.}
Y.M. But, anyway, he reared the plant after she watered the seed.
O.M. No. OUTSIDE
INFLUENCES reared it. At
the command— and trembling—he marched
out into the field—with
other soldiers and in the daytime, not alone and in the dark.
He
had the INFLUENCE
OF EXAMPLE, he drew courage from
his comrades' courage; he
was afraid, and wanted
to run, but he did not dare; he
was AFRAID to run, with all those
soldiers looking
on. He was progressing, you see—the
moral fear of shame had risen
superior to the physical
fear of harm. By the end of the
campaign experience will have
taught him that not
ALL who go into battle get hurt—an outside influence
which will be
helpful to him;
and he will also have learned how sweet it is to be
praised for courage and
be huzza'd at with
tear-choked voices as the war-worn
regiment marches past the
worshiping multitude
with flags flying and the drums
beating. After that he will be
as
securely brave as
any veteran in the army—and there will not be a
shade nor suggestion
of PERSONAL MERIT
in it anywhere; it will all have
come from the OUTSIDE. The
Victoria
Cross breeds more heroes than—
Y.M. Hang it, where is the sense in his becoming brave if he is to get no credit for it?
O.M. Your question will answer itself presently.
It involves an important detail of man's make
which we have
not yet touched upon.
Y.M. What detail is that?
O.M. The impulse which moves a person to do things—the
only impulse that ever moves a
person to do
a thing.
Y.M. The ONLY one! Is there but one?
O.M. That is all. There is only one.
Y.M. Well, certainly that is a strange enough doctrine. What is
the sole impulse that ever
moves a person
to do a thing?
O.M. The impulse {his
self-interest}
to CONTENT
HIS OWN SPIRIT —the NECESSITY of
contenting
his own spirit and WINNING ITS APPROVAL
{its peace-of-mind}.
Y.M. Oh, come, that won't do!
O.M. Why won't it?
Y.M. Because it puts him in the attitude of always
looking out for his own comfort and
advantage;
whereas an unselfish man often does a thing solely
for another person's
good when it
is a positive disadvantage to himself.
O.M. It is a mistake. The act must do HIM good, FIRST;
otherwise he will not
do it. He may
THINK he is
doing it solely for the other person's sake, but it is not so;
he is contenting
his own spirit
first—the other's person's benefit has to always take SECOND place.
Y.M. What a fantastic idea! What becomes of self-sacrifice? Please answer me that.
O.M. What is self-sacrifice?
Y.M. The doing good to another person where no
shadow nor suggestion of benefit to one's
self can result
from it.
{Scroll
down and continue for "Story of a Quarter."}
II. Man's
Sole Impulse—the Securing of His Own
Approval {Conatus}
{It is that which
he decides (as a computer
does), what best serves {his
self-interest}
to bring him
Peace of
Mind—Blessedness;
hence the enormous power of religion
or alcohol. If he loses
all hope and
is left with despair, he will contemplate
suicide.}
Old Man. There have been instances of it—you think?
Young Man. INSTANCES? Millions of them!
O.M. You have not jumped to conclusions? You have examined them—critically?
Y.M. They don't need it: the acts themselves reveal the golden impulse back of them.
O.M. For instance?
Y.M. Well, then, for instance. Take
the case in the book here. The man lives three miles
up-town.
It is bitter cold, snowing hard, midnight. He is about
to enter the horse-car when
a gray and
ragged old woman, a touching
picture of misery, puts out her lean hand and
begs
for rescue from hunger and death. The
man finds that he has a quarter in his
pocket, but
he does not hesitate: he gives it her and trudges home through the storm.
There—it
is noble, it is beautiful; its grace is marred by no fleck or blemish or
suggestion
of self-interest.
O.M. What makes you think that?
Y.M. Pray what else could I think? Do you imagine
that there is some other way of looking at
it?
O.M. Can you put yourself in the man's place and tell me what he felt and what he thought?
Y.M. Easily. The
sight of that suffering old face pierced his generous heart with a sharp
pain.
He could not
bear it. He could endure the
three-mile walk in the storm, but he could not
endure the
tortures his conscience would suffer if
he turned his back and left that poor
old creature
to perish. He would not have
been able to sleep, for thinking of it.
O.M. What was his state of mind on his way home?
Y.M. It was a state of joy which only the self-sacrificer
knows. His heart sang, he was
unconscious
of the storm.
O.M. He felt well?
Y.M. One cannot doubt it.
O.M. Very well. Now let
us add up the details and see how much he got for his twenty-five
cents.
Let us try to find out the REAL
why of his making the investment. In the first place
HE couldn't
bear the pain which the old suffering face gave him.
So he was thinking of
HIS pain—this
good man. He must buy a salve for it. If
he did not succor the old woman
HIS conscience
would torture him all the way home. Thinking
of HIS pain again. He must
buy relief
for that. If he didn't relieve
the old woman HE would not get any sleep. He
must
buy some sleep—still thinking of HIMSELF, you see.
Thus, to sum up, he bought
himself
free of a sharp pain in his heart, he
bought himself free of the tortures of a
waiting
conscience, he bought a whole night's sleep—all for twenty-five cents!
It should
make
Wall Street ashamed of itself.
On his way home his heart was joyful, and it
sang—profit
on top of profit! The impulse
which moved the man to succor the old woman
was—FIRST—to
CONTENT HIS OWN SPIRIT; secondly to relieve HER
sufferings. Is it
your
opinion that men's acts proceed from one central and
unchanging and inalterable
impulse,
or from a variety of impulses?
Y.M. From a variety, of course—some high and fine
and noble, others not. What is your
opinion?
O.M. Then there is but ONE law, one source.
Y.M. That both the noblest impulses and the basest proceed from that one source?
O.M. Yes.
Y.M. Will you put that law into words?
O.M. Yes. This is the law, keep it in your mind.
FROM HIS CRADLE TO HIS GRAVE A MAN
NEVER
DOES A SINGLE THING WHICH HAS ANY FIRST AND FOREMOST OBJECT
BUT
ONE—TO SECURE PEACE
OF MIND, SPIRITUAL COMFORT,
FOR HIMSELF.
{The
wherefore for Religion.}
Y.M. Come! He never does anything for any one else's comfort, spiritual or physical?
O.M. No. EXCEPT ON THOSE DISTINCT TERMS—that it
shall FIRST secure HIS OWN
spiritual
comfort. Otherwise he will not do it.
Y.M. It will be easy to expose the falsity of that proposition.
O.M. For instance?
Y.M. Take that noble passion, love of country,
patriotism. A man who loves peace
and dreads
pain,
leaves his pleasant home and his weeping family and
marches out to manfully
expose
himself to hunger, cold, wounds, and death. Is that seeking spiritual comfort?
O.M. He loves peace and dreads pain?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. Then perhaps there is something
that he loves MORE than he loves peace—THE
APPROVAL
OF HIS NEIGHBORS AND THE PUBLIC. And
perhaps there is something
which
he dreads more than he dreads pain—the DISAPPROVAL
of his neighbors and
the public.
If he is sensitive to shame he will go to the field—not
because his spirit will
be ENTIRELY
comfortable there, but because
it will be more comfortable there than it
would
be if he remained at home. He
will always do the thing which will bring him the
MOST
mental comfort—for that is THE SOLE LAW OF HIS LIFE.
He leaves the weeping
family
behind; he is sorry to make them uncomfortable, but
not sorry enough to sacrifice
his OWN
comfort to secure theirs.
Y.M. Do you really believe that mere public opinion could force a timid and peaceful man to—
O.M. Go to war? Yes—public opinion can force some men to do ANYTHING.
Y.M. ANYTHING?
O.M. Yes—anything.
Y.M. I don't believe that. Can it force a right-principled man to do a wrong thing?
O.M. Yes.
Y.M. Can it force a kind man to do a cruel thing?
O.M. Yes.
Y.M. Give an instance.
O.M. Alexander Hamilton was a conspicuously high-principled
man. He regarded dueling as
wrong,
and as opposed to the teachings of religion—but in
deference to PUBLIC
OPINION he
fought a duel. He deeply loved
his family, but to buy public approval he
treacherously
deserted them and threw his life away, ungenerously
leaving them to
lifelong sorrow
in order that he might stand well with a foolish world.
In the then condition
of the public
standards of honor he could not
have been comfortable with the stigma
upon him of
having refused to fight. The
teachings of religion,
his devotion to his family,
his kindness
of heart, his high principles, all
went for nothing when they stood in the way
of his spiritual
comfort. A man will do ANYTHING,
no matter what it is, TO SECURE HIS
SPIRITUAL
COMFORT; and he can neither
be forced nor persuaded to any act which
has not that
goal for its object. Hamilton's
act was compelled by the inborn necessity
of
contenting
his own spirit; in this it was
like all the other acts of his life, and like all the acts
of all men's
lives. Do you see where the kernel
of the matter lies? A man cannot be
comfortable
without HIS OWN approval. He
will secure the largest share possible of that,
at all costs,
all sacrifices.
Y.M. A minute ago you said Hamilton fought that duel to get PUBLIC approval.
O.M. I did. By
refusing to fight the duel he would have secured his family's approval
and a
large share
of his own; but the public approval
was more valuable in his eyes than all
other approvals
put together—in the earth or above it; to
secure that would furnish him
the MOST comfort
of mind, the most SELF-approval; so
he sacrificed all other values to
get it.
Y.M. Some noble souls have refused to fight duels,
and have manfully braved the public
contempt.
O.M. They acted ACCORDING TO THEIR MAKE.
They valued their principles and the
approval of
their families ABOVE the public approval. They
took the thing they valued
MOST and let
the rest go. They took what would
give them the LARGEST share of
PERSONAL CONTENTMENT
AND APPROVAL—a man ALWAYS does. Public
opinion
cannot force
that kind of men to go to the wars. When
they go it is for other reasons.
Other spirit-contenting
reasons.
Y.M. Always spirit-contenting reasons?
O.M. There are no others.
Y.M. When a man sacrifices his life to save a little
child from a burning building, what do you
call that?
O.M. When he does it, it is the law of HIS make.
HE can't bear to see the child in that peril (a
man of a different
make COULD), and so he tries to save the child, and loses his life.
But
he has got
what he was after—HIS OWN APPROVAL.
Y.M. What do you call Love, Hate,
Charity, Revenge,
Humanity, Magnanimity, Forgiveness?
O.M. Different results of the one Master
Impulse: the necessity of
securing one's self approval.
They wear diverse
clothes and are subject to diverse moods, but
in whatsoever ways
they masquerade
they are the SAME PERSON all the time. To
change the figure, the
COMPULSION
that moves a man—and there is but the one—is the necessity
of securing
the contentment
of his own spirit {peace
of mind}. When
it stops, the man is dead.
Y.M. That is foolishness. Love—
O.M. Why, love {need}
is that impulse, that law, in its most uncompromising
form. It will
squander life
and everything else on its object. Not
PRIMARILY for the object's sake,
but
for ITS OWN.
When its object is happy IT
is happy—and that is what it is unconsciously
after.
Y.M. You do not even except the lofty and gracious passion of mother-love?
O.M. No, IT is the absolute slave of that law.
The mother will go naked to clothe her child; she
will starve
that it may have food; suffer torture to save it from pain; die that it
may live.
She
takes a living PLEASURE in making these
sacrifices. SHE DOES IT FOR THAT
REWARD—{that
perpetuation},
that self-approval,
that contentment, that peace, that
comfort. SHE
WOULD DO IT FOR YOUR CHILD IF SHE COULD GET THE SAME PAY.
Y.M. This is an infernal philosophy of yours.
O.M. It isn't a philosophy, it is a fact.
Y.M. Of course you must admit that there are some acts which—
O.M. No. There is NO act, large or small, fine
or mean, which springs from any motive but the
one—the
necessity of appeasing and contenting one's own spirit.
Y.M. The world's philanthropists—
O.M. I honor them, I uncover my head to them—from
habit and training; and THEY
could not
know comfort
or happiness or self-approval if they did not work
and spend for the
unfortunate.
It makes THEM happy to see others happy;
and so with money and labor
they buy what
they are after—HAPPINESS, SELF-APPROVAL. Why
don't miners do the
same thing?
Because they can get a thousandfold more happiness by NOT doing it.
There
is no other reason. They follow the law of their make.
Y.M. What do you say of duty for
duty's sake?
O.M. That IS DOES NOT EXIST.
Duties are not performed for duty's SAKE, but because
their
NEGLECT would
make the man UNCOMFORTABLE. A
man performs but ONE
duty—the duty
of contenting his spirit, the duty of making himself agreeable to himself.
If
he can most
satisfyingly perform this sole and only duty by HELPING his neighbor,
he
will do it;
if he can most satisfyingly perform it by SWINDLING
his neighbor {sin},
he will
do it.
But he always looks out for Number One—FIRST;
the effects upon others are a
SECONDARY matter.
Men pretend to self-sacrifices {Altruism},
but this is a thing which, in
the ordinary
value of the phrase, DOES NOT EXIST
AND HAS NOT EXISTED. A man
often honestly
THINKS he is sacrificing himself merely and
solely for some one else, but
he is deceived;
his bottom impulse is to content a requirement of
his nature and training,
and thus acquire
peace for
his soul.
Y.M. Apparently, then, all men, both good and bad
ones, devote their lives to contenting their
consciences.
O.M. Yes. That is a good enough name for it:
Conscience— that independent Sovereign, that
insolent absolute
Monarch inside of a man who is the man's Master. There
are all kinds
of consciences,
because there are all kinds of men {or,
at times, different consciences in the same
man}.
You satisfy an assassin's conscience in one way,
a philanthropist's in another, a
miser's in
another, a burglar's in still another. As
a GUIDE or INCENTIVE to any
authoritatively
prescribed line of morals or conduct (leaving
TRAINING out of the
account), a
man's conscience is totally valueless. I
know a kind-hearted Kentuckian
whose self-approval
was lacking—whose conscience was troubling him, to
phrase it with exactness—BECAUSE
HE HAD NEGLECTED TO KILL A CERTAIN MAN—a man whom
he had never
seen. The stranger had killed
this man's friend in a fight, this man's
Kentucky training
made it a duty to kill the stranger for it. He
neglected his duty—kept
dodging it,
shirking it, putting it off, and
his unrelenting conscience kept persecuting him
for this conduct.
At last, to get ease {peace}
of mind, comfort, self-approval, he hunted up
the stranger
and took his life. It was an
immense act of SELF-SACRIFICE (as per the
usual definition),
for he did not want to do it, and he never would have
done it if he could
have bought
a contented spirit and an unworried mind at smaller cost.
But we are so
made that we
will pay ANYTHING for that contentment—even
another man's life.
Y.M. You spoke a moment ago of TRAINED
consciences. You mean that we are not BORN
with consciences
competent to guide us aright?
O.M. If we were, children and savages would know
right from wrong, and not have to be
taught it.
Y.M. But consciences can be TRAINED?
O.M. Yes.
Y.M. Of course by parents, teachers, the pulpit, and books.
O.M. Yes—they do their share; they do what they can.
Y.M. And the rest is done by—
O.M. Oh, a million unnoticed influences—for
good or bad: influences which work without rest
during every
waking moment of a man's life, from cradle to grave.
Y.M. You have tabulated these?
O.M. Many of them—yes.
Y.M. Will you read me the result?
O.M. Another time, yes. It would take an hour.
Y.M. A conscience can be trained to shun evil and prefer good?
O.M. Yes.
Y.M. But will it for spirit-contenting reasons only?
O.M. It CAN'T be trained to do a thing for any OTHER reason. The thing is impossible.
Y.M. There MUST be a genuinely and utterly self-sacrificing
act recorded in human history
somewhere.
O.M. You are young. You have many years before you. Search one out.
Y.M. It does seem to me that when a man sees a
fellow-being struggling in the water and
jumps in at
the risk of his life to save him—
O.M. Wait. Describe the MAN. Describe the FELLOW-BEING.
State if there is an AUDIENCE
present; or
if they are ALONE.
Y.M. What have these things to do with the splendid act?
O.M. Very much. Shall we suppose, as a beginning,
that the two are alone, in a solitary place,
at midnight?
Y.M. If you choose.
O.M. And that the fellow-being is the man's daughter?
Y.M. Well, n-no—make it someone else.
O.M. A filthy, drunken ruffian, then?
Y.M. I see. Circumstances alter cases. I suppose
that if there was no audience to observe the
act, the man
wouldn't perform it.
O.M. But there is here and there a man who WOULD.
People, for instance, like the man who
lost his life
trying to save the child from the fire; and
the man who gave the needy old
woman his twenty-five
cents and walked home in the storm—there are here
and there
men like that
who would do it. And why? Because
they couldn't BEAR to see a
fellow-being
struggling in the water and not jump in and help.
It would give THEM pain.
They would
save the fellow-being on that account. THEY
WOULDN'T DO IT
OTHERWISE.
They strictly obey the law which I have been insisting
upon. You must
remember and
always distinguish the people who
CAN'T BEAR things from people who
CAN.
It will throw light upon a number of apparently "self-sacrificing"
cases.
Y.M. Oh, dear, it's all so disgusting.
O.M. Yes. And so true.
Y.M. Come—take the good boy who does things he
doesn't want to do, in order to gratify his
mother.
O.M. He does seven-tenths of the act because it
gratifies HIM to gratify his mother. Throw
the
bulk of advantage
the other way and the good boy would not do the act.
He MUST obey
the iron law.
None can escape it.
Y.M. Well, take the case of a bad boy who—
O.M. You needn't mention it, it is a waste of time.
It is no matter about the bad boy's act.
Whatever it
was, he had a spirit-contenting reason for
it. Otherwise you have been
misinformed,
and he didn't do it.
Y.M. It is very exasperating.
A while ago you said that man's conscience is not
a born judge of
morals and
conduct, but has to be taught and trained. Now
I think a conscience can get
drowsy and
lazy, but I don't think it can go wrong; if you wake it up—
{Religion is an hypothesis designed to achieve PEACE-OF-MIND. When fleetingly achieved, it is called Bliss, Blessedness, Grace, Salvation, etc. Hampshire:206b, James:129, Anti-Semitism}
O.M. I will tell you a little story:
Once upon a time an Infidel was guest in the house of a Christian widow whose little boy was ill and near to death. The Infidel often watched by the bedside and entertained the boy with talk, and he used these opportunities to satisfy a strong longing in his nature—that desire which is in us all to better other people's condition by having them think as we think. He was successful. But the dying boy, in his last moments, reproached him and said:
"I BELIEVED, AND WAS HAPPY {HAD PEACE OF MIND} IN IT; YOU HAVE TAKEN MY BELIEF AWAY, AND MY COMFORT. NOW I HAVE NOTHING LEFT, AND I DIE MISERABLE; FOR THE THINGS WHICH YOU HAVE TOLD ME DO NOT TAKE THE PLACE OF THAT WHICH I HAVE LOST." {Religion has enormous power to bring Peace of Mind.}
And the mother, also, reproached the Infidel, and said:
"MY CHILD IS FOREVER LOST, AND MY HEART IS BROKEN. HOW COULD YOU DO THIS CRUEL THING? WE HAVE DONE YOU NO HARM, BUT ONLY KINDNESS; WE MADE OUR HOUSE YOUR HOME, YOU WERE WELCOME TO ALL WE HAD, AND THIS IS OUR REWARD."
The heart of the Infidel was filled with remorse for what he had done, and he said:
"IT WAS WRONG—I SEE IT NOW; BUT I WAS ONLY TRYING TO DO HIM GOOD. IN MY VIEW HE WAS IN ERROR; IT SEEMED MY DUTY TO TEACH HIM THE TRUTH."
Then the mother said:
"I HAD TAUGHT HIM, ALL HIS LITTLE LIFE, WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE THE TRUTH, AND IN HIS BELIEVING FAITH BOTH OF US WERE HAPPY {HAD PEACE OF MIND}. NOW HE IS DEAD,—AND LOST; AND I AM MISERABLE. OUR FAITH CAME DOWN TO US THROUGH CENTURIES OF BELIEVING ANCESTORS; WHAT RIGHT HAD YOU, OR ANY ONE, TO DISTURB IT? WHERE WAS YOUR HONOR, WHERE WAS YOUR SHAME?" {Anti-Semitism}
Y.M. He was a miscreant, and deserved death!
O.M. He thought so himself, and said so.
Y.M. Ah—you see, HIS CONSCIENCE WAS AWAKENED!
O.M. Yes, his Self-Disapproval was. It PAINED him
to see the mother suffer. He
was sorry he
had done a
thing which brought HIM pain. It
did not occur to him to think of the mother
when he was
misteaching the boy, for he was
absorbed in providing PLEASURE for
himself,
then. Providing it by satisfying what he believed
to be a call of duty.
Y.M. Call it what you please, it is to me a case
of AWAKENED CONSCIENCE. That
awakened conscience
could never get itself into that species of trouble again.
A cure like
that is a PERMANENT
cure.
O.M. Pardon—I had not finished the story.
We are creatures of OUTSIDE INFLUENCES—we
originate NOTHING
within. Whenever we take a new
line of thought and drift into a new
line of belief
and action, the impulse is ALWAYS suggested from the OUTSIDE.
Remorse
so preyed upon
the Infidel that it dissolved his harshness toward the boy's religion
and
made him come
to regard it with tolerance, next
with kindness, for the boy's sake and the
mother's.
Finally he found himself examining it.
From that moment his progress in his new
trend was steady
and rapid. He became a believing Christian. And
now his remorse for
having robbed
the dying boy of his faith and his salvation
was bitterer than ever. It gave
him no rest,
no peace. He MUST have rest and peace—it is the law of nature.
There
seemed but
one way to get it; he must devote himself to saving imperiled souls.
He
became a missionary.
He landed in a pagan country ill and helpless. A
native widow took
him into her
humble home and nursed him back to convalescence.
Then her young boy
was taken hopelessly
ill, and the grateful missionary helped her tend him.
Here was his
first opportunity
to repair a part of the wrong done to the other boy
by doing a precious
service for
this one by undermining his foolish
faith in his false gods. He was
successful.
But the dying
boy in his last moments reproached
him and said:
"I BELIEVED, AND WAS HAPPY {HAD PEACE OF MIND} IN IT; YOU HAVE TAKEN MY BELIEF AWAY, AND MY COMFORT. NOW I HAVE NOTHING LEFT, AND I DIE MISERABLE; FOR THE THINGS WHICH YOU HAVE TOLD ME DO NOT TAKE THE PLACE OF THAT WHICH I HAVE LOST."
And the mother, also, reproached the missionary, and said:
"MY CHILD IS FOREVER LOST, AND MY HEART IS BROKEN. HOW COULD YOU DO THIS CRUEL THING? WE HAD DONE YOU NO HARM, BUT ONLY KINDNESS; WE MADE OUR HOUSE YOUR HOME, YOU WERE WELCOME TO ALL WE HAD, AND THIS IS OUR REWARD."
The heart of the missionary was filled with remorse for what he had done, and he said:
"IT WAS WRONG—I SEE IT NOW; BUT I WAS ONLY TRYING TO DO HIM GOOD. IN MY VIEW HE WAS IN ERROR; IT SEEMED MY DUTY TO TEACH HIM THE TRUTH."
Then the mother said:
"I HAD TAUGHT HIM, ALL HIS LITTLE LIFE, WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE THE TRUTH, AND IN HIS BELIEVING FAITH BOTH OF US WERE HAPPY {HAD PEACE OF MIND}. NOW HE IS DEAD—AND LOST; AND I AM MISERABLE. OUR FAITH CAME DOWN TO US THROUGH CENTURIES OF BELIEVING ANCESTORS; WHAT RIGHT HAD YOU, OR ANY ONE, TO DISTURB IT? WHERE WAS YOUR HONOR, WHERE WAS YOUR SHAME?" {Anti-Semitism}
The missionary's anguish of remorse and sense of treachery were as bitter and persecuting and unappeasable, now, as they had been in the former case. The story is finished. What is your comment?
Y.M. The man's conscience is a fool! It was morbid. It didn't know right from wrong.
O.M. I am not sorry to hear you say that.
If you grant that ONE man's conscience doesn't know
right from
wrong, it is an admission that there are others like it.
This single admission
pulls down
the whole doctrine of infallibility of judgment in consciences.
Meantime there
is one thing
which I ask you to notice.
Y.M. What is that?
O.M. That in both cases the man's ACT gave him no
spiritual discomfort, and that
he was quite
satisfied with
it and got pleasure out of it. But
afterward when it resulted in PAIN to HIM,
he was sorry.
Sorry it had inflicted pain upon the others, BUT FOR
NO REASON
UNDER THE SUN
EXCEPT THAT THEIR PAIN GAVE HIM PAIN. Our
consciences take
NO notice of
pain inflicted upon others until it reaches a point where it gives pain
to US.
In
ALL cases without exception we
are absolutely indifferent to another person's pain
until his sufferings
make us uncomfortable. Many an
infidel would not have been troubled
by that Christian
mother's distress. Don't you believe that?
Y.M. Yes. You might almost say it of the AVERAGE infidel, I think.
O.M. And many a missionary, sternly fortified by his sense
of duty, would not have been
troubled by
the pagan mother's distress—Jesuit missionaries in Canada
in the early
French times, for
instance; see episodes quoted by Parkman.
Y.M. Well, let us adjourn. Where have we arrived?
O.M. At this. That we (mankind)
have ticketed ourselves with a number of qualities to which
we have given
misleading names. Love,
Hate, Charity, Compassion, Avarice,
Benevolence,
and so on. I mean we attach misleading
MEANINGS to the names. They
are all forms
of self-contentment, self-gratification {An
unfaced truth},
but the names so
disguise
them that they distract our attention from the fact.
Also we have smuggled a
word into the
dictionary which ought not to be there at all—Self-Sacrifice {Altruism}.
It
describes a
thing which does not exist. But worst of all, we
ignore and never mention the
Sole
Impulse which dictates and compels a man's every act:
the imperious necessity of
securing his
own approval, in every emergency and at all costs.
To it we owe all that we
are.
It is our breath, our heart, our blood.
It is our only spur, our whip, our goad, our only
impelling power;
we have no other. Without it
we should be mere inert images, corpses;
no one would
do anything, there would be no
progress, the world would stand still. We
ought to stand
reverently uncovered when the name of that stupendous
power is uttered.
Y.M. I am not convinced.
O.M. You will be when you think.
III. Instances in
Point:
Old Man. Have you given thought to the Gospel of Self-Approval since we talked?
Young Man. I have.
O.M. It was I that moved you to it. That is to say
an OUTSIDE INFLUENCE moved you to
it—not one
that originated in your head. Will you try to keep that in mind and not
forget it?
Y.M. Yes. Why?
O.M. Because by and by in one of our talks,
I wish to further impress upon you that neither
you, nor I,
nor any man ever originates a thought in his own head.
THE UTTERER OF A
THOUGHT ALWAYS
UTTERS A SECOND-HAND ONE.
Y.M. Oh, now—
O.M. Wait. Reserve
your remark till we get to that part of our discussion—tomorrow or next
day, say.
Now, then, have you been considering the proposition
that no act is ever born
of any but
a self-contenting impulse—(primarily). You
have sought. What have you
found?
Y.M. I have not been very fortunate. I have examined
many fine and apparently self-sacrificing
deeds in romances
and biographies, but—
O.M. Under searching analysis the ostensible self-sacrifice disappeared? It naturally would.
Y.M. But here in this novel is one which seems
to promise. In the Adirondack
woods is a
wage-earner
and lay preacher in the lumber-camps who
is of noble character and deeply
religious.
An earnest and practical laborer in the New York slums
comes up there on
vacation—he
is leader of a section of the University Settlement.
Holme, the lumberman,
is fired with
a desire to throw away his excellent worldly prospects
and go down and save
souls on the
East Side. He counts it happiness
to make this sacrifice for the glory of God
and for the
cause of Christ.
He resigns his place, makes the sacrifice cheerfully,
and
goes to the
East Side and preaches Christ and Him crucified every day and every night
to
little groups of half-civilized foreign paupers who scoff at him.
But he rejoices in the
scoffings,
since he is suffering them in the great cause of Christ.
You have so filled my
mind with suspicions
that I was constantly expecting to
find a hidden questionable
impulse back
of all this, but I am thankful
to say I have failed. This man
saw his duty, and
for DUTY'S
SAKE he sacrificed self and assumed the burden it imposed.
O.M. Is that as far as you have read?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. Let us read further, presently. Meantime,
in sacrificing himself—NOT for the glory of
G-D, PRIMARILY, as
HE imagined, but FIRST to content
that exacting and inflexible
master
within him—DID HE SACRIFICE ANYBODY ELSE?
Y.M. How do you mean?
O.M. He relinquished a lucrative post and got mere
food and lodging in place of it. Had he
dependents?
Y.M. Well—yes.
O.M. In what way and to what extend did his self-sacrifice affect THEM?
Y.M. He was the support of a superannuated father.
He had a young sister with a remarkable
voice—he was
giving her a musical education, so
that her longing to be self-supporting
might be gratified.
He was furnishing the money to put a young brother
through a
polytechnic
school and satisfy his desire to become a civil engineer.
O.M. The old father's comforts were now curtailed?
Y.M. Quite seriously. Yes.
O.M. The sister's music-lessens had to stop?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. The young brother's education—well, an extinguishing
blight fell upon that happy dream,
and he had
to go to sawing wood to support the old father, or something like that?
Y.M. It is about what happened. Yes.
O.M. What a handsome job of self-sacrificing he
did do! It seems to me that he
sacrificed
everybody EXCEPT
himself. Haven't I told you that
no man EVER sacrifices himself; that
there is no
instance of it upon record anywhere; and
that when a man's Interior Monarch
requires a
thing of its slave for either its MOMENTARY or its PERMANENT contentment,
that thing
must and will be furnished and that command obeyed,
no matter who may
stand in the
way and suffer disaster by it? That
man RUINED HIS FAMILY to please and
content his
Interior Monarch—
Y.M. And help Christ's cause.
O.M. Yes—SECONDLY. Not firstly. HE thought it was firstly.
Y.M. Very well, have it so, if you will. But it
could be that he argued that if he saved a hundred
souls in New
York—
O.M. The sacrifice of the FAMILY would be justified
by that great profit upon the—the—what
shall we call
it?
Y.M. Investment?
O.M. Hardly. How would SPECULATION do?
How would GAMBLE do? Not a solitary
soul-capture
was sure. He played for a possible
thirty-three-hundred-per-cent profit. It
was GAMBLING—
with his family for "chips." However
let us see how the game came
out. Maybe
we can get on the track of the secret original impulse, the REAL impulse,
that
moved him to
so nobly self-sacrifice his family in the Savior's cause
under the
superstition
that he was sacrificing himself. I
will read a chapter or so. . . . Here we have
it!
It was bound to expose itself sooner or later.
He preached to the East-Side rabble a
season, then
went back to his old dull, obscure
life in the lumber-camps "HURT TO THE
HEART, HIS
PRIDE HUMBLED." Why? Were
not his efforts acceptable to the Savior, for
Whom alone
they were made? Dear me, that
detail is LOST SIGHT OF, is not even
referred to,
the fact that it started out as a motive is entirely
forgotten! Then what is the
trouble?
The authoress quite innocently and unconsciously gives
the whole business
away.
The trouble was this: this man merely PREACHED to
the poor; that is not the
University
Settlement's way; it deals in
larger and better things than that, and it did not
enthuse over
that crude Salvation-Army eloquence. It
was courteous to Holme—but cool.
It did not
pet him, did not take him to its bosom. "PERISHED
WERE ALL HIS DREAMS
OF DISTINCTION,
THE PRAISE AND GRATEFUL APPROVAL—" Of whom? The
Savior? No;
the Savior is not mentioned. Of whom, then? Of "His FELLOW-WORKERS."
Why
did he want that? Because the
Master inside of him wanted it, and would not be
content without
it. That emphasized sentence
quoted above, reveals the secret we have
been seeking,
the original impulse, the REAL impulse,
which moved the obscure and
unappreciated
Adirondack lumberman to sacrifice his family and
go on that crusade to
the East Side—which
said original impulse was this, to
wit: without knowing it HE WENT
THERE TO SHOW
A NEGLECTED WORLD THE LARGE TALENT
THAT WAS IN HIM,
AND RISE TO
DISTINCTION. As I have warned
you before, NO act springs from any but
the one law,
the one motive. But I pray you,
do not accept this law upon my say-so; but
diligently
examine for yourself. Whenever
you read of a self-sacrificing act or hear of one,
or of a duty
done for DUTY'S SAKE,
take it to pieces and look for the REAL motive. It
is
always there.
Y.M. I do it every day. I
cannot help it, now that I have gotten started upon the degrading and
exasperating
quest. For it is hatefully
interesting!—in fact, fascinating is the word. As
soon as I come
across a golden deed in a book I
have to stop and take it apart and
examine it,
I cannot help myself.
O.M. Have you ever found one that defeated the rule?
Y.M. No—at least, not yet.
But take the case of servant-tipping in Europe. You
pay the
HOTEL for service;
you owe the servants NOTHING, yet
you pay them besides. Doesn't
that defeat
it?
O.M. In what way?
Y.M. You are not OBLIGED to do it, therefore its
source is compassion for their ill-paid
condition,
and—
O.M. Has that custom ever vexed you, annoyed you, irritated you?
Y.M. Well, yes.
O.M. Still you succumbed to it?
Y.M. Of course.
O.M. Why of course?
Y.M. Well, custom is law, in a way, and laws must
be submitted to—everybody recognizes it
as a DUTY.
O.M. Then you pay for the irritating tax for DUTY'S sake?
Y.M. I suppose it amounts to that.
O.M. Then the impulse which moves you to submit
to the tax is not ALL compassion, charity,
benevolence?
Y.M. Well—perhaps not.
O.M. Is ANY of it?
Y.M. I—perhaps I was too hasty in locating its source.
O.M. Perhaps so. In case you ignored the custom
would you get prompt and effective service
from the servants?
Y.M. Oh, hear yourself talk! Those European servants?
Why, you wouldn't get any of all, to
speak of.
O.M. Couldn't THAT work as an impulse to move you to pay the tax?
Y.M. I am not denying it.
O.M. Apparently, then, it is a case of for-duty's-sake with a little self-interest added?
Y.M. Yes, it has the look of it.
But here is a point: we pay that tax knowing it to
be unjust and
an extortion;
yet we go away with a pain at the heart if we think
we have been stingy with
the poor fellows;
and we heartily wish we were back again, so that we
could do the right
thing, and
MORE than the right thing, the GENEROUS thing. I
think it will be difficult for
you to find
any thought of self in that impulse.
O.M. I wonder why you should think so. When you
find service charged in the HOTEL bill
does it annoy
you?
Y.M. No.
O.M. Do you ever complain of the amount of it?
Y.M. No, it would not occur to me.
O.M. The EXPENSE, then, is not the annoying detail.
It is a fixed charge, and you pay it
cheerfully,
you pay it without a murmur. When
you came to pay the servants, how would
you like it
if each of the men and maids had a fixed charge?
Y.M. Like it? I should rejoice!
O.M. Even if the fixed tax were a shade MORE than
you had been in the habit of paying in the
form of tips?
Y.M. Indeed, yes!
O.M. Very well, then. As
I understand it, it isn't really compassion nor yet duty that moves you
to pay the
tax, and it isn't the AMOUNT of the tax that annoys you.
Yet SOMETHING
annoys you.
What is it?
Y.M. Well, the trouble is, you never know WHAT to pay, the tax varies so, all over Europe.
O.M. So you have to guess?
Y.M. There is no other way.
So you go on thinking and thinking, and calculating
and guessing,
and consulting
with other people and getting their views; and
it spoils your sleep nights,
and makes you
distraught in the daytime, and
while you are pretending to look at the
sights you
are only guessing and guessing and guessing all the time,
and being worried
and miserable.
O.M. And all about a debt which you don't owe and
don't have to pay unless you want to!
Strange. What
is the purpose of the guessing?
Y.M. To guess out what is right to give them, and not be unfair to any of them.
O.M. It has quite a noble look—taking so much pains
and using up so much valuable time in
order to be
just and fair to a poor servant to whom you owe nothing,
but who needs
money and is
ill paid.
Y.M. I think, myself, that if there is any ungracious motive back of it it will be hard to find.
O.M. How do you know when you have not paid a servant fairly?
Y.M. Why, he is silent; does not thank you.
Sometimes he gives you a look that makes you
ashamed.
You are too proud to rectify your mistake there, with
people looking, but
afterward you
keep on wishing and wishing you HAD done it. My,
the shame and the
pain of it!
Sometimes you see, by the signs, that you have it JUST RIGHT,
and you go
away mightily
satisfied. Sometimes the man
is so effusively thankful that you know you
have given
him a good deal MORE than was necessary.
O.M. NECESSARY? Necessary for what?
Y.M. To content him.
O.M. How do you feel THEN?
Y.M. Repentant.
O.M. It is my belief that
you have NOT been concerning yourself in guessing out his just dues,
but only in
ciphering out what would CONTENT him. And
I think you have a self-deluding
reason for
that.
Y.M. What was it?
O.M. If you fell short of what he was expecting
and wanting, you would get a
look which would
SHAME YOU BEFORE
FOLK. That would give you PAIN.
YOU—for you are only
working for
yourself, not HIM. If you gave
him too much you would be ASHAMED OF
YOURSELF for
it, and that would give YOU pain—another
case of thinking of
YOURSELF,
protecting yourself, SAVING YOURSELF FROM DISCOMFORT.
You
never think
of the servant once—except to guess out how to get HIS APPROVAL.
If you
get that, you
get your OWN approval, and that is the sole and only thing you are after.
The
Master inside of you is then satisfied, contented, comfortable;
there was NO OTHER
thing at stake,
as a matter of FIRST interest, anywhere in the transaction.
Y.M. Well, to think of it; Self-Sacrifice
for others, the grandest thing in man, ruled out!
non-existent!
O.M. Are you accusing me of saying that?
Y.M. Why, certainly.
O.M. I haven't said it.
Y.M. What did you say, then?
O.M. That no man has ever sacrificed himself
in the common meaning of that phrase—which
is, self-sacrifice
for another ALONE. Men make daily
sacrifices for others, but it is for
their own sake
FIRST. The act must content their
own spirit FIRST. The other
beneficiaries
come second.
Y.M. And the same with duty for
duty's sake?
O.M. Yes. No man performs a duty for mere duty's
sake; the act must content his spirit FIRST.
He must feel
better for DOING the duty than he would for shirking it.
Otherwise he will
not do it.
Y.M. Take the case of the BERKELEY CASTLE.
O.M. It was a noble duty, greatly performed. Take it to pieces and examine it, if you like.
Y.M. A British troop-ship crowded with soldiers
and their wives and children. She
struck a rock
and began to
sink. There was room in the boats
for the women and children only. The
colonel lined
up his regiment on the deck and said "it
is our duty to die, that they may be
saved."
There was no murmur, no protest.
The boats carried away the women and
children. When
the death-moment was come, the
colonel and his officers took their
several posts,
the men stood at shoulder-arms, and so, as on dress-parade,
with their
flag flying
and the drums beating, they went down, a sacrifice to duty for duty's sake.
Can
you view it
as other than that?
O.M. It was something as fine as that, as exalted
as that. Could you have remained in those
ranks and gone
down to your death in that unflinching way?
Y.M. Could I? No, I could not.
O.M. Think. Imagine yourself there, with that watery
doom creeping higher and higher around
you.
Y.M. I can imagine it. I feel all the horror of
it. I could not have endured it, I could not have
remained in
my place. I know it.
O.M. Why?
Y.M. There is no why about it: I know myself, and I know I couldn't DO it.
O.M. But it would be your DUTY to do it.
Y.M. Yes, I know—but I couldn't.
O.M. It was more than thousand men, yet not one
of them flinched. Some of them
must have
been born with
your temperament; if
they could do that great duty for duty's SAKE, why
not you?
Don't you know that you could go out and gather together
a thousand clerks
and mechanics
and put them on that deck and ask them to die for duty's sake,
and not
two dozen of
them would stay in the ranks to the end?
Y.M. Yes, I know that.
O.M. But you TRAIN them, and put them through a
campaign or two; then they would
be
soldiers; soldiers,
with a soldier's pride, a soldier's self-respect, a soldier's ideals.
They
would have
to content a SOLDIER'S spirit then, not a clerk's, not a mechanic's.
They
could not content
that spirit by shirking a soldier's duty, could they?
Y.M. I suppose not.
O.M. Then they would do the duty not for the DUTY'S
sake, but for their OWN sake—primarily.
The DUTY was
JUST THE SAME, and just as imperative,
when they were clerks,
mechanics,
raw recruits, but they wouldn't perform it for that.
As clerks and mechanics
they had other
ideals, another spirit to satisfy, and they satisfied it.
They HAD to; it is the
law. TRAINING
is potent. Training toward higher
and higher, and ever higher ideals is
worth any man's
thought and labor and diligence.
Y.M. Consider the man who stands by his duty and
goes to the stake rather than be recreant
to it.
O.M. It is his make and his training.
He has to content the spirit that is in him, though
it cost
him his life.
Another man, just as sincerely religious, but of different
temperament, will fail
of that duty,
though recognizing it as a duty, and grieving to be unequal to it:
but he must
content the
spirit that is in him—he cannot help it. He
could not perform that duty for
duty's SAKE,
for that would not content his spirit, and
the contenting of his spirit must be
looked to FIRST.
It takes precedence of all other duties.
Y.M. Take the case of a clergyman of stainless
private morals who votes for a thief for public
office, on
his own party's ticket, and against an honest man on the other ticket.
O.M. He has to content his spirit. He has no public
morals; he has no private ones, where his
party's prosperity
is at stake. He will always be
true to his make and training.
IV. Training:
{Reprograms
the Data Base}
Young Man. You keep using that word—training. By it do you particularly mean—
Old Man. Study, instruction,
lectures, sermons? That is a
part of it—but not a large part.
I mean ALL
the outside influences.
There are a million of them. From the cradle to the
grave, during
all his waking hours, the human being is under training.
In the very first
rank of his
trainers stands ASSOCIATION. It
is his human environment which influences
his mind and
his feelings, furnishes him his ideals, and
sets him on his road and keeps
him in it.
If he leave that road he will find himself shunned
by the people whom he most
loves
and esteems, and whose approval
he most values. He is a chameleon;
by the
law of his
nature he takes the color of his place of resort.
The influences about him
create his
preferences, his aversions, his politics, his tastes, his morals, his religion.
He
creates none
of these things for himself. He
THINKS he does, but that is because he has
not examined
into the matter. You have seen
Presbyterians?
Y.M. Many.
O.M. How did they happen to be Presbyterians and
not Congregationalists? And why
were
the Congregationalists
not Baptists, and the Baptists
Roman Catholics, and the Roman
Catholics Buddhists,
and the Buddhists Quakers, and the Quakers Episcopalians,
and
the Episcopalians
Millerites and the Millerites Hindus, and
the Hindus Atheists, and the
Atheists Spiritualists,
and the Spiritualists Agnostics, and
the Agnostics Methodists, and
the Methodists
Confucians, and the Confucians Unitarians, and
the Unitarians
Mohammedans,
and the Mohammedans Salvation Warriors, and
the Salvation Warriors
Zoroastrians,
and the Zoroastrians Christian Scientists, and
the Christian Scientists
Mormons—and
so on? {All
these are properties of a Religion; not the essence of religion.
The essence,
common
to all these Religions, is the hope it brings peace of mind.}
Y.M. You may answer your question yourself.
O.M. That list of sects is not a record of STUDIES,
searchings, seekings after light; it
mainly
(and sarcastically)
indicates what ASSOCIATION can do. If
you know a man's nationality
you can come
within a split hair of guessing the complexion of his religion:
English—Protestant;
American— ditto; Spaniard, Frenchman,
Irishman, Italian, South
American— Roman
Catholic; Russian—Greek Catholic; Turk—Mohammedan; and so on.
And when you
know the man's religious complexion, you
know what sort of religious
books he reads
when he wants some more light, and
what sort of books he avoids, lest
by accident
he get more light than he wants. In
America if you know which party-collar a
voter wears,
you know what his associations are, and how he came
by his politics, and
which breed
of newspaper he reads to get light, and which breed he diligently avoids,
and
which breed of mass-meetings he attends in
order to broaden his political
knowledge,
and which breed of mass-meetings he doesn't attend,
except to refute its
doctrines with
brickbats. We are always hearing
of people who are around SEEKING
AFTER TRUTH.
I have never seen a (permanent) specimen. I think
he had never lived.
But
I have seen several entirely sincere people who
THOUGHT they were (permanent)
Seekers after
Truth. They sought diligently,
persistently, carefully, cautiously, profoundly,
with perfect
honesty and nicely adjusted judgment—until they believed
that without doubt
or question
they had found the Truth. THAT
WAS THE END OF THE SEARCH. The
man spent the
rest of his life hunting up shingles wherewith
to protect his Truth from the
weather. If
he was seeking after political Truth he
found it in one or another of the
hundred political
gospels which govern men in the earth; if
he was seeking after the Only
True
Religion he found it in one or another of the three thousand that are
on the market.
In
any case, when he found the Truth
HE SOUGHT NO FURTHER; but from
that day
forth, with
his soldering-iron in one hand and his bludgeon in
the other he tinkered its
leaks and reasoned
with objectors. There have been
innumerable Temporary Seekers of
Truth—have
you ever heard of a permanent one? In
the very nature of man such a
person is impossible.
However, to drop back to the text— training: all training
is one from
or another
of OUTSIDE INFLUENCE, and ASSOCIATION
is the largest part of it. A
man
is never anything
but what his outside influences have made him. They
train him
downward or
they train him upward—but they TRAIN him; they
are at work upon him all
the time.
Y.M. Then if he happen by the accidents of life to be evilly placed
there is no help for him,
according to
your notions—he must train downward.
O.M. No help for him? No help for this chameleon?
It is a mistake. It is in his chameleonship
that his greatest
good fortune lies. He has only
to change his habitat—his
ASSOCIATIONS.
But the impulse to do it must come from the OUTSIDE—he
cannot
originate it
himself, with that purpose in
view. Sometimes a very small
and accidental
thing can furnish
him the initiatory impulse and start him on a new road, with a new idea.
The
chance remark of a sweetheart, "I
hear that you are a coward," may
water a seed
that shall
sprout and bloom and flourish, and
ended in producing a surprising fruitage—in
the fields
of war. The history of man is
full of such accidents. The accident
of a broken
leg brought
a profane and ribald soldier under religious influences
and furnished him a
new ideal.
From that accident sprang the Order of the Jesuits,
and it has been shaking
thrones,
changing policies, and doing other tremendous work
for two hundred
years—and will
go on. The chance reading of
a book or of a paragraph in a newspaper
can start a
man on a new track and make him
renounce his old associations and seek
new ones that
are IN SYMPATHY WITH HIS NEW IDEAL: and
the result, for that man,
can be an entire
change of his way of life.
Y.M. Are you hinting at a scheme of procedure?
O.M. Not a new one—an old one. One as mankind.
Y.M. What is it?
O.M. Merely the laying of traps for people.
Traps baited with INITIATORY IMPULSES
TOWARD HIGH
IDEALS. It is what the tract-distributor does. It
is what the missionary
does. It is
what governments ought to do.
Y.M. Don't they?
O.M. In one way they do, in another they don't.
They separate the smallpox patients from the
healthy people,
but in dealing with crime they put the healthy into
the pest-house along
with the sick.
That is to say, they put the beginners in with the
confirmed criminals. This
would be well
if man were naturally inclined to good, but
he isn't, and so ASSOCIATION
makes the beginners
worse than they were when they went into captivity.
It is putting a
very severe
punishment upon the comparatively innocent at times.
They hang a
man—which is
a trifling punishment; this breaks
the hearts of his family—which is a
heavy one.
They comfortably jail and feed a wife-beater, and
leave his innocent wife and
family to starve.
Y.M. Do you believe in the doctrine that man is equipped with an
intuitive perception of good
and
evil?
O.M. Adam hadn't it.
Y.M. But has man acquired it since?
O.M. No. I think he has no intuitions
{not
based on impressions} of
any kind. He gets ALL his ideas,
all his impressions,
from the outside. I keep repeating
this, in the hope that I may impress
it upon you
that you will be interested to observe and examine for yourself
and see
whether it
is true or false.
Y.M. Where did you get your own aggravating notions?
O.M. From the OUTSIDE. I did not invent them. They
are gathered from a thousand unknown
sources. Mainly
UNCONSCIOUSLY gathered.
Y.M. Don't you believe that God could make an inherently honest man?
O.M. Yes, I know He could. I also know that He never did make one.
Y.M. A wiser observer than you has recorded the
fact that "an honest man's the noblest work
of God."
O.M. He didn't record a fact, he recorded a falsity.
It is windy, and sounds well, but it is not
true.
G-D makes a
man with honest and dishonest POSSIBILITIES in him and stops
there. The
man's ASSOCIATIONS develop the possibilities—the one set or the other.
The
result is accordingly an honest man or a dishonest one.
Y.M. And the honest one is not entitled to—
O.M. Praise? No. How often must I tell you that? HE is not the architect of his honesty.
Y.M. Now then, I will ask you where there is any
sense in training people to lead virtuous lives.
What is gained
by it?
O.M. The man himself gets large
advantages out of it, and
that is the main thing—to HIM. He
is not a peril
to his neighbors, he is not a
damage to them—and so THEY get an
advantage out
of his virtues. That is the main thing to THEM. It
can make this life
comparatively
comfortable to the parties concerned;
the NEGLECT of this training can
make this life
a constant peril and distress to the parties concerned. {Organic,
Morality.}.
Y.M. You have said that training is everything;
that training is the man HIMSELF, for it makes
him what he
is.
O.M. I said training and ANOTHER
thing. Let that other thing pass, for the moment. What were
you going to
say?
Y.M. We have an old servant.
She has been with us twenty- two years. Her service
used to be
faultless,
but now she has become very forgetful. We
are all fond of her; we all recognize
that she cannot
help the infirmity which age has brought her; the
rest of the family do not
scold her for
her remissnesses, but at times
I do—I can't seem to control myself. Don't I
try?
I do try. Now, then, when I was ready to dress, this
morning, no clean clothes had
been put out.
I lost my temper; I lose it easiest and quickest in
the early morning. I rang;
and immediately
began to warn myself not to show temper, and
to be careful and speak
gently.
I safe-guarded myself most carefully.
I even chose the very word I would use:
"You've
forgotten the clean clothes, Jane." When
she appeared in the door I opened my
mouth to say
that phrase—and out of it, moved by an instant surge of passion
which I
was not expecting
and hadn't time to put under control, came the hot rebuke,
"You've
forgotten them
again!" You say a man always
does the thing which will best please his
Interior Master.
Whence came the impulse to make careful preparation
to save the girl
the humiliation
of a rebuke? Did that come from
the Master, who is always primarily
concerned about
HIMSELF?
O.M. Unquestionably. There is no other source for
any impulse. SECONDARILY you
made
preparation
to save the girl, but PRIMARILY
its object was to save yourself, by contenting
the Master.
Y.M. How do you mean?
O.M. Has any member of the family ever implored
you to watch your temper and not fly out at
the girl?
Y.M. Yes. My mother.
O.M. You love her?
Y.M. Oh, more than that!
O.M. You would always do anything in your power to please her?
Y.M. It is a delight to me to do anything to please her!
O.M. Why? YOU WOULD DO IT FOR PAY, SOLELY—for PROFIT.
What profit would you
expect and
certainly receive from the investment?
Y.M. Personally? None. To please HER is enough.
O.M. It appears, then, that your object, primarily,
WASN'T to save the girl a humiliation, but to
PLEASE YOUR
MOTHER. It also appears that
to please your mother gives YOU a
strong pleasure.
Is not that the profit which you get out of the investment?
Isn't that the
REAL profits
and FIRST profit?
Y.M. Oh, well? Go on.
O.M. In ALL transactions, the Interior Master
looks to it that YOU GET THE FIRST PROFIT.
Otherwise there
is no transaction.
Y.M. Well, then, if I was so anxious to get that
profit and so intent upon it, why did I threw it
away by losing
my temper?
O.M. In order to get ANOTHER profit which suddenly superseded it in value. {Waves}
Y.M. Where was it?
O.M. Ambushed behind your born temperament,
and waiting for a chance. Your
native warm
temper suddenly
jumped to the front, and FOR
THE MOMENT its influence was more
powerful than
your mother's, and abolished it. In
that instance you were eager to flash
out a hot rebuke
and enjoy it. You did enjoy it, didn't you?
Y.M. For—for a quarter of a second. Yes—I did.
O.M. Very well, it is as I have said: the thing
which will give you the MOST pleasure, the
most
satisfaction,
in any moment or FRACTION of a moment, is the thing you will always do.
You
must content the Master's LATEST whim, whatever it may be.
Y.M. But when the tears came into the old servant's
eyes I could have cut my hand off for what
I had done.
O.M. Right. You
had humiliated YOURSELF, you see, you had given yourself PAIN. Nothing
is of FIRST
importance to a man except results
which damage HIM or profit him—all
the
rest is SECONDARY.
Your Master was displeased with you, although you
had obeyed
him. He required
a prompt REPENTANCE; you obeyed
again; you HAD to—there is
never any escape
from his commands. He is a hard
master and fickle; he changes his
mind in the
fraction of a second, but you
must be ready to obey, and you will obey,
ALWAYS.
If he requires repentance, you content him, you will
always furnish it. He must
be nursed,
petted, coddled, and kept contented, let the terms be what they may.
Y.M. Training! Oh, what's the use of it? Didn't
I, and didn't my mother try to train me up to
where I would
no longer fly out at that girl?
O.M. Have you never managed to keep back a scolding?
Y.M. Oh, certainly—many times.
O.M. More times this year than last?
Y.M. Yes, a good many more.
O.M. More times last year than the year before?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. There is a large improvement, then, in the two years?
Y.M. Yes, undoubtedly.
O.M. Then your question is answered. You see there
IS use in training. Keep on. Keeping
faithfully
on. You are doing well.
Y.M. Will my reform reach perfection?
O.M. It will. UP to YOUR limit.
Y.M. My limit? What do you mean by that?
O.M. You remember that you said that I said training was EVERYTHING.
I corrected you, and
said "training
and ANOTHER thing." That
other thing is TEMPERAMENT—that
is, the
disposition
you were born with. YOU
CAN'T ERADICATE YOUR DISPOSITION NOR
ANY RAG OF
IT—you can only put a pressure on it and keep it down and quiet.
You
have a warm
temper?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. You will never get rid of it;
but by watching it you can keep it down nearly all
the time.
ITS PRESENCE
IS YOUR LIMIT. Your reform will
never quite reach perfection, for your
temper will
beat you now and then, but you come near enough. You
have made valuable
progress and
can make more. There IS use in training. Immense use.
Presently you will
reach a new
stage of development, then your
progress will be easier; will proceed on a
simpler basis,
anyway.
Y.M. Explain.
O.M. You keep back your scoldings now, to
please YOURSELF by pleasing your MOTHER;
presently the
mere triumphing over your temper will delight
your vanity and confer a
more
delicious pleasure
{better
PcM} and satisfaction
upon you than even the approbation
of
your MOTHER
confers upon you now. You will
then labor for yourself directly and at
FIRST HAND,
not by the roundabout way through your mother. It
simplifies the matter,
and it also
strengthens the impulse.
Y.M. Ah, dear! But I sha'n't ever reach the point
where I will spare the girl for HER sake
PRIMARILY,
not mine?
O.M. Why—yes. In heaven.
Y.M. (AFTER A REFLECTIVE PAUSE) Temperament.
Well, I see one must allow for
temperament.
It is a large factor, sure enough. My mother is thoughtful,
and not
hot-tempered.
When I was dressed I went to her room; she was not there;
I called, she
answered from
the bathroom. I heard the water
running. I inquired. She answered,
without temper,
that Jane had forgotten her bath, and she was preparing it herself.
I
offered to
ring, but she said, "No, don't do that; it
would only distress her to be confronted
with her lapse,
and would be a rebuke; she doesn't
deserve that—she is not to blame for
the tricks
her memory serves her." I
say—has my mother an Interior Master?—and where
was he?
O.M. He was there. There,
and looking out for his own peace and pleasure and contentment.
The girl's
distress would have pained YOUR MOTHER. Otherwise
the girl would have
been rung up,
distress and all. I know women
who would have gotten a No. 1
PLEASURE out
of ringing Jane up—and so they would infallibly have pushed the button
and
obeyed the law of their make and training, which
are the servants of their Interior
Masters.
It is quite likely that a
part of your mother's forbearance came from training.
The
GOOD kind of training—whose best and highest function is to see to it
that every
time it confers
a satisfaction upon its pupil a benefit shall fall at second hand upon
others.
Y.M. If you were going to condense into an admonition
your plan for the general betterment of
the race's
condition, how would you word it?
O.M. Diligently train your ideals
UPWARD and STILL UPWARD toward
a summit where you
will find your
chiefest pleasure in conduct which, while
contenting you, will be sure to
confer benefits
upon your neighbor and the community. {Organic}
Y.M. Is that a new gospel? {Cash Value of the Gospel.}
O.M. No.
Y.M. It has been taught before?
O.M. For ten thousand years.
Y.M. By whom?
O.M. All the great religions—all
the great gospels.
Y.M. Then there is nothing new about it?
O.M. Oh yes, there is. It is candidly stated, this time. That has not been done before.
Y.M. How do you mean?
O.M. Haven't I put YOU FIRST, and your neighbor and the community AFTERWARD?
Y.M. Well, yes, that is a difference, it is true.
O.M. The difference between straight speaking and
crooked; the difference between
frankness
and shuffling.
Y.M. Explain.
O.M. The others offer you a hundred bribes to be
good, thus conceding that the
Master inside
of you must
be conciliated and contented first, and
that you will do nothing at FIRST
HAND but for
his sake; then they turn square
around and require you to do good for
OTHER'S sake
CHIEFLY; and to do your duty
for duty's SAKE, chiefly; and to do acts of
SELF-SACRIFICE.
Thus at the outset we all stand upon the same ground—recognition
of
the supreme and absolute Monarch that resides in man,
and we all grovel before him
and appeal
to him; then those others dodge and shuffle, and
face around and unfrankly
and inconsistently
and illogically change the form of their appeal and
direct its
persuasions
to man's SECOND-PLACE powers and
to powers which have NO
EXISTENCE in
him, thus advancing them to FIRST
place; whereas
in my Admonition I
stick logically
and consistently to the original position: I
place the Interior Master's
requirements
FIRST, and keep them there.
Y.M. If we grant, for the sake of argument, that
your scheme and the other schemes aim at
and produce
the same result— RIGHT LIVING—has
yours an advantage over the
others?
O.M. One, yes—a large one. It has no concealments,
no deceptions. When a man leads
a
right and valuable
life under it he is not deceived as
to the REAL chief motive which
impels him
to it—in those other cases he is.
Y.M. Is that an advantage?
Is it an advantage to live a lofty life for a mean
reason? In the other
cases he lives
the lofty life under the IMPRESSION that he is living for a lofty reason.
Is
not that an
advantage?
O.M. Perhaps so. The
same advantage he might get out of thinking himself a duke, and living
a duke's life
and parading in ducal fuss and feathers, when
he wasn't a duke at all, and
could find
it out if he would only examine the herald's records.
Y.M. But anyway, he is obliged to do a duke's part;
he puts his hand in his pocket and does
his benevolences
on as big a scale as he can stand, and that benefits the community.
O.M. He could do that without being a duke.
Y.M. But would he?
O.M. Don't you see where you are arriving?
Y.M. Where?
O.M. At the standpoint of the other schemes:
That it is good morals to let an ignorant duke do
showy benevolences
for his pride's sake, a pretty low motive, and
go on doing them
unwared, lest
if he were made acquainted with
the actual motive which prompted them
he might shut
up his purse and cease to be good?
Y.M. But
isn't it best to leave him in ignorance, as long as he THINKS he is doing
good for
others' sake?
O.M. Perhaps so. It is the position of the other
schemes. They think humbug is good enough
morals when
the dividend on it is good deeds and handsome conduct.
Y.M. It
is my opinion that under your scheme of a man's doing a good deed for his
OWN sake
first-off,
instead of first for the GOOD DEED'S sake, no man would ever do one.
O.M. Have you committed a benevolence lately?
Y.M. Yes. This morning.
O.M. Give the particulars.
Y.M. The cabin of the old negro woman who
used to nurse me when I
was a child and who
saved my life
once at the risk of her own, was
burned last night, and she came mourning
this morning,
and pleading for money to build another one.
O.M. You furnished it?
Y.M. Certainly.
O.M. You were glad you had the money?
Y.M. Money? I hadn't. I sold my horse.
O.M. You were glad you had the horse?
Y.M. Of course I was; for if I hadn't had the horse
I should have been incapable, and my
MOTHER would
have captured the chance to set old Sally up.
O.M. You were cordially glad you were not caught out and incapable?
Y.M. Oh, I just was!
Y.M. Stop where you are! I know your whole catalog
of questions, and I could answer
every
one of them
without your wasting the time to ask them; but
I will summarize the whole
thing in a
single remark: I did the charity
knowing it was because the act would give ME a
splendid pleasure,
and because old Sally's moving gratitude and delight
would give ME
another one;
and because the reflection that
she would be happy now and out of her
trouble would
fill ME full of happiness. I
did the whole thing with my eyes open and
recognizing
and realizing that I was looking
out for MY share of the profits FIRST. Now
then, I have
confessed. Go on.
O.M. I haven't anything to offer; you have covered
the whole ground. Can you have
been any
MORE strongly
moved to help Sally out of her
trouble—could you have done the deed
any more eagerly—if
you had been under the delusion that
you were doing it for HER
sake and profit
only?
Y.M. No! Nothing in the world could have made the
impulse which moved me more powerful,
more masterful,
more thoroughly irresistible. I played the limit!
O.M. Very well. You begin to suspect—and I claim
to KNOW —that when a man is a
shade
MORE STRONGLY
MOVED to do ONE of two things or
of two dozen things than he is to
do any one
of the OTHERS, he will infallibly do that ONE thing, be it good or be it
evil;
and
if it be good, not all the beguilements
of all the casuistries can increase the strength
of the impulse
by a single shade or add a shade
to the comfort and contentment he will
get out of
the act.
Y.M. Then you believe that such tendency toward
doing good as is in men's hearts would
not
be diminished
by the removal of the delusion that good deeds are
done primarily for the
sake of No.
2 instead of for the sake of No. 1?
O.M. That is what I fully believe.
Y.M. Doesn't it somehow seem to take from the dignity of the deed?
O.M. If there is dignity in falsity, it does. It removes that.
Y.M. What is left for the moralists to do?
O.M. Teach unreservedly what he already teaches
with one side of his mouth and
takes back
with the other:
Do right
FOR YOUR OWN SAKE, and be happy in knowing that your
NEIGHBOR will
certainly share in the benefits resulting. {need}
Y.M. Repeat your Admonition.
O.M. DILIGENTLY TRAIN YOUR IDEALS UPWARD
AND STILL UPWARD TOWARD A
SUMMIT WHERE YOU
WILL FIND YOUR CHIEFEST PLEASURE
IN CONDUCT
WHICH, WHILE
CONTENTING YOU, WILL BE SURE
TO CONFER BENEFITS UPON
YOUR NEIGHBOR
AND THE COMMUNITY. {Golden
Rule, Organic Interdependence}
Y.M. One's EVERY act proceeds from EXTERIOR INFLUENCES, you think?
O.M. Yes.
Y.M. If I conclude to rob a person, I am not the
ORIGINATOR of the idea, but it comes in from
the OUTSIDE?
I see him handling money—for instance—and THAT moves
me to the
crime?
O.M. That, by itself? Oh,
certainly not. It is merely the LATEST outside influence of a
procession
of preparatory influences stretching back over a period of years.
No SINGLE
outside influence
can make a man do a thing which is at war with his training.
The most it
can do is to
start his mind on a new tract and
open it to the reception of NEW
influences—as
in the case of Ignatius
Loyola.
In time these influences can train him to a
point where
it will be consonant with his new character to yield
to the FINAL influence
and do that
thing. I will put the case in
a form which will make my theory clear to you, I
think.
Here are two ingots of virgin gold. They shall represent
a couple of characters
which have
been refined and perfected in
the virtues by years of diligent right training.
Suppose
you wanted to break down these
strong and well-compacted characters—what
influence would
you bring to bear upon the ingots?
Y.M. Work it out yourself. Proceed.
O.M. Suppose I turn upon one of them a steam-jet
during a long succession of hours. Will
there be a
result?
Y.M. None that I know of.
O.M. Why?
Y.M. A steam-jet cannot break down such a substance.
O.M. Very well. The
steam is an OUTSIDE INFLUENCE, but it is ineffective because the gold
TAKES NO INTEREST
IN IT. The ingot remains as it was. Suppose
we add to the steam
some quicksilver
in a vaporized condition, and turn the jet upon the ingot,
will there be an
instantaneous
result?
Y.M. No.
O.M. The QUICKSILVER is an outside influence which
gold (by its peculiar nature—say
TEMPERAMENT,
DISPOSITION) CANNOT BE INDIFFERENT TO. It
stirs up the
interest of
the gold, although we do not perceive it; but
a SINGLE application of the
influence works
no damage. Let us continue the
application in a steady stream, and call
each minute
a year. By the end of ten or
twenty minutes—ten or twenty years—the little
ingot is sodden
with quicksilver, its virtues
are gone, its character is degraded. At
last it
is ready to
yield to a temptation which it would have taken no notice of,
ten or twenty
years ago.
We will apply that temptation in the form of a pressure
of my finger. You note
the result?
Y.M. Yes; the ingot has crumbled to sand.
I understand, now. It is not the SINGLE outside
influence that
does the work, but only the LAST
one of a long and disintegrating
accumulation
of them. I see, now, how my SINGLE
impulse to rob the man is not the one
that makes
me do it, but only the LAST one of a preparatory series.
You might illustrate
with a
parable.
O.M. I will. There
was once a pair of New England boys— twins. They were alike in good
dispositions,
feckless morals, and personal appearance. They
were the models of the
Sunday-school.
At fifteen George had the opportunity to go as cabin-boy
in a whale-ship,
and sailed
away for the Pacific. Henry remained
at home in the village. At eighteen
George was
a sailor before the mast, and
Henry was teacher of the advanced Bible
class.
At twenty-two George, through fighting-habits and
drinking-habits acquired at sea
and
in the sailor boarding-houses of the European and Oriental ports,
was a common
rough in Hong-Kong,
and out of a job; and Henry was superintendent of
the
Sunday-school.
At twenty-six George was a wanderer, a tramp, and
Henry was pastor of
the village
church. Then George came home,
and was Henry's guest. One evening
a
man passed
by and turned down the lane, and Henry said, with a pathetic smile,
"Without
intending me
a discomfort, that man is always
keeping me reminded of my pinching
poverty,
for he carries heaps of money about him, and goes
by here every evening of his
life."
That OUTSIDE INFLUENCE—that remark—was enough for
George, but IT was not
the one that
made him ambush the man and rob him, it
merely represented the eleven
years' accumulation
of such influences, and gave
birth to the act for which their long
gestation had
made preparation. It had never
entered the head of Henry to rob the
man—his ingot
had been subjected to clean steam only; but
George's had been
subjected to
vaporized quicksilver.
V. More About the
Machine:
Note.—When Mrs. W. asks how can a millionaire give a single dollar to colleges and museums while one human being is destitute of bread, she has answered her question herself. Her feeling for the poor shows that she has a standard of benevolence; there she has conceded the millionaire's privilege of having a standard; since she evidently requires him to adopt her standard, she is by that act requiring herself to adopt his. The human being always looks down {Mocking} when he is examining another person's standard; he never finds one that he has to examine by looking up.
The Man-Machine Again:
Young Man. You really think man is a mere machine?
Old Man. I do.
Y.M. And that his mind works automatically and
is independent of his control—carries on
thought on
its own hook?
O.M. Yes. It is diligently at work, unceasingly
at work, during every waking moment. Have
you
never tossed
about all night, imploring, beseeching, commanding
your mind to stop work
and let you
go to sleep?—you who perhaps imagine that your mind is your servant
and
must obey your
orders, think what you tell it to think, and stop when you tell it to stop.
When
it chooses to work, there is no way to keep it still for an instant.
The brightest man
would not be
able to supply it with subjects if he had to hunt them up.
If it needed the
man's help
it would wait for him to give it work when he wakes in the morning.
Y.M. Maybe it does.
O.M. No, it begins right away,
before the man gets wide enough awake to give it a
suggestion.
He may go to
sleep saying, "The moment I wake I will think upon such and such a
subject,"
but he will fail. His
mind will be too quick for him; by the time he has become
nearly enough
awake to be half conscious, he
will find that it is already at work upon
another subject.
Make the experiment and see.
Y.M. At any rate, he can make it stick to a subject if he wants to.
O.M. Not if it find another that suits it better.
As a rule it will listen to neither a dull speaker
nor
a bright one.
It refuses all persuasion. The
dull speaker wearies it and sends it far away
in idle dreams;
the bright speaker throws out stimulating ideas which
it goes chasing after
and is at once
unconscious of him and his talk. You
cannot keep your mind from
wandering,
if it wants to; it is master, not you.
O.M. Now, dreams—but we will examine that later.
Meantime, did you try commanding your
mind to wait
for orders from you, and not do any thinking on its own hook?
Y.M. Yes, I commanded it to stand ready to take orders when I should wake in the morning.
O.M. Did it obey?
Y.M. No. It went to thinking of something of its
own initiation, without waiting for me. Also—as
you suggested—at
night I appointed a theme for it to begin on in the morning,
and
commanded it
to begin on that one and no other.
O.M. Did it obey?
Y.M. No.
O.M. How many times did you try the experiment?
Y.M. Ten.
O.M. How many successes did you score?
Y.M. Not one.
O.M. It is as I have said: the mind is independent
of the man. He has no control
over it; it does
as it pleases.
It will take up a subject in spite of him; it will
stick to it in spite of him; it will
throw it aside
in spite of him. It is entirely independent of him.
Y.M. Go on. Illustrate.
O.M. Do you know chess?
Y.M. I learned it a week ago.
O.M. Did your mind go on playing the game all night that first night?
Y.M. Don't mention it!
O.M. It was eagerly, unsatisfiably interested; it
rioted in the combinations; you implored it to
drop the game
and let you get some sleep?
Y.M. Yes. It wouldn't listen; it played right along.
It wore me out and I got up haggard and
wretched in
the morning.
O.M. At some time or other you have been captivated by a ridiculous rhyme-jingle?
Y.M. Indeed, yes!
"I saw Esau kissing Kate, And she saw I saw Esau; I saw Esau, he saw Kate, And she saw—"
And so on. My mind went mad with joy over it. It repeated
it all day and all night for a week
in spite of all I could do to stop it, and it seemed to me that I must
surely go crazy.
O.M. And the new popular song?
Y.M. Oh yes! "In the Swee-eet By and By";
etc. Yes, the new popular song
with the taking
melody sings
through one's head day and night, asleep and awake, till one is a wreck.
There
is no getting the mind to let it alone.
O.M. Yes, asleep as well as awake.
The mind is quite independent. It is master. You have
nothing to
do with it. It is so apart from
you that it can conduct its affairs, sing its songs,
play its chess,
weave its complex and ingeniously constructed dreams, while you sleep.
It
has no use
for your help, no use for your guidance, and never uses either,
whether you
be asleep or
awake. You have imagined that
you could originate a thought in your mind,
and you have
sincerely believed you could do it.
Y.M. Yes, I have had that idea.
O.M. Yet you can't originate a dream-thought for it to work out, and get it accepted?
Y.M. No.
O.M. And you can't dictate its procedure after it has originated a dream-thought for itself?
Y.M. No. No one can do it. Do you think the waking
mind and the dream mind are the same
machine?
O.M. There is argument for it. We have wild and
fantastic day-thoughts? Things that are
dream-like?
Y.M. Yes—like Mr. Wells's man who invented a drug
that made him invisible; and like the
Arabian tales
of the Thousand Nights.
O.M. And there are dreams that are rational, simple, consistent, and unfantastic?
Y.M. Yes. I have dreams that are like that.
Dreams that are just like real life; dreams in which
there are several
persons with distinctly differentiated characters—inventions of my mind
and
yet strangers to me: a vulgar
person; a refined one; a wise person; a fool; a cruel
person; a kind
and compassionate one; a quarrelsome
person; a peacemaker; old
persons and
young; beautiful girls and homely ones. They
talk in character, each
preserves his
own characteristics. There are
vivid fights, vivid and biting insults, vivid
love-passages;
there are tragedies and comedies,
there are griefs that go to one's heart,
there are sayings
and doings that make you laugh: indeed,
the whole thing is exactly like
real life.
O.M. Your dreaming mind originates the scheme, consistently
and artistically develops it, and
carries the
little drama creditably through—all without help or suggestion from you?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. It is argument that it could do the like awake
without help or suggestion from
you—and I
think it does.
It is argument that it is the same old mind in both
cases, and never needs
your help.
I think the mind is purely a machine, a thoroughly
independent machine, an
automatic machine.
Have you tried the other experiment which I suggested
to you?
Y.M. Which one?
O.M. The one which was to determine how much influence you have over your mind—if any.
Y.M. Yes, and got more or less entertainment out
of it. I did as you ordered:
I placed two texts
before my eyes—one
a dull one and barren of interest, the
other one full of interest,
inflamed with
it, white-hot with it. I commanded
my mind to busy itself solely with the dull
one.
O.M. Did it obey?
Y.M. Well, no, it didn't. It busied itself with the other one.
O.M. Did you try hard to make it obey?
Y.M. Yes, I did my honest best.
O.M. What was the text which it refused to be interested in or think about?
Y.M. It was this question:
If A owes B a dollar and a half, and B owes C two
and three-quarter,
and C owes
A thirty- five cents, and D and
A together owe E and B three-sixteenths of
—of—I don't
remember the rest, now, but anyway
it was wholly uninteresting, and I could
not force my
mind to stick to it even half a minute at a time;
it kept flying off to the other
text.
O.M. What was the other text?
Y.M. It is no matter about that.
O.M. But what was it?
Y.M. A photograph.
O.M. Your own?
Y.M. No. It was hers.
O.M. You really made an honest good test. Did you make a second trial?
Y.M. Yes. I
commanded my mind to interest itself in the morning paper's report of the
pork-market,
and at the same time I reminded it of an experience
of mine of sixteen years
ago.
It refused to consider the pork and gave its whole
blazing interest to that ancient
incident.
O.M. What was the incident?
Y.M. An armed desperado slapped my face in the
presence of twenty spectators. It makes me
wild and murderous
every time I think of it.
O.M. Good tests, both; very good tests. Did you try my other suggestion?
Y.M. The one which was to prove to me
that if I would leave my mind to its own devices it
would find
things to think about without any of my help, and
thus convince me that it was
a machine,
an automatic machine, set in motion by exterior influences,
and as
independent
of me as it could be if it were in some one else's skull. Is that the one?
O.M. Yes.
Y.M. I tried it. I
was shaving. I had slept well, and my mind was very lively, even gay and
frisky.
It was reveling
in a fantastic and joyful episode of my remote boyhood
which had
suddenly flashed
up in my memory—moved to this by the spectacle of a yellow cat
picking
its way carefully along the top of the garden wall. The color of this cat
brought the
bygone cat
before me, and I saw her walking along the side-step of the pulpit;
saw her
walk on to
a large sheet of sticky fly-paper and get all her feet involved;
saw her struggle
and fall down,
helpless and dissatisfied, more
and more urgent, more and more
unreconciled,
more and more mutely profane; saw
the silent congregation quivering like
jelly, and
the tears running down their faces. I saw it all.
The sight of the tears whisked
my mind to
a far distant and a sadder scene—in
Terra del Fuego—and with Darwin's
eyes
I saw a naked great savage hurl his little boy against
the rocks for a trifling fault;
saw
the poor mother gather up her
dying child and hug it to her breast and weep, uttering
no word.
Did my mind stop to mourn with that nude black sister
of mine? No—it was far
away from that
scene in an instant, and was
busying itself with an ever-recurring and
disagreeable
dream of mine. In this dream
I always find myself, stripped to my shirt,
cringing
and dodging about in the midst of
a great drawing-room throng of finely dressed
ladies and
gentlemen, and wondering how I got there. And
so on and so on, picture after
picture,
incident after incident, a drifting panorama of ever-changing,
ever-dissolving
views manufactured
by my mind without any help from me—why, it
would take me two
hours to merely
name the multitude of things my
mind tallied off and photographed in
fifteen minutes,
let alone describe them to you.
O.M. A man's mind, left free, has no use for his
help. But there is one way whereby
he can get
its help when
he desires it.
Y.M. What is that way?
O.M. When your mind is racing along from subject
to subject and strikes an inspiring
one,
open your mouth
and begin talking upon that matter—or—take your pen and use that.
It
will interest
your mind and concentrate it, and it will pursue the subject with satisfaction.
It
will take full
charge, and furnish the words itself.
Y.M. But don't I tell it what to say?
O.M. There are certainly occasions when you haven't
time. The words leap out before you
know what is
coming.
Y.M. For instance?
O.M. Well, take a "flash of wit"—repartee.
Flash is the right word. It is out instantly. There
is
no time to
arrange the words. There is no
thinking, no reflecting. Where there is a
wit-mechanism
it is automatic in its action and needs no help. Where
the wit-mechanism
is lacking,
no amount of study and reflection can manufacture the product.
Y.M. You really think a man originates nothing, creates nothing.
The Thinking-Process: {Robinson4:156}
O.M. I do. Men perceive,
and their brain-machines automatically combine the things perceived.
That is all.
Y.M. The steam-engine?
O.M. It takes fifty men a hundred years to invent
it. One meaning of invent is
discover. I use
the word in
that sense. Little by little
they discover and apply the multitude of details that
go to make
the perfect engine. Watt noticed
that confined steam was strong enough to lift
the lid of
the teapot. He didn't create the idea, he merely discovered the fact;
the cat had
noticed it
a hundred times. From the teapot
he evolved the cylinder—from the displaced
lid he evolved
the piston-rod. To attach something
to the piston-rod to be moved by it,
was a simple
matter—crank and wheel. And so there was a working engine.
One by one,
improvements
were discovered by men who used their eyes, not
their creating
powers—for
they hadn't any—and now, after
a hundred years the patient contributions of
fifty or a hundred
observers stand compacted in
the wonderful machine which drives the
ocean liner.
Y.M. A Shakespearean play?
O.M. The process is the same.
The first actor was a savage. He reproduced in his
theatrical
war-dances,
scalp-dances, and so on, incidents which he had seen in real life.
A more
advanced civilization
produced more incidents, more episodes; the
actor and the
story-teller
borrowed them. And so the drama
grew, little by little, stage by stage. It is
made up of
the facts of life, not creations. It
took centuries to develop the Greek drama. It
borrowed from
preceding ages; it lent to the ages that came after.
Men observe and
combine, that
is all. So does a rat.
Y.M. How?
O.M. He observes a smell, he infers a cheese, he
seeks and finds. The astronomer
observes
this and that;
adds his this and that to the this-and-thats of a
hundred predecessors,
infers an invisible
planet, seeks it and finds it. The
rat gets into a trap; gets out with
trouble; infers
that cheese in traps lacks value, and meddles with that trap no more.
The
astronomer
is very proud of his achievement, the rat is proud of his.
Yet both are
machines;
they have done machine work, they have originated
nothing, they have no
right to be
vain; the whole credit belongs
to their Maker. They
are entitled to no honors,
no praises,
no monuments when they die, no remembrance. One
is a complex and
elaborate machine,
the other a simple and limited machine, but
they are alike in principle,
function,
and process, and neither of them works otherwise than automatically,
and
neither of
them may righteously claim a
PERSONAL superiority or a personal dignity
above the other.
Y.M. In earned personal dignity, then, and
in personal merit for what he does, it follows of
necessity that
he is on the same level as a rat?
O.M. His brother the rat; yes, that is how it seems
to me. Neither of them being
entitled to any
personal merit
for what he does, it follows
of necessity that neither of them has a right to
arrogate to
himself (personally created) superiorities over his brother.
Y.M. Are you determined to go on believing
in these insanities? Would you
go on believing in
them in the
face of able arguments backed by collated facts and instances?
O.M. I have been a humble, earnest, and sincere Truth-Seeker.
Y.M. Very well?
O.M. The humble, earnest, and sincere Truth-Seeker is always convertible by such means.
Y.M. I am thankful to God to hear you say this, for now I know that your conversion—
O.M. Wait. You misunderstand. I said I have BEEN a Truth-Seeker.
Y.M. Well?
O.M. I am not that now. Have
you forgotten? I told you that there are none but temporary
Truth-Seekers;
that a permanent one is a human impossibility; that
as soon as the
Seeker finds
what he is thoroughly convinced is the Truth, he
seeks no further, but gives
the rest of
his days to hunting junk to patch it and caulk it and prop it with,
and make it
weather-proof
and keep it from caving in on him. Hence
the Presbyterian remains a
Presbyterian,
the Mohammedan a Mohammedan, the
Spiritualist a Spiritualist, the
Democrat a
Democrat, the Republican a Republican, the Monarchist a Monarchist;
and if
a humble, earnest,
and sincere Seeker after Truth should find it in the
proposition that
the moon is
made of green cheese nothing
could ever budge him from that position; for
he is nothing
but an automatic machine, and must obey the
laws of his construction.
Y.M. After so—
O.M. Having found the Truth;
perceiving that beyond question man has but one moving
impulse—the
contenting of his own spirit— and is merely a machine
and entitled to no
personal merit
for anything he does, it is not humanly possible for me to seek further.
The
rest of my
days will be spent in patching and painting and
puttying and caulking my
priceless possession
and in looking the other way when
an imploring argument or a
damaging fact
approaches.
VI. Instinct and
Thought:
Young Man. It is odious. Those drunken theories
of yours, advanced a while ago—concerning
the
rat and all that—strip Man bare of all his dignities, grandeurs, sublimities.
Old Man. He hasn't any
to strip—they are shams, stolen clothes.
He claims credits which
belong
solely to his Maker.
Y.M. But you have no right to put him on a level with a rat.
O.M. I don't—morally. That would not be fair to the rat. The rat is well above him, there.
Y.M. Are you joking?
O.M. No, I am not.
Y.M. Then what do you mean?
O.M. That comes under the head of the Moral Sense.
It is a large question. Let us finish with
what we are
about now, before we take it up.
Y.M. Very well. You
have seemed to concede that you place Man and the rat on A level. What
is it? The
intellectual?
O.M. In form—not a degree.
Y.M. Explain.
O.M. I think that the rat's mind and the man's mind
are the same machine, but of
unequal
capacities—like
yours and Edison's; like the
African pygmy's and Homer's; like the
Bushman's and
Bismarck's.
Y.M. How are you going to make that out, when
the lower animals have no mental quality but
instinct, while
man possesses reason?
O.M. What is instinct?
Y.M. It is merely unthinking and mechanical exercise of inherited habit.
O.M. What originated the habit?
Y.M. The first animal started it, its descendants have inherited it.
O.M. How did the first one come to start it?
Y.M. I don't know; but it didn't THINK it out.
O.M. How do you know it didn't?
Y.M. Well—I have a right to suppose it didn't, anyway.
O.M. I don't believe you have. What is thought?
Y.M. I know what you call it:
the mechanical and automatic putting together of impressions
{ideas}
received from outside, and drawing
an inference {the
process of deriving from assumed
premises
either the strict logical conclusion or one that is to some degree probable}
from them.
O.M. Very good. Now
my idea of the meaningless term "instinct" is,
that it is merely
PETRIFIED THOUGHT;
solidified and made inanimate by habit; thought which
was once
alive and awake,
but it become unconscious—walks in its sleep, so to speak.
Y.M. Illustrate it.
O.M. Take a herd of cows, feeding in a pasture.
Their heads are all turned in one direction.
They do that
instinctively; they gain nothing by it, they
have no reason for it, they don't
know why they
do it. It is an inherited habit
which was originally thought—that is to say,
observation
of an exterior fact, and a valuable
inference drawn from that observation and
confirmed by
experience. The original wild
ox noticed that with the wind in his favor he
could smell
his enemy in time to escape; then
he inferred that it was worth while to keep
his nose to
the wind. That is the process
which man calls reasoning. Man's
thought-machine
works just like the other animals', but
it is a better one and more
Edisonian.
Man, in the ox's place, would go further, reason wider:
he would face part of
the herd the
other way and protect both front
and rear.
Y.M. Did you say the term instinct is meaningless?
O.M. I think it is a bastard word.
I think it confuses us; for as a rule it applies itself
to habits
and impulses
which had a far-off origin in thought, and
now and then breaks the rule and
applies itself
to habits which can hardly claim a thought-origin.
Y.M. Give an instance.
O.M. Well, in
putting on trousers a man always inserts the same old leg first—never the
other
one.
There is no advantage in that, and no sense in it.
All men do it, yet no man thought
it out and
adopted it of set purpose, I imagine. But
it is a habit which is transmitted, no
doubt, and
will continue to be transmitted.
Y.M. Can you prove that the habit exists?
O.M. You can prove it, if you doubt. If you will
take a man to a clothing-store and watch him try
on a dozen
pairs of trousers, you will see.
Y.M. The cow illustration is not—
O.M. Sufficient to show that a dumb animal's mental
machine is just the same as a
man's and
its reasoning
processes the same? I will illustrate further. If
you should hand Mr. Edison a
box which you
caused to fly open by some concealed device he would infer a spring,
and
would hunt
for it and find it. Now an uncle
of mine had an old horse who used to get into
the closed
lot where the corn-crib was and dishonestly take the corn.
I got the
punishment
myself, as it was supposed that
I had heedlessly failed to insert the wooden
pin
which kept the gate closed. These persistent punishments
fatigued me; they also
caused me to
infer the existence of a culprit, somewhere; so
I hid myself and watched the
gate.
Presently the horse came and pulled the pin out with
his teeth and went in. Nobody
taught him
that; he had observed—then thought it out for himself.
His process did not
differ from
Edison's; he put this and that
together and drew an inference—and the peg,
too; but I
made him sweat for it.
Y.M. It has something of the seeming of thought about it. Still it is not very elaborate. Enlarge.
O.M. Suppose Mr. Edison has been enjoying some one's
hospitalities. He comes again
by
and by, and
the house is vacant. He infers
that his host has moved. A while afterward, in
another town,
he sees the man enter a house; he
infers that that is the new home, and
follows to
inquire. Here, now, is the experience
of a gull, as related by a naturalist. The
scene is a
Scotch fishing village where the gulls were kindly treated.
This particular gull
visited a cottage;
was fed; came next day and was
fed again; came into the house, next
time, and ate
with the family; kept on doing this almost daily, thereafter.
But, once the gull
was away on
a journey for a few days, and when it returned the house was vacant.
Its
friends had
removed to a village three miles distant. Several
months later it saw the head
of the family
on the street there, followed him home, entered
the house without excuse or
apology, and
became a daily guest again. Gulls do not rank high mentally,
but this one
had memory
and the reasoning faculty, you see, and applied them Edisonially.
Y.M. Yet it was not an Edison and couldn't be developed into one.
O.M. Perhaps not. Could you?
Y.M. That is neither here nor there. Go on.
O.M. If Edison were in trouble and a stranger helped
him out of it and next day he
got into the
same difficulty
again, he would infer the wise
thing to do in case he knew the stranger's
address.
Here is a case of a bird and a stranger as related
by a naturalist. An
Englishman
saw a bird flying around about his dog's head, down in the grounds,
and
uttering cries
of distress. He went there to
see about it. The dog had a young
bird in his
mouth—unhurt.
The gentleman rescued it and put it on a bush and
brought the dog
away.
Early the next morning the mother bird came for the
gentleman, who was sitting on
his veranda,
and by its maneuvers persuaded him to follow it to
a distant part of the
grounds—flying
a little way in front of him and
waiting for him to catch up, and so on; and
keeping to
the winding path, too, instead of flying the near way across lots.
The distance
covered was
four hundred yards. The same
dog was the culprit; he had the young bird
again, and
once more he had to give it up. Now
the mother bird had reasoned it all out:
since
the stranger had helped her once, she inferred that he would do it again;
she knew
where to find
him, and she went upon her errand with confidence.
Her mental processes
were what Edison's
would have been. She put this
and that together—and that is all that
thought IS—and
out of them built her logical arrangement of inferences.
Edison couldn't
have done it
any better himself.
Y.M. Do you believe that many of the dumb animals can think?
O.M. Yes—the elephant, the monkey, the horse, the
dog, the parrot, the macaw, the
mocking-bird,
and many others. The elephant
whose mate fell into a pit, and who
dumped dirt
and rubbish into the pit till
bottom was raised high enough to enable the
captive to
step out, was equipped with the
reasoning quality. I conceive
that all animals
that can learn
things through teaching and drilling have to know how to observe,
and put
this and that
together and draw an inference—the process of thinking.
Could you teach
an idiot of
manuals of arms, and to advance,
retreat, and go through complex field
maneuvers at
the word of command?
Y.M. Not if he were a thorough idiot.
O.M. Well, canary-birds can learn all that;
dogs and elephants learn all sorts of wonderful
things.
They must surely be able to notice, and to put things
together, and say to
themselves,
"I get the idea, now: when
I do so and so, as per order, I am praised and fed;
when I do differently
I am punished." Fleas can
be taught nearly anything that a
Congressman
can.
Y.M. Granting, then, that dumb animals are able
to think upon a low plane, is there any that
can think upon
a high one? Is there one that is well up toward man?
O.M. Yes. As a thinker and planner the ant is the
equal of any savage race of men; as
a
self-educated
specialist in several arts she is the superior of any savage race of men;
and
in one or two high mental qualities she
is above the reach of any man, savage or
civilized!
Y.M. Oh, come! you are abolishing the intellectual frontier which separates man and beast.
O.M. I beg your pardon. One cannot abolish what does not exist.
Y.M. You are not in earnest, I hope.
You cannot mean to seriously say there is no such
frontier.
O.M. I do say it seriously.
The instances of the horse, the gull, the mother bird,
and the
elephant show
that those creatures put their this's and thats together
just as Edison
would have
done it and drew the same inferences that he would have drawn.
Their
mental machinery
was just like his, also its manner of working. Their
equipment was as
inferior to
the Strasburg clock, but that is the only difference—there is no frontier.
Y.M. It looks exasperatingly true; and is distinctly
offensive. It elevates the dumb beasts
to—to—
O.M. Let us drop that lying phrase, and call them
the Unrevealed Creatures; so far as we can
know, there
is no such thing as a dumb beast.
Y.M. On what grounds do you make that assertion?
O.M. On quite simple ones.
"Dumb" beast suggests an animal that has
no thought-machinery,
no understanding,
no speech, no way of communicating what is in its mind.
We know that
a hen HAS speech.
We cannot understand everything she says, but we easily
learn two
or three of
her phrases. We know when she
is saying, "I have laid an egg"; we know
when she is
saying to the chicks, "Run here, dears, I've found a worm";
we know what
she is saying
when she voices a warning: "Quick!
hurry! gather yourselves under
mamma, there's
a hawk coming!" We understand
the cat when she stretches herself out,
purring
with affection and contentment and lifts up a soft voice and says,
"Come, kitties,
supper's ready";
we understand her when she goes mourning about and
says, "Where
can they be?
They are lost. Won't you help me hunt for them?"
and we understand the
disreputable
Tom when he challenges at midnight from his shed,
"You come over here,
you product
of immoral commerce, and I'll make your fur fly!"
We understand a few of a
dog's phrases
and we learn to understand a few of the remarks and
gestures of any bird
or other animal
that we domesticate and observe. The
clearness and exactness of the
few of the
hen's speeches which we understand
is argument that she can communicate
to her kind
a hundred things which we cannot comprehend—in a word,
that she can
converse.
And this argument is also applicable in the case of
others of the great army of
the Unrevealed.
It is just like man's vanity and impertinence to call
an animal dumb
because it
is dumb to his dull perceptions. Now as to the ant—
Y.M. Yes, go back to the ant, the creature that—as
you seem to think—sweeps away the last
vestige of
an intellectual frontier between man and the Unrevealed.
O.M. That is what she surely does.
In all his history the aboriginal Australian never
thought out
a house for
himself and built it. The ant
is an amazing architect. She is a wee little
creature,
but she builds a strong and enduring house eight feet
high—a house which is
as large
in proportion to her size as is the largest capitol
or cathedral in the world
compared to
man's size. No savage race has
produced architects who could approach
the air in
genius or culture. No civilized
race has produced architects who
could plan a
house better
for the uses proposed than can hers. Her
house contains a throne-room;
nurseries for
her young; granaries; apartments
for her soldiers, her workers, etc.; and
they and the
multifarious halls and corridors which
communicate with them are arranged
and distributed
with an educated and experienced eye for convenience
and adaptability.
Y.M. That could be mere instinct.
O.M. It would elevate the savage if he had it.
But let us look further before we decide. The ant
has soldiers—battalions,
regiments, armies; and they have
their appointed captains and
generals, who
lead them to battle.
Y.M. That could be instinct, too.
O.M. We will look still further. The ant has a
system of government; it is well planned,
elaborate,
and is well carried on.
Y.M. Instinct again.
O.M. She has crowds of slaves, and is a hard and unjust employer of forced labor.
Y.M. Instinct.
O.M. She has cows, and milks them.
Y.M. Instinct, of course.
O.M. In Texas she lays out a farm twelve feet square,
plants it, weeds it, cultivates it, gathers
the crop and
stores it away.
Y.M. Instinct, all the same.
O.M. The ant discriminates between friend and stranger.
Sir
John Lubbock took ants from two
different nests,
made them drunk with whiskey and laid them, unconscious,
by one of the
nests, near
some water. Ants from the nest
came and examined and discussed these
disgraced creatures,
then carried their friends home and threw the strangers overboard.
Sir
John repeated the experiment a number of times. For
a time the sober ants did as
they had done
at first—carried their friends home and threw the strangers overboard.
But
finally they
lost patience, seeing that their
reformatory efforts went for nothing, and threw
both friends
and strangers overboard. Come—is
this instinct, or is it thoughtful and
intelligent
discussion of a thing new— absolutely new—to their experience;
with a verdict
arrived at,
sentence passed, and judgment executed? Is
it instinct?—thought petrified by
ages of habit—or
isn't it brand-new thought, inspired
by the new occasion, the new
circumstances?
Y.M. I have to concede it. It was not a result
of habit; it has all the look of reflection, thought,
putting this
and that together, as you phrase it. I believe it was thought.
O.M. I will give you another instance of thought.
Franklin had a cup of sugar on a table in his
room.
The ants got at it. He tried several preventives;
and ants rose superior to them.
Finally he
contrived one which shut off access—probably set the table's legs
in pans of
water,
or drew a circle of tar around the cup, I don't remember.
At any rate, he watched
to see what
they would do. They tried various schemes—failures, every one.
The ants
were badly
puzzled. Finally they held a consultation, discussed
the problem, arrived at a
decision—and
this time they beat that great philosopher. They
formed in procession,
cross the floor,
climbed the wall, marched across the ceiling to a point just over the cup,
then
one by one they let go and fell down into it! Was
that instinct—thought petrified by
ages of inherited
habit?
Y.M. No, I don't believe it was. I believe it was
a newly reasoned scheme to meet a new
emergency.
O.M. Very well. You
have conceded the reasoning power in two instances. I come now to a
mental detail
wherein the ant is a long way the superior of any human being.
Sir John
Lubbock proved
by many experiments that an ant
knows a stranger ant of her own
species in
a moment, even when the stranger is disguised —with paint.
Also he proved
that an ant
knows every individual in her hive of five hundred thousand souls.
Also, after
a year's absence
one of the five hundred thousand she will straightway
recognize the
returned absentee
and grace the recognition with a affectionate welcome.
How are these
recognitions
made? Not by color, for painted ants were recognized.
Not by smell, for ants
that had been
dipped in chloroform were recognized. Not
by speech and not by antennae
signs nor contacts,
for the drunken and motionless ants were recognized
and the friend
discriminated
from the stranger. The ants were
all of the same species, therefore
the
friends had
to be recognized by form and
feature— friends who formed part of a hive of
five hundred
thousand! Has any man a memory
for form and feature approaching that?
Y.M. Certainly not.
O.M. Franklin's ants and Lubbuck's ants
show fine capacities of putting this and that together
in new and
untried emergencies and deducting
smart conclusions from the
combinations—a man's
mental process exactly. With
memory to help, man preserves his
observations
and reasonings, reflects upon
them, adds to them, recombines, and so
proceeds,
stage by stage, to far results—from
the teakettle to the ocean greyhound's
complex engine;
from personal labor to slave labor;
from wigwam to palace; from the
capricious
chase to agriculture and stored food; from
nomadic life to stable government
and concentrated
authority; from incoherent hordes
to massed armies. The ant has
observation,
the reasoning faculty, and the preserving adjunct of a prodigious memory;
she
has duplicated man's development and
the essential features of his civilization, and
you call it
all instinct!
Y.M. Perhaps I lacked the reasoning faculty myself.
O.M. Well, don't tell anybody, and don't do it again.
Y.M. We have come a good way. As a result—as I
understand it— I am required to concede
that
there is absolutely no intellectual frontier separating
Man and the Unrevealed
Creatures?
O.M. That is what you are required to concede.
There is no such frontier—there is no way to
get around
that. Man has a finer and more
capable machine in him than those others, but
it is the same
machine and works in the same way. And
neither he nor those others can
command the
machine—it is strictly automatic, independent
of control, works when it
pleases, and
when it doesn't please, it can't be forced.
Y.M. Then man and the other animals are all alike,
as to mental machinery, and there isn't any
difference
of any stupendous magnitude between them, except in quality, not in kind.
O.M. That is about the state of it—intellectuality.
There are pronounced limitations on both
sides.
We can't learn to understand much of their language,
but the dog, the elephant,
etc., learn
to understand a very great deal of ours. To
that extent they are our superiors.
On the other
hand, they can't learn reading, writing, etc., nor
any of our fine and high
things, and
there we have a large advantage over them.
Y.M. Very well, let them have what they've got,
and welcome; there is still a wall, and a lofty
one.
They haven't got the Moral Sense; we have it, and
it lifts us immeasurably above
them.
O.M. What makes you think that?
Y.M. Now look here—let's call a halt. I have stood
the other infamies and insanities and that is
enough; I am
not going to have man and the other animals put on the same level morally.
O.M. I wasn't going to hoist man up to that.
Y.M. This is too much! I think it is not right to jest about such things.
O.M. I am not jesting, I
am merely reflecting a plain and simple truth—and without
uncharitableness.
The fact that man knows right from wrong proves his
INTELLECTUAL
superiority
to the other creatures; but the
fact that he can DO wrong proves his MORAL
inferiority
to any creature that CANNOT. It
is my belief that this position is not assailable.
Y.M. What is your opinion regarding Free Will?
O.M. That there is no
such thing. {To
say there is free-will is like saying a computer
is useful without software
and
database.} Did
the man possess it who gave the old woman his last shilling and trudged
home
in the storm?
Y.M. He had the choice between succoring the old woman and leaving her to suffer. Isn't it so?
O.M. Yes, there was a {seeming}
choice to be made, between
bodily comfort on the one hand
and the comfort
of the spirit on the other. The
body made a strong appeal, of
course—the
body would be quite sure to do that; the spirit made a counter appeal.
A
choice
had to be made between the two appeals, and was made.
Who or what
determined
that {so-called
free} choice?
Y.M. Any one but
you would say that the man determined it,
and that in doing it he
exercised Free
Will. {Wegner,
Ridley:309.}
O.M. We are constantly assured that every man is
endowed with Free Will,
and that he can
and must exercise
it where he is offered a choice
between good conduct and less-good
conduct.
Yet we clearly saw that in that man's case he really
had no Free Will: his
temperament,
his training, and the daily influences
which had molded him and made him
what he
was, COMPELLED
him to rescue the old woman and thus save
HIMSELF—save
himself from spiritual pain, from unendurable wretchedness.
He did not
make the choice,
it was made FOR him by forces which he could not control.
Free Will
has always
existed in WORDS, but it stops there, I think—stops short of FACT.
I would
not
use those words—Free Will—but others. {Taylor/Wheeler92:iii}
Y.M. What others?
O.M. Free Choice.
Y.M. What is the difference?
{JBY. There
is no Free Will—you cannot stop the rain; but, there is Free Choice—you
can get an umbrella.}
From Matt
Ridley's Genome; 1999; 0060932902;
p. 307—Free Choice.
The reason the equation of determinism with fatalism is a fallacy is as follows. Suppose you are ill, but you reason that there is no point in calling the doctor because either you will recover, or you won't: in either case, a doctor is superfluous. But this overlooks the possibility that your recovery or lack thereof could be caused by your calling the doctor, or failure to do so. It follows that determinism implies nothing about what you can or cannot do. Determinism looks backwards to the causes of the present state, not forward to the consequences.
O.M. The one
implies untrammeled power to ACT
as you please, the other implies
nothing
beyond a mere
MENTAL PROCESS: the
critical ability to determine which of two things
is nearest
right and just, {true
or false. Just like a Computer, it says
"yes" or "no" and then makes a
decision—a
"go-to". }
Y.M. Make the difference clear, please.
O.M. The mind can freely SELECT, CHOOSE,
POINT OUT the right and just one—its
function stops
there. It can go no further in the matter. It
has no authority to say that the
right one shall
be acted upon and the wrong one discarded. That
authority is in other
hands.
Y.M. The man's?
O.M. In the {computer
and data base of the}
machine which stands for him. In his born
disposition
and the character
which has been built around it by training and environment.
Y.M. It will act upon the right one of the two?
O.M. It will do as it pleases in the matter. George
Washington's machine would act upon the
right one;
Pizarro would act upon the wrong one.
Y.M. Then as I understand
it a bad man's mental machinery calmly and judicially points out
which of two
things is right and just—
O.M. Yes, and his MORAL machinery will freely act
upon the other or the other, according
to
its make,
and be quite indifferent to the MIND'S feeling concerning
the matter—that is,
WOULD be, if
the mind had any feelings; which it hasn't. It
is merely a thermometer: it
registers the
heat and the cold, and cares
not a farthing about either.
Y.M. Then we must not claim that if a man KNOWS
which of two things is right he is
absolutely
BOUND to do that thing?
O.M. His temperament
and training will decide what he shall do, and he will do it;
he cannot
help himself,
he has no authority over the mater. Wasn't
it right for David to go out and
slay Goliath?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. Then it would have been equally RIGHT for any one else to do it?
Y.M. Certainly.
O.M. Then it would have been RIGHT for a born coward to attempt it?
Y.M. It would—yes.
O.M. You know that no born coward ever would have attempted it, don't you?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. You know that a born coward's make and temperament
would be an absolute and
insurmountable
bar to his ever essaying such a thing, don't you?
Y.M. Yes, I know it.
O.M. He clearly perceives that it would be RIGHT to try it?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. His mind has Free Choice
in determining that it would be RIGHT to try it?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. Then if by reason of his inborn cowardice he
simply can NOT essay it, what
becomes of
his Free
Will? Where is his Free Will?
Why claim that he has Free Will when the plain
facts show
that he hasn't? Why content that
because he and David SEE the right alike,
both must ACT
alike? Why impose the same laws upon goat and lion?
Y.M. There is really no such thing as Free
Will?
O.M. It is
what I think. There is WILL. But
it has nothing to do with INTELLECTUAL
PERCEPTIONS
OF RIGHT AND WRONG, and is not under their command.
David's
temperament
and training had Will, and it was a compulsory force;
David had to obey its
decrees, he
had no choice. The coward's temperament
and training possess Will, and IT
is compulsory;
it commands him to avoid danger, and he obeys, he has no choice.
But
neither the
Davids nor the cowards possess
Free Will—will that may do the right or do
the wrong,
as their MENTAL verdict shall decide. Ridley:309
Y.M. There is one thing which bothers me: I can't
tell where you draw the line between
MATERIAL covetousness
and SPIRITUAL covetousness.
O.M. I don't draw any.
Y.M. How do you mean?
O.M. There is no such thing as MATERIAL covetousness. All covetousness is spiritual
Y.M. ALL longings, desires, ambitions SPIRITUAL, never material?
O.M. Yes. The Master in you
requires that in ALL cases you shall content
his SPIRIT—that
alone.
He never requires anything else, he never interests
himself in any other matter.
Y.M. Ah, come! When
he covets somebody's money—isn't that rather distinctly material and
gross?
O.M. No. The
money is merely a symbol—it represents in visible and concrete form a
SPIRITUAL
DESIRE. Any so-called material
thing that you want is merely a symbol: you
want
it not for ITSELF, but because
it will content your spirit {give
you PcM}
for the
moment.
Y.M. Please particularize.
O.M. Very well. Maybe
the thing longed for is a new hat. You get it and your vanity is pleased,
your spirit
contented. Suppose your friends
deride the hat, make fun of it: at once it loses
its value;
you are ashamed of it, you put it out of your sight,
you never want to see it
again.
Y.M. I think I see. Go on.
O.M. It is the same hat, isn't it?
It is in no way altered. But it wasn't the HAT you
wanted, but
only what it
stood for—a something to please and content your SPIRIT.
When it failed of
that, the whole
of its value was gone. There
are no MATERIAL values; there are only
spiritual ones.
You will hunt in vain for a material value that is
ACTUAL, REAL—there is
no such thing.
The only value it possesses, for even a moment, is
the spiritual value back
of it:
remove that end and it is at once worthless—like the
hat.
Y.M. Can you extend that to money?
O.M. Yes. It is merely a symbol, it has no MATERIAL
value; you think you desire it
for its own
sake, but it
is not so. You desire it for
the spiritual content it will
bring; if it fail of that, you
discover that
its value is gone. There is that
pathetic tale of the man who labored like a
slave, unresting,
unsatisfied, until he had accumulated
a fortune, and was happy over it,
jubilant about
it; then in a single week a pestilence
swept away all whom he held dear
and left him
desolate. His money's value was gone. He
realized that his joy in it came not
from the money
itself, but from the spiritual
contentment he got out of his family's
enjoyment of
the pleasures and delights it
lavished upon them. Money has
no value;
MATERIAL value;
if you remove its spiritual value nothing is left but dross.
It is so with all
things, little
or big, majestic or trivial—there are no exceptions.
Crowns, scepters,
pennies, paste
jewels, village notoriety, world-wide fame—they are all the same,
they
have no MATERIAL
value: while they content the
SPIRIT they are precious, when this
fails they
are worthless {TEI}.
Y.M. You keep me confused and perplexed
all the time by your elusive terminology.
Sometimes you
divide a man up into two or three separate personalities,
each with
authorities,
jurisdictions, and responsibilities of its own, and
when he is in that condition I
can't grasp
it. Now when I speak of a man, he
is THE WHOLE THING IN ONE, and easy
to hold and
contemplate. {Twain's
disclaimer.}
O.M. That is pleasant and convenient, if true. When you speak of "my body" who is the "my"?
Y.M. It is the "me."
O.M. The body is a property then, and the Me owns it. Who is the Me?
Y.M. The Me is THE WHOLE THING; it is a common
property; an undivided ownership,
vested in the
whole entity.
O.M. If the Me admires a rainbow, is it the whole
Me that admires it, including the hair, hands,
heels, and
all?
Y.M. Certainly not. It is my MIND that admires it.
O.M. So YOU divide the Me yourself. Everybody does;
everybody must. What, then, definitely,
is the Me?
Y.M. I think it must consist of just those two parts— the
body and the mind
{the
computerized machine}.
O.M. You think so? If you say "I believe the world is round," who is the "I" that is speaking?
Y.M. The mind.
O.M. If you say "I grieve for the loss
of my father," who is the "I"?
Y.M. The mind.
O.M. Is the mind exercising an intellectual function
when it examines and accepts the evidence
that the world
is round?
Y.M. Yes.
O.M. Is it exercising an intellectual function when it grieves for the loss of your father?
Y.M. That is not cerebration, brain-work, it is a matter of FEELING.
O.M. Then its source is not in your mind, but in your MORAL territory?
Y.M. I have to grant it.
O.M. Is your mind a part of your PHYSICAL equipment?
Y.M. No. It is independent of it; it is spiritual. {Spinoza-Descartes - Ryle:18}
O.M. Being spiritual, it cannot be affected by physical influences?
Y.M. No.
O.M. Does the mind remain sober with the body is drunk?
Y.M. Well—no.
O.M. There IS a physical effect present, then?
Y.M. It looks like it.
O.M. A cracked skull has resulted in a crazy mind.
Why should it happen if the mind is
spiritual,
and INDEPENDENT of physical influences?
Y.M. Well—I don't know.
O.M. When you have a pain in your foot, how do you know it?
Y.M. I feel it.
O.M. But you do not feel it until a nerve reports
the hurt to the brain. Yet the brain is the seat
of the mind,
is it not?
Y.M. I think so.
O.M. But isn't spiritual
enough to learn what is happening in the outskirts
without the help of
the PHYSICAL
messenger? You perceive that
the question of who or what the Me is, is
not a simple
one at all. You say "I admire
the rainbow," and "I
believe the world is round,"
and in these
cases we find that the Me is not speaking, but only the MENTAL part.
You
say, "I
grieve," and again the Me is not all speaking, but only the MORAL
part. You say
the mind is
wholly spiritual; then you say
"I have a pain" and find that this time the Me is
mental AND
spiritual combined. We all use
the "I" in this indeterminate fashion, there is
no help for
it. We imagine a Master and King
{Observer,
Pineal Gland,
Soul}
over what you call
The Whole Thing,
and we speak of him as "I," but when we
try to define him we find we
cannot do it.
The intellect and the feelings can act quite INDEPENDENTLY
of each
other;
we recognize that, and we look around for a Ruler
who is master over both, and
can serve as
a DEFINITE AND INDISPUTABLE "I," and
enable us to know what we
mean and who
or what we are talking about when
we use that pronoun, but we have
to give it
up and confess that we cannot find him. To
me, Man is a machine, made up of
many mechanisms,
the moral and mental ones acting automatically in
accordance with
the impulses
of an interior Master who is built out of born-temperament
and an
accumulation
of multitudinous outside influences and trainings;
a machine whose ONE
function is
to secure the spiritual contentment
of the Master, be his desires
good or be
they evil;
a machine whose Will is absolute and must be obeyed,
and always IS obeyed.
Y.M. Maybe the Me is the Soul?
O.M. Maybe it is. What is the Soul?
Y.M. I don't know.
O.M. Neither does any one else.
The Master Passion: {
Conatus }
Y.M. What is the Master?—or, in common speech, the Conscience? Explain it.
O.M. It is that mysterious autocrat,
lodged in a man, which compels the man to content its
desires.
It may be called the Master Passion—the hunger for
Self-Approval.
Y.M. Where is its seat?
O.M. In man's moral constitution.
Y.M. Are its commands for the man's good?
O.M. It is indifferent to the man's good;
it never concerns itself about anything but the
satisfying
of its own desires.
It can be TRAINED to prefer things which will be for
the
man's good,
but it will prefer them only because they will content
IT better than other
things would.
Y.M. Then even when it is trained to high ideals
it is still looking out for its own contentment,
and not for
the man's good.
O.M. True. Trained or untrained, it cares nothing
for the man's good, and never concerns itself
about it.
Y.M. It seems to be an IMMORAL force seated in the man's moral constitution.
O.M. It is a COLORLESS force seated in the man's
moral constitution. Let us call
it an
instinct—a
blind, unreasoning instinct, which
cannot and does not distinguish between
good
morals and bad ones, and cares
nothing for results to the man provided its own
contentment
be secured; and it will ALWAYS
secure that.
Y.M. It seeks money, and it probably considers
that that is an advantage for the man?
O.M. It is not always seeking money, it is not always seeking power,
nor office, nor any other
MATERIAL advantage.
In ALL cases it seeks a SPIRITUAL
contentment, let the MEANS
be what they
may. Its desires are determined
by the man's temperament— and it is lord
over that.
Temperament, Conscience, Susceptibility, Spiritual
Appetite, are, in fact, the
same thing.
Have you ever heard of a person who cared nothing
for money?
Y.M. Yes. A scholar who would not leave his garret
and his books to take a place in a
business house
at a large salary.
O.M. He had to satisfy his master—that is to say,
his temperament, his Spiritual Appetite—and
it preferred
books to money. Are there other cases?
Y.M. Yes, the hermit.
O.M. It is a good instance. The
hermit endures solitude, hunger, cold, and manifold perils, to
content his
autocrat, who prefers these things,
and prayer and contemplation, to money
or to any show
or luxury that money can buy. Are
there others?
Y.M. Yes. The artist, the poet, the scientist.
O.M. Their autocrat prefers the deep pleasures of these occupations,
either well paid or ill
paid,
to any others in the market, at any price. You
REALIZE that the Master
Passion—the
contentment of the spirit—concerns
itself with many things besides
so-called
material advantage, material prosperity, cash, and all that?
{the
O.M.'s doctrine}
Y.M. I think I must concede it.
O.M. I believe you must. There
are perhaps as many Temperaments that would refuse the
burdens
and vexations and distinctions of public office as there are that hunger
after
them.
The one set of Temperaments seek the contentment of
the spirit, and that alone;
and
this is exactly the case with the other set. Neither
set seeks anything BUT the
contentment
of the spirit. If the one is sordid, both are sordid;
and equally so, since the
end in
view is precisely the same in both cases. And
in both cases Temperament
decides
the preference—and Temperament is BORN, not made.
O.M. You have been taking a holiday?
Y.M. Yes; a mountain tramp covering a week. Are you ready to talk?
O.M. Quite ready. What shall we begin with?
Y.M. Well, lying abed resting up, two days and
nights, I have thought over all these talks, and
passed
them carefully in review. With
this result: that . . . that . . . are you intending to
publish
your notions about Man some day?
O.M. Now and then, in these past twenty years,
the Master inside of me has
half-intended to
order
me to set them to paper and publish them. Do
I have to tell you why the order has
remained
unissued, or can you explain so simply a thing without my help? { Rationalizers
}
Y.M. By your doctrine, it is
simplicity itself: outside influences
moved your interior Master to
give
the order; stronger outside influences deterred him.
Without the outside influences,
neither
of these impulses could ever have been born, since
a person's brain is incapable
or originating
an idea within itself.
O.M. Correct. Go on.
Y.M. The matter of publishing or withholding is
still in your Master's hands. If some day an
outside
influence shall determine him to publish, he
will give the order, and it will be
obeyed.
O.M. That is correct. Well?
Y.M. Upon reflection I have arrived at the conviction
that the publication of your doctrines
would
be harmful. Do you pardon me?
O.M. Pardon YOU? You have done nothing.
You are an instrument—a speaking-trumpet.
Speaking-trumpets
are not responsible for what is said through them.
Outside
influences—
in the form of lifelong teachings, trainings, notions, prejudices,
and other
second-hand
importations—have persuaded the Master within you
that the publication
of these
doctrines would be harmful.
Very well, this is quite natural, and was to be
expected;
in fact, was inevitable. Go on;
for the sake of ease and convenience, stick to
habit:
speak in the first person, and tell me what your Master thinks about it.
Y.M. Well, to begin: it is a desolating
doctrine; it is not inspiring,
enthusing, uplifting. It takes
the glory
out of man, it takes the pride out of him, it takes the heroism out of
him, it
denies
him all personal credit, all applause;
it not only degrades him to a machine, but
allows
him no control over the machine; makes
a mere coffee-mill of him, and neither
permits
him to supply the coffee nor turn the crank, his
sole and piteously humble
function
being to grind coarse or fine, according to his make,
outside impulses doing the
rest.
O.M. It is correctly stated. Tell me—what do men admire most in each other?
Y.M. Intellect, courage, majesty of build, beauty
of countenance, charity, benevolence,
magnanimity,
kindliness, heroism, and—and—
O.M. I would not go any further.
These are ELEMENTALS. Virtue, fortitude, holiness,
truthfulness,
loyalty, high ideals— these, and
all the related qualities that are named in
the dictionary,
are MADE OF THE ELEMENTALS, by
blendings, combinations, and
shadings of
the elementals, just as one makes green by blending blue and yellow,
and
makes several
shades and tints of red by modifying the elemental red.
There are several
elemental colors;
they are all in the rainbow; out
of them we manufacture and name fifty
shades of them.
You have named the elementals of the human rainbow,
and also one
BLEND—heroism,
which is made out of courage and magnanimity. Very
well, then; which
of these elements
does the possessor of it manufacture for himself? Is it intellect?
Y.M. No.
O.M. Why?
Y.M. He is born with it.
O.M. Is it courage?
Y.M. No. He is born with it.
O.M. Is it majesty of build, beauty of countenance?
Y.M. No. They are birthrights.
O.M. Take those others—the elemental moral qualities— charity, benevolence,
magnanimity,
kindliness;
fruitful seeds, out of which spring, through cultivation
by outside influences, all
the manifold
blends and combinations of virtues named in the dictionaries:
does man
manufacture
any of those seeds, or are they all born in him?
Y.M. Born in him.
O.M. Who manufactures them {immanently},
then?
Y.M. God.
O.M. Where does the credit of it belong?
Y.M. To God.
O.M. And the glory of which you spoke, and the applause?
Y.M. To God.
O.M. Then it is YOU who degrade man.
You make him claim glory, praise, flattery, for every
valuable thing
he possesses— BORROWED finery, the whole of it; no
rag of it earned by
himself, not
a detail of it produced by his own labor. YOU
make man a humbug; have I
done worse
by him?
Y.M. You have made a machine of him.
O.M. Who devised that cunning and beautiful mechanism, a man's hand?
Y.M. God.
O.M. Who devised the law
by which it automatically hammers out of a piano an
elaborate
piece of music,
without error, while the man is thinking about something else,
or talking to
a friend?
Y.M. God.
O.M. Who devised the blood?
Who devised the wonderful machinery which automatically
drives its
renewing and refreshing streams through the body, day and night,
without
assistance
or advice from the man? Who devised
the man's mind, whose machinery
works automatically,
interests itself in what it pleases, regardless of its will or desire,
labors
all night when it likes, deaf to his appeals for mercy?
G-D devised
all these things.
I have not
made man a machine, G-D made him a machine. I
am merely calling attention
to the fact,
nothing more. Is it wrong to call attention to the fact? Is it a crime?
{I conjecture
Mark
Twain means Spinoza's G-D; therefore
I have changed all of Mark Twain's spellings of God to G-D where I
believe
Spinoza's immanent G-D is meant.}
Y.M. I think it is wrong to EXPOSE
a fact {no
praise, no blame}
when harm {going
berserk} can come
of it.
O.M. Go on.
Y.M. Look at the matter
as it stands now. Man has been
taught that he is the supreme
marvel of the
Creation; he believes it; in
all the ages he has never doubted it, whether he
was a naked
savage, or clothed in purple and fine linen, and civilized.
This has made his
heart buoyant,
his life cheery. His pride in
himself, his sincere admiration of himself, his
joy in what
he supposed were his own and unassisted achievements,
and his exultation
over the praise
and applause which they evoked—these have exalted him,
enthused him,
ambitioned
him to higher and higher flights; in a word, made his life worth
the living. But
by your scheme,
all this is abolished; he is
degraded to a machine, he is a nobody, his |
noble prides
wither to mere vanities; let
him strive as he may, he can never be any better
than his humblest
and stupidest neighbor; he would
never be cheerful again, his
life
would not be
worth the living. {Troubling
to Young Man.}
O.M. You really think that?
Y.M. I certainly do.
O.M. Have you ever seen me uncheerful, unhappy.
Y.M. No.
O.M. Well, I believe these things. Why have they not made me unhappy?
Y.M. Oh, well—temperament, of course! You never let THAT escape from your scheme.
O.M. That is correct. If a man is born with an unhappy
temperament, nothing can make him
happy; if he
is born with a happy temperament, nothing can make him unhappy.
Y.M. What—not even a degrading and heart-chilling system of beliefs?
O.M. Beliefs?
Mere beliefs? Mere convictions? They are powerless. They strive in vain
against
inborn temperament.
Y.M. I can't believe that, and I don't.
O.M. Now you are speaking hastily. It shows that
you have not studiously examined the facts.
Of all your
intimates, which one is the happiest? Isn't it Burgess?
Y.M. Easily.
O.M. And which one is the unhappiest? Henry Adams?
Y.M. Without a question!
O.M. I know them well. They
are extremes, abnormals; their temperaments are as opposite as
the poles.
Their life-histories are about alike—but look at the
results! Their ages are
about the same—about
around fifty. Burgess had always
been buoyant, hopeful, happy;
Adams has always
been cheerless, hopeless, despondent. As
young fellows both tried
country journalism—and
failed. Burgess didn't seem to
mind it; Adams couldn't smile, he
could only
mourn and groan over what had happened and
torture himself with vain
regrets for
not having done so and so instead
of so and so—THEN he would have
succeeded.
They tried the law— and failed.
Burgess remained happy—because he
couldn't help
it. Adams was wretched—because he couldn't help it.
From that day to this,
those two men
have gone on trying things and failing: Burgess
has come out happy and
cheerful every
time; Adams the reverse. And
we do absolutely know that these men's
inborn temperaments
have remained unchanged through all the vicissitudes
of their
material affairs.
Let us see how it is with their immaterials.
Both have been zealous
Democrats;
both have been zealous Republicans; both have been zealous Mugwumps.
Burgess
has always found happiness and
Adams unhappiness in these several political
beliefs and
in their migrations out of them. Both
of these men have been Presbyterians,
Universalists,
Methodists, Catholics—then Presbyterians again, then
Methodists again.
Burgess
has always found rest in these excursions, and Adams unrest.
They are trying
Christian Science,
now, with the customary result, the inevitable result.
No political or
religious belief
can make Burgess unhappy or the other man happy. I
assure you it is
purely a matter
of temperament. Beliefs
are ACQUIREMENTS, temperaments are BORN;
beliefs are
subject to change {software},
nothing whatever can change temperament
{hardware}.
Y.M. You have instanced extreme temperaments.
O.M. Yes, the half-dozen others are modifications
of the extremes. But the law
is the same.
Where the temperament
is two-thirds happy, or two-thirds unhappy, no
political or
religious beliefs
can change the proportions. The
vast majority of temperaments are
pretty equally
balanced; the intensities are
absent, and this enables a nation to learn to
accommodate
itself to its political and religious circumstances and like them,
be satisfied
with them,
at last prefer them. Nations
do not THINK, they only FEEL. They get their
feelings at
second hand through their temperaments, not their brains.
A nation can be
brought— by
force of circumstances, not argument—to
reconcile itself to ANY KIND OF
GOVERNMENT
OR RELIGION
THAT CAN BE DEVISED;
in time it will fit itself to the
required conditions;
later, it will prefer them and will fiercely fight for them.
As instances,
you have all
history: the Greeks, the Romans, the Persians, the
Egyptians, the Russians,
the Germans,
the French, the English, the Spaniards, the Americans,
the South
Americans,
the Japanese, the Chinese, the Hindus, the Turks—a
thousand wild and
tame religions,
every kind of government that can be thought of, from
tiger to house-cat,
each
nation KNOWING it has the only true religion and
the only sane system of
government,
each despising all the others, each an ass and not
suspecting it, each
proud of its
fancied supremacy,
each perfectly sure it is the pet of God,
each without
undoubting
confidence summoning Him to take command in time of war,
each surprised
when He goes
over to the enemy, but by habit
able to excuse it and resume
compliments—in
a word, the whole human race content, always
content, persistently
content, indestructibly
content, happy, thankful, proud, NO
MATTER WHAT ITS
RELIGION IS,
NOR WHETHER ITS MASTER BE TIGER OR HOUSE-CAT. Am
I stating
facts? You
know I am. Is the human race cheerful? You know it is.
Considering what it
can stand,
and be happy, you do me too much
honor when you think that I can place
before it
a system of plain cold facts that can take the cheerfulness
out of it. Nothing can
do that.
Everything has been tried. Without success. I beg
you not to be troubled
{because I
conclude that Darwinian natural selection
will take care of your troubles}.

From Richard
Dawkins' "The Selfish Gene";
Oxford University Press;
ISBN:
0192860925;
Page 2—Machines Created by our Genes.
Before beginning on my argument itself, I want to explain briefly what sort of an argument it is, and what sort of an argument it is not. If we were told that a man had lived a long and prosperous life in the world of Chicago gangsters, we would be entitled to make some guesses as to the sort of man he was. We might expect that he would have qualities such as toughness, a quick trigger finger, and the ability to attract loyal friends. These would not be infallible deductions, but you can make some inferences about a man's character if you know something about the conditions in which he has survived and prospered. The argument of this book is that we, and all other animals, are machines created by our genes. Like successful Chicago gangsters, our genes have survived, in some cases for millions of years, in a highly competitive world. This entitles us to expect certain qualities in our genes. I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene is ruthless selfishness. This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behaviour. However, as we shall see, there are special circumstances in which a gene can achieve its own selfish goals best by fostering a limited form of altruism {enlightened self-interest} at the level of individual animals. 'Special' and 'limited' are important words in the last sentence. Much as we might wish to believe otherwise, universal love and the welfare of the species as a whole are concepts that simply do not make evolutionary sense.
From Richard
Dawkins' The Selfish Gene; 0192860925;
p. 276—Brains and Computers.
p. 49 Brains may be regarded as analogous in function to computers. They are analogous in that both types of machines generate complex patterns of output, after analysis of complex patterns of input , and after reference to stored information {data base}.
Statements like this worry literal-minded critics. They are right, of course, that brains differ in many respects from computers. Their internal methods of working, for instance, happen to be very different from the particular kind of computers that our technology has developed. This in no way reduces the truth of my statement about their being analogous in function. Functionally, the brain plays precisely the role of on-board computer—data processing, pattern recognition, short-term and long-term data storage, operation coordination, and so on. {Storage Technology}
From Richard Dawkins'
"The Selfish Gene"; 0192860925;
p. 192—Cultural Evolution.
[1] ... The gene, the DNA molecule, happens to be the replicating entity that prevails on our own planet. There may be others. If there are, provided certain other conditions are met, they will almost inevitably tend to become the basis for an evolutionary process.
[2] But do we have to go to distant worlds to find other kinds of replicator and other, consequent, kinds of evolution? I think that a new kind of replicator has recently emerged on this very planet. It is staring us in the face. It is still in its infancy, still drifting clumsily about in its primeval soup, but already it is achieving evolutionary change at a rate that leaves the old gene panting far behind.
[3] The new soup is the soup of human culture. We need a name for the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation. 'Mimeme' comes from a suitable Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit like 'gene'. I hope my classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme. If it is any consolation, it could alternatively be thought of as being related to 'memory', or to the French word même. It should be pronounced to rhyme with 'cream'.
[4] Examples of memes are {concept of G-D,} tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool by leaping from body to body via sperms or eggs {hardware}, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in the broad sense, can be called imitation {software} {functionalism}. If a scientist hears, or reads about, a good idea, he passes it on to his colleagues and students. He mentions it in his articles and his lectures. If the idea catchs on, it can be said to propagate itself, spreading from brain to brain. As my colleague N. K. Humphrey neatly summed up an earlier draft of this chapter: . . . memes should be regarded as living structures, not just metaphorically but technically. When you plant a fertile meme in my mind you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme's propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism of a host cell. And this isn't just a way of talking—the meme for, say, "belief in life after death" {i.e., their religion} is actually realized physically, millions of times over, as a structure in the nervous systems of individual men the world over.
[5] Consider the idea of God {god(s), God, G-D}. We do not know how it arose in the meme pool. Probably it originated many times by independent 'mutation'. In any case, it is very old indeed. How does it replicate page 193 itself? By the spoken and written word, aided by great music and great art. Why does it have such high survival value? {Because it brings PcM.} Remember that 'survival value' here does not mean value for a gene in a gene pool, but value for a meme in a meme pool. The question really means: What is it about the idea of a god that gives it its stability and penetrance in the cultural environment? The survival value of the god meme in the meme pool results from its great psychological appeal. It provides a superficially plausible answer to deep and troubling questions about existence {and thereby achieving PcM}. It suggests that injustices in this world may be rectified in the next. The 'everlasting arms' hold out a cushion against our own inadequacies which, like a doctor's placebo, is none the less effective for being imaginary. These are some of the reasons why the idea of God is copied so readily by successive generations of individual brains. God exists, if only in the form of a meme with high survival value, or infective power, in the environment provided by human culture.
From
Richard Dawkins'
The Blind Watchmaker —Why the evidence
of evolution reveals a universe without
design; 1996; 0393315703;
p. 217—Genes and Memes:
Languages {memes} clearly evolve in that they show trends, they diverge, and as the centuries go by after their divergence they become more and more mutually unintelligible. The numerous islands of the Pacific provide a beautiful workshop for the study of language evolution. The languages of different islands clearly resemble each other, and their differences can be measured precisely by the numbers of words that differ between them, a measure that is closely analogous to the molecular taxonomic measures that we shall discuss in Chapter 10. Difference between languages, measured in numbers of divergent words, can be plotted on a graph against distance between islands, measured in miles, and it turns out that the points on the graph fall on a curve whose precise mathematical shape tells us something about rates of diffusion from island to island. Words travelled by canoe, island-hopping at intervals proportional to the degree of remoteness of the islands concerned. Within any one island words change at a steady rate, in very much the same way as genes occasionally mutate. Any island, if completely isolated, would exhibit some evolutionary change in its language as time went by, and hence some divergence from the languages of other islands. Islands that are near each other obviously have a higher rate of word flow between them, via canoe, than islands that are far from each other. Their languages also have a more recent common ancestor than the languages of islands that are far apart. These phenomena, which explain the observed pattern of resemblances between near and distant islands, are closely analogous to the facts about finches on different islands of the Galapagos Archipelago which originally inspired Charles Darwin. Genes island-hop in the bodies of birds, just as words island- hop in canoes.
From Richard Dawkins'
The Ancestor's Tale; 0618005838;
p. 546—Altuism.
What is so special about humans that we have managed to overcome our antisocial instincts and build roads that we all share? Oh, there is so much. No other species comes remotely close to a welfare state, to an organisation that takes care of the old, that looks after the sick and the orphaned, that gives to charity. On the face of it these things present a challenge to Darwinism {not the survival of the fittest}, but this is not the place to go into that. We have governments, police, taxation, public works to which we all subscribe whether we like it or not. The man who wrote, 'Sir, You are very kind, but I'd prefer not to join your Income Tax Scheme', heard back, we may be sure, from the Inland Revenue. Unfortunately, no other species has invented the tax. They have, however, invented the (virtual) fence. An individual can secure his exclusive use of a resource if he actively defends it against rivals.
Many species of animals are territorial, not just birds and mammals, but fish and insects too. They defend an area against rivals of the same species, often so as to sequester a private feeding ground, or a private courtship bower or nesting area. An animal with a large territory might benefit by building a network of good, flat roads across the territory from which rivals were excluded. ....
MT:
A Computer of Sorts - From Daniel
Dennett's Book XXVII:433.
Robinson4:156,169
How could the brain be the seat of
consciousness? This
has usually been treated as a rhetorical question by philosophers,
suggesting that an answer to it would be quite beyond
human comprehension. A primary
goal of this book has been to demolish that presumption.
I have argued that you can imagine how all that complicated
slew of activity in the brain amounts to conscious experience.
My argument is straightforward: I have shown you how
to do it. It turns out that the
way to imagine this is to think of the brain as a computer
of sorts. The concepts of computer
science provide the crutches of imagination we need if we are to stumble
across the terra incognita {unknown
land} between
our phenomenology as we know it by "introspection"
{observation
or examination of one's own mental and emotional state, mental processes,
etc.} and our brains
as science reveals them to us. By
thinking of our brains as information-processing systems
we can gradually dispel the fog and pick our way across
the great divide, discovering
how it might be that our brains produce all the phenomena.
There are many treacherous pitfalls to avoid—such
inviting dead ends as the Central Meaner, {subjective}
"filling in," and "qualia
{intrinsic
qualities; a gun can be either 'good' or 'bad'}",
for instance—and no doubt there are still some residual
confusions and outright errors in the sketch I have provided,
but at least we can now see what a path would be like.
From
The Teaching
Company's Tapes; The
Great Ideas of Philosophy,
2nd
Edition; 2004; Professor
Daniel N. Robinson—Consciousness.
Lecture 47; Part 4 Transcript, p.169; William James' Pragmatism—Consciousness.
There's a famous brief treatise by James on the question "Does consciousness exist?" And, of course, the answer James serves up is "yes and no." It depends on what you mean by consciousness. If you think of it as a kind of medieval {Cartesian} substance—some immaterial, spaceless, massless, but nonetheless ontologically real thing—no, that doesn't exist at all. But, if you think of it as this flow of ideas, this stream of perceptions and thoughts and feelings—the process by which a supernumerary intelligence knits together experiences over a course of time—then consciousness is indubitable. {Scroll down for more.}
Lecture 46; Part 4 Transcript, p.156; The Radical William James—Consciousness.
Mind, however, is not going to be
treated as some sort of Cartesian substance
or entity. On James's account, "consciousness" is not an entity,
but a process. This is not to depreciate
consciousness. Rather, it is a process not only as real as anything else
{a
verb},
but the one on which something ever enters reality as known, anything would
enter reality as known.
This is an organ, this brain—this
is an organ that has a "hair-trigger" sensitivity; left to its
own devices, it would be popping off constantly. Mind, as such—mental
processes, as such, consciousness as such—should
be understood as having this one function: the regulation of the activity
of the brain itself {so
that we survive to an advanced state—evolution}.
It's an odd notion, but an interesting one.
MT:
A Computer of Sorts - From Ed Sexton's Dawkins and the Selfish
Gene; 2001;
ISBN: 1840462388;
p.14: Ridley:7,
Ridley:49,
Just as a computer disk is essentially a long series of
data split into different files, so a single
DNA molecule may have many
functional genes encoded along its length. Unlike
the binary
system of computers, however, in which every 'bit' of data is represented
by a 0 or a 1, DNA
uses four different chemical compounds, called nucleotides.
These are usually written A,
T, C and G, using the first letters of their chemical names. If you 'read'
the sequence on a computer disk,
you may get '10001001110', whereas a DNA sequence
would look like 'ATTCGATTCG'.
When DNA is sequenced, the result is a gel with four
columns marked in correspondence to the four 'letters'
of DNA's alphabet. Distance along the
DNA molecule is represented
vertically, and horizontal lines in each column show
which letter is at that position. I mention this only
because it is one of the media's stock images
when discussing the matter.
{Storage
Technology}
In general, the information encoded by DNA
is used for making one thing: proteins." These
proteins not only make up the organic structures of
which you and I are composed, they also
regulate in precise detail the workings of the cell, and hence the organism.
They control chemical reactions
responsible for everything from digesting your food to repairing
damaged skin. It is through proteins that DNA makes
its mark on the world. Change the DNA
sequence and you change the protein sequence, thus the effect it has on
the organism. 'Start' and 'stop'
signals ensure that the cell 'knows' where protein-encoding
regions begin and end—molecular biologists call this
functional unit a 'cistron'
to avoid the problems of the
ill-defined gene. To distinguish between the information carried on DNA
and its effects, biologists use the terms
'genotype' and 'phenotype'. Suppose you carry a
gene for blue eyes: your genotype describes the DNA
involved, while the phenotype (the gene's
effects) is 'blue eyes'. The complete genotype of an organism—i.e., all
its genes— is called its 'genome'.
In many organisms, the genome is split between several long DNA
molecules—'chromosomes'.
In our computer analogy, this corresponds to having several
disks of data. Ridley:7,
Ridley:49.
From Matt Ridley's Genome; 1999; 0060932902, p. 49—Structure of DNA:
.... they, {Watson and Crick,} had made possibly the greatest scientific discovery of all time, the structure of DNA. Not even Archimedes leaping from his bath had been granted greater reason to boast, as Francis Crick did in the Eagle pub on 28 February 1953, 'We've discovered the secret of life.' James Watson was mortified; he still feared that they might have made a mistake.
But they had not. All was suddenly clear: DNA contained a code written along the length of an elegant, intertwined staircase of a double helix, of potentially infinite length. That code copied itself by means of chemical affinities between its letters and spelt out the recipes for proteins by means of an as yet unknown phrasebook linking DNA to protein. The stunning significance of the structure of DNA was how simple it made everything seem and yet how beautiful. As Richard Dawkins has put it, 'What is truly revolutionary about molecular biology in the post-Watson-Crick era is that it has become digital ... the machine code of the genes is uncannily computer-like.'
MT:
A Computer of Sorts - From Richard
Dawkins' The Blind Watchmaker —Why
the evidence of evolution reveals a universe without
design; 1996; 0393315703;
p.115—Electronic and Chemical
Storage Mediums:
In our electronic technology the discrete, digital locations have only two states conventionally represented as 0 and 1 although you can think of them as high and low, on and off, up and down: all that matters is that they should be distinct from one another, and that the pattern of their states can be 'read out' so that it can have some influence on something. Electronic technology uses various physical media for storing 1s and 0s, including magnetic discs, magnetic tape, punched cards and tape, and integrated 'chips' with lots of little semi-conductor units inside them.
The main storage medium inside willow seeds, ants and all other living cells is not electronic but chemical. It exploits the fact that certain kinds of molecule are capable of 'polymerizing', that is joining up in long chains of indefinite length. There are lots of different kinds of polymer. For example, 'polythene' is made of long chains of the small molecule called ethylene - polymerized ethylene. Starch and cellulose are polymerized sugars. Some polymers, instead of being uniform chains of one small molecule like ethylene, are chains of two or more different kinds of small molecule. As soon as such heterogeneity enters into a polymer chain, information technology becomes a theoretical possibility. If there are two kinds of small molecule in the chain, the two can be thought of as 1 and 0 respectively, and immediately any amount of information, of any kind, can be stored, provided only that the chain is long enough. The particular polymers used by living cells are called polynucleotides. There are two main families of polynucleotides in living cells, called DNA and RNA for short. Both are chains of small molecules called nucleotides. Both DNA and RNA are heterogeneous chains, with four different kinds of nucleotides. This, of course, is where the opportunity for information storage lies. Instead of just the two states 1 and 0, the information technology of living cells uses four states, which we may conventionally represent as A, T, C and G. There is very little difference, in principle, between a two-state binary information technology like ours, and a four-state information technology like that of the living cell.
MT:
Functionalism - From Joseph
LeDoux's Book XXIX96:27—
Is
Consciousness Computable? {See
Roger Penrose's "Shadows
of the Mind" Page 393}
[1] One of the most important conceptual developments in the establishment of cognitive science was a philosophical position known as functionalism {Robinson5:14}, which holds that intelligent functions carried out by different machines reflect the same underlying process.
{WkipediA
- Second Para.}: According
to functionalism, the mental states that make up
consciousness can essentially be
defined as complex interactions between different
functional processes. Because these processes are not limited to a particular
physical state or physical medium, they can be realized in multiple ways,
including,
theoretically, within non-biological systems.
For example, a computer and a person can both add 2 + 5 and come up with 7. The fact that both achieve the same answer cannot be explained by the use of similar hardware—brains are made of biological stuff and computers of electronic parts. The similar outcome must be due to a similar process that occurs at a functional level. In spite of the fact that the hardware in the machines is vastly different, the software or program that each executes may be the same. Functionalism thus holds that the mind {software} is to the brain {hardware} as a computer program {applications and data base—software} is to the computer hardware. {Storage Technology}
[2] Cognitive scientists,
carrying the functionalist banner, have
been allowed to pursue the functional organization of the mind
without reference to the hardware that generates the
functional states. According
to functionalist doctrine, cognitive science stands on its own as a discipline—it
does not require that we know anything about the brain.
This logic was a shot in the arm to the field, giving
it a strong sense of independence. Regardless
of whether they do experiments on humans or
use computer simulations of the human mind, many cognitive scientists today
are functionalists.
[3]
Page 28
[3]Page
28 
This is a philosophical position which proposes that mental functions (thinking, reasoning, planning, feeling) are functional {being, i.e. verbs} rather than physical states {nouns}. When a person and a computer add 2 to 5 and come up with 7, the similar outcome cannot be based on similar physical makeup, but instead must be due to a functional equivalence of the processes involved. As a result, it is possible to study mental processes using computer simulations. Minds might in principle even exist without bodies. (Based on J.A. Fodor, The Mind-Body Problem. Scientific American [January 1981], Vol. 244, p. 118.)
{If the ghost in the lower right-hand of Fig. 2-2 above, represents Descartes' ghost-in-the-machine, I think it would be more correct not to give the answer '7', because the ghost, even if it existed, is transcendent to us.}
{WkipediA
- Fourth Para.}: Functionalism's
explanation of consciousness, or
the mental,
is best understood when considering the analogy {Fig.
2-2} made
by functionalists
between the mind and the modern digital
computer. More specifically, the analogy is
made to a "machine" capable of computing any given algorithm
(i.e. a Turing machine).
This machine would involve: {Storage
Technology, Robinson5:14.}
1. Data input (the senses
in humans). {Education,
Experiences, Trainng.}
2. Data output
(both behaviour and memory). {Decision,
Storing.}
3. Functional states
(mental states). {Thinking,
Analyzing, Hypothsizing, Calculating.}
4. The ability
to move from one functional state into another.
5. The definition of functional states with reference to the part
they play in the
operation of the entire entity - i.e. in
reference to the other functional states.
So long as the same process was
achieved, the "physical stuff"—that
being computer
hardware or biological structure—could achieve
consciousness.
MT:
Functionalism—From The
Teaching Company's Tapes; The
Great Ideas of Philosophy,
2nd Edition; 2004; Professor
Daniel N. Robinson's
Lecture 50; Part 5 Transcript, pp.
14 & 15; Alan Turing
in the Forest of Wisdom—Functionalism
and Problem Solving.
Human beings just happen to be biological instantiations of something that otherwise could be instantiated non-biologically; it can be instantiated by galenium sulfide crystals, by popping diodes, printed circuits, all sorts of things made in the Silicon Valley and sold by Japanese companies. ...
... Now, one interesting consequence of this is that it's
no longer necessary to reserve the domain
of intelligent life to the domain of brainy life, and so one thing I say
that comes out of Turing's
efforts here is what is sometimes referred to as "machine
functionalism within philosophy
of mind." That is, the real challenge and philosophy of mind becomes
not an understanding of how the
brain works as a biological entity, but an understanding of the
computational achievements of an organ like this,
and the extent to which those achievements
can be mimicked or mirrored in many other kinds of devices, many other
kinds of machines properly programmed
and having sufficient power. So, the task for a developed
philosophy of mind, then, doesn't become a task in neurophysiology;
it becomes a task in computer
science. The brain, then, is just one kind of device that does
that sort of thing; it can be achieved by many other
ways, and what makes a performance an
intelligent performance, then; is not that it's achieved by a brain, but
that it solves problems of a
certain kind. Thus, anything that also solves problems of that kind is
performing intelligently.
MT: Neurons and Persons - An insight gotten from Joseph LeDoux's Book XXIX96:139.
[1] A neuron (nerve cell) is composed of "dendrite—>cell—>axon". Neuron electrical charges flow from dendrite to cell to axon terminal. An axon connects {across a synapse} to the dendrite (or cell) of the next cell down the line. Billions of axons connect to billions of dendrites.
[2] Other analogies are the way knowledge is propagated throughout the world, hearing, reading, etc—>person—>talking, writing, etc. Thus billions of people connect to billions of people. {Memes}
[3] In computer talk 'downloading—>person—>uploading'. Thus billions of people connect to billions of people.
[4] All the above are the infinite, immanent systems in G-D.
MT:
ROM & RAM - From Joseph
LeDoux's Book XXVIII:178.
{Is
Consciousness Computable?, Cosmides
& Tooby, Storage
Technologies.}
[1] In the spirit of viewing the mind in terms of computer-like operations, some cognitive scientists like Tim Shallice and Phillip Johnson-Laird have referred to executive functions as supervisory or operating system functions. A computer operating system is responsible for controlling the flow of information processing, moving information from permanent memory (ROM) to a central processing unit with active memory (RAM), scheduling tasks to be preformed using the active memory, and so on. Similarly, executive functions are involved in the constant updating of temporary memory, selecting which specialized systems to work with (pay attention to) at the moment, and then moving relevant information into the workspace from long-storage by retrieving specific memories or activating schemata pertinent to the immediate situation. Through executive functions, specialized systems are also directed to attend to certain specific stimuli and to ignore others, depending on what working memory is working on. In complex tasks involving multiple kinds of mental activities, executive functions plan the sequence of mental steps and schedule the participation of the different activities, switching the focus of attention between activities as needed {interrupts}. Executive functions are crucially involved in decision-making, allowing you to choose between different courses of action given what is happening in the present, what you know about such situations, and what you can expect to happen if you do different things in this particular situation. Executive functions, in short, make practical thinking and reasoning possible.
[2] The executive represents a powerful mental capacity, but is not all-powerful. Like the workspace, it has its limits. It basically can do one or at most a few things at a time. This is why you forget a phone number if you are distracted while dialing. With practice and training, we can learn to divide our attention between two mental tasks simultaneously, but only with difficulty. In this sense, the executive is more like an old-fashioned DOS operating system that can only run one program at a time than like a multitasking Windows operating system that can concurrently run word processing, spreadsheet, e-mail, calendar, and other programs.
[3] ..... If the executive has to work on multiple unrelated goals at the same time, however, the system begins to page 179 fall apart, especially if the goals conflict with one another. An easy way to stress people is to make them do too much at once {computers crash, people have nervous breakdowns}. Planning, decision-making, and other aspects of mental life suffer when the executive is overloaded. {Storage Technologies.}
MT:
ROM & RAM - From Richard
Dawkins' The Blind Watchmaker —Why
the evidence of evolution reveals a universe without
design; 1996;
0393315703;
p.116:
[1] Electronic computer memory is conventionally classified into ROM and RAM. ROM stands for 'read only' memory. More strictly it is 'write once, read many times' memory. The pattern of 0s and 1s is 'burned' into it once and for all on manufacture. It then remains unchanged throughout the life of the memory, and the information can be read out any number of times. Other electronic memory, called RAM, can be 'written to' (one soon gets used to this inelegant computer jargon) as well as read. RAM can therefore do everything that ROM can do, and more. What the letters RAM actually stand for is misleading, so I won't mention it. The point about RAM is that you can put any pattern of 1s and 0s into any part of it that you like, on as many occasions as you like. Most of a computer's memory is RAM. As I type these words they are going straight into RAM, and the wordprocessing program controlling things is also in RAM, although it could theoretically be burned into ROM and then never subsequently altered. ROM is used for a fixed repertoire of standard programs, which are needed again and again, and which you can't change even if you wanted to.
[2] DNA is ROM. It can be read millions of times over, but only written to once—when it is first assembled at the birth of the cell in which it resides. The DNA in the cells of any individual is 'burned in', and is never altered during that individual's lifetime, except by very rare random deterioration. It can be copied, however. It is duplicated every time a cell divides. The pattern of A,T,C and G nucleotides is faithfully copied into the DNA of each of the trillions of new cells that are made as a baby grows. When a new individual is conceived, a new and unique pattern of data is 'burned into' his DNA ROM, and he is then stuck with that pattern for the rest of his life. It is copied into all his cells (except his reproductive cells, into which a random half of his DNA is copied, as we shall see).
[3] All computer memory, whether 'ROM' or 'RAM', is addressed. This means that every location in the memory has a label, usually a number but this is an arbitrary convention. It is important to understand the distinction between the address and the contents of a memory location. Each location is known by its address. For instance the first two letters of this chapter, 'It', are at this moment sitting in RAM locations 6446 and 6447 of my computer, which has 65,536 RAM locations altogether. At another time, the contents of those two locations will be different. The contents of a location is whatever was most recently written in that location. Each ROM location also has an address and a contents. The difference is that each location is stuck with its contents, once and for all.
From
Joseph
LeDoux's Book XXVIII:301-2.
MT:
Brains and Other Parallel Computers:
[1] Parallel computers work differently from the standard model with which we're familiar. Rather than doing computations one at a time in sequence (in Page 302 other words, carrying out the steps of a program line by line in serial order), they process many steps simultaneously. Parallel computers can function this way because, in contrast to your desktop PC or Mac, they have many processing units that can be devoted to the execution of a given task. By distributing the workload across the various processors, they can perform the task much faster than serial computers. (Don't plan on getting one for your home or office, however: they cost millions of dollars.)
[2] The brain is also sometimes described as a parallel computer, but it actually functions differently from an off-the-shelf connection machine. The brain is organized into processors (neural systems) that function independently of one another (at least to some extent). Since each of these systems has a specific job assignment, several types of tasks can be done by the brain simultaneously, that is, in parallel. This architecture enables you to {play piano with right and left hand together,} chew gum and walk down the street, guiding yourself toward your destination while feeling happy and rehearsing the phone number your friend gave you a block back, all at the same time as your posture is maintained upright, your blood pressure is kept at a safe level, and your rate of breathing is paced to the oxygen needs imposed by all the activities in which you're engaged.
[3] Connection machines can, like brains, be divided up in such a way that different groups of processors are responsible for particular tasks. Although each task is then performed less efficiently than it would be if all the processors were devoted to it, overall this can be a more efficient use of the machine since multiple tasks can be worked on at the same time. Reversing the logic, if we had fewer neural systems using up the same overall computing power in our brains the systems would each be more powerful. However, because we have to do lots of different things each day to stay alive and well (eat, sleep, walk, avoid danger and pain, hear, see, smell, taste, talk, and think, to name some), with fewer brain systems we would almost certainly be less capable, even if the remaining systems were each more proficient at their particular tasks. {Is Consciousness Computable?}
MT:
Language is Software - From Daniel
Dennett's Book XXVII:302.
The philosopher Justin Leiber sums up the role of language in shaping our mental lives:
Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. [Leiber, 1991, p. 8] {Genes and Memes}
{Comment
to 1a. Man the {Computerized}
Machine.}
From The Washington Post, Washington,
D.C. USA - Thursday, May 2, 2002, Front Page.
Rats Turned Into Remote-Controlled
Robots
Technique's Potential Uses Include Aid to Victims
of Disaster or Neural Injuries
[1] Scientists for the first time have managed to remotely direct the movements of rats by using implanted electrodes to control their behavior—in effect transforming living animal into robots.
[2] The technique has potentially important implications for activities ranging from land mine detection, earthquake recovery and spying to the emerging field of neural prostheses—using electronics to bridge nervous-system gaps caused by spinal injuries, strokes or other physical infirmities.
[3] 'It's really just conditioning behavior," said physiologist John K. Chapin of the State University of New York's Downstate Medical Center, noting that training an animal to do human bidding is as old as teaching dogs to fetch. "But its different in that you can do it all with remote control," he added. "In theory, you could guide the animal anywhere."
[4] In fact, after implanting the electrodes and training a "robot" for eight to 10 days in a figure-eight shaped maze, the Chapin-led team could steer it through any three-dimensional route. It could induce the animal to climb ladders, descend ramps, walk on a pipe or navigate through uneven terrain. The rat would even climb trees or wander around a brightly lit room—alien behaviors for the untrained.
[5] "I really like the results," said Northwestern University physiologist Sandro Mussa-Ivaldi: "People have been doing conditioning with reflex behaviors for a long time, but this is the first time where you have control of a whole complex animal."
[6] Chapin said the research, reported yesterday in the journal Nature, was inspired by his own and many others' efforts to use electronics to help the disabled bridge the gap between what their brains want to do and what their damaged bodies are able to do.
[7] Chapin and others demonstrated in earlier research that rats could be trained to retrieve rewards by operating a robotic arm with neural motor impulses captured by electrodes.
[8] But Chapin wanted to
do the same thing with sensory impulses. "Imagine
a paralyzed person grasping a glass of water and bringing it to his mouth,"
Chapin said. "But he can't
feel the glass when he grasps it, so now we have to work on the sensory
side. The rat is the first experiment.
Can it discriminate between one stimulus and another?"
[9] The Chapin team
implanted three electrodes in the rat's brain. One
was placed in a "generic' pleasure center that records satisfaction
whenever needs—for food, water or warmth—are satisfied.
The others were implanted to stimulate the whisker
bundles on either side of the rat's nose.
[10] By triggering one of the whisker implants and then stimulating the reward center, the researchers were able to make the rat turn in one direction or the other and move forward—much as a sled driver can order his dogs to "gee" or "haw."
[11] After up to 10 days of training, the rat could navigate practically any landscape, wearing a receiver and a power pack on its back and being steered by a technician issuing commands from a laptop computer up to 550 yards away, Chapin said.
[12] The rat thus becomes a living robot, controlled remotely by a human handler but able to go anywhere a rat can go. And its supple anatomy gives it a huge and—at least for now—insurmountable advantage over any mechanical robot, which can be confounded by a pair of shoes lying on a carpet.
[13] "This trumps that problem," Chapin said. "The rat is much more adept than a robot at getting around difficult terrain—and it has a nose."
[14] The military and public service potential of the project has won funding from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Army's research arm. Camera-equipped rats may have a future as land mine detectors, or as couriers or scouts searching for human victims trapped in collapsed buildings or mine shafts, Chapin said.
[15] They could also be used as the "rat on the floor" equivalent of the "fly on the wall," providing a real-time ability to eavesdrop on sensitive conversations taking place behind closed doors.
[16] The implications of the experiment for neural prostheses are far less clear. "The idea is wonderful, and it's really interesting that John has accomplished this," said Rutgers University neuroscientist Gyorgy Buzsaki. "But robotic control is relatively easy, and if you want to achieve complex patterns of behavior'—by training a human brain to react instinctively to an electronically transmitted stimulus—"it gets very complicated in a hurry."
[17] Also, Chapin noted, "we're trying to avoid using bigger animals" because of the "big brother" ethical issues involved in developing a technique that in many cases overrides an animal's natural instincts.
[18] "The rat looks
normal and isn't feeling any pain because
he's getting rewards for doing the right thing," Chapin said. "They
get very tame. They love to get
picked up, and they don't even have to be sacrificed because the longer
we use them the better they get. We
have one old lady rat that received an implant at the beginning of last
September."
{Comment
to 1a. Man the {Computerized}
Machine.}
MT:
Endnote Boeing 747 - From Antonio
Damasio's Book
XXVI:128-9—Robots.
[1] There is nothing really
equivalent to that living cell in
the tons of aluminum, composite alloys, plastic, rubber, and silicone that
make up the great Boeing bird. There
are miles of electrical wiring, thousands of square feet of composite alloys,
and millions of nuts, bolts,
and rivets in the skin of the aircraft. It
is true that all of these are made of matter, which is made of atoms.
So is our human flesh at the
level of its microstructure. But the physical matter of the aircraft is
not alive, its
parts are not made of living cells possessed of a genetic inheritance,
a biologic destiny, and a life risk. And
even if one were to argue that the plane has an "engineered concern"
for its survival, which
allows it to preempt the wrong maneuver of a distracted pilot, the blatant
difference is inescapable. The
plane's integrated cockpit computers have a concern for the execution of
its flying function. Our
brains and minds have a global concern for
the integrity of our entire living real estate, every nook and cranny of
it, and underneath it all, every
nook and cranny has a local, automated concern with itself.
[2] These distinctions
are chronically glossed over whenever
living organisms and intelligent machines, e.g., robots, are compared.
Here I just wish to make clear that our brains receive
signals from deep in the living flesh and
thus provide local as well as global maps of the intimate anatomy and intimate
functional state of that living flesh. This
arrangement, so impressive in any complex living organism,
is positively astounding in humans.
I do not wish to diminish in any way
the value of the interesting artificial creatures
being created in the laboratories of Gerald Edelman Page
129 or Rodney Brooks.
In different ways, those engineered creatures deepen
our understanding of certain brain processes and
may become useful complements of our own brain equipment.
I simply want to note that these animated creatures
are not living in the sense we are and
are not likely to feel in the way we do? {Is
consciousness computable?}
{Comments
to 1a. Man the {Computerized}
Machine.} {Quantum
Mechanics}
From
The Teaching
Company's Tapes; The
Great Ideas of Philosophy, 2nd Ed; 2004;
Prof.
Daniel N. Robinson's
Lecture 54; Part 5 Transcript, p. 84-85; Philosophy
of the Mind, If There Is One—Descartes'
Error. {Damasio30:249,
Stewart:165.}
I. Descartes drew a sharp distinction between himself as a thinking thing—res cogitans—and as an extended thing—res extensa—drawing criticism from the likes of Thomas Hobbes and Pierre Gassendi.
A. Both would surely have agreed with the broad scientific perspective according to which the physical sciences are "complete."
1. That term refers to the view that nothing in the domain
of the "really real" falls outside the
realm of the "really physical," of physics.
2. In other words, reality is not composed of two
radically different kinds of stuff but of one kind
only—the physical {Substance}.
B. This position is referred to as ontological monism and stands in opposition to ontological dualism.
1. For the ontological monist, there is but one kind of
furniture in reality.
2. For the ontological dualist, there are two; the
dualist adds the mental to the physical.
3. Were the latter position to be correct, it is argued
that physics would be "incomplete," because
its laws and principles do not account for this other immaterial,
non-physical aspect or part of reality.
C. The ontological monist can retain mentalistic terms and concepts as a form of "folk" psychology.
1. For practical purposes, it may be impossible to conduct
normal social and personal lives without this age-old
language of mental states and mental events.
2. Donald
Davidson dubbed this use of language anomalous monism: a recognition
both of the validity of ontological monism and the fact that our mentalistic
terms and concepts will never be reduced to physical events and processes.
MT: Descartes'
Error - From Damasio's
Book XXX:249-50—Body
and Mind Separation. {Robinson5:84,
Stewart:165.}
[1] This is Descartes'
error: the abyssal separation between
body and mind, between the sizable,
dimensional, mechanically operated,
Page 250
infinitely divisible {for
study purposes}
body stuff, on the one hand, and
the unsizable, undimensioned, un-pushpullable, nondivisible
mind stuff {ghost-in-the-machine,
pineal gland, Robinson5:97};
the suggestion that reasoning, and
moral judgment, and the suffering that comes from physical pain
or emotional upheaval might exist separately from
the body. Specifically: the separation
of the most refined operations of mind from the structure and operation
of a biological organism.
{Durant65:176}
[2] Now,
some may ask, why quibble with Descartes
rather than with Plato,
whose views on body and mind were far more exasperating,
as can be discovered in the Phaedo?
Why bother with this particular error of Descartes'?
After all, some of his other errors sound more spectacularly
wrong than this one. He believed
that heat made the blood circulate, and that tiny,
ever so fine particles of the blood distilled themselves
into "animal spirits,"
which could then move muscles. Why
not take him to task for either of those notions? The reason is simple:
We have known for a long time that he was wrong on
those particular points, and
the questions of how and why the blood circulates have been answered to
our complete satisfaction. That
is not the case when we consider questions of mind, brain, and body, concerning
which Descartes' error remains influential. For
many, Descartes' views are regarded as self-evident and in no need
of reexamination. {Dualist}
MT: Descartes'
Error - From Matthew Stewart's The Courier and the Heretic,
2006; 0393058980;
p.165—Dualism
- Descartes'
Error:
{Damasio30:249,
Robinson5:84, Stewart:165,
Cosmides & Tooby.}
[1] The mind-body problem manifested itself in other ways that kept seventeenth-century thinkers awake at night. The strict Cartesian dualism left animals, for example, impaled on the horns of dilemma: Do dogs, say, have minds like us or are they machines? To endow a dog with a mind, according to Cartesian logic, was tantamount to giving it a place in heaven; so the Cartesians stuck to the less theologically risky position that animals are indeed machines. Their critics forced them to concede that this implied that beating a dog and thus causing it to bark, for example, is equivalent to beating a bagpipe and causing it to squeal—a philosophical howler that seemed then, as now, both repellent and obviously untrue.
[2] Babies, sleepers, and dreamers all presented similar forms of the mind-body problem. Since babies cannot say "I think therefore I am," do they lack minds? Do they acquire them later-say, on the thirteenth birthday? When we sleep, do our minds go on holiday? Can a dreamer say "I think therefore I am"? And if we should at long last fall into a very deep sleep, sans dreams, do we cease to be human for the duration?
From
The Teaching
Company's Tapes; The
Great Ideas of Philosophy, 2nd Ed; 2004;
Prof.
Daniel N. Robinson's
Lecture 54; Part 5 Transcript, pp. 97-98; Philosophy
of the Mind, If There Is One—Functionalism.
In its most interesting and most extreme form, this identity
theory approach to the reduction
of the mental to the physical gives rise to what is
called eliminative
materialism. Science
need not worry about explaining the "mental," for there are not
minds as such to be explained,
nor is there anything mental as such to explain. The camel's nose may be
said to have poked into this
tent in 1949 with the appearance of Gilbert
Ryle's The
Concept of Mind, but it was surely not Ryle's intention
to lay the foundation for eliminative materialism.
Rather, Ryle set out to establish the odd and quirky
notions that arise from Cartesian
conceptions of a distinct mental world to which only
the percipient has access—a world in which
events are projected onto a private screen and viewed by something {Pineal
Gland}
called a mind. It was not Ryle's aim to promote
skepticism about
the reality of experience, but
skepticism about theories that would account for that reality in terms
of what he called "the ghost
in the machine." Ryle, in a word, set
out to expose certain linguistic sources of confusion,
not to challenge the ontological
status of qualia {RH—a
quality, as bitterness, regarded as an independent object}.
To this point emphasis has been placed on reductionistic
strategies by which to get from the
mental to the physical via mind-brain relations or mind-brain identities
{mind
is to brain as digestion is to
stomach}, but in philosophy
of mind, there are alternatives to brains and neural
events as such, for it is clear that any number of
animals succeed preeminently in negotiating
the challenges afforded by the environment—but they do so with nervous
systems radically different from our own. What matters
is that a given function is performed in
such a manner as to yield adaptive success. What matters not at all is
the precise physical means by
which the function is performed. If the task is arithmetic, then, and only
arithmetic, then a simple computer and a grade-school
child will achieve success with apparatus
having nothing in common; one has a circuit board within which algorithms
have been programmed; the other
has an evolved brain comprised chiefly of fat, protein, and
water.
From Gilbert Ryle's
"Concept
of Mind"; ISBN: 0226732967:
Pages 18, 19—Descartes Error.
{Damasio30:249,
Robinson5:84, Stewart:165,
Cosmides & Tooby.}
One of the chief intellectual origins of what I have yet to prove to be the Cartesian category-mistake seems to be this. When Galileo showed that his methods of scientific discovery were competent to provide a mechanical theory which should cover every occupant of space, Descartes found in himself two conflicting motives {world views}. As a man of scientific genius he could not but endorse the claims of mechanics, yet as a religious and moral man he could not accept, as Hobbes accepted, the discouraging rider to those claims, namely that human nature differs only in degree of complexity from clockwork. The mental could not be just a variety of the mechanical.
From Gilbert Ryle's "Concept of Mind"; ISBN: 0226732967: Page 20—No praise/no Blame.
A second major crux points the same moral. Since, according to the doctrine {Descartes' Error: the abyssal separation between body and mind}, minds belong {mistakenly} to the same category as bodies and since bodies are rigidly governed by mechanical laws, it seemed to many theorists to follow that minds must be similarly governed by rigid non-mechanical {chemical and electrical} laws. The physical world is a deterministic system, so the mental world must be a deterministic system. Bodies cannot help the modifications that they undergo, so minds cannot help pursuing the careers fixed for them. Responsibility, choice, merit and demerit are therefore inapplicable concepts—unless the compromise solution is adopted of saying that the laws governing mental processes, unlike those governing physical processes, have the congenial attribute of being only rather rigid. The problem of the Freedom of the Will was the problem how to reconcile the hypothesis that minds are to be described in terms drawn from the categories of mechanics with the knowledge that higher-grade human conduct is not of a piece with the behaviour of machines.
From "Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy"; ISBN: 052148328X: Pg. 108—Category Mistake
Category mistake, the placing of an entity in the wrong category. In one of Ryle's examples, to place the activity of exhibiting team spirit in the same class with the activities of pitching, batting, and catching is to make a category mistake; exhibiting team spirit is not a special function like pitching or batting but instead a way those special functions are performed. A second use of 'category mistake' is to refer to the attribution to an entity of a property which that entity cannot have (not merely does not happen to have), as in 'This memory is violet' or, to use an example from Carnap, 'Caesar is a prime number'. These two kinds of category mistake may seem different, but both involve misunderstandings of the natures of the things being talked about. It is thought that they go beyond simple error or ordinary mistakes, as when one attributes a property to a thing which that thing could have but does not have, since category mistakes involve attributions of properties (e.g., being a special function) to things (e.g., team spirit) that those things cannot have. According to Ryle, the test for category differences depends on whether replacement of one expression for another in the same sentence results in a type of unintelligibility that he calls "absurdity" {Descartes' Error—Transcendence}. J.W.M.
From
Prof.
Robert Morris Sapolsky's Tape 2 -
CG1:9 Scope of Lecture 2:
This second lecture moves from how
the brain works on the level of a single neuron
to how information moves across the synapse from
one neuron to the next. Exploring
how electrical signals are changed to chemical
messages in the brain provides
a critical foundation for understanding how the brain works, the
effects of certain drugs on the brain, and
the neurological origins of individuality.

Figure 2-1: A Typical Myelinated Neuron
From Charles G. Morris; Psychology:
An Introduction:
10th ed. Prentis Hall, inc; ISBN: 0136765378:
Page 47.

Figure 2-4: Synaptic
Transmission—communications between neurons.
When a neural impulse reaches
the end of an axon,
tiny oval sacs,
called synaptic vesicles,
at the end of most axons release varying
amounts of chemical substances called neurotransmitters.
These
substances travel across the synaptic space
and affect the next neuron.
From Charles G. Morris; Psychology:
An Introduction: 10th ed. Prentis Hall,
inc; ISBN: 0136765378:
Page 50.
{Comment
to 1a. Man the {Computerized}
Machine. Watts consumed.}
From Lederman,
Leon and Christopher T. Hill, "Symmetry
and the beautiful universe", Prometheus Books, 1591022428, 2004,
Page 60—We living organisms are also engines. Our
bodies are consuming energy to sustain our metabolism,
ergo our lives. Here we measure
energy in "food calories," usually designated with the uppercase
C, as in the word Calorie. A
typical (lean) person in the United States eats about 2,000 Calories per
day. To convert this into joules
we multiply by (approximately) 4,200 {1
calorie = 4.18400 joules};
hence, the average lean person is consuming about
8,400,000, or 8.4 million, joules of food energy per day!
In a day
page 61
there are 24 hours and 60 minutes per hour, and 60 seconds per minute,
that is, 86,400 seconds total in a day. Therefore
the average person consumes energy, and
burns off the equivalent energy, at an average rate of about 8,400,000/86,400
= 97 watts.
Therefore each of us, as living, functioning, metabolizing
beings is approximately equivalent to
a 100-watt light bulb in our metabolic power
consumption. {watt--
the SI unit of power, equivalent to one joule per second and equal to the
power in a circuit in which a current of one ampere flows across a potential
difference of one volt.}
{Comment
to 1a. Man the {Computerized}
Machine.}
From The Washington Post, Washington,
D.C. USA - Monday, May 20, 2002, Page A9.
A New Thinking Emerges About Consciousness
Robinson4:156,169
Descartes
Notwithstanding, Some Neuroscientists Find Answer in Chemistry
By Shankar Vedantam Washington Post Staff Writer
[1] For
centuries, philosophers have been bedeviled by this question:
What makes people aware of themseIves, and what gives
rise to intention and free will?
In other words, what is consciousness
{Philos.
the mind or the mental faculties as characterized by thought, feelings,
and volition}?
[2] In the 17th century,
the French Philosopher Rene
Descartes suggested that consciousness was like an "observer"
{pineal
gland, Soul} in
the head, a higher function,
separate from the workings of the physical
brain {dualism}.
In the four
centuries since, no one has done much better in explaining subjective
experience—your sensation of the color, red, or a twinge of pain,
or your ability to choose your actions.
In recent years, philosohers who study cognition {of
or pertaining to the mental processes of
perception, memory, judgment, and reasoning, as
contrasted with emotional and volitional
processes} have come
to call this 'the hard
problem." {See
Endnote Descartes Pineal Gland and 2P35(6).}
[3] Neuroscientists—data-dependent
investigators who map brain function,
trace neural networks
and explore the biochemistry of neurotransmitters—have
traditionally treated the question
of consciousness like an unwelcome guest
at the dining table. Some have
dismissed it as irrelevant to their understanding of the brain,
and others have contended that objective
analysis can never comprehend a feeling that is entirely subjective.
[4] Increasingly, however, some scientists
who explore neurons
and brain connections are
turning their attention to the philosophers "hard
problem." Most have
come to believe that Descartes was wrong—that
there is no "observer"
sitting in the head. Consciousness,
they say, is highly organized brain chemistry, just
as life itself comprises proteins and cells organized into complex patterns
{A
useful hypothesis, for it sets the logic for continued study.}.
[5] "Consciousness is real, but like stage magic—it has a mundane scientific explanation," said Daniel C. Dennett, a philosopher and cognitive scientist at Tufts University. It's all just brain mechanisms and their activities. {Joseph LeDoux's Functionalism—Computer}
[6] "All the work that one imagines being done by the ego are really done by bits of the brain. Those brain tissues are not conscious and do not know who you are or care—but their activity adds up to "conscious you."
[7] The most extreme version of this view, which is sometimes called reductionism {the theory that every complex phenomenon, esp. in biology or psychology, can be explained by analyzing the simplest, most basic physical mechanisms that are in operation during the phenomenon}, suggests that consciousness is an illusion. A new book by Harvard professor Daniel Wegner is titled, "The Illusion of Conscious Will."
[8] The feeling you have as you read this sentence, Wegner argues, is an illusion pulled off by a complex machine in your skull. It not only reads and understands this sentence, he says, but also makes you feel as if you have experienced the reading of the sentence. In other words, the brain, not content with being a remarkably complex machine, also convinces itself that it isn't a machine at all.
[9] But why would it bother? The brain, Wegner contends, produces consciousness to give itself a feeling of having done something: This feeling helps the brain recognize similar situations when they arise—the next article in the newspaper, for instance. Being aware of its actions, the brain-machine can better decide whether to read another article.
[10] When you drive to work, you don't feel there are hundreds of little gears in a machine in your head that make you do this. You think, "I'm going to get up and go to work," Wegner said in an interview.
[11] We think the intentions cause the actions, and we get the feeling we have willed what we do. It could be the intentions and actions are being caused by the machinery of the brain."
[12] Wegner cites numerous examples to show that intentions and actions are produced by different mechanisms in the brain—while they are timed to occur simultaneously they sometimes don't. During hypnosis, for instance people's bodies act apparently without their will. Yet their movements are still produced by their brains, suggesting that conscious intention doesn't always precede action.
[13] Other experiments have shone that people are not aware of most brain activity. Until they focus on it, for example most readers would not be conscious that they were stringing together the words in this sentence, applying the laws of grammar and extracting meaning. Wegner says the relationship between conscious will and action is like that of a magician's wand and the rabbit he pulls out of a hat—it only seems as if the wand made the rabbit appear. But why would the brain ascribe intention to only some of its actions? "Why do certain areas of the brain not produce consciousness and other areas at other times produce experience?" asked Terrence Deacon, an anthropologist at the University of California at Berkeley. Deacon, the author of "The Symbolic Species," disagrees with Wegner's mechanistic explanation. Deacon is exploring a new theory, that the brain has two separate aspects. One part, which handles things it has mastered, is all about computation. The other part, which is consciousness, reacts to the world in a process that mimics evolution {Category Mistake}.
[14] In Charles Darwin's theory, species evolve from one to the next without a guiding hand; competition and selection spur adaptation and improvement.
[15] "Evolution is information coming out of nothing, information coming out of chaos," said Deacon. The same phenomenon of "emergent" information in our brain is consciousness, he said.
[16] This ability,
he said, is useful dealing with the unexpected. "When I am outdoors
at night and I hear a crackling sound in
bushes; it pushes everything else out of the way," he said.
{Biology
of Emotions—ANS}
[17] In other words, consciousness, helps people pay attention to what's important. But Deacon admits that this theory, which tries to explain what consciousness does doesn't quite get at what consciousness is. Deacon is among the many who quote David Chalmers's description of this as the "hard problem." The hard problem is hard because no explanation of brain processes will explain subjective experience," said Chalmers, a philosopher at the University of Arizona. "I am interested in the perceptual aspects of consciousness. The feeling of pain, the taste of chocolate, the sight of blue—all these are subjective experiences."
[18] Chalmers believes scientists will eventually conclude that consciousness, is a fundamental property of the universe—like space, time, or gravity {or process}—and therefore not reducible.
[19] Why does the law of gravity hold? No one can explain that," Chalmers said.
[20] The neuroscientists all furiously disagree with each other, of course. The reductionists call arguments about new fundamental properties of the universe "woolly-headed" and a back-door return to Descartes' "observer" in the brain. Their detractors criticize them for being "more neural than thou," which is actually the title of one paper. Beyond the hard problem is what New York University philosopher Ned Block calls 'the harder problem"—how to understand consciousness in other creatures, especially those with brains very different from ours. And as technology improves, Block said that question may one day be posed about complex machines, or humans with visual and neurological implants.
[21] And so it goes.
Despite the neuroscientists' new theories, the hard problem isn't getting
any easier.
{Roger
Penrose in his Shadows
of the Mind doubts that consciousness
is computable and makes clear that when we admire a computer we are really
admiring the ingenuity of the hardware designers and the ingenuity
of the software programmers.}
{Comment to 1a.
Man the {Computerized}
Machine.} Is
the Brain a Digital Computer?
From LeDoux's
Book XXIX96:281—Is
Consciousness Computable?
The
Emotional Brain {See
Roger Penrose's
Shadows of the Mind; p. 393}
However, it is not clear that consciousness
is computable. Johnson-Laird
reminds us that a computer simulation of the weather
is not the same thing as rain
or sunshine {Symbolized
Beauty}.
Working memory theories, in dealing with consciousness
in terms of processes rather than
as content, try to explain what
kinds of computational functions might be
responsible for and underlie conscious experiences
but they do not explain what it is like to have those
experiences? These theories provide
an account of the way human minds work, in a general sense,
rather than an account of what a particular experience
is like in a particular mind. They
can suggest how a representation might be created in working memory but
not what it is like to be aware of that representation.
They suggest how decision processes in working memory
might lead to movement but not
what it is like to actually decide to move. In
other words, working memory is likely to be an important, and possibly
an essential, aspect of consciousness. It
is in fact likely to be the platform on which a conscious experience stands.
But consciousness,
especially its phenomenal or subjective
nature, is not completely explained
by the computational processes that underlie working memory, at least not
in a way that anyone presently comprehends.
{Comment
to 1a. Man the {Computerized}
Machine.}
From Mexico News, December 16, 2002, Page 25.
Researchers Find Brain Center Of Music Appreciation
By PAUL RECER
Associated Press
[1] Sounds from the radio slip into a melody and suddenly your mind skips back to an evening of moonlight and romance and happy times. It happens to everybody, but until now science was unsure just why.
[2] A new study by researchers at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire, suggests recalling that melody is the job of a part of the brain known as the rostromedial prefrontal cortex. it is the part that remembers music and is even able to recognize a sour note in the midst of a familiar tune.
[3] A team led by researcher Petr Janata of Dartmouth's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience explored the mind's memory for tunes by studying the brains of eight musicians as they listened to a bit of original music.
[4] Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, which detects the part of the brain active in response to specific stimuli, they found the ability to recognize music is contained in a centrally located area just behind the forehead.
[5] Janata said that part of the brain also plays a key role in learning and in the response and control of emotions.
[6] "Our results provide a stronger foundation for explaining the link between music, emotion and the brain," Janata said.
[7] In the study, eight people who had studied music for at least 12 years listened to the music and were asked to pick out specific tones and to detect notes played by a flute-like instrument instead of a clarinet which had dominated the music. As they performed these tasks, the functional MRI tracked which parts of the brain were active.
[8] The researchers reported that the brains of each of the subjects tracked the sounds in a slightly different way each time the music was played. This may be the reason the same music, in different times, may prompt different emotions.
[9] Janata said the fact that the brain is naturally wired to appreciate and remember music suggests that the pleasant {harmonious} sounds were an important part of the human mind from the earliest of times.
[10] "It's not necessary for human survival, yet something inside us craves it {peace-of-mind}," said Janata. "I think this research helps us understand that craving a little bit more."
On The, Net. Science: www.sciencemag.org
{Comment
to 1a. Man the {Computerized}
Machine.}
From The Washington Post, Washington, D.C. USA - Tuesday, April
15, 2003, Page A6.
Genome
Project Completed
Findings May Alter Humanity's Sense of Itself,
Experts Predict
By Rick Weiss, Washington Post Staff Writer
[1] Thirteen years after its launch
as the most ambitious biomedical research project
ever undertaken, the Human
Genome Project yesterday was declared officially complete, having revealed
in exquisite detail the genetic blueprint underlying all life.
[2] But citing Shakespeare's famous assertion that "what is past is prologue" project leaders immediately looked ahead, unveiling a formal plan to catapult the genetic findings into every sphere of life—including plans that even proponents said would raise difficult social, ethical and legal questions.
[3] That roadmap for future studies calls for new research into the role that genes play in race and ethnicity; in influencing personality traits and behaviors, including mental illness; and in other politically sensitive aspects of the human condition. Experts predicted that the results will have profound societal impacts and will ultimately revamp humanity's sense of itself.
[4] "We are learning at a very rapid clip how we are all the same and how we are different," said Francis Collins, chief of the National Human Genome Research Institute of the National Institutes of Health, which spearheaded the U.S. part of the international effort along with the Department of Energy.
[5] The project's formal completion, announced at a celebratory scientific meeting in Bethesda, occurred at 2 a.m. last Tuesday, Collins said—two hours after the project's self-imposed deadline—when scientists at the project's 16 laboratories around the world e-mailed final bits of the genetic code to a centralized database.
[6] The final sequence, completed at a cost of $2.6 billion, provides the exact order of virtually all 3 billion letters of the human genetic code. It fills in holes and corrects errors in a "working draft" that was feted at a White House ceremony in 2000.
[7] The end came two years ahead of its initially anticipated completion, $400 million under budget, and 50 years to the month after James Watson and Francis Crick, published their historic determination of the three-dimensional structure of DNA—a seminal discovery that revealed for the first lime how DNA might serve as the chemical basis of heredity.
[8] "This structure has novel features which are of considerable interest," Watson and Crick wrote in that article, in what has since come to be known as one of the great understatements in scientific history.
[9] Yet even as Watson and other scientific luminaries reveled in the project's success at yesterday's meeting on the NIH campus, project leaders conceded there was far more still to learn.
[10] Perhaps the biggest and simplest unanswered question is how many genes it really takes to make a human being, genes being the stretches of DNA within the overall sequence that carry instructions to grow a body. So central was that question that the researchers themselves had started a betting pool on the numbers of genes, with the goal of "opening the envelope" and declaring a winner this month.
[11] As it turned out, it has been difficult to create a computer program that recognizes discrete genes within the immensely long double helix of DNA that carries the code of life. Current estimates range between 25,000 and 30,000—far fewer than the 100,000 that scientists initially expected—but that could still change.
[12] Richard Gibbs, director of the Baylor College of Medicine Genome Center, one of a handful of U.S. labs that dedicated themselves to the genome project, said he expects the number to grow to perhaps 40,000. But Eric Lander, who directs the genome sequencing center at the Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research in Cambridge. Mass, said he could imagine the number shrinking.
[13] What is important, Lander said, is that "starting today, the real serious analysis of things can begin."
[14] The genome project's roots reach back to 1984, when scientists meeting at a Utah resort first focused on the problem of how to identify genetic mutations in the survivors of the atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II.
[15] An Energy Department advisory committee followed up with a 1987 report that urged the nation to begin an effort, "extraordinary in scope and magnitude," that would allow a "reading of the ‘Book of Man."
[16] The idea was endorsed in a pair of 1988 federal reports, and Congress began funding the effort in 1990, with the goal of completing the project in 2005 and making all findings public along the way.
[17] Not everyone thought it could be done. The necessary technology was mostly non-existent, so the first several years of the project were devoted largely to developing gene analysis methods and making advances in computational biology and information storage.
[18] At the beginning of the project, it cost $10 to definitively identify a single base pair—or "letter" of DNA code—and a highly trained technician could scan perhaps 10,000 base pairs in a day. Now the equivalent cost is 5 cents and lightning-fast robotic sequencers routinely process 10,000 base pairs a second.
[19] The project accelerated ever more quickly starting in 1999, when Celera Genomics Corp., a Rockville biotechnology concern, injected a dose of competitive pressure by announcing its own plan to sequence—and then sell—human genome data. The two groups jointly celebrated completion of their respective draft sequences in a June 2000 White House ceremony.
[20] That was just one of several milestones in the life of the human genome project, which gained a reputation over years for repeatedly announcing that it was almost done. Even now, though the project is formally over, the sequence is not 100 percent finished. For reasons that remain mostly mysterious, about 1 percent of the genome has proved impossible to sequence, and will remain so until new technologies emerge that are up to the task.
[21] Still, the final product beats the 2000 draft handily, scientists said. The frequency of errors, which was one in 10,000 bases, is now about one in 100,000. And the average distance one can go along the genome before coming to an unreadable gap in the sequence has grown from 82,000 bases two years ago to 27 million today.
[22] Moreover, the project found time and money to sequence the genomes of other organisms along the way including the mouse and the fugu fish—offering invaluable comparative data that will help scientists figure out what various human genes do. Hundreds of thousands of information requests are flowing into the genome database every day from researchers around the world.
[23] Congratulations arrived yesterday from President Bush and the leaders of the five other countries hat participated in the project: Britain (whose Wellcome Trust funded about a third of the project), Japan, France, Germany and China. And scientists expressed an enormous measure of satisfaction.
[24] "I stand in awe at this joyous occasion," said Ari Patrinos, who led the Energy Department's contribution.
[25] But Patrinos and others said they were already focusing on the future. The Energy Department has begun an initiative called Genomes to Life, which will use technologies developed for the genome project to work on environmental cleanups, climate change and the search for new energy sources.
[26] The new roadmap for NIH genomic research released yesterday—a consensus document forged by more than 600 scientists at a dozen workshops—is reminiscent of the 1990 genome initiative in that it looks beyond the horizon of what is immediately possible.
[27] It sets major goals in applying genomics to medicine and health, including an ambitious effort to find new gene-based drugs and genetic tests to predict diseases before they occur.
[28] The plan, to be published in the April 24 issue of the journal Nature, also calls for a focus on "heritable human genetic variation," including how race and ethnicity influence people's susceptibility to disease and affect their responses to medicines—and how such information affects people's sense of identity and kinship and their perception of what is "normal."
[29] It also calls for more research in behavioral genetics, the complicated, nascent and controversial field that looks for "inborn" {hardware} propensities to certain behaviors.
From Matt Ridley's Genome; 1999; 0060932902, p. 7—Genes:
Imagine that the genome is a book.
There are twenty-three chapters, called CHROMOSOMES.
Each chapter contains several thousand stories, called
GENES.
Each story is made up of paragraphs, called EXONS,
which are interrupted by {regulartory}
advertisements called INTRONS.
Each paragraph is made up of words, called CODONS.
Each word is written in letters called BASES.
{Definitions
below are from RH, unless noted.}
genome
(jee'nohm) n. a full haploid (simple) set of chromosomes
with all its genes; the total genetic constitution of a cell or organism;
a full set of chromosomes; all the inheritable traits of an organism.
gene (jeen) n. 1. the basic physical unit of heredity; a linear sequence of nucleotides along a segment of DNA that provides the coded instructions for synthesis of RNA, which, when translated into protein, leads to the expression of hereditary character.
Neo-Darwinism:
A modification of Darwin's theory of evolution holding that species evolve
by natural selection acting on genetic variation. {Analogy:
Species--hard drive; Genetic variation--data
base.}
{Paraphrased: A computer evolves by natural selection
acting on its data base.}
DNA 1. deoxyribonucleic acid: an extremely long, double-stranded nucleic acid molecule arranged as a double helix that is the main constituent of the chromosome and that carries the genes as segments along its strands: found chiefly in the chromatin of cells and in many viruses.
Watson-Crick
model n:. a model
of DNA structure in which the molecule is a cross-linked double-stranded
helix, each strand is composed of alternating links of phosphate and deoxyribose,
and the strands are cross-linked by pairs of purine and pyrimidine bases
projecting inward from the deoxyribose sugars and joined by hydrogen bonds
with adenine paired with thymine and with cytosine paired with guanine.
Etymology: J. D. Watson & F. H. C. Crick Date: 1958
chromatin (kroh'muh tin) n. 1. the readily stainable substance of a cell nucleus that consists of DNA, RNA, and various proteins, and forms chromosomes during cell division.
chromosome (kroh'muh sohm) n. 1. one of a set of threadlike structures, composed of DNA and a protein, that form in the nucleus when the cell begins to divide and that carry the genes which determine an individual's hereditary traits.
RNA 1. ribonucleic acid: any of a class of single-stranded nucleic acid molecules composed of ribose and uracil, found chiefly in the cytoplasm of cells and in certain viruses, and important in protein synthesis and in the transmission of genetic information transcribed from DNA.
progeria
(proh jeer'ee uh) n. 1. a rare congenital abnormality characterized by
premature and rapid aging, the affected individual appearing in childhood
as an aged person.
{Comment
to 1a. Man the {Computerized}
Machine.}
From The Washington Post, Washington, D.C. USA - Thursday,
April 17, 2003, Page A6.
Genetic Error Causes Rapid-Aging
Syndrome
Discovery Offers, Hope for Treatments
Reuters
[1] Two teams of scientists reported yesterday that they had found a genetic mutation that causes children to die of old age, and said their research offered both a way to find a cure and insights into normal aging.
[2] Children with Hutchinson-Gilford, progeria syndrome age at a rate five to 10 times faster than normal. They lose their hair, their skin wrinkles and they die of atherosclerosis, or hardening of the arteries, by their early teens.
[3] The disease strikes about one in 4 million. There is no known cure, and until the two teams finished their work last year, no one knew the cause.
[4] Now, French and U.S. teams have traced the defect to a gene that controls the structure of the nucleus, the part of the cell that holds most of the genes and chromosomes. The teams reported their findings in the journals Science and Nature, respectively.
[5] The mutation, found in children with progeria, causes the nucleus to be unstable, affecting virtually every cell in the body apart from the brain.
[6] The nucleus is usually a nice, round structure," said Leslie Gordon of Tufts University in Boston, of the U.S. team. "There are these bubbles that form because of this defect. That most likely causes the instability that leads to cell death."
[7] It may now be possible to look for a cure for those children, she said.
[8] "I feel like the door has just flown open," Gordon, who has a 6-year-old son with progeria, said in a telephone interview. "It's going to be a springboard for a lot of exciting research for aging and heart disease and, obviously, will be a big step for a cure for these children."
[9] The mutation seems to be carried in sperm, because it only affects half a patient's DNA. The mutation causes production of an abnormal protein that takes over the formation of the nucleus.
[10] The mutated gene, called LMNA, controls a protein called Lamin A. A separate team led by Nicolas Levy of the Faculte de Medecine de la Timone in Marseille, France, found the same mutation.
[11] "We have shown
we can find the shorter, defective
protein causing all these problems and leading to this disease in children,"
Gordon said. "So we have
a place to start now."
From The Washington Post, Washington, D.C. USA
- Saturday, November 13, 2004, Page B9.
Is the Capacity for Spirituality Determined by Brain
Chemistry?
Geneticist's Book "The
God Gene" Is Disputed by Scientists, Embraced by Some Religious
Leaders
By Bill Broadway: Washington
Post Staff Writer
[1]
Dean H. Hamer has received much criticism for the new book "The God
Gene: How Faith is Hardwired
Into Our Genes."
{Storage
Technologies.}
[2]
Evangelicals reject the idea that faith might
be reduced to chemical reactions in the brain. Humanists refuse to accept
that religion is inherent in people's makeup
{Psychology}.
And some scientists have criticized Hamer's methodology
and what they believe is a futile effort to find empirical
proof of religious experience.
[3]
But Hamer, a behavioral geneticist at
the National Institutes of Health and the National Cancer Institute,
stands by research he says shows that spirituality
{seeking
PcM}—the
feeling of transcendence {going
beyond the universe}—is
part of our nature {conatus}.
And he believes that a universal penchant {a
strong inclination, taste, or liking for something, seeking}
for spiritual fulfillment {i.e.
Peace of Mind}
explains the growing popularity of nontraditional religion in this country
and the presence of hundreds of religions
throughout the world.
[4]
"We think that all human beings have an innate {inborn,
hardwired}
capacity for spirituality and that that desire to
reach out beyond oneself, which
is at the heart of spirituality {seeking
PcM},
is part of the human makeup," Hamer,
53, said in an interview at his Northwest Washington townhouse. "The
research suggests some people have a bit more of that capacity than others,
but it's present to some degree
in everybody."
[5]
"The God Gene," published in September, 2004,
and featured in Time magazine's Oct. 25 cover story,
is a sequel to "Living With Our Genes,"
a 1998 book in which Hamer examined the genetic basis
of such behavioral traits as anxiety, thrill-seeking
and homosexuality. Hamer said
his previous research, most notably
his work on anxiety, encouraged him to look into the genetic propensity
for religious
belief.
[6]
What he found was that the brain chemicals associated
with anxiety and other emotions,
including joy and sadness,
appeared to be in play in the deep meditative states
of Zen practitioners and the
prayerful repose of Roman Catholic nuns—not
to mention the mystical trances
brought on by users of peyote and other mind-altering
drugs.
[7]
At least one gene, which
goes by the name VMAT2, controls the flow to the brain of chemicals that
play a key role in emotions and consciousness. This
is the "God gene" of the book's title, and Hamer acknowledges
that it's a misnomer. There probably
are dozens or hundreds more genes, yet to be identified,
involved in the universal propensity for transcendence,
he said.
[8]
Furthermore, the scientific linkage
of a gene with chemicals that affect happiness
or sadness does not answer the question "Is
there a God?" but rather "Why do we believe
in God?"
{Answer:
to find Peace of Mind.}
[9]
"Our genes can predispose us to believe. But
they don't tell us what to believe in," said Hamer, whose current
research involves HIV/AIDS.
[10]
Critics in the scientific community argue
that Hamer's conclusions are simplistic and speculative,
relying too much on anecdotal {based
on incidental observations or reports rather than systematic evaluation}
evidence and too little on testing of the VMAT2 gene
to determine other possible connections to behavior.
They also wonder whether his findings can be replicated
{duplicated},
a necessity in scientific research.
[11]
"The field of behavioral genetics is
littered with failed links between particular genes and personality traits,"
said Carl Zimmer, a science author
who reviewed the book in last month's Scientific American.
[12]
Some religious leaders welcome the idea of
a genetic basis for spirituality and say it validates long-held
teaching.
[13]
"I wondered for a long time why
[the concept of] a genetic implant hasn't been put in print or been part
of a conversation in the broad theological community,"
said Bishop John B. Chane of the Episcopal Diocese
of Washington. Chane associates
Hamer's findings with the Apostle Paul's statement,
"There are a variety of gifts but the same spirit."
[14]
Chane also welcomes the notion of genetic universality
as a new, deeper way of promoting understanding
among people of different faiths—particularly
Judaism, Christianity and Islam,
all of which trace their beginnings to the same father,
Abraham.
[15]
Others, such as Bishop Adam J. Richardson Jr. of
the Washington area district of the African Methodist Episcopal Church,
said that it's hard to quantify matters of the spirit
and that attributing behavior to one's genetic makeup "can be a frightful
thing." By analogy, saying
that people are predisposed to be spiritual also
means that criminals are genetically wired
to be criminals and have
no hope of rehabilitation.
[16]
"Why not just put them in prison and throw away the key?" he
asked.
[17]
Richardson said there's also the danger of people losing hope,
of believing their genetic makeup limits their development
and personal growth. "In
my own system, we do have choice.
We always have choice," the
bishop said.
[18]
Hamer said his own religious development began in a Congregationalist church,
which he abandoned when he became a scientist.
But he discovered new spiritual meaning when he began
researching this book—through,
in part, Zen meditative practices he learned at a
Zen center near Kyoto, Japan.
[19]
He likens spirituality to the capacity for language:
Humans are genetically {hardware}
predisposed to have it, but the
language people speak and the religion
they practice are learned {data
base} rather than inherited
characteristics. {Genes
and Memes}
[20]
People are designed to communicate through language,
but they speak English, French or
Chinese because of the part of the world they grew up in.
Similarly, genetic makeup urges people to believe
in a Creator or find spiritual fulfillment {i.e.
Peace of Mind},
but culture, history
and environment determine whether
one is a Christian, Hindu, Jew, Buddhist or Muslim.
[21]
Although people can change or abandon
that religious affiliation, they
cannot rid themselves of the genetic propensity to be spiritual.
But people can build on and develop that innate spirituality
through meditation, prayer and creative arts such as music and painting.
These practices can be done inside or outside organized
religion, he said.
[22]
Hamer said he has received numerous comments from people
who say that the dichotomy
{division
into two exclusive, opposed, or contradictory group}
of spirituality and religion makes sense. "I
always knew this, that I was inclined to be spiritual,
even though I've always had a problem with {scriptural
theology} religion,"
they tell him.
[23]
"I see more and more people doing things like yoga,"
Hamer said. "They do it initially because they
want to get more flexible and look good and feel great.
Then they find that once they spend some time sitting
on a mat, doing nothing but concentrating
on their body and clearing their mind of everything else, they say,
'That feels kind of good.'"
[24]
Such feelings can lead to an intuitive sense of God's
presence, Hamer said. "We
do not know God; we feel Him."
[25]
Organized {scriptural
theology} religion
can become so codified, so caught
up with learned rituals, that the focus on spirituality gets lost, Hamer
said. The resurgence of Pentecostalism
{noting
or pertaining to any of various Christian groups, usu. fundamentalist,
that emphasize the activity of the Holy Spirit, stress
holiness of living, and express their religious feelings uninhibitedly,
as by speaking in tongues; <tongues> speech,
often incomprehensible, typically uttered during moments of religious ecstasy}
and other emotion-based religions is one sign of the staying power of inherited
spirituality, he said.
[26]
Megachurches, too, are part of
this phenomenon and have widespread appeal because of the emotional aspects
of worship, he said. "They
have lots of music, video screens, the whole multimedia thing going on,"
he said. "They're tapping
into that [innate spirituality]. It's fun and allows people
to get into that spiritual frame of mind."
[27]
Hamer said more research has to be done to
determine whether there is a genetic basis for other religion-related phenomena,
including the existence of arche-types, the similarity
of creation stories in various religions and
the common characteristics of fundamentalism in Christianity, Judaism
and Islam.
[28]
Also left hanging is why women score much higher than men on transcendence
tests.
[29]
"I'm not completely sure about that," Hamer
said. "I just know that it's true. Women are more attuned to their
emotional connections, and that's
at the heart of spirituality."
William
James,
"The Reality of the Unseen," reprinted in Robinson;
ISBN:
0872202224.
page 129 Our impulsive belief is here always what sets up the original body of truth {as we seek Peace of Mind}, and our articulately verbalized philosophy is but its showy translation into formulas. The unreasoned and immediate assurance is the deep thing in us, the reasoned argument is but a surface exhibition. Instinct leads, intelligence does but follow. If a person feels the presence of a living God after the fashion shown by my quotations, your critical arguments, be they never so superior, will vainly set themselves to change his faith. {Mark Twain's "Little Story," Catholic Faith.}
Please observe, however, that I do not yet say that it is better that the subconscious and non-rational should thus hold primacy in the religious realm. I confine myself to simply pointing out that they do so hold it as a matter of fact.
From Professor James Hall's Lecture 29 - CG3:16—{technological advancement}.
Fundamental changes in dominant scientific {and religious} opinion are not the result of rational argument in the arena of demonstration, but of rhetorical argument in the arena of persuasion {the same game, same paradigm}. The shifts are not evidence-driven, they are driven by the dynamics of culture, {technological advancement} and by the utility—at a given time and place—of seeing things this way rather than that. {Evolution, Millennium, Catholic, James:129.}
Endnote
Descartes Pineal Gland -
From Antonio Damasio's
Book XXVI:187-9—Pineal
Gland.
[1] In its outline, the substance dualism view is the account that Descartes helped dignify and which is difficult to reconcile with his remarkable scientific achievements {2P35(6)}. Descartes was ahead of his peers in the way he conceived of complicated mechanisms for the operations of the body. He broke with the scholastic tradition page 188 by weaving together two worlds that remained separate until then: the physical-inorganic and the living-organic. He was equally adroit at conceiving sophisticated operations for the mind and insisted that mind and body influenced each other mutually. Yet he never proposed a plausible means for those mutual influences to exert themselves. In a bizarre twist, Descartes proposed that mind and body interacted, but never explained how the interaction might take place beyond saying that the pineal gland was the conduit for such interactions. The pineal is a small structure, located at the midline and base of the brain, and it turns out to be rather poorly connected and endowed for the momentous job Descartes required of it. In spite of Descartes' sophisticated views of mental and physiological body processes, which he separately considered, he either left the mutual connections of mind and body unspecified or made them implausible. Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, the sort of bright and friendly student we all wish to have, saw quite clearly then what we see clearly now: For mind and body to do the job Descartes required of them, mind and body needed to make contact. However, by emptying mind of any physical property, Descartes made contact impossible {transcendent}.
[2] For Descartes, the human mind remained devoid of spatial {existing or occurring in space} extension and material substance, two negative traits that made it capable of living after the body no longer existed. It was a substance but it was not physical. Whether Descartes really believed this formulation is by no means certain. He might have believed it, at some point, and then not, which is not meant at all as a criticism. It would simply mean that Descartes was uncertain and ambivalent about a conception that has chronically plunged human beings, learned as well as ignorant, smart as well as stupid, into precisely the same state of uncertainty and ambivalence. Very human and very understandable. Believed or not, however, the fact that his formulation reaffirmed the immortality of the page 189 personal mind allowed him to escape the anathema that was to befall Spinoza only a few years later. Unlike Spinoza, Descartes has been acknowledged continuously well into our own era, by philosophers, scientists, and the lay public, although not always favorably.
[3] In spite of its scientific shortcomings, the view identified with Descartes resonates well with the awe and wonder we deservedly have for our own minds. There is no doubt that the human mind is special—special in its immense capacity to feel pleasure and pain and to be aware of the pain and pleasure of others; in its ability to love and to pardon; in its prodigious memory; in its ability to symbolize and narrate; in its gift of language with syntax {the rules for the formation of grammatical sentences in a language}; in its power to understand the universe and create new universes; in the speed and ease with which it processes and integrates disparate information so that problems can be solved. But awe and wonder at the human mind are compatible with other views of the relation between body and mind and do not make Descartes' views any more correct.
[4] As the observations made possible by introspection {observation or examination of one's own mental and emotional state, mental processes, etc.} became increasingly informed by the modern scientific facts of neurobiology, the substance dualistic view of the mind-body problem lost its appeal. Mental phenomena were revealed as closely dependent on the operation of many specific systems of brain circuits. For example: .....
From Antonio Damasio's Book XXVI:28—'Emotion' versus 'Feelings', Biology of Emotions:
[1] In the context of this book then, emotions {called 'feeling' by James} are actions or movements, many of them public, visible to others as they occur in the face, in the voice, in specific behaviors. To be sure, some components of the emotion process are not visible to the naked eye {adrenal flow, pulse, blood pressure, etc.} but can be made "visible" with current scientific probes such as hormonal assays and electrophysiological wave patterns. Feelings, on the other hand, are always hidden, like all mental images necessarily are, unseen to anyone other than their rightful owner, the most private property of the organism in whose brain they occur.
[2] Emotions play out {physically} in the theater of the body. Feelings play out {mentally} in the theater of the mind. {Emotions precede feelings.} As we shall see, emotions and the host of related reactions that underlie them are part of the basic mechanisms of life regulation; feelings also contribute to life regulation, but at a higher level. Emotions and related reactions seem to precede feelings in the history of life. Emotions and related phe- nomena are the foundation for feelings, the mental events that form the bedrock of our minds and whose nature we wish to elucidate. {Biology of Emotions—ANS}
[3] Emotions and feelings are so intimately related along a continuous process that we tend to think of them, understandably, as one single thing. In the normal situation, however, we can glean different segments along the continuous process and, under the microscope of cognitive neuroscience, it is legitimate to dissociate one segment from the other. With naked eyes and a slew of scientific probes, an observer may objectively examine the behaviors that make up an emotion. In effect, the prelude to the process of feeling can be studied. Turning emotion and feeling into separate research objects helps us discover how it is that we feel.
{Comment
to 1a. Man the {Computerized}
Machine.} Is
Consciousness Computable?
From The New York Times, New York, NY, USA - Saturday, April 19,
2003.
I Feel, Therefore I Am
By EMILY EAKIN
[1] In the middle of the 17th century, Spinoza took on Descartes and lost.
[2] According to Descartes' famous dualist theory {the belief that humans embody two parts, as body and soul.}, human beings were composed of physical bodies and immaterial minds. Spinoza disagreed. In "The Ethics," his masterwork, published after his death in 1677, he argued that body and mind are not two separate entities but one continuous substance.
[3] As for Descartes' view of the mind as a reasoning machine, Spinoza thought that was dead wrong. Reason, he insisted, is shot through with emotion. More radical still, he claimed that thoughts and feelings are not primarily reactions to external events but first and foremost about the body. In fact, he suggested, the mind exists purely for the body's sake, to ensure its survival {conatus}. {Biology of Emotions—ANS}
[4] For his beliefs, Spinoza was vilified and — for extended periods — ignored. Descartes, on the other hand, was immortalized as a visionary. His rationalist doctrine shaped the course of modern philosophy and became part of the cultural bedrock.
[5] But it seems history may have sided with the wrong man. For more than a decade, neuroscientists armed with brain scans have been chipping away at the Cartesian façade. Gone is Descartes' lofty Cogito, reasoning in pristine detachment from the physical world. Fading fast are its sophisticated modern incarnations, including the once-popular "computational model," according to which the mind is like a software program and the brain like a hard drive {but a still valid simplified analogy is genes—hardware, and experience—software}.
[6] Lately, scientists have begun to approach consciousness in more Spinozist terms: as a complex and indivisible mind-brain-body {and environmental} system. And now Dr. Antonio Damasio, the head of neurology at the University of Iowa Medical Center in Iowa City and leading anti-Cartesian crusader, says that Spinoza was right in other ways as well. In particular, Dr. Damasio argues in his new book, Book XXVI, "Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain" (Harcourt, 2003), the philosopher anticipated one of brain science's most important recent discoveries: the critical role of the emotions in ensuring our survival and allowing us to think. Feeling, it turns out, is not the enemy of reason, but, as Spinoza saw it, an indispensable accomplice.
[7] "Science is proving Spinoza more current," Dr. Damasio said over tea at his hotel during a recent visit to New York. "He intuited the basic mechanism of the emotions."
[8] A slight, fine-featured man with elegant manners and a shock of white hair, Dr. Damasio, 58, exudes old-world charm. His conversation is a velvet murmur that hints at his Portuguese roots; his passion is in his hands, which slice the air in quick, graceful movements as he speaks.
[9] And these days, his pronouncements carry considerable weight. His theories are technical (he distinguishes between feelings and emotions and talks of an elaborate "body loop"). And in their details they are sometimes controversial. But his general emphasis on affect — or feelings — strikes most experts as beyond dispute. "His contributions at the human level have been remarkable," said Jaak Panksepp, a neuroscientist and director of Affective Neuroscience at the Falk Center for Molecular Therapeutics at Northwestern University in Evanston, Ill. "He's done some of the most spectacular brain-imaging work that shows us what emotions are like in the brain."
[10] In short, Dr. Damasio is at the forefront of what neuroscientists are calling an "affect revolution" that is turning decades of scientific wisdom on its head and reverberating through other fields as well.
[11] "Academics are throwing themselves into the study of emotion with the rapturous intensity of a love affair," The Chronicle of Higher Education reported in February, in an article that included a list of 25 recent scholarly books, from philosophy and history to literature and political science, all devoted to affect in one way or another.
[12] And while Dr.
Damasio hardly deserves all the credit for this trend,
thanks to his breakthrough research and two previous,
surprisingly accessible books —
Book XXXI, "Descartes'
Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain" (1994)
and
Book XXX, "The
Feeling of What Happens, Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness"
(1999) — he can take a good deal. He
is required reading in literature seminars. Writers
like Ian McEwan and David Lodge have acknowledged his work in their novels.
He's even inspired a piano concerto, "Body Loops,"
and a quintet that was given its premiere at Lincoln Center last week.
[13] "For students of the humanities, the key neurophysiological insight of our time is that which has been so eloquently expressed by Antonio Damasio," declared Jonathan Bate, a Shakespeare scholar at the University of Liverpool in the Times Literary Supplement last December. "The division between reason and passion, or cognition and emotion (an opposition that goes all the way back to Aristotle), is, from a neurological point of view, a fallacy."
[14] Dr. Damasio and
other researchers, he added, "have
brought us close to the possibility of a scientifically verifiable investigation
of the hypothesis — which
in various forms has a very long history — that literature
may have been genetically evolved to
do cognitive work precisely by stimulating the emotions."
[15] All the talk
about affect marks the demise of a long-upheld scholarly taboo.
In the late 19th century, science's
leading lights regarded feelings as a natural subject for exploration.
Darwin devoted a book to emotional expression in humans
and animals, Freud based his
theory of mental pathology on unsuccessful emotional repression,
and the American psychologist William
James weighed in with
a body-based theory of emotion strikingly similar to Spinoza's own.
[16] But by the early 20th century, science had fallen sway to behaviorism and affect was off limits. Human beings, it was thought, could be understood purely by observing what they did. Internal mental states were dismissed as irrelevant. As Dr. Damasio put it, "Neuroscience gave the cold shoulder to emotion." Feelings, he said, were considered "elusive, indescribable, too subjective."
[17] When Dr. Damasio began to study affect in the late 1980's, it was by accident, not design. He had moved to the United States from Lisbon in the 1970's to work with Norman Geschwind, a Harvard neurologist and expert on brain lesions. In 1976, Dr. Damasio and his wife, Hanna Damasio, also a neurologist, became professors at the University of Iowa, where he acquired a reputation as an authority on language, memory and Alzheimer's disease. But it was his work with brain-damaged patients with impaired decision-making skills that led him to wonder about emotions.
[18] "I was forced to think about emotions because of those patients with frontal lobe damage," Dr. Damasio said. "They had incredible problems with social behavior that had normally been attributed only to cognitive disturbances. I was very struck by the fact that they had clear disturbances of emotion. I started thinking that emotions might play a role in making decisions and choices in a normal way."
[19] Typical of his patients was Elliot, a man in his 30's who had suffered frontal lobe damage as a result of a brain tumor. Elliot performed normally on intelligence tests but could no longer make choices, prioritize tasks, manage his time or — as a consequence — hold down a job. To make a living, he embarked on hare-brained business schemes with shady partners that ended in bankruptcy.
[20] Then Dr. Damasio
discovered that Elliot was unable to feel. He
spoke of the tragic events of his life without emotion. Shown
pictures of gruesome accidents and natural disasters, he registered no
reaction. When Dr. Damasio
tested other patients with similar brain damage he
found the same striking combination of impaired reason and impaired affect.
[21] When Dr.
Damasio presented his findings in Book XXX,
"Descartes'
Error," the
book was greeted as a breakthrough. (An
international best seller, it has been translated into 24 languages.) "It's
one thing to have a speculative theory
about the role of reason and the role of emotions," said
Patricia Churchland, a neurophilosopher at the University of California
in San Diego. "For
the first time, his lab really showed" that "you can't shut off
all the emotions from rational decision-making."
[22] Neuroscience
has since converged around the idea that
emotions are central to cognition — and
thus survival. But just why and
how remain more open questions. In his second book, Book
XXXI, "The Feeling of What Happens,"
Dr. Damasio speculated that emotions and feelings were crucial to the evolution
of consciousness and,
along with it, a sense of self.
In Book XXVI, "Looking
for Spinoza," he tackles the mystery
of how affect works.
[23] His theory is both elaborate and
counterintuitive, involving a
chain reaction that begins when an
emotion (defined
as a change in body state in response to
an external stimulus) triggers a feeling (the
representation of that change in the brain as well as specific mental images).
In other words, feelings do not cause bodily symptoms
but are caused by them: we do not tremble because
we feel afraid; we
feel afraid because we tremble {my
emphasis}.
{Biology
of Emotions—ANS}
Subject: Re: [spinoza-ethics] Digest
Number 322
Date: Sun, 6 Nov 2005 17:33:31 -0800 (PST)
From: Gary Geiser <aahouse10@yahoo.com>
...... But Spinoza is objective: he starts from the world, and relfects
it logistically in G-D's infinite
impersonal mind..... For Spinoza, we do not love
G-D because it makes us happy; but rather,
we become happy because we love
G-D. ....
{We need the totality of ALL things for our perpetuation, we therfore love G-D.}
[24] Still more provocative is his Spinozist conclusion, that the mind's primary focus is the body: "The mind exists for the body, is engaged in telling the story of the body's multifarious events, and uses that story to optimize the life of the organism."
[25] Such a notion,
he concedes, "departs radically
from traditional wisdom and may sound implausible at first glance."
After all, he points out, "we usually regard
our mind as populated by images or thoughts of objects, actions and abstract
relations, mostly related to
the outside world rather than to our bodies."
[26] And despite
Dr. Damasio's assurances that he has neurobiology
on his side, not every expert
is willing to endorse the notion yet. Writing
in The New York Times Book Review in February, Colin McGinn, a philosopher
at Rutgers University, called
the theory "unoriginal" and "false,"
arguing that it had been thoroughly debunked when
William James and another
psychologist, Carl G. Lange, introduced it
120 years ago.
[27] Scientists, however, have been less dismissive. "Damasio's data is very important and very robust," Mr. Panksepp said. "His theory is more controversial. But his approach, by focusing on the nature of body representations of the brain, is essential to make progress on how affective experience emerges in the mind."
[28] Most delighted, perhaps, are Spinoza scholars. Heidi M. Ravven, a professor of the philosophy of religion at Hamilton College, said his work prompted her to write a 70-page paper on Spinoza and neuroscience. "I realized everything he said confirmed Spinoza," she said. "I was just jumping out of my skin."
From Harcourtbook
Web Page, March 23, 2005:
Looking
for Spinoza / Joy, Sorrow, and
the Feeling Brain
Antonio Damasio Interview
Completing the trilogy that began with Descartes' Error and continued with The Feeling of What Happens, noted neuroscientist Antonio Damasio now focuses the full force of his research and wisdom on emotions. He shows how joy and sorrow are cornerstones of our survival. As he investigates the cerebral mechanisms behind emotions and feelings, Damasio argues that the internal regulatory processes not only preserve life within ourselves, but they create, motivate, and even shape our greatest cultural accomplishments.
Biography
Antonio R. Damasio is the Van Allen Professor and head of the department of neurology at the University of Iowa Medical Center and is an adjunct professor at the Salk Institute in San Diego. DESCARTES' ERROR was nominated for the Los Angeles Times Book Award, and has been translated into twenty-three languages. His most recent book, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS, was a New York Times Book Review Editors' Choice, a Publishers Weekly Best Book of the Year, a Library Journal Best Book of the Year, and has eighteen foreign editions. He lives in Iowa City and Chicago.
Interview
Q: Much of the work you have done in the lab and with your previous books explored the role that emotions play in decision-making and in the construction of the self. In your new book, LOOKING FOR SPINOZA {2003} you seem to be presenting a progress report on our understanding of the nature and significance of feelings. What is new here? What have you found out?
A: Neuroscience is advancing at a fast pace. As of four years ago, when my last book was published {1999}, we had a reasonable hypothesis regarding the brain basis for feeling, but no certainties. Now, we can speak with confidence about "what feelings {sorrow, boredom, joy} are" - where they come from, how they happen, what they are made of biologically {emotions}. That is why the book's subtitle is the "feeling brain." We have identified brain areas and brain pathways necessary to feel emotions. Armed with the new knowledge we can even venture to say what feelings are for. The new knowledge broadens our view of human nature. We can not really know who we are if we do not understand the brain mechanisms behind emotion and feeling - what causes emotions, what leads to feelings, how they affect our decisions, social behavior, and creativity, and where they fit in evolution.
Q: What value does understanding the difference between emotions and feelings have?
A: Understanding the difference between emotions and feelings removed a barrier to research on the nature of affect, and opened the way to elucidating the origin and content of feelings. {Biology of Emotions—ANS}
Q: Are there neurobiological foundations for Ethics?
A: Yes there are. One of the payoffs of the new understanding of emotions and feelings is the realization that moral behavior does not begin with humans. In certain circumstances numerous non-human species behave in ways that are, for all intents and purposes, comparable to the moral ways of human beings. Interestingly, the moral behaviors are emotional—compassion, shame, indignation, dominant pride or submission. As in the case of culture, the contribution of everything that is learned and created in a group plays a major role in shaping moral behaviors. Only humans can codify and refine rules of moral behavior. Animals can behave in moral-like ways, but only humans have ethics and write laws and design justice systems. Animals can show attachment to others but as I discuss in the book only humans love {?} in the proper sense {need} of the term.
Q: Why bring Spinoza in to this?
A: Because Spinoza prefigured in a remarkable way some of the ideas on emotion, feelings, and ethics that are now taking shape as a result of modern neuroscience (Spinoza's views on the mind body problem are especially modern). Also because Spinoza's uncanny foreshadowing of modern views on biology and mind have not been recognized by contemporary science and deserve to be so. Finally, as I studied Spinoza with the purpose of giving him his due, I became intrigued by the person and the times, and both found their way into the book.
Q: Are there any case studies that illuminate your argument?
A: There are many such cases. For example, children who suffer brain injury in certain regions of the frontal lobe in their first year years of life develop major defects of social behavior in spite of being otherwise intelligent. They do not exhibit social emotions (compassion, shame, guilt) and they never learn social conventions and ethical rules.
Q: Is it possible to locate the spiritual {desire for PcM—i.e., that is nothing less than conatus at work} in the human organism?
A: It is indeed. The spiritual is a special feeling state and, as other feelings states, it can be traced to the particular operations of several brain and body regions. We might say that the spiritual is the ultimate state of well-being {PcM}—there is a maximal ease, harmony, and balance of organism functions. Spiritual states are most conducive to survival.
Q: People who have read Looking for Spinoza were surprised to find it hopeful. Do you think it is hopeful?
A: The book does have a message of hope. This may be unexpected, given the bleakness of today's headlines, but I believe it is justified. The message emerges naturally from several sources. For example, I am suggesting that knowing about the workings of mind and brain can help us deal more effectively with the social problems we face today. Part of our failures in the past may well be due to underestimating the positive and negative power of emotions. On a purely practical level, the new knowledge will also let us develop new medications to cure causes of human suffering such as pain and depression. No less importantly, perhaps, the book shows how Spinoza, alone and marginalized, was able to achieve happiness {better PcM} by cultivating curiosity, knowledge, and goodness of character.
{Comment
to 1a. Man the {Computerized}
Machine.} Is
Consciousness Computable?
From Los Angeles
Times, April 27, 2003: Soul-searching
science Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow,
and the Feeling Brain, Antonio Damasio, Harcourt: 356 pp., ISBN: 0151005575.
By Margaret Jacob, Margaret Jacob is the author of "The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans." She is a professor of history at UCLA.
If in the midst of an intense fight with your beloved,
you find yourself crying, then be aware that you owe
your feelings to a reaction triggered within
the {medial and ventral prefrontal
region of the brain read
Biology of Emotions—ANS.
If with this knowledge you laugh in relief, the reaction
comes from the medial and dorsal prefrontal region.
Which is one way of reading the hard-nosed implications
of "Looking for Spinoza,"
Antonio Damasio's remarkable new book on the physical
foundations of the emotional. Damasio's
thesis is both philosophical and scientific. The
emotions have physical location, indeed
they are physical — a part of the material construction of the brain.
But that is not all: The physical structures of the
brain can be transformed by the emotions. In
a more classical age when bodies and souls
were deemed separate and unequal by God,
such a notion would have been attacked as atheism.
Now it is simply unnerving. Damasio's project in this
book continues work and philosophical positions he set forth
in "Descartes' Error:
Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain" (1994) and
"The Feeling of What Happens: Body
and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness"
(1999). Almost like a crusader,
Damasio, who is head of the department of neurology at the University of
Iowa Medical Center and an affiliate
of the Salk Institute
in San Diego, attacks the Western
propensity to separate emotion, feelings or affect — our internal mental
states and their visual manifestations — from what we
do or how we act. The separation has a philosophical
pedigree that goes back to Descartes.
But taking on the father of modern philosophy requires
more than neuroscience;
for this, Damasio turns to philosophy and finds his
ally in Spinoza,
who followed Descartes first as a pupil and then as
a radical rethinker of his decreed
separation of thought from body.
In our own time, philosophers
have called for some kind of reassessment of the role of emotions
or consciousness,
but until lately the project had been left to them,
not to science. Damasio's
once behaviorally oriented scientific work turned toward emotions only
when he realized that patients
with frontal lobe damage had not only behavior problems,
they also could not feel.
They registered no emotion in the face of tragedies,
their own or others. Thus began
a radical reorientation within neuroscience that entailed,
as Spinoza would have put it, seeing that the mind
exists for the body, or put perhaps too simply, we
do not laugh because we feel happy, we feel happy because
we laugh. Damasio
understands that contemporary neuroscientific work has conflated
{to
fuse into one entity}
spirit into matter, soul
into body (as Spinoza's contemporaries would have put it),
or as we might say now, places
emotions in the cerebral cortices, the amygdala,
the hypothalamus
and the viscera.
More accurately, however, Damasio
argues that emotions formed as the result of evolutionary processes,
work by blind mechanistic necessity and manage the
body. As Damasio writes, "the
result is feelings." We
feel because changes have occurred in the
molecular structure of the brain. It
is that simple, yet research on such a structure is overwhelmingly complex.
It also has serious implications that go to the heart
of our philosophical and moral assumptions. Have
the lover's feelings been dismissed — reduced to insignificance
by the ever-expanding power of neuroscience — or have
we found a key for understanding
depression
or the disorders left by strokes
and seizures?
Both ethical implications are present.
The obvious compassion that informs Damasio's science
may reassure the lover, but other unsettling implications still remain.
All physical gestures — and that includes the impact
made by talk and discussion —
can shape the emotional life. That
knowledge should validate psychotherapy.
But the danger remains — and indeed,
some argue that this day is upon us — that armed with
a shallow reading of neuroscience, the
HMOs and insurance companies could turn psychotherapy into 20-minute sessions
for adjusting the drug dosage or for keeping the mentally
ill passive or institutionalized. When
Damasio describes the physiology of laughing and crying, he invokes the
philosophy of Spinoza, who,
when considering the full implications of Descartes' thought,
moved away from his dualism and defined the world
as matter in motion, with impulse
and necessity at the root of human drives.
Then and now, that philosophical position may be described as materialism
or pantheism
{or
Buddhism}.
The differences between materialism and pantheism
are largely semantic {of
or pertaining to meaning or arising from the different meanings of words
or other symbols}:
Materialists argue that matter is driven by blind
forces, and pantheists argue
that matter is driven by some embedded life
spirit {soul}.
During the 17th century, both
positions were heresy pure and simple, for both reduced the soul
to matter and the soul could be said to exist insofar
as its imagined state evoked certain bodily feelings. For the devout,
the same disturbing conclusion could be applied to
God, who
could be similarly ascribed existence insofar as his imagined being evoked
a state of human feeling. Prior
to Spinoza and his followers — around 1650 — there was not a place in the
Western world where such shocking
thoughts were possible. Attempting
to soften the image of materialism, the Irish freethinker,
John Toland,
gave the name pantheism to it in 1705. For
the pantheist, Nature is G-D, and as a
result, matter possesses life or force. The
name rightly stuck and, for some, obscured the reality
that a separate spiritual realm once reserved for
the soul and for God
had been obliterated by philosophy.
Historically, pantheism and materialism initiated
a new era, what historians (since the 1980s) have called the Radical Enlightenment.
Around 1700 being openly Spinozist could mean jail
time, and it took two centuries
of ferocious debate to resolve the issue.
By 1900 and after the enormous impact of Darwin,
materialism won out as an acceptable philosophical foundation for doing
science. Science had sequestered
itself from theological disputes
and then gradually, haltingly, turned
its gaze on the human mind itself. We
created maps of the brain that occasionally could be shown
to correspond with a physiological experience in a
brain. The correspondences are
now coming faster and with greater precision. Thanks to the achievements
of the new neuroscience, pantheism,
with its emphasis upon life or consciousness
within matter, has suddenly been
made to seem all the more reasonable. A
philosophical position once buried under the scorn of the devout
has been reconstructed. Neuroscience is beginning
to unlock areas of brain matter and
their interconnections previously unknown. Consequently
we understand feelings as altered modes of matter and see that all feelings
exist in tension with the physical world, as
it is experienced in the mind. "Looking
for Spinoza" accessibly lays out many of these discoveries
while relating them to the beliefs of a once scorned
17th century thinker. We learn
that the brain possesses body-sensing regions that
enable it to construct "maps of the ongoing body state."
These regions are critically important, Damasio argues.
Without them feelings would be impossible.
Unlike what was previously believed, feelings are
not instantaneous. They require
anywhere from two to 20 seconds to occur, about
as long as it takes the brain to register changes in body temperature,
glucose levels or genital stimulation {sympathetic
nervous system}.
Put another way, William
James was right when he argued that feelings are what happen
when the brain senses the body being changed by emotion.
Feelings or affect become the end product
of a deeply physical process that unfolds in the mind.
Damasio has the rare talent
of rendering science intelligible
while also being gifted in philosophy, literature and wit.
He asks us to go against our intuition,
to separate feelings from emotion and to see the latter as hard-wired
and primal, a result of the evolutionary
process. He then takes us through
experiments that associate emotional states
with the neural circuitry of certain regions of the
brain. He explains why under
certain circumstances the brain sends "false" signals, known
as endorphins,
and these shield the body from complete knowledge
of the damage or danger that has been visited upon it.
As Spinoza's more philosophically
astute followers knew as early as 1700, standing
in the world as a pantheist requires the embrace
of paradox {acosism}.
Keeping true to evolutionary theory derived from Darwin,
Damasio
tells us that random selection and survival determined
what got kept or discarded in the millenniums
involved in human evolution. Yet
in another moment, he assigns meaning and design, telling us that
"nature provides us with the same analgesic
{a remedy
that relieves or allays pain}
shot" — endorphins — "that the compassionate
physician administers to the
patient suffering pain." Vividly
and unwittingly he illustrates what the first materialists stumbled upon
when they eliminated God:
Nature would
have to stand in his place, evoked
to explain the order {cosmic
religious feeling}
and beneficence we see around us. Damasio
embraces the paradox that random evolutionary processes govern nature
and it still possesses attributes once assigned to
God. In
Damasio's post-Darwinian position, all
is random mutation working to enhance the chances of some and not others.
Damasio
employs the analogy of {computerized}
machines and machinery in describing the circuitry
of the brain but then confronts
the behavioralist who would reduce human processes
to the on-board computers
of a Boeing 777. Like Diderot
and other enlightened materialists before him, Damasio
recoils from the analogy and turns to the
vitalism found in the pantheist
tradition, "every elementary
part of our organism, every cell in the body, is
not just animated {interacting}
but living." Life {Soul}
is "a strange state" and no machine offers an equivalent to the
living cell; even nerve sensors
are living cells that "have a say" on the matter signaled to
the brain. Once again, as in
the 18th century, the escape from the cold, mechanistic
implications of materialism lies in pantheism,
in the realization that matter can be alive.
One of Damasio's
goals is to understand cold and
uncaring behavior when it suddenly
appears among patients who had previously been compassionate.
Damage to a sector of the frontal
lobe causes patients to exhibit asocial behavior,
and by studying these behaviors,
we learn how profoundly basic the integrity of emotion
and feeling are for normal human
social behavior. Damasio speculates
that evolution itself would have failed humanity if
it had started out with "a population deprived of the ability
to respond toward
others with {enlightened}
sympathy, attachment, embarrassment, and other social emotions."
Neuroscience at the moment may be interpreted as the
pharmacologist's best friend in
the treatment of mental ailments, but
it is also providing incontrovertible proof for the necessary linkage
of social virtues
and emotions. Conceiving
of the emotions in pantheistic ways cannot explain how law, religious
beliefs and ethical behaviors emerged {they
all bring PcM},
but we now know that without the beneficent hard-wiring
of emotions, life would have
been as Spinoza's great contemporary Hobbes
feared: solitary, nasty, brutish and
especially short. Anyone with
an interest in the origins of human nature,
society, government or ethics needs to read this book
and ponder its implications. In
homage to the philosopher who allowed matter to feel and think,
Damasio begins and ends his account with a pilgrimage
to Amsterdam and to Spinoza's
house and haunts. He asks:
How does one become Spinoza?
And to answer his question, Damasio tries his hand
at Dutch history in the age of Rembrandt, almost
Spinoza's exact contemporary.
He takes up fairly well-accepted
generalizations about the Dutch as prosperous, relatively
tolerant, anti-Catholic and, above all, preoccupied with trade
and commerce, and then argues
that the goal of the homeostasis
{the
tendency of a system, esp. the physiological system of higher animals,
to maintain internal stability, owing
to the coordinated response of its parts to any situation or stimulus tending
to disturb its normal condition or function.}
endeavor means every cell
of our bodies searches for "what
we as thinking and affluent creatures
identify as well-ness and well-being." It
cannot be accidental that first
Spinoza and then Damasio write in the richest societies then known in the
world. Spinoza died amid a few
close friends, an outcast from his
synagogue, merely a heretical
Jew in the eyes of pious Christians. The
time of his philosophical insights may only now have arrived. Thanks to
him, Antonio Damasio or other
neuroscientists of his school may wind up as Nobel
laureates.
Comment to 1a. Man
the {Computerized}
Machine.
Mark
Twain 1907
From "The
Complete Essays of Mark Twain." Edited
and with an introduction by Charles Neider; 1963
by Charles Heider. p. 484 "The Turning-point of My Life"
by Mark Twain, written in 1910 {the
year Mark Twain died}.
[1] Circumstances do the planning for us all, no doubt, by help of our temperaments. I see no great difference between a man and a watch, except that the man is conscious and the watch isn't, and the man tries to plan things and the watch doesn't. The watch doesn't wind itself and doesn't regulate itself—these things are done exteriorly. Outside influences, outside circumstances, wind the man and regulate him. Left to himself, he wouldn't get regulated at all, and the sort of time he would keep would not be valuable. Some rare men are wonderful watches, with gold case, compensation balance, and all those things, and some men are only simple and sweet and humble Waterburys. I am a Waterbury. A Waterbury of that kind, some say.
[2] A nation is only an individual multiplied. It makes plans and Circumstance comes and upsets them—or enlarges them. Some patriots throw the tea overboard; some other patriots destroy a Bastille. The plans stop there; then Circumstance comes in, quite unexpectedly, and turns these modest riots into a revolution.
[3] And there was por
Columbus. He elaborated a doeep
plan to find a new route to an old country. Circumstance revised his plan
for him; and he found a new world.
And he gets the credit of it to this day. He hadn't anything to do with
it.
Mark
Twain 1907
From "The
Complete Essays of Mark Twain." Edited
and with an introduction by Charles Neider; Copyright 1963 by Charles Heider:
p. 585 "Corn-pone
Opinions" by Mark Twain, written in 1923.
The outside {exterior} influences are always pouring in upon us, and we are always obeying their orders and accepting their verdicts. The Smiths like the new play; the Jones go see it, and they copy the Smith verdict. Morals, religions, politics, get their following from surrounding influences and atmospheres, almost entirely; not from study, not from thinking. A man must and will have his own approval first of all, in each and every moment and circumstance of his life—even if he must repent of a self-approved act the moment after its commission, in order to get his self-approval again: but, speaking in general terms, a man's self-approval in the large concerns of life has its source in the approval of the peoples about him, and not in a searching personal examination of the matter. Mohammedans are Mohammedans because they are born and reared among that sect, not because they have thought it out and can furnish sound reasons for being Mohammedans; we know why Catholics are Catholics; why Presbyterians are Presbyterians; why Baptists are Baptists; why Mormons are Mormons; why thieves are thieves; why monarchists are monarchists; why Republicans are Republicans and Democrats, Democrats. We know it is a matter of association and sympathy, not reasoning and examination; that hardly a man in the world has an opinion upon morals, politics, or religion which he got otherwise than through his associations and sympathies. Broadly speaking, there are none but corn-pone {corn-pone - corn bread, esp. of a plain or simple kind} opinions. And broadly speaking, corn-pone stands for self-approval. Self-approval is acquired mainly from the approval of other people. The result is conformity. Sometimes conformity has a sordid business interest—the bread-and-butter interest—but not in most cases, I think. I think that in the majority of cases it is unconscious and not calculated; that it is born of the human being's natural yearning to stand well with his fellows and have their inspiring approval and praise—a yearning which is commonly so strong and so insistent that it cannot be effectually resisted, and must have its way {obeyed}.
From Matt Ridley's Genome; 1999; 0060932902, p. 309—Free Will, Determinism, Sin:
Full responsibility for one's actions is a necessary fiction without which the law would flounder, but it is a fiction all the same. To the extent that you act in character you are responsible for your actions; yet acting in character is merely expressing the many deter- minisms that caused your character. David Hume found himself impaled on this dilemma, subsequently named Hume's fork. Either our actions are determined, in which case we are not responsible for them, or they are random, in which case we are not responsible for them. In either case, common sense is outraged and society impossible to organise.
Christianity has wrestled with these issues for two millennia
and theologians of other stripes
for much longer. God, almost by
definition, seems to deny free will or He would not
be omnipotent. Yet Christianity in particular has
striven to preserve a concept of free will because,
without it, human beings cannot be held accountable for their actions.
Without accountability, sin
is a mockery and Hell a damnable injustice from a just God. The modern
Christian consensus is that God has implanted free
will in us, so that we have a choice of living
virtuously or in sin.
End.
Since October 31, 2000
hits.
Mark Twain
and Spinoza
Revised: September 18,
2006
josephb@yesselman.com
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