THE  ETHICS -  PART  III

On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions
                            SCR:Dijn'sSalvation, Hampshire:141.                       
 ] AffectusG:Shirley:2821 [

Circulated - 1673
Posthumously Published - 1677

Benedict de Spinoza
1632 - 1677  

IntroductionPurpose  -  Spinozistic Ideas 
The Ethics:   Part I  -  Part II  -  Part III  -  Part IV  -  Part V 
Spinozistic Glossary and Index  
 




JBY Notes:

1.  The text is the 1883 translation of the  "The Ethics"  by  R. H. M.
 
     Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was 
     scanned and proof-read by JBY. For other Versions see Note 7. 

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):  y = Proposition Number, if given;  xx = Sentence Number.
 

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols:
 
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ), 
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ], 
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [,
 
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >, 
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <, 
           { JBY Comment }    G-D   
   Metaphors       LINKS 

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here.

6.  Please e-mail, errors, clarification requests, disagreement, or
     suggestions to josephb@yesselman.com.
 

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read
on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively
        EL:[3]:vi
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its         Durant's Story
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and            Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze.  

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions,
or best, study the printed book
    book page numbers
are given for most scanned books. 

9.  From Elwes's IntroductionEL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi. 
 
10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for   every-          E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,   is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for   teaching  the 
       "Organic  Interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and   all 
       his   puzzling   sayings,   for  example   E3:IV:136,   become   more, 
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.    Look  for  the
       Cash Value. 
 
      To  help  further  understand  many  of  the  Propositions,  use  the         {Examples
      analogy  of  you  as  G-D  and  all  parts of you (past, present, and        1D6, 2P3, 2P4.}
      future) as the modes ( particular  things ).
 Apparent Contradiction, Analogies,        Indivisible 


11.  Wolfson's  summaries:  Part IIIPart IV, and Part V.  


12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff.
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xxii. 
       For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi. 
       
For a "study of the plan of Ethics 3" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:339-40. 
       
For a criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.

 



TABLE OF CONTENTS:  Bk.XII:xi—The Nature of Man.  
                                                                      Bk.XIV:xxii—Chapter XVIII,  Bk.XIV:2:180—Emotions.
 

Preface:128

Definitions:129

Postulates:130

Part III Propositions: Book I:Pg. x 
           If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral. 
           If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 

I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX
XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVI XXVII XXVIII XXIX XXX
XXXI XXXII XXXIII XXXIV XXXV XXXVI XXXVII XXXVIII XXXIX XL
XLI XLII XLIII XLIV XLV XLVI XLVII XLVIII XLIX L
LI LII LIII LIV LV LVI LVII LVIII LIX


Definitions of the Emotions:173  Glossary

General Definition of the Emotions:185

JBY Endnotes



Part III Proposition List:  Book I:Pg. x;  { Hypotheses }

           Suggestion:  Do  not  read  consecutively  as  you would a novel;
 
                                but  select a Proposition,  click its number to the left 
                                and  then  follow  all  its  links in turn wherever they 
                                may  lead.   You will then be putting hypertexting to 
                                its fullest and best advantage—the fuller discussion 
                                of  a  thread.  If  you  do not stick to one thread at a 
                                time,  this  Web Site  will seem very convoluted and 
                                confusing. 
            
{Definition of Proposition: a statement in which something is affirmed or denied,
                           so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.
}
                    All axioms, definitions, and propositions are hypotheses. Test 
                       them for their 'cash value'. See Notes 10 & 11, Posit, and Idea
} 

Prop. I.
    
I-III 
Bk.III:239 
Bk.XIV:2:185 
Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases
passive.   In  so  far as it has adequate ideas it is neces-
 
sarily  active,  and  in so far as it has  inadequate  ideas, 
it is necessarily passive. 
 
Prop. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind
determine  body to motion or rest or any state different
 
from these, if such there be. 
 
Prop. III. The  activities  of  the mind arise solely from adequate
ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on
 
inadequate ideas. 
 

Prop. IV.
  
IV-XI 
Bk.III:240. 
Bk.XIV:2:195 


Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external
to itself.  {
conatus } 
 
Prop. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the
same  object,  in  so far as one is capable of destroying
 
the other. 
   
Prop. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to
persist in its own being.
 
   
Prop. VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual
 
essence of the thing in question. 
  
Prop. VIII. The  endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist
in its being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.
 
  
Prop. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct
ideas,  and  also in so far as it has confused ideas,
 
endeavours  to  persist in its being for an indefinite 
period, and of this endeavour it is conscious. 
   
Prop. X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body,
cannot  be  postulated in our mind, but is contrary
 
thereto. 
 
Prop. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders
the  power  of  activity  in  our  body,  the idea thereof
 
increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of 
thought in our mind. 
Prop. XII.
 
XII-LVII 
Bk.XIV:2:208 
The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those
things, which increase or help the power of activity in the
 
body. 
 
Prop. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder
the  body's  power  of  activity,  it  endeavours,  as  far as
 
possible, to remember things which exclude the existence 
of the first-named things. 
 
Prop. XIV.
 
XIV-XVIII, 
Bk.XIV:2:213.
If  the  mind has once been affected by two emotions at
the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected
 
by one of the two, be also affected by the other. 
 
Prop. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,
pain, or desire.
 
 
Prop. XVI. Simply  from  the  fact  that  we  conceive,  that  a given
object  has  some  point  of  resemblance  with  another
 
object  which  is  wont  to affect the mind pleasurably or 
painfully,  although  the point of resemblance be not the 
efficient cause of the said emotions, we shall still regard 
the first-named object with love or hate.                           Need
 
Prop. XVII. If we conceive that a thing which is wont to affect us
painfully,  has any point of resemblance with  another
 
thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong 
emotion  of  pleasure,  we  shall  hate the first-named 
thing, and  at  the same time we shall love it. 
 
Prop. XVIII.
A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by
the image of a thing past or future as by the image of
 
a thing present. 
  
Prop. XIX.
 
XIX-XXXII, 
Bk.XIV:2:215,
Bk.XIV:2:217.
He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed
will  feel  pain;  if he conceives that it is preserved he will
 
feel pleasure. 
 
Prop. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed
will feel pleasure.
 
 
Prop. XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected 
pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasur- 
ably  or  painfully;  and the one or the other emotion will 
be  greater or less in the lover according as it is greater 
or less in the thing loved. 
 
Prop. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some
object  of  our  love,  we  shall  be  affected  with love
 
towards that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it 
affects  an  object  of  our  love  painfully,  we shall be 
affected with hatred towards it. 
  
Prop. XXIII.
XXXIII-XLIX, 
Bk.XIV:2:217. 
He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is pain-
fully  affected,  will  feel  pleasure.  Contrariwise, if he
 
thinks  that the said object is pleasurably affected, he 
will feel pain.   Each of these emotions will be greater 
or less,  according as its contrary is greater or less in 
the object of hatred. 
 
Prop. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object
of our hate, we shall feel, hatred towards him also.  If we
 
conceive  that  he  painfully  affects  the  said object,  we 
shall feel love towards him. 
 
Prop. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and con-
cerning  what  we  love,  everything that we conceive to
 
affect  pleasurably  ourselves, or the loved object.  Con- 
trariwise,  we  endeavour  to negative everything, which 
we  conceive  to  affect painfully  ourselves or the loved 
object. 
 
Prop. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate,
everything  which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,
 
contrariwise,   we   endeavour  to  deny,  concerning  it, 
everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably. 
 
Prop. XXVII. By  the  very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like
ourselves,  and  which  we  have not regarded with any
 
emotion,  to  be  affected  with any emotion, we are our- 
selves affected with a like emotion.
 
Prop. XXVIII. We  endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or
 
destroy  whatsoever  we conceive to be truly repugnant 
thereto, or to conduce to pain. 
 
Prop. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive
men  to
 regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall 
shrink  from doing that which we conceive men to shrink 
from. 
 
Prop. XXX. If  anyone  has done something which he conceives as
affecting  other men pleasurably, he will be affected by
 
pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; 
in  other  words,  he  will  regard  himself  with pleasure. 
On  the  other  hand,  if he has done anything which he 
conceives  as  affecting  others painfully, he will regard 
himself with pain. 
 
Prop. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates any-
thing which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall
 
thereupon regard the thing in question with more stead- 
fast love, &c.  On the contrary,  if we think that  anyone 
shrinks  from something that we love, we shall undergo 
vacillation of soul. 
 
Prop. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something,
which only one person can possess, we shall endeav-
 
our to bring it about that the man in question shall not 
gain possession thereof. 
 
Prop. XXXIII. When  we  love a thing similar to ourselves we endeav-
our, as far as we can,  to bring about that it should love
 
us in return. 
 
Prop. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved
object  to be  affected towards us, the greater will be our
 
complacency. 
 
Prop. XXXV. If  anyone  conceives,  that an object of his  love  joins
itself  to  another  with  closer bonds of friendship than
 
he  himself  has  attained   to,  he  will be affected with 
hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards 
his rival. 
 
Prop. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken
delight,  desires  to  possess   it under the same circum-
 
stances as when he first took delight therein. 
 
Prop. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love,
is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
 
 
Prop. XXXVIII. If  a  man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that
love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal,
 
regard  it  with more hatred than if he had never  loved  it, 
and  his  hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his 
former love. 
 
Prop. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury,
unless  he  fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue
 
to  himself;  on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, 
by the same law, seek to beneflt him. 
 
Prop. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will
 
hate that other in return. 
 
Prop. XLI. If  anyone  conceives that he is loved by another, and
believes that he has given no cause for such love, he
 
will love that other in return. 
 
Prop. XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives
of love or honour will feel pain,  if he sees that the bene-
 
fit is received without gratitude.
 
Prop. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on
the other hand be destroyed by love.
 
 
Prop. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes
into  love:  and love is thereupon greater than if hatred
 
had not preceded it. 
 
Prop. XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates
anything also similar to himself,  which he loves, he will
 
hate that person. 
 
Prop. XLVI. If  a  man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by
anyone, of a class or nation different front his own, and
 
if  the  pleasure  or  pain has been accompanied by the 
idea  of  the  said stranger as cause, under the general 
category  of  the  class  or  nation: the man will feel love 
or hatred, not only to the individual stranger, but also to 
the whole class or nation whereto he belongs. 
 
Prop. XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is de-
stroyed,  or suffers other injury, is never unaccompa-
 
nied by a certain pain in us. 
  
Prop. XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed,
if  the  pleasure  involved  in  the  former,  or  the pain in-
 
volved  in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea 
of another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as 
we  conceive  Peter  not  to have been the sole cause of 
either emotion. 
 
Prop. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing,  which we conceive to be
free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than
 
if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity. 
 
Prop. L.
L - LVII, 
Bk.XIV:2:217
.
Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope
or fear.
 
 
Prop. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same
object, and the same man may be differently affected
 
at different times by the same object. 
 
Prop. LII. An  object  which we have formerly seen in conjunction
with others, and which we do not conceive to have any
 
property that is not common to many, will not be regard 
ed by us for so long, as an object which we conceive to 
have some property peculiar to itself. 
 
Prop. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity,
it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion
 
to  the  distinctness  wherewith  it  conceives  itself and its 
own power of activity. 
 
Prop. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as
assert its power of activity.
 
 
Prop. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels
pain thereat.
 
 
Prop. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire,
and  of  every  emotion  compounded of these, such as
 
vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, 
hatred,  hope,  fear,  &c.,  as  there are kinds of objects 
whereby we are affected. 
 
Prop. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion 
of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the 
one individual differs from the essence of the other. 
 
Prop. LVIII.
LVIII-LIX 
Bk.III:242 
Bk.XIV:2:218 
Besides  pleasure  and  desire,  which  are  passivities or 
passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure 
and  desire,  which  are  attributable  to us in so far as we 
are active. 
 
Prop. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, 
there  are  none  which cannot be referred to pleasure or 
desire. 
 




`
PREFACE:  Bk.I:128; Bk.XII:214-16.

                                       [ Affects ]
(Pfc:1) Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be          E3:Wolfson:2:1833.

treating rather of matters outside Nature than of natural phenomena        lines, planes, and solids
           Bk.XIV:2:1822—common. 
following Nature's general laws.  (2) They appear to conceive man to
                                                 
E3:Wolfson:2:1836. 
be situated in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe         Spinoza's daring  

that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has abso-          E2:Wolfson:2:110
        ] power [ 
lute  control  over  his  actions,  and that he is determined solely by               Mark Twain 
 Bk.XX:23781.                                      ] weakness [          ] frailty [ 
himself.  (Pfc:3) They attribute human infirmities and fickleness,  not to
          {
Mark Twain }
the  power of Nature in general,  but to some mysterious flaw in the
                                                                           ]
ridicule [
nature of man, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or,              Bk.XIV:2:1811.
                                                                             [ censuring ]
as usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weak-
                                                                               [
cunningly ]
ness  of  the  human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his
                                         [
Godly ]
fellows, is looked upon as a seer.  (Pfc:4)  Still there has been no lack

of very excellent men  (to  whose  toil and industry I confess myself               Bk.XIV:2:1813.

much indebted), who have written many noteworthy things concern-

ing  the  right way of life and have given much sage advise to man-

kind.  (Pfc:5)  But no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and
                            [
Affects ]                  Bk.XVIII:2683p56s.
strength  of  the  emotions, and the power of the mind against them
           [
moderation ]
for their restraint.



(Pfc:6) I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though be believed,
                           
that the mind has absolute power over its actions,  strove to explain             
Bk.XIV:2:1827.

human emotions by their primary causes,  and, at the same time, to

point out of the way, by which the mind might attain to absolute do-
]
control [
minion over them.   (Pfc:7)  However,  in my opinion,  he accomplishes
                                                   ]
brilliance [                            ] genius [
nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect,

as I will show in the proper place.  (Pfc:8)  For the present I wish to re-

vert to those,  who  would  rather  abuse or deride human emotions
   
Bk.XVIII:19f, 3443Preface.
than understand them. (9) Such persons will, doubtless  page 129  think
                                                                                
Bk.XIB:2142.
it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geo-
                                             
                          ] logical [
metrically,  and  should  wish  to set forth with rigid reasoning those

matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous

absurd, and dreadful. 
(Pfc:10)  However, such is my plan.   (11)  Nothing

comes to pass in Nature,  which  can  be set down to a flaw therein;

for  Nature  is always the same,  and everywhere one and the same

in her efficacy and power of action;  that is,  nature's laws and ordi-
 ]
rules [
nances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form
                                                            
Bk.XIB:7748.
to another,  are  everywhere  and  always  the  same;  so that there

should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of
                                                                                 
Bk.XX:238. 
all things whatsoever,  namely, through nature's universal laws and            E3:Wolfson:2:1833.

rules.  (Pfc:12)  Thus  the passions of hatred,  angerenvy,  and so on,

considered  in  themselves,  follow  from  this  same  necessity and
 ]
force [
efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through

which they are understood, and possess certain properties as wor-

thy of being known as the properties of anything else,  whereof the
                                                                         
Bk.III:239.
contemplation in itself affords us delight. (Pfc:13) I shall, therefore, treat

of  the  nature  and strength of the emotions according to the same

method,  as I employed heretofore in my investigations  concerning
 
Bk.XIB:244132.                     Bk.III:239.                                       ] appetites [ 
G-D and the mind(Pfc:14) I shall consider human actions and desires
                              
Durant:636                                Bk.XI:1542.   
in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines,         Bk.XIV:2:1812, 2:1851.  
 
Bk.XIA:3553 ] bodies [ 
planes, and solids.
 
Bk.XIB:7746; Bk.XX:238.

 
  
  




   < E1:Parkinsob:2601 >
DEFINITIONS   { G:Notes 1 & 2, Hypothesis
. }; Bk.XIX:2185. 

                        
       Bk.III:205.
Def. I.  (1) By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its 
           effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived.  (2) By an inad-              Bk.XIV:2:1022.
           equate or partial cause,  I mean a cause through which,  by 
           itself, its effect cannot be understood. 3D2; 3P1; 4P2, 5, 23, 33; 5P31.   <------- small print, Logical Index.
               Bk.XVIII:177
3d1, p1d.
 

                                          Bk.III:205, 242. 
Def. II. 
(1) I say that we act when anything takes place, either within 
            us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; 
            that is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature 
            something takes  place  within  us or externally to us, which 
            can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly under- 
            stood {PcM}(2) On the other hand, I say that we are passive           Bk.XIV:2:1891. 
            as regards something when that something takes place with- 
                                                              <       of which we are        >
            in us,  or follows from our nature externally,  we  being  only
            the  {
 inadequate, }  partial cause  { that  is  not  clearly and distinctly 
               understood. 
}        
   3P1; 4P2, 5, 15, 23, 33, 35, 35C1, 52, 61, 64.    <------- small print, Logical Index.

page 130  
                   
Bk.VIII:46443; Bk.XIV:2:1951, 2:2012, 2:2031, 2:2661, 2:2681 & 2. 
                        Bk.III:219, 241, 242; Bk.XV:277107; Bk.XVIII:143d3254d3259d3. 
                       ] affectus [                      ] affections [                                              Hampshire:135—affectus 
Def. III.  By emotions I mean the modifications of the body, whereby            { The feelings are 
             the active power of  said  body  is increased or diminished,        °JOY or °SORROW. }
             aided  or  constrained,  and  also ]together with[  the  ideas            E2:2P24-32
             of such modifications.  E3:Endnote GN:2;               3P14.

                                            { efficient cause }
N.B.      If  we  can be the adequate cause of any of these modifica- 
             tions,  I  then call the emotion an activity,  otherwise I call it 
             a  passion,  or  state  wherein  the  mind  is  passive.  
             { E3:Endnote GN:2 } 





POSTULATES.  
Bk.XVIII:233p1280Part 3. 


               
Bk.III:241III,Post.1, 242III,Post.1
Post. I.  The human  body can be affected in many ways,  whereby 
             its power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in         Bk.XIV:2:1951  
             other ways which do not  render its power of activity either 
             greater or less.             3P12, 15.                           <------- small print, Logical Index.

            N.B.    This  postulate  or  axiom  rests  on  II:Post.I.:97 and 
                       II:Lemmas v.:95 and vii., which see after II:xiii. 


Post. II. The human body can undergo many changes,  and, never- 
             theless,  retain  the  impressions  or  traces  of  objects (cf. 
             II:Post.v.),  and,  consequently,  the same images of things  
             ( ] for the definition of which [ see II:xvii.note).   

 




PART III PROPOSITIONS.  { Hypotheses }; Bk.XIV:2:185.

Prop. I.  E3:Didn:239; Bk.XVIII:1773p13243p1,3; Bk.XIX:22113. 

  
 
Proof.(1:1)  In every human mind  there are some  adequate ideas,
                                              [
mutilated ]
and  some  ideas  that  are  fragmentary  and  confused  (II:xl.note).           Bk.XIV:2:1892.

(1:2)  Those ideas which are adequate in the mind  are adequate also

in  G-D,  inasmuch  as  he  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  mind                  1D6

(II:xi.Coroll.),  and  those  which are inadequate in the mind are like-

wise  (by  the  same  Coroll.) adequate in G-D, not inasmuch as he                Deus

contains  in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as he,

at the same time, contains the minds of other things. 
(1:3) Again, from

any  given  idea some effect must necessarily follow (I:xxxvi); of this
                               
Bk.XVIII:1773d1,p1d.
effect  G-D  is the adequate cause (III:Def.i.),  not inasmuch as he is

infinite,  but  inasmuch  as he is conceived  as affected by the given

idea (II:ix.).  (4) But of that effect whereof G-D is the cause, inasmuch

as he is affected by an idea which is adequate  in a given mind,  of
                                                                                      
Bk.XIX:28326.
that effect,  I repeat,  the  mind  in  question  is  the adequate cause

(II:xi.Coroll.).  (1:5)  Therefore  our mind,  in  so  far as it has adequate

 page 131  ideas (III:Def.ii.), is in certain cases necessarily, active; this

was our first point.  (1:6)  Again, whatsoever necessarily, follows from

the idea which is adequate in G-D,  not by virtue of his possessing

in himself the mind of one man only,  but by virtue of his containing,
                                                                                        
Bk.XIX:1451.
together  with the mind  of that one man,  the minds  of other things

also, of such an effect (II:xi.Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not

an adequate,  but only a partial cause;  thus (III:Def.ii.) the mind, in-

asmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases necessarily

passive;  this  was  our  second  point.   (1:7)  Therefore our mind, &c.

Q.E.D.



Corollary.
 (1:8) Hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable

to be acted upon,  in proportion  as it possesses inadequate ideas,

and,  contrariwise,  is  more  or  less  active in proportion as it pos-             Durant:646135

sesses adequate ideas.



Prop. II.  Bk.XVIII:493p2,1103p2. 

  
Proof.
(2:1) All modes of thinking have for their cause G-D, by virtue
                                                                                          [
explained ]
of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his being display-

ed  under any other attribute (II:vi.).  (2) That, therefore, which deter-
                              ]
think [                     ] Thinking
mines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a mode of

extension; that is (II:Def.i.), it is not body.  (3) This was our first point.

(2:4)  Again,  the motion and rest  of a body,  must arise from another
                                             
Bk.XIB:241125
body,  which has also been determined  to a state  of motion or rest
                                     ]
without exception [
by a third body,  and absolutely  everything  which takes place in a
                 ]
arise [
body must spring from G-D, in so far as he is regarded as affected

by  some  mode  of  extension,  and  not  by  some mode of thought

(II:vi.);  that is,  it  cannot spring  from the mind,  which is a mode of
[
2P11 ]
thought (2:5)  This  was  our  second  point.  (6)  Therefore  body can-

not determine mind, &c.  Q.E.D..


] Scholium [
Note.(2:7) This is made more clear by what was said in the note to
                                   Bk.XV:277108; Bk.XVIII:1413p2s.
II:vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing, con-            Hampshire32:128 

ceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under the attri-
                                                                               [
connection]  ]linking[
bute of extension.  (:8) Thus it follows that the order or concatenation

of  things  is  identical, whether Nature be conceived under the one

attribute  or  the  other;  consequently the order of states of activity

and passivity in our body is simultaneous in Nature with  page 132  the
                                                                  
Bk.XIX:2565.
order  of  states  of activity and passivity in the mind.  (2:9)  The same

conclusion  is  evident  from  the  manner  in  which  we proved II:xii.



(2:10)  Nevertheless,  though such is the case, and though there be no

further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is proved
Bk.XV:278109E3:XXXII(3)N:152, E3:Def.XXVII:179. >     ] examine [ 
by  experience,  that  men  can  be induced to consider the question
]
without prejudice [ 
calmly and fairly,  so firmly are they convinced that it is merely at the

bidding of the mind,  that the body is set in motion or at rest,  or per-

forms a variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will or the            
Bk.XIV:2:1896. 
    [ art of thinking ]                                                             ] determined [
exercise of thought. (2:11) However, no one has hitherto laid down the
                      ]
capabilities [
limits   to   the   powers   of the body,  that is,  no  one  has  as  yet
                                                    
Bk.XIX:2551E2:XIII(10)n:93, E5:Prf.(5):244.
been   taught   by   experience   what   the   body   can  accomplish           Hampshire32:133 

] , without  being  determined  by  the  mind, [  solely by the laws of
]
its [                              ] it [          Bk.XIV:2:1901—corporeal. 
nature,  in  so  far  as  she  is  regarded  as extension.  (2:12 ) No one

hitherto  has  gained  such  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the bodily            Bk.XIV:2:1904.
  ] structure [                                         Bk.XIX:27814. 
mechanism,  that  he can explain all its functions;  nor need I call at-           Damasio:216

tention  to  the fact that many actions are observed in the lower ani-
                                                    [
ingenuity ]
mals, which far transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists

do  many  things in their sleep,  which they would not venture to do

when  awake:  these  instances are enough to show,  that the body

can  by  the  sole  laws  of its nature do many things which the mind           Hampshire32:130 

wonders at.



(2:13)  Again,  no  one  knows how or by what means the mind moves               Damasio:216

the body,  nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to
                                               
Bk.XIX:2184. 
the body,  nor how quickly it can move it.  (2:14) Thus, when men say               Bk.XIV:2:1905 

that  this  or  that  physical  action  has its origin in the mind,  which
                 ]
command [                                         { undefined } 
latter  has  dominion  over the body, they are using ^ words without
                                                        [
fine-sounding words ] 
meaning,  or  are  confessing  in  specious  phraseology  that  they
                                                              ]
are not concerned to discover it. [ 
are ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it.             Bk.XIV:2:1903.



(2:15) But,  they will say, whether we know or do not know the means
                              
  ] moves [
whereby  the  mind  acts on  the body, we have, at any rate, experi-

ence of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit state to think,

the body remains inert.  (16)  Moreover,  we have experience, that the

mind  alone  can  determine  whether we speak or are silent,  and a

variety  of  similar states which,  accordingly, we say depend on the
          ]
decision [
mind's  decree.   (2:17)  But,  as to the first point,  I ask such objectors,

whether experience does not also teach, that if the body be inactive
                                            ]
not capable [
the  mind  is  simultaneously  unfitted  for  thinking?  page 133   (2:18)   For

when  the  body  is at rest in sleep,  the mind simultaneously is in a
           {
dormancy }
state  of  torpor  also,  and has no power of thinking, such as it pos-

sesses  when the body, is awake.  (2:19) Again, I think everyone's ex-

perience will confirm the statement, that the mind is not at all times
           ]
apt [
equally  fit  for  thinking  on  a  given subject,  but  according as the
                                 ]
apt [
body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this
                                                                           ]
      apt to regard       [
or that object, so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplat-
        
Bk.XVIII:1323p2s.
ing the said object.


(2:20) But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the laws of

Nature  considered  as  extended substance,  we should be able to

deduce the causes of buildings,  pictures,  and  things  of that kind,

which are produced only by human art; nor would the human body,
                                              ]
guided [
unless it were determined and led by the mind, be capable of build-

ing a single temple.   (2:21)  However,  I have just pointed out that the

objectors  cannot  fix  the  limits of the body's power,  or say  what
             ]
deduced [
can be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature, whereas

they  have  experience  of  many  things being accomplished solely

by the laws of nature, which they would never have believed possi-

ble except under the direction of mind: such are the actions perform-

ed  by  somnambulists while asleep,  and wondered at by their per-

formers when awake.  (2:22) I would further call attention to the mech-
                           
Bk.III:227.                                            ] ingenuity [
anism  of  the  human body,  which far surpasses in complexity  all
                                                          ]
skill [
that has been put together by human art, not to repeat what I have

already shown, namely, that from Nature, under whatever attribute

she be considered, infinite results follow.   (23)  As for the second ob-
]
point [
jection, I submit that the world would be much happier, if men were

as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak.  
(2:24)  Experience

abundantly  shows  that men can govern anything more easily than
                              ]
control [
their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than their appetites;

whence it comes about that many believe,  that we are only free in

respect to objects which we moderately desire, because our desire
                                        
Bk.XVIII:270p2s.
for  such  can easily be controlled by the thought of something else

frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect

to what we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be

allayed with the remembrance of anything else.   
(2:25)  However, un-

less  such  persons  had  proved  by  experience  that  we do many

things  which  we  afterwards  page 134  repent  of,  and again that we
                                     ]
conflicting [                  Bk.XV:278110E4:Prf.(1):187,
often,  when assailed by contrary  emotions, see the better and fol-
 
E4:XVII(2)N:200. >  
low the worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that

we are free in all things.  (2:26) Thus an infant believes that of its own
                ]
seeks [                                                                   [ wants ]
free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires               Mark Twain
                               ] man [                  ] he [
vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away;

further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision

of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly, have
                                                           
] gossiping [
withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and
                         
] sort [
others of like complexion,  believe that they speak from the free de-

cision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to restrain their

impulse to talk.  (2:27) Experience teaches us no less clearly than rea-

son,  that  men believe themselves to be free,  simply because they            Stewart:285
                                                                ]
ignorant [
are  conscious  of  their  actions,  and  unconscious  of  the causes

whereby those actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that
         ]
mental decisions [                                             Bk.XVIII:2223p2s.
the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and
                                                         ]
disposition [
therefore vary according to the varying state of the body. (2:28) Every-

one shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who are as-
 ]
prey to [                                                                 ] want [
sailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;  those who
             [
moved ]              [ affect ]
are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this way or that.

(2:29) All these considerations clearly show that a mental decision and
                                    ]
physical
a bodily appetite,  or determined state,  are simultaneous,  or rather

are  one and the same thing,  which we call decision,  when it is re-

garded under and explained through the attribute of thought, and a
  ]
physical
conditioned state,  when it is regarded under the attribute of exten-

sion,  and deduced from the laws of motion and rest.   (2:30)  This will

appear yet more plainly in the sequel.  (2:31) For the present I wish to

call  attention  to  another point,  namely,  that we cannot act by the
                                                      [
recollect it. ]
decision  of  the  mind,  unless  we  have a remembrance of having
                                                                           [
unless we recollect it. ]
done so.   (2:32)  For instance,  we cannot say a word without remem-

bering  that  we  have  done so.  (2:33)  Again,  it is not within the free

power of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will.  (2:34)  There-
                                                                            ]
restricted
fore the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the pow-

er of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers. 
(2:35) But

when  we  dream  that  we speak,  we believe that we speak from a

free decision of the mind,  yet we do not speak,  or, if we do, it is by

a spontaneous   page 135   motion of the body.   (2:36)  Again,  we  dream

that  we  are  concealing  something,  and  we seem to act from the

same decision of the mind as that,  whereby we keep silence when

awake concerning something we know.   (2:37)  Lastly, we dream that

from  the  free  decision  of  our  mind  we do something,  which we

should not dare to do when awake.


                                                                                              
Bk.III:236.
(2:38) Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts
                 
                   [ fantasy ]
of  decisions,  one sort illusive, and the other sort free (39) If our folly

does  not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily admit, that the

decision  of  the mind, which is believed to be free, is not distinguish-
                                  
Bk.XIV:2:842.    
able  from  the imagination or memory,  and is nothing more than the

affirmation,  which an idea,  by  virtue  of  being an idea,  necessarily

involves  (II:xlix.).  (40)  Wherefore  these decisions of the mind arise in

the  mind  by  the  same  necessity,  as  the  ideas  of  things actually

existing.   (2:41) Therefore  those  who believe, that they speak or keep

silence  or  act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but

dream with their eyes open.




Prop. III. E3:Dijn:239; Bk.XVIII:189273083p33243p1,33693p3; Bk.XIX:22113.

 

Proof.(3:1) The first element, which constitutes the essence of the

mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent body (II:xi.

and xiii.), which (II:xv.) is compounded of many other ideas, whereof

some are adequate and some inadequate  (II:xxix.Coroll.  , II:xxxviii.

Coroll.).  
(3:2)   Whatsoever therefore follows from the nature of mind,
          ]
the [
and has mind for its proximate cause,  through which it must be un-

derstood,  must  necessarily follow either from an adequate or from

an inadequate idea.   (3:3)  But in so far as the mind  (III:i.) has inade-
                                                                                 ]
active states [
quate ideas, it is necessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the

mind follow solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is

only passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas Q.E.D.



Note.— 
(3:4)  Thus we see,  that passive states are not attributed to

the  mind, except in so far as it contains something involving nega-
 
4P32                                           { , at times unavoidably, } 
tion, or in so far as it is regarded ^ as a part of Nature, which cannot
                                                                      
Bk.XIX:22621.
be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts:
                                                                    ]
characteristic of [ 
I  could  thus  show,  that passive states are attributed to individual
                                
                                              [ related ] 
things  in the  page 136   same way that they are attributed to the mind,             Bk.XIV:2:1926.

and that they  cannot  otherwise  be perceived,  but  my purpose is

solely to treat of the human mind.      
4P59; 5P40.




Prop. IVE3:Wolfson:2:195Passive Emotions;   connatusBk.III:204, 205, 240, 241. <
                  
         Bk.XVIII:2313p4,5,6240p4243p4,5,6246p4,5,6Bk.XII:218-2213003p43273p43713p4. 

  
  
Proof.— (4:1) This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of any-

thing affirms the essence of that thing,  but does not negative it;  in

other  words,  it  postulates  the essence of the thing,  but does not

take it away. (4:2) So long therefore as we regard only the thing itself,

without taking into account external causes, we shall not be able to

find in it anything which could destroy it.  Q.E.D.




Prop. V.  Bk.XVIII:2313p4,5,6243p5,6240p5d2863p5. 

 
Proof.(5:1)  If they could agree together or co-exist in the same ob-

ject,  there would then be in the said object something which could

destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is absurd, therefore

things, &c.  Q.E.D.




Prop. VI.  >conatusBk.III:240, 241.<; Bk.XIA:12419; Bk.XII:217;
                            Bk.XVIII:14
3p6d1143p6d1203p6dp34241p6d277p6280p63003p6d; Bk.XX:23882. 

 
                     < Particular >
Proof (6:1) Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of G-D
                                                                          
Bk.XVIII:143p6d.
are expressed in a given determinate manner (I:xxv.Coroll.);  that is

(I:xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given determinate man-

ner the power of G-D, whereby G-D is and acts;  now no thing con-

tains  in  itself anything whereby it can be destroyed,  or which can

take  away its existence (III:iv.);  but contrariwise it is opposed to all

that could take away its existence (III.v.).  (6:2) Therefore, in so far as

it can,  and  in  so  far as it is in itself,  it endeavours to persist in its

own being.  Q.E.D.



Prop. VII.   Bk.III:230; Bk.XVIII:2223p7243p73053p7. 

 
Proof.(7:1) From the given essence of any thing certain consequen-

ces necessarily follow I:xxxvi.), nor have things any power save such
                                                            ]
determinate nature [
as  necessarily  follows  from  their  nature  as  determined  (I:xxix.);
                                                                           ]
conatus [
wherefore the power of any given thing, or the endeavour whereby,
                             
E3:Dijn:240 
either alone or with other things, it acts, or endeavours to act, that is

(III:vi.),  the  power  or endeavour, wherewith it endeavours  page 137  to

persist  in  its  own being  is  nothing  else  but  the  given  or  actual

essence  of  the  thing  in  question.  Q.E.D.



Prop. VIII.  Bk.III:240; Bk.XVIII:2026235p8; Bk.XIX:24934. 

  

Proof.(8:1) If it involved a limited time,  which should determine the

duration  of  the  thing,  it  would then follow solely from that power

whereby  the thing exists,  that the thing could not exist beyond the

limits  of  that time,  but that it must be destroyed;  but this (III:iv.) is

absurd.  (8:2)  Wherefore  the  endeavour wherewith a thing exists in-

volves  no definite time;  but, contrariwise, since (III:iv.) it will by the

same  power  whereby  it  already  exists  always  continue to exist,

unless it  be  destroyed  by  some  external  cause,  this endeavour

involves an indefinite time.




Prop. IX.  Bk.XVIII:179181903p9d261p9; Bk.XIX:23130. 

 
Proof.(9:1)  The  essence  of   the mind is constituted by adequate
         {
confused }
and  inadequate  ideas (III:iii.),  therefore (III:vii.),  both in so far as it

possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the latter, it en-

deavours  to persist in its own being,  and that for an indefinite time

(III:viii.).
(9:2)  Now  as  the  mind  (II:xxiii.)  is necessarily  conscious of

itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mind is               Data base 

therefore (III:vii.) conscious of its own endeavour.


                           ]
conatus [     
Note. (9:3) This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is call-
  
< Bk.XV:278113E3:Def.VI(2):175, 
      Bk.XV:276
100 on E2:XLVIII(6):120. >                        ]      together      [
ed will,  when  referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is call-
 {
EL:[55]:xxvii }            Bk.XVIII:1603p9s.
ed appetite;  it is,  in fact,  nothing else but man's essence, from the
          
Bk.III:241.                                                                          ] his [
nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its             Bk.XIV:2:2273.
  Bk.XVIII:245p9s. 
preservation;  and which man has thus been determined to perform.
                                   < Bk.XV:278114E3:Def.I(1):173 >; Bk.XIV:2:1681, 2:2032, 2:2064. 
(9:4)    Further,  between  appetite and desire  there  is  no  difference,
                                                    ^ 
Bk.III:233, 241, 242. 
except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as 
         
 Bk.XVIII:2213p9s     ^ 3P11S, 58
they  are  conscious of their appetite,  and may accordingly be thus
            {
EL:[55]:xxvii }Bk.XVIII:259p9s. 
defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof. (9:5) It is thus
                         ^
3De1, 3P37; 4P19, 26
plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish           Letter:3219[2]:331 
                       
Bk.XVIII:2623p9s.                           ] judge [         Bk.III:242.      
for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but
                                              < E4:Parkinson:280136 on E4:D.I:190 >         ^ 3P39S
on  the  other hand we deem a thing to be good,  because we strive            E3:Wolfson:2:2043.
 
for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it.  Bk.XIB:21456.

                           3P27C3, 28, 55CSC, 56, 57. 

 
 page 138
Prop. X.  Bk.XVIII:239-2413p10. 


Proof.(10:1)  Whatsoever can destroy our body,  cannot be postula-

ted therein (Ill:v.).   (2) Therefore neither can the idea of such a thing

occur  in G-D,  in so far as he has the idea of our body (II:ix.Coroll.);

that is  (II:xi., xiii.),  the  idea of that thing cannot be postulated as in
                                                                                      ]
thing [
our mind,  but contrariwise,  since (II:xi., xiii.)  the first element,  that

constitutes the essence of the mind,  is the idea of the human body
                                                        ]
basic and most important [
as  actually  existing,  it follows that the first and chief endeavour of
           [
by 3P7 ]
our  mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body:  thus,
                   [
that denies ]              Bk.III:219.
an  idea,  which  negatives the existence of our body,  is contrary to

our mind, &c.  Q.E.D..




Prop. XI.  Bk.XVIII:268p11-13 

 
Proof. (11:1) This proposition is evident from II:vii. or from II:xiv.


 
 3P15, 15C, 19, 20, 21, 23, 34, 35, 37, 38, 53, 55, 55CSC, 5659De2, 34P8, 18, 29, 30, 41, 51. 
Note. (11:2) Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,
            { transit }
and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes

to a state of lesser perfection P}.
(3) These passive states of transi-
                                                   
 Bk.XV:278115; Bk.XIV:2:2076. 
                                   [ affects ]         [ joy ]        [ sorrow ]           ( laetitia )
tion explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain(4) By pleasure            Hampshire:125 

therefore in the following propositions I shall signify a passive state
                             
Bk.III:219.                 Bk.XX:23983.                    ( tristitia ) 
wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection {°P}(11:5)  By pain I             Bk.XIV:2:3075.
                                            { at times unavoidable , say, going blind } 
shall  signify a passive state ^ wherein the mind passes to a lesser

perfection
.  
(11:6)  Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the
                                                        [
pleasure 4P4344,         ] cheerfulness [ 
body and mind together I shall call stimulation (titillatio) or merriment        Hampshire:142—titillatio
                                                                                               ] anguish
(hilaritas),  the  emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call suffer-
(
dolor)    (melancholia)
ing or melancholy.   (11:7)  But we must bear in mind,  that stimulation
                              
[ ascribed ]                                             ] him
and  suffering  are attributed to man,  when one part of his nature is
                                                       
4P42
more  affected  than  the rest,  merriment and melancholy,  when all
                
Bk.XVIII:1743p11s                                ( cupiditas )
parts are alike affected.  (11:8) What I mean by desire I have explained
                                                                          ^
3P57
in the note to Prop.ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no             Bk.XIV:2:2079. 
        <
Bk.XV:278116E3:LIX:171, E3:Def.IV:175. >                       De4
other  primary emotion;  I will show as I proceed,  that all other emo-
               ^ 
Bk.III:243. 
tions arise from these three. (11:9) But, before I go further, I should like 
           ^ spring—Bk.XIV:2:2085.
here to explain at greater length Prop. x. of this part, in order that we

may  page 139   clearly  understand how one idea is contrary to another.

(11:10) In the note.II:xvii. we showed that the idea, which constitutes the

essence  of  mind,  involves  the  existence  of body,  so long as the

body itself exists.  (11:11)  Again, it follows from what we pointed out in

the Coroll. to II:viii.,  that the present existence of our mind depends

solely  on the fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the

body.  (12) Lastly, we showed (II:xvii., xviii., note) that the power of the

mind,  whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends on

the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body. 
(13) Whence
                                                                                           
[ capacity to    
it  follows,  that  the  present  existence of the mind and its power of
perceive through the senses are annulled,
imagining  are  removed,  as  soon  as the mind ceases to affirm the

present   existence  of the body. 
(11:14)  Now the cause, why the mind

ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself

(III:iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist.  (11:15) For (by

II:vi.)  the cause,  why the mind affirms the existence of the body, is

not  that the body began to exist;  therefore, for the same reason,  it

does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body

ceases  to  exist;  but  (II:xvii.)  this  result  follows from another idea,

which excludes the present existence of our body and, consequently,

of our mind,  and  which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting             Bk.XIV:2:2021. 

the essence of our mind.      

 
 

Prop. XIIBk.III:244; Bk.XIV:2:208; Bk.XVIII:277p12; 2953p12; 3043p12. 

 
Proof.
(12:1)  So  long  as  the  human  body  is affected in a mode,

which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will

regard  that  external  body  as  present (II:xvii.),  and  consequently

(II:vii.), so long as the human mind regards an external body as pre-
                                       
   [ imagines ]
sent,  that is (II:xvii.note), conceives it, the human body is affected in
  ]
manner [
a  mode,   which  involves  the nature of the said external body;  thus

so  long  as  the  mind conceives things,  which increase or help the

power  of  activity in our body,  the body is affected in modes which

increase or help its power of activity (III:Post.i.); consequently (III:xi.)
                                                    {
at  that  instant }
the  mind's  power  of thinking is for that period increased or helped.
                                                                            [
strives ]
(12:2) Thus (III:vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine

such things.  Q.E.D..




Prop. XIII.  Bk.III:244; Bk.XIX:24320; Bk.XVIII:1583p13.

   

                                                        [ imagines
Proof.(13:1)  So  long  as  the mind conceives anything of the kind

alluded  to,  the  power  of  the mind and body is diminished or con-
                                                                                         ]
think of [
strained (cf. III:xii.Proof); nevertheless it will continue to conceive it,

until  the  mind  conceives something else,  which excludes the pre-

sent  existence  thereof (II:xvii.);  that is (as I have just shown),  the

power  of  the  mind  and of the body is diminished,  or constrained,

until  the mind conceives something else,  which excludes the exist-

ence  of  the former thing conceived:  therefore the mind (III:ix.),  as
                                   [
strive ]            [ imagine or recollect ]
far  as  it  can,  will  endeavour  to conceive or remember the latter.

Q.E.D.


                                                                           [
avoids imagining ]
Corollary. (13:2) Hence it follows, that the mind shrinks from conceiv-

ing those things, which diminish or constrain the power of itself and

of the body.            3P15C, 38.



         3P15C, 17, 19, 20, 22, 28, 29, 30S, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 48, 49, 55CSC, De7; 4P57. 
Note.  (13:3)  From  what  has been said we may clearly understand 
                    ( amor )     ( odium )  < Bk.XV:278117E3:LVI(15)N:169 >     [ joy ] 
the nature of Love and Hate.  (13:4) Love is nothing else but pleasure           Calculus:Fig.1(b) 

accompanied by the idea of an external causeHate is nothing else
     [
sorrow ]
but  pain  accompanied by the  idea of an external cause.   (13:5)  We

further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and      Bk.XIV:2:213—Inseparable. 

to  keep  present to him,  the object of his love;  while he who hates

endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. 
(13:6) But    

I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.  { E3:xxxv ff }




Prop. XIV. XIV-XVIIIBk.XIV:2:213; Bk.XVIII:2793p14. 

 

Proof.—  (14:1)   If  the  human  body  has  once been affected by two

bodies  at  once,  whenever  afterwards the mind conceives one of

them, it will straightway remember the other also (II:xviii.).  (2) But the

mind's  conceptions  indicate  rather  the emotions of our body than

the nature of external bodies (II:xvi.Coroll.ii.);  therefore, if the body,

and  consequently the mind  (III:Def.iii.)  has been once affected by

two emotions at the same time,  it will,  whenever it is afterwards af-

fected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.




Prop. XV.  Bk.XIX:24322 & e; Bk.XVIII:257p15.  

 
                                ] supposed [
Proof.(15:1) Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously  page 141   

affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor dimin-

ishes  its power of activity, and the other does either increase or di-

minish the said power (III:Post.i.).  (2) From the foregoing proposition

it  is  evident that,  whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the

former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) neither increa-

ses nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at the same time af-

fected  by  the latter,  which  does increase or diminish its power of

activity,  that  is  (III:xi.note)  it will be affected with pleasure or pain.

(15:3) Thus the former of the two emotions will,  not through itself, but
  ]
indirectly [
accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain.  (15:4) In the same way

also  it  can  be  easily  shown,  that a thing may be accidentally the

cause of desire.  Q.E.D.



Corollary.
(15:5) Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing

with  the  emotion  of pleasure or pain,  though that thing be not the

efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it.

                                   3P16, 35, 35S, 41, 50S, 52S.



Proof. (15:6)  For from this fact alone it arises (III:xiv.),  that the mind

afterwards  conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of
  [
Joy or Sadness ]
pleasure or pain,  that is  (III:xi.note),  according as the power of the           Calculus:Fig.1(a) 

mind  and  body may be increased or diminished,  &c.;  and  conse-

quently (III:xii.), according as the mind may desire or shrink from the

conception of it (III:xiii.Coroll.), in other words (III:xiii.note), according

as it may love or hate the same.  Q.E.D.                                                       Calculus:Fig.1(b) 





Note. (15:7) Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love

or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;
                            
                  ( misericordia )   3De9
merely, as the phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. (15:8) We should

refer  to  the same category those objects,  which affect us pleasur-

ably or painfully, simply because they resemble other objects which

affect  us  in  the  same  way.   (15:9)  This I will show in the next Prop. 
               < Bk.XV:279118Neff-L60(56):385, last paragraph.> { Nature and Miracles } 
(15:10)  I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to introduce

these  terms  "sympathy" and "antipathy,"  wished to signify thereby
       < Bk.XV:283163 on E5:Prf.(20):246. > 
some occult qualities in things;  nevertheless I think we may be per-

mitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities.




Prop. XVI.  Bk.XVIII:278p16,17. 

 

Proof.(16:1)  The point of resemblance was in the object  (by hypo-

thesis),  when  we  regarded  it  with pleasure or pain, thus (III. xiv),

when  the  mind  is affected by the image thereof, it will straightway

be affected by one or the other emotion, and consequently the thing,

which we  perceive to  have the same point of resemblance,  will be
  ]
indirectly [
accidentally ( III:xv.)  a  cause of pleasure or pain.  (16:2) Thus (by the
       
Bk.XIX:24322 & e.
foregoing  Corollary),  although  the  point  in  which the two objects

resemble  one  another  be  not  the  efficient  cause of the emotion, 

we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.   Q.E.D..




Prop. XVII.  Bk.XIB:21560; Bk.XVIII:278p16,17; Bk.XIX:24323

 

Proof.(17:1) The given thing is  (by hypothesis)  in itself a cause of

pain,  and  (III:xiii.note),  in so far as we imagine it with this emotion,

we shall hate it:  further, inasmuch as we conceive that it has some

point  of resemblance to something else,  which is wont to affect us

with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall with an equally

strong  impulse of pleasure love it  (III:xvi.);  thus we shall both hate

and love the same thing.  Q.E.D..


                          [
constitution ]
Note. (17:2) This disposition of the mind, which arises from two con-
                     
Bk.XIV:2:2142—wavering; Bk.XIX:24323. 
trary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the emotions in the
                       
Bk.XIV:2:2144     ^ 3P31
same  relation as doubt does to the imagination (II:xliv.note); vacilla-
                                                                                           ]
intensity [
tion  and  doubt  do not differ one from the other,  except as greater
                                                                 [
by 3P17 ]
differs from less.  (17:3) But we must bear in mind that I have deduced

this  vacillation from causes,  which give rise through themselves to
                                                              
Bk.XIV:2:2145. 
one of the emotions,  and to the other accidentally.  (17:4)  I have done

this, in order that they might be more easily deduced from what went

before; but I do not deny that vacillation of the disposition generally
 
arises from an object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions.             
Bk.XIV:2:2146.

(17:5) The human body is composed  (II:Post.i.)  of a variety of individ-

ual  page 143    parts of different nature,  and may therefore  (Ax.i. after

Lemma iii.  after  II: xiii.)  be affected in a variety of different ways by

one  and  the  same  body;  and contrariwise,  as one and the same

thing  can  be  affected  in many ways,  it can also in many different

ways affect one and the same part of the body.   (17:6)  Hence we can

easily  conceive,  that  one  and  the same object may be the cause

of many and conflicting emotions. .




Prop. XVIII. 

 

Proof. (18:1)  So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,

he  will regard that thing as present,  even though it be non-existent

(II:xvii.&Coroll.), he will not conceive it as past or future, except in so

far  as  its  image is joined to the image of time past or future (II:xliv.

note).  (2) Wherefore the image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is

identical,  whether  it  be  referred to time past,  time future,  or time

present; that is (II:xvi.Cor2.), the disposition or emotion of the body

is identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or present.

(18:3) Thus  the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same,  whether the

image be of a thing past or future.  Q.E.D.


                                                  
3De15; 4D6.
Note I. (18:4)  I  call  a  thing  past or future,  according  as we either

have been or shall be affected thereby.  (18:5) For instance, according
                                                                                           ]
refreshed [
as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has recre-
                          ]
refresh [
ated  us,  or will recreate us,  according as it has harmed us,  or will

harm us. 
(6) For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its existence; that

is, the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence

of the thing, and therefore (II:xvii.) the body is affected by the image

of  the  thing,  in the same way as if the thing were actually present.

(18:7)  However,  as  it  generally  happens  that those,  who have had

many experiences, vacillate, so long as they regard a thing as future
                                        
Bk.XIV:2:2144. 
or past,  and are usually in doubt about its issue  (II:xliv.note);  it fol-

lows that the emotions which arise from similar images of things are

not so constant,  but are generally disturbed by the images of other
                                                             ]
outcome [
things, until men become assured of the issue. 



Note II.
(18:8) From what has just been said, we understand what is
                                                  3P50, 50S, De13, 15; 4D6                                       [ gladness ]
meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence,   page 144   Despair, Joy,
             [
remorse ]
and Disappointment (Conscientiś morsus - thus rendered by Mr. Pollock.).

(18:8a)  Hope is nothing else but an inconstant pleasure,  arising from

the image of something future or past, whereof we do not yet know
    ]
outcome [
the issue.   (18:9)  Fear, on the other hand,  is an inconstant pain also

arising  from  the  image  of something concerning which we are in

doubt.   (10)  If the element of doubt be removed from these emotions,

hope becomes  Confidence and fear becomes Despair (11)  In other

words,  Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of something con-
                                                                               [
gladness ]    [ joy ]
cerning which we have hoped or feared(18:12) Again, Joy is Pleasure

arising  from  the  image of something past whereof we doubted the
                     [
remorse ]            [ sadness ]             [ gladness ]
issue. (13) Disappointment is the Pain opposed to Joy.
 


Prop. XIX.  XIX-XXXIIBk.XIV:2:215; Bk.XVIII:1583p13,19,56.

 
                                                                         [ strives to imagine ]                                               
Proof.(19:1) The mind,  as far as possible, endeavours to conceive

those  things  which  increase  or  help  the body's power of activity

(III:xii.);  in  other  words  (III:xiii.note),  those  things  which  it  loves.
             ]
imagination [
(19:2)  But  conception  is  helped by those things which postulate the

existence of a thing, and contrariwise is hindered by those which ex-
                                             
Durant65:176
clude the existence of a thing (II:xvii.); therefore the images of things,

which  postulate  the existence of an object of love,  help the mind's
  ]
conatus [
endeavour to conceive the object of love, in other words (III:xi.note),

affect the mind pleasurably; contrariwise those things, which exclude

the  existence  of an object of love,  hinder the aforesaid mental en-

deavour; in other words, affect the mind painfully.  (19:3) He, therefore,

who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed will feel pain,

&c.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XX.  Bk.XVIII:1583p20; Bk.XIX:24424.

 

Proof.— (20:1) The mind (III:xiii.) endeavours to conceive those things,

which exclude the existence of things whereby the body's power of

activity  is diminished or constrained; that is (III:xiii.note),  it endeav-

ours  to  conceive  such  things  as  exclude the existence of what it

hates; therefore the image of a thing, which excludes the existence

of what the mind hates, helps the aforesaid mental effort, in   page 145

other words (III:xi.note),  affects the mind pleasurably.  (20:2)  Thus he

who  conceives  that  the  object  of  his  hate  is  destroyed will feel

pleasure.  Q.E.D.



Prop. XXI.  Bk.XVIII:25719-21.

 
  
Proof.
(21:1) The  images  of  things  (as we showed in III:xix.) which

postulate the existence of the object of love, help the mind's endeav-

our to conceive the said object.
(21:2) But pleasure postulates the exist-

ence  of something feeling pleasure, so much the more in proportion

as the emotion of pleasure is greater; for it is (III:xi.note) a transition

to a greater perfection; therefore the image of pleasure in the object
                                        ]
conatus [
of love helps the mental endeavour of the lover; that is, it affects the

lover  pleasurably,  and so much the more, in proportion as this emo-

tion  may  have been greater in the object of love.   (21:3) This was our

first  point.  (21:4) Further, in so far as a thing is affected with pain, it is

to that extent destroyed, the extent being in proportion to the amount

of pain (III:xi.note); therefore (III:xix.) he who conceives,  that the ob-

ject of his love is affected painfully, will himself be affected painfully,

in  proportion  as  the said emotion is greater or less in the object of

love.  Q.E.D.



Prop. XXII.

 
                                                    [ with joy or sadness ]
Proof.(22:1)  He,  who  affects pleasurably or painfully the object of

our love,  affects us also pleasurably or painfully—that is, if we con-

ceive  the  loved  object  as  affected  with the said pleasure or pain
                                                                    ]
supposed [
(III:xxi.).   (22:2)   But  this  pleasure or pain is postulated to come to us
          {
awareness }
accompanied by the idea of an external cause; therefore (III:xiii.note),

if we conceive that anyone affects an object of our love pleasurably

or  painfully,  we  shall  be  affected  with love or hatred towards him.

Q.E.D.


                                                            
3P27S, De18. ( misericordia )
Note.
(22:3) Prop. xxi. explains to us the nature of Pity, which   page 146 

we  may  define  as pain arising from another's hurt.  (4)  What term we

can  use  for  pleasure  arising  from  another's  gain,  I  know  not.


(22:5)  We  will  call  the love towards him who confers a benefit on an-

other, Approval; and the hatred towards him who injures another, we
                
3De20
will call Indignation.  (6) We must further remark, that we not only feel
   {
Durant:191}
pity  for  a  thing which we have loved (as shown in III:xxi.),  but also              love/need

for a thing which we have hitherto regarded without emotion,  provi-
                                             
3P27C3S
ded  that  we  deem that it resembles ourselves (as I will show pres-
                                              { ^
more likely to help us in our need}
ently).  (22:7)Thus, we bestow approval on one who has benefited any-

thing resembling ourselves, and contrariwise, are indignant with him

who has done it an injury.                




Prop. XXIII.


Proof.(23:1)  In  so far as an object of hatred is painfully affected,  it

is  destroyed,  to  an  extent proportioned to the strength of the pain

(III:xi.note).  (2)Therefore, he (III:xx.) who conceives, that some object

of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure, to an extent pro-

portioned  to  the  amount  of  pain he conceives in the object of his

hatred.  (23:3) This was our first point.  (23:4)  Again, pleasure postulates

the existence of the pleasurably affected thing (III:xi.note), in propor-

tion as the pleasure is greater or less.   (23:5)  If anyone imagines that

an  object  of  his  hatred  is  pleasurably  affected,  this conception

(III:xiii.)  will  hinder  his  own  endeavour  to persist;  in other words

(III:xi.note), he who hates will be painfully affected.  Q.E.D.



Note.
(23:6)  This pleasure can scarcely be felt unalloyed, and with-
               
Bk.XIV:2:2151. 
out any mental conflict.  (7) For (as I am about to show in Prop. xxvii.),
                               [
imagines ]
in  so far as a man conceives that something similar to himself is af-

fected by pain, he will himself be affected in like manner; and he will

have the contrary emotion in contrary circumstances.   (23:8)  But here

we are regarding hatred only.



Prop. XXIV.

 

Proof.(24:1) This proposition is proved in the same way as III:xxii.,

which see.


Note.
(24:2) These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable to
 
3P55CS, 55CSC, De24.
envy, which, accordingly, is nothing else but hatred, in so far as it is

regarded  as  disposing  a  man  to  rejoice in another's hurt, and to

grieve at another's advantage.




Prop. XXV.  Bk.XVIII:277p25.

 

Proof.(25:1) That, which we conceive to affect an object of our love

pleasurably  or  painfully,  affects  us  also pleasurably,  or painfully

(III:xxi.).  (25:2)  But the mind (III:xii) endeavours,  as far as possible,  to

conceive  those  things which affect us pleasurably;  in other words

(II:xvii.&Coroll.),  it endeavours to regard them as present.  (25:3) And,

contrariwise (III:xiii.), it endeavours to exclude the existence of such

things as affect us painfully;  therefore, we endeavour to affirm con-

cerning  ourselves,  and  concerning the loved object,  whatever we

conceive to affect ourselves, or the loved object pleasurably. Q.E.D.




Prop. XXVI.

 
 Proof.— (26:1) This  proposition follows from III:xxiii.,  as the foregoing

proposition followed from III:xxi.



Note.
(26:2) Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may

easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and, contrariwise,

too meanly of a hated object.  (3) This feeling is called pride,  in refer-

ence to the man who thinks too highly of himself, and is a species of

madness,  wherein a man dreams with his eyes open,  thinking that

he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his concep-

tion,  and thereupon accounting them real,  and exulting in them, so

long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their exist-

ence,  and determines his own 
page 148   power of action.  (26:4)  Pride,

therefore,  is  pleasure  springing from a man thinking too highly of

himself.  (26:5)  Again, the pleasure which arises from a man thinking

too highly of another is called over-esteem(26:6) Whereas the pleas-
                                                                                         ]
disparagement [
ure  which  arises  from  thinking too little of a man is called disdain.
                                                                                                                       3De22, 28.




Prop. XXVII.  Bk.XVIII:279p27. 

 
                                                                   ] affections [
Proof.(27:1)  The  images  of  things are modifications of the human

body, whereof the ideas represent external bodies as present to us
 ]
 note [                           ] II.xvi [
(II:xvii.);  in other words (II.x.),  whereof the ideas involve the nature

of our body, and, at the same time, the nature of external bodies as

present.  (2) If, therefore, the nature of the external body be similar to

the nature of our body,  then the idea which we form of the external

body will involve a modification of our own body similar to the modi-

fication of the external body. 
(27:3) Consequently, if we conceive any-

one similar to ourselves as affected by any emotion, this conception

will  express  a  modification  of  our  body  similar  to  that  emotion.

(27:4) Thus, from the fact of conceiving a thing like ourselves to be af-

fected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emo-

tion.  (27:5) If, however, we hate the said thing like ourselves, we shall,
      
     ] III.xxiii [
to  that extent,  be affected by a contrary,  and not similar,  emotion.   


                                  
 {
Durant:191}
Note I.  (27:6)  This imitation of emotions,  when it is referred to pain,
               ]
 pity [  3De18, 35.
is called compassion (cf. III:xxii.note); when it is referred to desire, it
                   
3De33.
is called emulation, which is nothing else but the desire of anything,

engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the

like desire



Corollary I.
(27:7) If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hither-

to  regarded with no emotion,  pleasurably affects something similar
                                                           {
approval }
to ourselves,  we shall be affected with love towards him.  (27:8)  If, on

the other hand,  we conceive that he painfully affects the same,  we

shall be affected with hatred towards him.           3P32, De20.



Proof.—  (27:9)  This  is  proved  from  the last proposition in the same

manner as  III. xxii.  is proved from III:xxi.



Corollary II.
(27:10)  We cannot hate a thing which we pity, because
   ]
 distress [             [ with  Sadness ]
its misery affects us painfully.

page 149 
                                                                       [ by 3P23 ]      ] be pleased [
Proof.(27:11) If we could hate it for this reason, we should rejoice in

its pain, which is contrary to the hypothesis.


                               
                                         [ suffering ]
Corollary III. (27:12)  We seek to free from misery,  as far as we can,                 slums

a thing which we pityIV.l. }                     4P50.                                  Mark Twain



Proof. (27:13)  That,  which painfully affects the object of our pity, af-
                                       [
Sadness, by 3P27 ]
fects  us also with similar pain  (by the foregoing proposition); there-

fore,  we  shall endeavour to recall everything which removes its ex-

istence,  or  which destroys it  (cf. III:xiii.);  in other words (III:ix.note),

we  shall  desire  to  destroy  it,  or we shall be determined for its de-

struction; thus, we shall endeavour to free from misery a thing which

we pity.   



Note II.
(27:14) This will or appetite for doing good, which arises from

pity of the thing whereon we would confer a benefit, is called benev-

olence,  and  is  nothing  else  but  desire  arising from compassion.

(27:15)  Concerning  love  or  hate  towards  him who has done good or

harm  to  something,  which  we  conceive  to be like ourselves,  see

III:xxii.note.




Prop. XXVIII.  Bk.XVIII:1583p28; Bk.XIX:24320; Bk.XX:23984. 

 
                                                                                   ] imagine [
Proof.(28:1)  We  endeavour,  as  far  as  possible, to  conceive that
                   ]
 think [                             [ joy ]
which  we  imagine  to conduce to pleasure  (III:xii.) ;  in other words

(II:xvii.) we shall endeavour to conceive it as far as possible as pres-

ent or actually existing.   (28:2)  But the endeavour of the mind,  or the

mind's power of thought, is equal to, and simultaneous with, the en-

deavour of the body, or the body's power of action.  (3) (This is clear

from II:vii.Coroll. and II:xi.Coroll.). (4) Therefore we make an absolute

endeavour for its existence, in other words (which by III:ix.note come

to the same thing) we desire and strive for it; this was our first point.

(28:5)  Again,  if we conceive that something,  which we believed to be
                 [
sadness ]
the cause of pain,  that is (III:xiii.note),  which we hate, is destroyed,

we shall rejoice (III:xx.). (6) We shall, therefore (by the first part of this

proof), endeavour to destroy, the same, or (III:xiii.) to remove it from             Bk.XIV:2:2121.
 
us,  so  that  we  may not regard it as present;  this was our second

point.  (28:7)  Wherefore whatsoever conduces to pleasure, &c.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XXIX.  Bk.XVIII:279p29. 


Proof.— (29:1)   From  the  fact of imagining,  that men love or hate any-

thing,  we  shall  love  or  hate  the same thing (III:xxvii.).   (29:2)  That is

(III:xiii.note),  from  this mere fact we shall feel pleasure or pain at the
                                                   [
by 3P28 ]
thing's  presence.   (29:3)   And  so  we  shall endeavour to do whatever

we   conceive   men  to  love  or  regard  with  pleasure,  etc.  Q.E.D.



Note.—  
(29:4)  This  endeavour  to do a thing or leave it undone, solely
                                                           
3P31CS
in  order  to  please  men,  we  call  ambition,  especially when we so
                                                    ]
 multitude [
eagerly  endeavour  to  please the vulgar,  that we do or omit certain

things  to  our  own  or  another's  hurt:  in  other cases it is generally
                                                                                       
3P53C; 4P37S2
called  kindliness(29:5)   Furthermore  I give the name of praise to the              Mark Twain 

pleasure,  with  which  we  conceive the action of another,  whereby

he  has  endeavoured  to please us;  but of blame to the pain where-

with we feel aversion to his action. 




Prop. XXX.  Bk.XVIII:277p30. 

 

Proof. (30:1)  He  who conceives, that he affects others with pleasure

or  pain,  will,  by  that  very fact, himself be affected with pleasure or

pain  (III:xxvii.), but, as a man (II:xix. and xxiii.) is conscious of himself
                       ]
affections [
through  the  modifications  whereby he is determined to action, it fol-

lows  that  he  who conceives, that he affects others pleasurably, will

be  affected  with  pleasure  accompanied  by  the  idea of himself as

cause;  in  other words, will regard himself with pleasure.  (30:2) And so
    [
the converse ]
mutatis mutandis in the case of pain. Q.E.D.


                                   
[
note ]        3P34, 35
Note. (30:3)  As  love  (III:xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of
          
Bk.XIV:1:3198. 
an  external  cause,  and  hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of

an  external  cause;  the  pleasure and pain in question will be a spe-

cies  of  love  and hatred. 
(30:4)  But,  as the terms love and hatred are

used  in  reference  to  external objects,  we will employ other names

for  the  emotions  now  under  discussion: pleasure accompanied by
                                    <[
internal ]>          { See Curley Book VIII:511 } 
the  idea  page 151  of  an  external  cause (So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch

version  and  Camerer  read,   "an internal cause."     "Honour " = Gloria.)    we  will  style
    
3P42                                                                                    3P40S, 3De31.
Honour  and   the  emotion  contrary  thereto we will style Shame:  I

mean  in  such  cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's

belief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure accom-
   
                                     [ internal ]
panied by the idea of an external cause (So Van Vloten and Bruder. The Dutch

version and Camerer read, "an internal cause." "Honour " = Gloria.)  is  called self-com-

placency
,  and  its  contrary pain is called repentance
(30:5) Again, as

it  may  happen  (II:xvii.Coroll.)  that  the  pleasure,  wherewith a man

conceives  that  he affects others, may exist solely in his own imagin-

ation,  and  as (III:xxv.) everyone endeavours to conceive concerning

himself  that  which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it may
                                                                       
3P41S, De29
easily  come  to pass that a vain man may be proud and may imagine
                 ]
popular [                                                        ] obnoxious [
that  he  is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be an annoyance to

all.                                     3P34,  



Prop. XXXI. Bk.III:244ff.


Proof.—  (31:1)  From  the  mere  fact of conceiving that anyone loves

anything we shall ourselves love that thing (III:xxvii.): but we are as-

sumed  to love it already;  there is,  therefore,  a new cause of love,

whereby our former emotion is fostered; hence we shall thereupon

love it more steadfastly.  
(31:2) Again, from the mere fact of conceiving
                     ]
dislikes [
that  anyone  shrinks from anything,  we shall ourselves shrink from

that thing (III:xxvii.).  (3) If we assume that we at the same time love it,

we  shall  then  simultaneously  love  it  and  shrink from it;  in other
                                                ]
fluctuation of feelings. [
words, we shall be subject to vacillation (III:xvii.note).  Q.E.D.



Corollary.
(31:4) From the foregoing, and also from III:xxviii., it follows

that everyone endeavours, as far as possible, to cause others to love

what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself hates: as the poet

says:                                 
4P37; 5P4S.  

 

page 152

Note.(31:5) This endeavour to bring it about, that our own likes and
                                             
5P4S
dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really ambition (see

III:xxix.note) ;  wherefore  we  see  that  everyone  by nature desires

(appetere), that the rest of mankind should live according to his own
             
      ] attitudes [
individual  disposition:  when  such a desire is equally present in all,
               ]
hinders [
everyone stands in everyone else's way, and in wishing to be loved
                                ]
  provoke  mutual  dislike.    [
or praised by all, all become mutually hateful.




Prop. XXXII.  Bk.XVIII:301f3p32. 

 

Proof.— (32:1)  From  the  mere fact of our conceiving that another per-

son takes delight in a thing (III:xxvii.&Coroll.) we shall ourselves love

that  thing  and desire to take delight therein.   (32:2)   But we assumed
                                                                ]
impeded [
that  the  pleasure  in  question would be prevented by another's de-
             {
that thing }
light  in  its object; we shall, therefore, endeavour to prevent his pos-

session thereof (III:xxviii.).  Q.E.D.



Note.
(32:3)  We thus see that man's nature is generally so constitu-
                                                                      [
by 3P32 ] 3P55CS, De24
ted,  that he takes pity on those who fare ill,  and envies those who

fare  well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his own love for
                                 
4P34
the goods in their possession. (4) Further, we see that from the same
                                                                                    [
 compassionate ]
property  of  human nature, whence it follows that men are merciful,

it follows also that they are envious and ambitious.   (5)  Lastly, if  we
            
Bk.XV:278109 on E3:II(10)n:132, E3:Def.XXVII:179. > 
make appeal to Experience, we shall find that she entirely confirms

what  we  have said;  more especially if we turn our attention to the

first years of our life.  (32:6)  We find that children, whose body is con-
         {
doing what they wish without restraint }
tinually, as it were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they

see others laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to im-

itate  whatever  they see others doing,  and to possess themselves

whatever  they  conceive as delighting others:  inasmuch as the im-

ages  of  things  are,  as we have said,  modifications of the human

body, or modes wherein the human body, is affected and disposed

by external causes to act in this or that manner. 



Prop. XXXIII.  XXXIII-XLIXBk.XIV:2:217Emotions of love and hatred; Bk.XVIII:277p33. 

 
page 153

Proof.—  (33:1)  That which we love we endeavour, as far as we can,
   
  ] think of [
to conceive in preference to anything else (III:xii.).  (2) If the thing be

similar to ourselves,  we shall endeavour to affect it pleasurably in

preference to anything else (III:xxix.).   (33:3)  In other words, we shall

endeavour, as far as we can, to bring it about, that the thing should

be  affected  with  pleasure  accompanied by the idea of ourselves,

that is (III:xiii.note), that it should love us in return.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XXXIV.  Bk.XVIII:25734. 

 

Proof.(34:1)  We  endeavour (III:xxxiii.), as far as we can, to bring
                                                                                    [
by 3P13S ]
about, that what we love should love us in return: in other words,

that what we love should be affected with pleasure accompanied

by the idea of ourself as cause(2) Therefore, in proportion as the

loved  object  is more pleasurably affected because of us, our en-

deavour  will  be assisted—that is (III:xi.&note) the greater will be

our pleasure. 
(34:3) But when we take pleasure in the fact, that we

pleasurably affect something similar to ourselves, we regard our-

selves with pleasure  (III:xxx.);   therefore the greater the emotion
                                                                                      [
by 3P30S ]
with which we conceive a loved object to be affected,  [ the more

we shall exult at being esteemed
]
&c.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XXXV.  Bk.XVIII:278p35, 3013p35. 


Proof.—  (35:1)  In  proportion  as  a man thinks,  that a loved object is
                                                                                          ]
vanity [
well  affected  towards him,  will be the strength of his self-approval

(by the last Prop.), that is (III:xxx.note), of his pleasure; he will, there-

fore (III:xxviii.), endeavour, as far as he can, to imagine the loved ob-

ject  as most closely bound to him:  this endeavour or desire will be

increased,  if  he  thinks  that  someone  else  has  a  similar  desire

(III:xxxi.). 
(35:2)  But this endeavour or desire is assumed to be check-
                                         
                ] accompanied [
ed by the image of the loved object in conjunction with the image of

him whom the loved object has joined to itself ; therefore (III:xi.note)

he  will  for  that reason be affected with pain,  accompanied by the

idea of the loved object as a cause in conjunction with the image of
                                             [
note ]
his rival;  that is,  he will be (III:xiii.) affected with   page 154   hatred to-

wards  the  loved  object  and  also  towards his rival  (III:xv.Coroll.),
                                                                                          [
by 3P23 ]
which  latter  he  will envy  as  enjoying the beloved object.  Q.E.D.



Note.
 (35:3)  This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy
            (
zelotypia ) 5P20.                                                        ] vacillation [
is called Jealousy, which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering

of the disposition arising from combined love and hatred, accompa-             
Bk.XIV:2:2685. 

nied by the idea of some rival who is envied.  (4) Further, this hatred

towards the object of love will be greater, in proportion to the pleas-

ure  which the jealous man had been wont to derive from the recip-

rocated  love  of  the said object;  and also in proportion to the feel-

ings he had previously entertained towards his rival.  (35:5)  If he had
                                                                          ]
III.xxiv [
hated him, he will forthwith hate the object of his love,  because he

conceives it is pleasurably affected by one whom he himself hates:
            ]
III.xv.Cor [
and  also  because  he  is  compelled  to associate the image of his

loved one with the image of him whom he hates.  (35:6) This condition

generally  comes  into  play in the case of love for a woman:  for he
                                                                       ]
gives [
who  thinks,  that a woman whom be loves prostitutes herself to an-

other,  will feel pain,  not only because his own desire is restrained,

but  also  because,  being  compelled to associate the image of her
                                  ]
sexual parts [
he  loves  with  the  parts of shame  and the excreta of another,  he

therefore shrinks from her.


(35:7)  We must add,  that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved

with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives him

pain as a lover, as I will now show.
 


Prop. XXXVI. Bk.XVIII:278p36. 

 
 Proof.— (36:1)  Everything,  which a man has seen in conjunction with
                                                           ]
indirectly [
the object of his love, will be to him accidentally a cause of pleasure
             ]
III.xxviii [
(III:xv.);  he will,  therefore,  desire to possess it, in conjunction with

that wherein he has taken delight;  in other words,  he will desire to

possess  the  object  of  his  love under the same circumstances as

when he first took delight therein.  Q.E.D.   Bk.XIB:21560.



Corollary. (36:2) A lover will, therefore, feel pain if one of the afore-

said attendant circumstances be missing.



Proof.
(36:3) For, in so far as he finds some circumstance to be miss-

ing, he conceives something which excludes its existence.  (3a) As he

is  assumed  to  be desirous for love's sake  page 155  of  that  thing or

circumstance (by the last Prop.), he will, in so far as he conceives it

to be missing, feel pain (III:xix.).  Q.E.D.



Note.
(36:4)  This pain,  in so far as it has reference to the absence
                           
                   [ longing ]
of the object of love, is called Regret.




Prop. XXXVII. Bk.XVIII:260f3p37d. 

 
 
Proof.— (37:1)  Pain  diminishes  or  constrains man's power of activity

(III:xi.note), in other words (III:vii.), diminishes or constrains the effort,

wherewith he endeavours to persist in his own being; therefore (III:v.)

it is contrary to the said endeavour: thus all the endeavours of a man
                                                         
Bk.XIX:24320.
affected by pain are directed to removing that pain.   (37:2)  But (by the
          {
III.xi:5 }
definition of pain),  in  proportion  as the pain is greater,  so also is it

necessarily  opposed  to  a  greater  part  of man's power of activity;

therefore  the greater the pain,  the greater the power of activity em-
                                  [
by 3P9S ]
ployed to remove it; that is, the greater will be the desire or appetite
                            
Bk.XIX:23132.
in endeavouring to remove it.  (37:3)  Again,  since pleasure (III:xi.note)

increases or aids a man's power of activity it may easily be shown in

like manner,  that  a  man affected by pleasure has no desire further

than to preserve it,  and his desire will be in proportion to the magni-
         
Bk.XIX:24115 & 16.
tude of the pleasure.



(37:4)  Lastly,  since  hatred and love are themselves emotions of pain

and pleasure, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite,

or desire, which arises through hatred or love, will be greater in pro-

portion to the hatred or love.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XXXVIII. 

 

Proof.— (38:1)  If  a man begins to hate that which he had loved,  more

of  his appetites are put under restraint than if he had never loved it.

(38:2)  For love is a pleasure  (III:xiii.note)  which a man endeavours as           [ by 3P21 ]

far as he can to render permanent (III:xxviii.);  he does so by regard-

ing the object of his love as present,  and by affecting it as far as he
           [
Joy ]         [ by 3P21 ]            [ by 3P37 ]
can pleasurably;  this endeavour is greater in proportion as the love

is  greater,  and  so also is the endeavour to bring about that the be-

loved  should  return  his  affection  (III:xxxiii.).
page 156  (38:3)  Now these

endeavours  are  constrained  by  hatred  towards the object of love                 Need

(III:xiii.Coroll. and III:xxiii.); wherefore the lover (III:xi.note) will for this

cause  also  be  affected with pain,  the more so in proportion as his

love has been greater; that is, in addition to the pain caused by hat-

red, there is a pain caused by the fact that he has loved the object;

wherefore  the lover will regard the beloved with greater pain,  or in

other words, will hate it more than if he had never loved it,  and with

the  more  intensity  in  proportion  as  his  former  love was greater.

Q.E.D.




Prop. XXXIX.  Bk.XIB:21560; Bk.XVIII:2753p39d, 277p39, 3453p39.  


                                                                             ] imagine [
Proof.— (39:1)  To  hate  a  man  is  (III:xiii.note)  to conceive him as a

cause  of  pain;  therefore he who hates a man will endeavour to re-

move or destroy him.  (39:2)  But if anything more painful,  or,  in other

words,  a greater evil,  should accrue to the hater thereby and if the

hater  thinks  he  can  avoid  such evil by not carrying out the injury,

which he planned against the object of his hate he will desire to ab-

stain from inflicting that injury (III:xxviii.),  and  the strength of his en-

deavour  (III:xxxvii.)  will be greater than his former endeavour to do

injury,  and  will  therefore  prevail over it, as we asserted.  (39:3)  The

second part of this proof proceeds in the same manner. (39:3a) Where-

fore he who hates another, etc.  Q.E.D.


                           
3P51S                                            Bk.XIV:2:2295. 
Note. (39:4)  By  good  I  here mean every kind of pleasure,  and all

that conduces thereto,  especially that which satisfies our longings,

whatsoever  they  may  be.  (39-5)  By evil,  I mean every kind of pain,                 Satan 

especially that which frustrates our longings.  (39:6)  For I have shown

(III:ix.note)  that  we  in  no  case  desire  a thing because we deem

it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because we desire

it:  consequently we deem evil that which we shrink from; everyone,
                                                                              
4P70.
therefore, according to his particular emotions, judges or estimates

what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse, lastly, what

is best, and what is worst.  (39:7) Thus a miser thinks that abundance                 Satan 

of  money  is  the best,  and  want of money the worst; an ambitious

man  desires  nothing so much as glory,  and fears nothing so much

as  page 157  shame.   (8) To an envious man nothing is more delightful

than another's misfortune, and nothing more painful than another's

success.  (39:9)  So every man,  according  to his emotions,  judges a

thing to be good or bad, useful or useless. 
(39:10) The emotion, which

induces a man to turn from that which he wishes, or to wish for that
                                                     
3De39, 42;
which  he  turns  from,  is  called timidity, which may accordingly be

defined as the fear whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which

he  regards  as  future  by  encountering  a  lesser  evil   (III:xxviii.).

(39:11)  But if the evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes bash-

fulness
(39:12)  Lastly,  if  the desire to avoid a future evil be checked

by  the  fear  of  another  evil,  so  that  the man knows not which to

choose,  fear  becomes  consternation,  especially  if  both the evils

feared be very great. 
 


Prop. XL.  Bk.XVIII:2743p40d, 279p40.  

 

Proof.— (40:1) He who conceives another as affected with hatred, will

thereupon  be  affected  himself with hatred  (III:xxvii.),  that is,  with
]
III:xiii.note [
pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. 
(40:2)  But, by the

hypothesis,  he  conceives  no cause for this pain except him who is

his enemy; therefore, from conceiving that he is hated by some one,

he will be affected with pain, accompanied by the idea of his enemy;
   ]
III:xiii.note [
in other words, he will hate his enemy in return.  Q.E.D.


                                                                           
 
3P41, 41S.
Note.  (40:3)  He  who  thinks that he has given just cause for hatred

will (III:xxx.&note) be affected with shame; but this case (III:xxv.) rare-

ly happens.   (4)  This reciprocation of hatred may also arise from the

hatred,  which  follows an endeavour to injure the object of our hate

(III:xxxix.).   (40:5)  He therefore  who conceives that he is hated by an-

other  will  conceive  his  enemy  as the cause of some evil or pain;

thus he will be affected with pain or fear,  accompanied by the idea

of his enemy as cause; in other words, he will be affected with hat-

red towards his enemy, as I said above. 



Corollary I.— 
(40:6)  He  who  conceives,  that one whom he loves
                        
   suffer       [    3P41C
hates him, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  (7) For, in

so far as he conceives that he is an object of hatred, he is deter-
                                           [
by 3P40 ]
mined to hate his enemy in return.  (40:8) But, by the hypothesis, he
                                                                     [
 tormented by ]
nevertheless loves him: wherefore he will be a prey to conflicting
 
Bk.XVIII:256p17,40c1. 
hatred and love. 


page 158

Corollary II. (40:9) If a man conceives that one, whom he has hither-

to regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from motives

of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind.


Proof.
(40:10) He who conceives, that another hates him, will (by the

last proposition)  hate his enemy in return, and (III:xxvi.) will endeav-

our  to recall everything which can affect him painfully; he will more-

over endeavour to do him an
injury (III:xxxix.). (40:11) Now the first thing

of  this sort which he conceives is the injury done to himself; he will,
                                                       
3De37; 4P37S2
therefore, forthwith endeavour to repay it in kind. Q.E.D. 



Note.
(40:12) The endeavour to injure one whom we hate is called

Anger;  the endeavour to repay in kind injury done to ourselves is
                  3De37; 4P34
called Revenge.




Prop. XLI.  Bk.XVIII:277p41, 277p40s, 41sp25. 

 
Proof.— (41:1) This proposition is proved in the same way as the

preceding one.  See also the note appended thereto.



Note.
(41:2)  If he believes that he has given just cause for the love,
                 
4P49; 57S
he will take pride therein (III:xxx.&note); this is what most often hap-

pens (III:xxv.),  and we said that its contrary took place whenever a

man conceives himself to be hated by another.  (3)  (See note to pre-

ceding proposition.) 
(41:4) This reciprocal love, and consequently the

desire of benefiting him who loves us  (III:xxxix.),  and  who endeav-
                                                                     
3De34
ours to benefit us,  is called gratitude or thankfulness.   (41:5)  It thus

appears that men are much more prone to take vengeance  than to

return benefits.



Corollary.
(41:6) He who imagines, that he is loved by one whom he
                      [       
  torn  by            ]      Bk.XIB:21560.
hates, will be a prey to conflicting hatred and love.  (7) This is proved

in the same way as the first corollary of the preceding proposition.



Note.
(41:8) If hatred be the prevailing emotion, he will endeavour to

injure him who loves him; this emotion is called cruelty, especially if

the  victim  be  believed  to have given no ordinary cause for hatred.




Prop. XLII.  Bk.XVIII:279p42. 

 
page 159

Proof.(42:1) When a man loves something similar to himself, he en-

deavours, as far as he can, to bring it about that he should be loved

thereby in return  (III:xxxiii.).   (42:2) Therefore he who has conferred a
                               ]
 longing for [
benefit confers it in obedience to the desire, which he feels of being
                                                                              [
Esteem ]
loved  in  return; that is (III:xxxiv.) from the hope of honour or (III:xxx.
            [
Joy ]             [ by 3P12 ]
note) pleasure;  hence he will endeavour,  as far as he can, to con-

ceive this  cause  of  honour,  or  to  regard  it  as  actually  existing.

(42:3) But, by the hypothesis, he conceives something else, which ex-

cludes the existence of the said cause of honour: wherefore he will

thereat feel pain (III:xix.).  Q.E.D.



Prop. XLIII.

 

Proof.— (43:1) He who conceives, that an object of his hate hates him

in  return,  will thereupon feel a new hatred, while the former hatred

(by hypothesis) still remains (III:xl.).   (2)  But if, on the other hand, he

conceives  that  the  object  of  hate loves him,  he will to this extent
  ]
 III:xxx [
(III:xxxviii.) regard himself with pleasure, and (III:xxix.) will endeavour

to please the cause of his emotion.   (43:3)  In other words,  he will en-

deavour not to hate him (III:xli.),  and not to affect him painfully; this

endeavour (III:xxxvii.) will be greater or less in proportion to the emo-

tion  from  which  it arises.   (43:4)  Therefore,  if it be greater than that

which  arises from hatred,  and through which the man endeavours
              ]
 III:xxvi [
to affect painfully the thing which he hates, it will get the better of it
     ]
 eradicate [
and banish the hatred from his mind.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XLIV.

 
 
Proof.— (44:1) The proof proceeds in the same way as III:xxxviii. for he

who begins to love a thing, which he was wont to hate or regard with

pain, from the very fact of loving, feels pleasure.  (2) To this pleasure
    ]
 III:xiii.note [
involved  in love is added the pleasure arising, from aid given to the
                                             
Bk.XIX:24529.
endeavour  to  remove the pain involved in hatred (III:xxxvii.), accom-

panied by the idea of the former object of hatred as cause.



Note.
 (44:3) Though this be so,  no one will endeavour to hate any-

thing, or to be affected with pain, for the sake of enjoying this great-

er pleasure;  that is, no one will desire that  page 160  he should be in-

jured, in the hope of recovering from the injury, nor long to be ill for

the  sake of getting well.   (4)  For everyone will always endeavour to

persist in his being, and to ward off pain as far as he can.  (44:5) If the

contrary  is conceivable,  namely,  that a man should desire to hate

someone,  in  order  that  he  might  love  him  the  more  thereafter,

he will always desire to hate him.
(44:6) For the strength of the love is

in proportion to the strength of the hatred, wherefore the man would

desire,  that  the  hatred  be  continually  increased  more and more,

and, for a similar reason, he would desire to become more and more

ill, in order that he might take a greater pleasure in being restored to

health:  in  such  a case he would always endeavour to be ill,  which

(III:vi.) is absurd.




Prop. XLV.   Bk.XVIII:277p45. 


Proof.— (45:1) The beloved object feels reciprocal hatred towards him

who  hates it  (III:xl.);  therefore the lover,  in conceiving that anyone

hates  the  beloved object,  conceives the beloved thing as affected
                                           ]
note [
by hatred,  in other words  (III:xiii.),  by pain; consequently he is him-
                          ]
III.xxi [
self  affected  by  pain  accompanied  by the idea of the hater of the

beloved thing as cause; that is, he will hate him who hates anything

which he himself loves (III:xiii.note).  Q.E.D.




Prop. XLVI.  Bk.XVIII:278p46. 

  
Proof.— This is evident from III:xvi.




Prop. XLVII.

 
 
Proof.— (47:1) This is evident from III:xxvii.  (2) For in so far as we con-
                                                                       
Bk.XIX:24730.
ceive  a thing similar to ourselves to be affected with pain,  we our-

selves feel pain.



Note.
(47:3) This proposition can also be proved from the Corollary

to  II:xvii.   (47:4)   Whenever we remember anything,  page 161  even if it

does not actually, exist, we regard it only as present, and the body

is affected in the same manner; wherefore, in so far as the remem-

brance of the thing is strong,  a man is determined to regard it with
[
sadness ]
pain;  this  determination,  while  the  image of the thing in question

lasts, is indeed checked by the remembrance of other things exclud-

ing the existence of the aforesaid thing, but is not destroyed: hence,
                               
3De113De32.
a  man  only  feels  pleasure  in  so  far as the said determination is

checked: for this reason the joy arising from the injury done to what

we hate is repeated, every time we remember that object of hatred.

(47:5) For, as we have said, when the image of the thing in question is

aroused, inasmuch as it involves the thing's existence, it determines

the  man  to  regard the thing with the same pain as he was wont to

do,  when it actually did exist.  (47:6)  However, since he has joined to

the  image  of  the  thing other images,  which exclude its existence,

this determination to pain is forthwith checked, and the man rejoices

afresh  as  often as the repetition takes place. 
(47:7) This is the cause
                                                       ]
ills [
of men's pleasure in recalling past evils, and delight in narrating dan-
                                        ]
been saved [                                ] imagine [
gers from which they have escaped(47:8)  For when men conceive a

danger,  they conceive it as still future, and are determined to fear it;

this  determination is checked afresh by the idea of freedom,  which
                                                                                     {
 Calculus:Fig. 2 }
became  associated with the idea of the danger when they escaped
                                                ]
safe
therefrom:  this renders them secure afresh:  therefore they  rejoice

afresh.   { Herein lies the "Theory of Games."



Prop. XLVIII. Bk.XVIII:2863p48,495p2. 

  
Proof.— (48:1)  This  Prop. is evident from the mere definition  of  love

and hatred (III:xiii.note). (2) For pleasure is called love towards Peter,

and pain is called hatred towards Peter, simply in so far as Peter is

regarded as the cause of one emotion or the other.   (48:3)  When this

condition of causality is either wholly or partly removed, the emotion

towards Peter also wholly or in part vanishes.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XLIX.

 

Proof.(49:1)  A  thing  which we conceive as free must (I:Def.vii.) be

perceived  through itself without anything else.  (2)  If,  therefore,  we
                                       ]
III.xlviii. [
conceive  it  as  the  cause  of  pleasure or pain,  we shall therefore

(III:xiii.note) love it or hate it, and shall do so with the utmost love or
                                                             [
affect         
hatred  that  can  arise from the given emotion.  
(49:3)  But if the thing

which causes the emotion be conceived as acting by necessity, we

shall then (by the same I:Def.vii.) conceive it not as the sole cause,

but  as one of the causes of the emotion,  and therefore our love or

hatred towards it will be less.  Q.E.D..



Note. (49:4) Hence it follows, that men, thinking themselves to be

free, feel more love or hatred towards one another than towards

anything else:  to this consideration we must add the imitation of

emotions treated of in III:xxvii., xxxiv., xl., and xliii.




Prop. L. LBk.XIV:2:217—Imaginary hope and fear; Bk.XVIII:278p50

 
 
Proof.— (50:1)  This  proposition  is  proved in the same way as III:xv.,

which see, together with III:xviii.note2.



Note.
  (50:2)  Things  which  are  accidentally the causes of hope or

fear are called good or evil omens.  (3) Now, in so far as such omens

are  the  cause  of hope or fear,  they are (by the definitions of hope

and fear given in III:xviii.note2) the causes also of pleasure and pain;
                            [
by 3P15C ]
consequently  we,  to  this  extent,  regard them with love or hatred,
         ]
III.xxviii. [                  [ use ]
and  endeavour either to invoke them as means towards that which

we  hope  for,  or  to  remove  them  as obstacles,  or causes of that

which we fear.  (50:4)  It follows, further, from III:xxv., that we are natur-
                                                       [
easily ]
ally  so  constituted  as  to believe readily in that which we hope for,
           ]
reluctantance [
and with difficulty in that which we fear; moreover, we are apt to es-

timate such objects above or below their true value.  (5)  Hence there

have  risen  superstitions,  whereby  men  are  everywhere assailed.

(50:6)  However,  I do not think it worthwhile to point out here the vacil-

lations springing from hope and fear; it follows from the definition of

these emotions, that there can be no hope without fear, and no fear

without hope,  as I will duly explain in the proper place.  (50:7) Further,

in  so  far as we hope for or fear anything,  we regard it with love or

hatred;  thus  everyone  can  apply  by  himself to  page 163  hope and

fear what we have said concerning love and hatred.




Prop. LI.   Bk.XIV:2:217—Relativity of emotions. 

  
 
Proof.—  (51:1)  The  human  body  is  affected by external bodies in a

variety of ways (II:Post.iii.).  (2) Two men may therefore be differently

affected  at  the  same time,  and therefore  (by Ax.i. after Lemma iii.

after II:xiii.)  may be differently affected by one and the same object.

(51:3) Further  (by  the  same  Post.)  the human body can be affected

sometimes in one way,  sometimes in another; consequently (by the

same  Axiom)  it may be differently affected at different times by one

and the same object.  Q.E.D.



Note.
(51:4) We thus see that it is possible, that what one man loves

another  may  hate,  and  that  what one man fears another may not

fear;  or,  again, that one and the same man may love what he once

hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on. (5) Again,

as  everyone  judges according to his emotions what is good,  what

bad, what better, and what worse (III:xxxix.note), it follows that men's

judgments  may  vary  no  less  than their emotions,  (This is possible,

though  the  human  mind  is  part  of  the  divine  intellect,  as  I  have  shown in

II:xiii.note.), hence when we compare some with others, we distinguish

them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid,

 others timid, others by some other epithet.  
(51:6)  For instance, I shall
                  ]
fearless [
call  a  man intrepid, if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to

fear;   if  I  further take into consideration, that,  in his desire to injure

his  enemies  and  to  benefit  those  whom  he  loves,  he  is  not re-

strained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall
                
3P42
call him daring.   (51:7)  Again, a man will appear timid to me, if he fears

an  evil  which  I  am  accustomed to despise; and if I further take into

consideration  that  his  desire  is  restrained  by  the  fear  of  an evil,

which  is  not  sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that he is cowardly;

and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.



(51:8)  Lastly,  from  this  inconstancy in the nature of human judgment,

inasmuch  as  a  man  often  judges of things solely by his emotions,

and  inasmuch  as the things which page 164  he believes cause pleas-

ure  or  pain,  and therefore endeavours to promote or prevent,  are

often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things allu-

ded  to  in  III:xxviii.;  we  may readily conceive that a man may be at

one time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain, accompa-

nied by the idea of himself as cause. 
(51:9) Thus we can easily under-
                             
3De27
stand what are Repentance and Self-complacency.  (10) Repentance

is pain,  accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause; Self-com-

placency  is  pleasure  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  one's self as

cause,  and  these emotions are most intense because men believe

themselves to be free (III:xlix.). 




Prop. LII.  Bk.XIV:2:217—Wonder (admiratio). 

  

                                             [ imagine ]
Proof.— (52:1)  As soon as we conceive an object which we have seen

in conjunction with others, we at once remember those others (II:xviii.
                                      
                                       [ consideration ]
& Note),  and  thus  we  pass forthwith from the contemplation of one

object to the contemplation of another object.   (2) And this is the case

with  the  object,  which  we  conceive to have no property that is not

common  to many.  (52:3) For we thereupon assume that we are regard-

ing  therein  nothing,  which  we  have not before seen in conjunction
                                                                                      ]
perceive [
with  other  objects.   (4)  But when we suppose that we conceive in an
                 
            [ singular ]
object  something  special,  which  we  have  never  seen before,  we

must  needs  say that the mind,  while regarding that object,  has in it-
                                    [
   is  led  to  consider    ]
self  nothing  which  it  can fall to regarding instead thereof;  therefore

it  is  determined  to the contemplation of that object only.   (52:5)  There-

fore an object, &c.  Q.E.D.


                                         ]
affection [
Note.  (52:6)  This mental modification,  or imagination of a particular
                                                                                
3De4, 42.
thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called Wonder; but if it be

excited by an object of fear, it is called Consternation, because won-

der at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in the simple contemplation

thereof,  that  he  has no power to think of anything else whereby he

might avoid the evil.
 (52:7) If, however, the object of wonder be a man's

prudence,  industry,  or  anything  of  that sort,  inasmuch as the said

man  is  thereby  regarded  as  far  surpassing  ourselves,  wonder is
               
3P55CSCS
called  Veneration;   otherwise,   if  a  page 165  man's  anger, envy, &c.,
                                                                       [
dread ]
be what we wonder at, the emotion is called Horror.   (8) Again, if it be

the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we won-

der at, our love will on this account be the greater (III:xii.), and when

joined  to  wonder or veneration is called Devotion
.    (52:9)  We may in
                     [
 imagine ]
like  manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other emo-

tions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able to de-

duce more emotions than those which have obtained names in ordin-

ary  speech.   (52:10)   Whence it is evident, that the names of the emo-
                             ]         
  taken   from   common  usage   of   words   rather   
tions  have  been  applied  in  accordance  rather with their ordinary
                                                  than   from   detailed   knowledge   of   them.             [ 
manifestations  than  with  an  accurate  knowledge  of  their  nature.


                                                 
3De11
(52:11)  
To  wonder is opposed Contempt,  which generally arises from

the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or fear-

ing something,  or because something,  at first sight,  appears to be

like things,  which we ourselves wonder at,  love,  fear, &c.,  we are,

in consequence (III:xv&Coroll. and III:xxvii.), determined to wonder at

love, or fear that thing.  (52:12) But if from the presence, or more accur-

ate  contemplation of the said thing,  we are compelled to deny con-

cerning  it  all that can be the cause of wonder,  love, fear,  &c.,  the

mind  then,  by,  the  presence  of  the thing,  remains determined to

think rather of those qualities which are not in it, than of those which

are in it;  whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  the presence of the object

would  cause  it  more  particularly  to  regard  that  which is therein.

(52:13)  As  devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love,  so

does Derision spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear,

and Scorn from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at pru-

dence.   (52:14)  Lastly, we  can  conceive  the emotions of love,  hope,

honour,  &c.,  in association with contempt, and can thence deduce

other  emotions,  which  are  not  distinguished one from another by 
          [
single ]
any recognized name. 




Prop. LIII.  LIII-LVBk.XIV:2:217—Emotions arising from the mind's contemplation of itself;
                              Bk.XVIII:257
p53, 3463p53. 

 
 
Proof.—
(53:1) A man does not know himself except through the mod-
]
 affections [
ifications  of  his body,  and   the  ideas  thereof  (II: xix.,  and  xxiii.).
                                                                    [
consider ]
(53:2)  When,  therefore,  the mind is able to contemplate page 166  itself,
                      [
supposed ]
it  is  thereby  assumed to pass to a greater perfection {°P}, or (III:xi.
                       [
joy ]
note) to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be greater in proportion

to the distinctness, wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own

power of activity.  Q.E.D.


                                              [
encouraged ]
Corollary. (53:3)  This pleasure is fostered more and more, in propor-

tion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others.  (53:4) For the

more  he  conceives  himself  as praised by others,  the more will he

imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by the idea

of  himself  (III:xxix.note);  thus  he  is  (III:xxvii.)  himself affected with

greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself. Q.E.D. 3P55C, 4P52S.




Prop. LIV.

  
 
Proof.
(54:1) The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual ess-

ence thereof (III:vii.); but the essence of the mind obviously only af-

firms  that  which the mind is and can do; not that which it neither is

nor can do;  therefore  the  mind endeavours to conceive only such
               ]
posit [
things as assert or affirm its power of activity.  Q.E.D.




Prop. LV. 

  
Proof.(55:1)  The  essence  of  the  mind only affirms that which the

mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to conceive

only such things as assert its power of activity (last Prop.).  (2 )Thus,

when we say that the mind contemplates its own weakness, we are

merely  saying  that  while the mind is attempting to conceive some-
                                                                       [
restrained ]
thing  which  asserts its power of activity, it is checked in its endeav-

ourin other words (III:xi.note), it feels pain Q.E.D.


                               [
sadness ]                        [ encouraged ]
Corollary. (55:3) This pain is more and more fostered, if a man con-

ceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the same

way as III:liii.Coroll.             4P52S.



  
3De27; 4P34. 
Note. (55:4)  This pain,  accompanied  by the idea of our own weak-

ness, is called humility;  the pleasure,  which  springs from the con-
                                                         (
philautia )    ( acquiescentia in se ipso )
templation  of  ourselves,  is  called  self-love or  self-complacency.

(55:5)  And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as often as a man con-

templates his own virtues, or his own power of activity, it follows that

everyone  is fond of narrating his own exploits,  and  displaying  the

force both of his body and mind, and also that, for this reason, men

page 167  are  troublesome one to another. (6) Again, it follows that men

are  naturally  envious (III:xxiv.note, and III:xxxii.note), rejoicing in the
 ]
weaknesses [                                                           ] accomplishments [
shortcomings of their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues.  (7) For

whenever  a  man  conceives  his  own  actions,  he  is affected with

pleasure (III:liii.), in proportion as his actions display more perfection,

and he conceives them more distinctlythat is (II.xl.note1), in propor-

tion  as  he  can  distinguish  them  from  others, and regard them as

something  special.  (55:8) Therefore, a man will take most pleasure in
   ]
regarding [
contemplating  himself,  when  he contemplates  some quality which

he denies to others.  (9) But, if that which he affirms of himself be attri-

butable  to  the  idea  of  man or animals in general, he will not be so

greatly  pleased:  he  will,  on the contrary,  feel pain, if he conceives

that  his  own  actions  fall short when compared with those of others.
                                                        [
strive ]
(55:10) This  pain  (III:xxviii.)  he  will endeavour to remove,  by putting a

wrong  construction  on  the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he
        
 [ magnifying ]
can, embellishing his own.
 
 
(55:11)  It is thus apparent  that men are naturally prone  to hatred and
                              ]
accentuated [
envy, which latter is fostered by their education.  (12) For parents are

accustomed  to  incite  their  children  to virtue solely by the spur of
                   
3P57S
honour and envy (55:13)  But, perhaps, some will scruple to assent to

what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's virtues, and

venerate their possessors.   (55:14)  In order  to  remove  such doubts,

I append the following corollary. 


                                                  ]
accomplishments [
Corollary. (55:15)  No one envies the virtue of anyone who is not his
]
peer [
equal.



Proof.
(55:16) Envy is a species of hatred (III:xxiv.note) or (III:xiii.note)
                                              ]
affection [
pain,  that is  (III:xi.note),  a  modification  whereby a man's power of
               ]
            that is, his conatus             [                                [ by 3P9S ]
activity,  or endeavour towards activity, is checked.  (55:17)  But a man

does  not  endeavour  or  desire to do anything, which cannot follow
                                                                     
from  his nature as it is given;  therefore  a  man  will not desire any

power of activity or virtue  (which is the same thing)  to be attributed

to him, that is appropriate to another's nature and foreign to his own;

hence  his desire cannot be checked,  nor he himself pained by the

contemplation of virtue in some one unlike himself, consequently he

cannot envy  such an one.   (55:18)  But he can envy his equal,  who is

assumed to have the same nature as himself.  Q.E.D.


page 168

Note.(55:19)  When,  therefore,  as  we said  in the note to III:lii.,  we

venerate a man, through wonder at his prudence, fortitude, &c.,  we
                                  [
imagine ]             [ virtues ]
do so,  because  we  conceive  those qualities to be peculiar to him,

and  not as common to our nature; we, therefore, no more envy their
                                                                                        ]
their strength. [
possessor,  than  we envy trees for being tall, or lions for being cour-

ageous.



Prop. LVI.  LVIBk.XIV:2:217The indefiniteness of the number of derivative emotions;
                                Bk.XIB:219
67Bk.XVIII:1583p13,19,563p17  

  

Proof.(56:1)  Pleasure  and pain,  and  consequently  the  emotions

compounded thereof, or derived therefrom, are passions, or passive

states (III.xi.note); now we are necessarily passive (III.i.), in so far as

we have inadequate ideas; and only in so far as we have such ideas

are  we  passive (III:iii.);  that is,  we  are  only  necessarily  passive
                                          [
imagine ]
(II.xl.note), in so far as we conceive, or (II:xvii.&note) in so far as we

are  affected  by  an  emotion,  which involves the nature of our own

body, and the nature of an external body.  (56:2) Wherefore the nature

of  every  passive  state must necessarily be so explained,  that the

nature   of   the   object   whereby  we  are  affected  be  expressed.

(56:3)  Namely,  the pleasure,  which arises from, say, the object A, in-

volves  the  nature of that object A,  and the pleasure,  which arises

from  the  object  B,  involves the nature  of the object B;  wherefore

these two pleasurable emotions are by nature different, inasmuch as

the causes whence they arise are by nature different.  (56:4)  So again

the  emotion of pain,  which arises from one object,  is by nature dif-

ferent from the pain arising from another object, and, similarly, in the

case of love, hatred, hope, fear, vacillation, &c.
 

(56:5)  Thus,  there  are necessarily  as many kinds  of pleasure,  pain,

love,  hatred,  &c.,  as  there  are  kinds of objects  whereby we are
                            
Bk.XIX:23131.
affected.  (56:6) Now desire is each man's essence or nature, in so far

as  it  is conceived as determined to a particular action by any given

modification of itself (III:ix.note); therefore, according as a man is af-

fected through external causes by this or that kind of pleasure, pain,

love, hatred, &c., in other words, according as his nature is disposed

in  this  or  that  manner,  so  will his desire be of one page 169  kind or

another,  and the nature of one desire  must necessarily  differ from

the nature of another desire, as widely as the emotions differ, where-
           
 Bk.XVIII:261185/11. 
from each desire arose.  (56:7) Thus there are as many kinds of desire,

as there are kinds of pleasure,  pain,  love,  &c.,  consequently  (by

what has been shown) there are as many kinds of desire, as there

are kinds of objects whereby we are affected.  Q.E.D.
 

                                                       
De48
Note. (56:8)  Among the kinds of emotions, which, by the last proposi-
                                                                   (
 luxuria )     ( ebrietas )  ( libido )
tion,  must be very numerous, the chief are luxury, drunkenness, lust,
(
avaritia )          ( ambitio )
avarice,  and ambition,  being merely species of love or desire, dis-

playing the nature of those emotions in a manner varying according
                                                                                               [
gluttony ]
to  the  object,  with  which  they  are  concerned.  (9)  For  by  luxury ,
                                 [
 greed ]
drunkenness,  lust,  avarice,  ambition,  &c.,  we  simply  mean  the
]
uncontrolled [                                               ] sex [
immoderate  love  of  feasting,  drinking,  venery,  riches,  and  fame.

(56:10)  Furthermore,  these  emotions, in so far as we distinguish them

from  others  merely  by  the  objects  wherewith they are concerned,
             ]
opposites [              ] self-control [   ( sobrietas )      ( castitas )  
have no contraries. (11) For temperance, sobriety, and chastity, which
                    ^
Bk.XIV:2:2073. 
we are wont to oppose to luxury, drunkenness, and lust, are not emo-  

tions or passive states, but indicate a power of the mind which mod-
]
controls [  
erates the last-named emotions. (56:12) However, I cannot here explain

the remaining kinds of emotions (seeing that they are as numerous

as the kinds of objects), nor, if I could, would it be necessary. (13) It is

sufficient  for our purpose,  namely,  to determine the strength of the

emotions, and the mind's power over them, to have a general defini-

tion of each emotion. 
(56:14) It is sufficient, I repeat, to understand the
< common.  Bk.XV:27489 on E2:XXXIX:110. >  
general properties of the emotions and the mind, to enable us to de-

termine the quality and extent of the mind's power in moderating and
                                                                                              {
of intensity }
checking the emotions.
(56:15) Thus, though there is a great difference
                             < Bk.XV:278117 on E3:XIII(3)N:140 > 
between various emotions of love, hatred, or desire, for instance be-

tween love felt towards children, and love felt towards a wife, there

is no need for us to take cognizance of such differences, or to track

out further the nature and origin of the emotions..




Prop. LVII.  XLIIBk.XIV:2:217—Individual and generic differences within each particular emotion;
                                 Bk.III:245;
 Bk.XVIII:257
p57. 

 

Proof.— (57:1) This  proposition  is  evident  from II:Ax.i  (which  page 170 

see after Lemma iii. Prop. xiii. Part ii.). (2) Nevertheless, we will prove

it from the nature of the three primary emotions.   (3)  All emotions are

attributable  to desire,  pleasure,  or pain,  as their definitions above

given show.  (57:4)  But desire is each man's nature or essence (III: ix.

note); therefore desire in one individual differs from desire in another

individual,  only  in so far as the nature or essence of the one differs

from  the  nature  or essence of the other. 
(57:5)  Again,  pleasure and

pain  are  passive states, { °EMOTIONS },  or passions, whereby every
                                               
Bk.XIX:23134.
man's  power or endeavour to persist in his being is increased or di-

minished, helped or hindered (III:xi. & note).  (57:6) But by the endeav-

our  to  persist in its being,  in so far  as it is attributable to mind and

body in conjunction, we mean appetite and desire (III.ix.note); there-

fore pleasure and pain are identical with desire or appetite, in so far
               
Bk.XIX:23910.
as by  external causes  they are increased or diminished,  helped or

hindered, in other words, they are every man's nature; wherefore the

pleasure  and pain felt by one man differ from the pleasure and pain

felt  by another man,  only in so far  as the nature or essence of  the

one  man differs  from the essence of the other;  consequently,  any

emotion of one individual only differs, &c.  Q.E.D.
 

                                                                         
4P37S1.
Note. (57:7) Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals which

are  called  irrational  (for after learning the origin of mind we cannot

doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's emotions, to the extent

that brute nature differs from human nature.  (57:8) Horse and man are

alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but the desire of the               E3:Dijn:240.

former is equine,  the desire of the latter is human.   (57:9)  So also the

lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary ac-
 
Bk.XIX:2172; E3:Dijn:240—organism
cording to the several natures.  (57:10) Thus,  although each individual

lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he

has his being,  yet the life,  wherein each is content and rejoices,  is
                                           (
 anima )
nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual,  and hence
                                                
Bk.XIV:2:442. 
the  joy  of  one only differs in nature from the joy of another,  to the  

extent that the essence of one differs from the essence  of another.

(57:11) Lastly, it follows from the foregoing proposition, that there is no
                                                                 ]
guides [
small  difference  between the joy which actuates,  say,  a drunkard,

and  the  joy possessed by a philosopher,  page 171   as I just mention

here by the way.  (57:12) Thus far I have treated of the emotions attrib-

utable to man,  in so far as he is passive.   (57:13)  It remains  to add a
                                  [
related ]
few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active.



Prop. LVIIIBk.III:242; Bk.XIA:16083, 84; Bk.XVIII:257fp58; Bk.XIX:2743,4. 


Proof.(58:1) When the mind conceives itself and its power of activity,

it feels pleasure  (III:liii.):  now the mind necessarily contemplates it-

self, when it conceives a true or adequate idea (II:xliii).  (58:2)  But the

mind does conceive certain adequate ideas (II:xl.note2). (3)Therefore,

it feels pleasure in so far as it conceives adequate ideas;  that is, in

so far as it is active (III:i). (58:4) Again, the mind, both in so far as it has

clear and distinct ideas,  and in so far  as it has confused ideas, en-

deavours to persist in its own being (III:ix.);  but by such an endeav-

our we mean desire (by the note to the same Prop.);  therefore,  de-
                                                         
Bk.XIV:2:2041—think. 
sire is also attributable to us, in so far as we understand, or (III:i.) in

so far as we are active.  Q.E.D.




Prop. LIX. Bk.III:242, 245; Bk.XIB:21454;  Bk.XIA:16083, 84.
                        Bk.XVIII:254
p59d, 257p59,d, 3373p59; Bk.XIX:2742.  

 
 
Proof.— (59:1)  All emotions  can be  referred to  desirepleasure,  or
 < Bk.XV:278116 on E3:XI(8)N:138 >  
pain, as their definitions, already given, show. 
(59:2) Now by pain we

mean  that  the  mind's  power  of thinking is diminished or checked

(III:xi.&note); therefore, in so far as the mind feels pain, its power of

understanding,  that is,  of activity,  is diminished  or checked (III:i.);

therefore, no painful emotions can be attributed to the mind in virtue

of its being active, but only emotions of pleasure and desire, which
                                        ]
related [
(by the last Prop.)  are  attributable  to  the  mind  in  that condition. 

Q.E.D.
 
 

Note.
(59:3) All actions following from emotion,  which are attributable
                            
4P69                                                            Bk.III:256.
to  the  mind  in  virtue of its understanding,  I set down to strength of
 (
 fortitudo ) Bk.XIA:24108.               (animositasBk.XIV:2:3284 (generositas)
character,  which  I divide into courage
and highmindedness(59:4)  By
[
tenacity 4P69S 
courage  I  mean  the  desire  whereby every man strives to preserve     Bk.XIV:2:2022, 2202, 2:3285.
            Bk.XIA:3556. 
his  own  being  in  accordance  solely  with  the  dictates  of  reason.
             [
nobility ] 4P46, 73S. 
(59:5) 
By  highmindedness  I  mean  the  desire  whereby  page 172  every 
      ]
nobility [ ^                                                {enlightened self-interest}
man  endeavours  solely under  the  dictates  of  reason, to aid other
                                                     
Bk.XIV:2:2207, 2:3291.                                            { Organic
men  and  to unite them to himself in friendship.    (59:6)  Those  actions,        interdependence }     

therefore,  which  have regard  solely  to  the good of the agent I set

down  to  courage,  those which aim at the good of others I set down
      {
 E3:Endnote 59:6 }
to  highmindedness.   (59:7)  Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence

of  mind  in  danger, &c., are  varieties  of  courage; courtesy, mercy,
                   
Bk.XIA:16185—Nobility.
&c., are varieties of highmindedness.              (59:8)   I think I have thus
                                                                 
Bk.XVIII:264p59s.
explained, and displayed through their  primary  causes the principal

emotions and vacillations of spirit, which  arise from the combination

of  the  three  primary  emotions,  to witdesire,  pleasure,  and pain.

(59:9)   It  is evident  from what I have said,  that  we  are  in many ways
                                                                            
Bk.XX:24085.
driven  about  by  external causes, and  that  like  waves  of  the sea               Durant:646136

driven  by  contrary  winds we toss to and fro unwitting  of  the issue            
Fire of Our Reason

and of our fate.  
(59:10)  But I have said, that  I  have only  set forth the              Hampshire:139 

chief conflicting emotions,  not all that might  be  given.   (59:11) For, by

proceeding  in  the  same  way  as above, we  can  easily show that

love is united to repentance, scorn, shame, &c. 
(12)  I  think everyone

will  agree  from what has been said, that the emotions may be com-

pounded one with another in so many ways, and so many variations

may  arise  therefrom,  as  to  exceed  all possibility  of  computation.


(59:13)  However,  for  my  purpose,  it  is  enough to have  enumerated

the most important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would

be more curious than profitable. 
(14) It remains to remark concerning

love,  that  it  very  often happens that while we are enjoying a thing

which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment,  acquires

a  new disposition, whereby  it is determined in another way,  other

images 
 of things are aroused in it, and the mind begins to conceive

and desire something fresh.  
(59:15)  For example, when  we conceive

something  which  generally  delights us with its flavour,  we  desire

to  enjoy,  that is, to eat it. 
(59:16)  But whilst we are thus  enjoying,  it,

the  stomach  is  filled  and  the body is otherwise disposed. 
(59:17)  If,

therefore, when the body is thus otherwise disposed, the  image of

the  food  which  is  present  be  stimulated,  and  consequently  the

endeavour or desire to eat it be stimulated also, the new disposition

of  the  body  will  feel  repugnance  to  the  desire  or  attempt, and

consequently  the  presence  of  the food which we formerly longed

page 173  for  will  become  odious.   (59:18)  This  revulsion  of  feeling  is
          (
fastidium )     ( taedium )
called  satiety  or weariness.  
(59:19)  For the rest, I have neglected the
                 ]
affections [
outward  modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for

instance,  as  trembling,  pallor, sobbing, laughter, &,c., for these are
                                                                                   
Bk.XVIII:268p59s.
attributable  to  the  body  only,  without  any reference  to  the  mind.

(59:20)  Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be supplement-

ed  in  a few points;  I  will therefore  repeat them,  interpolating such

observations as I think should here and there be added.


 
  




  Biology of EmotionsANS                      Bk.XIV:2:209-210
  E1:Parkinson:2601 >                   [ affects. Bk.VIII:53139 ] Hampshire:135—affectus              Wegner02:54
DEFINITIONS
OF THE EMOTIONS.
 G:Note 4 , Neff          LeDoux96:43James. Bear
                                                 affectus. Bk.XV:277106  >                                    LeDoux96:113, Robinson3:109.

  "I have made a ceaseless effort not to ridicule (mock), not to bewail,
  not  to  scorn  human  actions  {
emotions},  but  to  understand  them."
 
 {Carefully  study  these  Definitions  and  see  how  they  help you                     Mark Twain
  understand "human actions," including your own.  
G:Notes 1 & 2 }                         Hampshire:139d


De.I.  Bk.III:243; Bk.XIB:21454, 55Bk.XVIII:262AD13p9s; Bk.XIX:22620.



De.II. Bk.III:243; Bk.XIV:2:206.

De.III. Bk.III:243, {Mark Twain}. 



De.IV. 



De.V. 



De.VI. Bk.III:244, Durant:649[:159


De.VII. 

 

De.VIII. 


De.IX. 



De.X. 



De.XI.   Bk.XVIII:2634, 274AD11-15. 



De.XII.  Bk.XVIII:27012-13274wavers.

De.XIII.  Bk.XIB:205; Bk.XVIII:26312-132661327012-13274wavers321AD13.              E4:Dijn:250, Wolf:ST:14-1

 

De.XIV. 

De.XV. Bk.III:244. 



De.XVI. Bk.XVIII:27524p18s2


De.XVII. 


De.XVIII. Bk.XIV:2:2694; Bk.XIB:205; Bk.XVIII:26418, 27524p22s, 341AD18.



De.XIX. 

page 178
De.XX. Bk.III:244. 


De.XXI. 

                            Bk.XVIII:26318,19.


De.XXII. 



De.XXIII. 

 
De.XXIV. 



De.XXV.   Bk.XVIII:2646, 27425-6. 


De.XXVI. Bk.XIB:242; Bk.XVIII:27425-6, 344426,27. 



De.XXVII.  Bk.XVIII:26427, 270AD27, expl5p2, 344AD26,27.


De.XXVIII.  Bk.XVIII:26222,28,29. 



De. XXIX.  Bk.XVIII:26222,28,29. 


De.XXX.  Bk.XVIII:2646, 325AD30,31, 344AD30,31. 


De.XXXI.  Bk.XVIII:263AD31, 2754AD19, 325AD30-31, 344AD30,31. 


De.XXXII.  Bk.XVIII:26332.



De.XXXIII.  Bk.III:244; Bk.XVIII:26333. 


De.XXXIV.  Bk.XVIII:26334-37, 26734, 345AD34. 



De.XXXV.  Bk.XVIII:26334-37, 26734-37. 

 
De.XXXVI.  Bk.XVIII:26334-37, 26734-37, 344AD36,37. 


De.XXXVII.  Bk.XVIII:26334-37, 26734-37, 344AD36,37. 


De.XXXVIII.  Bk.XVIII:264AD38, 329AD38,expl. 



De.XXXIX.  Bk.XVIII:26339, 266timor,39, 321AD39. 



De.XL.  Bk.XVIII:26340-42. 

 

De.XLI.  Bk.XVIII:26340-42. 



De.XLII.  Bk.XVIII:26340-42. 



De.XLIII.


De.XLIV.  Bk.XVIII:262AD44,expl. 



De.XLV. 


De.XLVI. 


De.XLVII.

page 184
De.XLVIII.



 



   4P7, 7C, 8, 9, 14; 5P3, 4C, 17, 34, 40C.               <------- small print, Logical Index. 
                                < E1:Parkinson:2601 > 
GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS Affects ].  {GDE}

         
{ Passive Emotion, }                                                             Bk.III:243. 
(GN:1)  Emotion,  which  is called a passivity of the soul,  is a confused             Bk.XIV:2:2261.

idea whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part there- 
                                                                      Bk.III:243.  
of,  a force for existence  (existendi visgreater or less than before,
                                                                                       {
desire } 
and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one          Is there free- will? 

thing rather than another. 


                                                                           ] passivity of the mind [
Explanation. (GN:2)  I  say,  first,  that  emotion  or passion of the soul is
a confused idea
(3) For we have shown that the mind is only passive,  

in so far  as it has  inadequate or confused ideas (III:iii.).   (GN:4)  I say,

further,  whereby the mind affirms  concerning its body  or  any part

thereof a force for existence greater than before (5) For all the ideas
                                                                     
Bk.XIV:2:2264—constitution.  
of bodies, which we possess, denote rather the actual disposition of
                                                                              
Bk.XIX:1478. ^
our  own  body   (II:xvi.Coroll.ii.)  than the nature of an external body.

(GN:6) But the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion must de-

note  or  express the disposition of the body, or of some part thereof,

which is possessed by the body,  or some part thereof,  because its

power  of  action  or  force  for existence is increased or diminished,

helped or hindered. (GN:7) But it must be noted that, when I say a great-

er or  less  force  for  existence  than  before,  I do not mean that the

mind compares the present with the past disposition of the body, but

that the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms some-

thing of the body,  which, in fact, involves more or less of reality than
 
Bk.XIX:22011. 
before.


(GN:8) And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II:xi.,

xiii.),  that  it affirms  the actual existence  of its own body, and inas-

much  as  we understand by perfection the very essence of a thing,
                                                                  
Bk.XVIII:256GenDef.
it  follows  that  the  mind  passes  to  greater or less perfection {°P},

when  it  happens  to affirm
an °EMOTION  } concerning its own body,

or  any  part  thereof, something  involving more or less reality than

before.


(GN:9)  When,  therefore,  I said above  that  the  power  of the mind is

increased  or  diminished,   I  merely  meant  that  the  page 186   mind

had formed of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involv-

ing  more  or  less of reality { perfection }, than it had already affirmed

concerning its own body.   (GN:10) For the excellence of ideas, and the

actual  power  of  thinking  are  measured  by  the  excellence of the

object. (GN:11)  Lastly, I have added by the presence of which the mind

is  determined  to  think  of  one  thing  rather  than another, so that,
                                           
besides  the  nature  of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the

definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.

 
 




JBY  ENDNOTES


E3:Endnote N.11. - From Wolfson's Book XIV:2:184—Summaries of Parts III, IV, and V. 


E3:Endnote 3:27. - From Matthew Stewart's The Courier and the Heretic 2006;                                     0393058980; p. 285—Free Will: 


E3:Endnote 6:0. - From De Dijn's Bk. III:240Conatus.                           Endnotes 6:0a & 11:0

 
E3:Endnote 6:0a. - From Wolfson's Bk. XIV:2:204Conatus.
                           Endnotes 6:0 & 11:0

 
E3:Endnote 7:0. - From Wolfson's Bk. XIV:2:183Virtue.
 

 
E3:Endnote 11:0. - From Wolfson's Bk. XIV:2:195Conatus.
                            Endnotes 6:0 & 6:0a

 
E3:Endnote 33:0. - From Wolfson's Bk. XIV:2:218Passive and Active Emotions.
 


E3:Endnote 3P57 - "Any emotion of a given individual differs . . . ."
From Book 32; Hampshire:138-9—Freedom and Morality:
  

It is one of the first principles of his logic, throughout nominalistic {the philosophical doctrine that general or abstract words do not stand for objectively existing entities and that universals are no more than names assigned to them}, that definitions of the abstract, general terms of ordinary language cannot yield genuine knowledge; it is nonsense to talk of the essence of jealousy common to your jealousy and to mine. He strongly insists (3P57) that the joy of one man is essentially different from the joy of another, although the common name is properly applicable to them both; the difference between the two experiences depends on the particular nature ('actual essence' {temperament}) of the particular individuals involved, and this in turn depends on their particular situations in Nature. To understand the two experiences is to situate each of them in the chain of causes in Nature as a whole; it is useless to inquire into the vague similarities which the common abstract name represents. The catalogue of the emotions, and Spinoza's analyses of them in terms of pleasure, pain and desire, serve mainly to show that the "emotions can be understood and interpreted on his principles, and as ultimately arising from the conatus, the tendency to self-preservation, which is common to all things in Nature, human or inhuman; secondly, the catalogue page 139 serves to exhibit in convincing detail the varieties of human servitude and unreason. The emotions which we ordinarily distinguish{love, the most important definition, I believe}, ambition, lust, pity, pride, anger, and many othersare shown to be differentiated only by the way in which the primary passions of pleasure, pain and desire are evoked. In our ordinary experience of this whole range of emotions, we are 'agitated by contrary winds like waves of the sea, waver and are unconscious of our issue and our fate' (3P59:9n) {Fire of Our Reason}; this is one of the very few uses of rhetorical metaphor in Spinoza's writing; to him, as to Montaigne, man in his normal condition is essentially chose ondoyante, pathetically unstable and unreasonable. The list of the emotions at the end of Part III of the Ethics, although mainly intended to illustrate the manifold complications of desire and its objects, contains many acute psychological observations, for example, on the natural alternation between love and hatred of the same person. Spinoza, in his detached and impersonal {clear and objective} style, notices the twists and perversities of human feeling and behaviour more closely than most of the philosopher- psychologists of his age; he is conspicuously less schematic {having an underlying organizational pattern or structure} and crude than Hobbes, and is nearer to the great French moralists in his calm pessimism. The many philosophers who have tried to show the varieties of human feeling and behaviour as deducible from a primary urge towards pleasure and self-preservation have generally over-simplified the intricacies of human behaviour; they have made men appear more starkly rational and self-seeking than they are.

                                                                         (generositas)
E3:Endnote 59:6 - ". . . I set down to highmindedness."


E3:Endnote Def. II - From Will and Ariel Durant's The Story of Civilization: Part VIII,
Chapter XXII - Spinoza. ISBN: 0671012150, 1963, Pages 645, 646:
  


E3: William James' Emotion - From Joseph E. LeDoux's Book XXIX, p. 43—James' Bear: 

From Charles G. Morris; Psychology: An Introduction; 10th ed.; 0136765378; Johnson and Delanney's Figure 2-15; p. 72—Biology of the Emotions:    {James' Bear, James' Fear, Sequence.}   
            
                                             Autonomic Nervous System (ANS) 

                 Parasympathetic Nervous System              Sympathetic Nervous System
                               (PNS)                                                              (SNS)
                   
Picture

                                 The Sympathetic and Parasympathetic Divisions
                                          of the Autonomic Nervous System.
 

From The Teaching Company's Tapes; Biology and Human Behavoir: The Neurological Origins of Individuality; by Professor Robert Morris Sapolsky, Ph.D.; © 1998 The Teaching Company; Lecture 5 - The Autonomic Nervous System (ANS)—James' Bear, James' Fear:

Scope:  {The Biology of the Emotions, Calculus of the Emotions.} 

This lecture examines the workings of the autonomic nervous system and its subparts, the
sympathetic nervous system and the parasympathetic nervous system.
How the autonomic
nervous system regulates the organs of the body,
how different levels of the brain activate the
system, and how the system is strengthened are also investigated.
The lecture ends with a
glimpse into ways
that the autonomic nervous system influences individual differences.

I. The voluntary nervous system controls the rapid regulation of skeletal muscles, while the
    {
unconscious} involuntary nervous system regulates every cell in the body. 

 
E3: Daniel M. Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will; 2002 p.54;
         0262232227James' Bear and Free Will, James' Emotion, James' Fear:
 


E3: Plutchik's Blends of Basic Emotions - From LeDoux's Book XXIX, Pages 113-114. 

Definition of the Emotions—From The Teaching Company's Tapes; The Great Ideas of Philosophy, 2nd Ed; 2004; Prof. Daniel N. Robinson's Lecture 31; Part 3 Transcript, p. 109; Hume and the Pursuit of Happiness—James' BearANSSapolsky, Neurotransmitters.  


E3:Endnote De.6 - ". . . accompanied by the idea . . ." 


E3:Endnote De.6 - "Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause."
From Book 32; Hampshire:170-1—Love:
  


E3:Endnote GN:2 - ". . . is a confused idea."     EL:[59]:xxviii.

 

End of Part III of V.


Since November 6, 1997 Part III hits.

THE ETHICS - Part III
Revised: August 29, 2006 

josephb@yesselman.com
 

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