THE ETHICS - PART IV

JBY Notes:

1.  The  text  is the  1883 translation of the "The Ethics" by R. H. M.
     Elwes, as printed by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was 
     scanned and proof-read by JBY. For other Versions see Note 7. 

2.  JBY added sentence numbers. 
     (y:xx):  y = Proposition Number, if given;  xx = Sentence Number. 

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I. 

4.  Symbols: 
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ), 
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ], 
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [, 
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >, 
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <, 
           { JBY Comment }.    G-D      Metaphors       LINKS 

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here. 

6.  Please  e-mail  errors,  clarification  requests,  disagreements, 
     or  suggestions  to  josephb@yesselman.com. 
 
7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively         Durant's Story
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its          EL:[3]:vi
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and            Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze.  

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions, or best, study the printed book—
    book page numbers are given for most scanned books. 

9.  From Elwes's Introduction—EL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi. 
 
10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for  every-          E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,  is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for   teaching  the 
       "Organic  interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and  all 
       his   puzzling   sayings,    for  example  E4:II:192,   become   more, 
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.    Look  for  the 
       Cash Value.  
 
      To  help  further  understand  many  of  the  Propositions,  use  the        {Examples
      analogy  of  you  as  G-D  and  all  parts of you (past, present, and        1D6, 2P3, 2P4.}
      future)   as   the   modes   ( particular  things );  also  useful  is  the           Indivisible 
    individual organism to the social organism—the State.            Analogies, Apparent Contradiction 
 

11. Wolfson's  summaries: Part III, Part IV, and Part V.
      De Dijn's summary of Part IV.


12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff. 
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xxiii. 
       For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi. 
     For a "study of the plan of Ethics 4" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:340-1. 
       For a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.
 
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS:   Bk.XII:xi—The Burden of Man.
                                                                     Bk.XIV:xxiii—Chapter XIX,  E4:Wolfson:2:221—Virtues.

Preface:187

Definitions:190

Axiom:191

Part IV Propositions: Book I:Pg. vii
    If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral. 
    If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here. 

Appendix:236

JBY Endnotes

Appendix:236

page 187

PREFACE:
 
                   ] lack of power [                                                          [ affects ]
(Prf:1)   Human  infirmity  in  moderating  and  checking  the  emotions              Bk.XIV:2:2551.
             servitude—E3:Wolfson:2:1838.     ] at the mercy of [
I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not
                               ]       is  subject  to        [
his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he             Bk.XIV:2:2312.
                                                                  < Bk.XV:278110 on E3:II(25)N:134 > 
is  often  compelled,  while seeing that which is better for him, to fol-
                                                                                                  ] bad [ 
low that which is worse. (Prf:2) Why this is so, and what is good or evil              E4:Dijn:246

in the emotions,  I  propose  to  show  how in this part of my treatise.

(Prf:3)  But,  before  I  begin,  it  would  be well to make a few prefatory
                               {         E4:Endnote Prf:4           }                     { bad }
observations  on  perfection  and  imperfection,  good  and  evil.                  Subjective terms  
                                                ^ Bk.III:247; Bk.XVIII:3714Preface.                                LT:L3421:336

                                       determined Bk.XII:245 
(Prf:4)  When  a  man  has  purposed  to  make  a given thing,  and has
  ] Bk.XIII:342379—completion [
brought  it  to  perfection,  his  work  will be pronounced perfect, not             Calculus:6.2b & c  

only  by  himself,  but by everyone who rightly knows,  or thinks that

he knows, the intention and aim of its author.  (Prf:5) For instance, sup-

pose anyone sees a work (which I assume to be not yet completed),

and knows that the aim of the author of that work is to build a house,

he will call the work imperfect;  he will, on the other hand, call it per-

fect,  as soon as he sees that it is carried through to the end,  which

its author had purposed for it.  (Prf:6) But if a man sees a work, the like

whereof he has never seen before, and if he knows not the intention

of the artificer, he plainly cannot know, whether that work be perfect

or  imperfect.  (Prf:7)  Such  seems  to be the primary meaning of these

terms.



(Prf:8)  But,  after  men began to form general ideas,  to think out types

of  houses, buildings, towers, &c., and to prefer certain types to oth-

ers,  it  came about, that each man called perfect that which he saw

agree  with the general idea he had formed of the thing in question,

and called imperfect that which he saw agree less with his own pre-

conceived  page 188   type, even though it had evidently been comple-

ted in accordance with the idea of its artificer. (Prf:9) This seems to be

the only reason for calling natural phenomena,  which,  indeed,  are

not made with human hands, perfect or imperfect: for men are wont

to  form general ideas of things natural,  no less than of things artifi-

cial,  and such ideas they hold as types, believing that Nature (who

they  think  does  nothing  without an object) has them in view,  and

has set them as types before herself.  Prf:10) Therefore, when they be-

hold something in Nature, which does not wholly conform to the pre-

conceived  type  which  they  have  formed  of the thing in question,

they say that Nature has fallen short or has blundered, and has left
        Bk.XVIII:291II/206/11. 
her work incomplete.   (Prf:11)  Thus we see that men are wont to style

natural   phenomena  perfect  or  imperfect  rather  from  their  own
] preconceptions [
prejudices, than from true knowledge of what they pronounce upon.



(Prf:12)  Now  we showed  in  the  Appendix to Part I., that Nature does

not  work with an end in view.  (13)  For the eternal and infinite Being, 
                     Bk.XV:xx; Bk.XIV:1:3731; Bk.XIA:12414.     Bk.XVIII:30II/206/26, 116II/206/26.           Stewart06:158
which  we  call G-D, or Nature,  acts by the same necessity as that              { The terms
       Bk.XIX:1003.             ^ Bk.VII:24; Bk.III:206; Bk.XX:24370.                                         G-D and Nature 
whereby it exists.  (14)  For we have shown,  that by the same neces-         are interchangeable. }

sity of its nature,  whereby it exists, it likewise works (I:xvi.).  (15)  The
                                       Bk.XIB:5549.
reason or cause why G-D or Nature exists,  and the reason why he

acts,  are one and the same.  (16) Therefore,  as he does not exist for

the  sake  of an end,  so  neither does he act for the sake of an end;

of  his  existence  and  of  his  action  there is neither origin nor end.

(Prf:17)  Wherefore,  a  cause  which  is  called final is nothing else but

human  desire, in so far as it is considered as the origin or cause of

anything.  (18)  For  example,  when we say that to be inhabited is the

final cause of this or that house, we mean nothing more than that a

man,  conceiving  the conveniences of household life,  had a desire
    Bk.XVIII:224II/207/7.
to build a house. (Prf:19) Wherefore, the being inhabited, in so far as it
                                                                          
is  regarded  as  a final cause,  is nothing else but this particular de-

sire, which is really the efficient cause; it is regarded as the primary

cause,  because  men  are  generally ignorant of the causes of their

desires.   (Prf:20) They are,  as I have often said already, conscious of

their own actions and appetites, but ignorant of the causes whereby

they  are  determined  to  any  particular  desire.  (:Prf:21) Therefore, the
                                Bk.III:206. 
common saying that Nature sometimes falls short,  or blunders, and

produces  page 189   things which are imperfect,  I set down among the
< fabrications >
glosses  treated  of  in  the  Appendix to Part 1.  (Prf:22) Perfection and

imperfection, then, are in reality merely modes of thinking, or notions

which  we form from a comparison among one another of individuals

of  the same species;  hence  I  said above (II:Def.vi.), that by reality
                                                                                               ] classify [
and perfection I mean the same thing.  (Prf:23) For we are wont to refer
                                                                                  < class >
all  the  individual  things in Nature to one genus,  which is called the
  < most general >                                  < notion >      ] Entity [
highest  genus,  namely, to the category of Being, whereto absolute-
            Bk.XIX:27712.                < appertain >
ly  all individuals in Nature belong.  (24) Thus, in so far as we refer the

individuals  in Nature to this category,  and comparing them one with

another, find that some possess more of being or reality than others,
                                                                 Bk.XVIII:297II/207/27.
we,  to  this  extent,  say  that  some  are  more  perfect  than others.

(Prf:25)  Again,  in so far as we attribute to them anything implying nega-

tion—as  term,  end,  infirmity,  etc.,  we,  to  this extent, call them im-

perfect,  because  they do not affect our mind so much as the things

which we call perfect, not because they have any intrinsic deficiency,

or  because  Nature has blundered.   (Prf:26)  For nothing lies within the

scope of a thing's nature, save that which follows from the necessity

of  the  nature of its efficient cause, and whatsoever follows from the

necessity  of  the  nature  of its efficient cause necessarily comes to

pass.


                                       Bk.XIB:5238
                              < E4:Parkinson:280136 on E4:D.I:190 > 
                         { Likewise perfect and imperfect. }                                                   Ferguson
(Prf:27)  As for the terms good and bad, they indicate no positive quality 
                                             ^ E4:Dijn:246.
in  things  regarded in themselves, but are merely modes of thinking,           E4:Dijn:34

or  notions  which  we  form  from  the comparison of things one with
                     4P59, 65.                                                                          <------- small print, Logical Index.
another.   (28)  Thus  one and the same thing can be at the same time
         { subjective terms }                                      Bk.XII:251
good,  bad, and indifferent.  (Prf:29) For instance, music is good for him

that is melancholy, bad for him that mourns; for him that is deaf, it is
            Bk.XVIII:296II/208/14.
neither good nor bad.


Bk.XIA:12939; Bk.XII:325      .                     { good/bad; perfect/imperfect }                         Ferguson
(Prf:30)  Nevertheless,  though  this  be  so,  the terms should still be re-

tained.  (31)   For,  inasmuch  as we desire to form an idea of man as a
{ model }
type of human nature which we may hold in view, it will be useful for        Bk.XIV:2:2232; E4:D1
                     { subjective }
us  to  retain  the ^  terms in  question, in the sense I have indicated.


                                              Bk.XVIII:2844Preface. 
(Prf:32)  In what follows,  then,  I shall mean by,  "good"  that,  which we

certainly  know  to  be  a  means  of approaching more nearly to the
                < E4:Parkinson:280136 on E4:D.I:190, 
                   Bk.XV:288204 on TEI:[42]:15,
Exemplar.   Bk.XV:286186 on TEI:[13]:6 >                         Bk.XIA:13786.
type of human nature, which we have set before ourselves; by "bad,"
  ^ Model         ^ E4:Dijn:247; Bk.XVIII:296II/208/14.
that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in approaching

the said type.    page 190   (Prf:33)  Again,  we shall say that men are more

perfect,  or  more imperfect,  in proportion as they approach more or

less  nearly  to the said type.  (Prf:34) For it must be specially remarked

that,  when  I  say  that  a man passes from a lesser to a greater per-

fection { ° P },  or vice versâ,  I do not mean that he is changed from
                                                                             Bk.XVIII:233II/208/26.
one  essence or reality to another; for instance, a horse would be as
                         4P39
completely  destroyed  by  being  changed  into  a man,  as by being

changed  into  an insect.  (Prf:35)  What I mean is,  that we conceive the

thing's  power  of action,  in so far as this is understood by its nature,           Bk.XIV:2:2231. 

to  be increased or diminished.  (pef:36)  Lastly, by perfection in general

I  shall,  as  I  have  said,   mean  reality in other words,  each thing's

essence,  in  so far  as it exists, and operates in a particular manner,

and  without  paying  any  regard  to  its  duration.  (Prf:37)  For no given

thing  can  be said to be more perfect, because it has passed a long-
                Bk.XIX:24934.                      Bk.XVIII:235II/209/6—1p24c.
er  time  in  existence.  (Prf:38)  The  duration  of things cannot be deter-

mined  by  their  essence, for the essence of things involves no fixed

and  definite period of existence;  but everything, whether it be more

perfect  or  less  perfect,  will  always  be able to persist in existence
                                                                Bk.XVIII:2026.
with  the  same force wherewith it began to exist;  wherefore,  in this

respect, all things {animate and inanimate} are equal.  { EL:L15(32):290 }

 
 

  < E1:Parkinson:2601 >
DEFINITIONS    { G:Notes 1 & 2, Hypothesis. }


                < E4:Parkinson:280136—E3:IX(5)N:137, E4:Prf.(27):189. >             Bk.XIX:2398. 
Def. I.   By  good  I mean that which we certainly know to be useful         Bk.XIV:2:2296.
            to us.             ^ E4:Dijn:246—real freedom.            E4:Dijn:251 ^ 
                                                                                        4P8, 26, 31.   <------- small print, Logical Index.

                  E4:Dijn:246; Bk.XVIII:114d1,2, 2924d1,2, 2964d1,2, 2984d1,2,8, 319d1,2. 


Def. II.  By   evil   I   mean  that  which  we  certainly  know  to  be  a                Satan  
            hindrance to us in the attainment of any good. 
 
            (Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards 
            the end {and E4:Dijn:246}.)  


                                                       < E1:Parkinson:26844 >
Def. III.  Particular things I call contingent in so far as, while regard- 
             ing  their  essence  only,  we  find  nothing  therein,  which 
             necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.   4P12; 13.     <------- small print, Logical Index.

                         Bk.XVIII:121f, 210.
                                                     < E1:Parkinson:26844 >
Def. IV.  Particular things I call possible in so far as,  while regarding
              the  causes whereby they must be produced,  we know not, 
              whether  such  causes  be  determined  for producing them.  
                                                                                             4P12, 20.
             (In I:xxxiii.note.i., I drew no distinction between possible and 
             contingent,  because  there  was  in  that  place  no need to 
             distinguish them accurately.) 

page 191
                                                 [ affects ]
Def. V.   By  conflicting  emotions I mean those which draw a man in
              different directions, though they are of the same kind, such 
              as luxury and avarice, which are both species of love,  and 
              are contraries, not by nature, but by accident. 
                                                                   ] indirectly [

                         Bk.XVIII:1994d6, 2026, 2754d6, 2922,.

Def. VI.  What I mean by emotion felt  towards a thing,  future,  pres-
             ent, and past, I explained in III:xviii., notes.i., & ii., which see. 
                                       4P10S. 
             (But  I  should here also remark,  that we can only distinctly 
             conceive  distance  of space or time up to a certain definite 
             limit;  that is,  all objects distant from us more than two hun- 
             dred feet,  or  whose distance from the place where we are 
             exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive,  seem to be 
             an equal distance from us,  and all in the same plane; so al- 
             so objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed 
             from  the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly  
             conceive,  seem  to  be  all equally distant from the present, 
             and are set down,  as it were, to the same moment of time.) 


Def. VII.  By an end, for the sake of which we do something, I mean             Bk.XIV:2:2361.
              a desire [ appetite ].   
                       Bk.XVIII:2224d7. 


                   Bk.XVIII:298d8, 309d8.
Def. VIII.  By virtue (virtus) and power I mean the same thing; that is
               (III:vii.),  virtue,  in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's 
               nature  or  essence,  in so far as it has the power of effect- 
               ing what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.   E3:Wolfson:2:1841, 2:2374
                                                   4P18S, 22, 24, 35C2, 56; 5P25, 42.                             <------- small print, Logical Index.

 
 

AXIOM.

There  is  no  individual  thing in nature,  than  which  there  is  not
another  more  powerful  and  strong.    Whatsoever thing be given,         E3:Dijn:240.
there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.  4P3, 7; 5P37S.                    E4:Dijn:247.
          Bk.III:248, 250; Bk.XIB:13584; 217; Bk.XVIII:2834axiom, 286stronger.  
 

PART IV PROPOSITIONS. { Hypotheses }
 
                  For all Propositions see Scroll P1. 

Prop. I. Bk.III:225; Bk.XVIII:1754p1, 286p1—p14d. 

                  Bk.XIX:14914.                                      Bk.XIV:2:2262.                      E4:Dijn:247
No positive quality possessed by a false             E4:Wolfson:2:223
idea is removed by the presence of what              Bk.XIV:2:2271.
is true, in virtue of its being true.     4P14.                      E2:Parkinson:27597
                        < in so far >

                                                                { lack, defect }
Proof.— (1:1)  Falsity  consists  solely  in  the  privation of  knowledge

which inadequate ideas involve (II:xxxv.), nor have they any positive

quality on account of which they are called false (II:xxxiii.);  contrari-

wise,  in  so  far  as  they are referred to G-D, they are true (II:xxxii.).

(1:2) Wherefore, if the positive quality possessed by a false idea were

removed  by  the presence of what is true,  in virtue of its being true,

page 192   a  true  idea  would then be removed by itself,  which  (III:iv.)

is  absurd.  (1:3) Therefore,  no  positive  quality possessed by a false

idea, &c.  Q.E.D.



Note.—  (1:4)  This  proposition  is  more  clearly  understood from II:xvi.         E2:Parkinson:27597
                             Bk.XIV:2:2263.                                        Bk.XIX:1477.
Coroll.ii.  (1:5)  For  imagination  is  an  idea,  which indicates rather the
                  Bk.XIV:2:2264; Bk.XVIII:1804p1s. 
present disposition of the human body than the nature of the external

body;  not indeed distinctly, but confusedly; whence it comes to pass,
                                   { sin } 
that the mind is said to err.  (1:6) For instance, when we look at the sun,
                              Bk.XVIII:1714p1s.
we  conceive  that  it is distant from us about two hundred feet; in this

judgment  we  err, so long as we are in ignorance of its true distance;
                                                        Bk.III:225.
when its true distance is known, the error is removed, but not the ima-

gination;  or,  in other words, the idea of the sun, which only explains

the nature of that luminary, in so far as the body is affected thereby:

wherefore,  though we know the real distance, we shall still neverthe-
                                   Bk.XVIII:1694p1s.
less imagine the sun to be near us.  (1:7) For, as we said in III:xxxv.note,

we do not imagine the sun to be so near us, because we are ignorant

of  its  true distance,  but  because the mind conceives the magnitude

of  the  sun  to  the extent that the body is affected thereby.  (1:8)  Thus,

when  the rays of the sun falling on the surface of water are reflected

into  our  eyes,  we  imagine the sun as if it were in the water, though

we  are  aware  of  its  real  position; and similarly other imaginations,

wherein  the  mind  is  deceived whether they indicate the natural dis-

position of the body, or that its power of activity is increased or dimin-
                       Bk.XVIII:171211/33—5p37d.
ished, are not contrary to the truth, and do not vanish at its presence. 

(1:9)  It  happens  indeed that, when we mistakenly fear an evil, the fear

vanishes  when  we  hear  the  true  tidings; but the contrary also hap-

pens,  namely,  that we fear an evil which will certainly come, and our

fear  vanishes  when  we  hear false tidings; thus imaginations do not
                                                                    Bk.XVIII:1754p1s.
vanish  at  the  presence of the truth, in virtue of its being true, but be-

cause  other  imaginations,  stronger than the first, supervene and ex-            Bk.XIV:2:2272.

clude  the  present  existence  of  that  which  we  imagined, as I have
            Durant65:176
shown in II:xvii.



Prop. II.  Bk.XVIII:2834p2,3,4. 

                          [ acted on ] 
We  are  only  passive,  in  so  far  as  we are              Bk.XIV:2:227.
a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived
by  itself  without  other  parts.
{ EL:[57]:xxviii; See Analogy. } 

Proof.—  (2:1)  We  are  said  to  be  passive,  when something   page 193

arises  in  us,  whereof  we  are only a partial cause (III:Def.ii.), that is

(III:Def.i.),  something  which  cannot be deduced solely from the laws

of our nature.  (2:2)  We are passive therefore in so far as we are a part
                                                              ] independently [
of  Nature,  which  cannot  be  conceived by itself without other parts.

Q.E.D.
 


Prop. III. Bk.XVIII:2834p2,3,4 & p3. 

The force whereby a man persists in
existing  is  limited,  and is infinitely
surpassed  by  the power of external
causes.                  4P6, 15, 43, 69.                           <------- small print, Logical Index.

 
 
Proof.— (3:1)  This  is evident from the axiom of this part.   (2)  For, when

man  is  given, there is something else—say A—more powerful; when

A  is  given,  there  is something else—say B— more powerful than A,

and  so on to infinity; thus the power of man is limited by the power of

some other thing, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external

causes.  Q.E.D.

 
Prop. IV.  Bk.XVIII:364p4, 2834p2,3,4; Bk.XIX:2197; Bk.XX:24087. 

It is impossible,  that man should not be a
part   of   Nature,   or   that   he  should  be       E3:Wolfson:2:1835—virtue. 
capable of undergoing no <suffering> changes,           Peace of Mind
save  such  as  can be understood through
his nature only as their adequate cause.        4P68S.

                                                                 ] single [
Proof.—  (4:1)  The  power,  whereby  each  particular thing, and conse-
                                                                                      Bk.XIA:12414. 
quently  man,  preserves  his  being, is the power of G-D or of Nature                G-D

(I:xxiv.Coroll.);  not  in  so  far  as it is infinite, but in so far as it can be   
                     Bk.XIX:9121; 9122; 22723; { Analogy }.
explained by the actual human essence (III:vii.).  (2) Thus the power of
                                                                                  Bk.XIX:18320.
man,  in  so far as it is explained through his own actual essence, is a
                        Bk.XIX:9120.
part  of  the  infinite power of G-D or Nature, in other words, of the es-

sence thereof (I:xxxiv.).  (4:3) This was our first point.  (4) Again, if it were

possible,  that man should undergo no changes save such as can be
                                                                                        [ by 3P4 & 3P6 ]
understood  solely  through  the nature of man, it would follow that he

would  not  be  able  to  die,  but  would always necessarily exist; this

would  be  the necessary consequence of a cause whose power was

either  finite  or infinite; namely, either of man's power only, inasmuch

as  he  would  be capable of removing from himself all changes which

could  spring  from  external causes; or of the infinite power of Nature,

whereby all individual things would be so ordered, that man should be

incapable  of  undergoing  any changes save such as tended towards

his  own  preservation.   (4:5)  But  the  first alternative is absurd (by the

last Prop.,  the  proof  of  which is universal, and can be applied to all

individual  things).  (4:6) Therefore,  if  it  be  page 194  possible,  that man

should not be capable of undergoing any changes, save such as can

be explained solely through his own nature, and consequently that he

must  always  (as  we  have  shown)  necessarily  exist; such a result

must  follow  from  the  infinite power of G-D, and consequently (I:xvi.)
                            Bk.XIB:217.
from  the  necessity  of the divine nature, in so far as it is regarded as

affected  by  the  idea of any given man, the whole order of Nature as

conceived  under  the  attributes  of  extension  and  thought must be

deducible.  (4:7)  It  would  therefore  follow  (I:xxi.)  that  man  is infinite,

which  (by  the first part of this proof) is absurd.  (4:8) It is, therefore, im-

possible,  that  man  should  not  undergo  any  changes  save  those

whereof he is the adequate cause.  Q.E.D.



Corollary.— (4:9)  Hence  it  follows,  that  man  is necessarily always a
] subject to [
prey  to  his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of

Nature,  and  that  he  accommodates himself thereto, as much as the

nature of things demands.

 


Prop. V.

             [ force ]                            Bk.XVIII:283p5; Bk.XIX:24012. 
The  power  and  increase  of every passion,
and   its   persistence   in   existing  are  not
defined by the power, whereby we ourselves
endeavour  to  persist in existing, but by the
power  of  an  external cause compared with
our own {power of understanding}.        4P6, 7, 15, 43, 69; 5P8, 20S. 
 { E5:VIII(1):251,  E5:XX(12):258,  E5:Endnote 18:3n. }
 { Analogy—gangrene overtakes or does not overtake your anti-bodies. } 

Proof.— (5:1)  The  essence  of a passion cannot be explained through

our  essence  alone  (III:Def.i.&.ii.),  that  is  (III:vii.),  the  power  of  a

passion  cannot  be defined by the power, whereby we ourselves en-

deavour  to  persist in existing, but (as is shown in II:xvi.) must neces-

sarily  be  defined  by  the power of an external cause compared with

our own.  Q.E.D..  { an alcoholic }

Prop. VI.

           Bk.XVIII:283p6, 313p6.        ] passive emotion [
The force of any passion or emotion
can   overcome  the  rest  of  a man's
activities   or   power,   so   that   the
emotion  becomes  obstinately  fixed,                  Faulty  Computer  Data  Base
[clings], to him {without the amelioration of understanding }.
             4P44, 60; 5P7.

Proof.— (6:1)  The  force  and  increase  of  any  passion and its persis-

tence  in  existing are defined by the power of an external cause com-

pared  with  our  own (by the foregoing Prop.); therefore (IV:iii.) it can
 ] surpass [
overcome a man's power, &c.  Q.E.D.    { an alcoholic }




Prop. VII.  Bk.XIA:12943; Bk.XVIII:2864p7d, 3324p7.

                                            Bk.XII:2521—Pragmatically
An  emotion  can  only be controlled or
destroyed by another emotion contrary                Durant:646137
thereto,  and  with more power for con-              Dictates of Reason
trolling emotion. { Alcoholics Anonymous } 4P7C, 14, 15, 69.                   Fire of Our Reason

                                                             ] related [
Proof.— (7:1)  Emotion,  in so far as it is referred to the mind, is an idea,

whereby  the  mind  affirms  of its body a greater or less force of exist-

ence  than  before  (cf.  the general Definition of the Emotions  at  the
                                                                                       [ troubled ]
end  of  Part III.)  page 195   (7:2)   When, therefore, the mind is assailed by

any emotion, the body is at the same time affected with a modification

whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished.  (7:3)  Now this

modification  of  the  body  (IV:v.) receives from its cause the force for

persistence  in  its being; which force can only be checked or destroy-
          [ corporeal ]
ed by a bodily cause (II:vi.), in virtue of the body being affected with a

modification  contrary to (III:v.) and stronger than itself (IV.Ax.); where-

fore  (II:xii.) the mind is affected by the idea of a modification contrary

to,  and  stronger than the former modification, in other words, (by the

general definition of the emotions)  the  mind  will  be  affected  by an

emotion  contrary  to and stronger than the former emotion, which will

exclude or destroy the existence of the former emotion; thus an emo-
                                                                                     [ an opposite ]
tion  cannot  be  destroyed  nor  controlled  except  by a contrary and

stronger emotion.  Q.E.D.   Bk.XVIII:2414p7d—3p37d; 2864p7d. 



Corollary.—  (7:4)  An emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind, can

only  be  controlled  or  destroyed through an idea of a modification of
                                                                                           ] experiencing [
the body contrary to, and stronger than, that which we are undergoing.

(7:5)  For  the  emotion  which  we  undergo  can only be checked or de-
                                                                                     [ by 4P7 ]
stroyed  by  an  emotion  contrary to, and stronger than, itself, in other

words,  (by the general Definition of the Emotions)  only  by an idea of

a   modification   of   the   body   contrary  to,  and  stronger  than,  the

modification which we undergo.  Bk.XVIII:287p7d,3. 




Prop. VIII. Bk.XVIII:235p8, 284p8, 296p8,Note 4, 318f; Bk.XIX:23911; 24219.

The knowledge of good and evil is                   E4:Dijn:246
nothing  else  but  the emotions of  
pleasure  or  pain,  in  so far as  we                  E4:Dijn:247- 8
are conscious thereof. 4P14, 15, 19, 29, 30, 63C, 64.
 

                                                                                   ] advantageous [
Proof.— (8:1)  We  call  a  thing  good or evil, when it is of service or the          E3:Wolfson:2:204

reverse  in  preserving our being (IV:Def.i.&.ii.), that is (III:vii.), when it

increases  or  diminishes,   helps  or  hinders,  our  power  of  activity. 
                       [ by Def. of Joy & Sadness in 3P11S ]
(8:2)  Thus, in so far as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure

or pain, we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and

evil  is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which neces-

sarily   follows   from   that   pleasurable   or  painful  emotion  (II:xxii.).

(8:3)  But  this  idea  is united to the emotion in the same way as mind is
                         ] & note [
united  to body (II:xxi.); that is, there is no real distinction between this
                                       [ by GDE ]
idea  and  the emotion or idea of the modification of the body, save in

 page 196   conception only.  (8:4)  Therefore  the  knowledge  of  good and

evil  is  nothing  else  but  the  emotion,  in so far as we are conscious

thereof.  Q.E.D.  Bk.XVIII:1914p8d—3p9d.




Prop. IX.  Bk.XVIII:200-202, 2104p9,10,13, 2834p9-13, 319p9,10. 

                                                              [ imagine ]
An  emotion,  whereof we conceive the
cause to be with us at the present time,
is  stronger than if we did not conceive
the cause to be with us.     4P10, 11, 13; 5P7.
{ E5:VII(2):251 }

Proof.— (9:1)  Imagination  or  conception is the idea, by which the mind
                              Bk.XII:2523
regards  a thing as present (II:xvii.note), but which indicates the dispo-

sition  of  the  mind  rather  than the nature of the external thing (II:xvi.
                                         [ by GDE ]    [ an imagination ]
Coroll.ii).   (9:2)  An emotion is therefore a conception, in so far as it indi-
                 [ constitution ]                                   ] an imagining [    Durant65:176
cates  the  disposition  of  the body.  (9:3) But a conception (by II:xvii.) is

stronger,  so long as we conceive nothing which excludes the present

existence  of the external object; wherefore an emotion is also strong-

er  or more intense, when we conceive the cause to be with us at the

present  time, than when we do not conceive the cause to be with us.

 Q.E.D.



Note.—  (9:4)  When  I  said above in III:xviii. that we are affected by the

image  of  what  is past or future with the same emotion as if the thing

conceived  were present, I expressly stated, that this is only true in so

far  as  we  look  solely  to the image of the thing in question itself; for

the thing's nature is unchanged, whether we have conceived it or not;

I  did  not  deny  that  the image becomes weaker, when we regard as

present  to  us other things which exclude the present existence of the

future  object:  I  did  not expressly call attention to the fact, because I

purposed  to  treat  of  the  strength  of the emotions in this part of my

work.



 Bk.XVIII:200-202, 2104p9,10,13, 2834p9-13, 319p9,10.                4P12C, 16, 60S.
Corollary.—  (9:5)  The  image  of  something past or future, that is, of a 

thing  which  we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to the

exclusion  of  time present, is, when other conditions are equal, weak-

er than the image of something present; consequently an emotion felt

towards  what  is past or future is less intense, other conditions being

equal, than an emotion felt towards something present.
 



Prop. X.   Bk.XVIII:200-202, 2104p9,10,13, 2834p9-13, 319p9,10.  

Towards  something future,  which we
conceive  as  close at hand,  we are af-
fected  more intensely,  than if we con-           Calculus:3.3
ceive  that its time for existence is sep-
arated  from  the  present  by  a longer
interval; so too by the remembrance of
what  we  conceive  to  have  not  long
passed  away  we  are affected more in-
tensely, than if we conceive that it has
long passed away.             4P12C..

page 197
                                                                                    ] imminent [
Proof.— (10:1)  In so far as we conceive a thing as close at hand, or not

long passed away, we conceive that which excludes the presence of

the object less, than if its period of future existence were more distant

from the present, or if it had long passed away (this is obvious) there-

fore  (by the foregoing Prop.)  we are, so far, more  intensely affected

towards it.  Q.E.D.  
 
 { Elwes: Pg. 197. }
Corollary.— (10:2)  From the remarks made in IV:Def.vi. of this part it fol-

lows that, if objects are separated from the present by a longer period

than we can define in conception, though their dates of occurrence be

widely  separated  one from the other, they all affect us equally faintly.

{ Curley: Pg. 552. } 
[ Schol. {Note}:  (10:2)  From  what  we noted at D6, it follows that we are

still affected equally mildly  toward objects separated from the present

by  an  interval  of  time  longer  than  we  can determine by imagining,

even  though  we  may  understand  that  they are separated from one

another by a long interval of time. ]

 
 

Prop. XI.  Bk.XVIII:3384p11. 

An  emotion  towards  that  which we
conceive    as   necessary   is,   when
other   conditions   are   equal,  more
intense   than   an  emotion  towards
that which is possible, or contingent,
or non-necessary.                    5P5.

                                                                                  ] inevitable [
Proof.—  (11:1)  In so far as we conceive a thing to be necessary, we, to

that  extent,  affirm  its existence; on the other hand we deny a thing's

existence,  in  so  far  as  we  conceive  it  not to be necessary (I:xxxiii.

note.i.); wherefore (IV.ix.) an emotion towards that which is necessary

is,  other  conditions  being  equal, more intense than an emotion that

which is non-necessary.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XII.  Bk.XVIII:2844p12.  

An emotion towards a thing, which
we know not to exist at the present
time,  and  which  we  conceive  as
possible,   is  more  intense,  other                        Calculus:3.3
conditions   being  equal,  than  an
emotion towards a thing contingent.     4P12C.

Proof.— (12:1)  In  so  far  as  we conceive a thing as contingent, we are
[not]  ]not[                                                                                      ] posit [
affected  by  the conception of some further thing, which would assert

the  existence  of  the  former  (IV:Def.iii.);  but,  on the other hand, we

(by hypothesis)  conceive  certain  things,  which  exclude  its present

existence.  (12:2)   But, in so far as we conceive a thing to be possible in
                                                                                               [ by 4D4 ]
the  future,  we  thereby  conceive  things  which  assert its existence

(IV:iv.),  that  is  (III:xviii.),  things  which  promote hope or fear: where-
                                                                                              ] intense [
fore   an   emotion  towards  something  possible  is  more  vehement.

Q.E.D.



Corollary.—  (12:3)  An  emotion  towards a thing, which we know not to
                                                                                       4P17
exist  in  the  present,  and  which  we  conceive  as contingent, is far
] feebler [
fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us. 

page 1988

Proof.— (12:4)  Emotion  towards  a thing, which we conceive to exist, is

more  intense  than  it  would  be,  if  we conceived the thing as future

(IV:ix.Coroll.),  and  is much more vehement, than if the future time be

conceived  as  far  distant  from  the present (IV:x.).  (12:5) Therefore an

emotion  towards  a  thing,  whose period of existence we conceive to

be  far  distant  from the present, is far fainter, than if we conceive the
                                                        [ by 4P12 ]
thing  as  present;  it  is,  nevertheless,  more  intense, than if we con-

ceived the thing as contingent, wherefore an emotion towards a thing,

which  we  regard  as  contingent,  will  be  far  fainter, than if we con-

ceived the thing to be present with us.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XIII.  Bk.XVIII:2104p9,10,13. 

Emotion  towards  a  thing  contingent,
which   we  know  not  to  exist  in  the
present,   is,   other   conditions  being
equal, fainter than an emotion towards
a thing past.  

Proof.—  (13:1)  In  so  far  as we conceive a thing as contingent, we are

not  affected  by  the image of any other thing, which asserts the exist-

ence  of the said thing (IV:Def.iii.), but, on the other hand (by hypothe-

sis), we conceive certain things excluding its present existence. (2) But,

in so far as we conceive it in relation to time past, we are assumed to
                                                                              ] that is, which activates [
conceive something, which recalls the thing to memory, or excites the
                      Durant65:176
image  thereof (II:xviii. & Note), which is so far the same as regarding

it  as  present (II:xvii.Coroll.).  (13:3) Therefore (IV:ix.) an emotion toward

a  thing  contingent,  which  we  know does not exist in the present, is

fainter,  other  conditions  being  equal,  than  an  emotion  towards a

thing past.  Q.E.D..



Prop. XIV.   Bk.XVIII:285fp14-17—p8. 

A  true  knowledge  of good and evil                     E4:Dijn:247- 8.
cannot  check any emotion by virtue  
of  being  true,  but only in so far as                               Durant:649158
it is considered as an {active} emotion. 

Proof.—  (14:1)  An  emotion  is  an idea, whereby the mind affirms of its
                 E4:Dijn:247.
body  a  greater or less  force  of existing than before (by the general
                                                       ] IV.i. [
Definition of the Emotions);  therefore it has no positive quality, which
              ] annulled [
can  be  destroyed  by the presence of what is true; consequently the

knowledge  of  good  and evil cannot, by virtue of being true, restrain
                                                       Bk.XII:2522—judgment
any  emotion.   (14:2)  But,  in  so  far  a  such  knowledge is an emotion
  {4P8}
(IV:viii.)  if  it  have more strength for restraining emotion, it will to that
                            ] check [               [ by 4P7 ]
extent be able to restrain the given emotion.  Q.E.D.



Prop. XV. 

                                Bk.XIV:2:2048—true. 
Desire arising from the knowledge                  E4:Dijn:247- 8
of   good   and   page 199     bad  can  be
quenched  or checked by many of
the  other desires arising from the
emotions whereby we are assailed.     4P16.
                                           [ tormented ]

 
Proof.— (15:1) From the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it           E4:Dijn:247- 8
                    [ by 4P8 ]
is an emotion, necessarily arises desire (Def. of the Emotions, i.), the

strength  of  which  is  proportioned  to  the  strength  of  the emotion

wherefrom it arises (III:xxxvii.).   (2)  But, inasmuch as this desire arises

(by hypothesis)  from  the  fact  of our truly understanding anything, it
                                                                                                    [ III:iii. ]
follows  that it is also present with us, in so far as we are active (III:i.),

and must therefore be understood through our essence only (III:Def.ii.);

consequently   (III:vii.)   its force and increase can be defined solely by

human   power.   (15:3)   Again,  the  desires  arising  from  the  emotions

whereby  we are assailed are stronger, in proportion as the said emo-
                           [ violent ]                                                     [ IV:v. ]
tions  are more vehement; wherefore their force and increase must be

defined  solely  by  the  power  of  external causes, which, when com-

pared  with  our  own  power, indefinitely surpass it (IV:iii.); hence the
                                                                          ] stronger [
desires  arising  from  like  emotions may be more vehement, than the

desire  which  arises from a true knowledge of good and evil, and may,
                 [ 4P7 ]
consequently, control or quench it.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XVI.   Bk.III:249; Bk.XII:2531; Bk.XVIII:285p16. 

                                                                             true—Bk.XIV:2:2048. 
Desire arising from the ^ knowledge of                E4:Dijn:247- 8
good and evil,  in  so far as such know-
ledge  regards  what  is  future,  may be
more   easily  controlled  or  quenched,
than the desire for what is agreeable at
the present moment.              [ ^ more pleasurable ]   4P17, 62S. 

Proof.— (16:1)  Emotion  towards  a  thing, which we conceive as future,

is  fainter  than  emotion  towards a thing that is present (IV:ix.Coroll.).

(16:2)  But  desire,  which  arises  from  the true knowledge of good and

evil,  though  it  be  concerned  with  things which are good at the mo-
                                                                      [ some rash ]
ment,  can  be  quenched  or controlled by any headstrong desire (by

the   last Prop.,   the   proof   whereof   is   of   universal   application).

(16:3)  Wherefore desire arising from such knowledge, when concerned

with the future, can be more easily controlled or quenched, &c. Q.E.D.




Prop. XVII.  Bk.III:249; Bk.XIV:2:2048; Bk.XVIII:319n. 

Desire  arising  from the true knowledge            E4:Dijn:247- 8
of good and evil, in so far as such know-
ledge  is  concerned with what is contin-
gent,  can  be  controlled far more easily
still,   than   desire   for  things  that  are
present. 

Proof.— (17:1)  This  Prop.  is  proved  in  the  same  way  as  the
last Prop from IV:xii.Coroll. 

page 200

Note.— (17:2) I think I have now shown the reason, why men are moved
  ] uncritical belief [
by  opinion  more  readily  than  by  true reason, why it is that the true
                                            Bk.III:249—disturbances.          ] mind [
knowledge  of  good  and  evil  stirs up conflicts in the soul, and often
                                       > lust <
yields  to  every  kind of passion.  (17:3) This state of things gave rise to

the exclamation of the poet:   < Bk.XV:278110 on E3:II(25)N:134 >

          (Ov. Met. vii.20)
         "Video meliora proboque,               [ I see and approve the better,
          Deteriora sequor."                           but follow the worse. ]

        The better path I gaze at and approve,
        The worse— I follow.


         Ecc. 1:18—Bk.III:249.
(17:4)  Ecclesiastes  seems  to  have  had  the same thought in his mind,

when  he  says,  "He  who  increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." 
                  Bk.XII:2532
(17:5) I have not written the above with the object of drawing the conclu-
                   Bk.III:249.  
sion,  that ignorance is more excellent than knowledge, or that a wise

man  is on a par with a fool in controlling his emotions, but because it
                                                            [ lack of power ]
is necessary to know the power and the infirmity of our nature, before

we  can  determine  what  reason  can do in restraining the emotions,

and what is beyond her power.  (6) I have said, that in the present part
                                           ] weakness [
I shall merely treat of human infirmity.   (17:7) The power of reason over

the emotions I have settled to treat separately.




Prop. XVIII. 

                                                     [ joy ] 
Desire  arising  from pleasure is, other
conditions  being equal {opposite emotions},                  Bk.XVIII:2584p18d.
stronger than desire arising from pain.     4P56S, 66S.
                                                                           [ sadness ]

                                                                                                [ by 3P7 ]
Proof.— (18:1)  Desire  is  the  essence  of  a  man (III:De.I.), that is, the
 [ conatus ]                 { when Rational }
endeavour  whereby  a man ^ endeavours to persist in his own being.
                                                     [ III:.xi.note ]
(18:2)  Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is, by the fact of pleasure

being  felt,  increased  or  helped; on the contrary, desire arising from

pain  is,  by  the fact of pain being felt, diminished or hindered; hence

the  force  of  desire arising from pleasure must be defined by human
                                                            Bk.XIX:24014; 24321.
power  together with the power of an external  cause, whereas desire

arising  from  pain  must be defined by human power  only.  (18:3) Thus

the former is the stronger of the two.  Q.E.D. 


                                                                       { E2:Parkinson:278111 & 112 }
Note.—  (18:4)  In  these  few  remarks  I  have  explained  the causes of         E4:Wolfson:2:223
               impotence and instability—E3:Wolfson:2:1837. 
human  infirmity and inconstancy,  and  shown why men do not abide            Bk.XIV:2:2311.
                 [ ^ lack of power ]
by the precepts of reason.   (18:5)  It  now  remains for me to show what     Dictates of Reason
                                                                                     [ affects ] 
course  is  marked out for us by reason, which of the emotions are in

harmony  with  the  rules  of  human  reason,  and  which of them are

contrary thereto.

page 201
                                                                             [ cumbersome ]
(18:6)  But, before I begin to prove my Propositions in detailed geometri-

cal  fashion,  it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance, so that

everyone may more readily grasp my meaning. 
 
(18:7)  As  reason  makes  no  demands  contrary  to nature, it demands,        Bk.XII:253, 254.
                                       Bk.XIV:2:2372.                                     Bk.XIV:2:2364. 
that  every man  should love himself, should seek that which is useful           Cash Value 
                                            { judging }
to him—I mean, that which is really useful to him, should desire every-
                Bk.XIB:20420; 21863.                                           { °P }
thing  which  really  brings  man  to  greater  perfection,  and  should,            Durant:644121
                                         [ strive ]     Bk.XIA:13992, 93.
each  for  himself,  endeavour  as far as  he can to  preserve his own            Bk.XIV:2:2381.

being.  (18:8) This is as necessarily true, as that a whole is greater than

its part{s}. (Cf. III:iv.)
 
(18:9)  Again, as  virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the

laws  of  one's own nature (IV:Def.viii.), and as no one endeavours to             Bk.XIV:2:2375.
                                    [ by 3P7 ]
preserve  his  own  being,  except  in accordance with the laws of his
                                                                Bk.XIV:2:2383.                conatum           E4:Damasio:170-1
own nature, it follows, first, that the foundation of virtue is the endeav-
                                                                         { better PcM }                                Mark Twain
our  to  preserve  one's  own being,  and  that  happiness  consists in

man's  power  of  preserving his own being; secondly, that virtue is to             Bk.XIV:2:2381.

be  desired  for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent

or  more useful to us, for the sake of which we should desire it; thirdly

and lastly that suicides are weak-minded, and are overcome by exter-
                     Bk.XII:2541 & 2       { human }
nal  causes  repugnant  to  their ^ nature.  (18:10)  Further, it follows from
                                                                                                  4P37S1
E2:Postulate iv., that we can never arrive at doing without all external

things  for  the  preservation  of  our being  or living, so as to have no

relations  with  things  which  are outside ourselves. (18:11)  Again, if we

consider our mind, we see that our intellect would be more imperfect,

if  mind   were   alone,   and  could  understand nothing besides itself.          Bk.XIV:2:2413. 

(18:12) There are, then, many things outside ourselves, which are useful

to  us, and are, therefore, to be desired.  (13)  Of such none can be dis-

cerned more excellent, than those which are in entire agreement with

our  nature.   (18:14)  For  if,  for  example,  two  individuals of entirely the
                                                      Bk.XIA:13993; Bk.XIX:26424. 
same nature are united, they form a combination twice as powerful as          Bk.XIV:2:2453.
 
either of them singly.


(18:15)  Therefore,  to man there is nothing more useful than man—noth-         E2:Wolfson:2:243.

ing,  I repeat, more excellent for preserving their being can be wished

for  by  men, than that all should so in all points agree, that the minds

and  bodies  of  all  should  form, as it were, one single mind and one

single  page 202   body,  and  that  all should, with one consent, as far as

they  are  able,  endeavour  to  preserve  their being, and all with one
                                    Bk.XIX:26422.
consent  seek  what  is  useful  to them all.  (18:16) Hence, men who are
           Bk.XIX:26838.
governed  by  reason—that is, who seek what is useful to them in ac-             Bk.XIA:13785.

cordance  with  reason,  desire for themselves nothing, which they do
                                                          { and vice versa, }
not  also  desire  for  the rest of mankind, and, consequently, are just,

faithful, and honourable in their conduct.


                             SpinIdea:Wolfson:2:231-2
(18:17)  Such are the dictates of reason, which I purposed thus briefly to

indicate,  before  beginning to prove them in greater detail.  (18)  I have

taken  this  course, in order, if possible, to gain the attention of those

who  believe, that the principle that every man is bound to seek what
 { really }
is  useful  for  himself is the foundation of impiety, rather than of piety

and  virtue.  (18:19)  Therefore,  after briefly showing that the contrary is

the  case,  I  go  on to prove it by, the same method, as that whereby

I have hitherto proceeded. 

 
 

Prop. XIX.  Bk.III:242; Bk.XII:257—The first deals ...; Bk.XVIII:296n, 303fp19. 

Every  man,  by  the  laws  of his nature,            E4:Dijn:247
necessarily desires or shrinks from that
which  he  deems  to  be  good  or  bad. 
                                  4P35, 37, 37S2, 46, 59.

Proof.—  (19:1)  The  knowledge of good and evil is (IV:viii.) the emotion

of  pleasure  or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof; therefore,
             ] III.xxviii. [                                  [ judges ]           Bk.XIV:2:2364. 
every man necessarily desires what he thinks good, and shrinks from

what  he  thinks bad.  (2)  Now  this  appetite  is nothing else but man's

nature  or  essence  (Cf.  the  Definition of Appetite given in III:ix.note

and  III:De.I).   (19:3)  Therefore,  every  man,  solely  by  the laws of his
            [ wants ]                      [ repells ]
nature, desires the one, and shrinks from the other, &c.  Q.E.D.



Prop. XX.  Bk.XIB:21250; 21454; Bk.XIV:2:2364. 

The  more  every  man  endeavours,
and  is  able  to seek what is useful
to him—in other words, to preserve                 Rationality
his  own  being—the  more is he en-
dowed  with virtue;  on the contrary,                      Durant:651167 
in  proportion  as a man neglects to
seek  what  is  useful to him, that is,
to  preserve  his own  being,   he  is                 Irrationality
wanting in power.        4P35C2, 37S2..

Proof.—  (20:1)  Virtue is human power, which is defined solely by man's
                                      [ by 3P7 ]
essence  (IV:D.viii.),  that is, which is defined solely by the endeavour

made  by  man  to persist in his own being.  (2)  Wherefore, the more a

man  endeavours,  and is able to preserve his own being, the more is

he  endowed  with   page 203   virtue,  and, consequently (III:iv. &, vi.), in

so  far as a man neglects to preserve his own being, he is wanting in

power.  Q.E.D.



Note.— (20:3) No one, therefore, neglects seeking his own good, or pre-

serving  his  own  being,  unless  he be overcome by causes external       E2:Parkinson:278111 & 112
                       Bk.XIX:24527.
and  foreign  to  his nature.  (4) No one, I say, from the necessity of his

own   nature,   or   otherwise  than  under  compulsion  from  external

causes,  shrinks  from food, or kills himself: which latter may be done

in  a  variety  of  ways.  (20:5)  A  man,  for  instance,  kills  himself {D:1.9}

under  the  compulsion  of  another  man,  who  twists  round his right

hand,  wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword, and forces

him to turn the blade against his own heart; or, again, he may be com-

pelled,  like Seneca, by a tyrant's command, to open his own veins—
                                                                                          ] unobsevable [
that is, to escape a greater evil by incurring, a lesser; or, lastly, latent

external  causes  may  so  disorder  his imagination, and so affect his

body,  that  it  may  assume  a  nature contrary to its former one, and

whereof  the  idea  cannot exist in the mind (III:x.)  (20:6) But that a man,

from  the  necessity  of  his own nature, should endeavour to become

non-existent,  is as impossible as that something should be made out

of  nothing,  as  everyone  will  see  for himself, after a little reflection.




Prop. XXI.  XXI- XXVIII—Bk.XVIII:298p24-28, 2404p21.

                                 < Bk.XV:281144—E2:XLIX(64)N:126, 
                                                 E4:Ap.IV:237, E5:XLII:270. >
No  one can desire to be blessed,
to  act  rightly, and to live rightly,
without at the same time wishing
to  be,  act,  and to live—in  other
words, to actually exist.     4P22C. 

Proof.—  (21:1)  The  proof  of this proposition, or rather the proposition

itself,  is self-evident,  and  is  also  plain from the definition of desire.
                                                               ] happily [       ] well [
(21:2) For the desire of living, acting, &c., blessedly or rightly, is (Def. of

the Emotions, i.)  the essence of man—that is (III:vii.), the endeavour

made by everyone to preserve his own being.  (21:3) Therefore, no one

can desire, &c.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XXII. 

No  virtue  can be conceived as prior                        Durant:651167 
to  this  endeavour  to preserve one's                    Bk.XIV:2:238.
own being.           4P22C.

                         ] conatus [
Proof.— (22:1) The effort for self-preservation is the essence of a thing

(III:vii.);  therefore,  if  any  virtue  could be conceived as prior thereto,
                                                                                           [ by 4D8 ]
the  essence  of a thing would have to be conceived as prior to itself,
                                                   {     self-evident       }
which is obviously absurd [ as is known through itself ]. (22:2) Therefore

no virtue, &c.  Q.E.D.



Corollary.—  (22:3)  The  effort  for  self-preservation  is  the  first  page 204
             E5:XLI(1):269; Bk.XIB:21250.                                  [ by 4P22 ]
and only foundation of virtue.  (4) For prior to this principle nothing can           Bk.XIV:2:2383.

be conceived, and without it no virtue can be conceived ]independent

of it.  IV.xxi.[                        4P24, 25, 26, 56; 5P41. 



Prop. XXIII.   Bk.XIB:21250. 

Man,  in so far as he is determined to
a  particular  action  because  he has
inadequate ideas, cannot be absolute-
ly  said  to  act in obedience to virtue;
he can only be so described, in so far
as  he  is  determined  for  the  action
because he understands.          4P28.

Proof.—  (23:1)  In  so  far  as  a man is determined to an action through

having  inadequate  ideas,  he  is passive (III:i.), that is (III:Def.i., &iii.),

he  does  something,  which  cannot  be perceived solely through his

essence, that is (by IV:Def.viii.), which does not follow from his virtue.

(23:2)  But, in so far as he is determined for an action because he under-

stands,  he  is  active; that is, he does something, which is perceived
                                                  [ by IV:Def.viii. ]
through  his  essence  alone,  or  which  adequately  follows from his

virtue.  Q.E.D.




Prop. XXIV.  Bk.XII:2572; Bk.XVIII:308f4p24, 309p24; Bk.XIX:26115. 

                                                      [ conformity ] 
To  act  absolutely  in obedience to                  Hampshire:165
virtue  is in us the same thing as to
act,  to  live,  or  to  preserve one's                          Durant:651167 
being (these three terms are identi-
cal in meaning) in accordance with
the  dictates of reason on the basis
of  seeking  what is useful to one's                             Cash Value.
self.                        ] one's own advantage. [
                  4P36, 37, 56, 67, 72; 5P41. 

Proof.—  (24:1)  To  act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else
                                        { first }                     [ by 4D8 ]
but  to act according to the ^ laws of one's own nature.  (2) But we only

act,  in  so far as we understand (III:iii.) : therefore to act in obedience

to  virtue  is  in us nothing else but to act, to live, or to preserve one's

being  in  obedience to reason, and that on the basis of seeking what

is useful for us (IV:xxii.Coroll.).  Q.E.D.




Prop. XXV.  Bk.XIB:21250; Bk.XVIII:2464p25. 

                    [ strives ] 
No one wishes to preserve his being
for the sake of anything else.   4P26, 52S. 

Proof.—  (25:1)  The  endeavour,  wherewith  everything  endeavours to

persist  in its being, is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself

(III:vii.);  from  this alone, and not from the essence of anything else, it

necessarily  follows  (III:vi.) that everyone endeavours to preserve his

being.  (25:2) Moreover, this proposition is plain from IV:xxii.Coroll., for if

a  man  should  endeavour  to preserve his being for the sake of any-
                                                                                 ] primary [
thing else, the last-named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue,

which,  by  the  foregoing  corollary, is absurd  ] as is self-evident [. 

(25:3) Therefore no one, &c.  Q.E.D.


page 205

Prop. XXVI. Bk.XII:257—The first deals ...; Bk.XVIII:1824p26, 304fp26, 3524p26,27.