Concerning G-D

Circulated - 1673
Posthumously Published - 1677.

Benedict de Spinoza
1632 - 1677

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This English electronic text was taken by kind permission from: ;
the text of which was scanned and proof-read by
Edward A. Beach, Ph.D. in Philosophy and Religious Studies.

JBY Notes:

1.   The  text  is  the  1883  translation  of  the  "The Ethics" by R. H. M.
      Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications in  Book I. See note above.
      For other Versions see Note 7.

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):   y = Proposition Number, if given;   xx = Sentence Number.

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols:
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ),
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ],
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [,
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >,
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <,
           { JBY Comment } Metaphors, Links, G-D {Spelling change not consistent; too many of them.}
        All comments in right-hand margin are by JBY unless noted.

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here.

6.  Please   e-mail  errors,  clarification  requests,  disagreement,  or
     suggestions  to

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions.
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read  this Spinoza electronic HTML linearly as
     you  would  a  novel,  but  rather  follow a  thread  by following all its         EL:[3]:vi
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and        Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Durant's Story  
     to  one  thread  at  a  time, this  Web  Site  will  be  very  convoluted,       Tickle the Fancy  
     confusing,and an annoying maze. 

     If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
     abridged versions, e-book versions,or best, study the printed book
     book page numbers are given for most scanned books.

9.  From Elwes's IntroductionEL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi.

10. The secret to understanding Spinoza                                                           E1:Bk.III:200 
      In  "The Ethics - Part 1;  Concerning G-D",   Spinoza  spells  out  the          E5:Note 10 
      hypothesis that all things, animate, inanimate, and even the concept 
      of G-D, are bound into one grand "Organic Interdependence of Parts". 
      From this hypothesis it logically follows that obedience to the Golden        Spinozistic Idea 
      Rule is an act of self-interest and not altruism. Remember this and all 
      his   puzzling  sayings,  for  example  E1:Def.III & VI:45,  E1:I:46,  and 
      E1:XIV:54,become more, if not completely, understandable. 
      See Posit: 1D6 = ONE; and look for the Cash Value. Important.                  Burden of E1 

11.  To  help  further  understand  many  of  the Propositions and Ideas,       { Examples
                    use  the  analogy  of  you  as  'G-D (substance                     1D6, 2P3, 2P4 }
                  I WAS                 I AM             I WILL BE                                         Exo. 3:14
                   ( antecedents,  present,  and  descendents ),
                                                           ^ Being
                                    brain, heart, lungs, fingernails, shoes, etc.        Analogies,        Organic
                   and all parts of you as modes ( particular things ).                              2P20

         Example—you  are  a  part  of  G-D  as your heart is a part of you.        Indivisible
         You should serve G-D as you would want your heart to serve you.
      E2:Endnote N.11, E5:Endnote 18:1N, Pantheism, Fetus, Skin, Bk.XIV:2:243—Man needs.

        Also  interchange  G-D and Nature.                                          G-D siveNatura
      (For this last, thanks to "Frank Dixon" <>)
12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by Terry Neff.
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xii.
For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi.                      Spinoza's Daring
For a "study of the plan of Ethics 1" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:337-8.       Dijn:238—On Salvation
       For a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.

13.  See Nadler's entry in "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy".

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Bk.XII:x—The Nature of Things.
                                                      Bk.XIV:xii-xix—Ethics, Part 1.



Part I Propositions:Book I:Pg. vii. 
         If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral. 
         If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 



JBY Endnotes.

Part I Proposition List: Book I:Pg. v;  { Hypotheses }

                                 Premises 1 to 5 and Conclusion are from Wikipedia.

Prop. I.
Substance {G-D} is by Nature prior to its modifications
{EL:Bk.XIII:626, Deus sive NaturaBk.XX:228.}

Premise 1. Substance exists and cannot be dependent on anything
                  else for its existence.

Prop. II.
Bk.XIV:1:79, 81
Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
nothing in common.

Premise 2. No two substances can share an attribute.

Proof: If they share an attribute, they would be identical. Therefore
they can only be individuated by their modes. But then they would
depend on their modes for their identity. This would have the sub-
stance being dependent on its mode, in violation of premise 1.
Therefore, two substances cannot share the same attribute.

Prop. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one
the cause of the other. 

Premise 3. A substance can only be caused by something similar
                  to itself (something that shares its attribute).
Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from
the  other,  either  by the difference of the attributes of
the  substances,  or by the difference of their modifica-

Implied is Premise 4. Substance cannot be caused.

Proof: Something can only be caused by something which
is similar to itself, in other words something that shares its
attribute. But according to premise 2, no two substances can
share an attribute. Therefore substance cannot be caused.

Prop. V. There  cannot exist in the universe two or more
substances having the same nature or attribute. 

Implied is Premise 5. Substance is infinite.

Proof: If substance were not infinite, it would be finite and
limited by something. But to be limited by something is to be
dependent on it. However, substance cannot be dependent
on anything else (premise 1), therefore substance is infinite.

Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another

IImplied is the Conclusion: There can only be one substance.

Proof: If there were two infinite substances, they would limit
each other. But this would act as a restraint, and they would
be dependent on each other. But they cannot be dependent
on each other (premise 1), therefore there cannot be two
Prop. VII.
Existence belongs to the Nature of substance
Prop. VIII
Every substance is necessarily infinite.
Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has the greater the
number of its attributes.
Prop. X. Each  particular attribute  of  the one substance must
be conceived through itself.
Prop. XI. G-D, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes,  of
which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,
necessarily exists.
Prop. XII.
No attribute of substance can be conceived from which
it would follow that substance can be divided.
Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible. 
Prop. XIV.
Besides G-D no substance can be granted or
Prop. XV.
Whatsoever is, is in G-D, and without G-D nothing can
be, or be conceived.
Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an
infinite  number of things in infinite ways—that is,  all
things  which  can  fall  within  the  sphere  of  infinite
Prop. XVII. G-D acts solely by the laws of his own Nature, and is
not constrained by any one.
Prop. XVIII. G-D is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all
Prop. XIX.
G-D, and all the attributes of G-D, are eternal. 
Prop. XX. The existence of G-D and his essence are one and
the same.
Prop. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute Nature of any
attribute  of G-D  must always exist and be infinite, or,
in  other  words,  are  eternal  and  infinite through the
said attribute.
Prop. XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of G-D, in so far
as it is modified by a  modification,  which  exists
necessarily  and  as  infinite, through the said attribute,
must also exist necessarily, and as infinite.
Prop. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infi-
nite, must  necessarily  follow either from the absolute
Nature  of  some  attribute of G-D, or from an attribute
modified  by  a  modification  which  exists necessarily,
and as infinite.
Prop. XXIV. The essence of things produced by G-D does not
involve existence.
Prop. XXV. G-D is the efficient cause not only of the existence of
things, but also of their essence.
Prop. XXVI. A  thing  which  is  conditioned  to  act in a particular
manner,  has necessarily been  thus  conditioned by
G-D;  and  that  which  has  not been conditioned by
G-D cannot condition itself to act.
Prop. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by G-D to act in
a  particular  way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
Prop. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and
has  a  conditioned existence, cannot exist or be condi-
tioned  to  act,  unless  it  be  conditioned for existence
and  action  by  a cause other than itself, which also is
finite,  and  has  a  conditioned existence; and likewise
this  cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to
act,  unless  it  be conditioned for existence and action
by  another  cause, which also is finite, and has a con-
ditioned existence, and so on to infinity.
Prop. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are
conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner
by the necessity of the Divine Nature.
Prop. XXX.
Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function infinite,
must   comprehend  the  attributes  of  G-D  and  the
modifications of G-D, and nothing else.
Prop. XXXI. The  intellect  in  function, whether finite or infinite, as
will, desire, love, etc.,  should  be  referred to passive
nature and not to active Nature.
Prop. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary
Prop XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by G-D
in  any manner or in any order different from that which
has in fact obtained.
Prop. XXXIV. G-D's power is identical with his essence.                                      Metaphors
Prop. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of G-D,
necessarily exists.
Prop. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect
does not follow. 


page 45

 < E1:Bk.XV:2601E3:Def.XX:178, TEI:[95-98]:35 >  For symbols see E1:Note 4
DEFINITIONS  { G:Notes 1 & 2, Hypothesis. }

                Bk.III:197; Bk.XIV:1:1273, 1:1281TEI:[92]:34; NeffEL:L02(02):276.

                                      <causa sui, E1:Bk.XV:2602E1:XI:51, E1:XVI:59 >                         Being
Def. I.   By that which is  self-caused,  I mean that of which the          Spinoza's Religion
            essence involves existence, or that of which the Nature                 G-D siveNatura
            is only conceivable as existing1P7, 1P24; 5P35.          <------- small print, Logical Index.

               {G:Bk.VII:2821,G-D, Deus, Immanent, Exodus 3:14 " I AM THAT I AM";                   Analogy
                    Strong:1961, 1933, 1934.   J---vah; Strong:3068, 3069, Bk.XIV:1:144-5. }

                 Bk.XVIII:76d2, 87d2, 88p21,22; Bk.XIX:13a.

                                             Bk.XIB:237108; Bk.XIV:1:133.
                                                           Bk.III:198TEI:[101]:37               Bk.III:199.
Def. II.  A thing is called finite after its kind,  when  it can be limited
            by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is           G-d sivenatura
            called finite because  we always  conceive another greater
            body.  So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but
            a  body  is  not  limited  by  thought,  nor a thought by body.       Bk.XIV:1:136.
                   NeffEL:L04[3](04):282, Bk.XIII:6713E2:I & II:82.   1P8, 21.

              G:Bk.VII:223; Bk.XIII:623; Bk.XIV:1:64; Bk.XV:2613; Bk.XVIII:601d3, 64d3, 67d3.

                  Durant:636reality, essence                              Bk.III:197.
Def. III.  By  substance,  I  mean   that   which  is  in  itself, and is              term 'G-D'
            conceived through itself; in other words,  that of which a 
             conception  can  be  formed  independently  of any other   Hampshire32:22, Joseph Kupfer
             conception.                   1P1, 2, 4, 5, 6c, 10, 15, 28.                           <------- small print, Logical Index.
                      EL:[42];xxiii, NeffEL:L02[4](02):277, NeffE5:L29(12):318.

                  Bk.VIII:4082Bk.XIV:1:121; Bk.XIII:623.
Bk.XIV:1:142,146,1521,1532, 2322, 236, 2554, 2575, 3883, 404; Bk.XV:2614E2:XLIV:116;
                       Bk.XVIII:611d4, 1461d4Bk.XIV:1:121.  

Def. IV.  By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as {if}       Wolfson:1:1432Talmud.
             constituting the essence of substance. 1P4, 9, 10, 12, 19, 20; 2P1note.                 Durant:63672

                   G:Shirleys:234, NeffEL:L02[3](02):277. ^ Bk.III:158,196NeffTL:L27(09):315.

              Bk.III:200; Bk.XIV:1:64, 2504, 2554; Bk.XVIII:61d5, 67d5, 92d5, 1481d5.
                <Bk.XV:2615E1:XXV(7)C:66, E2:D.1:82,  E2:V(1):85 >  

                { Calculus:Fig. 3 }           ] affections[       ( accidents )
Def. V.   By mode, I mean the modifications ("Affectiones") of                   { Spinoza's motive;
             substance, or that which exists in,  and is conceived                  All things are in G-D. }
              through, something other than itself.  { G:Shirley:236}                  Durant:638 - modes
             { E1:Note 11, NeffE5:L29(12):318 }     1P1, 4, 6c, 15, 23, 25c, 28, 31; 2P1.

                 Def. VI References: Bk.XIII:6817Bk.XIII:612EL:L04[4]G-D(04):283; SCR:Dijn's Salvation.
38, 198, 199, 200; Bk.XIB:23296, 235, 237108; Bk.XIV:1:1182, 133, 158,Bk.XIV:2:3431; 
1d61p14d, 64d6, 75d6, 14713; Bk.XIX:13;Bk.XX:228.

                 {It will be a happy day when all books and footnotes are available electronically and permanently.}
             <Bk.XV:2616Bk.XV:27167 on E2:VII(8):87>, {See Note 13}, {Quantum Mechanics}.   E1:Dijn:195.

          Simply Posit.  {Compare ONE Spinoza's and Jewish identical Foundation Rock is to Know G-D, Durant:169.}
Def. VI.  By G-D,  I  mean   { Being }   absolutely   infinite—that  is,   
      {by religious hypothesis,
             substance  consisting  in  infinite attributes, of which each              MOTIVE,
             expresses eternal and infinite essentiality {and an infinite number           Spinoza's Daring}
                of finite modes. Included in these modes are you, me, and every other                     Logical necessity
                particular thing}.   G-D sive Natura and G-d sive natura. }                             ST:Note 4
                      {G-D at 100% °P^ Robinson5:40   {^ G-d at <100% °P, Disclaimer}        Stewart06:[5]
                                                G:Bk.VII:236Spinoza's Pantheism ^
              New Wine in Old Bottles—E1:Wolfson:1:158, E1:Wolfson:1:216, E1:Albert Schweizer:79, Root Sources.
                                1P10S, 11, 14, 14C1, 16, 19, 31; 2P1, 1S, 45; 4P28; 5P35.                <------- small print, Logical Index.
             { Deus, Posit, EL:[40]:xxiii, TEI:[39]:14, TEI:[40]:15, E1:X(4)n:51, NeffEL:L02[3](02):276
                NeffTEI:L64(60):395, Cash Value—an all-inclusive  organic interdependence.  Importance of 1D6 = ONE
                C:Fig.3, G:Spinoza's Pantheism, Spinoza's Religion, Man's place in Nature, Quantum Mechanics.}

Def. VI paraphrased using the analogy suggested in Note 11:               Other Examples—2P3, 2P4

              By YOU  I  mean  a  being  absolutely  infinite—that  is, a
              substance  consisting  in  infinite attributes, of which each             Spinozism
              expresses eternal and infinite essentiality {an infinite                         {Cash Valueorganic
                  number of finite modes. Included in these modes are your heart,                     interdependence of parts}
                  lungs, fingernails, shoes, etc., etc., etc.}.

                     Bk.XIV:1:xvi2, 2552, 3851, 3994, 400, 4071, 2:1731; Bk.XVIII:181d7, 3151d7.                  Popkin:71

                                             < E1:Bk.XV:2627, E1:XVII(7)N:60. >; Bk.III:206, 229.           Spinoza's Religion
Def. VII.  That  thing  is  called free, which exists solely by the neces-               G-D
              sity of  its  own  nature,  and of  which  the  action  is  deter-           Wolf:ST:29-16
              mined  by  itself  alone.  On  the other hand,  that  thing  is         Hampshire:182
              ]inevitable [,                    compelledBk.XIV:1:3091                                    Mark Twain
              necessary ,  or  rather constrained, which is determined by            E5:Wolfson:2:268
              something external  to  itself  to a fixed and definite method             Mark Twain
              of existence or action.            1P17C2, 32, 33S2; 2P17S; 3P49.                          LT:L3421:336

                ] Bk.XIII:276276Neff-TL:L60(56):389. [      { Taylor/Wheeler92:iii }
                ] Bk.VII:16'free'  is  not  opposed to 'necessary' but to 'compelled' [               Fatalism—Ridley:307
                { Since nothing is external to G-D, by hypothesis, He is at 100%
°P, always "free." }
                {E3:XLIX:161, EL:[41];xxiii, NeffTL:L62(58):389, Free-will, Volition. }

                    Bk.XIB:226; Bk.XIV:1:xvii3, 331-369, 358, 3685, 3692; Bk.XVIII:111d8, 2041d8.
                 < E1:Parkinson:2628, E1:XIX(5)N:63, E1:XXXIII(21)N2:72, E2:XLIV(11)C2:117. >

Def. VIII.  By  eternity,  I mean  exist-ing  itself,  in  so  far  as it is
               conceived  necessarily  to follow solely <merely> from the        Calc:Note 4.7
               definition of that which is eternal.   P19, 20, 23; 5P29, 30.     <------- small print, Logical Index.

                 {G-D, EL:[41];xxiii, EL:[60]:xxix; NeffE5:L29(12)[5]:319.}

        Explanation.—Existence  of  this  kind  is  conceived  as  an
                                          [ Bk.VIII:4095E1:VIII(14)N2:49, E1:XIX:62. ]
       eternal truth,   like  the essence  of  a   thing,  and,  therefore,
                            [ expressed                        durationBk.XIV:1:3583.
        cannot   be   explained   by  means  of  continuance  or  time,            Calculus:4.7
        though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or       Hampshire32:172
        end. {E5:Einstein Time, Hawking Time; NeffE5:L29(12)[3]:318}; Bk.XIB:224.

AXIOMS < Bk.XV:2629E2:Postulate:97, E2:XXXVIII(4)C:110.>; Bk.XIV:1:58.

Ax. I.   Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something
          else.            1P4, 6C, 11, 14C2, 15, 28.                                           <------- small print, Logical Index.
              Bk.III:152,196; Bk.XII:160; Bk.XVIII:181a1.

Ax. II.  That which cannot be conceived through anything else must                Bk.XIV:1:76.
           be conceived through itself                                            I am that I am

                                                                           {event}   ]inevitably [
Ax. III.  From  a  given  definite cause an effect necessarily follows;      Chain of natural events
           and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is          Wolfson:1:90
           impossible that an effect can follow.      1P27; 4P31; 5P33.
                  Bk.III:196; Bk.XVIII:321a3, 112a3.

Ax. IV.  The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
            knowledge {understanding} of a cause. 1P3, 6C, 25; 2P5, 6, 7, 16, 45; 5P22.
Bk.III:188; Bk.XII:160; Bk.XV:26210; Bk.XVIII:1271a4, 1791a4; Bk.XIX:13313.

Ax. V.  Things  which have nothing in common cannot be understood,   Wolfson:1:90Transcendent
           the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not                Transcendent
           involve the conception of the other.  1P3.
                 Bk.XVIII:1271a51p3d, 1481a5.

                      Bk.III:80—TEI:L64(60):395; 188; Bk.XIV:2:996; Bk.XVIII:1671a6, 1701a6. 
                 ] G:Bk.VII:2513ideate, E2:XLVIII(9) & XLIX:120, E1:XXX:(1):69.[             E1:Parkinson:26311—True Idea
Ax. VI.   A true idea  must  correspond with its ideate or object.
                             1P5, 30; 2P29, 32, 44, 44C2.                                    <-------------- small print, Logical Index.
                 { L65(63):396, NeffLT:L66(64):398, E2:Def.IV:82. }

Ax. VII.  If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence
            does not involve existence.   1P11.      Bk.XVIII:74a7.

{Axiom VIII—simply posit}
                                                       1D6= ONEDeusWilliam James; Importance of 1D6 = ONE
{In order to avoid useless speculation,
simply posit Spinoza's G-D as a working hypothesis and then prove or disprove it by testing for its cash value. Col:Hampshire}  

Hypothesis—1. a provisional theory set forth to explain some class of phenomena (say, like gravity), either accepted as a guide to future investigation (working hypothesis) or assumed for the sake of argument and testing for its cash value (which is, that all things are in G-D; therefore everything is organically  interdependent and you cannot harm one part without eventually harming yourself or your progeny.) 2. a tentative assumption made in orderto draw out and test its logical or empirical consequences.  

This working hypothesis helps to understand our universe, society, and ourselves and thus brings moments of peace-of-mind—the goal of all Religions and righteous governments.}

PART I PROPOSITIONS { Hypotheses }  ] G:Bk.VII:2513 [

   Bk.XX:228.               For all Propositions see Scroll P1.

PROP. I.  EL:Bk.XIII:626;Bk.XIV:1:78; Bk.XVIII:67p1, 1471p12p7s; Bk.XX:228.          See Premise 1

Proof.— (1:1) This is clear from Defs. iii. and v {iv and vi}.                               Motive

PROP. IIBk.III:196; Bk.XIV:1:79, 85, 96; Bk.XVIII:691p2, 104p2,4,5,6, 1481p2.            See Premise 2      

page 47
Proof.— (2:1) Also evident from Def. iii(2:2) For each must exist in itself,

and  be  conceived  through  itself;  in other words, the conception of
                    ]involve[  For symbols See Note 4.
one does not imply the conception of the other.

PROP. III.  Bk.III:196; Bk.XIV:1:86, 94, 95; Bk.XVIII:501p3, 1271p3d, 1481p2,3;
                                                                 See Premise 3

Things which have nothing in common                   Satan, slums
cannot  be  one  the cause of the other.            Wolfson:1:90Transcendent
]Bk.XIII:6816 on EL:L04[4](04):283.[     Bk.XIB:237109.     1P6  

Proof.— (3:1) If they have nothing in common, it follows that one can-
           < understood >
not be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.),  and,  therefore,

one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).  Q.E.D.

PROP. IV.   Bk.XIV:1:91, 92; Bk.XVIII:64p4d, 66p4, 104p2,4,5,6.

Proof.—  (4:1)  Everything   which  exists,  exists  either  in  itself  or in
                                                                                 ]    nothing exists
something else (Ax. i.),—that is (by Defs. iii. and v.), nothing is grant-
                             external to the intellect, [
ed  in  addition to the understanding, except substance and its modi-
                   < Bk.XV:26312E1:XIV:54 >  [        outside   the  intellect               ]
fications.  (4:2) Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding,

by    which   several   things   may  be  distinguished  one  from  the

other, except  the substances,  or,  in  other words  ] Def. iv. [,   their
                           ] affections[
attributes  and  modifications.  Q.E.D.

PROP. V.  Bk.III:195,197; Bk.XIII:625 on EL:L02[4]Bk.XIV:1:139.
                       Bk.XVIII:61p5d, 661p5, 82p5,7,8, 88p5, 104p2,4,5,6, 1481p5, 17014; Bk.XIX:282, 3415Bk.XX:228.

Proof.— (5:1)  If  several distinct substances be granted, they must be
distinguished  one  from  the  other,  either  by the difference of their

attributes,  or  by   the  difference  of  their  modifications (Prop. iv.).
                                                                                       [conceded ]
(5:2)   If  only by the difference of their attributes,  it will be granted that

there  cannot  be more than one with an identical attribute.   (5:3) If by

the  difference of their modifications—as substance is naturally prior

to  its  modifications  (Prop. i.),—it  follows  that setting the modifica-

tions aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Defs. iii.

and,  there cannot be conceived one substance different from

another—that  is   (by Prop. iv.),   there  cannot  be  granted  several

substances, but one substance only.  Q.E.D.

PROP. VI. Bk.III:196; Bk.VIII:93[7]; Bk.XIII:612 on EL:L02[3](02),625 on EL:L02[4].
                            Bk.XIV:1:94, 95; Bk.XVIII:104p2,4,5,6.

Proof.— (6:1) It is impossible that there should be in the universe two

substances  with  an  identical  attribute,  i. e.  which have anything

common to them both (Prop. ii.),  and,  therefore  page 48   (Prop. iii.),

one  cannot be the cause of another,  neither can one be produced

by the other.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.(6:2)  Hence  it  follows  that  a  substance  cannot be pro-             Bk.XIV:1:95.
              < Bk.XV:26314E1:XV(11)N:55, E1:VIII(10)N2:49 >
duced  by anything external  to itself. (6:3) For in the universe nothing
]   exists     [                     { ^ A transcendent God }
is  granted,  save  substances  and  their  modifications  (as appears

from Ax. i. and Defs. iii. and v.). (6:4) Now (by the last Prop.) substance

cannot  be  produced  by  another substance,  therefore it cannot be

produced by anything external itself.  Q.E.D.            1P7, 15s.

 Bk.XVIII:181p6c, 601p6c, 1281.

      < Another Proof >
 (6:5)  [ Alternatively: ]  This  is  shown   still  more  readily by the absurdity

of the contradictory.  (6:6)  For, if substance be produced by an external

cause,  the  knowledge  of  it  would depend  on  the knowledge of its

cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be substance.

PROP. VII. Bk.XIV:1:116,1263,130,139; Bk.XVIII:707,11, 82p5,7,8; Bk.XIX:3415.

Proof.— (7:1) Substance cannot be produced by anything external

(Corollary, Prop. vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause—that is,
                                < Bk.XV:26317 ontological argument, E1:XI:51 >
] Def. I [,  its  essence necessarily involves existence, or existence                  Durant:63671

belongs to its nature.  Bk.XVIII:171p7d, 251p7d; Bk.XIX:13313.

PROP. VIII. Bk.XIV:1:118,120,133,139; Bk.XVIII:69p8d, 82p5,7,8, 88p8; Bk.XIX:3415.

                                                        < Bk.XV:26315E1:XI:51, E1:XIII(4)C:54
                                                                            E1:XV(32)N:57, E2:Lemma1:93. >
                                                                         < a substance of one attribute >
Proof.— (8:1) There  can  be  only  one  substance  with  an identical
] Prop. v.  Bk.VIII:41212E1:X(2)N:51 [
attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.); its nature,
                                                                                                  ] can [
therefore,  involves existence,  either as finite or infinite.  (8:2) It does

not exist as finite,  for  (by Def. ii.)  it would then be limited by some-

thing  else  of  the  same  kind,  which  would also necessarily exist

(Prop. vii.);  and  there  would  be  two substances with an identical
                                                                           ] must exist [
attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.).  (8:3) It therefore exists as infinite.
                                                    { NeffE5:L29[4](12):318.}

Note I.(8:4) As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infin-

ite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows

(solely  from  Prop. vii.)  that  every  substance is necessarily infinite.               Durant:63671

Note II.(8:5)   No  doubt  it  will  be difficult for those who think about

things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by their

primary  causes, to comprehend the demonstrations of Prop. vii.: for

such  persons  make  no  distinction  between  the  modifications  of

substances  and the substances themselves, and are ignorant of the
manner  in  which  things  are  produced;   hence  they  attribute  to
                     ] a [
substances   the   beginning   which  they observe in natural objects.
                                                                     [ confuse everything ]
(8:6)  Those  who  are  ignorant  of  true causes, make complete page 49
                             [ Bk.VIII:41316TEI:[58:4]:22]
confusion—think  that trees might talk just as well as men—that men

might  be formed from stones as well as from seed; and imagine that

any  form  might be changed into any other. (8:7)  So,  also, those who
                 Bk.XVIII:1811p8s2.    { whole and a part. }
confuse  the  two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human
] emotions[            ] G-D[
passions  to  the deity,  especially  so  long as they do not know how              Durant:63979

passions  originate in the mind.  (8:8)  But, if people would consider the

Nature  of substance,  they  would  have  no doubt about the truth of             Bk.XIV:1:116.

Prop. vii.   (8:9)  In fact,  this  proposition  would  be a universal axiom,
and  accounted  a truism.  (8:10)  For,  by substance,  would  be  under-
stood  that  which is in itself,  and is conceived through itself—that is,

something  of  which  the  conception  requires not the conception of
  < E1:VI(2)C:48 >                                                                               Bk.III:153
anything  else;  whereas modifications exist in something external to

themselves,  and  a conception of them is formed by means of a con-
                   { substance }
ception  of the thing in which they exist.  (8:11) Therefore, we may have

true  idea  of non-existent modifications; for, although they may have
  ] Bk.XIII:6918 on EL:L04[4](04):284.[
no  actual  existence  apart  from  the  conceiving  intellect,  yet their

essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they

may through it be conceived. (8:12) Whereas the only truth substances

can  have,  external  to  the  intellect,  must consist in their existence,

because  they  are  conceived  through themselves.   (8:13)  Therefore,
for  a person to say that he has a clear and distinct—that is, a true

idea  of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance

exists,  would  be  the same as if he said that he had a true idea, but

was  not  sure  whether  or not it was false  (a little consideration will

make  this plain);  or  if anyone affirmed that substance is created,  it

would  be  the  same  as  saying that a false idea was true—in short,

the  height of absurdity.  (8:14)  It must,  then,  necessarily be admitted
                                                           [ Bk.VIII:4095E1:D.VIII:46, E1:XIX:62 ]
that  the  existence  of  substance  as  its essence is an eternal truth.
                                            [ infer ]
(8:15)   And  we  can  hence  conclude by another process of reasoning
—that  there is but one such substance. (8:16) I think that this may prof-
  [ Bk.VIII:41421NeffTL:L39(34):351, ]
itably  be  done  at once;  and,  in order to proceed regularly with the
                                        [ note ]
demonstration, we must premise:—   ] Neff, Bk.XIII:201184. [

(8:21)  It  therefore  follows  that,  if  a  given number of individual things

exist  in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exact-

ly  that number, neither more nor less. (22) For example, if twenty men

exist  in the universe (for simplicity's sake,  I will suppose them exist-

ing simultaneously, and to have had no predecessors), and we want

to  account  for  the  existence  of  these  twenty  men,  it  will  not be

enough  to  show  the cause of human existence in general; we must

also  show  why  there are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less:
         ] Note 3 [
for  a  cause  must  be  assigned  for the existence of each individual.
                  ] Note 2 & 3[
(8:23)  Now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man,

for  the  true definition of man does not involve any consideration of
                                                                 ] Note 4 [
the number twenty.  (24) Consequently, the cause for the existence of

these  twenty  men, and, consequently, of each of them, must neces-

sarily  be  sought externally  to  each  individual.  (8:25) Hence we may
  [              infer  absolutely              ]
lay  down   the   absolute  rule,  that  everything which may consist of
       ] Bk.XIII:6311 on EL:L02[9](02):279.[
several   individuals   must   have   an   external  cause.     (8:26)  And,

as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature

of substance, existence must necessarily be included in its definition;
and  from  its  definition alone existence must be deducible.   (8:27) But

from  its  definition (as we have shown, Notes 2 & 3), we cannot infer

the  existence  of  several  substances;  therefore it follows that there
is only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.       1P15S.

PROP. IX.  Bk.III:195,198; Bk.XIB:234102; Bk.XIV:1:119, 140, 2121;
                             Bk.XVIII:69p9, 761p9.; Bk.XIX:3519.

] Proof.— (9:1) This is evident from Def. iv. [

PROP. X.  Bk.III:197, 200, 216; Bk.XIV:1:119,140, 141, 156, 2:221;
                           Bk.XVIII:141p10,2p6, 481p10, 2p6, 61p10.

Proof.— (10:1) An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of sub-
                                     Bk.XVIII:1471p10d, 2p7s.
stance,  as constituting its essence (Def. iv.),  and, page 51  therefore,                  Bk.XIV:1:2581

must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.).  Q.E.D.

                       ] Bk.VIII:41212E1:VIII(1):54[        Bk.XIV:1:2555, 2576, 2582.
Note.(10:2)  It is thus evident that,  though  two attributes are, in fact,
  Bk.XIV:2:221; Bk.XIX:3417.                    { Analogysay a heart and a lung. }
conceived as distinct—that is, one without the help of the other—yet
we  cannot,  therefore,  conclude that they constitute two entities,  or
< Bk.XV:26316E2:I:83, E2:II:84 >
< Bk.XV:283162 on E5:Prf(6):244 >
two  different  substances (10:3)  For it is the nature of substance that
each  of its attributes is conceived through itself, inasmuch as all the

attributes  it  has have always existed simultaneously in it,  and none
                                                                                             Bk.XIV:1:1522, 2571.
could  be  produced  by any other;  but each expresses the reality or           Bk.XIV:1:156

being  of  substance.  (10:4) It  is, then, far from an absurdity to ascribe
                                               { G-D }
several  attributes  to  one  substance:  for  nothing in nature is more
clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some

attribute, and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of
                                         Bk.III:199; Bk.XIX:131; {Sham }.
its  attributes  expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. (10:5)  Con-

sequently  it  is  abundantly  clear,  that  an  absolutely  infinite being
                                       ] Def. vi[
must   necessarily   be   defined  as  consisting  in  infinite  attributes

each  of   which   expresses  a  certain  eternal  and  infinite  essence.

(10:6)  If  anyone  now ask,  by what sign shall he be able to distinguish

different  substances,  let him read the following propositions,  which
                                                                   ]     Nature    [
show  that  there  is but one substance in the universe,  and that it is
absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be sought for in vain.       1P14C1.

Prop. XI.  Bk.III:195, 200; Bk.XIV:1:129, 158-213; Bk.XV:26738 on E1:XXIX:68 ; Bk.XX:228.

                                                                   ] if you can [
Proof.— (11:1)  If this be denied,  conceive,  if possible,  that G-D does
                    [by 1A7 ]
not  exist:  then his essence does not involve existence.  (11:2)  But this
                                                    < Bk.XV:26317E1:VII:48 > {Bk.XVII:141, 145}
(by  Prop. vii.)  is absurd.     (11:3)  Therefore  G-D necessarily  exists.

  Bk.XIII:624 on EL:L02[4](02).                                         Bk.III:54.
Another proof.(11:4)  Of  everything  whatsoever  a  cause or reason

must  be  assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence

e.g.,  if  a  triangle  exist,  a  reason  or cause must be granted for its

existence;  if, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause must also be

granted,  which  prevents  it  from  existing,   or  annuls  its existence.

(11:5)   This  reason  or cause must either be contained in the nature of

the  thing  in  question,  or  be  external  to it.   (11:6)  For instance,  the

reason  for  the  non-existence  of  a  square  circle is indicated in its

page 52  nature,  namely,  because  it  would  involve  a  contradiction.

(11:7) On the other hand, the existence of substance follows also solely

from  its  nature,  inasmuch  as  its  nature  involves  existence. (See

Prop. vii.)

(11:8) But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not
follow  from the nature of those figures,  but from the order of univer-
                  [  corporeally  ]
sal  Nature in extension. (9) From the latter it must follow, either that a
                                                                        Bk.XVIII:120p11d2; [now ]
triangle necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it should  exist.

(11:10)   So  much is self-evident.    (11:11)  It follows therefrom that a thing

necessarily  exists,  if no cause or reason be granted which prevents

its existence.

(11:12)   If,  then,  no cause or reason can be given,  which prevents the

existence of G-D,  or which destroys his existence, we must certainly

conclude  that  he  necessarily  does  exist.  (11:13)  If such a reason or

cause  should  be given, it must either be drawn from the very Nature

of G-D, or be external to him—that is, drawn from another substance

of another nature. (11:14) For if it were of the same nature, G-D, by that

very  fact,  would be admitted to exist. (11:15) But substance of another

nature  could  have  nothing  in common with G-D  (by Prop. ii.),  and
                                                          ]      posit or annul        [
therefore  would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence.

(11:16)  As,  then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine exist-

ence  cannot  be  drawn  from  anything external to the Divine Nature,
                            ] necessarily [
such  cause  must  perforce,  if  G-D  does not exist,  be  drawn from

G-D's  own Nature, which would involve a contradiction. (17) To make

such  an  affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely

perfect, is absurd; therefore, neither in the Nature of G-D, nor extern-             Transcendent

ally  to  his Nature,  can a cause or reason be assigned which would
annul his existence.  (11:18) Therefore, G-D necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.

                                              ] ability [
Another proof.  (11:19) The  potentiality  of  non-existence  is  a nega-
   ]weakness [
tion  of  power,  and  contrariwise  the  potentiality  of  existence  is a

power,  as  is obvious.  (11:20) If,  then,  that which necessarily exists is
nothing  but  finite  beings, such finite beings are more powerful than

a  being  absolutely  infinite,  which  is  obviously  absurd;  therefore,

either  nothing exists,  or  else a being absolutely infinite necessarily

exists  also.   (11:21) Now we exist either in ourselves,  or in something

else  which  necessarily exists (see Ax. i. and Prop. vii.)   (11:22) There-

fore page 53  a  being  absolutely infinite—in other words, G-D (Def. vi.),
necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.

Note. (11:23)  In  this  last proof,  I have purposely shown G-D's exist-
   {by observation and induction }
ence  à  posteriori,  so  that  the proof might be more easily followed,
{from particular ^ instances to a general principle or law; based on observation or experiment}
not  because,  from  the  same  premises,  G-D's  existence does not
   { byintuition and deduction }
follow à priori. (24)  For, as the potentiality of existence is a power,  it
               {  ^  from a general law to a particular instance; valid independently of observation}       Robinson3:170
follows  that,  in  proportion  as  reality  increases  in  the nature  of a
thing,  so  also will it increase its strength for existence.   (11:25) There-

fore  a  being  absolutely  infinite,  such as G-D,  has from himself an

absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely
 Bk.XIX:8914.                             Bk.XIV:1:208, 2101.                     ]   to  be
exist.   (11:26) Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the
convinced [
force  of  this  proof,  inasmuch  as they are accustomed only to con-
                                        ] derive [
sider  those  things  which  flow from external causes. (11:27)  Of such

things,  they  see  that  those  which  quickly  come  to passthat is,
                                                  ] likewise readily perish [
quickly  come  into existencequickly also disappear; whereas they
                                         ]   to bring into being   [                     ] readily [
regard  as  more  difficult  of  accomplishment,  that is,  not so easily

brought  into  existencethose  things which they conceive as more
  ] complex[

(11:28) However,  to  do away with this misconception,  I need not here

show  the  measure  of  truth  in  the  proverb,  "What comes quickly,

goes  quickly,"  nor discuss whether, from the point of view of univer-

sal  Nature,  all  things  are  equally  easy,  or otherwise:  I need only
remark,  that  I  am not here speaking of things,  which come to pass

through  causes  external  to  themselves,   but  only  of  substances

which  (by  Prop. vi.)  cannot  be  produced  by  any  external cause.

(11:29)  Things  which  are  produced by external causes, whether they
                                                                          < Bk.XV:26418E2:D.VI:83 >
consist  of  many parts  or few,  owe whatsoever perfection or reality
they possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause, and there-

fore  their existence arises solely from the perfection of their external
cause,  not from their own.  (11:30) Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection

is  possessed  by  substance is due to no external cause;  wherefore

the  existence  of  substance  must  arise  solely from its own Nature,

which  is  nothing else but its essence. (11:31) Thus, the perfection of a
{1D6= ONE                                                                              ]posits [
thing  does  not annul  its existence,  but,  on the contrary,  asserts it.

(11:32)   Imperfection,  on  the  other hand,  does  annul it;  therefore we

cannot  be  more  certain  of  the  existence  of anything,  than of the
                     ] an Entity [                                                       Bk.XIV:1:2122.
existence  of  a  being absolutely  infinite or perfect—that is,  of G-D.

(11:33)  For  inasmuch  as  his  essence  page 54 excludes all imperfection,

and  involves  absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his

existence  is  done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is

given.  (11:34) This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive


PROP. XII. Bk.III:200; Bk.XVIII:85p12.

Proof.—  (12:1) The  parts  into  which  substance  as  thus  conceived
would  be divided,  either will retain the nature of substance,  or they

will not.  (2) If  the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will necessar-

ily  be infinite,  and (by  Prop. vi.) self-caused,  and (by  Prop. v.) will

perforce consist of a different attribute, so that, in that case,  several

substances  could  be  formed  out  of  one  substance,   which  (by

Prop. vi.) is  absurd. (3) Moreover, the parts (by Prop. ii.) would have

nothing  in common with their whole,  and the whole  (by Def. iv. and

Prop. x.)  could  both exist and be conceived without its parts,  which

everyone  will  admit to be absurd.  (12:4)  If we adopt the second alter-

nativenamely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance

then,  if  the  whole  substance  were  divided  into  equal  parts, it

would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to exist, which

(by Prop. vii.) is absurd.

PROP. XIII.  Bk.XIV:1:121,157; Bk.XVIII:82p13,c,sp15s.

Proof.— (13:1) If  it could be divided, the parts into which it was divided

would  either  retain  the  nature  of  absolutely infinite substance,  or

they  would  not. (2) If the former, we should have several substances

of  the  same nature,  which (by Prop. v.) is absurd.   (13:3) If the latter,
               [ P12 ]
then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely infinite could cease to exist,

which (by Prop. xi.) is also absurd.

Corollary. (13:4) It follows that no substance,  and consequently no
] corporeal[                                                   < Bk.XV:26315 on E1:VIII(1):48 >
extended   substance,   in  so  far  as  it  is  substance,   is  divisible.

Bk.XVIII:76p13cs; 82p13,c,sp15s.     1P15S

Note.(13:5) The indivisibility of substance may be more easily under-

stood  as follows.  (6) The nature of substance can only be conceived

as  infinite,  and  by a part of substance,  nothing else can be under-
                                                                                              ] obvious [
stood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii.) involves a manifest


PROP. XIV.  Bk.XIV:1:112, 214-261, 323; Bk.XVIII:661p14.

Proof.  (14:1)  As  G-D  is  a  being  absolutely  infinite,  of whom  page 55
no  attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied

(by  Def. vi.),  and  he  necessarily  exists  (by  Prop. xi.);  if  any sub-
                                           { posited }
stance  besides  G-D  were granted it would have to be explained by

some  attribute of G-D, and thus two substances with the same attri-

bute  would exist,  which (by Prop. v.) is absurd;  therefore,  besides
G-D  no substance can be granted,  or consequently,  be conceived.

(14:2)  If  it  could  be  conceived,  it  would  necessarily have to be con-

ceived  as existent;  but this  (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.

(14:3)  Therefore,  besides  G-D  no  substance can be granted or con-

ceived.  Q.E.D.  Bk.XVIII:811p14d,1501p14d.

Corollary I. (14:4) Clearly, therefore:

Corollary II.(14:5) It follows:—

PROP. XVBk.III:200, 201, 208; Bk.XIB:253157; Bk.XIV:1:xvi3, 296-330.

                  ]Apart from [
Proof.—  (15:1) Besides  G-D,  no substance is granted or can be con-

ceived  (by  Prop. xiv.),  that is  (by Def. iii.)  nothing which is in itself

and is conceived through itself(2) But modes (by Def. v.) can neither

be,   nor   be   conceived  without  substance;  wherefore  they  can

only  be  in  the Divine Nature,  and can only through it be conceived.

(15:3)  But  substances and  modes form the sum total of existence  (by

Ax. i.),   therefore,  without  G-D  nothing  can  be,  or  be conceived.


                [ 1 ]    Bk.XIV:1:3011.              < Bk.XV:26420E1:XIV:54, Parts and Whole >
Note. (15:4) Some  assert that G-d, like a man, consists of body and                        1D6
                          {waves, Reality Curve, C:4.4. }
mind,  and  is susceptible of passions. (5) How far such persons have            Calculus:6.2b & c.

strayed from the truth is sufficiently evident from what has been said.
                          ] dismiss [                                  Bk.XIV:1:3012—looked into
(15:6)   But  these I pass over. (15:7) For all who have in anywise reflected
on the  divine Naturedeny that G-d has a body. (15:8) Of this they find

excellent  proof  in  the  fact  that  we  understand  by body a definite

quantity,  so  long,  so broad,  so deep, bounded by a certain shape,

and  it  is the height of absurdity to predicate such a thing of G-D,  a
                                                                                      ] arguments [
being  absolutely infinite. (9) But meanwhile by the other reasons with

which  they  try to prove their point,  they show that they think corpo-

real  or extended substance wholly apart from the Divine Nature, and
] assert[
say page 56  it was created by G-D(15:10)  Wherefrom the Divine Nature

can  have  been created,  they are wholly ignorant;  thus they clearly

show,  that they do not know the meaning of their own words.  (15:11) I

myself  have  proved  sufficiently clearly, at any rate in my own judg-

ment  (Coroll. Prop. vi.,  and  Note 2, Prop. viii.),  that  no substance
                                                                   < E1:VI(2)C:48 >
can be produced or created by anything other than itself(12) Further,

I  showed  (in Prop. xiv.),  that  besides  G-D  no  substance  can  be

granted or conceived.   (15:13) Hence  we  drew the conclusion that ex-
                                                                            < E1:VIII(1):48 >
tended  substance  is one of the infiniteattributes ofG-D. (15:14) How-

ever,  in  order to explain more fully, I will refute the arguments of my

adversaries, which all start from the following points:

 [ II ]
(15:15)  Extended  substance,  in so far as it is substance,  consists,  as
                                   ] and so [
they think,  in parts,  wherefore  they  deny that it can be infinite,  or,
consequently,  that  it can appertain to G-d. (15:16) This they illustrate

with many examples, of which I will take one or two.  (15:17) If extended

substance,  they say,  is infinite, let it be conceived to be divided into

two  parts  each  part  will  then  be either finite or infinite.  (15:18) If the

former, then infinite substance is composed of two finite parts, which

is absurd.  (15:19) If the latter, then one infinite will be twice as large as
another infinite, which is also absurd.

                        Bk.XII:1811; Bk.XIII:10366.
(15:20)  Further,  if an infinite line be measured out in foot lengths, it will

consist  of  an infinite number of such parts;  it would equally consist

of  an  infinite  number  of parts,  if each part measured only an inch:
                           Bk.XIV:1:2881; Bk.XVIII:76p15s, 104p15s; Bk.XIX:3313.
therefore,  one  infinity  would  be twelve times as great as the other.

                                        < Bk.XV:26421 >
(15:21) Lastly, if from a single point there be conceived to be drawn two
] See Sketch, Bk.VII:41[; Bk.VIII:422.
diverging  lines  which at first are at a definite distance apart, but are
      ^ Bk.XIV:1:2932.
produced  to  infinity,  it  is certain  that the distance between the two

lines  will  be  continually  increased,  until  at  length it changes from
{ Bk.XVII:47"A remarkable feature ..." }
definite to indefinable. (15:22) As these absurdities follow, it is said, from

considering quantity as infinite, the conclusion is drawn, that extend-

ed  substance  must necessarily be finite, and, consequently, cannot

appertain to the Nature of G-D.

 [ III ]                                                                              ] consummate [
(15:23)  The second  argument  is  also drawn from G-D's supreme per-

fection(15:24) G-D,  it  is said, inasmuch as he is a supremely perfect

being,  cannot  be passive; but extended substance,  in so far as it is

divisible, is  passive.  (15:25)  It  follows,  therefore, page 57  that extended

substance does not appertain to the essence of G-d.

 [ IV ]
(15:26)  Such  are  the arguments I find on the subject in writers, who by

them  try  to prove that extended substance is unworthy of the divine             Spinoza's Daring
nature, and  cannot possibly appertain thereto. (15:27) However, I think                 Satan

an  attentive  reader  will see that I have already answered their pro-

positions;  for all their arguments are founded on the hypothesis that
                                          { Part and Whole}
extended  substance  is composed of parts,  and such a hypothesis

I  have  shown    (Prop. xii.,  and   Coroll. Prop. xiii.)   to   be  absurd.

(15:28)   Moreover,  anyone  who  reflects  will see that all these absurd-

ities  (if  absurdities  they  be,  which I am not now discussing),  from
           ]   they seek to prove    [
which  it is sought to extract the conclusion that extended substance
                                                     ] supposition [
is  finite, do not at all follow from the notion of an infinite quantity, but
                                                             Bk.III:184, 185NeffE5:L29(12):319.
merely  from  the  notion  that an infinite quantity is measurable,  and

composed  of  finite  parts;  therefore,  the  only fair conclusion to be
                            Bk.XIV:1:2632; Bk.XVIII:1981p15s.
drawn  is  that  infinite  quantity  is not  measurable,  and  cannot be
composed  of finite parts.  (15:29) This is exactly what we have already

proved  ( in  Prop. xii. ).    (15:30)  Wherefore  the  weapon  which  they

aimed  at  us  has in reality recoiled upon themselves.   (15:31) If,  from

this  absurdity  of  theirs,  they  persist in drawing the conclusion that
                                                                        ]      surely      [
extended  substance must be finite, they will in good sooth be acting

like  a  man  who asserts that circles have the properties of squares,

and,  finding himself thereby landed in absurdities, proceeds to deny

that circles have any centre, from which all lines drawn to the circum-
                                                          ] corporeal [
ference  are  equal.  (15:32) For, taking extended substance, which can
                                                         < E1:VIII(1):48    Bk.XIV:1:2813.
only be conceived as infinite, one, and indivisible (Props. viii., v., xii.)
      ]conceive [
they  assert,  in  order to prove that it is finite,  that it is composed of
finite  parts,  and  that  it  can  be  multiplied  and  divided.

           Bk.XII:180—Wherefore they ...
         < Bk.XV:26422Neff-E5:L29(12):322 >
(15:33) So, also, others, after asserting that a line is composed of points,

can produce many arguments to prove that a line cannot be infinitely

divided.  (34) Assuredly  it  is  not  less absurd to assert that extended

substance  is  made up of bodies or parts,  than it would be to assert

that  a  solid is made up of surfaces,  a surface of lines, and a line of
points.  (35) This must be admitted by all who know clear reasonto be

infallible,  and  most  of  all  by  those  who  deny  the possibility of a

vacuum.  (15:36) For  if  extended  substance could be so page 58 divided

that its parts were really separate,  why should not one part admit of

being  destroyed,  the  others  remaining  joined together as before?

(15:37)   And  why should all be so fitted into one another as to leave no

vacuum?   (15:38) Surely in the case of things, which are really distinct

one  from  the  other, one can exist without the other, and can remain

in its original condition. (15:39) As then, there does not exist a vacuum in
           < Bk.XV:26423L9(13):287 >
Nature  (of  which anon),  but all parts are bound to come together to

prevent  it,  it  follows  from  this  also  that the parts cannot be really
distinguished,   and   that   extended   substance   in  so  far  as  it  is

substance  cannot  be  divided.

 [ V ]
(15:40)  If  anyone  asks  me  the further question,  Why are we naturally

so  prone  to  divide quantity?  (41) I answer, that quantity is conceived
                              {1 }                   ] , or [
by  us  in  two ways;  in the abstract and superficially,  as we imagine
       { 2 }                                                                                    {intuition}
it;  or  as substance, as  we  conceive it solely by the intellect. (15:42) If,

then,  we  regard  quantity  as  it  is  represented  in  our imagination,

which  we  often  and  more  easily  do,  we  shall  find that it is finite,

divisible,  and  compounded of parts; but if we regard it as it is repre-

sented in our intellect, and conceive it as substance, which it is very

difficult  to do,  we shall then,  as I have sufficiently proved,  find that
                [ unique ]
it is  infinite, one, and indivisible. (15:43) This will be plain enough to all,
                                                                     < Bk.XV:26424E2:XL(19)n2:113,
                                                                      Bk.XV:26955 on E1:Ap(61):81. >
who  make  a  distinction  between  the  intellect and the imagination,
especially  if  it be remembered,  that matter is everywhere the same,
                                      {E=Mc², Bk.XVII:21}
that  its  parts  are  not  distinguishable,  except  in so far as we con-
                                           ^ 2P13L1
ceive  matter as diversely modified, whence its parts are distinguish-
     ] Bk.VII:422E1:XII & XIII:54 [
ed,  not  really, but modally. (15:44) For instance,  water,  in so far as it

is  water,  we  conceive  to be divided,  and its parts to be separated
one  from  the  other;  but  not  in  so far as it is extended substance;

from  this point of view it is neither separated nor divisible.  (15:45) Fur-
                                                             {synthesized}        {analyzed}
ther,  water,  in  so far as it is water,  is produced and corrupted; but,
                           {E=Mc², Bk.XVII:21}                                   Bk.XVIII:97p15s.
in  so  far  as  it  is  substance,  it  is neither produced nor corrupted.

{CashValue—an all-inclusive uncorrupted organic interdependence.}

 [ VI ]
(15:46)  I  think I have now answered the second argument;  it is,  in fact,

founded  on  the  same assumption as the first—namely,  that matter,

in  so  far  as  it  is  substance,  is  divisible,  and  composed of parts.
                           ] not [
(15:47) Even  if it were  so,  I  do  not know why it should be considered

unworthy  of  the  divine Nature, inasmuch as besides G-D (by Prop.
        ] external [                                     {posited}     ] from which [
xiv.)  no   substance  can   page 59    be   granted,   wherefrom  it  could

receive  its modifications. (15:48) All things, I repeat, are in G-D, and all
                      ^ Bk.III:177.
things  which come to pass, come to pass solely through the laws of

the infinite Nature of G-D, and follow (as I will shortly show) from the
necessity  of  his essence. (15:49) Wherefore it can in nowise be said,

that  G-D is passive in respect to anything other than himself, or that
extended  substance  is  unworthy of the DivineNature,  even if it be

supposed  divisible, so long as it is granted to be infinite and eternal.

(15:50)  But enough of this for the present.        2P13L1.

PROP. XVI.  Bk.III:197, 198, 200, 202, 204, 208; Bk.XII:1741.         Knowing G-D—Yirmiyahu YovelStewart:177

Proof.— (16:1) This proposition will be clear to everyone,  who remem-
                                                                  ] one [; Bk.XIX:144.
bers  that  from  the  given  definition of any  thing the intellect infers

several  properties, which really necessarily follow therefrom (that is,

from  the actual essence of the thing defined); and it infers more pro-

perties  in  proportion  as  the definition of the thing  expresses more

reality,  that  is,  in  proportion  as  the  essence  of the thing defined

involves  more reality. (16:2) Now, as the Divine Nature has absolutely
      Bk.III:176;Bk.XIX:1189. {G-D }
infinite  attributes   (by  Def. vi.),   of  which  each  expresses  infinite

essence  after  its kind, it follows that from the necessity of its nature
                        {modes }; Bk.XVIII:147131p25c;Bk.XIX:144.
an  infinite  number of things (that is, everything which can fall within

the  sphere  of  an  infinite  intellect) must necessarily follow.  Q.E.D.

< Bk.XV:26425E1:XVI:59,                    < Bk.XV:26526E1:XVIII:62, E1:XVI(5)C3:59 >
   Bk.XV:27698 on E2:XLIV(11)C2:117 >                                 Bk.XIV:1:3064, 3572.
Corollary I.(16:3) Hence it follows, that G-D is the efficient cause of             E1:Parkinson:26425
                             all  that  can  fall  within  the  sphere  of an infinite
                             intellect.            1P17S, 18, 34.                  Bk.III:202, 204.

                                                                                               < Bk.XV:26527 >
Corollary II.— (16:4) It also follows that G-D is a cause in himself, and                      causa sui
                             not through an accident of his Nature.  1P34.                         Conceived thru itself.
                            [ Bk.VIII:42545Bk.XIV:1:307 ], Bk.XIV:1:3072.

< Bk.XV:26528E1:XV:55 >
Corollary III.— (16:5)  It  follows,  thirdly,  that  G-D  is  the  absolutely
                               first cause{ Bk.XV:26528, Bk.XV:xix, Bk.XVII:7 & 145.}. 

PROP. XVII. Bk.XIB:249147;Bk.XIV:1:3083,3091,313, 402; Bk.XIX:10411.

Proof.— (17:1) We  have  just shown (in Prop. xvi.), that solely from the

necessity of the Divine Nature, or, what is the same thing, solely from
the  laws of  his nature, an infinite number of things absolutely follow

in  an  infinite  number  of  ways;  and  we proved  (in Prop. xv.),  that

without  G-D  page 60  nothing  can  be  nor  be  conceived;  but that all
                                                                                   ]external to G-D [
things  are  in G-D.  (17:2) Wherefore nothing can exist outside himself,

whereby  he  can  be conditioned or constrained to act. (3) Wherefore

G-D acts solely by the laws of his own Nature, and is not constrained

by anyone.  Q.E.D.

Corollary I.(17:4) It follows:

I.   That  there can be no cause which,  either extrinsically or intrinsi-
     cally, besides the perfection of his own Nature, moves G-D to act.               Bk.XIV:1:313

Corollary II.(17:5) It follows:  Bk.III:202.
                     < Bk.XV:26739E1:XIX(8)N:68 >
2.  That  G-D  is  the sole free cause(17:6) For G-D alone exists by             Spinoza's Religion
     the  sole necessity  of  his  Nature (by  Prop. xi.  and Prop. xiv.,
     Coroll. i.), and acts by the sole necessity of his Nature, wherefore
     G-D is (by Def. vii.) the sole free cause.    Q.E.D.
     < E1:Bk.XV:26739. >      1P29S; 2P48.     Bk.XIV:1:3083, 3852; Bk.XVIII:1984, 3051p17c2.

[ Bk.VIII:42547Bk.XIV:1:308-319 ]
{ E1:XXXIII(15):72}                                     < E1:Bk.XV:26529E1:XXXV:74, E1:D.VII:46 >
Note.(17:7) Others  think  that G-D is a free cause, because he can,

as  they  think,  bring  it about,  that those things which we have said
                          Bk.III:206.                                     Bk.XIV:1:3142.                                  Durant:63982
follow  from  his  Nature—that is,  which are in his power,  should not            Wolfson:1:4032

come  to  pass, or should not be produced by him.  (17:8) But this is the

same  as if they said, that G-D could bring it about, that it should not
follow  from  the  nature  of  a triangle,  that  its  three interior angles               Bk.XIV:1:3131.
                            Bk.XIB:234100; Bk.XX:23067.
should  not  be equal to two right angles;  or that from a given cause

no effect should follow, which is absurd.     1P33S2

(17:9)  Moreover,  I   will show below,  without the aid of this proposition,
that  neither  intellect  nor will appertain to G-D's Nature. (17:10)  I know

that  there  are  many  who  think  that they can show,  that supreme
intellect  and free will do appertain to G-D's nature; for they say they

know  of  nothing more perfect, which they can attribute to God, than

that  which  is  the  highest  perfection  in  ourselves.    (17:11)  Further,

although  they  conceive  God as actually supremely intelligent, they

yet  do not believe, that he can bring into existence everything which

he  actually  understands,  for they think that they would thus destroy

God's  power.   (17:12) If,  they  contend,  God  had  created  everything

which  is  in  his  intellect,  he  would  not  be able to create anything
                                                              Bk.XIV:1:3162, 4113; Bk.XIX:1039.
more,  and  this,  they  think,  would  clash  with  God's omnipotence;

therefore,  they  prefer  to  assert  that God is indifferent to all things,

and  that  he  creates  nothing  except that which he has decided, by
some  absolute  exercise  of  will, to create.   (17:13)  However,  I think I

have  shown  sufficiently  clearly   (by  Prop. xvi. ),  that  from G-D's

supreme   power,   or  infinite  page 61 Nature,  an  infinite  number  of
things—that  is,  all things have necessarily flowed forth in an infinite

number  of  ways,  or  always follow from the same necessity;  in the
same way as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity and

for eternity, that its three interior angles are equal to two right angles.
(17:14) Wherefore the omnipotence of G-D has been displayed from all         Chain of Natural Events
eternity,  and  will  for all eternity remain in the same state of activity.

(17:15) This manner of treating the question attributes to G-D an omni-

potence,  in my opinion, far more perfect. (16) For, otherwise, we are

compelled  to  confess  that  God  understands  an infinite number of

creatable  things,  which  he  will  never  be  able  to create, for, if he

created all that he understands, he would, according to this showing,

exhaust  his omnipotence, and render himself imperfect. (17:17) Where-

fore,  in order to establish that God is perfect, we should be reduced

to  establishing at the same time, that he cannot bring to pass every-

thing  over which his power extends; this seems to be an hypothesis

most absurd, and most repugnant to G-D's omnipotence.

(17:18) Further (to say a word here concerning the intellect and the will

which we attribute to God), if intellect and will appertain to the etern-

al  essence of God, we must take these words in some significations
< Bk.XV:26530E2:XI(7)c:91, E2:XLIII(5)n:114, E5:XL(5)n:268, E1:XXI:63 "we are not to
think of G-D,  the  ultimate  explanation  of  all things, as a being which forms plans (by his intellect) and
carries them out (through his will)." >   {but that all things flow immanently from G-D.}
quite different from those they usually bear.  (19) For intellect and will,
          ] would [                                                              ] have to [
which  should  constitute the essence of God,  would perforce be as
 ]         vastly different          [
far  apart  as  the  poles  from  the  human  intellect  and will,  in fact,

would have nothing in common with them but the name; there would

be  about  as  much  correspondence  between  the  two  as there is
                                    ] celestial [
between  the  Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, an animal
that barks.  (17:20) This I will prove as follows: If intellect belongs to the

Divine Nature,  it cannot be in nature, as ours is generally thought to

be,  posterior  to,  or  simultaneous  with the things understood, inas-
much as G-D is prior to all things by reason of his casualty (Prop. xvi.
                                                                             < E1:Bk.XV:26531; TEI:Bk.XV:287196 >
Coroll. i.). (17:21) On the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things
                                                                          ^ Bk.XIV:2:2929.
is  as  it is, because it exists by representation as such in the intellect

of  G-D;  Wherefore the intellect of G-D, in so far as it is conceived to

constitute  G-D's  essence,  is,  in reality, the cause of things, both of

their essence and of their existence.   (17:22)  This seems to  page 62  have

been  recognized  by  those  who have asserted,  that G-D's intellect,
G-D's  will,  and G-D's power, are one and the same. (23) As, therefore,

G-D's  intellect  is  the  sole cause  of  things,  namely,  both  of their

essence and existence, it must necessarily differ from them in respect

to  its  essence,  and  in  respect  to  its  existence.  (17:24) For a cause
differs  from  a thing it causes,  precisely in the quality which the latter

gains from the former.

(17:25)  For  example,  a  man  is  the cause of another man's existence,

but  not of his essence  (for the latter is an eternal truth),  and, there-

fore,  the  two  men  may be entirely similar in essence,  but must be

different  in  existence;  and  hence  if  the  existence  of one of them

cease,  the  existence  of  the  other  will not necessarily cease also;

but  if  the  essence  of  one could be destroyed,  and be made false,
the  essence of the other would be destroyed also. (17:26) Wherefore,

a  thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence

of  a  given  effect,  must  differ from such effect both in respect to its

essence,  and also in respect to its existence. (17:27) Now the intellect

of  G-D  is  the  cause  of both the essence and the existence of our

intellect;  therefore  the  intellect  of  G-D  in so far as it is conceived

to  constitute  the  divine  essence,  differs  from our  intellect both in

respect  to essence and in respect to existence, nor can it in anywise

agree therewith save in name, as we said before. (17:28) The reasoning

would  be  identical, in the case of the will,  as anyone can easily see..

PROP. XVIII.  Bk.XIB:250149; Bk.XIV:1:111, 319, 322; Bk.XVIII:113p18.

Proof.— (18:1) All  things  which  are,  are  in  G-D,  and  must be con-

ceived through G-D (by Prop. xv.), therefore (by Prop. xvi., Coroll. i.)

G-D is the cause of those things which are in him. (2) This is our first

point.   (18:3) Further,  besides  G-D  there  can  be no substance  (by

Prop. xiv.),  that  is  nothing in itself external to G-D.  (18:4) This is our

second  point.  (18:5)  G-D therefore,  is  the  indwelling  and  not  the

transient  cause  of  all  things. Q.E.D.

PROP. XIXBk.XIV:1:370-399; Bk.XIX:132.

Proof.— (19:1) G-D  (by  Def. vi. )  is  substance,  which  (by Prop. xi.)
necessarily  exists,  that  is  (by Prop. vii.)  existence appertains to its

Nature, or  (what is the same thing)  follows  page 63  from its definition;

therefore,  G-D  is eternal (by Def. viii.).   (2) Further, by the attributes

of  G-D  we  must understand that which  (by Def. iv.)  expresses the

essence  of the divine substancein other words,  that which apper-
tains to substance: that, I say, should be involved in the attributes of

substance.  (19:3)  Now  eternity  appertains to the nature of substance

(as  I  have  already  shown  in  Prop. vii.);  therefore,  eternity  must

appertain  to each of the attributes,  and thus all are eternal.  Q.E.D.

Bk.XVIII:147p19d, 147131p25c.

Note.(19:4) This  proposition  is  also  evident  from  the  manner in

which (in Prop. xi.) I demonstrated the existence of G-D; it is evident,

I repeat, from that proof, that  the existence of G-D,  like his essence,
is  an eternal truth(19:5) Further  (in Prop. xix. of my "Principles of the
                                                                     < Bk.XV:26532E1:XXXIII(21)N2:72 >
Cartesian Philosophy"), I have proved the eternity of G-D, in another

manner, which I need not here repeat.


Proof.— (20:1) G-D (by the last Prop.) and all his attributes are eternal,
that  is   (by  Def. viii.)  each  of  his  attributes  expresses  existence.

(20:2)  Therefore  the  same  attributes of G-D which explain his eternal
                                                                                        ] Def. iv [
essence,  explain  at  the  same  time his eternal existencein other

words,   that  which  constitutes  G-D's  essence  constitutes  at  the

same time his existence.  (20:3) Wherefore G-D's existence and G-D's
essence are one and the same.  Q.E.D.  Bk.XIX:132.

Corollary I.(20:4)  Hence  it  follows  that  G-D's existence, like his
essence, is an eternal truth.

Corollary II.(20:5) Secondly,  it follows  that G-D, and all the attrib-
utes of G-D, are unchangeable.  (6) For if they could be changed in
respect  to  existence,   they   must  also  be able to be changed in
respect  to  essence  ]Prop. xx.[that  is,  obviously,  be  changed
from true to false, which is absurd.   1P21; 5P17.      Bk.III:202—immutable
 Bk.XIV:1:3755;Bk.XVIII:64p19,20c2; 2081p20c2.

PROP. XXI.  Bk.III:202, 203; Bk.XIV:1:376; Bk.XVIII:88p21,22E1:D.II:45, Bk.XVIII:111p21,22E1:D.VIII:46.

                   ]      Suppose, if you can         [
Proof. (21:1) Conceive,  if  it  be  possible  (supposing the proposition

to be denied),  that  something  in  some attribute of G-D can follow

from  the absolute Nature of the said attribute,  and that at the same
                                                               [determinate] <fixed>             Bk.XIV:1:3532.
time  it  is finite,  and  page 64  has a conditioned existence or duration;
                   [Bk.VIII:42954E2:III:84, E2:VII(3)c:86; Bk.XIV:1:238ff; Bk.XII:165,187. ]
                   ]Bk.VII:474 on E1:Endnote 21:1 [
for  instance,  theidea of G-D  expressed  in  the  attribute thought.
                    Bk.XIV:1:2384 ^ >infinite intellect of G-D—Bk.III:203 <
(21:2) Now Thought,  in  so  far  as  it is supposed to be an attribute of
                                                                  ] ^ assumed[
G-D, is necessarily (by Prop. xi.) in its Nature infinite. (21:3) But, in so
                            { man's }
far as it possesses the idea of G-D it is supposed finite. (3a) It cannot,
                                                                    ] determined[
however,  be conceived as finite, unless it be limited by Thought (by

Def. ii.);  but it is not limited by Thought itself,  in so far as it has con-
         { man's }
stituted the idea of G-D (for so far it is supposed to be finite);  there-
            ] determined[
fore,  it  is  limited  by Thought,  in so far as it has not constituted the
] E1:Endnote 21:1 [
idea  of  G-D,  which  nevertheless  (by Prop. xi.)  must necessarily


       ]      There must be,         [
(21:4) We  have now granted,  therefore,  thought not constituting the
] E1:Endnote 21:1 [                         { man's }
idea  of G-D,  and,  accordingly,  the idea of G-D does not naturally

follow from its Nature in so far as it is absolute Thought  (for it is con-

ceived as constituting, and also as not constituting, the idea of G-D),
           ] contrary to [
which is against our hypothesis. (21:5)  Wherefore,  if the idea of G-D

expressed  in  the  attribute Thought, or, indeed, anything else in any

attribute  of  G-D  ( for we may take any example,  as the proof is of
    {E1:Endnote 21:5 }
universal application)  follows  from  the  necessity  of  the  absolute

Nature of the said attribute, the said thing must necessarily be infinite,

which was our first point.

(21:6) Furthermore, a thing which thus follows from the necessity of the

Nature of any attribute cannot have a limited duration(7) For if it can

suppose a thing,  which  follows  from the necessity of the nature of

some  attribute,  to  exist  in some attribute of G-D, for instance,  the
] E1:Endnote 21:1 [
idea  of  G-D  expressed  in  the  attribute Thought, and let it be sup-

posed  at some time not to have existed,  or to be about not to exist.

                       ] assumed [
(21:8) Now  Thought  being an attribute of G-D, must necessarily exist
] immutable[
unchanged  (by Prop. xi., and Prop. xx., Coroll. ii.);  and beyond the
                Bk.XVIII:2041p21d.                    { wrongly }
limits of the duration of the idea of G-D (supposing the latter at some

time not to have existed,  or not to be going to exist),  Thought would

perforce  have  existed without the idea of G-D,  which is contrary to

our hypothesis, for we supposed that, Thought being given, the idea

of G-D necessarily flowed therefrom.  (21:9) Therefore the idea of G-D

expressed  in  Thought, or anything which necessarily  page 65  follows

from  the  absolute  Nature  of some attribute of G-D,  cannot have a
] determinate existence [
limited duration, but through the said attribute is eternal, which is our

second  point.   (21:10) Bear in mind that the same proposition may be

affirmed of anything,  which in any attribute necessarily follows from

G-D's absolute Nature.

PROP. XXII. Bk.III:203; Bk.XVIII:88p21,22E1:D.II:45, Bk.XVIII:111p21,22E1:D.VIII:46.

Proof.— (22:1)The proof of this proposition is similar to that of the

preceding one{ Good luck! }


Proof.— (23:1) A mode exists in something else, through which it must

be conceived (Def. v.), that is (Prop. xv.), it exists solely in G-D, and

solely  through  G-D  can be conceived. (23:2) If, therefore, a mode is

conceived as necessarily existing and infinite, it must necessarily be
inferred  or  perceived  through  some attribute  of G-D,  in so far as

such  attribute  is  conceived as expressing the infinity and necessity
of existence, in other words (Def. viii.) eternity; that is, in so far as it

is  considered absolutely.  (23:3) A mode, therefore, which necessarily            G-D at 100% °P
              { Bk.XII:187 }
exists  as  infinite, must follow from the absolute Nature of some attri-
                                ] directly [              Bk.XIV:1:2442.          ] mediation [
bute of G-D, either immediately (Prop. xxi.) or through the means of

some  modification,  which  follows  from  the  absolute Nature of the

said attribute; that is (by Prop. xxii.), which exists necessarily and as


PROP. XXIV.  Bk.III:204; Bk.XIV:1:1261,3849; Bk.XVIII:2351p24,c; Bk.XIX:1938.

Proof.—  (24:1) This proposition is evident from (Def. i).   (24:2) For that

of which the Nature  (considered in itself)  involves existence is self-            Conceived thru itself.

caused, and exists by the sole necessity of its own Nature.

Corollary. (24:3) Hence  it  follows that G-D is not only the cause of
things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in existence,

that  is,  in  scholastic  phraseology, page 66 G-D is  cause of the being
                                                                          { ^ the immanent}
of things (essendi rerum). (4) For whether things exist, or do not exist,
                         ] reflect on [
whenever  we  contemplate  their essence,  we  see  that it involves
neither existence nor duration; consequently, it cannot be the cause
of either the one or the other. (24:5) G-D must be the sole cause, inas-

much as to him alone does existence appertain. (Prop.xiv. Coroll. i.)

Q.E.D.    1P28, 1P28S; 2P45S; 4P4.

PROP. XXV.  Bk.III:204, 205; Bk.XVIII:1281; Bk.XIX:1937;Bk. 32:pg50.

Proof.— (25:1) If  this be denied,  then G-D is not the cause of the es-

sence of things; and therefore the essence of things can (by Ax.iv.)

be  conceived  without  G-D.    (25:2) This  (by  Prop. xv.)  is  absurd.
(25:3) Therefore,  G-D  is  the  cause of the essence of things.  Q.E.D.

Note. (25:4) This  proposition  follows  more  clearly  from  Prop. xvi.

(5) For it is evident thereby that, given the Divine Nature, the essence

of things must be inferred from it,  no less than their existence—in a

word, G-D must be called the cause of all things, in the same sense
as  he  is  called  the  cause  of  himself(25:6) This  will  be made still

clearer  by  the  following  corollary. {L65(63):396, NeffL66(64):399 }

 Bk.XVIII:141p25c,34.  ] Particular[                                           ] affections[
Corollary.(25:7) Individual  things  are  nothing  but  modifications of

the  attributes  of  G-D,  or modes by which the attributes of G-D are
 < Bk.XV:26635;26313 on E1:V:47. >; Bk.XVIII:92p25c,14713; Bk.XX:23067.
expressed  in  a  fixed and definite manner.   (25:8) The proof appears
   > ^ Bk.III:204 <
from Prop. xv. and Def. v.       1P28, 36; 2D1, 2P1, 5, 10C; 3P6; 5P36.                                    Spinoza's Pantheism

PROP. XXVI. Bk.III:204;Bk.XIV:1:385.

Proof.—  (26:1) That by which things are said to be conditioned to act

in a particular manner is necessarily something positive (this is obvi-

ous);  therefore  both of its essence and of its existence G-D by the
necessity  of  his Nature is the efficient cause (Props. xxv. and xvi.);

this is our first point.  (26:2) Our second point is plainly to be inferred

therefrom.  (3) For if a thing, which has not been conditioned by G-D,

could condition itself, the first part of our proof would be false, and

this, as we have shown, is absurd.


Proof.— (27:1) This proposition is evident from the third axiom.

page 67
PROP. XXVIII. Bk.III:204; Bk.XIV:1:389, 2:32; Bk.XVIII:112p28, 124p28, 3161p28; Bk.XIX:2011.

Proof. (28:1) Whatsoever is conditioned to exist and act, has been

thus  conditioned  by  G-D  (by Prop. xxvi.  and  Prop. xxiv. Coroll.)

(28:2) But that which is finite and has a conditioned existence,  cannot

be produced by the absolute Nature of any attribute of G-D; for what-
                                           Bk.XIV:1:389, 3913.
soever  follows  from  the  absolute  Nature of any attribute of G-D is

infinite and eternal (by Prop. xxi). (28:3) It must, therefore,  follow from

some  attribute  of  G-D,  in so far as the said attribute is considered

as  in  some  way  modified;  for substance and modes make up the
                                                                                     ]Cor.Pr.25 [
sum total of existence  (by Ax. i. and  Def. iii., v.),  while modes  are
              ] affections[
merely modifications of the attributes of G-D.   (28:4) But from G-D, or
                    ^ Bk.XIV:1:3931.
from  any  of  his  attributes,  in  so  far as the latter is modified by a
                    {universal application}  ]1P22 [
modification  infinite  and eternal,  a conditioned thing cannot follow.

(28:5) Wherefore it must follow from,  or be conditioned for,  existence

and action by G-D or one of his attributes, in so far as the latter are

modified by some modification which is finite and has a conditioned

existence.   (28:6) This is our first point.  (28:7) Again,  this cause or this

modification (for the reason by which we established the first part of

this proof)  must  in its turn be conditioned by another cause,  which

also is finite,  and has a conditioned existence,  and again,  this last

by another  (for the same reason);  and so on (for the same reason)

to infinity.  Q.E.D.

                                                                 < Bk.XV:26737>]directly[
Note.(28:8) As  certain  things  must  be  produced  immediately by

< Bk.XV:26737E2:XXI & XXII:102. >
< Bk.XV:26633Neff-L66(64):400, E2:Ax.1:93. >
< Bk.XV:26634Neff-L66(64):399, E2:XIII(30)N2:96. >

G-D, namely those things which necessarily follow from his absolute

Nature, through the means of these primary attributes, which, never-
                                      [Latin text corruptedBk.VIII:43359Bk.XIV:1:390.]
theless, can neither exist nor be conceived without G-D, it follows:

                                                 {E1:Endnote 28:8} Bk.III:176; Bk.XIV:1:2441.
1.     (28:9) That G-D is absolutely the proximate cause of those things
       immediately  produced by him.    (28:10) I say absolutely,  not after
       his kind, as is usually stated. (28:11) For the effects of G-D cannot
       either  exist  or  be  conceived  without  a  cause  (Prop. xv. and
       Prop. xxiv., Coroll.).
page 68
                                                                                      Bk.III:157; Bk.XIV:2:324, 2:1435.
2.    (28:12) That  G-D  cannot  properly be styled the remote cause of
       individual  things,  except  for  the  sake  of distinguishing these
       from what he immediately produces, or rather from what follows
       from his absolute nature(13) For, by a remote cause, we under-
       stand  a  cause  which  is  in  no  way  conjoined  to  the  effect.
       (28:14) But  all  things  which are,  are in G-D,  and so depend on
       G-D,  that  without  him  they  can  neither be nor be conceived.

PROP. XXIX. Bk.XVIII:121p29, 222p29,363p7, 3201p29; Bk.XX:187.

Proof.— (29:1) Whatsoever is, is in G-D (Prop. xv.). (2) But G-D cannot

be called a thing contingent. (3) For (by Prop. xi.) he exists necessar-

ily, and not contingently. (29:4) Further, the modes of the Divine Nature

follow therefrom necessarily,  and not contingently (Prop. xvi.);  and
                                                                                             [by 1P21 ]
they  thus  follow,  whether we consider the Divine Nature absolutely
or  whether  we  consider  it as in any way conditioned to act (Prop.

xxvii.).  (29:5) Further, G-D is not only the cause of these modes, in so

far as they simply exist (by Prop. xxiv., Coroll.), but also in so far as
                                    ] determined[    < doing anything. >
they are considered as conditioned for operating in a particular man-
] action[
ner (Prop. xxvi.).  (29:6) If they be not conditioned by G-D (Prop. xxvi.),

it is impossible, and not contingent, that they should condition them-

selves;  contrariwise, if they be conditioned by G-D, it is impossible,

and not contingent that they should render themselves uncondition-

ed.  (29:7) Wherefore all things are conditioned by the necessity of the

Divine Nature,  not  only  to  exist,  but also to exist and operate in a
  ]   definite way     [     ] thus [
particular  manner,  and  there  is  nothing  that is contingent Q.E.D.

Note. (29:8) Before  going  any further,  I wish here to explain,  what
                                       < E1:Bk.XV:26739E1:XVII(5)C2:60 >;
                              Bk.III:206; Bk.XIB:230;Bk.XIV:1:3995; Bk.XVIII:119p29s; Bk.XX:24370.
we should understand by Nature viewed as active (natura naturans),            Blake McBride
                                                   ]Bk.VII:2411 [
and nature viewed as passive (natura naturata). (29:9) I say to explain,
                                                                 ^ Bk.III:202.
or rather call attention to it, for I think that, from what has been said,

it  is  sufficiently  clear,  that  by  Nature  viewed as active we should

understand  that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself, or
                         { knowable attributes—Extension and Thought }
those  attributes  of  substance,  which  express  eternal  and infinite

essence, in other words (Prop. xiv.Cor. i., and Prop. xvii.Cor. ii.) G-D,
in so far as he is considered as a free cause. {AnalogyE1:Endnote 29:10}

page 69

(29:10) By nature ^ viewed as passive I understand all that which follows
                                       Bk.III:179; Naturans.
from  the necessity of the Nature of G-D, or of any of the attributes of
G-D,  that  is,  all the modes of the attributes of G-D, in so far as they

are  considered  as  things which are in G-D,  and which without G-D
cannot exist or be conceived.   {AnalogyE1:Endnote 29:10}   1P31.

PROP. XXX.  Bk.III:206, 210; Bk.VII:526; Bk.XIV:1:400-424; 2:461;Bk.XIX:1658.

                         Bk.III:197, 80—TEI:L64(60):395
                       ] ideate, Bk.VII:2513E2:XLVIII(9) & XLIX:120[
Proof. (30:1) A true idea must agree with its object (Ax. vi.); in other
words  (obviously),  that  which is contained in the intellect in repre-
                                             ]     exist    [     Bk.III:207.
sentation  must necessarily be granted in Nature. (30:2) But in Nature
(by Prop. xiv.Coroll. i.)  there  is  no  substance save G-D,  nor any

modifications  save  those (Prop. xv.) which are in G-D,  and cannot

without G-D either be or be conceived.  (30:3) Therefore the intellect,
    < actuality >                 < actuality >
in  function  finite,  or in function infinite,  must comprehend the attri-
                                     ] affections[
butes of G-D and the modifications of G-D, and nothing else. Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXI. Bk.XVIII:119p31.

                                                                               ] understand [
Proof.— (31:1) By  the  intellect  we  do not (obviously) mean absolute

thought,  but  only  a  certain  mode  of thinking, differing from other

modes,  such as love,  desire,  etc., and therefore (Def. v.) requiring
to be conceived through absolute thought. (31:2) It must (by Prop. xv.

and  Def. vi.),  through  some  attribute  of G-D which expresses the

eternal and infinite essence of thought,  be so conceived,  that with-
              Bk.III:206.                                           Bk.III:207.
out such attribute it could neither be nor be conceived.   (31:3) It must
                                      [ natura naturata ]                     [ Natura Naturans ]
therefore be referred to nature passive rather than to nature active,
        [ P29S ]               Bk.XIX:12220.
as must also the other modes of thinking.  Q.E.D.

                                                                        < Bk.XV:26741E1:XXX:69 >
                            Bk.XIV:2:252.                                                    < actuality >
Note.(31:4) I do not here,  by speaking of intellect in function, admit
                                                 Bk.XIV:1:2387; 2:461             ^ Bk.III:206.
that  there is such a thing as intellect in potentiality:  but,  wishing to

avoid all confusion, I desire to speak only of what is most clearly per-
                                                                 Bk.XIV:1:4053, :2:561.            <      for       >
ceived by us,  namely, of the very act of understanding,  than which
                                                                                  ] understand [
nothing is more clearly perceived. (31:5) For we cannot perceive any-
        <  which  does  not  lead  to  a  greater  knowledge  of  understanding. >
thing  without  adding to our knowledge of the act of understanding.

page 70
PROP. XXXII. Bk.III:206; Bk.XIB:241126Bk.XIII:6311E1:VIII(25)N2:279; Bk.XVIII:3151p32.

                                            [Bk.VIII:43564E2:XLIX(10)C:121, E2:XLVIII:119 ]
Proof.— (32:1) Will  is only a particular mode of thinking,  like intellect;
                                                Bk.XVIII:3301p32d.               ] determined[
therefore (by Prop. xxviii.) no volition can exist, nor be conditioned to

act, unless it be conditioned by some cause other than itself, which

cause is conditioned by a third cause, and so on to infinity. (2) But if
[Bk.VIII:43565E1:XXVIII:67, Bk.XIV:1:407]
will be supposed infinite, it must also be conditioned to exist and act

by G-D, not by virtue of his being substance absolutely infinite,  but
by  virtue of his possessing an attribute which expresses the infinite

and eternal essence of thought (by Prop. xxiii.).  (32:3) Thus, however
{ , the will, }
it  be conceived,  whether as finite or infinite,  it requires a cause by
                                    ] determined[                                       [ by 1D7 ]
which   it   should  be  conditioned  to  exist  and  act.   (32:4) Thus  it
                          Bk.XIV:1:4074.                                              { forced }
cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary   or constrained

cause.    Q.E.D.   {FREEG-D , as 100% °P, always (acting with adequate

knowledge.  FORCED—G-d, as <100% °P, when acting with confused knowledge. }

Corollary. I. (32:5) Hence  it  follows,  first,  that  G-D  does not act                    Durant:63986
                      Bk.III:206; Bk.XIV:1:4081.
according  to  freedom of the will. < E1:Bk.XV:26738E1:XXIX:681App; 2P3S.

Corollary II.(32:6) It follows secondly, that will and intellect stand in
                                                     < Bk.XV:26742E2:XLIX(10)C:121, E1:XXVIII(8)N:67 >
         {Darwinian}                                                                  Bk.XIV:1:4082.                            Hampshire:69-71
the same ^ relation to the Nature of G-D as do motion, and rest, and              Wolfson:1:4032
                                      < things                                ] determined[
absolutely  all  natural  phenomena, which  must  be conditioned by
                                                           ] definite [
G-D (Prop. xxix.) to exist and act in a particular manner. (32:7) For will,                 Mark Twain
                                                                                    ] determined[
like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by which it is conditioned to
                            ] definite [
exist and act in a particular manner.  (32:8) And although, when will or
                     ] given [
intellect  be  granted,  an  infinite  number of results may follow,  yet

G-D  cannot  on that account be said to act from freedom of the will,

any  more  than  the  infinite  number of results from motion and rest

would  justify  us  in  saying  that  motion  and  rest  act  by  free will.

(32:9) Wherefore  will  no more appertains to G-D than does anything
    ]natural phenomena, [
else in nature, but stands in the same relation to him as motion, rest,

and  the  like,  which  we have shown to follow from the necessity of
                                                   ] determined[
the  Divine Nature,  and  to  be  conditioned by it to exist and act in a
 ] definite[                                          ^ Bk.III:206.
particular manner.    2P3S.

PROP. XXXIII. Bk.III:205; Bk.XIB:237108; Bk.XIV:1:414; Bk.XIV:2:291; Bk.XV:xxi; Bk.XVIII:119p33,122p33.

Proof.— (33:1) All  things  necessarily  follow  from  the  Nature of G-D

(Prop. xvi.),  and  by  the Nature of G-D are conditioned to exist and
                ] definite [
act  in  a  particular way  (Prop. xxix).   (33:2)  If things,  page 71  therefore,

could  have been of a different nature,  or have been conditioned to

act  in a different way,  so that the order of nature would have been

different,  G-D's  Nature  would  also  have been able to be different

from what it now is;  and therefore (by Prop. xi.) that different nature

also  would  have  perforce  existed,  and consequently there would
have  been  able  to be two or more G-Ds.   (33:3)  This  (by Prop. xiv.,

Coroll. i.)  is  absurd.   (33:4) Therefore  things  could  not  have  been

brought  into  being  by  G-D  in  any  other  manner ,  etc.    Q.E.D.

Note I. (33:5) As  I  have  thus  shown,  more  clearly  than  the  sun

at  noonday,  that  there  is  nothing  to  justify  us  in  calling  things
< E1:Bk.XV:26844 >  Bk.XIB:253.
contingent,  I  wish  to  explain briefly what meaning we shall attach
to the word  contingent;  but  I  will first explain the words necessary
and impossible.

(33:6)  A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in

respect  to its cause; for the existence of a thing necessarily follows,

either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause.

(33:7) For similar reasons a thing is said to be impossible;  namely,  in-

asmuch  as its essence or definition involves a contradiction,  or be-
                                           { present }                ] determined[
cause no external cause is granted, which is conditioned to produce

such  an  effect;  but  a  thing can in no respect be called contingent,
                      Bk.XIV:1:1893, 3992—deficiency in our intellect.
save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge.                                                E2:2P24-32.
                                           ^ Bk.XVIII:1221p33s1.

(33:8)  A thing  of which we do not know whether the essence does or

does  not  involve  a  contradiction,  or of which knowing that it does

not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt concerning the exist-

ence, because the order of causes escapes us,—such a thing, I say,

cannot appear to us either necessary or impossible. (33:9) Wherefore
we call it contingent or possible.    2P31C; 4D4, P11.

Note II.(33:10) It clearly follows from what we have said, that things

have been brought into being by G-D in the highest perfection, inas-

much as they have necessarily followed from a most perfect Nature.
(33:11) Nor  does this  prove any  imperfection  in G-D,  for it has com-

pelled us to affirm his perfection.  (33:12) From its contrary proposition,

we  should  clearly  gather  (as I have just shown),  that  G-D  is not

supremely  perfect,  for  if things had been brought into being in any

other way,  we should have to assign to G-D a nature different from

that,  which  we are bound to attribute to him from the consideration

of an absolutely perfect being.

page 72
                                                     [ reject ]           Bk.XVIII:3161p33s2.
(33:13) I do not doubt, that many will scout this idea as absurd, and will
                                                         ] examining [
refuse  to  give  their  minds  up to contemplating it,  simply because
they are accustomed to assign to God a freedom very different from

that  which we (Def. vii.) have deduced.  (33:14) They assign to him, in
           < Bk.XV:26845Miracles >
short,  absolute freewill(33:15) However, I am also convinced that if

such  persons  reflect  on the matter,  and duly  weigh in their minds
                        ] proofs [
our  series of propositions, they will reject such freedom as they now
                                        ] nonsensical [ < futile >
attribute to God, not only as nugatory, but also as a great impediment
     ]science {Darwinism}[
to organized knowledge. (33:16) There is no need for me to repeat what
    Bk.III:203 ^            { Cor. 2 }
I said in the note to Prop. xvii  (17) But, for the sake of my opponents,

I will show further,  that although it be granted that will appertains to
the essence of G-D,  it nevertheless follows from his perfection, that

things could not have been by him created other than they are, or in

a different  order;  this  is  easily  proved,  if  we  reflect  on what our

opponents themselves concede,  namely,  that it depends solely on

the decree and will of G-D, that each thing is what it is.  (18) If it were

otherwise, G-D would not be the cause of all things. (19) Further, that
                                                                                                       < E1:XIX(5)N:63 >
all  the  decrees  of  G-D have been ratified from all eternity by G-D

himself.  (33:20) If  it were otherwise, G-D would be convicted of imper-
            ] inconstancy [
fection or change. (33:21) But in eternity there is no such thing as when,
          < Bk.XV:26532 on E1:XIX(5)N:63 >
before,  or  after;  hence  it  follows solely from the perfection of G-D,
                   ^Bk.XIV:1:4133; Bk.XVIII:2051p33s2.
that  G-D  never can decree,  or never could have decreed anything

but what is; that G-D did not exist before his decrees, and would not

exist without them.  (33:22) But, it is said, supposing that G-D had made

a  different universe,  or had ordained other decrees from all eternity
concerning  Nature  and her order,  we could not therefore conclude

any imperfection in G-D.   (33:23) But persons who say this must admit

that G-D can change his decrees. (33:24) For if G-D had ordained any

decrees concerning Nature and her order, different from those which

he  has  ordained—in  other  words,  if  he had willed and conceived
                                                                             ] necessarily [
something different concerning Naturehe would perforce have had

a  different  intellect from that which he has,  and also a different will.

(33:25) But if it were allowable to assign to G-D a different intellect and

a  different will,  without any change in his essence or his perfection,

what  would there be to prevent him changing the decrees which he

has  made  concerning  created  things,  and nevertheless page 73 re-
maining  perfect?  (33:26) For  his  intellect  and  will concerning things

created and their order are the same, in respect to his essence and

perfection, however they be conceived.

                                                                                                   < concede >
(33:27) Further, all the philosophers whom I have read admit that G-D's
                                                                        < Bk.XV:26846. BK.XV:26740E1:XXX:60 >
                         {E1:XXX:69 }                   ] Bk.VII:526 [
intellect is entirely actual, and not at all potential; as they also admit

that G-D's intellect, and G-D's will, and G-D's essence are identical,

it follows that, if G-D had had a different actual intellect and a differ-

ent  will,  his essence would also have been different;  and thus, as I
] deduced[
concluded at first, if things had been brought into being by G-D in a

different way from that which has obtained, G-D's intellect andwill,

that is (as is admitted) his essence would perforce have been differ-

ent, which is absurd.

(33:28) As these things could not have been brought into being by G-D

in any but the actual way and order which has obtained; and as the

truth of this proposition follows from the supreme perfection of G-D;

we  can  have  no sound reason for persuading ourselves to believe

that  G-D did not wish to create all the things which were in his intel-

lect,  and  to  create  them  in  the same perfection as he had under-

stood them.

(33:29) But, it will be said, there is in things no perfection nor imperfect-

ion;  that which is in them,  and which causes them to be called per-                 Ferguson

fect  or  imperfect,  good or bad,  depends  solely on the will of G-D.
    ]Accordingly, [
(33:30) If  G-D had so willed,  he might have brought it about that what

is  now  perfection  should be extreme imperfection,  and vice versa.

(33:31) What  is  such  an assertion,  but an open declaration that G-D,

who  necessarily  understands  that  which he wishes,  might bring it

about  by  his will,  that he should understand things differently from

the way in which he does understand them?  (33:32) This (as we have

just shown) is the height of absurdity. (33) Wherefore,  I may turn the

argument  against  its employers,  as follows:—All things depend on

the power of G-D(33:34) In order that things should be different from

what  they  are,  G-D's  will  would  necessarily  have to be different.
(33:35) But G-D's will cannot be different (as we have just most clearly

demonstrated)  from  G-D's  perfection.   (33:36) Therefore neither can
                                                               { hypothesis, religion }
things be different.  (33:37) I confess that the theory which subjects all
                                 { Calculus:4.4, E3:GN(2)n }
things  to  the  will  of  an indifferent deity,  and asserts that they are

all  dependent  on His  fiat, page 74   is less far from the truth than the

theory of those, who maintain that G-D acts in all things with a view
    < furthering.Bk.XV:26847 >  { for man; but for the multitude, has more Cash Value }.
of promoting what is good ^  (33:38) For these latter persons seem to                    Ferguson
] posit[                 ] external to [
set up  something beyond God, which  does not depend on G-D, but
                                                  ]    a model     [
which G-D in acting, looks to as an exemplar, or which he aims at as
 ]fixed target[, {final causes}
a definite goal(33:39) This is only another name for subjecting G-D to
                           [ fate ]
the dominion of destiny, an utter absurdity in respect to G-D, whom

we have shown to be the first and only free cause of the essence of

all things and also of their existence.   (33:40) I need,  therefore, spend

no time in refuting such wild theories.   < Bk.XV:26847 >

PROP. XXXIV. Bk.III:197, 206; Bk.XV:26848E2:III(4)N:84, 278112E3:VII:136;
                                         Bk.XVIII:141p25c,34, 74p34p11d3,119p34.

Proof.— (34:1) From  the  sole  necessity  of  the  essence  of  G-D it
                                   < E1:Def.I:45 - E1:Bk.XV:2602>
follows  that  G-D is the cause of himself (Prop. xi.) and of all things            Conceived thru itself.

(Prop. xvi. and Coroll.). (34:2) Wherefore the power of G-D, by which
      {immanently }
he and ^ all things are and act, is identical with his essence. Q.E.D

PROP. XXXV.  Bk.XIB:248; Bk.XVIII:119p35d;1311p35.

Proof.(35:1) Whatsoever is in G-D's power, must (by the last Prop.)

be  comprehended  in  his essence in such a manner,  that it neces-

sarily  follows  therefrom,  and  therefore  necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.

PROP. XXXVI. Bk.XVIII:1201p36d, 1341p36, 1861p36, 222p29,363p7.

                                                  > connatusBk.III:204,205 <
Proof.— (36:1) Whatsoever exists expresses G-D's Nature or essence
                 ] determinate[; Bk.XIX:143,b.
in  a  given conditioned manner  (by Prop. xxv., Coroll.);  that is  (by
Prop. xxxiv.),  whatsoever  exists,  expresses  in a given conditioned
manner G-D's power,  which is the cause of all things,  therefore an

effect must (by Prop. xvi.) necessarily follow.  Q.E.D.

       Bk.III:206, 211.
APPENDIX.— (AP:1)  In  the foregoing I have explained the Nature               Bk. XIV:1:400-1

and properties of G-D. (AP:2) I have shown that he necessarily exists,                   term 'G-D'

that he is one: that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own

nature;  that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so; that

all  things are  in G-D,  and so depend on him, that without him they              Logos - 1 John 1.1
could  neither  exist  nor  be  conceived;  lastly,  that  all  things  are
  {determinism} Bk.XIB:241125.
predetermined  by  G-D,  not  through  his  free will  or  absolute  fiat,

but  from  the  very Nature of G-D or infinite power.  (AP:3) page 75  have
                                                                      < E1:Bk.XV:26849, TEI:[45]:16 >
further, where occasion offered, taken care to remove the prejudices,           G-d at <100% °P
                                                                                       ] proofs [
which   might   impede  the  comprehension  of  my  demonstrations.                     ^
4P37S2.                                  ] prejudices[
(AP:4) Yet there still remain misconceptions not a few, which might and              Added by JBY
                                 Bk.III:206, 211 ^.                     ] acceptance [
may   prove   very   grave  hindrances  to  the  understanding  of  the
concatenation  of  things,  as  I  have explained it above(AP:5) I have
                                                                            ] prejudices [
therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before
[ scrutiny]
the bar of reason.

4Pref:12.          ] prejudices[                                Bk.III:207.
(AP:6) All such opinions spring from the notion commonly entertained,

that all things in Nature act as men themselves act, namely, with an                Durant:64088
{ final causes }, Bk.VIII:44071Bk.XIV:1:422- 440; Bk.XVIII:2131App; Bk.XX:23272.                         Hall:TB2:146
end in view(AP:7)  It  is accepted as certain, that God himself directs              Ends, Einstein
                       Bk.XX:23272.                                                                                       Hampshire:147only purpose
things  to  a  definite  goal (for it is said that God made all things for            Durant:641—purpose

man, and man that he might worship him). (AP:8) I will, therefore, con-
    < Bk.XV:26850 >                 [ I ]
sider this opinion, asking first why it obtains general credence, and
                                                                              [ II ]
why all men are naturally so prone to adopt it? secondly, I will point
                                  [ III ]
out  its  falsity;  and, lastly,  I  will  show  how  it  has  given  rise  to                    Ferguson
                                                                                                 Stace:125, Robinson3:63.
prejudices  about good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame,         Mark Twain, Nagel:274.
{harmony and chaos }
order and confusion,  beauty and ugliness,  and the like.

[ I]
(AP:9) However,  this  is  not  the place to deduce these misconceptions

from the nature of the human mind: it will be sufficient here, if I assume

as a starting point, what ought to be universally admitted, namely, that

all  men  are  born  ignorant of the causes of things, that all have the

desire  to  seek  for  what  is  useful  to them,  and that they are con-
scious of such desire.  (AP:10) Herefrom it follows first,  that men think

themselves  free,  inasmuch  as they are conscious of their volitions

and  desires,  and  never  even  dream,  in  their  ignorance,  of  the                 Mark Twain

causes which have disposed them to wish and desire. (11) Secondly,

that men do all things for an end, namely, for that which is useful to

them, and which they seek.  (12) Thus it comes to pass that they only

look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these

are learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt.             Technological

(AP:13) If  they  cannot learn such causes from external sources,  they
are compelled to turn to considering themselves, and reflecting what

end  would  have  induced  them personally to bring about the given
                                                                           ] minds [
event , and  thus  they necessarily judge other natures by their own.

(AP:14) Further,  as  they  find  in  themselves and outside themselves

many  means  which  assist them not page 76 a little in their search for

what  is  useful,  for  instance,  eyes  for  seeing,  teeth for chewing,                 Darwin

herbs and animals for yielding food, the sun for giving light, the sea

for breeding fish, etc.,  they come to look on the whole of Nature as
                                                 ] advantages [
a  means  for  obtaining such conveniences. (AP:15) Now as they are

aware, that they found these conveniences and did not make them

they think they have cause for believing, that some other being has

made  them  for their use.  (AP:16) As they look upon things as means,

they  cannot  believe them to be self-created;  but,  judging from the

means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves,  they
                                                                           ] Nature[
are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed            Transcendent

with  human  freedom,  who have arranged and adapted everything

for human use.  (AP:17) They are bound to estimate the nature of such

rulers  (having  no  information  on  the  subject) in accordance with

their  own nature,  and therefore they assert that the gods ordained

everything  for  the  use of man,  in order to bind man to themselves

and obtain from him the highest honors. (AP:18) Hence also it follows,

that  everyone  thought out for himself,  according to his abilities,  a
different  way of worshipping God, so that God might love him more                Religion

than his fellows,  and direct the whole course of Nature for the satis-
                                                                  ] greed [
faction of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. (AP:19) Thus the pre-

judice developed into superstition, and took deep root in the human
mind;  and  for this reason everyone strove most zealously to under-

stand and explain the final causes of things; but in their endeavor to
                                 < Bk.XV:26851 >
show that Nature does nothing in vain, i.e., nothing which is useless

to man, they only seem to have demonstrated that Nature, the gods,
]      are as crazy as mankind.        [
and men are all mad together. (AP:20) Consider, I pray you, the result:

among  the  many  helps  of  Nature  they  were bound to find some
] disasters[
hindrances,  such as storms,  earthquakes,  diseases,  etc.: so they        Perfect and Imperfect

declared  that  such  things  happen, because the gods are angry at

some wrong done them by men,  or at some fault committed in their

worship.  (AP:21) Experience  day  by  day  protested  and  showed by
infinite  examples,  that  good and evil fortunes fall to the lot of pious
                                                                                            ] ingrained [
and  impious  alike;  still  they  would  not  abandon  their  inveterate

prejudice, for it was more easy for them to class such contradictions
                          ]mysteries [
among other unknown things of whose use they were ignorant, and
                                          ] present [
thus  to  retain  page 77   their actual and innate condition of ignorance,
                                                              ] theory {religion} [
than  to  destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and start afresh.

(AP:22) They  therefore  laid  down as an axiom,  that God's judgments

far transcend human understanding. (AP:23) Such a doctrine might well
have  sufficed  to  conceal  the  truth  from  the  human  race  for  all
                  Bk.XIB:240                                               < Bk.XV:26952 >
eternity, if mathematics had not furnished another standard of verity

in  considering  solely the essence and properties of figures without

regard to their final causes. (AP:24) There are other reasons (which I

need  not  mention  here)  besides  mathematics,  which might have
     [ Bk.VIII:44174TTP1:P(28):7. ]                                            ] misconceptions [
caused men's minds to be directed to these general prejudices, and
                                                                     [ things ]
have led them to the knowledge of the truth.

[ II]
(AP:25) I have now sufficiently explained my first point. (AP:26) There is no

need  to  show at length,  that Nature has no particular goal in view,              Hall:TB2:146

and that final causes are mere human figments. (AP:27) This, I think, is              Only purpose

already  evident  enough,  both from the causes and foundations on

which  I  have  shown  such  prejudice  to  be  based, and also from

Prop. xvi.,  and  the Corollary of Prop. xxxii.,  and,  in fact,  all those

propositions  in  which  I  have shown, that everything in Nature pro-

ceeds  from  a  sort  of  necessity,  and  with  the  utmost perfection.          Calculus:6.2b & c

(AP:28) However,  I  will  add a few remarks,  in order to overthrow this

doctrine of a final cause utterly.  (AP:29) That which is really a cause it

considers  as  an  effect,  and vice versa:  it makes that which is by

nature first to be last,  and that which is highest and most perfect to

be  most  imperfect.   (AP:30) Passing over the questions of cause and
                                                              { E1:Endnote 28:8 }
priority as self-evident, it is plain from Props. xxi., xxii., xxiii. that that
                                                                                 < Bk.XV: 26737,33,34 >
effect,  is  most  perfect which is produced immediately by G-D;  the
                                                                            ^ Bk.XIV:1:2442.
effect  which requires for its production several intermediate causes

is,  in  that  respect,  more  imperfect (AP:31) But if those things which

were  made  immediately by God were made to enable him to attain

his end,  then the things which come after, for the sake of which the

first were made, are necessarily the most excellent of all.

(AP:32) Further, this doctrine does away with the perfection of G-D: for,
                            < end >
if G-D acts for an object, he necessarily desires something which he

lacks.   (33) Certainly, theologians and metaphysicians draw a distinc-
                                                                ] Bk.VII:598[, < Bk.XV:26953 >
                                                                [ end. Bk.VIII:44275Bk.XIV:1:432. ]
tion  between  the object of want and the object of assimilation;  still

they confess that God made all things for the sake of himself, not for

the  page 78   sake of creation.   (AP:34) They  are  unable to point to any-
                                                                    ] as a purpose of God's action. [
thing  prior  to  creation,  except God himself, as an object for which

God  should  act,  and are therefore driven to admit  (as they clearly

must),   that   God   lacked  those  things  for  whose  attainment  he

created means, and further that he desired them.

                                                                                      {final causes}
(AP:35)  We  must  not  omit to notice that the followers of this doctrine,

anxious to display their talent in assigning final causes, have import-

ed a new method of argument in proof of their theory—namely, a re-
duction,  not to the impossible,  but to ignorance;  thus showing that

they  have  no  other  method  of  exhibiting  their doctrine.  (AP:36) For
example,  if a stone falls from a roof on to some one's head and kills

him, they will demonstrate by their new method, that the stone fell in

order  to kill  the  man;  for,  if  it had not by God's will fallen with that

object, how could so many circumstances (and there are often many
                                                            {we call our "ignorance" chance. }
concurrent  circumstances)  have  all happened together by chance?
(AP:37) Perhaps you will answer that the event is due to the facts that

the wind was blowing, and the man was walking that way. (AP:38) "But

why,"  they will insist, "was the wind blowing, and why was the man

at  that  very time walking that way?" (AP:38a) If you again answer, that

the  wind  had  then  sprung  up  because  the  sea had begun to be

agitated the day before, the weather being previously calm, and that

the man had been invited by a friend, they will again insist: "But why

was  the  sea  agitated,  and  why was the man invited at that time?"

(AP:39) So they will pursue their questions from cause to cause,  till at
                                                           Bk.XX:23374; Bk.XIV:1:4342—refuge.
last you take refuge in the will of God—in other words, the sanctuary

of  ignorance. (AP:40) So,  again,  when  they  survey the frame of the

human body, they are amazed; and being ignorant of the causes of

so  great  a  work  of  art  conclude  that it has been fashioned,  not

mechanically, but by divine and supernatural skill, and has been so

put together that one part shall not hurt another.

[ Bk.VIII:44376Bk.XIV:1:434-436. ]

                                                               < E1:Bk.XV:26954TTP2:Ch.VI:81 >
(AP:41) Hence anyone who seeks for the true causes of miracles,  and
                                                                              ]        a scholar         [
strives  to  understand  natural  phenomena  as  an intelligent being,

and  not  to  gaze at them like a fool, is set down and denounced as

an  impious  heretic  by those,  whom the masses adore as the inter-

preters  of Nature and the gods. (AP:42) Such persons know that, with
               [ Bk.VIII:44377TTP2:7(176):116. ]
the removal of ignorance, the page 79  wonder  which  forms  their only

available  means  for  proving  and  preserving their authority would
vanish also.   (AP:43) But  I  now  quit this subject,  and pass on to my

third point.

[ III]
(AP:44) After  men  persuaded  themselves,  that  everything  which  is

created is created for their sake, they were bound to consider as the

chief  quality  in  everything that  which is most useful to themselves,

and  to  account  those  things  the  best  of all which have the most

beneficial effect on mankind.  (AP:45)Further, they were bound to form

abstract  notions  for the explanation of the nature of things, such as

goodness, badness, order, confusion, warmth, cold, beauty, deform-          {Calculus:Fig.1(a) -
                                                Bk.III:261.                                                         All subjective terms.}
ity,  and  so  on;  and  from  the belief that they are free agents arose
                                                          ]right[      ]wrong[
the further notions praise and blame, sin and merit.                                         Mark Twain
                 Bk.XIV:1:4392Bk.VIII:86[6], 87[8]. ^    Bk.XVIII:2891App, 3441App.

(AP:46) I  will  speak  of  these  latter hereafter,  when I treat of human

nature; the former I will briefly explain here.

(AP:47) Everything  which conduces to health and the worship of God
they have called good, everything which hinders these objects they                    Ferguson

have styled bad; and inasmuch as those who do not understand the

nature  of  things  do  not verify phenomena in any way,  but merely
                                                                                   ] E1:Bk.VII:2720 [
imagine  them  after  a  fashion,  and  mistake  their  imagination for
] intellect—E1:Bk.VII:609 [
understanding,  such persons firmly believe that there is an order in

things,  being  really  ignorant  both  of  things and their own nature.

(AP:48) When phenomena are of such a kind, that the impression they

make  on  our  senses  requires  little effort of imagination,  and can

consequently  be  easily  remembered,  we  say  that  they are well-

ordered;   if  the  contrary,   that  they  are  ill-ordered  or  confused.

(AP:49) Further, as things which are easily imagined are more pleasing

to  us,  men  prefer  order  to  confusion,  as though there were any

order  in  Nature,  except in relation to our imagination, and say that

God  has  created all things in order;  thus,  without knowing it, attri-

buting  imagination to God, unless,  indeed,  they would have it that

God foresaw human imagination,  and arranged everything, so that

it  should be most easily imagined.   (AP:50) If this be their theory they

would  not,  perhaps,  be daunted by the fact that we find an infinite

number  of  phenomena,  far surpassing our imagination,  and very

many  others  which  confound its weakness. (AP:51) But enough has
                                                                       ] E1:Bk.VII:609 [
been  said  on  this  subject. (AP:52) The  other  abstract  notions are
                     Bk.XVIII:101App, 1801App.
nothing  but  modes  of imagining,  in which the imagination is differ-

ently  affected,  page 80  though  they  are  considered by the ignorant

as  the  chief  attributes  of  things,  inasmuch  as  they believe that

everything was created for the sake of themselves; and, according
as they are affected by it, style it good or bad, healthy or rotten and                      Ferguson

corrupt.  (AP:53) For instance, if the motion whose objects we see com-
municate to our nerves be conducive to health, the objects causing
it  are  styled beautiful;  if  a  contrary  motion  be excited,  they are                        Durant:64191

styled ugly.

(AP:54) Things  which  are  perceived  through our sense of smell are

styled fragrant or fetid;  it through our taste,  sweet or bitter,  full-fla-

vored or insipid,  if through our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth,


(AP:55) Whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound,

or harmony (AP:56)  In this last case,  there are men lunatic enough to

believe that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony;  and phil-

osophers are not lacking who have persuaded themselves, that the

motion  of  the  heavenly bodies gives rise to harmony—all of which

instances  sufficiently  show  that everyone judges of things accord-

ing  to the state of his brain,  or rather mistakes for things the forms

of his imagination. (AP:57) We need no longer wonder that there have

arisen  all  the  controversies we have witnessed and finally skeptic-

ism: for, although human bodies in many respects agree, yet in very

many  others  they  differ;  so  that  what seems good to one seems

bad to another; what seems well ordered to one seems confused to

another;  what  is  pleasing  to  one displeases another,  and so on.

(AP:58) I need not further enumerate,  because this is not the place to

treat  the subject at length,  and also because the fact is sufficiently
                                                                                            ] opinions [
well known.  (59)It is commonly said: "So many men, so many minds;
                                                 ] sight [
everyone  is  wise  in  his  own  way;  brains differ as completely as
                                           ] clearly [
palates."  (AP:60)All of which proverbs show, that men judge of things

according to their mental disposition, and rather imagine than under-

stand:  for,  if  they understood phenomena,  they would,  as mathe-

matics attest,  be convinced,  if not attracted,  by what I have urged.

(AP:61) We  have  now perceived,  that all the explanations commonly

given  of  nature are mere modes of imagining,  and do not indicate

the  true  Nature  of  anything,  but only the constitution of the imagi-

nation; and, although they have names, as though they were entities,
                                                                                       ]E2:Bk.VII:2720 [
existing externally to pg. 81 the imagination, I call them entities imaginary
    Bk.XV:26424 on E1:XV(43):58,
    Bk.XV:27166 on E2:VII(7)N:87. >
rather than real; and, therefore, all arguments against us drawn from

such abstractions are easily rebutted.

                           ] as follows [
(AP:62) Many argue in this way.  (63)If all things follow from a necessity

of  the absolutely perfect Nature of G-D, why are there so many im-

perfections in nature?  such,  for instance,  as  things corrupt to the

point  of  putridity,  loathsome  deformity,  confusion,  evil,  sin,  etc.
                                                                                     ] refuted [
(AP:64) But these reasoners are,  as I have said,  easily confuted,  for

the perfection of things is to be reckoned only from their own nature

and  power;  things are not more or less perfect,  according as they

delight  or  offend human senses,  or according as they are service-
able or repugnant to mankind.  (AP:65) To those who ask why God did

not so create all men, that they should be governed only by reason,

I give no answer but this: because matter was not lacking to him for

the  creation  of  every  degree  of perfection from highest to lowest;

or,  more strictly,  because the laws of his Nature are so vast,  as to

suffice  for  the  production  of  everything conceivable by an infinite                Bk.XIV:1:4402.
intelligence, as I have shown in Prop. xvi.

(AP:66) Such  are  the  misconceptions  I  have  undertaken to note;  if
                                                                                              ] correct [
there are any more of the same sort,  everyone may easily dissipate

them for himself with the aid of a little reflection.      4P37S2.                       <------- small print, Logical Index.


End of Part I of V.


E1:Endnote Definition - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:2601G:Notes 1 & 2, I:1.25c.

E1:Endnote Note 10 - From De Dijn's Bk.III:200Unified Nature.

E1:Endnote Def. I - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:2602G:Immanent

E1:Endnote Def. III - From Joseph Kupfer's "Art of Religious Communication" taken from       "Philosophy: Contemporary Perspectives on Perennial Issues"; ISBN: 0312084781;
        Page 311—Existence/Substance:

E1:Endnote Def. IV - From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:1:1342Talmud:

       "It was, however, generally agreed that attributes could not be taken in a sense which would imply plurality in the divine essenceor a similarity between G-D and His creatures. It was therefore commonly recognized that attributes are not to be taken in their literal sense {with Spinoza's philosophy, attributes could be taken literally}. The Talmudic saying that "the Torah speaks according to the language of men" is quoted in this connection by the mediaeval Jewish philosophers. Spinoza repeats it in his statement that "the Scripture . . . continually speaks after  the fashion of men" {L32(19):331[8]}. How these attributes could be interpreted so as not to contravene the absolute simplicity and uniqueness of G-D constituted the problem of divine attributes with which all the mediaeval Jewish philosophers had to grapple.

E1:Endnote Def. VI - From Paul Wienpahl's "The Radical Spinoza"; 0814791867; p. 49—
         Being, Mysticism, Soul, Conciousness all are processes; verbs not nouns.

E1:Endnote Def. VI—From The Teaching Company's Tapes; The Great Ideas of Philosophy,      2nd Edition; 2004; Professor Daniel N. Robinson's Lecture 51; Part 5 Transcript, p. 40;      Ontology - What There "Really" Is—Being:  

E1:Endnote Def. VI—From Tape 1 - Lecture 4:TB1:47—Being is a Title not a Name:

E1:Endnote Def. VI - From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:1:158G:Immanent continued.

E1:Endnote Def. VI - From Herman De Dijn's Book III:18938Real Definition.

E1:Endnote Def. VIa - From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:1:216Evolution of Philosophy/Religion.

E1:Endnote Def. VIb - From De Dijn's Bk.III:195G-D's Nature and Properties (Ethics I, P. 1-15)

E1:Endnote Def. VI - Edited from Albert Schweizer's The Quest of the Historical Jesus;          0486440273 pg. 79Mysticism. 

        {Edited by removing all Christological references. Spinozism takes divisive individual Religions and evolves them            to a Universal Religion.} 

E1:Endnote Def. VII - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:2627Free                            Mark Twain

E1:Endnote Def. VII - From Taylor and Wheeler's Spacetime Physics, 0716723271;
    Page iii—Freedom

E1:Endnote Def. VIII - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:2628Eternity

E1:Endnote Ax. III, IV, V, 1P3 - From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:1:90Transcendent.

 E1:Endnote Ax. III, IV, V, 1P3 - From The Teaching Company's Tapes; "Philosophy of Religion"; by Professor James H. Hall; Lecture 26: Groundless Faith Is Irrelevant to Life—Symmetrical and Reciprocal Relations: Immanent G-D or Transcendent God: 

I. The general characteristics of relevance determine its use in everyday contexts.

 E1:Endnote Ax. III, IV, V, 1P3 - From The Teaching Company's Tapes; "Philosophy of Religion"; by Professor James H. Hall; Lecture 27: God Is Beyond Human Grasp, But That's O.K— Transcendent 

4C. Transcendence3 is the "transcendence of otherness." The only place in which this is       commonly said to be exemplified is in the "great gulf(s) fixed" between humans and God      or between bodies and minds.  

E1:Endnote Ax. VI - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:26311True Idea.

E1:Endnote 14:5c2 - From Damasio's Bk.XXVI:209 & 217—Body, Mind, and Spinoza.
Cosmides & Tooby 

E1:Endnote 17:7n - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:26529Free Cause.

E1:Endnote 17:21n—From Parkinson's Bk.XV:26531Scholastic distinction.

E1:Endnote 21:1 - From Shirley's Bk.VII:474'idea of G-D', Bk.XII:286; Bk.III:207, 217.

E1:Endnote 21:5—universal application.

E1:Endnote 28:0 - From Yirmiyahu Yovel's "Spinoza and Other Heretics", ISBN: 0691020787 Second & Third Kind of Knowledge.  

E1:Endnote 28:8Immediate

E1:Endnote XXIX - From  Parkinson's Bk.XV:26738Determinism, Bk.XVII:55.
{ Free-will, Bk.VII:2512,G:Bk.X:56, Neff-EL:L25(78):305, Bk.XII:202, EL:Bk.III:211, Cash Value, Sham. }  

E1:Endnote 29:8 - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:26739Nature.  

E1:Endnote 29:8—Conceived through itself.

E1:Endnote 29:10Analogy

E1:Endnote XXXI—From Curley's Bk.VIII:43463

E1:Endnote 32:6c—From Wolfson's Bk.XIV:1:4032

E1:Endnote 1P33 - From Matthew Stewart's The Courier and the Heretic 2006;
0393058980; p.160—Things Happen Necessarily:

E1:Endnote 33:5n - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:26844Contingent.    Bk.XIB:253.

E1:Endnote AP:3 - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:26849Prejudice.

E1:Endnote AP:6 - Einstein—No Purpose in Nature.        Durant:640—purpose

E1:Endnote AP:41 - From Parkinson's Bk.XV:26954Miracles.

E1:Endnote AP:47 - From Shirley's Bk.VII:609Knowledge  TEI:[19(4)]:8.

End of Part I Notes.

Since November 6, 1997  Part I hits. 

Revised: September 9, 2006

"A Dedication to Spinoza's Insights"

The Ethics - Part I - Part II - Part III - Part IV - Part V