THE  ETHICS -  PART  III

On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions
                            SCR:Dijn'sSalvation, Hampshire:141.                       
 ] AffectusG:Shirley:2821 [

Circulated - 1673
Posthumously Published - 1677

Benedict de Spinoza
1632 - 1677  

IntroductionPurpose  -  Spinozistic Ideas 
The Ethics:   Part I  -  Part II  -  Part III  -  Part IV  -  Part V 
Spinozistic Glossary and Index  
 




JBY Notes:

1.  The text is the 1883 translation of the  "The Ethics"  by  R. H. M.
 
     Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was 
     scanned and proof-read by JBY. For other Versions see Note 7. 

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):  y = Proposition Number, if given;  xx = Sentence Number.
 

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols:
 
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ), 
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ], 
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [,
 
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >, 
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <, 
           { JBY Comment }    G-D   
   Metaphors       LINKS 

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here.

6.  Please e-mail, errors, clarification requests, disagreement, or
     suggestions to josephb@yesselman.com.
 

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read
on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively
        EL:[3]:vi
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its         Durant's Story
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and            Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze.  

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions,
or best, study the printed book
    book page numbers
are given for most scanned books. 

9.  From Elwes's IntroductionEL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi. 
 
10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for   every-          E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,   is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for   teaching  the 
       "Organic  Interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and   all 
       his   puzzling   sayings,   for  example   E3:IV:136,   become   more, 
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.    Look  for  the
       Cash Value. 
 
      To  help  further  understand  many  of  the  Propositions,  use  the         {Examples
      analogy  of  you  as  G-D  and  all  parts of you (past, present, and        1D6, 2P3, 2P4.}
      future) as the modes ( particular  things ).
 Apparent Contradiction, Analogies,        Indivisible 


11.  Wolfson's  summaries:  Part IIIPart IV, and Part V.  


12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff.
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xxii. 
       For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi. 
       
For a "study of the plan of Ethics 3" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:339-40. 
       
For a criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.

 



TABLE OF CONTENTS:  Bk.XII:xi—The Nature of Man.  
                                                                      Bk.XIV:xxii—Chapter XVIII,  Bk.XIV:2:180—Emotions.
 

Preface:128

Definitions:129

Postulates:130

Part III Propositions: Book I:Pg. x 
           If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral. 
           If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 

I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX
XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVI XXVII XXVIII XXIX XXX
XXXI XXXII XXXIII XXXIV XXXV XXXVI XXXVII XXXVIII XXXIX XL
XLI XLII XLIII XLIV XLV XLVI XLVII XLVIII XLIX L
LI LII LIII LIV LV LVI LVII LVIII LIX


Definitions of the Emotions:173  Glossary

General Definition of the Emotions:185

JBY Endnotes



Part III Proposition List:  Book I:Pg. x;  { Hypotheses }

           Suggestion:  Do  not  read  consecutively  as  you would a novel;
 
                                but  select a Proposition,  click its number to the left 
                                and  then  follow  all  its  links in turn wherever they 
                                may  lead.   You will then be putting hypertexting to 
                                its fullest and best advantage—the fuller discussion 
                                of  a  thread.  If  you  do not stick to one thread at a 
                                time,  this  Web Site  will seem very convoluted and 
                                confusing. 
            
{Definition of Proposition: a statement in which something is affirmed or denied,
                           so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.
}
                    All axioms, definitions, and propositions are hypotheses. Test 
                       them for their 'cash value'. See Notes 10 & 11, Posit, and Idea
} 

Prop. I.
    
I-III 
Bk.III:239 
Bk.XIV:2:185 
Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases
passive.   In  so  far as it has adequate ideas it is neces-
 
sarily  active,  and  in so far as it has  inadequate  ideas, 
it is necessarily passive. 
 
Prop. II. Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind
determine  body to motion or rest or any state different
 
from these, if such there be. 
 
Prop. III. The  activities  of  the mind arise solely from adequate
ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on
 
inadequate ideas. 
 

Prop. IV.
  
IV-XI 
Bk.III:240. 
Bk.XIV:2:195 


Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external
to itself.  {
conatus } 
 
Prop. V. Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the
same  object,  in  so far as one is capable of destroying
 
the other. 
   
Prop. VI. Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to
persist in its own being.
 
   
Prop. VII. The endeavour, wherewith everything endeavours to
persist in its own being, is nothing else but the actual
 
essence of the thing in question. 
  
Prop. VIII. The  endeavour, whereby a thing endeavours to persist
in its being, involves no finite time, but an indefinite time.
 
  
Prop. IX. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct
ideas,  and  also in so far as it has confused ideas,
 
endeavours  to  persist in its being for an indefinite 
period, and of this endeavour it is conscious. 
   
Prop. X. An idea, which excludes the existence of our body,
cannot  be  postulated in our mind, but is contrary
 
thereto. 
 
Prop. XI. Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders
the  power  of  activity  in  our  body,  the idea thereof
 
increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of 
thought in our mind. 
Prop. XII.
 
XII-LVII 
Bk.XIV:2:208 
The mind, as far as it can, endeavours to conceive those
things, which increase or help the power of activity in the
 
body. 
 
Prop. XIII. When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder
the  body's  power  of  activity,  it  endeavours,  as  far as
 
possible, to remember things which exclude the existence 
of the first-named things. 
 
Prop. XIV.
 
XIV-XVIII, 
Bk.XIV:2:213.
If  the  mind has once been affected by two emotions at
the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected
 
by one of the two, be also affected by the other. 
 
Prop. XV. Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure,
pain, or desire.
 
 
Prop. XVI. Simply  from  the  fact  that  we  conceive,  that  a given
object  has  some  point  of  resemblance  with  another
 
object  which  is  wont  to affect the mind pleasurably or 
painfully,  although  the point of resemblance be not the 
efficient cause of the said emotions, we shall still regard 
the first-named object with love or hate.                           Need
 
Prop. XVII. If we conceive that a thing which is wont to affect us
painfully,  has any point of resemblance with  another
 
thing which is wont to affect us with an equally strong 
emotion  of  pleasure,  we  shall  hate the first-named 
thing, and  at  the same time we shall love it. 
 
Prop. XVIII.
A man is as much affected pleasurably or painfully by
the image of a thing past or future as by the image of
 
a thing present. 
  
Prop. XIX.
 
XIX-XXXII, 
Bk.XIV:2:215,
Bk.XIV:2:217.
He who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed
will  feel  pain;  if he conceives that it is preserved he will
 
feel pleasure. 
 
Prop. XX. He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed
will feel pleasure.
 
 
Prop. XXI. He who conceives, that the object of his love is affected 
pleasurably or painfully, will himself be affected pleasur- 
ably  or  painfully;  and the one or the other emotion will 
be  greater or less in the lover according as it is greater 
or less in the thing loved. 
 
Prop. XXII. If we conceive that anything pleasurably affects some
object  of  our  love,  we  shall  be  affected  with love
 
towards that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it 
affects  an  object  of  our  love  painfully,  we shall be 
affected with hatred towards it. 
  
Prop. XXIII.
XXXIII-XLIX, 
Bk.XIV:2:217. 
He who conceives, that an object of his hatred is pain-
fully  affected,  will  feel  pleasure.  Contrariwise, if he
 
thinks  that the said object is pleasurably affected, he 
will feel pain.   Each of these emotions will be greater 
or less,  according as its contrary is greater or less in 
the object of hatred. 
 
Prop. XXIV. If we conceive that anyone pleasurably affects an object
of our hate, we shall feel, hatred towards him also.  If we
 
conceive  that  he  painfully  affects  the  said object,  we 
shall feel love towards him. 
 
Prop. XXV. We endeavour to affirm, concerning ourselves, and con-
cerning  what  we  love,  everything that we conceive to
 
affect  pleasurably  ourselves, or the loved object.  Con- 
trariwise,  we  endeavour  to negative everything, which 
we  conceive  to  affect painfully  ourselves or the loved 
object. 
 
Prop. XXVI. We endeavour to affirm, concerning that which we hate,
everything  which we conceive to affect it painfully; and,
 
contrariwise,   we   endeavour  to  deny,  concerning  it, 
everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurably. 
 
Prop. XXVII. By  the  very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like
ourselves,  and  which  we  have not regarded with any
 
emotion,  to  be  affected  with any emotion, we are our- 
selves affected with a like emotion.
 
Prop. XXVIII. We  endeavour to bring about whatsoever we conceive
to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavour to remove or
 
destroy  whatsoever  we conceive to be truly repugnant 
thereto, or to conduce to pain. 
 
Prop. XXIX. We shall also endeavour to do whatsoever we conceive
men  to
 regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall 
shrink  from doing that which we conceive men to shrink 
from. 
 
Prop. XXX. If  anyone  has done something which he conceives as
affecting  other men pleasurably, he will be affected by
 
pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; 
in  other  words,  he  will  regard  himself  with pleasure. 
On  the  other  hand,  if he has done anything which he 
conceives  as  affecting  others painfully, he will regard 
himself with pain. 
 
Prop. XXXI. If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates any-
thing which we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall
 
thereupon regard the thing in question with more stead- 
fast love, &c.  On the contrary,  if we think that  anyone 
shrinks  from something that we love, we shall undergo 
vacillation of soul. 
 
Prop. XXXII. If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something,
which only one person can possess, we shall endeav-
 
our to bring it about that the man in question shall not 
gain possession thereof. 
 
Prop. XXXIII. When  we  love a thing similar to ourselves we endeav-
our, as far as we can,  to bring about that it should love
 
us in return. 
 
Prop. XXXIV. The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved
object  to be  affected towards us, the greater will be our
 
complacency. 
 
Prop. XXXV. If  anyone  conceives,  that an object of his  love  joins
itself  to  another  with  closer bonds of friendship than
 
he  himself  has  attained   to,  he  will be affected with 
hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards 
his rival. 
 
Prop. XXXVI. He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken
delight,  desires  to  possess   it under the same circum-
 
stances as when he first took delight therein. 
 
Prop. XXXVII. Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love,
is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.
 
 
Prop. XXXVIII. If  a  man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that
love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal,
 
regard  it  with more hatred than if he had never  loved  it, 
and  his  hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his 
former love. 
 
Prop. XXXIX. He who hates anyone will endeavour to do him an injury,
unless  he  fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue
 
to  himself;  on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, 
by the same law, seek to beneflt him. 
 
Prop. XL. He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and
believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will
 
hate that other in return. 
 
Prop. XLI. If  anyone  conceives that he is loved by another, and
believes that he has given no cause for such love, he
 
will love that other in return. 
 
Prop. XLII. He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives
of love or honour will feel pain,  if he sees that the bene-
 
fit is received without gratitude.
 
Prop. XLIII. Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on
the other hand be destroyed by love.
 
 
Prop. XLIV. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes
into  love:  and love is thereupon greater than if hatred
 
had not preceded it. 
 
Prop. XLV. If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates
anything also similar to himself,  which he loves, he will
 
hate that person. 
 
Prop. XLVI. If  a  man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by
anyone, of a class or nation different front his own, and
 
if  the  pleasure  or  pain has been accompanied by the 
idea  of  the  said stranger as cause, under the general 
category  of  the  class  or  nation: the man will feel love 
or hatred, not only to the individual stranger, but also to 
the whole class or nation whereto he belongs. 
 
Prop. XLVII. Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is de-
stroyed,  or suffers other injury, is never unaccompa-
 
nied by a certain pain in us. 
  
Prop. XLVIII. Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed,
if  the  pleasure  involved  in  the  former,  or  the pain in-
 
volved  in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea 
of another cause: and will be diminished in proportion as 
we  conceive  Peter  not  to have been the sole cause of 
either emotion. 
 
Prop. XLIX. Love or hatred towards a thing,  which we conceive to be
free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than
 
if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity. 
 
Prop. L.
L - LVII, 
Bk.XIV:2:217
.
Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope
or fear.
 
 
Prop. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same
object, and the same man may be differently affected
 
at different times by the same object. 
 
Prop. LII. An  object  which we have formerly seen in conjunction
with others, and which we do not conceive to have any
 
property that is not common to many, will not be regard 
ed by us for so long, as an object which we conceive to 
have some property peculiar to itself. 
 
Prop. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity,
it feels pleasure: and that pleasure is greater in proportion
 
to  the  distinctness  wherewith  it  conceives  itself and its 
own power of activity. 
 
Prop. LIV. The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as
assert its power of activity.
 
 
Prop. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels
pain thereat.
 
 
Prop. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire,
and  of  every  emotion  compounded of these, such as
 
vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, 
hatred,  hope,  fear,  &c.,  as  there are kinds of objects 
whereby we are affected. 
 
Prop. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion 
of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the 
one individual differs from the essence of the other. 
 
Prop. LVIII.
LVIII-LIX 
Bk.III:242 
Bk.XIV:2:218 
Besides  pleasure  and  desire,  which  are  passivities or 
passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure 
and  desire,  which  are  attributable  to us in so far as we 
are active. 
 
Prop. LIX. Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, 
there  are  none  which cannot be referred to pleasure or 
desire. 
 




`
PREFACE:  Bk.I:128; Bk.XII:214-16.

                                       [ Affects ]
(Pfc:1) Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be          E3:Wolfson:2:1833.

treating rather of matters outside Nature than of natural phenomena        lines, planes, and solids
           Bk.XIV:2:1822—common. 
following Nature's general laws.  (2) They appear to conceive man to
                                                 
E3:Wolfson:2:1836. 
be situated in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe         Spinoza's daring  

that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has abso-          E2:Wolfson:2:110
        ] power [ 
lute  control  over  his  actions,  and that he is determined solely by               Mark Twain 
 Bk.XX:23781.                                      ] weakness [          ] frailty [ 
himself.  (Pfc:3) They attribute human infirmities and fickleness,  not to
          {
Mark Twain }
the  power of Nature in general,  but to some mysterious flaw in the
                                                                           ]
ridicule [
nature of man, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or,              Bk.XIV:2:1811.
                                                                             [ censuring ]
as usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weak-
                                                                               [
cunningly ]
ness  of  the  human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his
                                         [
Godly ]
fellows, is looked upon as a seer.  (Pfc:4)  Still there has been no lack

of very excellent men  (to  whose  toil and industry I confess myself               Bk.XIV:2:1813.

much indebted), who have written many noteworthy things concern-

ing  the  right way of life and have given much sage advise to man-

kind.  (Pfc:5)  But no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and
                            [
Affects ]                  Bk.XVIII:2683p56s.
strength  of  the  emotions, and the power of the mind against them
           [
moderation ]
for their restraint.



(Pfc:6) I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though be believed,
                           
that the mind has absolute power over its actions,  strove to explain             
Bk.XIV:2:1827.

human emotions by their primary causes,  and, at the same time, to

point out of the way, by which the mind might attain to absolute do-
]
control [
minion over them.   (Pfc:7)  However,  in my opinion,  he accomplishes
                                                   ]
brilliance [                            ] genius [
nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect,

as I will show in the proper place.  (Pfc:8)  For the present I wish to re-

vert to those,  who  would  rather  abuse or deride human emotions
   
Bk.XVIII:19f, 3443Preface.
than understand them. (9) Such persons will, doubtless  page 129  think
                                                                                
Bk.XIB:2142.
it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geo-
                                             
                          ] logical [
metrically,  and  should  wish  to set forth with rigid reasoning those

matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous

absurd, and dreadful. 
(Pfc:10)  However, such is my plan.   (11)  Nothing

comes to pass in Nature,  which  can  be set down to a flaw therein;

for  Nature  is always the same,  and everywhere one and the same

in her efficacy and power of action;  that is,  nature's laws and ordi-
 ]
rules [
nances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form
                                                            
Bk.XIB:7748.
to another,  are  everywhere  and  always  the  same;  so that there

should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of
                                                                                 
Bk.XX:238. 
all things whatsoever,  namely, through nature's universal laws and            E3:Wolfson:2:1833.

rules.  (Pfc:12)  Thus  the passions of hatred,  angerenvy,  and so on,

considered  in  themselves,  follow  from  this  same  necessity and
 ]
force [
efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through

which they are understood, and possess certain properties as wor-

thy of being known as the properties of anything else,  whereof the
                                                                         
Bk.III:239.
contemplation in itself affords us delight. (Pfc:13) I shall, therefore, treat

of  the  nature  and strength of the emotions according to the same

method,  as I employed heretofore in my investigations  concerning
 
Bk.XIB:244132.                     Bk.III:239.                                       ] appetites [ 
G-D and the mind(Pfc:14) I shall consider human actions and desires
                              
Durant:636                                Bk.XI:1542.   
in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines,         Bk.XIV:2:1812, 2:1851.  
 
Bk.XIA:3553 ] bodies [ 
planes, and solids.
 
Bk.XIB:7746; Bk.XX:238.

 
  
  




   < E1:Parkinsob:2601 >
DEFINITIONS   { G:Notes 1 & 2, Hypothesis
. }; Bk.XIX:2185. 

                        
       Bk.III:205.
Def. I.  (1) By an adequate cause, I mean a cause through which its 
           effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived.  (2) By an inad-              Bk.XIV:2:1022.
           equate or partial cause,  I mean a cause through which,  by 
           itself, its effect cannot be understood. 3D2; 3P1; 4P2, 5, 23, 33; 5P31.   <------- small print, Logical Index.
               Bk.XVIII:177
3d1, p1d.
 

                                          Bk.III:205, 242. 
Def. II. 
(1) I say that we act when anything takes place, either within 
            us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; 
            that is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature 
            something takes  place  within  us or externally to us, which 
            can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly under- 
            stood {PcM}(2) On the other hand, I say that we are passive           Bk.XIV:2:1891. 
            as regards something when that something takes place with- 
                                                              <       of which we are        >
            in us,  or follows from our nature externally,  we  being  only
            the  {
 inadequate, }  partial cause  { that  is  not  clearly and distinctly 
               understood. 
}        
   3P1; 4P2, 5, 15, 23, 33, 35, 35C1, 52, 61, 64.    <------- small print, Logical Index.

page 130  
                   
Bk.VIII:46443; Bk.XIV:2:1951, 2:2012, 2:2031, 2:2661, 2:2681 & 2. 
                        Bk.III:219, 241, 242; Bk.XV:277107; Bk.XVIII:143d3254d3259d3. 
                       ] affectus [                      ] affections [                                              Hampshire:135—affectus 
Def. III.  By emotions I mean the modifications of the body, whereby            { The feelings are 
             the active power of  said  body  is increased or diminished,        °JOY or °SORROW. }
             aided  or  constrained,  and  also ]together with[  the  ideas            E2:2P24-32
             of such modifications.  E3:Endnote GN:2;               3P14.

                                            { efficient cause }
N.B.      If  we  can be the adequate cause of any of these modifica- 
             tions,  I  then call the emotion an activity,  otherwise I call it 
             a  passion,  or  state  wherein  the  mind  is  passive.  
             { E3:Endnote GN:2 } 





POSTULATES.  
Bk.XVIII:233p1280Part 3. 


               
Bk.III:241III,Post.1, 242III,Post.1
Post. I.  The human  body can be affected in many ways,  whereby 
             its power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in         Bk.XIV:2:1951  
             other ways which do not  render its power of activity either 
             greater or less.             3P12, 15.                           <------- small print, Logical Index.

            N.B.    This  postulate  or  axiom  rests  on  II:Post.I.:97 and 
                       II:Lemmas v.:95 and vii., which see after II:xiii. 


Post. II. The human body can undergo many changes,  and, never- 
             theless,  retain  the  impressions  or  traces  of  objects (cf. 
             II:Post.v.),  and,  consequently,  the same images of things  
             ( ] for the definition of which [ see II:xvii.note).   

 




PART III PROPOSITIONS.  { Hypotheses }; Bk.XIV:2:185.

Prop. I.  E3:Didn:239; Bk.XVIII:1773p13243p1,3; Bk.XIX:22113. 

  
 
Proof.(1:1)  In every human mind  there are some  adequate ideas,
                                              [
mutilated ]
and  some  ideas  that  are  fragmentary  and  confused  (II:xl.note).           Bk.XIV:2:1892.

(1:2)  Those ideas which are adequate in the mind  are adequate also

in  G-D,  inasmuch  as  he  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  mind                  1D6

(II:xi.Coroll.),  and  those  which are inadequate in the mind are like-

wise  (by  the  same  Coroll.) adequate in G-D, not inasmuch as he                Deus

contains  in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as he,

at the same time, contains the minds of other things. 
(1:3) Again, from

any  given  idea some effect must necessarily follow (I:xxxvi); of this
                               
Bk.XVIII:1773d1,p1d.
effect  G-D  is the adequate cause (III:Def.i.),  not inasmuch as he is

infinite,  but  inasmuch  as he is conceived  as affected by the given

idea (II:ix.).  (4) But of that effect whereof G-D is the cause, inasmuch

as he is affected by an idea which is adequate  in a given mind,  of
                                                                                      
Bk.XIX:28326.
that effect,  I repeat,  the  mind  in  question  is  the adequate cause

(II:xi.Coroll.).  (1:5)  Therefore  our mind,  in  so  far as it has adequate

 page 131  ideas (III:Def.ii.), is in certain cases necessarily, active; this

was our first point.  (1:6)  Again, whatsoever necessarily, follows from

the idea which is adequate in G-D,  not by virtue of his possessing

in himself the mind of one man only,  but by virtue of his containing,
                                                                                        
Bk.XIX:1451.
together  with the mind  of that one man,  the minds  of other things

also, of such an effect (II:xi.Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not

an adequate,  but only a partial cause;  thus (III:Def.ii.) the mind, in-

asmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases necessarily

passive;  this  was  our  second  point.   (1:7)  Therefore our mind, &c.

Q.E.D.



Corollary.
 (1:8) Hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable

to be acted upon,  in proportion  as it possesses inadequate ideas,

and,  contrariwise,  is  more  or  less  active in proportion as it pos-             Durant:646135

sesses adequate ideas.



Prop. II.  Bk.XVIII:493p2,1103p2. 

  
Proof.
(2:1) All modes of thinking have for their cause G-D, by virtue
                                                                                          [
explained ]
of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his being display-

ed  under any other attribute (II:vi.).  (2) That, therefore, which deter-
                              ]
think [                     ] Thinking
mines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a mode of

extension; that is (II:Def.i.), it is not body.  (3) This was our first point.

(2:4)  Again,  the motion and rest  of a body,  must arise from another
                                             
Bk.XIB:241125
body,  which has also been determined  to a state  of motion or rest
                                     ]
without exception [
by a third body,  and absolutely  everything  which takes place in a
                 ]
arise [
body must spring from G-D, in so far as he is regarded as affected

by  some  mode  of  extension,  and  not  by  some mode of thought

(II:vi.);  that is,  it  cannot spring  from the mind,  which is a mode of
[
2P11 ]
thought (2:5)  This  was  our  second  point.  (6)  Therefore  body can-

not determine mind, &c.  Q.E.D..


] Scholium [
Note.(2:7) This is made more clear by what was said in the note to
                                   Bk.XV:277108; Bk.XVIII:1413p2s.
II:vii., namely, that mind an