E4:Dijn:246—On
Human Bondage, E4:Dijn:24919—Servitude—E4:Parkinson:280132,
Scr:Dijn's on Salvation
Of Human
Bondage
or the Strength
of the Emotions
Circulated - 1673
Posthumously Published - 1677
Benedict
de Spinoza
1632
- 1677
Introduction—Purpose
- Spinozistic
Ideas - Mark
Twain & Spinoza
The Ethics: Part
I - Part II - Part
III - Part IV - Part
V
Spinozistic Glossary and Index
JBY Notes:
1. The text is the
1883 translation of the "The Ethics" by R.
H. M.
Elwes, as
printed by Dover Publications in Book I.
The text was
scanned and proof-read
by JBY. For other Versions see Note 7.
2. JBY added sentence numbers.
(y:xx): y
= Proposition Number, if given; xx = Sentence Number.
3. Page numbers are those of Book
I.
4. Symbols:
( Spinoza's
footnote or the Latin word ),
[ Curley's
Book VIII translation variance or footnote
],
] Shirley's Book
VII translation variance or footnote [,
< Parkinson's Book
XV translation variance or endnote >,
> De
Dijn's Book III translation variation or
comment <,
{ JBY
Comment }. G-D Metaphors LINKS
5. For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations,
and Book ordering see here.
6. Please e-mail
errors, clarification requests, disagreements,
or suggestions
to josephb@yesselman.com.
7. Text
version of the Ethics; Latin
versions.
This HTML version was abridged
and formatted for conversion
to an eBook.
The abridged version is available
to be read on various eBook Readers
8. Suggestion: Do not read this Spinoza electronic
text consecutively Durant's
Story
as you
would a novel, but rather follow a thread by following
all its EL:[3]:vi
links
in turn. You will then be putting hypertexting
to its fullest and Schorsch
best advantage—the
fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not
stick Tickle
the Fancy
to
one thread at a time,
this
Web Site will seem very convoluted,
confusing, and an annoying
maze.
If you prefer to read linearly,
read these plain vanilla text
versions,
abridged
versions, e-book versions,
or best, study the
printed book—
book page numbers are
given for most scanned books.
9. From Elwes's Introduction—EL:[3]:vi,
EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii,
EL:[33]:xxi.
10. The
secret to understanding
Spinoza: the MOTIVE for
every- E1:Note
10
thing
he says, is to lay
the groundwork for teaching the
"Organic interdependence
of Parts." Remember this and all
his puzzling
sayings, for example E4:II:192,
become more,
if not
completely, understandable. See Posit.
Look for the
Cash
Value.
To help
further understand many of the Propositions,
use the {Examples
analogy
of you as G-D
and all parts of you
(past, present, and 1D6,
2P3, 2P4.}
future) as
the modes (
particular things
); also useful is the
Indivisible
individual
organism to the social organism—the
State. Analogies, Apparent
Contradiction
11. Wolfson's
summaries: Part III, Part
IV, and Part V.
De
Dijn's summary of Part IV.
12. See Wolfson's
Outline of "The Ethics" compiled
by Terry
Neff.
For Table
of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xxiii.
For
Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi.
For a "study
of the plan of Ethics 4" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:340-1.
For
a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.
TABLE OF CONTENTS: Bk.XII:xi—The
Burden of Man.
Bk.XIV:xxiii—Chapter
XIX, E4:Wolfson:2:221—Virtues.
Preface:187
Definitions:190
Axiom:191
Part IV Propositions:
Book I:Pg.
vii
If
you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral.
If you want to scroll
the list of Propositions click here.
| I | II | III | IV | V | VI | VII | VIII | IX | X |
| XI | XII | XIII | XIV | XV | XVI | XVII | XVIII | XIX | XX |
| XXI | XXII | XXIII | XXIV | XXV | XXVI | XXVII | XXVIII | XXIX | XXX |
| XXXI | XXXII | XXXIII | XXXIV | XXXV | XXXVI | XXXVII | XXXVIII | XXXIX | XL |
| XLI | XLII | XLIII | XLIV | XLV | XLVI | XLVII | XLVIII | XLIX | L |
| LI | LII | LIII | LIV | LV | LVI | LVII | LVIII | LIX | LX |
| LXI | LXII | LXIII | LXIV | LXV | LXVI | LXVII | LXVIII | LXIX | LXX |
| LXXI | LXXII | LXXIII |
Appendix:236
| Prop. I. I - XVIII E4:Bk.XIV:2:223 E4:Bk.III:247 E4:Bk.III:250 |
No positive quality possessed by a false idea
is removed by the presence of what is true, in virtue of its being true. |
| Prop. II. | We are only passive,
in so far as we are a part
of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts. |
| Prop. III. | The force whereby a man persists
in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. |
| Prop. IV. | It is impossible, that man should not be a
part of Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause. |
| Prop. V. | The power and increase of every passion, and its persis- tence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we ourselves endeavour to persist in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own. |
| Prop. VI. | The force of any passion or emotion
can overcome the rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him. |
| Prop. VII. | An emotion
can only be controlled or destroyed by an- other emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for controlling emotion. |
| Prop. VIII. | The knowledge
of good and evil is nothing
else but the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof. |
| Prop. IX. ST:P131 |
An emotion,
whereof we conceive the cause to
be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not con- ceive the cause to be with us. |
| Prop. X. | Towards something future, which we conceive as close at hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we con- ceive that its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that it has long passed away. |
| Prop. XI. | An emotion
towards that which we conceive as neces- sary is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion towards that which impossible, or con- tingent, or non-necessary. |
| Prop. XII. | An emotion towards a thing, which
we know not to exist at the present time, and which we conceive as possible, is more intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion towards a thing contingent. |
| Prop. XIII. | Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know
not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal, fainter than an emotion towards a thing past. |
| Prop. XIV. | A true knowledge
of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion. |
| Prop. XV. | Desire arising from
the knowledge of good and bad
can be quenched or checked by many of the other desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed. |
| Prop. XVI. | Desire arising from the
knowledge of good
and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment. |
| Prop. XVII. | Desire arising
from the true knowledge
of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire for things that are present. |
| Prop. XVIII. XVIIIn - XXVIII E4:Bk.XIV:2:223 |
Desire arising from
pleasure is, other conditions
being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain. |
| Prop. XIX. XIX - XXXVII E4:Bk.III:247 |
Every man, by the laws of
his nature, necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad. |
| Prop. XX. | The more every man endeavours,
and is able to seek what is useful to him—in other words, to preserve his own being—the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power. |
| Prop. XXI. Bk.XVIII:298p21-28. |
No one can desire to be blessed,
to act rightly, and to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, act, and to live—in other words, to actually exist. |
| Prop. XXII. | No virtue can
be conceived as prior to this endeavour to preserve one's own being. |
| Prop. XXIII. | Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolute- ly said to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in so far as he is determined for the action be cause he understands. |
| Prop. XXIV. | To act absolutely in obedience
to virtue is in us the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being (these three terms are identical in meaning) in accord- ance with the dictates of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to one's self. |
| Prop. XXV. | No one wishes to preserve
his being for the sake of any- thing else. |
| Prop. XXVI. | Whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so far as it makes use of reason, judge any- thing to be useful to it, save such things as are con- ducive to understanding. |
| Prop. XXVII. | We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are able to hinder us from understanding. |
| Prop. XXVIII. | The mind's highest good
is the knowledge of G-D, and the mind's highest virtue is to know G-D. |
| Prop. XXIX. XXIX - XL E4:Bk.XIV:2:223 |
No individual thing,
which is entirely different from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has something in common with our nature. |
| Prop. XXX. | A thing cannot be bad
for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us in so far as it is contrary to our nature. |
| Prop. XXXI. | In so far as a thing is in harmony
with our nature, it is necessarily good. |
| Prop.
XXXII. XXXII - XXXVII, E2:Bk.XIV:2:243. |
In so far as men are a prey to passion,
they cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony. |
| Prop. XXXIII. | Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are assailed by those emotions, which are passions, or passive states; and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant. |
| Prop. XXXIV. | In so far as men are assailed by emotions
which are passions, they can be contrary one to another. |
| Prop. XXXV. | In so far only as men live in obedience
to reason,
do they always necessarily agree in nature. |
| Prop. XXXVI. | The highest good of those
who follow virtue is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein. |
| Prop. XXXVII. | The good which
every man, who follows after virtue, desires for himself he will also desire for other men, and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of G-D. |
| Prop.
XXXVIII. XXXVIII - LVIII E4:Bk.III:247 |
Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man; and is so, in propor- tion as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected or affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man. |
| Prop. XXXIX. |
Whatsoever brings about the
preservation of the pro- portion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatso- ever causes a change in such proportion is bad. |
| Prop. XL. | Whatsoever conduces to man's social
life, or causes men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad. |
| Prop. XLI. XLI - LXXIII E4:Bk.XIV:2:223 |
Pleasure in itself
is not bad but good: contrariwise, pain in itself is bad. |
| Prop. XLII. | Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good;
contrari- wise, Melancholy is always bad. |
| Prop. XLIII. | Stimulation
may be excessive and bad; on the other hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad. |
| Prop. XLIV. | Love and desire
may be excessive. |
| Prop. XLV. | Hatred can never
be good. |
| Prop. XLVI. | He, who lives under the guidance
of reason,
endeav- ours, as far as possible, to render back love, or kind- ness, for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, &c., towards him. |
| Prop. XLVII. | Emotions of hope
and fear cannot be in themselves good. |
| Prop. XLVIII. | The emotions of over-esteem and
disparagement are always bad. |
| Prop. XLIX. | Over-esteem is apt to
render its object proud. |
| Prop. L. | Pity, in a man who
lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself bad and useless. |
| Prop. LI. | Approval is not repugnant
to reason,
but can agree therewith and arise therefrom. |
| Prop. LII. | Self-approval may arise
from reason,
and that which arises from reason is the highest possible. |
| Prop. LIII. | Humility is not a virtue, or
does not arise from reason. |
| Prop. LIV. | Repentance is not a virtue,
or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm. |
| Prop. LV. | Extreme pride
or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self. |
| Prop. LVI. | Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity
of spirit. |
| Prop. LVII. | The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded. |
| Prop. LVIII. | Honour (gloria)
is not repugnant to reason,
but may arise therefrom. |
| Prop. LIX. LIX - LXVI E4:Bk.III:247 E4:Bk.III:250 |
To all the actions, whereto we
are determined by emo- tion wherein the mind is passive; we can be determined without emotion by reason. |
| Prop. LX. | Desire arising
from a pleasure or pain, that is not attrib- utable, to the whole body, but only to one or certain parts thereof, is without utility in respect to a man as a whole. |
| Prop. LXI. | Desire which springs
from reason
cannot be excessive. |
| Prop. LXII. | In so far as the mind conceives a thing
under the dictates of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing future, past, or present. |
| Prop. LXIII. | He who is led by fear,
and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason. |
| Prop. LXIV. | The knowledge
of evil is an inadequate
knowledge. |
| Prop. LXV. | Under the guidance of reason we
should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils. |
| Prop. LXVI. | We may, under the guidance of reason,
seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future. |
| Prop. LXVII. LXVII - End E4:Bk.III:247 E4:Bk.III:250 |
A free man thinks
of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life. Bk.XIX:26218—LXVII-LXXIII. |
| Prop. LXVIII. | If men were born free, they
would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good and evil. |
| Prop. LXIX. | The virtue of a free
man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them. |
| Prop. LXX. | The free man,
who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favours from them. |
| Prop. LXXI. | Only free men are thoroughly grateful
one to another. |
| Prop. LXXII. | The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in good faith. |
| Prop. LXXIII. XLI - LXXIII |
The man, who is guided by reason,
is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent. |
Appendix:236
page 187
PREFACE:
]
lack of power [
[
affects ]
(Prf:1)
Human infirmity
in moderating and checking the emotions Bk.XIV:2:2551.
servitude—E3:Wolfson:2:1838. ]
at the mercy of [
I name bondage: for, when a man is a
prey to his emotions, he is not
]
is
subject to [
his own master, but lies
at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he Bk.XIV:2:2312.
< Bk.XV:278110
on
E3:II(25)N:134
>
is often compelled, while
seeing that which is better for him, to fol-
]
bad [
low that which is worse.
(Prf:2) Why
this is so, and what is good or evil E4:Dijn:246
in the emotions,
I propose to show how in this part of my treatise.
(Prf:3) But,
before I begin, it would be
well to make a few prefatory
{
E4:Endnote Prf:4
} {
bad }
observations on perfection
and imperfection, good
and evil.
Subjective terms
^ Bk.III:247;
Bk.XVIII:3714Preface.
LT:L3421:336
determined Bk.XII:245
(Prf:4)
When a man has
purposed to make a given thing,
and has
]
Bk.XIII:342379—completion
[
brought it to perfection,
his work will be pronounced perfect, not
Calculus:6.2b & c
only by himself, but by everyone who rightly knows,
or thinks that
he knows, the intention and aim of its author. (Prf:5) For instance, sup-
pose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not yet completed),
and knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a house,
he will call the work imperfect; he will, on the other hand, call it per-
fect, as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end, which
its author had purposed for it. (Prf:6) But if a man sees a work, the like
whereof he has never seen before, and if he knows not the intention
of the artificer, he plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect
or imperfect. (Prf:7) Such seems to be the primary meaning of these
terms.
(Prf:8) But,
after men began to form general ideas,
to think out types
of houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to oth-
ers, it came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw
agree with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question,
and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own pre-
conceived page 188 type, even though it had evidently been comple-
ted in accordance with the idea of its artificer. (Prf:9) This seems to be
the only reason for calling natural phenomena, which, indeed, are
not made with human hands, perfect or imperfect: for men are wont
to form general ideas of things natural, no less than of things artifi-
cial, and such ideas they hold as types, believing that Nature (who
they think does nothing without an object) has them in view, and
has set them as types before herself. Prf:10) Therefore, when they be-
hold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to the pre-
conceived type which they have formed of the thing in question,
they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered,
and has left
Bk.XVIII:291II/206/11.
her work incomplete. (Prf:11)
Thus we see
that men are wont to style
natural phenomena perfect
or imperfect rather from their own
]
preconceptions [
prejudices,
than from true knowledge of what they pronounce
upon.
(Prf:12) Now
we showed in the Appendix
to Part I., that Nature does
not work with an end in view. (13)
For the eternal and infinite Being,
Bk.XV:xx;
Bk.XIV:1:3731; Bk.XIA:12414. Bk.XVIII:30II/206/26,
116II/206/26. Stewart06:158
which we call G-D, or Nature,
acts by the same necessity as
that {
The terms
Bk.XIX:1003.
^ Bk.VII:24;
Bk.III:206;
Bk.XX:24370. G-D
and Nature
whereby it exists. (14)
For we have shown, that by the
same neces-
are interchangeable. }
sity of its nature, whereby it exists, it likewise
works (I:xvi.). (15)
The
Bk.XIB:5549.
reason or
cause why G-D or Nature exists, and
the reason why he
acts, are one and the same. (16) Therefore, as he does not exist for
the sake of an end, so neither does he act for the sake of an end;
of his existence and of his action there is neither origin nor end.
(Prf:17) Wherefore, a cause which is called final is nothing else but
human desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause of
anything. (18) For example, when we say that to be inhabited is the
final cause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that a
man, conceiving the conveniences of household
life, had a desire
Bk.XVIII:224II/207/7.
to build a house. (Prf:19)
Wherefore, the being inhabited, in so far as
it
is regarded as a final cause, is nothing else but
this particular de-
sire, which is really the efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary
cause, because men are generally ignorant of the causes of their
desires. (Prf:20) They are, as I have often said already, conscious of
their own actions and appetites,
but ignorant of the causes whereby
they are determined to any particular
desire. (:Prf:21) Therefore,
the
Bk.III:206.
common saying that Nature sometimes
falls short, or blunders, and
produces page
189 things
which are imperfect, I set down among the
< fabrications >
glosses treated of in
the Appendix to Part 1.
(Prf:22) Perfection
and
imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or notions
which we form from a comparison among one another of individuals
of the same species;
hence I said above (II:Def.vi.),
that by reality
]
classify [
and perfection
I mean the same thing. (Prf:23)
For we are wont to refer
<
class >
all the individual things
in Nature to one genus, which is
called the
< most general
> <
notion > ] Entity
[
highest genus, namely, to the category
of Being, whereto absolute-
Bk.XIX:27712.
< appertain >
ly all individuals in Nature belong.
(24) Thus,
in so far as we refer the
individuals in Nature to this category, and comparing them one with
another, find that some possess more of being or reality
than others,
Bk.XVIII:297II/207/27.
we, to this extent,
say that some are more perfect
than others.
(Prf:25) Again, in so far as we attribute to them anything implying nega-
tion—as term, end, infirmity, etc., we, to this extent, call them im-
perfect, because they do not affect our mind so much as the things
which we call perfect, not because they have any intrinsic
deficiency,
or because Nature has blundered.
(Prf:26) For
nothing lies within the
scope of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity
of the nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the
necessity of the nature of its efficient cause necessarily comes to
pass.
Bk.XIB:5238
< E4:Parkinson:280136
on E4:D.I:190
>
{
Likewise perfect and imperfect. }
Ferguson
(Prf:27) As
for the terms good and bad, they indicate
no positive quality
^ E4:Dijn:246.
in things regarded in themselves,
but are merely modes of thinking, E4:Dijn:34
or notions which
we form from the comparison of things one with
4P59,
65. <------- small
print, Logical
Index.
another. (28)
Thus one and the same
thing can be at the same time
{
subjective terms } Bk.XII:251
good, bad, and indifferent.
(Prf:29) For
instance, music is good for him
that is melancholy,
bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is
Bk.XVIII:296II/208/14.
neither good nor bad.
Bk.XIA:12939;
Bk.XII:325 .
{
good/bad; perfect/imperfect }
Ferguson
(Prf:30) Nevertheless,
though this be so, the
terms should still be re-
tained. (31)
For, inasmuch as we
desire to form an idea
of man as a
{
model }
type of human nature which we may hold in view,
it will be useful for Bk.XIV:2:2232; E4:D1
{
subjective }
us to retain the ^ terms in
question, in the sense I have indicated.
Bk.XVIII:2844Preface.
(Prf:32)
In what follows, then, I
shall mean by, "good" that,
which we
certainly know to be a means
of approaching more nearly to the
< E4:Parkinson:280136
on E4:D.I:190,
Bk.XV:288204
on TEI:[42]:15,
Exemplar. Bk.XV:286186
on TEI:[13]:6 >
Bk.XIA:13786.
type of human
nature, which we have set before ourselves; by "bad,"
^ Model ^ E4:Dijn:247;
Bk.XVIII:296II/208/14.
that which we certainly know to be a hindrance
to us in approaching
the said type. page
190 (Prf:33)
Again, we shall say that men are more
perfect, or more imperfect, in proportion as they approach more or
less nearly to the said type. (Prf:34) For it must be specially remarked
that, when I say that a man passes from a lesser to a greater per-
fection { ° P },
or vice versâ, I do not mean that he is changed
from
Bk.XVIII:233II/208/26.
one essence
or reality to another; for instance, a horse would be as
4P39
completely destroyed by
being changed into a man, as by being
changed into an insect. (Prf:35)
What I mean is, that we conceive
the
thing's power
of action, in so far as this
is understood by its nature, Bk.XIV:2:2231.
to be increased or diminished. (pef:36) Lastly, by perfection in general
I shall, as I have said, mean reality in other words, each thing's
essence, in so far as it exists, and operates in a particular manner,
and without paying any regard to its duration. (Prf:37) For no given
thing can be said to be more perfect, because
it has passed a long-
Bk.XIX:24934. Bk.XVIII:235II/209/6—1p24c.
er time
in existence. (Prf:38)
The duration
of things cannot be deter-
mined by their essence, for the essence of things involves no fixed
and definite period of existence; but everything, whether it be more
perfect or less perfect, will
always be able to persist
in existence
Bk.XVIII:2026.
with the same force wherewith
it began to exist; wherefore, in this
respect, all things {animate
and inanimate} are equal. { EL:L15(32):290
}
< E1:Parkinson:2601
>
DEFINITIONS
{ G:Notes
1 & 2, Hypothesis.
}
< E4:Parkinson:280136—E3:IX(5)N:137,
E4:Prf.(27):189. >
Bk.XIX:2398.
Def. I. By good
I mean that which we certainly
know to be useful Bk.XIV:2:2296.
to
us. ^ E4:Dijn:246—real
freedom.
E4:Dijn:251 ^
4P8,
26, 31. <------- small
print, Logical
Index.
E4:Dijn:246; Bk.XVIII:114d1,2, 2924d1,2, 2964d1,2, 2984d1,2,8, 319d1,2.
Def. II. By evil
I mean that which we
certainly know to be a
Satan
hindrance
to us in the attainment of any good.
(Concerning
these terms see the foregoing preface towards
the
end {and
E4:Dijn:246}.)
<
E1:Parkinson:26844
>
Def. III. Particular
things I call contingent
in so far as, while regard-
ing
their essence only,
we find nothing therein, which
necessarily
asserts their existence or excludes
it. 4P12;
13. <------- small
print, Logical
Index.
Bk.XVIII:121f,
210.
<
E1:Parkinson:26844
>
Def. IV. Particular things I call
possible in so far as, while
regarding
the
causes whereby they must be produced,
we know not,
whether
such causes be determined for producing them.
4P12,
20.
(In
I:xxxiii.note.i., I drew no distinction
between possible and
contingent,
because there was in that place no
need to
distinguish
them accurately.)
page 191
[
affects ]
Def. V. By conflicting
emotions I mean those which draw
a man in
different
directions, though they are of the same kind, such
as
luxury and avarice,
which are both species of love, and
are
contraries, not by nature, but by accident.
]
indirectly [
Bk.XVIII:1994d6, 2026, 2754d6, 2922,.
Def. VI. What I mean by emotion
felt towards a thing, future,
pres-
ent,
and past, I explained in III:xviii., notes.i., & ii.,
which see.
4P10S.
(But
I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly
conceive
distance of space or time up to a certain definite
limit;
that is, all objects distant from us more than two hun-
dred
feet, or whose distance from the place where we are
exceeds
that which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be
an
equal distance from us, and all in the same plane; so al-
so
objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed
from
the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly