THE ETHICS - PART IV

JBY Notes:

1.  The  text  is the  1883 translation of the "The Ethics" by R. H. M.
     Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was 
     scanned and proof-read by JBY. For other Versions see Note 7. 

2.  JBY added sentence numbers. 
     (y:xx):  y = Proposition Number, if given;  xx = Sentence Number. 

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I. 

4.  Symbols: 
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ), 
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ], 
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [, 
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >, 
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <, 
           { JBY Comment }.    G-D      Metaphors       LINKS 

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here. 

6.  Please  e-mail  errors,  clarification  requests,  disagreements, 
     or  suggestions  to  josephb@yesselman.com. 
 
7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively         Durant's Story
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its          EL:[3]:vi
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and            Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze.  

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions, or best, study the printed book—
    book page numbers are given for most scanned books. 

9.  From Elwes's Introduction—EL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi. 
 
10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for  every-          E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,  is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for   teaching  the 
       "Organic  interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and  all 
       his   puzzling   sayings,    for  example  E4:II:192,   become   more, 
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.    Look  for  the 
       Cash Value.  
 
      To  help  further  understand  many  of  the  Propositions,  use  the        {Examples
      analogy  of  you  as  G-D  and  all  parts of you (past, present, and        1D6, 2P3, 2P4.}
      future)   as   the   modes   ( particular  things );  also  useful  is  the           Indivisible 
    individual organism to the social organism—the State.            Analogies, Apparent Contradiction 
 

11. Wolfson's  summaries: Part III, Part IV, and Part V.
      De Dijn's summary of Part IV.


12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff. 
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xxiii. 
       For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi. 
     For a "study of the plan of Ethics 4" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:340-1. 
       For a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.
 
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS:   Bk.XII:xi—The Burden of Man.
                                                                     Bk.XIV:xxiii—Chapter XIX,  E4:Wolfson:2:221—Virtues.

Preface:187

Definitions:190

Axiom:191

Part IV Propositions: Book I:Pg. vii
    If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral. 
    If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 

Appendix:236

JBY Endnotes

Appendix:236

page 187

PREFACE:
 
                   ] lack of power [                                                          [ affects ]
(Prf:1)   Human  infirmity  in  moderating  and  checking  the  emotions              Bk.XIV:2:2551.
             servitude—E3:Wolfson:2:1838.     ] at the mercy of [
I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not
                               ]       is  subject  to        [
his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he             Bk.XIV:2:2312.
                                                                  < Bk.XV:278110 on E3:II(25)N:134 > 
is  often  compelled,  while seeing that which is better for him, to fol-
                                                                                                  ] bad [ 
low that which is worse. (Prf:2) Why this is so, and what is good or evil              E4:Dijn:246

in the emotions,  I  propose  to  show  how in this part of my treatise.

(Prf:3)  But,  before  I  begin,  it  would  be well to make a few prefatory
                               {         E4:Endnote Prf:4           }                     { bad }
observations  on  perfection  and  imperfection,  good  and  evil.                  Subjective terms  
                                                ^ Bk.III:247; Bk.XVIII:3714Preface.                                LT:L3421:336

                                       determined Bk.XII:245 
(Prf:4)  When  a  man  has  purposed  to  make  a given thing,  and has
  ] Bk.XIII:342379—completion [
brought  it  to  perfection,  his  work  will be pronounced perfect, not             Calculus:6.2b & c  

only  by  himself,  but by everyone who rightly knows,  or thinks that

he knows, the intention and aim of its author.  (Prf:5) For instance, sup-

pose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not yet completed),

and knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a house,

he will call the work imperfect;  he will, on the other hand, call it per-

fect,  as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end,  which

its author had purposed for it.  (Prf:6) But if a man sees a work, the like

whereof he has never seen before, and if he knows not the intention

of the artificer, he plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect

or  imperfect.  (Prf:7)  Such  seems  to be the primary meaning of these

terms.



(Prf:8)  But,  after  men began to form general ideas,  to think out types

of  houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to oth-

ers,  it  came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw

agree  with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question,

and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own pre-

conceived  page 188   type, even though it had evidently been comple-

ted in accordance with the idea of its artificer. (Prf:9) This seems to be

the only reason for calling natural phenomena,  which,  indeed,  are

not made with human hands, perfect or imperfect: for men are wont

to  form general ideas of things natural,  no less than of things artifi-

cial,  and such ideas they hold as types, believing that Nature (who

they  think  does  nothing  without an object) has them in view,  and

has set them as types before herself.  Prf:10) Therefore, when they be-

hold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to the pre-

conceived  type  which  they  have  formed  of the thing in question,

they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has left
        Bk.XVIII:291II/206/11. 
her work incomplete.   (Prf:11)  Thus we see that men are wont to style

natural   phenomena  perfect  or  imperfect  rather  from  their  own
] preconceptions [
prejudices, than from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.



(Prf:12)  Now  we showed  in  the  Appendix to Part I., that Nature does

not  work with an end in view.  (13)  For the eternal and infinite Being, 
                     Bk.XV:xx; Bk.XIV:1:3731; Bk.XIA:12414.     Bk.XVIII:30II/206/26, 116II/206/26.           Stewart06:158
which  we  call G-D, or Nature,  acts by the same necessity as that              { The terms
       Bk.XIX:1003.             ^ Bk.VII:24; Bk.III:206; Bk.XX:24370.                                         G-D and Nature 
whereby it exists.  (14)  For we have shown,  that by the same neces-         are interchangeable. }

sity of its nature,  whereby it exists, it likewise works (I:xvi.).  (15)  The
                                       Bk.XIB:5549.
reason or cause why G-D or Nature exists,  and the reason why he

acts,  are one and the same.  (16) Therefore,  as he does not exist for

the  sake  of an end,  so  neither does he act for the sake of an end;

of  his  existence  and  of  his  action  there is neither origin nor end.

(Prf:17)  Wherefore,  a  cause  which  is  called final is nothing else but

human  desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause of

anything.  (18)  For  example,  when we say that to be inhabited is the

final cause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that a

man,  conceiving  the conveniences of household life,  had a desire
    Bk.XVIII:224II/207/7.
to build a house. (Prf:19) Wherefore, the being inhabited, in so far as it
                                                                          
is  regarded  as  a final cause,  is nothing else but this particular de-

sire, which is really the efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary

cause,  because  men  are  generally ignorant of the causes of their

desires.   (Prf:20) They are,  as I have often said already, conscious of

their own actions and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby

they  are  determined  to  any  particular  desire.  (:Prf:21) Therefore, the
                                Bk.III:206. 
common saying that Nature sometimes falls short,  or blunders, and

produces  page 189   things which are imperfect,  I set down among the
< fabrications >
glosses  treated  of  in  the  Appendix to Part 1.  (Prf:22) Perfection and

imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or notions

which  we form from a comparison among one another of individuals

of  the same species;  hence  I  said above (II:Def.vi.), that by reality
                                                                                               ] classify [
and perfection I mean the same thing.  (Prf:23) For we are wont to refer
                                                                                  < class >
all  the  individual  things in Nature to one genus,  which is called the
  < most general >                                  < notion >      ] Entity [
highest  genus,  namely, to the category of Being, whereto absolute-
            Bk.XIX:27712.                < appertain >
ly  all individuals in Nature belong.  (24) Thus, in so far as we refer the

individuals  in Nature to this category,  and comparing them one with

another, find that some possess more of being or reality than others,
                                                                 Bk.XVIII:297II/207/27.
we,  to  this  extent,  say  that  some  are  more  perfect  than others.

(Prf:25)  Again,  in so far as we attribute to them anything implying nega-

tion—as  term,  end,  infirmity,  etc.,  we,  to  this extent, call them im-

perfect,  because  they do not affect our mind so much as the things

which we call perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency,

or  because  Nature has blundered.   (Prf:26)  For nothing lies within the

scope of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity

of  the  nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the

necessity  of  the  nature  of its efficient cause necessarily comes to

pass.


                                       Bk.XIB:5238
                              < E4:Parkinson:280136 on E4:D.I:190 > 
                         { Likewise perfect and imperfect. }                                                   Ferguson
(Prf:27)  As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality 
                                             ^ E4:Dijn:246.
in  things  regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking,           E4:Dijn:34

or  notions  which  we  form  from  the comparison of things one with
                     4P59, 65.                                                                          <------- small print, Logical Index.
another.   (28)  Thus  one and the same thing can be at the same time
         { subjective terms }                                      Bk.XII:251
good,  bad, and indifferent.  (Prf:29) For instance, music is good for him

that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is
            Bk.XVIII:296II/208/14.
neither good nor bad.


Bk.XIA:12939; Bk.XII:325      .                     { good/bad; perfect/imperfect }                         Ferguson
(Prf:30)  Nevertheless,  though  this  be  so,  the terms should still be re-

tained.  (31)   For,  inasmuch  as we desire to form an idea of man as a
{ model }
type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful for        Bk.XIV:2:2232; E4:D1
                     { subjective }
us  to  retain  the ^  terms in  question, in the sense I have indicated.


                                              Bk.XVIII:2844Preface. 
(Prf:32)  In what follows,  then,  I shall mean by,  "good"  that,  which we

certainly  know  to  be  a  means  of approaching more nearly to the
                < E4:Parkinson:280136 on E4:D.I:190, 
                   Bk.XV:288204 on TEI:[42]:15,
Exemplar.   Bk.XV:286186 on TEI:[13]:6 >                         Bk.XIA:13786.
type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by "bad,"
  ^ Model         ^ E4:Dijn:247; Bk.XVIII:296II/208/14.
that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching

the said type.    page 190   (Prf:33)  Again,  we shall say that men are more

perfect,  or  more imperfect,  in proportion as they approach more or

less  nearly  to the said type.  (Prf:34) For it must be specially remarked

that,  when  I  say  that  a man passes from a lesser to a greater per-

fection { ° P },  or vice versâ,  I do not mean that he is changed from
                                                                             Bk.XVIII:233II/208/26.
one  essence or reality to another; for instance, a horse would be as
                         4P39
completely  destroyed  by  being  changed  into  a man,  as by being

changed  into  an insect.  (Prf:35)  What I mean is,  that we conceive the

thing's  power  of action,  in so far as this is understood by its nature,           Bk.XIV:2:2231. 

to  be increased or diminished.  (pef:36)  Lastly, by perfection in general

I  shall,  as  I  have  said,   mean  reality in other words,  each thing's

essence,  in  so far  as it exists, and operates in a particular manner,

and  without  paying  any  regard  to  its  duration.  (Prf:37)  For no given

thing  can  be said to be more perfect, because it has passed a long-
                Bk.XIX:24934.                      Bk.XVIII:235II/209/6—1p24c.
er  time  in  existence.  (Prf:38)  The  duration  of things cannot be deter-

mined  by  their  essence, for the essence of things involves no fixed

and  definite period of existence;  but everything, whether it be more

perfect  or  less  perfect,  will  always  be able to persist in existence
                                                                Bk.XVIII:2026.
with  the  same force wherewith it began to exist;  wherefore,  in this

respect, all things {animate and inanimate} are equal.  { EL:L15(32):290 }

 
 

  < E1:Parkinson:2601 >
DEFINITIONS    { G:Notes 1 & 2, Hypothesis. }


                < E4:Parkinson:280136—E3:IX(5)N:137, E4:Prf.(27):189. >             Bk.XIX:2398. 
Def. I.   By  good  I mean that which we certainly know to be useful         Bk.XIV:2:2296.
            to us.             ^ E4:Dijn:246—real freedom.            E4:Dijn:251 ^ 
                                                                                        4P8, 26, 31.   <------- small print, Logical Index.

                  E4:Dijn:246; Bk.XVIII:114d1,2, 2924d1,2, 2964d1,2, 2984d1,2,8, 319d1,2. 


Def. II.  By   evil   I   mean  that  which  we  certainly  know  to  be  a                Satan  
            hindrance to us in the attainment of any good. 
 
            (Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards 
            the end {and E4:Dijn:246}.)  


                                                       < E1:Parkinson:26844 >
Def. III.  Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regard- 
             ing  their  essence  only,  we  find  nothing  therein,  which 
             necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.   4P12; 13.     <------- small print, Logical Index.

                         Bk.XVIII:121f, 210.
                                                     < E1:Parkinson:26844 >
Def. IV.  Particular things I call possible in so far as,  while regarding
              the  causes whereby they must be produced,  we know not, 
              whether  such  causes  be  determined  for producing them.  
                                                                                             4P12, 20.
             (In I:xxxiii.note.i., I drew no distinction between possible and 
             contingent,  because  there  was  in  that  place  no need to 
             distinguish them accurately.) 

page 191
                                                 [ affects ]
Def. V.   By  conflicting  emotions I mean those which draw a man in
              different directions, though they are of the same kind, such 
              as luxury and avarice, which are both species of love,  and 
              are contraries, not by nature, but by accident. 
                                                                   ] indirectly [

                         Bk.XVIII:1994d6, 2026, 2754d6, 2922,.

Def. VI.  What I mean by emotion felt  towards a thing,  future,  pres-
             ent, and past, I explained in III:xviii., notes.i., & ii., which see. 
                                       4P10S. 
             (But  I  should here also remark,  that we can only distinctly 
             conceive  distance  of space or time up to a certain definite 
             limit;  that is,  all objects distant from us more than two hun- 
             dred feet,  or  whose distance from the place where we are 
             exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive,  seem to be 
             an equal distance from us,  and all in the same plane; so al- 
             so objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed 
             from  the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly </