THE ETHICS - PART V

JBY Notes:

1.  The  text  is  the  1883  translation  of the "The Ethics" by R. H. M.
     Elwes,  as  printed  by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was
     scanned  and  proof-read by JBY.  For other Versions see Note 7.

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):   y = Proposition Number, if given;   xx = Sentence Number.

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols:
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ),
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ],
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [,
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >,
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <,
           { JBY Comment }    G-D      Metaphors       LINKS  

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here.

6.  Please  e-mail  errors,   clarification  requests,  disagreement,
     or  suggestions  to  josephb@yesselman.com.  

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively         Durant's Story
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its         EL:[3]:vi. 
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and           Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze.  

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions, or best, study the printed book—
    book page numbers are given for most scanned books. 

9.  From Elwes's Introduction—EL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi.
 
10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for   every-           E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,  is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for   teaching  the
       "Organic  Interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and  all
       his   puzzling   sayings,    for  example  E4:II:192,   become   more,
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.    Look  for  the
       Cash Value.

10a.  To  help  further  understand  many  of  the Propositions and Ideas,       { Examples
                    use  the  analogy  of  you  as  'G-D'  (substance)                       1D6, 2P3, 2P4.}
                   I WAS                I AM            I WILL BE   
                   ( antecedents,  present,  and  descendents ),                                         E2:Endnote N.11

                                                    heart, lungs, fingernails, shoes, etc.                      Organic
                   and all parts of you as modes ( particular  things ).
                              
         Example—you  are  a  part  of  G-D  as your heart is a part of you.          Indivisible 
         You should serve G-D as you would want your heart to serve you.  

        Apparent  Contradiction of the analogy. E5:Endnote 18:1N.

11. Wolfson's summary of Part V.

12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff.
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xxiv.
       For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi.
     For a "study of the plan of Ethics 5" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:341-2.
       For a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.
 
 
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS:   Bk.XII:xi, 278—The Deliverance of Man.
                                                                     Bk.XIV:xxiv—Chapter XX,  Bk.XIV:2:261-2—Love,
                                                                                                         Immortality, and Blessedness.

Preface: 244

Axioms: 247

Part V Propositions: Book I:Pg. xix
           If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral.
           If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here.
   

Part V Proposition List: Book I:Pg. xix; { Hypotheses }

             Suggestion:  Do  not  read  consecutively  as you would a novel;
                                but select a Proposition, click its number to the left
                               and  then  follow  all  its links in turn wherever they
                               may  lead.  You  will then be putting hypertexting to
                               its fullest and best advantage—the fuller discussion
                               of a thread.  If  you  do  not  stick to one thread at a 
                                time,  this  Web Site will seem very convoluted and 
                                confusing.   

              {Definition of Proposition: a statement in which something is affirmed or denied,
                             so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.}
                      { All axioms, definitions, and propositions are hypotheses. Test 
                       them for their 'cash value'. See Notes 10 & 11, Posit, and Idea. }   

page 244

PREFACE:   E5:Dijn:253; Bk.XII:278, 279.
 

(Prf:1)  At  length  I  pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is
   Bk.XIV:1:385&6.—Liberty, Blessedness—E5:Wolfson:2:3113 
concerned  with  the way leading to freedom.  (2) I shall therefore treat           Scr:Dijn'sSalvation 

therein  of  the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can                 Conclusion 

control  the  emotions,  and  what is the nature of Mental Freedom or  
  Bk.XVIII:3715Preface—p10s.
Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful               Enlight-ened
      ^ E5:Wolfson:2:3113     Bk.XIV:2:2591.                Bk.XVIII:52277/13.
the wise man is than the ignorant. (3)  It is no part of my design to point

out  the  method  and  means whereby the understanding may be per-

fected,  nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended, as

to  be  capable of the due performance of its functions.  (Prf:4) The latter
                                                        Bk.XIV:2:2651&2—TEI:[15]d:7
question  lies  in  the  province of Medicine, the former in the province               Bk.XII:279 

of Logic.  (5)  Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of   

the  mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature

of  its  dominion  over  the  emotions, for their control and moderation.
                                               < E5:Parkinson:283162—Bk.XV:26316 on E1:X(2)N:51,  
                                                  E2:VII(4)N:86, E2:VII(7)N:87, E4:Ap.XXXII(1):242. >
(Prf:6)  That  we  do  not possess  absolute  dominion  over them, I have
                                                Bk.III:254; Bk.XX:24291
already shown.  (Prf:7)  Yet  the  Stoics  have thought, that the emotions

depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern              Mark Twain 

them.  (Prf:8)  But  these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of

experience,  not  from  their  own principles, to confess, that no slight

practice  and  zeal  is needed to control and moderate them: and this

someone  endeavoured  to  illustrate  by  the  example (if I remember

rightly)   of   two  dogs,   the   one   a   house-dog   and   the  other  a

hunting-dog.  (Prf:9)  For  by long training it could be brought about, that

the  house-dog  should become accustomed to hunt, and the hunting-
                                                                                < E5:Parkinson:283162 >
dog to cease from running after hares. (Prf:10) To this opinion Descartes

not  a  little  inclines. (11)  For  he  maintained,  that  the soul or mind is

specially  united   to  a  particular part of the brain, namely,  page 245  to
                                 Bk.XIV:2:1165, 2:1894.
that  part  called  the  pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is en-             Wolf:P95, L22 
                                                     ^ Descartes Pineal Gland
abled  to  feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and         Hampshire32:111 
                                                                                                 ] willing [
also  external  objects,  and  which the mind by a simple act of volition                Mark Twain

can  put  in motion in various ways.  (Prf:12)  He asserted, that this gland
                                       ] middle [
is  so  suspended  in  the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by
                                          Bk.XIV:2:441—Bk.VIII:93[2].
the  slightest  motion  of  the  animal  spirits: further, that this gland is

suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners, as

the  animal  spirits  can  impinge thereon; and, again, that as many dif-

ferent  marks  are  impressed on the said gland, as there are different

external  objects  which  impel  the animal spirits towards it; whence it

follows,  that  if  the  will  of the soul suspends the gland in a position,

wherein  it  has  already  been suspended once before by the animal

spirits  driven  in  one  way  or another, the gland in its turn reacts on

the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition wherein

they  were,  when  repulsed  before  by a similar position of the gland.
                                                                    ]     willing        [
(Prf:13)  He  further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in

nature to a certain given motion of the gland.  (14)  For instance, when-

ever  anyone  desires  to  look  at  a remote object, the act of volition

causes  the  pupil  of  the  eye  to  dilate,  whereas,  if  the  person in

question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish

to  dilate  it would not have brought about the result, inasmuch as the
 {    part of the brain      }                                        { electrical signals }                              A Computer
motion  of the gland, which serves to impel the animal spirits towards

the  optic  nerve  in  a way which would dilate or contract the pupil, is

not  associated  in  nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil,

but  with  the wish to look at remote or very near objects.  (Prf:15) Lastly,

he  maintained  that,  although  every  motion  of  the aforesaid gland

seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out of

the  whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life,

yet  it  can  nevertheless become through habituation associated with
                                                                               ] Passions of the Soul [
other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'âme,

I. 50.  (Prf:16) He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it
                                                                                        { some }
cannot,   under   proper  direction,  acquire  absolute  power  over  its
                                                                                     Bk.XIV:2:1867.
passions.   (17)  For  passions  as  defined  by him are "perceptions, or
                     Bk.XIV:2:1931—affectus.
feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as

page 246  species,  and  which (mark the expression) are produced, pre-

served,  and  strengthened  through  some  movement  of  the spirits."

(Passion del l'âme, I.27.) (Prf:18) But, seeing that we can join any motion

of  the  gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the deter-

mination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore,

we  determine  our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to

which  we  wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the

passions  which  we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall

acquire  an  absolute  dominion  over  our passions.  (Prf:19)  Such is the

doctrine  of this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his

own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly

believe  to  have  proceeded  from so great a man.  (Prf:20) Indeed, I am

lost  in  wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he                 Descartes

would  draw  no  conclusions  which  do  not  follow  from self-evident

premisses,  and  would  affirm  nothing  which  he  did not clearly and

distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the scholastics
                                                         < Bk.XV:283163—Bk.XV:279118 on E3:XV(10)N:141 >
for  wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could main-

tain  a  hypothesis,  beside  which  occult  qualities are commonplace.

(Prf:21)  What  does  he  understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and                Dennett:433

the  body?   (Pfc:22)  What  clear  and  distinct  conception  has he got of

thought  in  most  intimate  union  with  a  certain particle of extended

matter?  (Pfc:23)  Truly  I  should like him to explain this union through its

proximate  cause. (Pfc:24)  But  he  had  so  distinct a conception of mind

being  distinct  from  body,  that  he  could  not  assign  any particular

cause  of  the  union  between  the  two, or of the mind itself, but was

obliged  to  have  recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is         Refuge of Ignorance

to God. (Pfc:25)  Further, I  should  much  like  to  know,  what degree of

motion  the  mind  can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force

can  it  hold  it suspended? (Prf:26)  For I am  in  ignorance, whether this

gland  can  be  agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than

by  the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which

we  have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined

therefrom  by  physical  causes;  in  which  case  it  would  follow that,

although  the  mind  firmly  intended  to  face a given danger, and had

united to this decision the motions of boldness,  yet at the sight of the

danger  the  gland  might  page 247  become  suspended  in a way, which

would  preclude  the  mind  thinking  of  anything except running away.
                                               <  no relation between  >
(Prf:27)  In  truth,  as  there is no common standard of volition and motion,
                                                    ^ Bk.XVIII:137II/280/13.
so  is  there  no comparison  possible between the powers of the mind

and   the  power  or strength of the body; consequently the strength of

one  cannot  in  any  wise  be  determined by the strength of the other.

(Pfc:28)  We  may  also  add,  that  there  is  no gland  discoverable in the

midst  of  the  brain,  so  placed that it can thus easily be set in motion
                                                                                     ] extended [
in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far

as  the  cavities of the brain. (Prf:29) Lastly, I omit all the assertions which

he  makes  concerning  the  will  and  its freedom, inasmuch as I have               Mark Twain

abundantly proved that his premisses are false.  (Prf:30)  Therefore, since
                                                                                     Bk.XVIII:329II/280/23.
the  power  of  the  mind,  as  I  have  shown  above,  is defined by the
 < Bk.XV:283164—E4:XXVIII(3):206 >
understanding  only,  we  shall  determine  solely by the knowledge of
                             Bk.VIII:5977—Bk.XIV:2:2631; Bk.XVIII:333II/280/24.
the  mind  the  remedies  against  the  emotions,  which  I  believe   all
                                                                                    Bk.XIV:2:2653.
have  had  experience  of,  but do not accurately observe or distinctly
                         ] this knowledge [                                            ] concerns [
see,  and  from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions,
                                               Bk.XIV:1:385&6—Liberty.
which have regard to the mind's blessedness.                                                        E5:Wolfson:2:311. 
 
 
 
 

Ax. I.  If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change                   Idolatry
          must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, 
          and continue until they cease to be contrary.           5P7.                   <------- small print, Logical Index.
 

Ax. II.  The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in 
           so  far  as  its essence is explained or defined by the essence 
           of its cause.   (This axiom is evident from IlI.vii.) .
              { The  essence of man  is what causes 
              the fetus to grow in its mother's womb. } 
 
 
 

PART V PROPOSITIONS.  { Hypotheses }
 
 
                       For all Propositions see Scroll P1. 

First Section - 5P1-20
Prop. I. Bk.III:253; E5:Dijn:258; E5:Wolfson:2:262; Bk.XVIII:27927, 3315p1; 345p1. summary

                                           <Bk.XV:27379—E2:XVII(8)N:99. >
Even  as  thoughts  and the ideas of things        Remedy for the emotions—
are  arranged  and  associated  in the mind,                 Bk.XIV:2:265
so  are  the  modifications  of  body  or the
<Bk.XV:283165—E2:XVII(10)N:100. > 
images of things precisely in the same way
arranged and associated in the body.   5P10.     <------- small print, Logical Index.

          {Cash Value—If thoughts are objective, reason prevails, III:ii.}
 
Proof.— (1:1)  The order and connection of ideas is the same (II:vii.) as

the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the order and con-

nection  of things is the same (II:vi.Coroll. and II:vii.) as the order and

connection of ideas.  (2) Wherefore, even as the order and connection

of  ideas  in  the mind takes place according to the order and associa-

tion  of  modifications  of the body (II:xviii.), so vice versâ (III:ii.) page 248

the  order  and connection of modifications of the body takes place in

accordance  with  the  manner,  in  which  thoughts  and  the ideas of

things are arranged and associated in the mind.  Q.E.D.
 

PROP. II. Bk.XV:283166—E5:XX(4)n:257; Bk.XIV:2:1931, 2:2682; Bk.XVIII:2865p2, 334p2; Bk.XIX:28428??. 

               Bk.XVIII:3495p2.               Bk.XVIII:2705p2.
               [ separate ]             ] agitation of the mind [
If  we  remove  a disturbance of the              Second remedy—Bk.XIV:2:268
spirit, or emotion, from the thought                       
of an external cause,  and unite it to
 { E5:Wolfson:2:268 - G-D }                                { need }
other thoughts, then will the love or                               Mock
hatred  towards that external cause,
                                                  { peace of } [ mind ]
and  also  the  vacillations  of  spirit              Need for Religion
which  arise  from  these  emotions,
be destroyed.  { Note 10, }              5P4S, 20S.                  <------- small print, Logical Index.

                                                                 < form >
Proof.— (2:1)  That,  which  constitutes  the reality of love or hatred, is

pleasure  or pain,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  an external cause
      Bk.XVIII:337p2d.                                                                 { understood }
(Def. Emotions:vi., & vii.);  wherefore,  when  this  cause is removed,
                                                      {    understood       }
the  reality  of  love  or  hatred  is  removed  with  it;  therefore these
                                                                         Bk.XVIII:3345p2d.
emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed { resulting in

peace of mind }.   Q.E.D.   { My  emendation  is  based on Prop. III and the

"other thoughts"  of  this  Prop. II. }
 
 

Prop. III.   E4:Feuer:211, Bk.XIB:212; Bk.XVIII:2865p3, 335p3; Bk.XIX:28427.

           [ affect ]
An emotion, which is a passion,
ceases to be a passion, as soon       {The object that causes the emotion is
as  we form a clear and distinct           not a free cause—E5:Wolfson:2:269}
idea thereof { resulting in °PcM, GN:2n. }.                                   Durant:647147
{ EL:[59]:xxviii }                   5P18S, 20S.                               <------- small print, Logical Index.

  

Proof.— (3:1)  An emotion,  which  is  a  passion, is a confused idea (by
                                                                             Bk.III:255.
the general Def. of the Emotions). (2) If, therefore, we form a clear and

distinct  idea  of  a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished
                                                              ] related [
from  the  emotion,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to  the mind only, by
 Bk.XIX:2745.
reason  (II:xxi., & Note); therefore (III:iii.), the emotion will cease to be

a passion.  Q.E.D.
 

Corollary.—  (3:3)   An  emotion  therefore  becomes  more  under  our

control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as
        Bk.XVIII:19030.
it is more known to us.            5P42.
 
 

Prop. IV.  Bk.XIB:21351; Bk.XVIII:335p4; Bk.XIX:28533.

                                ] affection [
There is no modification of the body,
whereof  we cannot form some clear
and distinct conception.       5P4C, 14.                         If objective.

{Cash Value—More understanding brings peace-of-mind.}

  
Proof.— (4:1)  Properties  which  are  common to all things can only be

conceived  adequately (II:xxxviii.); therefore (II:xii and Lemma. ii. after

II:xiii.)  there  is  no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form

some clear and distinct conception.  Q.E.D.
 

Corollary.— (4:2) Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we

cannot  form  some  clear and distinct conception.  (4:3) For an emotion

is  the  idea  of  a modification of the body (by the general Def. of the

Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some

clear and distinct conception.
 

Note.— (4:4)  Seeing  that  there  is nothing which is not followed by an
                                         Bk.XIB:21250; Bk.XIX:15118—EL:L42(37):360—E2:XL:111.
effect  (I:xxxvi.), page 249  and  that  we  clearly and distinctly understand

whatever  follows  from  an  idea,  which in us is adequate (II:xl.), it fol-

lows  that  everyone  has  the  power  of  clearly  and  distinctly under-
                                                          Bk.XVIII:336p4s.
standing himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part,

and  consequently  of  bringing  it  about, that he should become less
                                    Bk.III:255; Bk.XIX:28428.
subject  to  them.  (4:5)  To  attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly

direct  our  efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct

knowledge   of   every   emotion,  in  order  that  the  mind  may  thus,
                                { conditioned }
through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clear-

ly  and  distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
                                    &nbs