THE  ETHICS -  PART  III

JBY Notes:

1.  The text is the 1883 translation of the  "The Ethics"  by  R. H. M. 
     Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was 
     scanned and proof-read by JBY. For other Versions see Note 7. 

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):  y = Proposition Number, if given;  xx = Sentence Number. 

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols: 
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ), 
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ], 
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [, 
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >, 
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <, 
           { JBY Comment }    G-D      Metaphors       LINKS 

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here.

6.  Please e-mail, errors, clarification requests, disagreement, or
     suggestions to josephb@yesselman.com. 

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively         EL:[3]:vi
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its         Durant's Story
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and            Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze.  

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions, or best, study the printed book—
    book page numbers are given for most scanned books. 

9.  From Elwes's Introduction—EL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi. 
 
10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for   every-          E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,   is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for   teaching  the 
       "Organic  Interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and   all 
       his   puzzling   sayings,   for  example   E3:IV:136,   become   more, 
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.    Look  for  the
       Cash Value. 
 
      To  help  further  understand  many  of  the  Propositions,  use  the         {Examples
      analogy  of  you  as  G-D  and  all  parts of you (past, present, and        1D6, 2P3, 2P4.}
      future) as the modes ( particular  things ). Apparent Contradiction, Analogies,        Indivisible 


11.  Wolfson's  summaries:  Part III, Part IV, and Part V.  

12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff.
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xxii. 
       For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi. 
       For a "study of the plan of Ethics 3" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:339-40. 
       For a criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS:  Bk.XII:xi—The Nature of Man.  
                                                                      Bk.XIV:xxii—Chapter XVIII,  Bk.XIV:2:180—Emotions.
 

Preface:128

Definitions:129

Postulates:130

Part III Propositions: Book I:Pg. x 
           If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral. 
           If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 

Definitions of the Emotions:173  Glossary

General Definition of the Emotions:185

JBY Endnotes



Part III Proposition List:  Book I:Pg. x;  { Hypotheses }

           Suggestion:  Do  not  read  consecutively  as  you would a novel; 
                                but  select a Proposition,  click its number to the left 
                                and  then  follow  all  its  links in turn wherever they 
                                may  lead.   You will then be putting hypertexting to 
                                its fullest and best advantage—the fuller discussion 
                                of  a  thread.  If  you  do not stick to one thread at a 
                                time,  this  Web Site  will seem very convoluted and 
                                confusing. 
            {Definition of Proposition: a statement in which something is affirmed or denied,
                           so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.}
                    { All axioms, definitions, and propositions are hypotheses. Test 
                       them for their 'cash value'. See Notes 10 & 11, Posit, and Idea. } 

`
PREFACE:  Bk.I:128; Bk.XII:214-16.

                                       [ Affects ]
(Pfc:1) Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be          E3:Wolfson:2:1833.

treating rather of matters outside Nature than of natural phenomena        lines, planes, and solids
           Bk.XIV:2:1822—common. 
following Nature's general laws.  (2) They appear to conceive man to
                                                 E3:Wolfson:2:1836. 
be situated in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe         Spinoza's daring  

that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has abso-          E2:Wolfson:2:110
        ] power [ 
lute  control  over  his  actions,  and that he is determined solely by               Mark Twain 
 Bk.XX:23781.                                      ] weakness [          ] frailty [ 
himself.  (Pfc:3) They attribute human infirmities and fickleness,  not to
          { Mark Twain }
the  power of Nature in general,  but to some mysterious flaw in the
                                                                           ] ridicule [
nature of man, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or,              Bk.XIV:2:1811.
                                                                             [ censuring ]
as usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weak-
                                                                               [ cunningly ]
ness  of  the  human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his
                                         [ Godly ]
fellows, is looked upon as a seer.  (Pfc:4)  Still there has been no lack

of very excellent men  (to  whose  toil and industry I confess myself               Bk.XIV:2:1813.

much indebted), who have written many noteworthy things concern-

ing  the  right way of life and have given much sage advise to man-

kind.  (Pfc:5)  But no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and
                            [ Affects ]                  Bk.XVIII:268—3p56s.
strength  of  the  emotions, and the power of the mind against them
           [ moderation ]
for their restraint.



(Pfc:6) I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though be believed,
                           
that the mind has absolute power over its actions,  strove to explain             Bk.XIV:2:1827.

human emotions by their primary causes,  and, at the same time, to

point out of the way, by which the mind might attain to absolute do-
] control [
minion over them.   (Pfc:7)  However,  in my opinion,  he accomplishes
                                                   ] brilliance [                            ] genius [
nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect,

as I will show in the proper place.  (Pfc:8)  For the present I wish to re-

vert to those,  who  would  rather  abuse or deride human emotions
   Bk.XVIII:19f, 3443Preface.
than understand them. (9) Such persons will, doubtless  page 129  think
                                                                                Bk.XIB:2142.
it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geo-
                                                                       ] logical [
metrically,  and  should  wish  to set forth with rigid reasoning those

matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous

absurd, and dreadful.  (Pfc:10)  However, such is my plan.   (11)  Nothing

comes to pass in Nature,  which  can  be set down to a flaw therein;

for  Nature  is always the same,  and everywhere one and the same

in her efficacy and power of action;  that is,  nature's laws and ordi-
 ] rules [
nances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form
                                                            Bk.XIB:7748.
to another,  are  everywhere  and  always  the  same;  so that there

should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of
                                                                                  Bk.XX:238. 
all things whatsoever,  namely, through nature's universal laws and            E3:Wolfson:2:1833.

rules.  (Pfc:12)  Thus  the passions of hatred,  anger,  envy,  and so on,

considered  in  themselves,  follow  from  this  same  necessity and
 ] force [
efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through

which they are understood, and possess certain properties as wor-

thy of being known as the properties of anything else,  whereof the
                                                                         Bk.III:239.
contemplation in itself affords us delight. (Pfc:13) I shall, therefore, treat

of  the  nature  and strength of the emotions according to the same

method,  as I employed heretofore in my investigations  concerning
 Bk.XIB:244132.                     Bk.III:239.                                       ] appetites [ 
G-D and the mind.  (Pfc:14) I shall consider human actions and desires
                               Durant:636                                Bk.XI:1542.   
in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines,         Bk.XIV:2:1812, 2:1851.  
 Bk.XIA:3553.  ] bodies [ 
planes, and solids.
 Bk.XIB:7746; Bk.XX:238.

                                          Bk.III:205, 242. 
Def. II.  (1) I say that we act when anything takes place, either within 
            us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; 
            that is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature 
            something takes  place  within  us or externally to us, which 
            can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly under- 
            stood {PcM}.  (2) On the other hand, I say that we are passive           Bk.XIV:2:1891. 
            as regards something when that something takes place with- 
                                                              <       of which we are        >
            in us,  or follows from our nature externally,  we  being  only
            the  { inadequate, }  partial cause  { that  is  not  clearly and distinctly 
               understood. }           3P1; 4P2, 5, 15, 23, 33, 35, 35C1, 52, 61, 64.    <------- small print, Logical Index.

page 130  
                   Bk.VIII:46443; Bk.XIV:2:1951, 2:2012, 2:2031, 2:2661, 2:2681 & 2. 
                        Bk.III:219, 241, 242; Bk.XV:277107; Bk.XVIII:143d3, 254d3, 259d3. 
                       ] affectus [                      ] affections [                                              Hampshire:135—affectus 
Def. III.  By emotions I mean the modifications of the body, whereby            { The feelings are 
             the active power of  said  body  is increased or diminished,        °JOY or °SORROW. }
             aided  or  constrained,  and  also ]together with[  the  ideas            E2:2P24-32
             of such modifications.  E3:Endnote GN:2;               3P14.

                                            { efficient cause }
N.B.      If  we  can be the adequate cause of any of these modifica- 
             tions,  I  then call the emotion an activity,  otherwise I call it 
             a  passion,  or  state  wherein  the  mind  is  passive.  
             { E3:Endnote GN:2 } 

Post. II. The human body can undergo many changes,  and, never- 
             theless,  retain  the  impressions  or  traces  of  objects (cf. 
             II:Post.v.),  and,  consequently,  the same images of things  
             ( ] for the definition of which [ see II:xvii.note).   

For all Propositions see Scroll P1. 

Prop. I.  E3:Didn:239; Bk.XVIII:1773p1, 3243p1,3; Bk.XIX:22113. 

Our mind is in certain cases active,  and in
certain cases passive.  In so  far  as  it has
adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and       E3:Endnote GN:2
in so far as it  has  inadequate  ideas,  it  is
necessarily passive. 
               Bk.XIV:2:1893—suffers.            3P3, 56, 58, 59; 4P15, 23, 28; 5P20S.    <------- small print, Logical Index.

  
 
Proof.— (1:1)  In every human mind  there are some  adequate ideas,
                                              [ mutilated ]
and  some  ideas  that  are  fragmentary  and  confused  (II:xl.note).           Bk.XIV:2:1892.

(1:2)  Those ideas which are adequate in the mind  are adequate also

in  G-D,  inasmuch  as  he  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  mind                  1D6

(II:xi.Coroll.),  and  those  which are inadequate in the mind are like-

wise  (by  the  same  Coroll.) adequate in G-D, not inasmuch as he                Deus

contains  in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as he,

at the same time, contains the minds of other things. (1:3) Again, from

any  given  idea some effect must necessarily follow (I:xxxvi); of this
                               Bk.XVIII:1773d1,p1d.
effect  G-D  is the adequate cause (III:Def.i.),  not inasmuch as he is

infinite,  but  inasmuch  as he is conceived  as affected by the given

idea (II:ix.).  (4) But of that effect whereof G-D is the cause, inasmuch

as he is affected by an idea which is adequate  in a given mind,  of
                                                                                      Bk.XIX:28326.
that effect,  I repeat,  the  mind  in  question  is  the adequate cause

(II:xi.Coroll.).  (1:5)  Therefore  our mind,  in  so  far as it has adequate

 page 131  ideas (III:Def.ii.), is in certain cases necessarily, active; this

was our first point.  (1:6)  Again, whatsoever necessarily, follows from

the idea which is adequate in G-D,  not by virtue of his possessing

in himself the mind of one man only,  but by virtue of his containing,
                                                                                         Bk.XIX:1451.
together  with the mind  of that one man,  the minds  of other things

also, of such an effect (II:xi.Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not

an adequate,  but only a partial cause;  thus (III:Def.ii.) the mind, in-

asmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases necessarily

passive;  this  was  our  second  point.   (1:7)  Therefore our mind, &c.

Q.E.D.



Corollary.— (1:8) Hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable

to be acted upon,  in proportion  as it possesses inadequate ideas,

and,  contrariwise,  is  more  or  less  active in proportion as it pos-             Durant:646135

sesses adequate ideas.



Prop. II.  Bk.XVIII:493p2,1103p2. 

                                { directly }
Body cannot ^ determine mind to think,             Durant65:176
                                              { directly }
neither  can  mind ^ determine body to              Mark Twain
motion  or  rest  or  any  state different
from these, if such there be.     5P1:1.        <------- small print, Logical Index.

Bk.III:239—Spinoza rejects all causal influence between mind and body,
{The mind 'reads' the instinctual hormonal modifications of the body and         Autonomic Nervous System
  then directs the body motor nerves to act.}.                                               James' Bear, Sequence.

  
Proof.— (2:1) All modes of thinking have for their cause G-D, by virtue
                                                                                          [ explained ]
of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his being display-

ed  under any other attribute (II:vi.).  (2) That, therefore, which deter-
                              ] think [                     ] Thinking [ 
mines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a mode of

extension; that is (II:Def.i.), it is not body.  (3) This was our first point.

(2:4)  Again,  the motion and rest  of a body,  must arise from another
                                             Bk.XIB:241125. 
body,  which has also been determined  to a state  of motion or rest
                                     ] without exception [
by a third body,  and absolutely  everything  which takes place in a
                 ] arise [
body must spring from G-D, in so far as he is regarded as affected

by  some  mode  of  extension,  and  not  by  some mode of thought

(II:vi.);  that is,  it  cannot spring  from the mind,  which is a mode of
[ 2P11 ]
thought.  (2:5)  This  was  our  second  point.  (6)  Therefore  body can-

not determine mind, &c.  Q.E.D..


] Scholium [
Note.— (2:7) This is made more clear by what was said in the note to
                                   Bk.XV:277108; Bk.XVIII:1413p2s.
II:vii., namely, that mind an