Concerning G-D

Circulated - 1673
Posthumously Published - 1677.

Benedict de Spinoza
1632 - 1677

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This English electronic text was taken by kind permission from:
     http://www.erols.com/nbeach/spinoza.html ;
the text of which was scanned and proof-read by
Edward A. Beach, Ph.D. in Philosophy and Religious Studies.
 

JBY Notes:

1.   The  text  is  the  1883  translation  of  the  "The Ethics" by R. H. M.
      Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications in  Book I. See note above.
      For other Versions see Note 7.

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):   y = Proposition Number, if given;   xx = Sentence Number.

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols:
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ),
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ],
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [,
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >,
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <,
           { JBY Comment } Metaphors, Links, G-D {Spelling change not consistent; too many of them.}
        All comments in right-hand margin are by JBY unless noted.

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here.

6.  Please   e-mail  errors,  clarification  requests,  disagreement,  or
     suggestions  to  josephb@yesselman.com.

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions.
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read  this Spinoza electronic HTML linearly as
     you  would  a  novel,  but  rather  follow a  thread  by following all its         EL:[3]:vi
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and        Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Durant's Story  
     to  one  thread  at  a  time, this  Web  Site  will  be  very  convoluted,       Tickle the Fancy  
     confusing,and an annoying maze. 

     If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
     abridged versions, e-book versions,or best, study the printed book—
     book page numbers are given for most scanned books.

9.  From Elwes's Introduction—EL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi.

10. The secret to understanding Spinoza                                                           E1:Bk.III:200 
      In  "The Ethics - Part 1;  Concerning G-D",   Spinoza  spells  out  the          E5:Note 10 
      hypothesis that all things, animate, inanimate, and even the concept 
      of G-D, are bound into one grand "Organic Interdependence of Parts". 
      From this hypothesis it logically follows that obedience to the Golden        Spinozistic Idea 
      Rule is an act of self-interest and not altruism. Remember this and all 
      his   puzzling  sayings,  for  example  E1:Def.III & VI:45,  E1:I:46,  and 
      E1:XIV:54,become more, if not completely, understandable. 
      See Posit: 1D6 = ONE; and look for the Cash Value. Important.                  Burden of E1 

11.  To  help  further  understand  many  of  the Propositions and Ideas,       { Examples
                    use  the  analogy  of  you  as  'G-D'  (substance)                      1D6, 2P3, 2P4 }
                  I WAS                 I AM             I WILL BE                                         Exo. 3:14
                   ( antecedents,  present,  and  descendents ),
                                                           ^ Being
                                    brain, heart, lungs, fingernails, shoes, etc.        Analogies,        Organic
                   and all parts of you as modes ( particular things ).                              2P20

         Example—you  are  a  part  of  G-D  as your heart is a part of you.        Indivisible
         You should serve G-D as you would want your heart to serve you.
      E2:Endnote N.11, E5:Endnote 18:1N, Pantheism, Fetus, Skin, Bk.XIV:2:243—Man needs.

        Also  interchange  G-D and Nature.                                          G-D siveNatura
      (For this last, thanks to "Frank Dixon" <fdixon65@yahoo.com>)
 
12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by Terry Neff.
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xii.
     For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi.                      Spinoza's Daring
     For a "study of the plan of Ethics 1" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:337-8.       Dijn:238—On Salvation
       For a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.

13.  See Nadler's entry in "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy".
 
 


TABLE OF CONTENTS: Bk.XII:x—The Nature of Things.
                                                      Bk.XIV:xii-xix—Ethics, Part 1.

Definitions:45

Axioms:46

Part I Propositions:Book I:Pg. vii. 
         If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral. 
         If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 
 

I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX
XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVI XXVII XXVIII  XXIX  XXX
XXXI XXXII XXXIII XXXIV XXXV XXXVI 

 
Appendix:74. 

JBY Endnotes.
 


Part I Proposition List: Book I:Pg. v;  { Hypotheses }

                                 Premises 1 to 5 and Conclusion are from Wikipedia.

Prop. I.
E1:Bk.XIV:1:158		 Substance {G-D} is by Nature prior to its modifications. 
{EL:Bk.XIII:626, Deus sive Natura, Bk.XX:228.}

Premise 1. Substance exists and cannot be dependent on anything
                  else for its existence.
Prop. II.
II - VI
Bk.XIV:1:79, 81		 Two substances, whose attributes are different, have
nothing in common.

Premise 2. No two substances can share an attribute.

Proof: If they share an attribute, they would be identical. Therefore
they can only be individuated by their modes. But then they would
depend on their modes for their identity. This would have the sub-
stance being dependent on its mode, in violation of premise 1.
Therefore, two substances cannot share the same attribute.

Prop. III. Things which have nothing in common cannot be one
the cause of the other. 

Premise 3. A substance can only be caused by something similar
                  to itself (something that shares its attribute).
Prop. IV. Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from
the  other,  either  by the difference of the attributes of
the  substances,  or by the difference of their modifica-
tions.

Implied is Premise 4. Substance cannot be caused.

Proof: Something can only be caused by something which
is similar to itself, in other words something that shares its
attribute. But according to premise 2, no two substances can
share an attribute. Therefore substance cannot be caused.

Prop. V. There  cannot exist in the universe two or more
substances having the same nature or attribute. 

Implied is Premise 5. Substance is infinite.

Proof: If substance were not infinite, it would be finite and
limited by something. But to be limited by something is to be
dependent on it. However, substance cannot be dependent
on anything else (premise 1), therefore substance is infinite.

Prop. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another
substance. 

IImplied is the Conclusion: There can only be one substance.

Proof: If there were two infinite substances, they would limit
each other. But this would act as a restraint, and they would
be dependent on each other. But they cannot be dependent
on each other (premise 1), therefore there cannot be two
substances.
Prop. VII.
VII - X
Bk.XIV:1:113
E1:Bk.XIV:1:158		 Existence belongs to the Nature of substance. 
 
Prop. VIII
VIII - XI
Bk.XIV:1:139. 		 Every substance is necessarily infinite.
Prop. IX. The more reality or being a thing has the greater the
number of its attributes.
Prop. X. Each  particular attribute  of  the one substance must
be conceived through itself.
Prop. XI. G-D, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes,  of
which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality,
necessarily exists.
Prop. XII.
XII - XIII
Bk.XIV:1:113.		 No attribute of substance can be conceived from which
it would follow that substance can be divided.
Prop. XIII. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible. 
Prop. XIV.
Bk.XIV:1:214.		 Besides G-D no substance can be granted or
conceived.
Prop. XV.
XV - XVIII
Bk.XIV:1:296.		 Whatsoever is, is in G-D, and without G-D nothing can
be, or be conceived.
Prop. XVI. From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an
infinite  number of things in infinite ways—that is,  all
things  which  can  fall  within  the  sphere  of  infinite
intellect.
Prop. XVII. G-D acts solely by the laws of his own Nature, and is
not constrained by any one.
Prop. XVIII. G-D is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all
things.
Prop. XIX.
XIX - XXIX
Bk.XIV:1:370.		 G-D, and all the attributes of G-D, are eternal. 
Prop. XX. The existence of G-D and his essence are one and
the same.
Prop. XXI. All things which follow from the absolute Nature of any
attribute  of G-D  must always exist and be infinite, or,
in  other  words,  are  eternal  and  infinite through the
said attribute.
Prop. XXII. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of G-D, in so far
as it is modified by a  modification,  which  exists
necessarily  and  as  infinite, through the said attribute,
must also exist necessarily, and as infinite.
Prop. XXIII. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infi-
nite, must  necessarily  follow either from the absolute
Nature  of  some  attribute of G-D, or from an attribute
modified  by  a  modification  which  exists necessarily,
and as infinite.
Prop. XXIV. The essence of things produced by G-D does not
involve existence.
Prop. XXV. G-D is the efficient cause not only of the existence of
things, but also of their essence.
Prop. XXVI. A  thing  which  is  conditioned  to  act in a particular
manner,  has necessarily been  thus  conditioned by
G-D;  and  that  which  has  not been conditioned by
G-D cannot condition itself to act.
Prop. XXVII. A thing, which has been conditioned by G-D to act in
a  particular  way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
Prop. XXVIII. Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and
has  a  conditioned existence, cannot exist or be condi-
tioned  to  act,  unless  it  be  conditioned for existence
and  action  by  a cause other than itself, which also is
finite,  and  has  a  conditioned existence; and likewise
this  cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to
act,  unless  it  be conditioned for existence and action
by  another  cause, which also is finite, and has a con-
ditioned existence, and so on to infinity.
Prop. XXIX. Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are
conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner
by the necessity of the Divine Nature.
Prop. XXX.
XXX - XXXVI
Bk.XIV:1:400.		 Intellect, in function (actu) finite, or in function infinite,
must   comprehend  the  attributes  of  G-D  and  the
modifications of G-D, and nothing else.
Prop. XXXI. The  intellect  in  function, whether finite or infinite, as
will, desire, love, etc.,  should  be  referred to passive
nature and not to active Nature.
Prop. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary
cause.
Prop XXXIII. Things could not have been brought into being by G-D
in  any manner or in any order different from that which
has in fact obtained.
Prop. XXXIV. G-D's power is identical with his essence.                                      Metaphors
Prop. XXXV. Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of G-D,
necessarily exists.
Prop. XXXVI. There is no cause from whose nature some effect
does not follow. 
 

 SCR:Dijn'sSalvation
 
 
 


page 45

 < E1:Bk.XV:2601—E3:Def.XX:178, TEI:[95-98]:35 >  For symbols see E1:Note 4
DEFINITIONS  { G:Notes 1 & 2, Hypothesis. }
 
 

                Bk.III:197; Bk.XIV:1:1273, 1:1281—TEI:[92]:34; Neff—EL:L02(02):276.

                                      <causa sui, E1:Bk.XV:2602—E1:XI:51, E1:XVI:59 >                         Being
Def. I.   By that which is  self-caused,  I mean that of which the          Spinoza's Religion
            essence involves existence, or that of which the Nature                 G-D siveNatura
            is only conceivable as existing.  1P7, 1P24; 5P35.          <------- small print, Logical Index.

               {G:Bk.VII:2821,G-D, Deus, Immanent, Exodus 3:14 " I AM THAT I AM";                   Analogy
                    Strong:1961, 1933, 1934.   J---vah; Strong:3068, 3069, Bk.XIV:1:144-5. }
 


                 Bk.XVIII:76d2, 87d2, 88p21,22; Bk.XIX:13a.

                                             Bk.XIB:237108; Bk.XIV:1:133.
                                                           Bk.III:198—TEI:[101]:37               Bk.III:199.
Def. II.  A thing is called finite after its kind,  when  it can be limited
            by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is           G-d sivenatura
            called finite because  we always  conceive another greater
            body.  So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but
            a  body  is  not  limited  by  thought,  nor a thought by body.       Bk.XIV:1:136.
                   Neff—EL:L04[3](04):282, Bk.XIII:6713—E2:I & II:82.   1P8, 21.
 
 


              G:Bk.VII:223; Bk.XIII:623; Bk.XIV:1:64; Bk.XV:2613; Bk.XVIII:601d3, 64d3, 67d3.

                  Durant:636—reality, essence                              Bk.III:197.
Def. III.  By  substance,  I  mean   that   which  is  in  itself, and is              term 'G-D'
            conceived through itself; in other words,  that of which a 
             conception  can  be  formed  independently  of any other   Hampshire32:22, Joseph Kupfer
             conception.                   1P1, 2, 4, 5, 6c, 10, 15, 28.                           <------- small print, Logical Index.
                      EL:[42];xxiii, Neff—EL:L02[4](02):277, Neff—E5:L29(12):318.
 
 


                  Bk.VIII:4082—Bk.XIV:1:121; Bk.XIII:623.
                  Bk.XIV:1:142,146,1521,1532, 2322, 236, 2554, 2575, 3883, 404; Bk.XV:2614—E2:XLIV:116;
                       Bk.XVIII:611d4, 1461d4—Bk.XIV:1:121.  

Def. IV.  By attribute, I mean that which the intellect perceives as {if}       Wolfson:1:1432—Talmud.
             constituting the essence of substance. 1P4, 9, 10, 12, 19, 20; 2P1note.                 Durant:63672

                   G:Shirleys:234, Neff—EL:L02[3](02):277. ^ Bk.III:158,196—Neff—TL:L27(09):315.
 
 


              Bk.III:200; Bk.XIV:1:64, 2504, 2554; Bk.XVIII:61d5, 67d5, 92d5, 1481d5.
                <Bk.XV:2615—E1:XXV(7)C:66, E2:D.1:82,  E2:V(1):85 >  

                { Calculus:Fig. 3 }           ] affections[       ( accidents )
Def. V.   By mode, I mean the modifications ("Affectiones") of                   { Spinoza's motive;
             substance, or that which exists in,  and is conceived                  All things are in G-D. }
              through, something other than itself.  { G:Shirley:236}                  Durant:638 - modes
             { E1:Note 11, Neff—E5:L29(12):318 }     1P1, 4, 6c, 15, 23, 25c, 28, 31; 2P1.
 

                 Def. VI References: Bk.XIII:6817—Bk.XIII:612—EL:L04[4]G-D(04):283; SCR:Dijn's Salvation.
                 E1:Bk.III:18938, 198, 199, 200; Bk.XIB:23296, 235, 237108; Bk.XIV:1:1182, 133, 158,Bk.XIV:2:3431; 
                 Bk.XVIII:251d6—1p14d, 64d6, 75d6, 14713; Bk.XIX:13;Bk.XX:228.
                 {It will be a happy day when all books and footnotes are available electronically and permanently.}
             <Bk.XV:2616—Bk.XV:27167 on E2:VII(8):87>, {See Note 13}, {Quantum Mechanics}.   E1:Dijn:195.

          Simply Posit.  {Compare ONE — Spinoza's and Jewish identical Foundation Rock is to Know G-D, Durant:169.}
Def. VI.  By G-D,  I  mean   { Being }   absolutely   infinite—that  is,         {by religious hypothesis,
             substance  consisting  in  infinite attributes, of which each              MOTIVE,
             expresses eternal and infinite essentiality {and an infinite number           Spinoza's Daring}
                of finite modes. Included in these modes are you, me, and every other                     Logical necessity
                particular thing}.   G-D sive Natura and G-d sive natura. }                             ST:Note 4
                      {G-D at 100% °P^}   Robinson5:40   {^ G-d at <100% °P, Disclaimer}        Stewart06:[5]
                                                G:Bk.VII:236—Spinoza's Pantheism ^
              New Wine in Old Bottles—E1:Wolfson:1:158, E1:Wolfson:1:216, E1:Albert Schweizer:79, Root Sources.
                                1P10S, 11, 14, 14C1, 16, 19, 31; 2P1, 1S, 45; 4P28; 5P35.                <------- small print, Logical Index.
 
             { Deus, Posit, EL:[40]:xxiii, TEI:[39]:14, TEI:[40]:15, E1:X(4)n:51, Neff—EL:L02[3](02):276
                Neff—TEI:L64(60):395, Cash Value—an all-inclusive  organic interdependence.  Importance of 1D6 = ONE
                C:Fig.3, G:Spinoza's Pantheism, Spinoza's Religion, Man's place in Nature, Quantum Mechanics.}

Def. VI paraphrased using the analogy suggested in Note 11:               Other Examples—2P3, 2P4

              By YOU  I  mean  a  being  absolutely  infinite—that  is, a
              substance  consisting  in  infinite attributes, of which each             Spinozism
              expresses eternal and infinite essentiality {an infinite                         {Cash Value—organic
                  number of finite modes. Included in these modes are your heart,                     interdependence of parts}
                  lungs, fingernails, shoes, etc., etc., etc.}.


                     Bk.XIV:1:xvi2, 2552, 3851, 3994, 400, 4071, 2:1731; Bk.XVIII:181d7, 3151d7.                  Popkin:71

                                             < E1:Bk.XV:2627, E1:XVII(7)N:60. >; Bk.III:206, 229.           Spinoza's Religion
Def. VII.  That  thing  is  called free, which exists solely by the neces-               G-D
              sity of  its  own  nature,  and of  which  the  action  is  deter-           Wolf:ST:29-16
              mined  by  itself  alone.  On  the other hand,  that  thing  is         Hampshire:182
              ]inevitable [,                    compelled—Bk.XIV:1:3091                                    Mark Twain
              necessary ,  or  rather constrained, which is determined by            E5:Wolfson:2:268
              something external  to  itself  to a fixed and definite method             Mark Twain
              of existence or action.            1P17C2, 32, 33S2; 2P17S; 3P49.                          LT:L3421:336

                ] Bk.XIII:276276—Neff-TL:L60(56):389. [      { Taylor/Wheeler92:iii }
                ] Bk.VII:16—'free'  is  not  opposed to 'necessary' but to 'compelled' [               Fatalism—Ridley:307
                { Since nothing is external to G-D, by hypothesis, He is at 100% °P, always "free." }
                {E3:XLIX:161, EL:[41];xxiii, Neff—TL:L62(58):389, Free-will, Volition. }
 


                    Bk.XIB:226; Bk.XIV:1:xvii3, 331-369, 358, 3685, 3692; Bk.XVIII:111d8, 2041d8.
                 < E1:Parkinson:2628, E1:XIX(5)N:63, E1:XXXIII(21)N2:72, E2:XLIV(11)C2:117. >

Def. VIII.  By  eternity,  I mean  exist-ing  itself,  in  so  far  as it is
               conceived  necessarily  to follow solely <merely> from the        Calc:Note 4.7
               definition of that which is eternal.   P19, 20, 23; 5P29, 30.     <------- small print, Logical Index.

                 {G-D, EL:[41];xxiii, EL:[60]:xxix; Neff—E5:L29(12)[5]:319.}

 
        Explanation.—Existence  of  this  kind  is  conceived  as  an
                                          [ Bk.VIII:4095—E1:VIII(14)N2:49, E1:XIX:62. ]
       eternal truth,   like  the essence  of  a   thing,  and,  therefore,
                            [ expressed ]                         duration—Bk.XIV:1:3583.
        cannot   be   explained   by  means  of  continuance  or  time,            Calculus:4.7
                                                                           Bk.XIV:1:3662.
        though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or       Hampshire32:172
        end. {E5:Einstein Time, Hawking Time; Neff—E5:L29(12)[3]:318}; Bk.XIB:224.
 
   


AXIOMS < Bk.XV:2629—E2:Postulate:97, E2:XXXVIII(4)C:110.>; Bk.XIV:1:58.


Ax. I.   Everything which exists, exists either in itself or in something
          else.            1P4, 6C, 11, 14C2, 15, 28.                                           <------- small print, Logical Index.
              Bk.III:152,196; Bk.XII:160; Bk.XVIII:181a1.


Ax. II.  That which cannot be conceived through anything else must                Bk.XIV:1:76.
           be conceived through itself.                                             I am that I am

                                                                           {event}   ]inevitably [
Ax. III.  From  a  given  definite cause an effect necessarily follows;      Chain of natural events
           and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is          Wolfson:1:90
           impossible that an effect can follow.      1P27; 4P31; 5P33.
                  Bk.III:196; Bk.XVIII:321a3, 112a3.


Ax. IV.  The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the
            knowledge {understanding} of a cause. 1P3, 6C, 25; 2P5, 6, 7, 16, 45; 5P22.
          Bk.III:188; Bk.XII:160; Bk.XV:26210; Bk.XVIII:1271a4, 1791a4; Bk.XIX:13313.

                                                            Transcendent
Ax. V.  Things  which have nothing in common cannot be understood,   Wolfson:1:90—Transcendent
           the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not                Transcendent
           involve the conception of the other.  1P3.
                 Bk.XVIII:1271a5—1p3d, 1481a5.


                      Bk.III:80—TEI:L64(60):395; 188; Bk.XIV:2:996; Bk.XVIII:1671a6, 1701a6. 
                 ] G:Bk.VII:2513—ideate, E2:XLVIII(9) & XLIX:120, E1:XXX:(1):69.[             E1:Parkinson:26311—True Idea
Ax. VI.   A true idea  must  correspond with its ideate or object.
                             1P5, 30; 2P29, 32, 44, 44C2.                                    <-------------- small print, Logical Index.
                 { L65(63):396, Neff—LT:L66(64):398, E2:Def.IV:82. }


Ax. VII.  If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence
            does not involve existence.   1P11.      Bk.XVIII:74a7.

{Axiom VIII—simply posit}
                                                       1D6= ONE—Deus—William James; Importance of 1D6 = ONE