THE  ETHICS  -  PART  I         

JBY Notes:

1.   The  text  is  the  1883  translation  of  the  "The Ethics" by R. H. M.
      Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications in  Book I. See note above.
      For other Versions see Note 7.

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):   y = Proposition Number, if given;   xx = Sentence Number.

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols:
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ),
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ],
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [,
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >,
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <,
           { JBY Comment } Metaphors, Links, G-D {Spelling change not consistent; too many of them.}
        All comments in right-hand margin are by JBY unless noted.

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here.

6.  Please   e-mail  errors,  clarification  requests,  disagreement,  or
     suggestions  to  josephb@yesselman.com.

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions.
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read  this Spinoza electronic HTML linearly as
     you  would  a  novel,  but  rather  follow a  thread  by following all its         EL:[3]:vi
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and        Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Durant's Story  
     to  one  thread  at  a  time, this  Web  Site  will  be  very  convoluted,       Tickle the Fancy  
     confusing,and an annoying maze. 

     If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
     abridged versions, e-book versions,or best, study the printed book—
     book page numbers are given for most scanned books.

9.  From Elwes's Introduction—EL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi.

10. The secret to understanding Spinoza                                                           E1:Bk.III:200 
      In  "The Ethics - Part 1;  Concerning G-D",   Spinoza  spells  out  the          E5:Note 10 
      hypothesis that all things, animate, inanimate, and even the concept 
      of G-D, are bound into one grand "Organic Interdependence of Parts". 
      From this hypothesis it logically follows that obedience to the Golden        Spinozistic Idea 
      Rule is an act of self-interest and not altruism. Remember this and all 
      his   puzzling  sayings,  for  example  E1:Def.III & VI:45,  E1:I:46,  and 
      E1:XIV:54,become more, if not completely, understandable. 
      See Posit: 1D6 = ONE; and look for the Cash Value. Important.                  Burden of E1 

11.  To  help  further  understand  many  of  the Propositions and Ideas,       { Examples
                    use  the  analogy  of  you  as  'G-D'  (substance)                      1D6, 2P3, 2P4 }
                  I WAS                 I AM             I WILL BE                                         Exo. 3:14
                   ( antecedents,  present,  and  descendents ),
                                                           ^ Being
                                    brain, heart, lungs, fingernails, shoes, etc.        Analogies,        Organic
                   and all parts of you as modes ( particular things ).                              2P20

         Example—you  are  a  part  of  G-D  as your heart is a part of you.        Indivisible
         You should serve G-D as you would want your heart to serve you.
      E2:Endnote N.11, E5:Endnote 18:1N, Pantheism, Fetus, Skin, Bk.XIV:2:243—Man needs.

There is an apparent contradiction in the Note 11 analogy: G-D has no Emotions (5P17); no love; no hate—but you certainly love/hate your heart. When your heart gives-out  your conciousness is finished; but in G-D nothing is lost or gained: think conservation of matter (your chemicals return to the earth) and conservation of energy (your energy fertilizes the earth or is energy for the worms). The contradiction is thus resolved. Analogies,

        Also  interchange  G-D and Nature.                                          G-D siveNatura
      (For this last, thanks to "Frank Dixon" <fdixon65@yahoo.com>)
 
12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by Terry Neff.
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xii.
     For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi.                      Spinoza's Daring
     For a "study of the plan of Ethics 1" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:337-8.       Dijn:238—On Salvation
       For a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.

13.  See Nadler's entry in "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy".
 
 

Definitions:45

Axioms:46

Part I Propositions:Book I:Pg. vii. 
         If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral. 
         If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 
 

 
Appendix:74. 

JBY Endnotes.
 

Part I Proposition List: Book I:Pg. v;  { Hypotheses }

         Suggestion:  Do  not  read  consecutively  as you would a novel;
                              but select a Proposition,  click its number to the left
                              and  then  follow  all  its  links in turn wherever they
                              may  lead.  You  will then be putting hypertexting to
                              its  fullest  and best advantage—a fuller discussion
                              of  a  thread.  If  you  do not stick to one thread at a
                              time,  this  Web Site will seem very convoluted and
                              confusing.  
                 
                                     If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla
                              text versions, abridged versions, e-book versions, or
                              best, study the printed book—book page numbers are
                              given for most scanned books.

  {Definition of Proposition: a statement in which something is affirmed or denied,
             so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.}
            {All axioms, definitions, and propositions are hypotheses. Test them
           for their 'cash value'. See Notes 10 & 11, Posit: 1D6 = ONE, and Ideas.}    Stipulations

                                 Premises 1 to 5 and Conclusion are from Wikipedia.

 SCR:Dijn'sSalvation
 
 
 

 < E1:Bk.XV:2601—E3:Def.XX:178, TEI:[95-98]:35 >  For symbols see E1:Note 4
DEFINITIONS  { G:Notes 1 & 2, Hypothesis. }
 
 

                Bk.III:197; Bk.XIV:1:1273, 1:1281—TEI:[92]:34; Neff—EL:L02(02):276.

                                      <causa sui, E1:Bk.XV:2602—E1:XI:51, E1:XVI:59 >                         Being
Def. I.   By that which is  self-caused,  I mean that of which the          Spinoza's Religion
            essence involves existence, or that of which the Nature                 G-D siveNatura
            is only conceivable as existing.  1P7, 1P24; 5P35.          <------- small print, Logical Index.

               {G:Bk.VII:2821,G-D, Deus, Immanent, Exodus 3:14 " I AM THAT I AM";                   Analogy
                    Strong:1961, 1933, 1934.   J---vah; Strong:3068, 3069, Bk.XIV:1:144-5. }
 

                 Bk.XVIII:76d2, 87d2, 88p21,22; Bk.XIX:13a.

                                             Bk.XIB:237108; Bk.XIV:1:133.
                                                           Bk.III:198—TEI:[101]:37               Bk.III:199.
Def. II.  A thing is called finite after its kind,  when  it can be limited
            by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is           G-d sivenatura
            called finite because  we always  conceive another greater
            body.  So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but
            a  body  is  not  limited  by  thought,  nor a thought by body.       Bk.XIV:1:136.
                   Neff—EL:L04[3](04):282, Bk.XIII:6713—E2:I & II:82.   1P8, 21.
 
 

              G:Bk.VII:223; Bk.XIII:623; Bk.XIV:1:64; Bk.XV:2613; Bk.XVIII:601d3, 64d3, 67d3.

                  Durant:636—reality, essence                              Bk.III:197.
Def. III.  By  substance,  I  mean   that   which  is  in  itself, and is              term 'G-D'
            conceived through itself; in other words,  that of which a 
             conception  can  be  formed  independently  of any other   Hampshire32:22, Joseph Kupfer
             conception.                   1P1, 2, 4, 5, 6c, 10, 15, 28.                           <------- small print, Logical Index.
                      EL:[42];xxiii, Neff—EL:L02[4](02):277, Neff—E5:L29(12):318.
 
 

                  Bk.VIII:4082—Bk.XIV:1:121; Bk.XIII:623.
                  Bk.XIV:1:142,146,1521,1532, 2322, 236, 2554, 2575, 3883, 404; Bk.XV:2614—E2:XLIV:116;
                       Bk.XVIII:611d4, 1461d4—Bk.XIV:1:121.  

Def. IV.  By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as {if}       Wolfson:1:1432—Talmud.
             constituting the essence of substance. 1P4, 9, 10, 12, 19, 20; 2P1note.                 Durant:63672

                   G:Shirleys:234, Neff—EL:L02[3](02):277. ^ Bk.III:158,196—Neff—TL:L27(09):315.
 
 

              Bk.III:200; Bk.XIV:1:64, 2504, 2554; Bk.XVIII:61d5, 67d5, 92d5, 1481d5.
                <Bk.XV:2615—E1:XXV(7)C:66, E2:D.1:82,  E2:V(1):85 >  

                { Calculus:Fig. 3 }           ] affections[       ( accidents )
Def. V.   By mode, I mean the modifications ("Affectiones") of                   { Spinoza's motive;
             substance, or that which exists in,  and is conceived                  All things are in G-D. }
              through, something other than itself.  { G:Shirley:236}                  Durant:638 - modes
             { E1:Note 11, Neff—E5:L29(12):318 }     1P1, 4, 6c, 15, 23, 25c, 28, 31; 2P1.
 

                 Def. VI References: Bk.XIII:6817—Bk.XIII:612—EL:L04[4]G-D(04):283; SCR:Dijn's Salvation.
                 E1:Bk.III:18938, 198, 199, 200; Bk.XIB:23296, 235, 237108; Bk.XIV:1:1182, 133, 158,Bk.XIV:2:3431; 
                 Bk.XVIII:251d6—1p14d, 64d6, 75d6, 14713; Bk.XIX:13;Bk.XX:228.
                 {It will be a happy day when all books and footnotes are available electronically and permanently.}
             <Bk.XV:2616—Bk.XV:27167 on E2:VII(8):87>, {See Note 13}, {Quantum Mechanics}.   E1:Dijn:195.

          Simply Posit.  {Compare ONE — Spinoza's and Jewish identical Foundation Rock is to Know G-D, Durant:169.}
Def. VI.  By G-D,  I  mean   { Being }   absolutely   infinite—that  is,         {by religious hypothesis,
             substance  consisting  in  infinite attributes, of which each              MOTIVE,
             expresses eternal and infinite essentiality {and an infinite number           Spinoza's Daring}
                of finite modes. Included in these modes are you, me, and every other                     Logical necessity
                particular thing}.   G-D sive Natura and G-d sive natura. }                             ST:Note 4
                      {G-D at 100% °P^}   Robinson5:40   {^ G-d at <100% °P, Disclaimer}        Stewart06:[5]
                                                G:Bk.VII:236—Spinoza's Pantheism ^
              New Wine in Old Bottles—E1:Wolfson:1:158, E1:Wolfson:1:216, E1:Albert Schweizer:79, Root Sources.
                                1P10S, 11, 14, 14C1, 16, 19, 31; 2P1, 1S, 45; 4P28; 5P35.                <------- small print, Logical Index.
 
             { Deus, Posit, EL:[40]:xxiii, TEI:[39]:14, TEI:[40]:15, E1:X(4)n:51, Neff—EL:L02[3](02):276
                Neff—TEI:L64(60):395, Cash Value—an all-inclusive  organic interdependence.  Importance of 1D6 = ONE
                C:Fig.3, G:Spinoza's Pantheism, Spinoza's Religion, Man's place in Nature, Quantum Mechanics.}

Def. VI paraphrased using the analogy suggested in Note 11:               Other Examples—2P3, 2P4

              By YOU  I  mean  a  being  absolutely  infinite—that  is, a
              substance  consisting  in  infinite attributes, of which each             Spinozism
              expresses eternal and infinite essentiality {an infinite                         {Cash Value—organic
                  number of finite modes. Included in these modes are your heart,                     interdependence of parts}
                  lungs, fingernails, shoes, etc., etc., etc.}.

                                         Bk.XIV:1:215, 3771.                                < in >  Bk.III:157.
Explanation.— I  say absolutely infinite,  not  infinite after its kind:
for,  of  a  thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be
denied;  but  that  which  is  absolutely  infinite,  page 46  contains in
its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.        Bk.XIV:1:136,137.
                                                   {Being}                         {of its Being}

                     Bk.XIV:1:xvi2, 2552, 3851, 3994, 400, 4071, 2:1731; Bk.XVIII:181d7, 3151d7.                  Popkin:71

                                             < E1:Bk.XV:2627, E1:XVII(7)N:60. >; Bk.III:206, 229.           Spinoza's Religion
Def. VII.  That  thing  is  called free, which exists solely by the neces-               G-D
              sity of  its  own  nature,  and of  which  the  action  is  deter-           Wolf:ST:29-16
              mined  by  itself  alone.  On  the other hand,  that  thing  is         Hampshire:182
              ]inevitable [,                    compelled—Bk.XIV:1:3091                                    Mark Twain
              necessary ,  or  rather constrained, which is determined by            E5:Wolfson:2:268
              something external  to  itself  to a fixed and definite method             Mark Twain
              of existence or action.            1P17C2, 32, 33S2; 2P17S; 3P49.                          LT:L3421:336

                ] Bk.XIII:276276—Neff-TL:L60(56):389. [      { Taylor/Wheeler92:iii }
                ] Bk.VII:16—'free'  is  not  opposed to 'necessary' but to 'compelled' [               Fatalism—Ridley:307
                { Since nothing is external to G-D, by hypothesis, He is at 100% °P, always "free." }
                {E3:XLIX:161, EL:[41];xxiii, Neff—TL:L62(58):389, Free-will, Volition. }
 

                    Bk.XIB:226; Bk.XIV:1:xvii3, 331-369, 358, 3685, 3692; Bk.XVIII:111d8, 2041d8.
                 < E1:Parkinson:2628, E1:XIX(5)N:63, E1:XXXIII(21)N2:72, E2:XLIV(11)C2:117. >

Def. VIII.  By  eternity,  I mean  exist-ing  itself,  in  so  far  as it is
               conceived  necessarily  to follow solely <merely> from the        Calc:Note 4.7
               definition of that which is eternal.   P19, 20, 23; 5P29, 30.     <------- small print, Logical Index.

                 {G-D, EL:[41];xxiii, EL:[60]:xxix; Neff—E5:L29(12)[5]:319.}

 
        Explanation.—Existence  of  this  kind  is  conceived  as  an
                                          [ Bk.VIII:4095—E1:VIII(14)N2:49, E1:XIX:62. ]
       eternal truth,   like  the essence  of  a   thing,  and,  therefore,
                            [ expressed ]                         duration—Bk.XIV:1:3583.
        cannot   be   explained   by  means  of  continuance  or  time,            Calculus:4.7
                                                                           Bk.XIV:1:3662.
        though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or       Hampshire32:172
        end. {E5:Einstein Time, Hawking Time; Neff—E5:L29(12)[3]:318}; Bk.XIB:224.
 
   

AXIOMS < Bk.XV:2629—E2:Postulate:97, E2:XXXVIII(4)C:110.>; Bk.XIV:1:58.

Ax. I.   Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something
          else.            1P4, 6C, 11, 14C2, 15, 28.                                           <------- small print, Logical Index.
              Bk.III:152,196; Bk.XII:160; Bk.XVIII:181a1.

Ax. II.  That which cannot be conceived through anything else must                Bk.XIV:1:76.
           be conceived through itself.                                             I am that I am

                                                                           {event}   ]inevitably [
Ax. III.  From  a  given  definite cause an effect necessarily follows;      Chain of natural events
           and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is          Wolfson:1:90
           impossible that an effect can follow.      1P27; 4P31; 5P33.
                  Bk.III:196; Bk.XVIII:321a3, 112a3.

Ax. IV.  The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
            knowledge {understanding} of a cause. 1P3, 6C, 25; 2P5, 6, 7, 16, 45; 5P22.
          Bk.III:188; Bk.XII:160; Bk.XV:26210; Bk.XVIII:1271a4, 1791a4; Bk.XIX:13313.

                                                            Transcendent
Ax. V.  Things  which have nothing in common cannot be understood,   Wolfson:1:90—Transcendent
           the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not                Transcendent
           involve the conception of the other.  1P3.
                 Bk.XVIII:1271a5—1p3d, 1481a5.

                      Bk.III:80—TEI:L64(60):395; 188; Bk.XIV:2:996; Bk.XVIII:1671a6, 1701a6. 
                 ] G:Bk.VII:2513—ideate, E2:XLVIII(9) & XLIX:120, E1:XXX:(1):69.[             E1:Parkinson:26311—True Idea
Ax. VI.   A true idea  must  correspond with its ideate or object.
                             1P5, 30; 2P29, 32, 44, 44C2.                                    <-------------- small print, Logical Index.
                 { L65(63):396, Neff—LT:L66(64):398, E2:Def.IV:82. }

Ax. VII.  If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence
            does not involve existence.   1P11.      Bk.XVIII:74a7.

{Axiom VIII—simply posit}
                                                       1D6= ONE—Deus—William James; Importance of 1D6 = ONE
{In order to avoid useless speculation, simply posit Spinoza's G-D as a working hypothesis and then prove or disprove it by testing for its cash value. Col:Hampshire}  

Hypothesis—1. a provisional theory set forth to explain some class of phenomena (say, like gravity), either accepted as a guide to future investigation (working hypothesis) or assumed for the sake of argument and testing for its cash value (which is, that all things are in G-D; therefore everything is organically  interdependent and you cannot harm one part without eventually harming yourself or your progeny.) 2. a tentative assumption made in orderto draw out and test its logical or empirical consequences.  

This working hypothesis helps to understand our universe, society, and ourselves and thus brings moments of peace-of-mind—the goal of all Religions and righteous governments.}
 
 

PART I PROPOSITIONS { Hypotheses }  ] G:Bk.VII:2513 [

   Bk.XX:228.               For all Propositions see Scroll P1.

PROP. I.  EL:Bk.XIII:626;Bk.XIV:1:78; Bk.XVIII:67p1, 1471p1—2p7s; Bk.XX:228.          See Premise 1

   E1:Bk.XIV:1:158                 Bk.XIV:1:3751.
Substance { G-D }  is  by Nature  prior              Deus sive Natura
to its modifications. {Neff, EL:L04(04)[4]:283.} 1P5    <------- small print, Logical Index.
                [ affections ] For symbols see Note 4.
                     Bk.XIV:1:3792.

{ Paraphrased using the analogy suggested in Note 11. }        Other Examples—1D6, 2P3, 2P4

       { YOU are by nature prior to your emotional changes. }              James' Bear
 

Proof.— (1:1) This is clear from Defs. iii. and v {iv and vi}.                               Motive
 

PROP. II.  Bk.III:196; Bk.XIV:1:79, 85, 96; Bk.XVIII:691p2, 104p2,4,5,6, 1481p2.            See Premise 2      

Two substances, whose attributes are                            Bk.XIV:1:81.
different,  have  nothing  in common.
] Bk.XIII:6816 on EL:L04[4](04):283.[           1P6, 11, 12.                <------- small print, Logical Index.

page 47
Proof.— (2:1) Also evident from Def. iii.  (2:2) For each must exist in itself,

and  be  conceived  through  itself;  in other words, the conception of
                    ]involve[  For symbols See Note 4.
one does not imply the conception of the other.
 

PROP. III.  Bk.III:196; Bk.XIV:1:86, 94, 95; Bk.XVIII:501p3, 1271p3d, 1481p2,3;
                              Bk.XIX:4811—E1:17s.                                                                  See Premise 3

Things which have nothing in common                   Satan, slums
cannot  be  one  the cause of the other.            Wolfson:1:90—Transcendent
]Bk.XIII:6816 on EL:L04[4](04):283.[     Bk.XIB:237109.     1P6  
 

Proof.— (3:1) If they have nothing in common, it follows that one can-
           < understood >
not be apprehended by means of the other (Ax. v.),  and,  therefore,

one cannot be the cause of the other (Ax. iv.).  Q.E.D.
 

PROP. IV.   Bk.XIV:1:91, 92; Bk.XVIII:64p4d, 66p4, 104p2,4,5,6.

Two   or   more  distinct things  are               See Premise 4 
distinguished   one   from the other,
either   by   the   difference   of   the
attributes  of  the  substances, or by
the difference of their modifications.                                Bk.XIV:2:1943.
                    1P5                          Bk.XIV:1:86—Affections
 

Proof.—  (4:1)  Everything   which  exists,  exists  either  in  itself  or in
                                                                                 ]    nothing exists
something else (Ax. i.),—that is (by Defs. iii. and v.), nothing is grant-
                             external to the intellect, [
ed  in  addition to the understanding, except substance and its modi-
                   < Bk.XV:26312—E1:XIV:54 >  [        outside   the  intellect               ]
fications.  (4:2) Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding,

by    which   several   things   may  be  distinguished  one  from  the

other, except  the substances,  or,  in  other words  ] Def. iv. [,   their
                           ] affections[
attributes  and  modifications.  Q.E.D.
                          Bk.XIV:1:4041.
 

PROP. V.  Bk.III:195,197; Bk.XIII:625 on EL:L02[4]; Bk.XIV:1:139.
                       Bk.XVIII:61p5d, 661p5, 82p5,7,8, 88p5, 104p2,4,5,6, 1481p5, 17014; Bk.XIX:282, 3415; Bk.XX:228.

There  cannot exist  in the universe                   See Conclusion  
two or more substances having the                        See Note 10
same nature or attribute.    1P8, 12, 13, 14, 15s; 2P10s, 13L1.                          Bk.XIV:1:86.
                      < Bk.XV:26313—E1:XXV(7)C:66 >
{Cash Value—an all-inclusive organic interdependence. Analogy—you are unique.}
{Neff—EL:L02(02)[4]:276}

Proof.— (5:1)  If  several distinct substances be granted, they must be
     Bk.XIV:1:93
distinguished  one  from  the  other,  either  by the difference of their

attributes,  or  by   the  difference  of  their  modifications (Prop. iv.).
                                                                                       [conceded ]
(5:2)   If  only by the difference of their attributes,  it will be granted that

there  cannot  be more than one with an identical attribute.   (5:3) If by

the  difference of their modifications—as substance is naturally prior

to  its  modifications  (Prop. i.),—it  follows  that setting the modifica-

tions aside, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (Defs. iii.

and  Ax.vi.),  there cannot be conceived one substance different from

another—that  is   (by Prop. iv.),   there  cannot  be  granted  several

substances, but one substance only.  Q.E.D.
 

PROP. VI. Bk.III:196; Bk.VIII:93[7]; Bk.XIII:612 on EL:L02[3](02),625 on EL:L02[4].
                            Bk.XIV:1:94, 95; Bk.XVIII:104p2,4,5,6.

One substance cannot be produced                     Bk.XIV:1:86.
by  another  substance.      1P11S, 12.  
 

Proof.— (6:1) It is impossible that there should be in the universe two

substances  with  an  identical  attribute,  i. e.  which have anything

common to them both (Prop. ii.),  and,  therefore  page 48   (Prop. iii.),

one  cannot be the cause of another,  neither can one be produced

by the other.  Q.E.D.

Corollary.— (6:2)  Hence  it  follows  that  a  substance  cannot be pro-             Bk.XIV:1:95.
              < Bk.XV:26314—E1:XV(11)N:55, E1:VIII(10)N2:49 >
duced  by anything external  to itself. (6:3) For in the universe nothing
]   exists     [                     { ^ A transcendent God }
is  granted,  save  substances  and  their  modifications  (as appears

from Ax. i. and Defs. iii. and v.). (6:4) Now (by the last Prop.) substance

cannot  be  produced  by  another substance,  therefore it cannot be

produced by anything external itself.  Q.E.D.            1P7, 15s.

 Bk.XVIII:181p6c, 601p6c, 1281.

      < Another Proof >
 (6:5)  [ Alternatively: ]  This  is  shown   still  more  readily by the absurdity

of the contradictory.  (6:6)  For, if substance be produced by an external

cause,  the  knowledge  of  it  would depend  on  the knowledge of its

cause (Ax. iv.), and (by Def. iii.) it would itself not be substance.
 

PROP. VII. Bk.XIV:1:116,1263,130,139; Bk.XVIII:707,11, 82p5,7,8; Bk.XIX:3415.

Existence belongs to the                               E1:Bk.XIV:1:158
nature  of  substance. 
         1P8, 8S1, 8S2, 11, 12, 19; 2P10
 

Proof.— (7:1) Substance cannot be produced by anything external

(Corollary, Prop. vi.), it must, therefore, be its own cause—that is,
                                < Bk.XV:26317 —ontological argument, E1:XI:51 >
] Def. I [,  its  essence necessarily involves existence, or existence                  Durant:63671

belongs to its nature.  Bk.XVIII:171p7d, 251p7d; Bk.XIX:13313.
 

PROP. VIII. Bk.XIV:1:118,120,133,139; Bk.XVIII:69p8d, 82p5,7,8, 88p8; Bk.XIX:3415.

Every  substance  is                                             E1:Wolfson:1:158
necessarily infinite.       1P12, 13S, 15S; 2P13L1.                    {Famous letter on the Infinite}
{ EL:L15(32):2922, Neff—E5:L29[11](12):322.}
  Bk.XIII:625 on EL:L02[4](02).

                                                        < Bk.XV:26315—E1:XI:51, E1:XIII(4)C:54
                                                                            E1:XV(32)N:57, E2:Lemma1:93. >
                                                                         < a substance of one attribute >
Proof.— (8:1) There  can  be  only  one  substance  with  an identical
] Prop. v.  Bk.VIII:41212—E1:X(2)N:51 [
attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.); its nature,
                                                                                                  ] can [
therefore,  involves existence,  either as finite or infinite.  (8:2) It does

not exist as finite,  for  (by Def. ii.)  it would then be limited by some-

thing  else  of  the  same  kind,  which  would also necessarily exist

(Prop. vii.);  and  there  would  be  two substances with an identical
                                                                           ] must exist [
attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.).  (8:3) It therefore exists as infinite.
                                                    { Neff—E5:L29[4](12):318.}
Q.E.D.

                                                              Bk.XVIII:76p8s1—d6expl.
Note I.— (8:4) As finite existence involves a partial negation, and infin-

ite existence is the absolute affirmation of the given nature, it follows

(solely  from  Prop. vii.)  that  every  substance is necessarily infinite.               Durant:63671
 

Note II.—(8:5)   No  doubt  it  will  be difficult for those who think about

things loosely, and have not been accustomed to know them by their

primary  causes, to comprehend the demonstrations of Prop. vii.: for

such  persons  make  no  distinction  between  the  modifications  of

substances  and the substances themselves, and are ignorant of the
                                                                                       Bk.XIX:1611.
manner  in  which  things  are  produced;   hence  they  attribute  to
                     ] a [
substances   the   beginning   which  they observe in natural objects.
                                                                     [ confuse everything ]
(8:6)  Those  who  are  ignorant  of  true causes, make complete page 49
                             [ Bk.VIII:41316—TEI:[58:4]:22]
confusion—think  that trees might talk just as well as men—that men

might  be formed from stones as well as from seed; and imagine that

any  form  might be changed into any other. (8:7)  So,  also, those who
                 Bk.XVIII:1811p8s2.    { whole and a part. }
confuse  the  two natures, divine and human, readily attribute human
] emotions[            ] G-D[
passions  to  the deity,  especially  so  long as they do not know how              Durant:63979

passions  originate in the mind.  (8:8)  But, if people would consider the

Nature  of substance,  they  would  have  no doubt about the truth of             Bk.XIV:1:116.

Prop. vii.   (8:9)  In fact,  this  proposition  would  be a universal axiom,
                                                    1P15S.
and  accounted  a truism.  (8:10)  For,  by substance,  would  be  under-
                 Bk.XVIII:73p8s2—p11d2.
stood  that  which is in itself,  and is conceived through itself—that is,

something  of  which  the  conception  requires not the conception of
  < E1:VI(2)C:48 >                                                                               Bk.III:153
anything  else;  whereas modifications exist in something external to

themselves,  and  a conception of them is formed by means of a con-
                   { substance }
ception  of the thing in which they exist.  (8:11) Therefore, we may have

true  idea  of non-existent modifications; for, although they may have
  ] Bk.XIII:6918 on EL:L04[4](04):284.[
no  actual  existence  apart  from  the  conceiving  intellect,  yet their

essence is so involved in something external to themselves that they

may through it be conceived. (8:12) Whereas the only truth substances

can  have,  external  to  the  intellect,  must consist in their existence,

because  they  are  conceived  through themselves.   (8:13)  Therefore,
                                                                          Hypothesis
for  a person to say that he has a clear and distinct—that is, a true—

idea  of a substance, but that he is not sure whether such substance

exists,  would  be  the same as if he said that he had a true idea, but

was  not  sure  whether  or not it was false  (a little consideration will

make  this plain);  or  if anyone affirmed that substance is created,  it

would  be  the  same  as  saying that a false idea was true—in short,

the  height of absurdity.  (8:14)  It must,  then,  necessarily be admitted
                                                           [ Bk.VIII:4095—E1:D.VIII:46, E1:XIX:62 ]
that  the  existence  of  substance  as  its essence is an eternal truth.
                                            [ infer ]
(8:15)   And  we  can  hence  conclude by another process of reasoning
                          Bk.XIX:3416.
—that  there is but one such substance. (8:16) I think that this may prof-
  [ Bk.VIII:41421—NeffTL:L39(34):351, ]
itably  be  done  at once;  and,  in order to proceed regularly with the
                                        [ note ]
demonstration, we must premise:—   ] Neff, Bk.XIII:201184. [

1.    (8:17) The true definition of a thing neither involves nor expresses          Bk.XIV:1:1253.
        anything  beyond the nature of the thing defined. (8:17a) From this
        it follows that—

                                                                        ] fixed [
2.    (8:18)  No  definition implies or expresses a certain number of indi-
        viduals,  page 50 inasmuch  as  it  expresses  nothing  beyond the
        nature  of  the  thing defined.  (18a) For instance, the definition of
        a triangle  expresses  nothing  beyond  the  actual  nature  of  a
        triangle:  it  does  not  imply  any  fixed  number  of  triangles.

3.     (8:19)  There  is  necessarily  for  each  individual  existent thing a
         cause why it should exist.  Bk.XIV:1:3192.

                                                                                  Bk.XIB:249.
4.      (8:20) This cause of existence must either be contained in the
        nature  and  definition of the thing defined ]in effect, existence
        belongs to its nature[,  or must be postulated apart from such
        definition.                                  [outside ]        ] the thing itself. [
 

(8:21)  It  therefore  follows  that,  if  a  given number of individual things

exist  in nature, there must be some cause for the existence of exact-

ly  that number, neither more nor less. (22) For example, if twenty men

exist  in the universe (for simplicity's sake,  I will suppose them exist-

ing simultaneously, and to have had no predecessors), and we want

to  account  for  the  existence  of  these  twenty  men,  it  will  not be

enough  to  show  the cause of human existence in general; we must

also  show  why  there are exactly twenty men, neither more nor less:
         ] Note 3 [
for  a  cause  must  be  assigned  for the existence of each individual.
                  ] Note 2 & 3[
(8:23)  Now this cause cannot be contained in the actual nature of man,

for  the  true definition of man does not involve any consideration of
                                                                 ] Note 4 [
the number twenty.  (24) Consequently, the cause for the existence of

these  twenty  men, and, consequently, of each of them, must neces-

sarily  be  sought externally  to  each  individual.  (8:25) Hence we may
  [              infer  absolutely              ]
lay  down   the   absolute  rule,  that  everything which may consist of
       ] Bk.XIII:6311 on EL:L02[9](02):279.[
several   individuals   must   have   an   external  cause.     (8:26)  And,

as it has been shown already that existence appertains to the nature

of substance, existence must necessarily be included in its definition;
                Bk.XVIII:69p8s2—p5.
and  from  its  definition alone existence must be deducible.   (8:27) But

from  its  definition (as we have shown, Notes 2 & 3), we cannot infer

the  existence  of  several  substances;  therefore it follows that there
              Bk.XIX:3416.
is only one substance of the same nature. Q.E.D.       1P15S.
 
 

PROP. IX.  Bk.III:195,198; Bk.XIB:234102; Bk.XIV:1:119, 140, 2121;
                             Bk.XVIII:69p9, 761p9.; Bk.XIX:3519.

             < E2:Def. VI:83 >
The more reality or being a thing                         E1:Bk.XIV:1:158
has the greater the number of its                                Bk.XIV:1:141.
attributes.        { Computerized Machines }  
 

] Proof.— (9:1) This is evident from Def. iv. [
 

PROP. X.  Bk.III:197, 200, 216; Bk.XIV:1:119,140, 141, 156, 2:221;
                           Bk.XVIII:141p10,2p6, 481p10, 2p6, 61p10.

Each  particular attribute  of  the                       E1:Bk.XIV:1:158
one substance must be conceived
through itself.                 1P12; 2P5, 6.
{ Analogy,L65(63):396; Neff TL:L66(64):399—Bk.III:217. }
 

Proof.— (10:1) An attribute is that which the intellect perceives of sub-
                                     Bk.XVIII:1471p10d, 2p7s.
stance,  as constituting its essence (Def. iv.),  and, page 51  therefore,                  Bk.XIV:1:2581

must be conceived through itself (Def. iii.).  Q.E.D.

                       ] Bk.VIII:41212—E1:VIII(1):54[        Bk.XIV:1:2555, 2576, 2582.
Note.— (10:2)  It is thus evident that,  though  two attributes are, in fact,
  Bk.XIV:2:221; Bk.XIX:3417.                    { Analogy—say a heart and a lung. }
conceived as distinct—that is, one without the help of the other—yet
                                                                  Bk.XVIII:651p10s.
we  cannot,  therefore,  conclude that they constitute two entities,  or
< Bk.XV:26316—E2:I:83, E2:II:84 >
< Bk.XV:283162 on E5:Prf(6):244 >
two  different  substances.  (10:3)  For it is the nature of substance that
                                       Bk.XIV:1:1524.
each  of its attributes is conceived through itself, inasmuch as all the

attributes  it  has have always existed simultaneously in it,  and none
                                                                                             Bk.XIV:1:1522, 2571.
could  be  produced  by any other;  but each expresses the reality or           Bk.XIV:1:156

being  of  substance.  (10:4) It  is, then, far from an absurdity to ascribe
                                               { G-D }
several  attributes  to  one  substance:  for  nothing in nature is more
                                                Bk.I:397.
clear than that each and every entity must be conceived under some

attribute, and that its reality or being is in proportion to the number of
                                         Bk.III:199; Bk.XIX:131; {Sham }.
its  attributes  expressing necessity or eternity and infinity. (10:5)  Con-

sequently  it  is  abundantly  clear,  that  an  absolutely  infinite being
                                       ] Def. vi[
must   necessarily   be   defined  as  consisting  in  infinite  attributes

each  of   which   expresses  a  certain  eternal  and  infinite  essence.
 

(10:6)  If  anyone  now ask,  by what sign shall he be able to distinguish

different  substances,  let him read the following propositions,  which
                                                                   ]     Nature    [
show  that  there  is but one substance in the universe,  and that it is
                                                                                             Bk.XIX:3621.
absolutely infinite, wherefore such a sign would be sought for in vain.       1P14C1.
 

Prop. XI.  Bk.III:195, 200; Bk.XIV:1:129, 158-213; Bk.XV:26738 on E1:XXIX:68 ; Bk.XX:228.

                                                            Bk.XIV:2:3432
G-D, or substance, consisting of              G-D at 100% °P
  < Bk.XV:26315 on E1:VIII:48 >
infinite attributes,  of which each                Hampshire32:56
expresses  eternal  and  infinite
essentiality, necessarily  exists.                    term 'G-D'
              1P13, 14, 17C2, 19, 19S, 21, 29, 33, 34; 5P35.
{ Neff-EL:L02(02):276, Posit: 1D6 = ONE, Cash Value—an all-inclusive
   organic interdependence. }

                                                                   ] if you can [
Proof.— (11:1)  If this be denied,  conceive,  if possible,  that G-D does
                    [by 1A7 ]
not  exist:  then his essence does not involve existence.  (11:2)  But this
                                                    < Bk.XV:26317—E1:VII:48 > {Bk.XVII:141, 145}
(by  Prop. vii.)  is absurd.     (11:3)  Therefore  G-D necessarily  exists.

  Bk.XIII:624 on EL:L02[4](02).                                         Bk.III:54.
Another proof.—(11:4)  Of  everything  whatsoever  a  cause or reason

must  be  assigned, either for its existence, or for its non-existence—

e.g.,  if  a  triangle  exist,  a  reason  or cause must be granted for its

existence;  if, on the contrary, it does not exist, a cause must also be

granted,  which  prevents  it  from  existing,   or  annuls  its existence.

(11:5)   This  reason  or cause must either be contained in the nature of

the  thing  in  question,  or  be  external  to it.   (11:6)  For instance,  the

reason  for  the  non-existence  of  a  square  circle is indicated in its

page 52  nature,  namely,  because  it  would  involve  a  contradiction.

(11:7) On the other hand, the existence of substance follows also solely

from  its  nature,  inasmuch  as  its  nature  involves  existence. (See

Prop. vii.)
 
 

(11:8) But the reason for the existence of a triangle or a circle does not
                                                                             Bk.XVIII:121p11d2.
follow  from the nature of those figures,  but from the order of univer-
                  [  corporeally  ]
sal  Nature in extension. (9) From the latter it must follow, either that a
                                                                        Bk.XVIII:120p11d2; [now ]
triangle necessarily exists, or that it is impossible that it should  exist.

(11:10)   So  much is self-evident.    (11:11)  It follows therefrom that a thing

necessarily  exists,  if no cause or reason be granted which prevents

its existence.

(11:12)   If,  then,  no cause or reason can be given,  which prevents the

existence of G-D,  or which destroys his existence, we must certainly

conclude  that  he  necessarily  does  exist.  (11:13)  If such a reason or

cause  should  be given, it must either be drawn from the very Nature

of G-D, or be external to him—that is, drawn from another substance

of another nature. (11:14) For if it were of the same nature, G-D, by that

very  fact,  would be admitted to exist. (11:15) But substance of another

nature  could  have  nothing  in common with G-D  (by Prop. ii.),  and
                                                          ]      posit or annul        [
therefore  would be unable either to cause or to destroy his existence.
 

                             Bk.XIV:1:3741.
(11:16)  As,  then, a reason or cause which would annul the divine exist-

ence  cannot  be  drawn  from  anything external to the Divine Nature,
                            ] necessarily [
such  cause  must  perforce,  if  G-D  does not exist,  be  drawn from

G-D's  own Nature, which would involve a contradiction. (17) To make

such  an  affirmation about a being absolutely infinite and supremely

perfect, is absurd; therefore, neither in the Nature of G-D, nor extern-             Transcendent

ally  to  his Nature,  can a cause or reason be assigned which would
                                                                      Bk.XVIII:73p11d2.
annul his existence.  (11:18) Therefore, G-D necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.

                                              ] ability [
Another proof.—  (11:19) The  potentiality  of  non-existence  is  a nega-
   ]weakness [
tion  of  power,  and  contrariwise  the  potentiality  of  existence  is a

power,  as  is obvious.  (11:20) If,  then,  that which necessarily exists is
                                                                             Bk.XVIII:2971p11d3.
nothing  but  finite  beings, such finite beings are more powerful than

a  being  absolutely  infinite,  which  is  obviously  absurd;  therefore,

either  nothing exists,  or  else a being absolutely infinite necessarily

exists  also.   (11:21) Now we exist either in ourselves,  or in something

else  which  necessarily exists (see Ax. i. and Prop. vii.)   (11:22) There-

fore page 53  a  being  absolutely infinite—in other words, G-D (Def. vi.),
          Bk.XIX:8913.
necessarily exists.  Q.E.D.
 

Note.— (11:23)  In  this  last proof,  I have purposely shown G-D's exist-
   {by observation and induction }
ence  à  posteriori,  so  that  the proof might be more easily followed,
{from particular ^ instances to a general principle or law; based on observation or experiment}
not  because,  from  the  same  premises,  G-D's  existence does not
   { byintuition and deduction }
follow à priori. (24)  For, as the potentiality of existence is a power,  it
               {  ^  from a general law to a particular instance; valid independently of observation}       Robinson3:170
follows  that,  in  proportion  as  reality  increases  in  the nature  of a
                                                      ^Bk.III:199
thing,  so  also will it increase its strength for existence.   (11:25) There-

fore  a  being  absolutely  infinite,  such as G-D,  has from himself an

absolutely infinite power of existence, and hence he does absolutely
 Bk.XIX:8914.                             Bk.XIV:1:208, 2101.                     ]   to  be
exist.   (11:26) Perhaps there will be many who will be unable to see the
convinced [
force  of  this  proof,  inasmuch  as they are accustomed only to con-
                                        ] derive [
sider  those  things  which  flow from external causes. (11:27)  Of such

things,  they  see  that  those  which  quickly  come  to pass—that is,
                                                  ] likewise readily perish [
quickly  come  into existence—quickly also disappear; whereas they
                                         ]   to bring into being   [                     ] readily [
regard  as  more  difficult  of  accomplishment,  that is,  not so easily

brought  into  existence—those  things which they conceive as more
  ] complex[
complicated.
 

(11:28) However,  to  do away with this misconception,  I need not here

show  the  measure  of  truth  in  the  proverb,  "What comes quickly,

goes  quickly,"  nor discuss whether, from the point of view of univer-

sal  Nature,  all  things  are  equally  easy,  or otherwise:  I need only
                                                Bk.XVIII:77p11d2.
remark,  that  I  am not here speaking of things,  which come to pass

through  causes  external  to  themselves,   but  only  of  substances

which  (by  Prop. vi.)  cannot  be  produced  by  any  external cause.

(11:29)  Things  which  are  produced by external causes, whether they
                                                                          < Bk.XV:26418—E2:D.VI:83 >
consist  of  many parts  or few,  owe whatsoever perfection or reality
                                                               Bk.XIV:1:3198.
they possess solely to the efficacy of their external cause, and there-

fore  their existence arises solely from the perfection of their external
                  Bk.XIV:1:2111.
cause,  not from their own.  (11:30) Contrariwise, whatsoever perfection

is  possessed  by  substance is due to no external cause;  wherefore

the  existence  of  substance  must  arise  solely from its own Nature,

which  is  nothing else but its essence. (11:31) Thus, the perfection of a
{1D6= ONE}                                                                               ]posits [
thing  does  not annul  its existence,  but,  on the contrary,  asserts it.

(11:32)   Imperfection,  on  the  other hand,  does  annul it;  therefore we

cannot  be  more  certain  of  the  existence  of anything,  than of the
                     ] an Entity [                                                       Bk.XIV:1:2122.
existence  of  a  being absolutely  infinite or perfect—that is,  of G-D.

(11:33)  For  inasmuch  as  his  essence  page 54 excludes all imperfection,

and  involves  absolute perfection, all cause for doubt concerning his

existence  is  done away, and the utmost certainty on the question is

given.  (11:34) This, I think, will be evident to every moderately attentive

reader.
 

PROP. XII. Bk.III:200; Bk.XVIII:85p12.

No attribute of substance can be
conceived  from  which it would
follow   that   substance  can  be              Bk.XIV:1:156.
divided { Into parts }. {Analogy.}     1P15S.

Proof.—  (12:1) The  parts  into  which  substance  as  thus  conceived
                                                                              Bk.XVIII:82p12d—p15s.
would  be divided,  either will retain the nature of substance,  or they

will not.  (2) If  the former, then (by Prop. viii.) each part will necessar-

ily  be infinite,  and (by  Prop. vi.) self-caused,  and (by  Prop. v.) will

perforce consist of a different attribute, so that, in that case,  several

substances  could  be  formed  out  of  one  substance,   which  (by

Prop. vi.) is  absurd. (3) Moreover, the parts (by Prop. ii.) would have

nothing  in common with their whole,  and the whole  (by Def. iv. and

Prop. x.)  could  both exist and be conceived without its parts,  which

everyone  will  admit to be absurd.  (12:4)  If we adopt the second alter-

native—namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance

—then,  if  the  whole  substance  were  divided  into  equal  parts, it

would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to exist, which

(by Prop. vii.) is absurd.
 
 

PROP. XIII.  Bk.XIV:1:121,157; Bk.XVIII:82p13,c,s—p15s.

Substance absolutely
infinite  is  indivisible.                        Bk.XIV:1:156.
{Analogy, Pantheism, Disclaimer.}
 

Proof.— (13:1) If  it could be divided, the parts into which it was divided

would  either  retain  the  nature  of  absolutely infinite substance,  or

they  would  not. (2) If the former, we should have several substances

of  the  same nature,  which (by Prop. v.) is absurd.   (13:3) If the latter,
               [ P12 ]
then (by Prop. vii.) substance absolutely infinite could cease to exist,

which (by Prop. xi.) is also absurd.
 

Corollary.— (13:4) It follows that no substance,  and consequently no
] corporeal[                                                   < Bk.XV:26315 on E1:VIII(1):48 >
extended   substance,   in  so  far  as  it  is  substance,   is  divisible.

Bk.XVIII:76p13cs; 82p13,c,s—p15s.     1P15S
 

Note.— (13:5) The indivisibility of substance may be more easily under-

stood  as follows.  (6) The nature of substance can only be conceived

as  infinite,  and  by a part of substance,  nothing else can be under-
                                                                                              ] obvious [
stood than finite substance, which (by Prop. viii.) involves a manifest

contradiction.
 

PROP. XIV.  Bk.XIV:1:112, 214-261, 323; Bk.XVIII:661p14.

Besides  G-D  no  substance                   Spinozistic Idea, Spinoza's Daring
            <         exist         >         < E1:IV(1):47 >                                        Calculus:3.1c
can be granted or conceived.                                  Bk.XIV:1:214.
{ Analogy, CashValue = organic }   1P15S, 15, 18.                                  Popkin:80 
 

Proof.  (14:1)  As  G-D  is  a  being  absolutely  infinite,  of whom  page 55
                                                                   Bk.XVIII:251p14d—1d6.
no  attribute that expresses the essence of substance can be denied

(by  Def. vi.),  and  he  necessarily  exists  (by  Prop. xi.);  if  any sub-
                                           { posited }
stance  besides  G-D  were granted it would have to be explained by

some  attribute of G-D, and thus two substances with the same attri-

bute  would exist,  which (by Prop. v.) is absurd;  therefore,  besides
                                Bk.XVIII:70p14d.
G-D  no substance can be granted,  or consequently,  be conceived.

(14:2)  If  it  could  be  conceived,  it  would  necessarily have to be con-

ceived  as existent;  but this  (by the first part of this proof) is absurd.

(14:3)  Therefore,  besides  G-D  no  substance can be granted or con-

ceived.  Q.E.D.  Bk.XVIII:811p14d,1501p14d.
 

Corollary I.— (14:4) Clearly, therefore:—

      Bk.XVIII:104p14c1, Motive.                                                           { posited }
1.  G-D is one, that is (by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted        1D6 = ONE
     in  the  universe,  and  that  substance  is  absolutely infinite, as we
     have already indicated (in the note to Prop. x.). 1P17C2, 24C, 29S, 30, 33; 2P4.
      Bk.XIB:247141; Bk.XVIII:1984.

{From Max Jammer's "Einstein and Religion"; ISBN: 0691006997; 1999; p. 57. 

Einstein never ceased to believe that there ought to exist an unified field
theory. This belief may well have been rooted in his Spinozistic conviction
in the unity of nature: "G-D is One, hence in the nature of things only one
subtance is given; 1P14c. Spinoza taught that nature is divine and G-D is       
One, and the most fundamental maxim of Judaism, the "Shma' Israel"                Elwes [37] 
("Hear, O Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is One"; Deuteronomy 6:4)
was well known to Einstein from his early religious instruction." Clearly
Einstein's indomitable striving throughout his later lifetime- for "oneness"
in physics ...... }  

Corollary II.— (14:5) It follows:—

                 Body, Mind, and Spinoza—E1:Damasio:209, 217.
2.  That extension  and  thought  are  either attributes  of G-D             Bk.XIV:2:82
     or (by Ax. i.) accidents (affectiones) of the attributes of G-D.
     < Bk.XV:26419—E2:I & II:83, Bk.XV:xix >   Bk.III:201.
 

PROP. XV.  Bk.III:200, 201, 208; Bk.XIB:253157; Bk.XIV:1:xvi3, 296-330.

Bk.XIB:5549; 215, 21662.<immanent, Bk.XV:xix>  <E5:XXXVI(7)N:265>                Durant:63875
Whatsoever is, is in G-D, and without         Organic,Satan
G-D nothing can be,  or be conceived.        Parkinson:285177
       1P17, 18, 23, 25, 25C, 28S, 29, 30, 31; 2P33, 36; 4P28, 37; 5P14, 36S.                                    Popkin:80
{Analogy, Cash Value—Posits}

                  ]Apart from [
Proof.—  (15:1) Besides  G-D,  no substance is granted or can be con-

ceived  (by  Prop. xiv.),  that is  (by Def. iii.)  nothing which is in itself

and is conceived through itself.  (2) But modes (by Def. v.) can neither

be,   nor   be   conceived  without  substance;  wherefore  they  can

only  be  in  the Divine Nature,  and can only through it be conceived.

(15:3)  But  substances and  modes form the sum total of existence  (by

Ax. i.),   therefore,  without  G-D  nothing  can  be,  or  be conceived.

Q.E.D.

Bk.XIV:1:262-295.
                [ 1 ]    Bk.XIV:1:3011.              < Bk.XV:26420—E1:XIV:54, Parts and Whole >
Note.— (15:4) Some  assert that G-d, like a man, consists of body and                        1D6
                          {waves, Reality Curve, C:4.4. }
mind,  and  is susceptible of passions. (5) How far such persons have            Calculus:6.2b & c.