THE  ETHICS -  PART  III

JBY Notes:

1.  The text is the 1883 translation of the  "The Ethics"  by  R. H. M. 
     Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was 
     scanned and proof-read by JBY. For other Versions see Note 7. 

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):  y = Proposition Number, if given;  xx = Sentence Number. 

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols: 
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ), 
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ], 
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [, 
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >, 
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <, 
           { JBY Comment }    G-D      Metaphors       LINKS 

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here.

6.  Please e-mail, errors, clarification requests, disagreement, or
     suggestions to josephb@yesselman.com. 

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively         EL:[3]:vi
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its         Durant's Story
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and            Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze.  

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions, or best, study the printed book—
    book page numbers are given for most scanned books. 

9.  From Elwes's Introduction—EL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi. 
 
10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for   every-          E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,   is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for   teaching  the 
       "Organic  Interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and   all 
       his   puzzling   sayings,   for  example   E3:IV:136,   become   more, 
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.    Look  for  the
       Cash Value. 
 
      To  help  further  understand  many  of  the  Propositions,  use  the         {Examples
      analogy  of  you  as  G-D  and  all  parts of you (past, present, and        1D6, 2P3, 2P4.}
      future) as the modes ( particular  things ). Apparent Contradiction, Analogies,        Indivisible 


11.  Wolfson's  summaries:  Part III, Part IV, and Part V.  

12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff.
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xxii. 
       For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi. 
       For a "study of the plan of Ethics 3" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:339-40. 
       For a criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS:  Bk.XII:xi—The Nature of Man.  
                                                                      Bk.XIV:xxii—Chapter XVIII,  Bk.XIV:2:180—Emotions.
 

Preface:128

Definitions:129

Postulates:130

Part III Propositions: Book I:Pg. x 
           If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral. 
           If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 

Definitions of the Emotions:173  Glossary

General Definition of the Emotions:185

JBY Endnotes



Part III Proposition List:  Book I:Pg. x;  { Hypotheses }

           Suggestion:  Do  not  read  consecutively  as  you would a novel; 
                                but  select a Proposition,  click its number to the left 
                                and  then  follow  all  its  links in turn wherever they 
                                may  lead.   You will then be putting hypertexting to 
                                its fullest and best advantage—the fuller discussion 
                                of  a  thread.  If  you  do not stick to one thread at a 
                                time,  this  Web Site  will seem very convoluted and 
                                confusing. 
            {Definition of Proposition: a statement in which something is affirmed or denied,
                           so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.}
                    { All axioms, definitions, and propositions are hypotheses. Test 
                       them for their 'cash value'. See Notes 10 & 11, Posit, and Idea. } 

`
PREFACE:  Bk.I:128; Bk.XII:214-16.

                                       [ Affects ]
(Pfc:1) Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be          E3:Wolfson:2:1833.

treating rather of matters outside Nature than of natural phenomena        lines, planes, and solids
           Bk.XIV:2:1822—common. 
following Nature's general laws.  (2) They appear to conceive man to
                                                 E3:Wolfson:2:1836. 
be situated in Nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe         Spinoza's daring  

that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has abso-          E2:Wolfson:2:110
        ] power [ 
lute  control  over  his  actions,  and that he is determined solely by               Mark Twain 
 Bk.XX:23781.                                      ] weakness [          ] frailty [ 
himself.  (Pfc:3) They attribute human infirmities and fickleness,  not to
          { Mark Twain }
the  power of Nature in general,  but to some mysterious flaw in the
                                                                           ] ridicule [
nature of man, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or,              Bk.XIV:2:1811.
                                                                             [ censuring ]
as usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weak-
                                                                               [ cunningly ]
ness  of  the  human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his
                                         [ Godly ]
fellows, is looked upon as a seer.  (Pfc:4)  Still there has been no lack

of very excellent men  (to  whose  toil and industry I confess myself               Bk.XIV:2:1813.

much indebted), who have written many noteworthy things concern-

ing  the  right way of life and have given much sage advise to man-

kind.  (Pfc:5)  But no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and
                            [ Affects ]                  Bk.XVIII:268—3p56s.
strength  of  the  emotions, and the power of the mind against them
           [ moderation ]
for their restraint.



(Pfc:6) I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though be believed,
                           
that the mind has absolute power over its actions,  strove to explain             Bk.XIV:2:1827.

human emotions by their primary causes,  and, at the same time, to

point out of the way, by which the mind might attain to absolute do-
] control [
minion over them.   (Pfc:7)  However,  in my opinion,  he accomplishes
                                                   ] brilliance [                            ] genius [
nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect,

as I will show in the proper place.  (Pfc:8)  For the present I wish to re-

vert to those,  who  would  rather  abuse or deride human emotions
   Bk.XVIII:19f, 3443Preface.
than understand them. (9) Such persons will, doubtless  page 129  think
                                                                                Bk.XIB:2142.
it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geo-
                                                                       ] logical [
metrically,  and  should  wish  to set forth with rigid reasoning those

matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous

absurd, and dreadful.  (Pfc:10)  However, such is my plan.   (11)  Nothing

comes to pass in Nature,  which  can  be set down to a flaw therein;

for  Nature  is always the same,  and everywhere one and the same

in her efficacy and power of action;  that is,  nature's laws and ordi-
 ] rules [
nances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form
                                                            Bk.XIB:7748.
to another,  are  everywhere  and  always  the  same;  so that there

should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of
                                                                                  Bk.XX:238. 
all things whatsoever,  namely, through nature's universal laws and            E3:Wolfson:2:1833.

rules.  (Pfc:12)  Thus  the passions of hatred,  anger,  envy,  and so on,

considered  in  themselves,  follow  from  this  same  necessity and
 ] force [
efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through

which they are understood, and possess certain properties as wor-

thy of being known as the properties of anything else,  whereof the
                                                                         Bk.III:239.
contemplation in itself affords us delight. (Pfc:13) I shall, therefore, treat

of  the  nature  and strength of the emotions according to the same

method,  as I employed heretofore in my investigations  concerning
 Bk.XIB:244132.                     Bk.III:239.                                       ] appetites [ 
G-D and the mind.  (Pfc:14) I shall consider human actions and desires
                               Durant:636                                Bk.XI:1542.   
in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines,         Bk.XIV:2:1812, 2:1851.  
 Bk.XIA:3553.  ] bodies [ 
planes, and solids.
 Bk.XIB:7746; Bk.XX:238.

                                          Bk.III:205, 242. 
Def. II.  (1) I say that we act when anything takes place, either within 
            us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; 
            that is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature 
            something takes  place  within  us or externally to us, which 
            can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly under- 
            stood {PcM}.  (2) On the other hand, I say that we are passive           Bk.XIV:2:1891. 
            as regards something when that something takes place with- 
                                                              <       of which we are        >
            in us,  or follows from our nature externally,  we  being  only
            the  { inadequate, }  partial cause  { that  is  not  clearly and distinctly 
               understood. }           3P1; 4P2, 5, 15, 23, 33, 35, 35C1, 52, 61, 64.    <------- small print, Logical Index.

page 130  
                   Bk.VIII:46443; Bk.XIV:2:1951, 2:2012, 2:2031, 2:2661, 2:2681 & 2. 
                        Bk.III:219, 241, 242; Bk.XV:277107; Bk.XVIII:143d3, 254d3, 259d3. 
                       ] affectus [                      ] affections [                                              Hampshire:135—affectus 
Def. III.  By emotions I mean the modifications of the body, whereby            { The feelings are 
             the active power of  said  body  is increased or diminished,        °JOY or °SORROW. }
             aided  or  constrained,  and  also ]together with[  the  ideas            E2:2P24-32
             of such modifications.  E3:Endnote GN:2;               3P14.

                                            { efficient cause }
N.B.      If  we  can be the adequate cause of any of these modifica- 
             tions,  I  then call the emotion an activity,  otherwise I call it 
             a  passion,  or  state  wherein  the  mind  is  passive.  
             { E3:Endnote GN:2 } 

Post. II. The human body can undergo many changes,  and, never- 
             theless,  retain  the  impressions  or  traces  of  objects (cf. 
             II:Post.v.),  and,  consequently,  the same images of things  
             ( ] for the definition of which [ see II:xvii.note).   

For all Propositions see Scroll P1. 

Prop. I.  E3:Didn:239; Bk.XVIII:1773p1, 3243p1,3; Bk.XIX:22113. 

Our mind is in certain cases active,  and in
certain cases passive.  In so  far  as  it has
adequate ideas it is necessarily active, and       E3:Endnote GN:2
in so far as it  has  inadequate  ideas,  it  is
necessarily passive. 
               Bk.XIV:2:1893—suffers.            3P3, 56, 58, 59; 4P15, 23, 28; 5P20S.    <------- small print, Logical Index.

  
 
Proof.— (1:1)  In every human mind  there are some  adequate ideas,
                                              [ mutilated ]
and  some  ideas  that  are  fragmentary  and  confused  (II:xl.note).           Bk.XIV:2:1892.

(1:2)  Those ideas which are adequate in the mind  are adequate also

in  G-D,  inasmuch  as  he  constitutes  the  essence  of  the  mind                  1D6

(II:xi.Coroll.),  and  those  which are inadequate in the mind are like-

wise  (by  the  same  Coroll.) adequate in G-D, not inasmuch as he                Deus

contains  in himself the essence of the given mind alone, but as he,

at the same time, contains the minds of other things. (1:3) Again, from

any  given  idea some effect must necessarily follow (I:xxxvi); of this
                               Bk.XVIII:1773d1,p1d.
effect  G-D  is the adequate cause (III:Def.i.),  not inasmuch as he is

infinite,  but  inasmuch  as he is conceived  as affected by the given

idea (II:ix.).  (4) But of that effect whereof G-D is the cause, inasmuch

as he is affected by an idea which is adequate  in a given mind,  of
                                                                                      Bk.XIX:28326.
that effect,  I repeat,  the  mind  in  question  is  the adequate cause

(II:xi.Coroll.).  (1:5)  Therefore  our mind,  in  so  far as it has adequate

 page 131  ideas (III:Def.ii.), is in certain cases necessarily, active; this

was our first point.  (1:6)  Again, whatsoever necessarily, follows from

the idea which is adequate in G-D,  not by virtue of his possessing

in himself the mind of one man only,  but by virtue of his containing,
                                                                                         Bk.XIX:1451.
together  with the mind  of that one man,  the minds  of other things

also, of such an effect (II:xi.Coroll.) the mind of the given man is not

an adequate,  but only a partial cause;  thus (III:Def.ii.) the mind, in-

asmuch as it has inadequate ideas, is in certain cases necessarily

passive;  this  was  our  second  point.   (1:7)  Therefore our mind, &c.

Q.E.D.



Corollary.— (1:8) Hence it follows that the mind is more or less liable

to be acted upon,  in proportion  as it possesses inadequate ideas,

and,  contrariwise,  is  more  or  less  active in proportion as it pos-             Durant:646135

sesses adequate ideas.



Prop. II.  Bk.XVIII:493p2,1103p2. 

                                { directly }
Body cannot ^ determine mind to think,             Durant65:176
                                              { directly }
neither  can  mind ^ determine body to              Mark Twain
motion  or  rest  or  any  state different
from these, if such there be.     5P1:1.        <------- small print, Logical Index.

Bk.III:239—Spinoza rejects all causal influence between mind and body,
{The mind 'reads' the instinctual hormonal modifications of the body and         Autonomic Nervous System
  then directs the body motor nerves to act.}.                                               James' Bear, Sequence.

  
Proof.— (2:1) All modes of thinking have for their cause G-D, by virtue
                                                                                          [ explained ]
of his being a thinking thing, and not by virtue of his being display-

ed  under any other attribute (II:vi.).  (2) That, therefore, which deter-
                              ] think [                     ] Thinking [ 
mines the mind to thought is a mode of thought, and not a mode of

extension; that is (II:Def.i.), it is not body.  (3) This was our first point.

(2:4)  Again,  the motion and rest  of a body,  must arise from another
                                             Bk.XIB:241125. 
body,  which has also been determined  to a state  of motion or rest
                                     ] without exception [
by a third body,  and absolutely  everything  which takes place in a
                 ] arise [
body must spring from G-D, in so far as he is regarded as affected

by  some  mode  of  extension,  and  not  by  some mode of thought

(II:vi.);  that is,  it  cannot spring  from the mind,  which is a mode of
[ 2P11 ]
thought.  (2:5)  This  was  our  second  point.  (6)  Therefore  body can-

not determine mind, &c.  Q.E.D..


] Scholium [
Note.— (2:7) This is made more clear by what was said in the note to
                                   Bk.XV:277108; Bk.XVIII:1413p2s.
II:vii., namely, that mind and body are one and the same thing, con-            Hampshire32:128 

ceived first under the attribute of thought, secondly, under the attri-
                                                                               [connection]  ]linking[
bute of extension.  (:8) Thus it follows that the order or concatenation

of  things  is  identical, whether Nature be conceived under the one

attribute  or  the  other;  consequently the order of states of activity

and passivity in our body is simultaneous in Nature with  page 132  the
                                                                  Bk.XIX:2565.
order  of  states  of activity and passivity in the mind.  (2:9)  The same

conclusion  is  evident  from  the  manner  in  which  we proved II:xii.



(2:10)  Nevertheless,  though such is the case, and though there be no

further room for doubt, I can scarcely believe, until the fact is proved
< Bk.XV:278109—E3:XXXII(3)N:152, E3:Def.XXVII:179. >     ] examine [ 
by  experience,  that  men  can  be induced to consider the question
] without prejudice [ 
calmly and fairly,  so firmly are they convinced that it is merely at the

bidding of the mind,  that the body is set in motion or at rest,  or per-

forms a variety of actions depending solely on the mind's will or the             Bk.XIV:2:1896. 
    [ art of thinking ]                                                             ] determined [
exercise of thought. (2:11) However, no one has hitherto laid down the
                      ] capabilities [
limits   to   the   powers   of the body,  that is,  no  one  has  as  yet
                                                    Bk.XIX:2551—E2:XIII(10)n:93, E5:Prf.(5):244.
been   taught   by   experience   what   the   body   can  accomplish           Hampshire32:133 

] , without  being  determined  by  the  mind, [  solely by the laws of
] its [                              ] it [          Bk.XIV:2:1901—corporeal. 
nature,  in  so  far  as  she  is  regarded  as extension.  (2:12 ) No one

hitherto  has  gained  such  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the bodily            Bk.XIV:2:1904.
  ] structure [                                         Bk.XIX:27814. 
mechanism,  that  he can explain all its functions;  nor need I call at-           Damasio:216

tention  to  the fact that many actions are observed in the lower ani-
                                                    [ ingenuity ]
mals, which far transcend human sagacity, and that somnambulists

do  many  things in their sleep,  which they would not venture to do

when  awake:  these  instances are enough to show,  that the body

can  by  the  sole  laws  of its nature do many things which the mind           Hampshire32:130 

wonders at.



(2:13)  Again,  no  one  knows how or by what means the mind moves               Damasio:216

the body,  nor how many various degrees of motion it can impart to
                                               Bk.XIX:2184. 
the body,  nor how quickly it can move it.  (2:14) Thus, when men say               Bk.XIV:2:1905 

that  this  or  that  physical  action  has its origin in the mind,  which
                 ] command [                                         { undefined } 
latter  has  dominion  over the body, they are using ^ words without
                                                        [ fine-sounding words ] 
meaning,  or  are  confessing  in  specious  phraseology  that  they
                                                              ] are not concerned to discover it. [ 
are ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it.             Bk.XIV:2:1903.



(2:15) But,  they will say, whether we know or do not know the means
                                ] moves [
whereby  the  mind  acts on  the body, we have, at any rate, experi-

ence of the fact that unless the human mind is in a fit state to think,

the body remains inert.  (16)  Moreover,  we have experience, that the

mind  alone  can  determine  whether we speak or are silent,  and a

variety  of  similar states which,  accordingly, we say depend on the
          ] decision [
mind's  decree.   (2:17)  But,  as to the first point,  I ask such objectors,

whether experience does not also teach, that if the body be inactive
                                            ] not capable [
the  mind  is  simultaneously  unfitted  for  thinking?  page 133   (2:18)   For

when  the  body  is at rest in sleep,  the mind simultaneously is in a
           { dormancy }
state  of  torpor  also,  and has no power of thinking, such as it pos-

sesses  when the body, is awake.  (2:19) Again, I think everyone's ex-

perience will confirm the statement, that the mind is not at all times
           ] apt [
equally  fit  for  thinking  on  a  given subject,  but  according as the
                                 ] apt [
body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this
                                                                           ]       apt to regard       [
or that object, so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplat-
        Bk.XVIII:1323p2s.
ing the said object.


(2:20) But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the laws of

Nature  considered  as  extended substance,  we should be able to

deduce the causes of buildings,  pictures,  and  things  of that kind,

which are produced only by human art; nor would the human body,
                                              ] guided [
unless it were determined and led by the mind, be capable of build-

ing a single temple.   (2:21)  However,  I have just pointed out that the

objectors  cannot  fix  the  limits of the body's power,  or say  what
             ] deduced [
can be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature, whereas

they  have  experience  of  many  things being accomplished solely

by the laws of nature, which they would never have believed possi-

ble except under the direction of mind: such are the actions perform-

ed  by  somnambulists while asleep,  and wondered at by their per-

formers when awake.  (2:22) I would further call attention to the mech-
                           Bk.III:227.                                            ] ingenuity [
anism  of  the  human body,  which far surpasses in complexity  all
                                                          ] skill [
that has been put together by human art, not to repeat what I have

already shown, namely, that from Nature, under whatever attribute

she be considered, infinite results follow.   (23)  As for the second ob-
] point [
jection, I submit that the world would be much happier, if men were

as fully able to keep silence as they are to speak.   (2:24)  Experience

abundantly  shows  that men can govern anything more easily than
                              ] control [
their tongues, and restrain anything more easily than their appetites;

whence it comes about that many believe,  that we are only free in

respect to objects which we moderately desire, because our desire
                                        Bk.XVIII:270p2s.
for  such  can easily be controlled by the thought of something else

frequently remembered, but that we are by no means free in respect

to what we seek with violent emotion, for our desire cannot then be

allayed with the remembrance of anything else.   (2:25)  However, un-

less  such  persons  had  proved  by  experience  that  we do many

things  which  we  afterwards  page 134  repent  of,  and again that we
                                     ] conflicting [                  < Bk.XV:278110—E4:Prf.(1):187,
often,  when assailed by contrary  emotions, see the better and fol-
 E4:XVII(2)N:200. >  
low the worse, there would be nothing to prevent their believing that

we are free in all things.  (2:26) Thus an infant believes that of its own
                ] seeks [                                                                   [ wants ]
free will it desires milk, an angry child believes that it freely desires               Mark Twain
                               ] man [                  ] he [
vengeance, a timid child believes that it freely desires to run away;

further, a drunken man believes that he utters from the free decision

of his mind words which, when he is sober, he would willingly, have
                                                            ] gossiping [
withheld: thus, too, a delirious man, a garrulous woman, a child, and
                          ] sort [
others of like complexion,  believe that they speak from the free de-

cision of their mind, when they are in reality unable to restrain their

impulse to talk.  (2:27) Experience teaches us no less clearly than rea-

son,  that  men believe themselves to be free,  simply because they            Stewart:285
                                                                ] ignorant [
are  conscious  of  their  actions,  and  unconscious  of  the causes

whereby those actions are determined; and, further, it is plain that
         ] mental decisions [                                             Bk.XVIII:2223p2s.
the dictates of the mind are but another name for the appetites, and
                                                         ] disposition [
therefore vary according to the varying state of the body. (2:28) Every-

one shapes his actions according to his emotion, those who are as-
 ] prey to [                                                                 ] want [
sailed by conflicting emotions know not what they wish;  those who
             [ moved ]              [ affect ]
are not attacked by any emotion are readily swayed this way or that.

(2:29) All these considerations clearly show that a mental decision and
                                    ] physical [ 
a bodily appetite,  or determined state,  are simultaneous,  or rather

are  one and the same thing,  which we call decision,  when it is re-

garded under and explained through the attribute of thought, and a
  ] physical [ 
conditioned state,  when it is regarded under the attribute of exten-

sion,  and deduced from the laws of motion and rest.   (2:30)  This will

appear yet more plainly in the sequel.  (2:31) For the present I wish to

call  attention  to  another point,  namely,  that we cannot act by the
                                                      [ recollect it. ]
decision  of  the  mind,  unless  we  have a remembrance of having
                                                                           [ unless we recollect it. ]
done so.   (2:32)  For instance,  we cannot say a word without remem-

bering  that  we  have  done so.  (2:33)  Again,  it is not within the free

power of the mind to remember or forget a thing at will.  (2:34)  There-
                                                                            ] restricted [ 
fore the freedom of the mind must in any case be limited to the pow-

er of uttering or not uttering something which it remembers. (2:35) But

when  we  dream  that  we speak,  we believe that we speak from a

free decision of the mind,  yet we do not speak,  or, if we do, it is by

a spontaneous   page 135   motion of the body.   (2:36)  Again,  we  dream

that  we  are  concealing  something,  and  we seem to act from the

same decision of the mind as that,  whereby we keep silence when

awake concerning something we know.   (2:37)  Lastly, we dream that

from  the  free  decision  of  our  mind  we do something,  which we

should not dare to do when awake.


                                                                                              Bk.III:236.
(2:38) Now I should like to know whether there be in the mind two sorts
                                    [ fantasy ]
of  decisions,  one sort illusive, and the other sort free?  (39) If our folly

does  not carry us so far as this, we must necessarily admit, that the

decision  of  the mind, which is believed to be free, is not distinguish-
                                   Bk.XIV:2:842.    
able  from  the imagination or memory,  and is nothing more than the

affirmation,  which an idea,  by  virtue  of  being an idea,  necessarily

involves  (II:xlix.).  (40)  Wherefore  these decisions of the mind arise in

the  mind  by  the  same  necessity,  as  the  ideas  of  things actually

existing.   (2:41) Therefore  those  who believe, that they speak or keep

silence  or  act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but

dream with their eyes open.




Prop. III. E3:Dijn:239; Bk.XVIII:18927, 3083p3, 3243p1,3, 3693p3; Bk.XIX:22113.

              Bk.III:205. 
The activities of the mind arise solely
from   adequate   ideas;   the  passive
states  of  the mind depend solely on               Bk.XIV:2:1923.
inadequate ideas.  { GN(2):185, E5:XVIII(1):256. }
3P9, 56, GDE; 4P24, 28, 35, 35C2, 51, 52, 59, 61, 63, 64; 5P4S, 18, 20S, 36, 40, 40C, 42.   <------- small print, Logical Index.

 

Proof.— (3:1) The first element, which constitutes the essence of the

mind, is nothing else but the idea of the actually existent body (II:xi.

and xiii.), which (II:xv.) is compounded of many other ideas, whereof

some are adequate and some inadequate  (II:xxix.Coroll.  , II:xxxviii.

Coroll.).  (3:2)   Whatsoever therefore follows from the nature of mind,
          ] the [
and has mind for its proximate cause,  through which it must be un-

derstood,  must  necessarily follow either from an adequate or from

an inadequate idea.   (3:3)  But in so far as the mind  (III:i.) has inade-
                                                                                 ] active states [
quate ideas, it is necessarily passive: wherefore the activities of the

mind follow solely from adequate ideas, and accordingly the mind is

only passive in so far as it has inadequate ideas.  Q.E.D.



Note.—  (3:4)  Thus we see,  that passive states are not attributed to

the  mind, except in so far as it contains something involving nega-
 4P32                                           { , at times unavoidably, } 
tion, or in so far as it is regarded ^ as a part of Nature, which cannot
                                                                      ^ Bk.XIX:22621.
be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts:
                                                                    ] characteristic of [ 
I  could  thus  show,  that passive states are attributed to individual
                                                                              [ related ] 
things  in the  page 136   same way that they are attributed to the mind,             Bk.XIV:2:1926.

and that they  cannot  otherwise  be perceived,  but  my purpose is

solely to treat of the human mind.      4P59; 5P40.




Prop. IV. E3:Wolfson:2:195—Passive Emotions;   > connatus—Bk.III:204, 205, 240, 241. <
                           Bk.XVIII:2313p4,5,6, 240p4, 243p4,5,6, 246p4,5,6—Bk.XII:218-221, 3003p4, 3273p4, 3713p4. 

{ EL:[55]:xxvii }                                    { or changed }                E3:Dijn:240.
Nothing can be destroyed, except             { An organism or thing 
by  a  cause  external  to  itself.                  has conatus—inertia. }
             < E2:Parkinson:278111 & 112>  
                    3P5, 6, 8, 11S; 4P1, 4, 20, 30.

  
  
Proof.— (4:1) This proposition is self-evident, for the definition of any-

thing affirms the essence of that thing,  but does not negative it;  in

other  words,  it  postulates  the essence of the thing,  but does not

take it away. (4:2) So long therefore as we regard only the thing itself,

without taking into account external causes, we shall not be able to

find in it anything which could destroy it.  Q.E.D.




Prop. V.  Bk.XVIII:2313p4,5,6, 243p5,6, 240p5d, 2863p5. 

Things are naturally contrary,  that is,                 E3:Dijn:240.
cannot exist in the same object, in so
far  as  one  is  capable  of destroying            Calculus:3.1c, 4.3, & 4.6
the other.             3P6, 10, 37; 4P7, 30. 

 
Proof.— (5:1)  If they could agree together or co-exist in the same ob-

ject,  there would then be in the said object something which could

destroy it; but this, by the foregoing proposition, is absurd, therefore

things, &c.  Q.E.D.




Prop. VI.  >conatus—Bk.III:240, 241.<; Bk.XIA:12419; Bk.XII:217;
                            Bk.XVIII:143p6d, 1143p6d, 1203p6d—p34, 241p6d, 277p6, 280p6, 3003p6d; Bk.XX:23882. 

    { EL:[55]:xxvii }
Everything,  in  so  far  as it is in itself,      E3:Wolfson:2:204—conatus.
endeavours to persist in its own being {by perpetuating its genes}.  
<Conatus.  E2:Parkinson:278111 & 112, E4:XVIII(4)N:201, E4:XX(3)N:203,               E3:IV:136—inertia.
        Bk.XV:27699 on E2:XLV(6)N:118, Bk.XV:282160 on E4:LXXII(3)N:235.>           E3:Dijn:240—conatus.
        Bk.XV:282160 on E4:LXXII(3)N:235. >      Bk.XIA:3555.
                                        3P7, 12, 44S; 4P4, 20, 25, 26, 31, 60, 64. 

 
                     < Particular >
Proof— (6:1) Individual things are modes whereby the attributes of G-D
                                                                          Bk.XVIII:143p6d.
are expressed in a given determinate manner (I:xxv.Coroll.);  that is

(I:xxxiv.), they are things which express in a given determinate man-

ner the power of G-D, whereby G-D is and acts;  now no thing con-

tains  in  itself anything whereby it can be destroyed,  or which can

take  away its existence (III:iv.);  but contrariwise it is opposed to all

that could take away its existence (III.v.).  (6:2) Therefore, in so far as

it can,  and  in  so  far as it is in itself,  it endeavours to persist in its

own being.  Q.E.D.



Prop. VII.   Bk.III:230; Bk.XVIII:2223p7, 243p7, 3053p7. 

           < E2:Parkinson:278112, E3:VII(1):136,
             Bk.XV:27699 on E2:XLV(6)N:118. >
                conatus—Bk.VII:1081; Bk.XIV:2:204. 
The  endeavour     { I:1.5a } ,     wherewith       E3:Wolfson:2:195—Conatus.
everything  endeavours  to  persist  in          E3:Dijn:240—inertia.
its own being, is nothing else but  the              Hampshire:76 & 122 
actual essence of the thing in question.          E3:Wolfson:2:183—virtue. 
        { L65(63):396, Neff L66(64):398 }
3P9, 10, 37, 54; 4P4, 5, 15, 18, 18S, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 32, 33, 53, 60, 64; 5A2, 5P9, 25. 

 
Proof.— (7:1) From the given essence of any thing certain consequen-

ces necessarily follow I:xxxvi.), nor have things any power save such
                                                            ] determinate nature [
as  necessarily  follows  from  their  nature  as  determined  (I:xxix.);
                                                                           ] conatus [
wherefore the power of any given thing, or the endeavour whereby,
                             E3:Dijn:240 
either alone or with other things, it acts, or endeavours to act, that is

(III:vi.),  the  power  or endeavour, wherewith it endeavours  page 137  to

persist  in  its  own being  is  nothing  else  but  the  given  or  actual

essence  of  the  thing  in  question.  Q.E.D.



Prop. VIII.  Bk.III:240; Bk.XVIII:2026, 235p8; Bk.XIX:24934. 

The endeavour,  whereby  a thing           E3:Dijn:240—Conatus.
endeavours to persist in its being,
involves  no  finite  time,  but  an
indefinite time.                  3P9. 
Bk.XIV:1:3581—Time, as we have seen, does not differ essen- 
tially  from  duration;  it  is  only a limited portion of duration.

  

Proof.— (8:1) If it involved a limited time,  which should determine the

duration  of  the  thing,  it  would then follow solely from that power

whereby  the thing exists,  that the thing could not exist beyond the

limits  of  that time,  but that it must be destroyed;  but this (III:iv.) is

absurd.  (8:2)  Wherefore  the  endeavour wherewith a thing exists in-

volves  no definite time;  but, contrariwise, since (III:iv.) it will by the

same  power  whereby  it  already  exists  always  continue to exist,

unless it  be  destroyed  by  some  external  cause,  this endeavour

involves an indefinite time.




Prop. IX.  Bk.XVIII:17918, 1903p9d, 261p9; Bk.XIX:23130. 

The mind,  both in so far as it has clear
and distinct ideas, and also in so far as
it  has  confused ideas,  endeavours to
persist  in  its  being  for  an  indefinite
period,   and  of  this   endeavour  it  is
conscious.         3P12, 13, 58. 

 
Proof.— (9:1)  The  essence  of   the mind is constituted by adequate
         { confused }
and  inadequate  ideas (III:iii.),  therefore (III:vii.),  both in so far as it

possesses the former, and in so far as it possesses the latter, it en-

deavours  to persist in its own being,  and that for an indefinite time

(III:viii.). (9:2)  Now  as  the  mind  (II:xxiii.)  is necessarily  conscious of

itself through the ideas of the modifications of the body, the mind is               Data base 

therefore (III:vii.) conscious of its own endeavour.


                           ] conatus [     
Note.— (9:3) This endeavour, when referred solely to the mind, is call-
  < Bk.XV:278113—E3:Def.VI(2):175, 
      Bk.XV:276100 on E2:XLVIII(6):120. >                        ]      together      [
ed will,  when  referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is call-
 { EL:[55]:xxvii }            Bk.XVIII:1603p9s.
ed appetite;  it is,  in fact,  nothing else but man's essence, from the
          ^ Bk.III:241.                                                                          ] his [
nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its             Bk.XIV:2:2273.
  Bk.XVIII:245p9s. 
preservation;  and which man has thus been determined to perform.
                                   < Bk.XV:278114—E3:Def.I(1):173 >; Bk.XIV:2:1681, 2:2032, 2:2064. 
(9:4)    Further,  between  appetite and desire  there  is  no  difference,
                                                    ^ Bk.III:233, 241, 242. 
except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as 
          Bk.XVIII:2213p9s.      ^ 3P11S, 58
they  are  conscious of their appetite,  and may accordingly be thus
            { EL:[55]:xxvii }: Bk.XVIII:259p9s. 
defined: Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof. (9:5) It is thus
                         ^ 3De1, 3P37; 4P19, 26
plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish           Letter:3219[2]:331 
                       Bk.XVIII:2623p9s.                           ] judge [         Bk.III:242.      
for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but
                                              < E4:Parkinson:280136 on E4:D.I:190 >         ^ 3P39S
on  the  other hand we deem a thing to be good,  because we strive            E3:Wolfson:2:2043.
 
for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it.  Bk.XIB:21456.

                           3P27C3, 28, 55CSC, 56, 57. 

 
 page 138
Prop. X.  Bk.XVIII:239-2413p10. 

An idea, which excludes the existence
of our body,  cannot  be postulated in                           3P2
our mind, but is contrary thereto.
                          3P11S; 4P20S. 

Proof.— (10:1)  Whatsoever can destroy our body,  cannot be postula-

ted therein (Ill:v.).   (2) Therefore neither can the idea of such a thing

occur  in G-D,  in so far as he has the idea of our body (II:ix.Coroll.);

that is  (II:xi., xiii.),  the  idea of that thing cannot be postulated as in
                                                                                      ] thing [
our mind,  but contrariwise,  since (II:xi., xiii.)  the first element,  that

constitutes the essence of the mind,  is the idea of the human body
                                                        ] basic and most important [
as  actually  existing,  it follows that the first and chief endeavour of
           [ by 3P7 ]
our  mind is the endeavour to affirm the existence of our body:  thus,
                   [ that denies ]              Bk.III:219.
an  idea,  which  negatives the existence of our body,  is contrary to

our mind, &c.  Q.E.D..




Prop. XI.  Bk.XVIII:268p11-13.  

Whatsoever  increases  or  diminishes,        E3:Wolfson:2:195—Conatus.
helps or hinders the power of  activity
in our body, the idea thereof increases
or  diminishes,  helps  or  hinders  the
power of thought in our mind.  
                           ^ thinking—Bk.III:243.          3P12, 34, 59; 4P41, 42 

 
Proof.— (11:1) This proposition is evident from II:vii. or from II:xiv.


  3P15, 15C, 19, 20, 21, 23, 34, 35, 37, 38, 53, 55, 55CSC, 56, 59, De2, 3; 4P8, 18, 29, 30, 41, 51. 
Note.— (11:2) Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes,
            { transit }
and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes

to a state of lesser perfection {°P}. (3) These passive states of transi-
                                                    Bk.XV:278115; Bk.XIV:2:2076. 
                                   [ affects ]         [ joy ]        [ sorrow ]           ( laetitia )
tion explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain.  (4) By pleasure            Hampshire:125 

therefore in the following propositions I shall signify a passive state
                             Bk.III:219.                 Bk.XX:23983.                    ( tristitia ) 
wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection {°P}.  (11:5)  By pain I             Bk.XIV:2:3075.
                                            { at times unavoidable , say, going blind } 
shall  signify a passive state ^ wherein the mind passes to a lesser

perfection.   (11:6)  Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the
                                                        [ pleasure ] 4P43, 44,         ] cheerfulness [ 
body and mind together I shall call stimulation (titillatio) or merriment        Hampshire:142—titillatio
                                                                                               ] anguish [ 
(hilaritas),  the  emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call suffer-
(dolor)    (melancholia)
ing or melancholy.   (11:7)  But we must bear in mind,  that stimulation
                               [ ascribed ]                                             ] him [ 
and  suffering  are attributed to man,  when one part of his nature is
                                                       4P42
more  affected  than  the rest,  merriment and melancholy,  when all
                Bk.XVIII:1743p11s                                ( cupiditas )
parts are alike affected.  (11:8) What I mean by desire I have explained
                                                                          ^ 3P57
in the note to Prop.ix. of this part; beyond these three I recognize no             Bk.XIV:2:2079. 
        < Bk.XV:278116—E3:LIX:171, E3:Def.IV:175. >                       De4
other  primary emotion;  I will show as I proceed,  that all other emo-
               ^ Bk.III:243. 
tions arise from these three. (11:9) But, before I go further, I should like 
           ^ spring—Bk.XIV:2:2085.
here to explain at greater length Prop. x. of this part, in order that we

may  page 139   clearly  understand how one idea is contrary to another.

(11:10) In the note.II:xvii. we showed that the idea, which constitutes the

essence  of  mind,  involves  the  existence  of body,  so long as the

body itself exists.  (11:11)  Again, it follows from what we pointed out in

the Coroll. to II:viii.,  that the present existence of our mind depends

solely  on the fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the

body.  (12) Lastly, we showed (II:xvii., xviii., note) that the power of the

mind,  whereby it imagines and remembers things, also depends on

the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body.  (13) Whence
                                                                                            [ capacity to    
it  follows,  that  the  present  existence of the mind and its power of
perceive through the senses are annulled, ] 
imagining  are  removed,  as  soon  as the mind ceases to affirm the

present   existence  of the body.  (11:14)  Now the cause, why the mind

ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself

(III:iv.), nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist.  (11:15) For (by

II:vi.)  the cause,  why the mind affirms the existence of the body, is

not  that the body began to exist;  therefore, for the same reason,  it

does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body

ceases  to  exist;  but  (II:xvii.)  this  result  follows from another idea,

which excludes the present existence of our body and, consequently,

of our mind,  and  which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting             Bk.XIV:2:2021. 

the essence of our mind.      

 
 

Prop. XII. Bk.III:244; Bk.XIV:2:208; Bk.XVIII:277p12; 2953p12; 3043p12. 

The  mind,  as  far  as it can, endeavours
to conceive those things, which increase             E3:Dijn:240.
or help the power of activity in the body.
                    3P19, 25, 28, 33, 42, 52S; 4P60.

 
Proof.— (12:1)  So  long  as  the  human  body  is affected in a mode,

which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will

regard  that  external  body  as  present (II:xvii.),  and  consequently

(II:vii.), so long as the human mind regards an external body as pre-
                                          [ imagines ]
sent,  that is (II:xvii.note), conceives it, the human body is affected in
  ] manner [
a  mode,   which  involves  the nature of the said external body;  thus

so  long  as  the  mind conceives things,  which increase or help the

power  of  activity in our body,  the body is affected in modes which

increase or help its power of activity (III:Post.i.); consequently (III:xi.)
                                                    { at  that  instant }
the  mind's  power  of thinking is for that period increased or helped.
                                                                            [ strives ]
(12:2) Thus (III:vi., ix.) the mind, as far as it can, endeavours to imagine

such things.  Q.E.D..




Prop. XIII.  Bk.III:244; Bk.XIX:24320; Bk.XVIII:1583p13.

                                      [ imagines ] 
When the mind conceives things which
diminish     page 140     or  hinder  the  body's
power of activity,  it  endeavours,  as far             E3:Dijn:240.
as possible,  to remember things which
exclude the existence of the first-named
things.           3P20, 23, 25, 27C3, 28, De29.

   

                                                        [ imagines ] 
Proof.— (13:1)  So  long  as  the mind conceives anything of the kind

alluded  to,  the  power  of  the mind and body is diminished or con-
                                                                                         ] think of [
strained (cf. III:xii.Proof); nevertheless it will continue to conceive it,

until  the  mind  conceives something else,  which excludes the pre-

sent  existence  thereof (II:xvii.);  that is (as I have just shown),  the

power  of  the  mind  and of the body is diminished,  or constrained,

until  the mind conceives something else,  which excludes the exist-

ence  of  the former thing conceived:  therefore the mind (III:ix.),  as
                                   [ strive ]            [ imagine or recollect ]
far  as  it  can,  will  endeavour  to conceive or remember the latter.

Q.E.D.


                                                                           [ avoids imagining ]
Corollary.— (13:2) Hence it follows, that the mind shrinks from conceiv-

ing those things, which diminish or constrain the power of itself and

of the body.            3P15C, 38.



         3P15C, 17, 19, 20, 22, 28, 29, 30S, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 48, 49, 55CSC, De7; 4P57. 
Note.—  (13:3)  From  what  has been said we may clearly understand 
                    ( amor )     ( odium )  < Bk.XV:278117—E3:LVI(15)N:169 >     [ joy ] 
the nature of Love and Hate.  (13:4) Love is nothing else but pleasure           Calculus:Fig.1(b) 

accompanied by the idea of an external cause: Hate is nothing else
     [ sorrow ]
but  pain  accompanied by the  idea of an external cause.   (13:5)  We

further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and      Bk.XIV:2:213—Inseparable. 

to  keep  present to him,  the object of his love;  while he who hates

endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred.  (13:6) But    

I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.  { E3:xxxv ff }




Prop. XIV. XIV-XVIII—Bk.XIV:2:213; Bk.XVIII:2793p14. 

If the mind has once been affected by
two emotions at the same time, it will,
whenever  it is afterwards affected by
one of the two, be also affected by the
other.                      3P15C, 16.

 

Proof.—  (14:1)   If  the  human  body  has  once been affected by two

bodies  at  once,  whenever  afterwards the mind conceives one of

them, it will straightway remember the other also (II:xviii.).  (2) But the

mind's  conceptions  indicate  rather  the emotions of our body than

the nature of external bodies (II:xvi.Coroll.ii.);  therefore, if the body,

and  consequently the mind  (III:Def.iii.)  has been once affected by

two emotions at the same time,  it will,  whenever it is afterwards af-

fected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.




Prop. XV.  Bk.XIX:24322 & e; Bk.XVIII:257p15.  

Anything can, accidentally, be the                        C:(b)
cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.   
                          3P16, 36, 50, 52S.  

 
                                ] supposed [
Proof.— (15:1) Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously  page 141   

affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor dimin-

ishes  its power of activity, and the other does either increase or di-

minish the said power (III:Post.i.).  (2) From the foregoing proposition

it  is  evident that,  whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the

former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) neither increa-

ses nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at the same time af-

fected  by  the latter,  which  does increase or diminish its power of

activity,  that  is  (III:xi.note)  it will be affected with pleasure or pain.

(15:3) Thus the former of the two emotions will,  not through itself, but
  ] indirectly [
accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain.  (15:4) In the same way

also  it  can  be  easily  shown,  that a thing may be accidentally the

cause of desire.  Q.E.D.



Corollary.— (15:5) Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing

with  the  emotion  of pleasure or pain,  though that thing be not the

efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it.

                                   3P16, 35, 35S, 41, 50S, 52S.



Proof.— (15:6)  For from this fact alone it arises (III:xiv.),  that the mind

afterwards  conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of
  [ Joy or Sadness ]
pleasure or pain,  that is  (III:xi.note),  according as the power of the           Calculus:Fig.1(a) 

mind  and  body may be increased or diminished,  &c.;  and  conse-

quently (III:xii.), according as the mind may desire or shrink from the

conception of it (III:xiii.Coroll.), in other words (III:xiii.note), according

as it may love or hate the same.  Q.E.D.                                                       Calculus:Fig.1(b) 

Note.— (15:7) Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love

or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us;
                                              ( misericordia )   3De9
merely, as the phrase is, from sympathy or antipathy. (15:8) We should

refer  to  the same category those objects,  which affect us pleasur-

ably or painfully, simply because they resemble other objects which

affect  us  in  the  same  way.   (15:9)  This I will show in the next Prop. 
               < Bk.XV:279118—Neff-L60(56):385, last paragraph.> { Nature and Miracles } 
(15:10)  I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to introduce

these  terms  "sympathy" and "antipathy,"  wished to signify thereby
       < Bk.XV:283163 on E5:Prf.(20):246. > 
some occult qualities in things;  nevertheless I think we may be per-

mitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities.




Prop. XVI.  Bk.XVIII:278p16,17. 

                                                                     [ imagine ] 
Simply from the fact that we conceive,
that a given object has some point of
resemblance with another object  page 142  
which is wont to affect the mind pleas-
urably or painfully, although the point
of  resemblance  be  not  the  efficient
cause  of the said emotions,  we shall
still regard the first-named object with
love or hate.          3P17, 41, 46; 4P34.                                       Need

 

Proof.— (16:1)  The point of resemblance was in the object  (by hypo-

thesis),  when  we  regarded  it  with pleasure or pain, thus (III. xiv),

when  the  mind  is affected by the image thereof, it will straightway

be affected by one or the other emotion, and consequently the thing,

which we  perceive to  have the same point of resemblance,  will be
  ] indirectly [
accidentally ( III:xv.)  a  cause of pleasure or pain.  (16:2) Thus (by the
       ^ Bk.XIX:24322 & e.
foregoing  Corollary),  although  the  point  in  which the two objects

resemble  one  another  be  not  the  efficient  cause of the emotion, 

we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.   Q.E.D..




Prop. XVII.  Bk.XIB:21560; Bk.XVIII:278p16,17; Bk.XIX:24323. 

                  [ imagine ]
If  we  conceive that a thing,  which is
wont  to  affect us painfully,   has any
point  of  resemblance   with  another
thing  which  is wont to affect us with
an equally strong emotion of pleasure,                    Bk.XIV:2:214.
we  shall  hate  the  first-named  thing,
and  at  the same time we shall love it. .
                                 3P17S 

 

Proof.— (17:1) The given thing is  (by hypothesis)  in itself a cause of

pain,  and  (III:xiii.note),  in so far as we imagine it with this emotion,

we shall hate it:  further, inasmuch as we conceive that it has some

point  of resemblance to something else,  which is wont to affect us

with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall with an equally

strong  impulse of pleasure love it  (III:xvi.);  thus we shall both hate

and love the same thing.  Q.E.D..


                          [ constitution ]
Note.— (17:2) This disposition of the mind, which arises from two con-
                     Bk.XIV:2:2142—wavering; Bk.XIX:24323. 
trary emotions, is called vacillation; it stands to the emotions in the
                        Bk.XIV:2:2144.      ^ 3P31
same  relation as doubt does to the imagination (II:xliv.note); vacilla-
                                                                                           ] intensity [
tion  and  doubt  do not differ one from the other,  except as greater
                                                                 [ by 3P17 ]
differs from less.  (17:3) But we must bear in mind that I have deduced

this  vacillation from causes,  which give rise through themselves to
                                                              Bk.XIV:2:2145. 
one of the emotions,  and to the other accidentally.  (17:4)  I have done

this, in order that they might be more easily deduced from what went

before; but I do not deny that vacillation of the disposition generally
 
arises from an object, which is the efficient cause of both emotions.             Bk.XIV:2:2146.

(17:5) The human body is composed  (II:Post.i.)  of a variety of individ-

ual  page 143    parts of different nature,  and may therefore  (Ax.i. after

Lemma iii.  after  II: xiii.)  be affected in a variety of different ways by

one  and  the  same  body;  and contrariwise,  as one and the same

thing  can  be  affected  in many ways,  it can also in many different

ways affect one and the same part of the body.   (17:6)  Hence we can

easily  conceive,  that  one  and  the same object may be the cause

of many and conflicting emotions. .




Prop. XVIII. 

A man is  as  much affected pleasurably
or painfully by the image of a thing past                 Bk.XIV:2:214.
or  future  as  by  the  image  of  a  thing
present.      3De15; 4P9S, 12.

 

Proof.— (18:1)  So long as a man is affected by the image of anything,

he  will regard that thing as present,  even though it be non-existent

(II:xvii.&Coroll.), he will not conceive it as past or future, except in so

far  as  its  image is joined to the image of time past or future (II:xliv.

note).  (2) Wherefore the image of a thing, regarded in itself alone, is

identical,  whether  it  be  referred to time past,  time future,  or time

present; that is (II:xvi.Cor2.), the disposition or emotion of the body

is identical, whether the image be of a thing past, future, or present.

(18:3) Thus  the emotion of pleasure or pain is the same,  whether the

image be of a thing past or future.  Q.E.D.


                                                  3De15; 4D6.
Note I.— (18:4)  I  call  a  thing  past or future,  according  as we either

have been or shall be affected thereby.  (18:5) For instance, according
                                                                                           ] refreshed [
as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has recre-
                          ] refresh [
ated  us,  or will recreate us,  according as it has harmed us,  or will

harm us.  (6) For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its existence; that