JBY Notes:

1.  The text is the 1883 translation of the  "The Ethics"  by R. H. M.
     Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was 
     scanned and proof-read by JBY. For other Versions see Note 7. 

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):  y = Proposition Number, if given;  xx = Sentence Number.  

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols: 
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ), 
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ], 
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [, 
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >, 
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <, 
           { JBY Comment }.    G-D      Metaphors       LINKS 

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here. 

6.  Please e-mail errors, clarification requests, disagreement, or 
     suggestions to josephb@yesselman.com. 

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively       Durant's Story
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its          EL:[3]:vi
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and            Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze.    

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions, or best, study the printed book—
    book page numbers are given for most scanned books. 
 
9.  From Elwes's Introduction—EL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi. 

10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for every-           E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,  is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for  teaching  the 
       "Organic  interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and  all 
       his   puzzling   sayings,   for  example  E2:XX:102,  become  more, 
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.   Look  for  the 
       Cash Value.   

                                                                                      Bk.XIV:2:7, 8, 695.
11.  To  help  understand  many of the Propositions, use the analogy of           E2:Wolfson:2:8. 
       you  as  G-D  and all parts of you (past, present, and future) as the           Examples 
       modes  ( particular  things );  also  useful is the individual organism           Indivisible 
       to  the social organism—the State.      Apparent Contradiction                     2P20
         E2:III:84, E2:IV:84, E2:XLV:117, E5:XVIII:256, E5:XIX:256, E5:XXXV:264, E5:Endnote 18:1.         Analogies 

12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff. 
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xix. 
     For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi. 
     For a "study of the plan of Ethics 2" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:338-9. 
       For a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.

 
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Bk.XII:x—Body and Mind. Bk.XII:193—Let us now ....
                                                                   Bk.XIV:xix—Chapter XIII,  Bk.XIV:2:3—Body and Mind.


Preface:82    Book I. Page Numbers.

Definitions:82

Axioms:83

Axioms, Definitions, and Lemmas within Proposition XIII:93
     Ethica II: The Lemmas on Bodies - Ron Bombardi

Postulates:97
 

Part II Propositions: Book I:Pg. vii
          If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral. 
          If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 

JBY Endnotes

Part II Proposition List: Book I:Pg. vii;  { Hypotheses }
         
          Suggestion:  Do  not  read  consecutively  as you would a novel;  
                               but select a Proposition, click its number to the left  
                               and  then  follow  all  its links in turn wherever they 
                               may  lead.  You will then be putting hypertexting to 
                               its  fullest and best advantage—a fuller discussion 
                               of  a  thread.  If  you do not stick to one thread at a 
                               time,  this Web Site will seem very convoluted and 
                               confusing. 
      {Definition of Proposition: a statement in which something is affirmed or denied,
                 so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.}
             All axioms, definitions, and propositions are hypotheses. Test        Hampshire:99-100
             them for their 'cash value'. See Notes 10 & 11, Posit, and Idea. 

 SCR:Dijn'sSalvation
 

page 82

PREFACE:  Bk.XIV:2:51&2—Bk.VIII:93[1]. 


I  now  pass  on  to  explaining the results,  which must necessarily

follow from the essence of G-D, or of the eternal and infinite being;             Scr:Note 4. 

not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in I:Prop.xvi.,  that an infinite
                                                                                           Bk.III:209. 
number  must  follow  in an infinite number of ways), but only those             E2:Dijn:214. 

which are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge
                                            Bk.III:173—TEI:[16]:82
of the human mind and its highest blessedness.                                        E5:Wolfson:2:311
                             Bk.XIV:2:61&2—Bk.VIII:93[1], Nicomachean Ethics. 

                   Bk.III:207; Bk.VIII:4471; Bk.XVIII:612d2, 642d2, 1472d2, 2332d2.
                                                   < Bk.XV:27170 on E2:X(15)N2:90 >
                                        < appertaining.  Bk.XV:26957—E2:X(10)N2:89 > 
Def. II.  I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that, 
            which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, 
            and,  which  being  removed,  the thing is necessarily             Wolf:P66, L1- 5
            removed also;  in other words,  that without which the 
            thing, can neither be nor be conceived.  2P10, 37.                   <------- small print, Logical Index.
        


                     ] G:Shirley:2513—ideate, E2:XLVIII(9) & XLIX:120, E1:XXX:(1):69 [ 
Def. III.   By idea, I mean the mental conception which is formed     E1:Parkinson:26311—True Idea
              by  the  mind  as  a  thinking  thing.   2P48S.
              < Bk.XV:26958—E2:XLIII(5)N:114,  E2:XLVIII(2)N:119, E2:XLIX(21)N:121,
                    E2:XLIX:120,  TEI:[110]:41. > 

Explanation.—    I  say  conception  rather  than 
perception, because the word perception seems 
to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the 
object; whereas conception seems to express an                 Bk.XIV:2:462. 
activity of the mind.  

                                                     Bk.XIX:20.

                ] G:Shirley:2513—ideate, E2:XLVIII(8) & XLIX:120, E1:XXX:(1):69 [ 
                    < Bk.XV:27059—E1:Ax.VI:46, TEI:[29]:11, TEI:[35}:13, E2:XXIV:104. > 
Def. IV.    By an  adequate  idea, I mean  an  idea  which, in
                                  ^ Bk.III:79—TEI:L64(60):395. 
               so far  as it is considered in itself, without relation 
                 < denomination. TEI:[69]:26 >      { Bk.XIV:2:101—internal signs.}
               to  the  object,  has all  the  properties  or  intrinsic              Bk.XIV:1:165.
                ]characteristics[   Bk.XIV:2:98; Bk.XVIII:1762d4—TEI:L64(60):395..  
               marks    of    a    true   idea.
 
               { Bk.XIV:2:101—TEI:L64(60):395.   Example: POSIT }   

                                                            { internal }
                  Explanation.—  I say  intrinsic,  in  order to exclude                  Hampshire32:102
                          { sign }                 { external }
               that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement

               between  the idea and its object (ideatum).



                     Bk.XIV:1:xvii1&2, 331-369, 3571, Bk.XIB:22786; 248144. 
                 Bk.XVIII:2032d5, 2632d5.
              < E5:Parkinson:284170 > { Neff-E5:L29[5](12):317, E5:Einstein Time } 
Def. V.   Duration  is  the  indefinite  continuance  of existing.   
 
                 Explanation.— I say indefinite, because it cannot be 
              determined  page 83   through the existence itself of the 
              existing thing,  or by its efficient cause, which neces-                  E2:2P24-32. 
              sarily  gives  the existence of the thing,  but does not 
              take it away.    { E5:Endnote 31:1, Neff-E5:L29[3](12):317 } 


                  Bk.XV:27060—E1:IX:50, E1:XI(29)N:53, E4:Prf.(36):190; Bk.XVIII:2972d6.
Def. VI.   Reality and perfection I use as synonymous terms.              Reality Curve
                            ^ EL:Endnote Bk.III:211.         4PREF; 5P35, 40.         <------- small print, Logical Index.



                                    Bk.III:217,  Bk.XIV:2:192—E3:V:136. { Pantheism—Bk.XVIII:368p36cs, 369p24. }
                           [ singular ]  < Bk.XV:27061—E2:Def:95, E2:XIII(7)N1:92. >
Def. VII.  By   particular  ]individual[   things,  I  mean  things                Calculus:Fig. 3
              which are finite and have  a conditioned existence;                     Creation
              but if several individual things concur in one action,                Durant:638 - individual 
              so  as  to  be  all  simultaneously  the  effect of one 
              cause,  I consider them all, so far, as one particular 
              thing. { The ultimate thing is G-D, see 5P13. } Bk.XVIII:2502d7. 


 
 

                          For all Propositions see Scroll P1. 

 E2:Dijn:214
Prop. I. Bk.XIV:2:8—I - IX; Bk.III:215; Bk.XIV:2:223; Bk.XVIII:492p1, 131p1; Bk.XIX:467. 

          { Sequence }               < Bk.XV:26316—E1:X(2)N:51.>                                    Bk.XIV:2:83.
{ Mind, Ideas, Computer. }     < Bk.XV:26419—E1:XIV(5)C2:55. >                           Durant:637- 2P1
   Thought is an attribute of G-D,                   { Synthesize 
   or  G-D  is  a  thinking  thing.                      with Prop. II. }
    [ E1:Endnote XXXI. ]         2P2, 3, 20.       <------- small print, Logical Index.
     ] Neff—EL:L04[3](04):282, Bk.XIII:6713—E2:II:84. [  

 
                      ] Individual, Note 4 [
Proof.— (1:1)  Particular thoughts,  or this or that thought,  are modes        Calculus:Fig.3
                                  Bk.XIX:145.
which,  in  a certain conditioned manner,  express the Nature of G-D

(I:Prop.xxv.Coroll.).  (2) G-D therefore possesses the attribute (I:Def.v.)

of  which  the  concept  is  involved  in all particular thoughts,  which

latter  are  conceived  thereby.  (1:3) Thought,  therefore, is one of the

infinite  attributes  of  G-D  which  express G-D's eternal and infinite

essence (I:Def.vi.). (4) In other words, G-D is a thinking thing.  Q.E.D.



Note.— (1:5) This proposition is also evident from the fact, that we are

able  to  conceive  an  infinite  thinking Being.  (1:6)  For, in  page 84  pro-

portion  as  a  thinking being is conceived as thinking more thoughts,

so is it conceived as containing more reality or perfection.  (1:7) There-

fore  a  Being,  which  can  think  an  infinite  number  of things in an
                                                                                        Bk.XIX:12118.
infinite number of ways, is, necessarily, in respect of thinking, infinite.

(1:8)  As,  therefore,  from  the  consideration  of thought alone we con-

ceive an infinite being,  thought is necessarily  (I.Deff.iv.and vi.) one

of  the  infinite  attributes  of  G-D,  as we were desirous of showing.

E2:Dijn:214
Prop. II.  E2;Wolfson:2:10—Spinoza's Daring; Bk.XVIII:49, 131p2; Bk.XIX:467. 

            { Sequence }                < Bk.XV:26316—E1:X(2)N:51. >
           { Body, Machine }              < Bk.XV:26419—E1:XIV(5)C2:55. >                      Durant:637- 2P2
      Extension is an attribute of G-D,                { Synthesize 
      or  G-D  is  an  extended  thing.                  with Prop. I. }
                                                        Bk.XIV:2:223. 
           ] Neff—EL:L04[3](04):282, Bk.XIII:6713—E2:I:83. [ 

 Proof.— (2:1) The  proof  of  this  proposition  is  similar  to  that of the last. 

http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html; Evolutionary Psychology: A Primer; Leda Cosmides & John Tooby—Mind / Body 

Realizing that the function of the brain is information-processing has allowed cognitive scientists to resolve (at least one version of) the mind/body problem. For cognitive scientists, brain and mind are terms that refer to the same system, which can be described in two complementary ways—either in terms of its physical properties (the brain), or in terms of its {unconscious and conscious} information-processing operation (the mind). The physical organization of the brain evolved because that physical organization brought about certain information-processing relationships {ANS}—ones that were adaptive.

Prop. III. Bk.VII:474—E1:Endnote 21:1; Bk.XII:165,187; Bk.XIV:1:238ff, 2:2961;
                         Bk.XVIII:152p3,7, 762p3d, 1202p3d, 1302p3, 140p3d, 1502p3d,7d, 184p3, 1872p3; Bk.XIX:11610. 

                                                               Bk.III:203, 215.  
In G-D there is necessarily the idea 
not only of his essence, but also of 
all  things which necessarily follow             Bk.XIV:2:491, 532
from his essence.     2P5, 9C, 20., 24; 5P22, 35.    <------- small print, Logical Index.
[ Bk.VIII:42954—E2:III:84, E2:VII(3)C:86 ] 

{ Paraphrased using the analogy suggested in Note 11:           Other Examples—1D6, 2P4

In YOU there is necessarily the idea not only of 
yourself (your being), but also of all the things                      Cash Value—organic
which necessarily follow from your being (heart, 
lungs, fingernails, shoes, etc., etc., etc.). }

Proof.— (3:1) G-D  (by the first Prop. of this Part)  can think an infinite

number  of  things  in  infinite ways,  or  (what is the same thing,  by

I:Prop.xvi.) can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which

necessarily follow therefrom.   (2) Now all that is in the power of G-D
                                                                           ] E1:Endnote 21:1 [
necessarily is. (I:Prop.xxxv.)   (3:3) Therefore, such an idea as we are

considering  necessarily is, and in G-D alone.   Q.E.D.   ( I:Prop.xv.)


                                                                                            < E1:XXXIV:74 >
Note.— (3:4) The  multitude  understand by the power of G-D the free               Metaphors. 

will  of  God,  and the right over all things that exist,  which latter are
                                                Bk.XVIII:1162p3s. 
accordingly  generally  considered  as  contingent.   (3:5) For it is said

that God has the power to destroy all things, and to reduce them to

nothing.   (3:6)  Further,  the power of G-D is very often likened to the

power of  kings.   (3:7)  But this doctrine we have refuted  (I:Prop.xxxii,

Corolls.i. and  ii.), and we have shown (I:Prop. xvi.) that G-D acts by
                  Bk.XIX:1002.
the  same  necessity,  as  that  by which he understands himself;  in

other  words,  as  it  follows  from  the necessity of the divine Nature
  Bk.XIX:1015,6.
(as all admit),  that  G-D understands himself,  so also does it follow

by  the  same necessity,  that  G-D  performs  infinite  acts in infinite

ways. (3:8)  We  further  showed  (I:Prop.xxxiv.),  that  G-D's  power is              Metaphors
        <         E1:XXXIV:74            >
identical  with G-D's essence in action;  therefore it is as impossible

for  us  to  conceive G-D  as not acting,  as to conceive him as non-
  Bk.XIX:1003.
existent.  (3:9)  If  we  might  pursue the subject  page 85  further,  I could

point out, that the power which is commonly attributed to G-D is not

only human  (as showing that G-D is conceived by the multitude as
                 Bk.XVIII:332p3s—TL:L36(23):345. 
a man,  or  in  the  likeness of  a man),  but  involves  a  negation of

power.  (3:10)  However, I am unwilling to go over the same ground so

often.  (3:11) I would only beg the reader again and again, to turn over

frequently in his mind what I have said in from I:Prop. xvi. to the end.

(3:12)  No  one will  be able to follow my meaning,  unless he is scrupu-

lously  careful  not  to  confound  the power  of  G-D with the human

power and right of kings.

Prop. IV.   Bk.III:203, 207, 2153 ; Bk.XIB:249147;  Bk.XVIII:104p2,4,5,6, 1984; Bk.XIX:12015. 

         ] E1:Endnote 21:1 [—Bk.III:217; Bk.XIV:1:2384.
The idea of G-D,  from which an                     Avoids Idolatry.
infinite  number of things follow                      Bk.XIV:2:492
in infinite ways, can only be one. 
] EL:L15[5](32):290. [ 

{ Paraphrased using the analogy suggested in Note 11:                 Other Examples—1D6, 2P3 

The idea of YOU, from which an 
infinite number of things follow 
in infinite ways, can only be one interdependent organism. }           Cash Value

Proof.— (4:1)  Infinite  intellect  comprehends  nothing  save  the  attri-
                                    ] affections [                                 { my capitals }
butes of G-D and his modifications (I:Prop.xxx.).  (4:2) Now G-D is ONE 
                                                            ] E1:Endnote 21:1N [
(I:Prop.xiv.Coroll.).   (4:3)  Therefore  the  idea  of  G-D,  wherefrom an

infinite  number  of  things  follow  in  infinite  ways,  can only be one.

Q.E.D.

Prop. V.   Bk.III:216; Bk.XVIII:1281, 1302p5—5p22, 35, 156p5,6,9; Bk.XIX:1156.

           < Bk.XV:27062—E2:VI:86.   Bk.XV:26531—E1:XVII(21)N:61. > 
           ] formal. E1:Shirley:2617 [
The  actual  being of ideas owns G-D  
as  its  cause,  only  in so far  as he is 
considered as a thinking thing, not in 
so  far  as he is unfolded in any other 
attribute; that is, the ideas both of the 
attributes  of  G-D  and  of  particular 
things  do  not  own  as their efficient 
cause  their  objects  (ideata)   or  the      E1:Parkinson:26311—True Idea
things perceived,  but G-D himself in 
so far as he is a thinking thing.                                 Bk.XIV:2:225.

 
Proof.— (5:1)  This  proposition  is  evident  from  Prop. iii. of this Part.

(5:2) We there drew the conclusion,  that G-D can form the idea of his

essence, and of all things which follow necessarily therefrom, solely
                Bk.XIX:9017; 12118; 12219.
because he is a thinking thing,  and not because he is the object of

his  own  idea.   (5:3) Wherefore  the  actual  being  of  ideas owns for

cause G-D, in so far as he is a thinking thing. (3a) It may be differently

proved  as  follows:   the actual being of ideas is (obviously) a mode

of thought,  that  is  (I:Prop.xxv.Coroll.) a mode which expresses in a

certain manner the nature of G-d,  in so far as he is a thinking thing,

and  therefore  (I:Prop.x.)  involves  the  conception of no other attri-

bute  of  G-D,  and consequently  (by I:Ax.iv.) is not the effect of any

attribute save thought.  (5:4) Therefore the actual being of ideas owns

G-D  as  its  cause,  in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing,

&c.  Q.E.D.

page 86

Prop. VI. Bk.III:200, 216; Bk.XVIII:141p10,2p6, 482p6, 1281, 1422p6d, 156p5,6,9, 2862p6.  

The modes of any given attribute are 
caused  by  G-D,  in  so  far  as he is 
 Bk.XIV:1:1524, 2:2422.  
considered  through  the attribute of
which they are modes, and not in so 
far as he  is  considered through any            Bk.XIV:2:233
other attribute.      2P9, 13L3, 45; 3P2, 11S; 4P7, 29.    <------- small print, Logical Index.
< Bk.XV:27062—E2:V:85 >; TL:L65(63):396; Neff TL:L66(64):398.  

                                        Bk.XIV:2:224; Bk.XIX:10614.  
Proof.— (6:1)   Each  attribute  is conceived through itself,  without any

other (I:Prop. x.);  wherefore the modes of each attribute involve the

conception  of  that attribute, but not of any other.   (6:2) Thus (I:Ax.iv.)

they  are caused by G-D,  only in so far as he is considered through

the  attribute  whose modes they are,  and not in so far as he is con-

sidered through any other.  Q.E.D.



Corollary.—  (6:3)  Hence  the  actual  being of  things,  which  are not

modes of  thought, does not follow from the Divine Nature, because
                                                Bk.XVIII:2172p6c.
that  nature  has  prior  knowledge  of  the things.   (6:4)  Things repre-            Bk.XIV:2:231.
                                                  Bk.III:200. 
sented in ideas follow, and are derived from their particular attribute,
             { immanent }                              < Bk.XV:27063 >
in the same ^ manner,  and with the same necessity as ideas follow
                                                                             Bk.III:216. 
(according  to  what  we have shown)    from the attribute of thought.
                2P36; 5P1.                                 ^ and are concluded—Bk.XIV:2:232.

Prop. VII.  Bk.XVIII:152p3,7, 1272p7,d, 140p7d, 1502p3d,7d, 1682p7, 185p7.

The  order  and connection of               Quoteable Einstein
< TEI:[38]:14 >           Bk.III:138; Bk.XIB:234103, 236105.
ideas is the same as the order                  Durant65:176
                      Bk.XIV:2:493.                  {nature}
and  connection  of  things.                               Bk.XIV:2:235
{ EL:[47]:xxv. }    [ Ideas of G-D ]     Bk.III:80, 216
 See 2P49—Spinoza's Doctrine. 2P8, 9, 9C, 15, 19, 20, 24, 25, 26; 3P11, 12; 5P1. 

{From Max Jammer's "Einstein and Religion"; ISBN: 0691006997; 1999; p. 43.  

In 1930, Einstein was invited by the New York Times to contribute an essay on his conception of the relation between science and religion. In this article, entitled "Religion and Science, "Einstein used, apparently for the first time, the term "cosmic religious feeling" to describe the emotional state that one experiences when one recognizes the "futility of human desires and the sublimity and marvelous order which reveals itself both in nature and in world of thought." In assuming one order in nature and in thought, Einstein followed, consciously or not, Spinoza's Doctrine: "Order and connection of ideas is the same as order and connection of things." This Spinozistic tenet underlies Einstein's epistemological realism, his belief that a rational explanation of the universe is possible, his belief in the "mysterious comprehensibility of the world." }
 

Proof.— (7:1) This proposition is evident from I:Ax.iv.   (7:2)  For the idea

of  everything  that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause,

whereof it is an effect.


                                                Bk.III:217. 
Corollary.— (7:3)  Hence  G-D's  power  of thinking is equal to his rea-               Metaphors 

lized  power  of action—that is,  whatsoever follows from  the infinite
                                                             < E1:XVII(21)N:61 > 
nature of G-D in the world of extension (formaliter),  follows without
                                                           Bk.III:215.            ] E1:Endnote 21:1 [ 
exception  in  the same  order  and connection from the idea of G-D
                                 ] TEI:Shirley:2617 [                                  Bk.III:207, 215.  
in the world of thought (objective).     2P32, 38, 39; 3P28.

 Bk.XVIII:1542p7c, 168p7c, 1702p7c, 3604. 


Neff TL:L66(64):399.
Note.—  (7:4)  Before  going  any  further,  I wish to recall to mind what

has  been  pointed out above—namely, that whatsoever can be per-
                        Bk.XIV:1:1532, 2153, 226, 2385. 
ceived  by  the  infinite  intellect  as constituting  the essence of sub-
                                                        { L65(63):396, Neff-TL:L66(64):399 } 
stance,  belongs  altogether  only  to  one  substance: consequently,
                       < Bk.XV:27064, E5:Prf(6):244. > 
substance  thinking and substance extended are one and the same
 Bk.XVIII:152p7s; Bk.XX:23475. 
substance, comprehended now through one attribute,  now through
                  2P8, 12S, 21S; 3P2S.           Bk.XIV:1:2472. 
the other.   (7:5)  So,  also,  a  mode of extension  and  the idea of that
                                Bk.XVIII:142p7s.                 Bk.XIV:2:234, 415—different. 
mode  are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ^ ways.
                                                                                           Bk.XV:27065; Bk.XIX:10512. 
(7:6)  This  truth  seems  to have been dimly recognized by those Jews           Fifth Daring [2] 

who maintained that G-D, G-D's intellect, and the things understood               Metaphors 
                      Bk.XIX:1014.                                             Bk.XX:234.
by  G-D  are  identical.   (7:7)   For instance,  a circle existing  page 87  in

nature,  and  the  idea  of  a  circle  existing,  which  is  also  in G-D,
    <Bk.XV:27166—Bk.XV:27379-E2:XVII(6)N:99, E2:XII:91, E2:XIII:92>, 
    <E5:Parkinson:283162—Bk.XV:26316 on E1:X(2)N:51, E2:VII(4)N:86, E4:Ap.XXXII(1):242.>         
are one and the same thing  displayed  through  different  attributes.

(7:8) Thus,  whether  we  conceive Nature under the attribute of exten-           Hampshire32:64 
                                                                < Bk.XV:27167—E1:XI:51, E1:D.VI:45, 
                                                                                   Neff-L66(64):398 >; Bk.XVIII:772p7s.
sion, or  under the attribute of thought,  or under any other attribute,
                                                                  Bk.XIV:1:2465&6—natural events. 
we shall find the same order,  or one and the same chain of causes

—that is, the same things following in either case.   Bk.III:216. 



(7:9) I said that G-D is the cause of an idea—for instance, of the idea

of a circle,—in so far as he is a thinking thing;  and of a circle, in so

far  as he is an extended thing,  simply because the actual being of

the  idea  of  a  circle  can only be perceived  as a proximate cause

through  another  mode of thinking,  and that again through another,
                                                                            Bk.XIV:1:1524. 
and  so  on  to  infinity;  so  that,  so  long  as we consider things as
                                  Bk.XIV:2:261.
modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature,

or  the whole chain of causes,  through the attribute of thought only.

(7:10) And,  in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we

must  explain  the  order of the whole of nature through the attribute
                                                                                     Bk.XIX:1131.
of  extension  only;    and  so  on,  in  the  case  of  other  attributes.

(7:11) Wherefore  of things as they are in themselves G-D is really the

cause,  inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes.   (7:12)  I cannot
                                                   Bk.XIX:11119.
for the present explain my meaning more clearly.     2P8, 12S, 21S; 3P2S. 

 Bk.XVIII:262p7s, Bk.XVIII:2713—Bk.XIV:1:57-59—EL:L02(02):276;  Bk.XVIII:3582p7s. 

Prop. VIII.   Bk.III:215, 217;  Bk.XIV:2:312—Bk.VIII:86[7],  Bk.XIV:2:2927&9; 
                          Bk.XVIII:3582p8, 366; Bk.XIX:1935—E1:VIII(11)s2:48; Bk.XIX:19412.

The  ideas  of particular things, or of modes, 
that do not exist, must be comprehended in 
the infinite idea of G-D,  in the same way as       Bk.XIV:1:2384.
the  formal essences   of particular things or      Bk.XIV:2:2929.
modes are contained in the attributes of G-D.  3P11S. 

Proof.— (8:1) This proposition is evident from the last; it is understood

more clearly from the preceding note.



Corollary.—  (8:2)  Hence,  so  long  as particular things  do not exist,
                                     Bk.III:217; conceived—Bk.XIV:2:2921. 
except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of G-D,
              < E1:XVII(21):61 >                                                    Bk.XVIII:3662p8c. 
their  representations  in thought or ideas do not exist,  except in so

far as the infinite idea of G-D exists; and when particular things are
  Bk.III:203, 204, 215, 259; Bk.XIX:19613, 21422. 
said to exist, not only in so far as they are involved in the attributes

of G-D,  but  also in so far as they are said to continue,  their ideas
                                                                                   Bk.XIX:21321.
will also involve existence, through which they are said to continue.

                                       2P9, 11, 15, 45; 3P11S; 5P21, 23.



Note.— (8:3)  If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this

question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any, which adequate-

ly  explains the thing of which I here speak,  page 88   inasmuch as it is
] has no parallel [
unique;  however,  I  will endeavour to illustrate it as far as possible.
 
(8:4) The  nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines
 ] See Sketch Bk.VII:68 [; Bk.XIX:19613; 2049. 
intersect  within  it,  the rectangles formed by their segments will be
    
equal   to one another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained
         ^ [ in area. Bk.VIII:45215—This is  theorem 35,  Book III, of Euclid's Elements,
                  which is more easily stated if we add to Spinoza's diagram some letters 
                  he  does  not  use.   If  AC  and  FG  are  any  two  lines intersecting at a 
                  point B  in  a  circle,  then  the  rectangle with base AB and height BC is 
                  equal in area to that with base BG and height BF. ]       2P9; 3P11S.
in a circle.   (8:5)   Yet none of these rectangles  can  be  said to exist,  

except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these
                                                                                              Bk.III:217.  
rectangles  be  said  to  exist,  except  in  so far as they are compre-

hended in the idea of the circle. (8:6) Let us grant that, from this infinite

number of rectangles, two only exist.  (8:7) The ideas of these two not

only  exist,  in so far as they are  contained  in the idea of the circle,

but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles; wherefore

they  are  distinguished  from  the  remaining  ideas of the remaining

rectangles.

Prop. IX.  Bk.III:216, 218; Bk.XVIII:156p5,6,9, 17014; Bk.XIX:1451.

The idea  of an individual thing actually 
existing is caused by G-D, not in so far 
as  he  is infinite,  but  in so far as He is 
considered  as affected by another idea 
of a thing actually existing, of which He 
is the cause,  in  so far as He is affected 
by a third idea, and so on to infinity. 
{ However, E5:XVII(1):255 }          2P9C, 19, 20, 24, 25; 3P1. 

Proof.— (9:1)  The  idea  of  an individual  thing actually existing is an

individual mode of thinking, and is distinct from other modes (by the

Corollary and Note to Prop. viii.  of  this part);  thus  (by Prop. vi. of

this part) it is caused by G-D, in so far only as he is a thinking thing.

(9:2)  But not  (by I:Prop.xxviii.) in so far as he is a thing thinking abso-

lutely, only in so far as he is considered as affected by another mode

of thinking; and he is the cause of this latter, as being affected by a

third,  and so on  to infinity.    (9:3)  Now,  the order and connection of

ideas  is  (by  Prop. vii. of this book) the same as the order and con-

nection of causes.  (9:4)  Therefore of a given individual idea another

individual idea, or G-d, in so far as he is considered as modified by

that idea, is the cause; and of this second idea G-d is the cause, in

so far as he is affected by another idea, and so on to infinity. Q.E.D.



Corollary.— (9:5)  Whatsoever  takes  place in the individual object of

any idea,  the  knowledge thereof is in G-d, in so far only as he has              Bk.XIV:2:516
                       Bk.III:218.
the idea of the object.         2P12, 13, 30; 3P10. 

Bk.XVIII:1302p9c,20,24, 1542p9cd; Bk.XIX:1653.



Proof.— (9:6)  Whatsoever  takes  place  in the object of any idea,  its

idea  is in G-d (by Prop. iii. of this part), not in so far  page 89  as he is

infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea

of an individual  thing  (by the last Prop.);  but  (by Prop. vii.  of  this

part)   the  order  and connection of ideas  is the same  as the order

and connection of things. (9:7) The knowledge, therefore, of that which

takes  place  in any individual object will be in G-d, in so far only as

he has the idea of that object.  Q.E.D.

Prop. X.  Bk.XIV:2:8—X - XIII.; Bk.XVIII:1262p10, 11, 13.

The  being  of  substance does not
                                  < Bk.XV:27170 on E2:X(15)N2:90 > 
appertain to the essence of man—                  Wolf:P66, L1- 5
in other words, substance does not 
constitute the actual being ("Forma") 
of man.       2P10C. 

Proof.— (10:1)  The  being  of substance involves necessary existence

(I:Prop.vii.).  (2) If, therefore, the being of substance appertains to the
                                                       { posited }
essence of man,  substance being granted,  man would necessarily

be  granted also  (II:Def. ii.),  and,  consequently, man would neces-

sarily exist, which is absurd (II:Ax.i.). Therefore, &c.  Q.E.D.



Note 1.— (10:3) This proposition may also be proved from I:v., in which

it is shown that there cannot be two substances of the same nature;

for as there may  be  many men,  the being of substance is  not that

which constitutes the actual being of man.  (4)  Again, the proposition

is evident from the other properties of substance—namely, that sub-

stance is in its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c., as anyone

may see for himself.


                                                             < Bk.XV:27170 on E2:X(15)N2:90 > 
Corollary.—  (10:5)  Hence  it  follows,  that  the  essence  of  man  is
{ determined }                   ] affections [           Bk.III:218; Bk.XIB:23294. 
constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of G-D.  (6)  For
                                   ^Bk.XIV:1:3844; Bk.XIV:2:411&2—Bk.III:94[3]^ 
(by the  last Prop.)  the  being of substance does not belong to the 
  Bk.XIV:2:371&2—Bk.VIII:94[4]; Bk.XIX:479. 
essence of man.  (10:7)  That essence therefore (by I:xv) is something

which is in G-D,  and which without G-D can neither be nor be con-

ceived, whether it be a modification (I:xxv.Coroll.), or a mode which
                                         Bk.XIV:2:353—determinate. 
expresses G-d's nature in a certain conditioned manner.    2P11; 4P29. 



Note 2.— (10:8) Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be
  Bk.III:208. 
conceived without G-D.  (10:9)  All men agree that G-D  is the one and
                                                  < Bk.XV:27170—E2:De.II:82, E2:X:89, E2:XC:89 > 
only cause of all things, both of their essence and of their existence;

that is,  G-D is not only the cause of things in respect to their being
                                                                                         < E2:Def.II:82. >
made (secundum fieri), but also in respect to their being (secundum

esse).   { Analogy }
  
                       Bk.XIV:2:381&2—Bk.III:94[5].
(10:10)  At the same time many assert,  that that, without which a thing
                                                > pertains—Bk.III:207.  < 
cannot  be  nor be conceived,  belongs to the essence of that thing;
                          
wherefore they believe that either the Nature   page 90   of G-D apper-
 < Bk.XV:26957, E2:Def.II:82. > 
tains  to  the essence  of created things,  or else that created things

can  be or be conceived without G-D;  or else,  as is more probably
                                 Bk.XIV:2:393.
the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. (10:11) I think the cause for

such confusion is mainly,  that they do not keep to the proper order
                     < argument.  Bk.XV:27169. >
of philosophic thinking.  (10:12) The Nature of G-D,  which should be re-

flected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge

and  the  order of Nature,  they have taken to be  last in the order of

knowledge,  and  have  put into the first place what they call the ob-

jects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural pheno-

mena, they  give no attention at all to the Divine Nature,  and, when

afterwards they apply their mind  to the study  of  the Divine Nature,

they are quite  unable  to  bear  in  mind  the  first hypotheses,  with

which  they  have  overlaid  the  knowledge  of  natural phenomena,

inasmuch  as  such hypotheses are no help towards understanding

the Divine Nature.   (10:13)  So that it is hardly to be wondered at,  that
                          Bk.III:208. 
these persons contradict themselves freely.



(10:14) However, I pass over this point.  (15)  My intention here was only

to give a reason for not saying, that that, without which a thing can-
                                                < Bk.XV:27170—E2:Def.II:82, E2:X:89, E2:X(5)C:89. > 
not be or be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing: individ-

ual things  cannot  be  or be conceived without G-D,  yet G-D does

not appertain to their essence.   (10:16)  I said that "I considered as be-

longing to the essence of a thing that,  which being given, the thing

is  necessarily  given  also,  and which being removed,  the thing is

necessarily  removed  also;  or  that  without  which  the thing,  and

which  itself  without  the  thing  can  neither  be  nor be conceived."

(II:Def.ii.)

Prop. XI. Bk.III:205, 218; Bk.XIV:2:442; Bk.XVIII:142p11,12; 1262p10,11,13; 1552p11,13; 2052p11d; Bk.XIX:1923.

                                                     < Bk.XV:27171—E2:XII:91, E2:XIII:92. >  
The first element, which constitutes the 
actual  being of the human mind,  is the         Actuality Curve
idea  of  some  particular  thing actually         Calculus:Fig. 3
existing.       2P12, 13, 48; 3P2, 3, 10, GDE; 4P37; 5P9, 38.

Proof.— (11:1) The essence of man (by the Coroll. of the last Prop.) is

constituted  by  certain  modes  of the attributes of G-D, namely  (by

II:Ax.ii.), by the modes of thinking, of all which (by II.Ax.iii.) the idea is

prior in nature, and, when the idea is given, the other modes (namely,

those of which the idea is prior in nature)  must  be  in the same indi-

vidual (by the same Axiom). (11:2) Therefore an idea is the first element

constituting  the human mind.  (11:3)  But not the idea of a non-existent

thing,  for  then II:viii.Coroll.)  the   page 91  idea itself cannot be said to

exist;  it  must  therefore  be  the  idea of something actually existing.

(11:4)  But not of an infinite thing.    (11:5) For an infinite thing (I:xxi., xxii.),

must always necessarily exist;  this would  (by II:Ax.i.) involve an ab-

surdity.  (11:6) Therefore the first element, which constitutes the actual

being  of the human mind,  is the idea of something actually existing.

Q.E.D.



Corollary.— (11:7) Hence it follows,  that the human mind is part of the
 Bk.XIV:2:413, 2:494, 2:564, 2:155, 2:3245; Bk.III:140, 218, 222.                                Hampshire32:83
infinite intellect of G-D; thus when we say, that the human mind per-              Durant:63981 

ceives this or that, we make the assertion, that G-d has this or that

idea,  not  in so  far as he is infinite,  but in so far as he is displayed

through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes            Spinoza's Religion
         Bk.III:219, 225; Bk.XVIII:125p11c.
the essence of the human mind; and when we say that G-d has this

or that idea,  not only in so far as  he constitutes the essence of the

human mind, but also in so far as he, simultaneously with the human

mind, has the further idea of another thing, we assert that the human
                                     < Bk.XV:27272—E2:XXIV-XXIX:104, E1:XVII(18)N:61. > 
mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately.  Bk.III:223; Bk.XVIII:177p11c. 
                               2P12, 13, 19, 22, 23, 30, 34, 38, 43, 43S; 3P28; 5P36.                        <------- small print, Logical Index. 



Note.—  (11:8)  Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will

call  to  mind many things which will cause them to hesitate;  I there-
                                                                Bk.XVIII:192p11cs. 
fore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to pro-

nounce on my statements, till they have read to the end.

Prop. XII.  Bk.III:219, 221, 223; Bk.XVIII:142p11,12, 174p12.

Whatsoever  comes  to  pass in the object 
of  the idea, which  constitutes the human 
mind,  must  be  perceived  by  the human 
mind,  or there will necessarily be an idea 
in the human mind of the said occurrence. 
That  is,  if  the object of the idea constitu-          Waves 
ting  the  human  mind be a body, nothing 
can  take place in that body without being         Bk.XIV:2:515
perceived by the mind.       2P13, 14, 17, 17C, 19, 21, 22, 38;
< Bk.XV:27273—Bk.XV:27166-E2:VII(7):87 >                          3P2S; 4P7; 5P4. 

 
                                                        Bk.III:218.
Proof.—  (12:1)  Whatsoever  comes  to pass in the object of any idea,

the  knowledge  thereof is necessarily in G-D (II:ix.Coroll.), in so far

as he is considered  as affected by the idea of the said object,  that

is (II:xi.), in so far as he constitutes the mind of anything.  (12:2) There-

fore,  whatsoever  takes  place in the object constituting the idea of

the  human  mind,  the  knowledge  thereof is necessarily in G-d, in

so  far  as  he  constitutes the nature of the human mind;  that is (by

II:xi.Coroll.)  the  knowledge  of  the  said  thing  will  necessarily  be                                 Bk.XVIII:1542p12d; Bk.XIX:1464.
the mind, in other words the mind perceives it.

page 92

Note.—  (12:3) This proposition is also evident,  and is more clearly to
                               [ Note ]
be understood from II:vii., which see.

Prop. XIII.  Bk.XIB:236106, 107; Bk.XIV:2:2931; Bk.XVIII:362p13; 1262p13; 1552p11,13; Bk.XIX:1142.

     <Bk.XV:27274—E2:XI:90, E2:VII(7):87, E5:XX(18)N:258.> 
The  object  of  the  idea constituting the        Damasio:211
human mind is the body,  in other words 
a  certain mode of extension which actu- 
ally exists, and nothing else.   Neff LT:L66(64):398.               Bk.XIV:2:52 
                     2P15, 19, 21, 21S, 23, 24, 26, 29, 38, 39; 3P3, 10, GDE; 5P23, 29.

Proof.— (13:1)   If  indeed  the  body  were  not the object of the human

mind, the ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in G-D              Added by JBY  

(II:ix.Coroll.)  in  virtue of his constituting our mind, but in virtue of his

constituting the mind of something else; that is (Il:xi.Coroll.) the ideas

of the modifications  of  the body would not be in our mind:  now (by

II.Ax.iv.)  we  do  possess  the ideas of the modifications of the body.

(13:2) Therefore  the  object of the idea constituting the human mind is

the body, and the body as it actually exists (Il:xi.).  (3) Further, if there

were any other object of the idea constituting the mind besides body,

then,  as  nothing  can  exist from which some effect does not follow
                                       [ by 2P12 ]
(I:xxxvi.)  there  would  necessarily  have  to  be  in our mind an idea,

which  would  be the effect of that  other object  (II:xi.);  but  (II:Ax.v.)

there  is no such idea.   (13:4)  Wherefore  the object of our mind is the
          [ 2P17S ]             
body as it exists, and nothing else. Q.E.D. { L65(63):396, Neff TL:L66(64):398 }

.
Note 1.— (13:5)  We  thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is
          Bk.XIV:2:3242.                                           Bk.III:127, 219. 
united  to  the  body,  but  also the nature of the union between mind        E2:Wolfson:2:535, 2:552.

and body.  (6)  However,  no one will be able to grasp this adequately
                    Bk.XIX:2564.             { the Worm, EL:L15(32):290 } 
or distinctly, unless he first has adequate knowledge of the nature of

our body.  (7) The propositions we have advanced hitherto have been
                                                                                                                < Bk.XV:27275—   
entirely  general,  applying  not  more to men than to other individual
      E2:XIII:92, E2:D.VII:83, E3:LVII(7)N:170. >    
things,   all  of  which,  though  in  different  degrees,  are  animated               Durant:63773
 < Bk.VIII:45831—Bk.XIV::2:58, E2:XIII(Ax.2):95 >                       3P51S
("Animata"). (13:8) For of everything there is necessarily an idea in G-D,           Hampshire32:65 

of  which  G-D  is the cause,  in the same way as there is an idea of

the human body; thus whatever we have asserted of the idea of the

human  body  must  necessarily  also  be  asserted  of  the  idea  of

everything  else.  (13:9)  Still,  on  the other hand,  we cannot deny that

ideas,   like  objects,   differ  one  from  the  other,  one  being  more               Bk.XIV:2:601. 
                                            Bk.XIV:2:592. 
excellent than another and containing more reality, just as the object

of  one  idea  is  more  excellent than the object of another idea, and

contains more reality.

 
 
(13:10) Wherefore,  in  order  to  determine,  wherein the human  page 93 

mind differs from other things,  and wherein it surpasses them,  it is

necessary  for  us  to  know  the nature of its object,  that is,  of  the
  Bk.XIX:2551—E3:II(11):132, E5:Prf.(5):244.              Bk.III:37.
human body.  (13:11) What this nature is, I am not able here to explain,
                                                                       Bk.III:220.
nor  is  it  necessary  for  the  proof of what I advance,  that I should

do so.   (13:12) I will only say generally, that in proportion as any given

body  is  more fitted than others for doing many actions or receiving
         Bk.XVIII:139p13; Bk.XIX:22214.
many  impressions at once,  so  also  is  the mind,  of which it is the

object,  more  fitted  than others for forming many simultaneous per-

ceptions;  and  the  more  the  actions of one body depend on itself
 Bk.III:225; Bk.XVIII:1262p13; Bk.XIX:2576. 
alone, and the fewer other bodies concur with it in action, the more
                                                                      Bk.III:220—understanding 
fitted is the mind of which it is the object for distinct comprehension.

(13:13) We may thus recognize the superiority of one mind over others,

and may further see the cause,  why we have only a very confused

knowledge of our body,  and also many kindred questions,  which I

will,  in the following propositions,  deduce  from what has been ad-

vanced.  (13:14) Wherefore I have thought it worth while to explain and

prove  more  strictly  my present statements.   (13:15)  In order to do so,
                                                                                                      { Bk.XIV:2:65 }
I must  premise a few propositions concerning the nature of bodies.


Ethica II: The Lemmas on Bodies - Ron Bombardi
 Bk.III:220; Bk.XIV:2:63; Bk.XIX:20612. 

                                                          < Bk.XV:26633—E1:XXI:63 >
Axiom I.    All bodies are either in motion or at rest.    2P13L3. 


Axiom II.   Every body is moved sometimes more slowly, sometimes
                more quickly. 


                            { a little worm } ,  ] Bk.XIII:193165 [
Lemma I.  Bodies  are  distinguished from one another in respect of
                motion  and  rest,  quickness  and  slowness,  and  not  in           Bk.XIV:2:671.
                respect of substance.   < Bk.XV:26315—E1:VIII:48 >  

                    Proof.— The first part of this proposition is,  I take it,  self-
                evident.  That  bodies  are not distinguished in respect of 
                substance,  is plain both from  I:v.  and  I:viii.  It is brought 
                out still more clearly from I: xv.,note.         2P13L3, 13L4.  
 
Lemma II.  All bodies agree in certain respects.       2P37, 38C; 5P4.                         Bk.XIV:2:672.
                                 Bk.III:203—Neff L66(64):399. 

                     Proof.—   All  bodies  agree  in the fact,  that they involve 
                 the  conception  of  one  and the same attribute (II:Def.i.).            Bk.XIV:2:673, 4.
                 Further,  in  the fact that they may be moved less or more 
                quickly,   and   may  be  absolutely  in  motion  or  at  rest.  


Lemma III.   A body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion
                   or rest by another body,  which other body has been de-          Bk.XIV:2:678.
                   termined to motion or rest by a third body,  and that third 
                   again by a fourth, and so on to infinity.                                          Bk.XIV:2:681.  

                   Proof.—   Bodies  are  individual things (II:Def.i.), which
                       page 94  (Lemma I.)  are  distinguished  one from the other 
                   in respect to motion and rest;  thus  (I:xxviii.) each must 
                   necessarily  be determined to motion or rest by another 
                   individual  thing,  namely (II:vi.), by another body, which 
                   other  body  is  also (Ax.i.) in motion or at rest.   And this 
                   body again can only have been set in motion or caused 
                   to rest by being determined by a third body to motion or 
                   rest.  This  third  body  again  by  a  fourth, and so on to 
                   infinity.  Q.E.D.  { the Worm, EL:L15(32):290 } Bk.XVIII:33102/11. 


Corollary.— (13:16)  Hence  it  follows,  that  a body in motion keeps in