THE ETHICS - PART V

JBY Notes:

1.  The  text  is  the  1883  translation  of the "The Ethics" by R. H. M.
     Elwes,  as  printed  by Dover Publications in Book I.  The text was
     scanned  and  proof-read by JBY.  For other Versions see Note 7.

2.  JBY added sentence numbers.
     (y:xx):   y = Proposition Number, if given;   xx = Sentence Number.

3.  Page numbers are those of Book I .

4.  Symbols:
           ( Spinoza's footnote or the Latin word ),
           [ Curley's Book VIII translation variance or footnote ],
           ] Shirley's Book VII translation variance or footnote [,
           < Parkinson's Book XV translation variance or endnote >,
           > De Dijn's Book III translation variation or comment <,
           { JBY Comment }    G-D      Metaphors       LINKS  

5.  For Bibliography, Citation abbreviations, and Book ordering see here.

6.  Please  e-mail  errors,   clarification  requests,  disagreement,
     or  suggestions  to  josephb@yesselman.com.  

7.  Text version of the Ethics; Latin versions. 
    This HTML version was abridged and formatted for conversion to an eBook.
    The abridged version is available to be read on various eBook Readers

8.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively         Durant's Story
     as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its         EL:[3]:vi. 
     links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and           Schorsch
     best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread. If you do not stick      Tickle the Fancy
    to  one  thread  at  a  time,   this Web Site  will seem very convoluted,  
    confusing, and an annoying maze.  

    If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
    abridged versions, e-book versions, or best, study the printed book—
    book page numbers are given for most scanned books. 

9.  From Elwes's Introduction—EL:[3]:vi, EL:[5]:vii, EL:[7]:viii, EL:[33]:xxi.
 
10.  The  secret  to  understanding  Spinoza:  the  MOTIVE   for   every-           E1:Note 10 
       thing   he   says,  is   to   lay   the   groundwork   for   teaching  the
       "Organic  Interdependence  of  Parts."     Remember  this  and  all
       his   puzzling   sayings,    for  example  E4:II:192,   become   more,
       if   not   completely,  understandable.    See  Posit.    Look  for  the
       Cash Value.

10a.  To  help  further  understand  many  of  the Propositions and Ideas,       { Examples
                    use  the  analogy  of  you  as  'G-D'  (substance)                       1D6, 2P3, 2P4.}
                   I WAS                I AM            I WILL BE   
                   ( antecedents,  present,  and  descendents ),                                         E2:Endnote N.11

                                                    heart, lungs, fingernails, shoes, etc.                      Organic
                   and all parts of you as modes ( particular  things ).
                              
         Example—you  are  a  part  of  G-D  as your heart is a part of you.          Indivisible 
         You should serve G-D as you would want your heart to serve you.  

        Apparent  Contradiction of the analogy. E5:Endnote 18:1N.

11. Wolfson's summary of Part V.

12.  See  Wolfson's  Outline  of  "The Ethics"  compiled  by  Terry Neff.
       For Table of Contents of Wolfson's epic commentary see Bk.XIV:xxiv.
       For Wolfson's "What is New in Spinoza?" see E5:Bk.XIV:xxvi.
     For a "study of the plan of Ethics 5" see Deleuze's Bk.XIX:341-2.
       For a critical criticism of "The Ethics" see Bennett's Bk.XVIII.
 
 
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS:   Bk.XII:xi, 278—The Deliverance of Man.
                                                                     Bk.XIV:xxiv—Chapter XX,  Bk.XIV:2:261-2—Love,
                                                                                                         Immortality, and Blessedness.

Preface: 244

Axioms: 247

Part V Propositions: Book I:Pg. xix
           If you know the Proposition you want, click its Roman numeral.
           If you want to scroll the list of Propositions click here.
   

Part V Proposition List: Book I:Pg. xix; { Hypotheses }

             Suggestion:  Do  not  read  consecutively  as you would a novel;
                                but select a Proposition, click its number to the left
                               and  then  follow  all  its links in turn wherever they
                               may  lead.  You  will then be putting hypertexting to
                               its fullest and best advantage—the fuller discussion
                               of a thread.  If  you  do  not  stick to one thread at a 
                                time,  this  Web Site will seem very convoluted and 
                                confusing.   

              {Definition of Proposition: a statement in which something is affirmed or denied,
                             so that it can therefore be significantly characterized as either true or false.}
                      { All axioms, definitions, and propositions are hypotheses. Test 
                       them for their 'cash value'. See Notes 10 & 11, Posit, and Idea. }   

page 244

PREFACE:   E5:Dijn:253; Bk.XII:278, 279.
 

(Prf:1)  At  length  I  pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is
   Bk.XIV:1:385&6.—Liberty, Blessedness—E5:Wolfson:2:3113 
concerned  with  the way leading to freedom.  (2) I shall therefore treat           Scr:Dijn'sSalvation 

therein  of  the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can                 Conclusion 

control  the  emotions,  and  what is the nature of Mental Freedom or  
  Bk.XVIII:3715Preface—p10s.
Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful               Enlight-ened
      ^ E5:Wolfson:2:3113     Bk.XIV:2:2591.                Bk.XVIII:52277/13.
the wise man is than the ignorant. (3)  It is no part of my design to point

out  the  method  and  means whereby the understanding may be per-

fected,  nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended, as

to  be  capable of the due performance of its functions.  (Prf:4) The latter
                                                        Bk.XIV:2:2651&2—TEI:[15]d:7
question  lies  in  the  province of Medicine, the former in the province               Bk.XII:279 

of Logic.  (5)  Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of   

the  mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature

of  its  dominion  over  the  emotions, for their control and moderation.
                                               < E5:Parkinson:283162—Bk.XV:26316 on E1:X(2)N:51,  
                                                  E2:VII(4)N:86, E2:VII(7)N:87, E4:Ap.XXXII(1):242. >
(Prf:6)  That  we  do  not possess  absolute  dominion  over them, I have
                                                Bk.III:254; Bk.XX:24291
already shown.  (Prf:7)  Yet  the  Stoics  have thought, that the emotions

depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern              Mark Twain 

them.  (Prf:8)  But  these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of

experience,  not  from  their  own principles, to confess, that no slight

practice  and  zeal  is needed to control and moderate them: and this

someone  endeavoured  to  illustrate  by  the  example (if I remember

rightly)   of   two  dogs,   the   one   a   house-dog   and   the  other  a

hunting-dog.  (Prf:9)  For  by long training it could be brought about, that

the  house-dog  should become accustomed to hunt, and the hunting-
                                                                                < E5:Parkinson:283162 >
dog to cease from running after hares. (Prf:10) To this opinion Descartes

not  a  little  inclines. (11)  For  he  maintained,  that  the soul or mind is

specially  united   to  a  particular part of the brain, namely,  page 245  to
                                 Bk.XIV:2:1165, 2:1894.
that  part  called  the  pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is en-             Wolf:P95, L22 
                                                     ^ Descartes Pineal Gland
abled  to  feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and         Hampshire32:111 
                                                                                                 ] willing [
also  external  objects,  and  which the mind by a simple act of volition                Mark Twain

can  put  in motion in various ways.  (Prf:12)  He asserted, that this gland
                                       ] middle [
is  so  suspended  in  the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by
                                          Bk.XIV:2:441—Bk.VIII:93[2].
the  slightest  motion  of  the  animal  spirits: further, that this gland is

suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners, as

the  animal  spirits  can  impinge thereon; and, again, that as many dif-

ferent  marks  are  impressed on the said gland, as there are different

external  objects  which  impel  the animal spirits towards it; whence it

follows,  that  if  the  will  of the soul suspends the gland in a position,

wherein  it  has  already  been suspended once before by the animal

spirits  driven  in  one  way  or another, the gland in its turn reacts on

the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition wherein

they  were,  when  repulsed  before  by a similar position of the gland.
                                                                    ]     willing        [
(Prf:13)  He  further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in

nature to a certain given motion of the gland.  (14)  For instance, when-

ever  anyone  desires  to  look  at  a remote object, the act of volition

causes  the  pupil  of  the  eye  to  dilate,  whereas,  if  the  person in

question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish

to  dilate  it would not have brought about the result, inasmuch as the
 {    part of the brain      }                                        { electrical signals }                              A Computer
motion  of the gland, which serves to impel the animal spirits towards

the  optic  nerve  in  a way which would dilate or contract the pupil, is

not  associated  in  nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil,

but  with  the wish to look at remote or very near objects.  (Prf:15) Lastly,

he  maintained  that,  although  every  motion  of  the aforesaid gland

seems to have been united by nature to one particular thought out of

the  whole number of our thoughts from the very beginning of our life,

yet  it  can  nevertheless become through habituation associated with
                                                                               ] Passions of the Soul [
other thoughts; this he endeavours to prove in the Passions de l'âme,

I. 50.  (Prf:16) He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it
                                                                                        { some }
cannot,   under   proper  direction,  acquire  absolute  power  over  its
                                                                                     Bk.XIV:2:1867.
passions.   (17)  For  passions  as  defined  by him are "perceptions, or
                     Bk.XIV:2:1931—affectus.
feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as

page 246  species,  and  which (mark the expression) are produced, pre-

served,  and  strengthened  through  some  movement  of  the spirits."

(Passion del l'âme, I.27.) (Prf:18) But, seeing that we can join any motion

of  the  gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the deter-

mination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore,

we  determine  our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to

which  we  wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the

passions  which  we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall

acquire  an  absolute  dominion  over  our passions.  (Prf:19)  Such is the

doctrine  of this illustrious philosopher (in so far as I gather it from his

own words); it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly

believe  to  have  proceeded  from so great a man.  (Prf:20) Indeed, I am

lost  in  wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he                 Descartes

would  draw  no  conclusions  which  do  not  follow  from self-evident

premisses,  and  would  affirm  nothing  which  he  did not clearly and

distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the scholastics
                                                         < Bk.XV:283163—Bk.XV:279118 on E3:XV(10)N:141 >
for  wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could main-

tain  a  hypothesis,  beside  which  occult  qualities are commonplace.

(Prf:21)  What  does  he  understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and                Dennett:433

the  body?   (Pfc:22)  What  clear  and  distinct  conception  has he got of

thought  in  most  intimate  union  with  a  certain particle of extended

matter?  (Pfc:23)  Truly  I  should like him to explain this union through its

proximate  cause. (Pfc:24)  But  he  had  so  distinct a conception of mind

being  distinct  from  body,  that  he  could  not  assign  any particular

cause  of  the  union  between  the  two, or of the mind itself, but was

obliged  to  have  recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is         Refuge of Ignorance

to God. (Pfc:25)  Further, I  should  much  like  to  know,  what degree of

motion  the  mind  can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force

can  it  hold  it suspended? (Prf:26)  For I am  in  ignorance, whether this

gland  can  be  agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than

by  the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which

we  have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined

therefrom  by  physical  causes;  in  which  case  it  would  follow that,

although  the  mind  firmly  intended  to  face a given danger, and had

united to this decision the motions of boldness,  yet at the sight of the

danger  the  gland  might  page 247  become  suspended  in a way, which

would  preclude  the  mind  thinking  of  anything except running away.
                                               <  no relation between  >
(Prf:27)  In  truth,  as  there is no common standard of volition and motion,
                                                    ^ Bk.XVIII:137II/280/13.
so  is  there  no comparison  possible between the powers of the mind

and   the  power  or strength of the body; consequently the strength of

one  cannot  in  any  wise  be  determined by the strength of the other.

(Pfc:28)  We  may  also  add,  that  there  is  no gland  discoverable in the

midst  of  the  brain,  so  placed that it can thus easily be set in motion
                                                                                     ] extended [
in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far

as  the  cavities of the brain. (Prf:29) Lastly, I omit all the assertions which

he  makes  concerning  the  will  and  its freedom, inasmuch as I have               Mark Twain

abundantly proved that his premisses are false.  (Prf:30)  Therefore, since
                                                                                     Bk.XVIII:329II/280/23.
the  power  of  the  mind,  as  I  have  shown  above,  is defined by the
 < Bk.XV:283164—E4:XXVIII(3):206 >
understanding  only,  we  shall  determine  solely by the knowledge of
                             Bk.VIII:5977—Bk.XIV:2:2631; Bk.XVIII:333II/280/24.
the  mind  the  remedies  against  the  emotions,  which  I  believe   all
                                                                                    Bk.XIV:2:2653.
have  had  experience  of,  but do not accurately observe or distinctly
                         ] this knowledge [                                            ] concerns [
see,  and  from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions,
                                               Bk.XIV:1:385&6—Liberty.
which have regard to the mind's blessedness.                                                        E5:Wolfson:2:311. 
 
 
 
 

Ax. I.  If two contrary actions be started in the same subject, a change                   Idolatry
          must necessarily take place, either in both, or in one of the two, 
          and continue until they cease to be contrary.           5P7.                   <------- small print, Logical Index.
 

Ax. II.  The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause, in 
           so  far  as  its essence is explained or defined by the essence 
           of its cause.   (This axiom is evident from IlI.vii.) .
              { The  essence of man  is what causes 
              the fetus to grow in its mother's womb. } 
 
 
 

PART V PROPOSITIONS.  { Hypotheses }
 
 
                       For all Propositions see Scroll P1. 

First Section - 5P1-20
Prop. I. Bk.III:253; E5:Dijn:258; E5:Wolfson:2:262; Bk.XVIII:27927, 3315p1; 345p1. summary

                                           <Bk.XV:27379—E2:XVII(8)N:99. >
Even  as  thoughts  and the ideas of things        Remedy for the emotions—
are  arranged  and  associated  in the mind,                 Bk.XIV:2:265
so  are  the  modifications  of  body  or the
<Bk.XV:283165—E2:XVII(10)N:100. > 
images of things precisely in the same way
arranged and associated in the body.   5P10.     <------- small print, Logical Index.

          {Cash Value—If thoughts are objective, reason prevails, III:ii.}
 
Proof.— (1:1)  The order and connection of ideas is the same (II:vii.) as

the order and connection of things, and vice versâ the order and con-

nection  of things is the same (II:vi.Coroll. and II:vii.) as the order and

connection of ideas.  (2) Wherefore, even as the order and connection

of  ideas  in  the mind takes place according to the order and associa-

tion  of  modifications  of the body (II:xviii.), so vice versâ (III:ii.) page 248

the  order  and connection of modifications of the body takes place in

accordance  with  the  manner,  in  which  thoughts  and  the ideas of

things are arranged and associated in the mind.  Q.E.D.
 

PROP. II. Bk.XV:283166—E5:XX(4)n:257; Bk.XIV:2:1931, 2:2682; Bk.XVIII:2865p2, 334p2; Bk.XIX:28428??. 

               Bk.XVIII:3495p2.               Bk.XVIII:2705p2.
               [ separate ]             ] agitation of the mind [
If  we  remove  a disturbance of the              Second remedy—Bk.XIV:2:268
spirit, or emotion, from the thought                       
of an external cause,  and unite it to
 { E5:Wolfson:2:268 - G-D }                                { need }
other thoughts, then will the love or                               Mock
hatred  towards that external cause,
                                                  { peace of } [ mind ]
and  also  the  vacillations  of  spirit              Need for Religion
which  arise  from  these  emotions,
be destroyed.  { Note 10, }              5P4S, 20S.                  <------- small print, Logical Index.

                                                                 < form >
Proof.— (2:1)  That,  which  constitutes  the reality of love or hatred, is

pleasure  or pain,  accompanied  by  the  idea  of  an external cause
      Bk.XVIII:337p2d.                                                                 { understood }
(Def. Emotions:vi., & vii.);  wherefore,  when  this  cause is removed,
                                                      {    understood       }
the  reality  of  love  or  hatred  is  removed  with  it;  therefore these
                                                                         Bk.XVIII:3345p2d.
emotions and those which arise therefrom are destroyed { resulting in

peace of mind }.   Q.E.D.   { My  emendation  is  based on Prop. III and the

"other thoughts"  of  this  Prop. II. }
 
 

Prop. III.   E4:Feuer:211, Bk.XIB:212; Bk.XVIII:2865p3, 335p3; Bk.XIX:28427.

           [ affect ]
An emotion, which is a passion,
ceases to be a passion, as soon       {The object that causes the emotion is
as  we form a clear and distinct           not a free cause—E5:Wolfson:2:269}
idea thereof { resulting in °PcM, GN:2n. }.                                   Durant:647147
{ EL:[59]:xxviii }                   5P18S, 20S.                               <------- small print, Logical Index.

  

Proof.— (3:1)  An emotion,  which  is  a  passion, is a confused idea (by
                                                                             Bk.III:255.
the general Def. of the Emotions). (2) If, therefore, we form a clear and

distinct  idea  of  a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished
                                                              ] related [
from  the  emotion,  in  so  far  as  it  is  referred  to  the mind only, by
 Bk.XIX:2745.
reason  (II:xxi., & Note); therefore (III:iii.), the emotion will cease to be

a passion.  Q.E.D.
 

Corollary.—  (3:3)   An  emotion  therefore  becomes  more  under  our

control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as
        Bk.XVIII:19030.
it is more known to us.            5P42.
 
 

Prop. IV.  Bk.XIB:21351; Bk.XVIII:335p4; Bk.XIX:28533.

                                ] affection [
There is no modification of the body,
whereof  we cannot form some clear
and distinct conception.       5P4C, 14.                         If objective.

{Cash Value—More understanding brings peace-of-mind.}

  
Proof.— (4:1)  Properties  which  are  common to all things can only be

conceived  adequately (II:xxxviii.); therefore (II:xii and Lemma. ii. after

II:xiii.)  there  is  no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form

some clear and distinct conception.  Q.E.D.
 

Corollary.— (4:2) Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we

cannot  form  some  clear and distinct conception.  (4:3) For an emotion

is  the  idea  of  a modification of the body (by the general Def. of the

Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some

clear and distinct conception.
 

Note.— (4:4)  Seeing  that  there  is nothing which is not followed by an
                                         Bk.XIB:21250; Bk.XIX:15118—EL:L42(37):360—E2:XL:111.
effect  (I:xxxvi.), page 249  and  that  we  clearly and distinctly understand

whatever  follows  from  an  idea,  which in us is adequate (II:xl.), it fol-

lows  that  everyone  has  the  power  of  clearly  and  distinctly under-
                                                          Bk.XVIII:336p4s.
standing himself and his emotions, if not absolutely, at any rate in part,

and  consequently  of  bringing  it  about, that he should become less
                                    Bk.III:255; Bk.XIX:28428.
subject  to  them.  (4:5)  To  attain this result, therefore, we must chiefly

direct  our  efforts to acquiring, as far as possible, a clear and distinct

knowledge   of   every   emotion,  in  order  that  the  mind  may  thus,
                                { conditioned }
through emotion, be determined to think of those things which it clear-

ly  and  distinctly perceives, and wherein it fully acquiesces: and thus
                                                    Bk.XVIII:350II/283/12.
that  the  emotion  itself  may  be  separated  from  the  thought of an
                                                                      E5:Wolfson:2:268.
external cause, and may be associated with true thoughts; whence it

will  come  to  pass,  not  only that love, hatred, &c. will be destroyed

(V:ii.),  but  also that the appetites or desires, which are wont to arise

from such emotion, will become incapable of being excessive (IV:lxi.).

(4:6)  For  it  must  be  especially  remarked,  that  the  appetite through

which a man is said to be active, and that through which he is said to

be  passive  is  one  and the same.  (4:7) For instance, we have shown

that  human nature is so constituted, that everyone desires his fellow-

men  to live after his own fashion (III:xxxi.N & C); in a man, who is not
                                                             5P20S.                         Bk.XIV:2:2442.
guided  by reason, this appetite is a passion which is called ambition,

and does not greatly differ from pride; whereas in a man, who lives by

the  dictates  of  reason,  it is an activity or virtue which is called piety
     Bk.XIV:2:2671.
(IV:xxxvii.Note.i. and second proof).  (4:8) In like manner all appetites or

desires  are  only  passions,  in so far as they spring from inadequate

ideas;  the  same  results  are  accredited  to  virtue,  when  they  are

aroused  or  generated by adequate ideas.  (4:9) For all desires, where-

by  we  are  determined  to any given action, may arise as much from
                                Bk.XIB:21250; Bk.XIX:28430.
adequate as from inadequate ideas (IV:lix.).  (10) Than this remedy for

the  emotions  (to  return to the point from which I started), which con-

sists  in a true knowledge thereof, nothing more excellent, being with-
   Bk.XVIII:2705p4s; 336p4s.
in  our  power, can be devised.  (4:11) For the mind has no other power

save  that  of  thinking  and  of  forming  adequate ideas, as we have

shown above (III:iii.).
 
 

Prop. V.   Bk.XII:284; Bk.XVIII:2835p5,345p5,6; Bk.XIX:29516. 

An  emotion  towards  a thing, which we   page 250
conceive simply { free }, and not as neces-                        E5:Wolfson:2:268
sary, or as contingent, or as possible, is,
other   conditions  being  equal,  greater
than any other emotion.         5P6.

{Cash Value—The emotion towards G-D (the freest thing) is the greatest.}

 
Proof.— (5:1)  An  emotion  towards  a  thing,  which we conceive to be
 Bk.XVIII:316p5d.
free,  is greater than one towards what we conceive to be necessary

(III:xlix.),  and,  consequently,  still  greater than one towards what we

conceive  as  possible,  or  contingent  (IV:xi.).  (5:2)  But  to conceive a
         Bk.XVIII:3385p5d—E3:XLIX:161.                                  ] in itself [
thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we
                       Bk.XVIII:338p5d                                                                         Bk.XVIII:3455p5d
are  in  ignorance  of  the  causes whereby it has been determined to
                                                                                     { G-D }
action  (II:xxxv.Note); therefore, an emotion towards a thing which we
               ] in itself [
conceive  simply  is,  other  conditions being equal, greater than one,

which  we  feel  towards  what  is  necessary, possible, or contingent,

and, consequently, it is the greatest of all.  Q.E.D.
 

Prop. VI.    Bk.XVIII:345p5,6, 125p6,19, 28331—3p49.

The  mind  has greater power {°PcM}
over   the   emotions   and   is   less                            Durant:647148
subject   thereto,   in   so  far  as  it 
understands all things as necessary.           Alcoholics Anonymous Creed
{ E3:GN:2n. }                         5P10S. 

{Cash Value—Understanding brings peace-of-mind—Spinoza's Dictum.}

Proof.— (6:1)  The mind understands all things to be necessary (I:xxix.)

and to  be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain           E5:Wolfson:2:268

of  causes [ to exist and produce effects (by 1P28) ]; therefore (by the forego-

ing Proposition), it  thus  far brings it  about,  that it is less subject to
                                                                                                              {passive}
the  emotions  arising  therefrom,  and  (III:xlviii.) feels less ^  emotion   

towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.

                                             Bk.XII:284
Note.— (6:2)  The  more  this  knowledge, that things are necessary, is

applied  to  particular  things,  which  we conceive more distinctly and
              Bk.XVIII:3385p6s.
vividly,  the  greater  is  the  power  of the mind over the emotions, as

experience also testifies. (3)  For  we see, that the pain arising from the

loss  of  any  good  is  mitigated,  as  soon as the man who has lost it   
                                                                           Bk.XVIII:3395p6s; Bk.XIX:28635.          Happen by necessity—
perceives,  that  it  could  not  by  any  means  have  been preserved.             E5:Wolfson:2:269
                                   Bk.XIV:2:270; Bk.XVIII:342p6s; Bk.XIX:2198; Bk.XX:24290.
(6:4)  So  also  we  see  that  no  one  pities an infant, because it cannot

speak,  walk,  or  reason, or lastly,  because it passes so many years,

as  it  were,  in  unconsciousness.  (6:5)  Whereas,  if most people were

born  full-grown  and  only  one here and there as an infant, everyone
               Bk.XIV:2:270.
would  pity  the infants; because infancy would not then be looked on

as  a  state  natural  and  necessary,  but  as a fault or delinquency in

Nature;  and  we  may  note  several other instances of the same sort.
 
 

Prop. VII.  Bk.XVIII:2705p7,28331,3325p7, 345p7; Bk.XIX:29518.

        {Active}                                       Bk.XIV:2:270—actual causes
Emotions which are aroused or spring
from reason, if we take account of time,
are  stronger  than  those,  page 251   which
are   attributable  to  particular  objects
that we regard as absent.    5P10(3)S, 5P10S, 20S.
{         Bk.XIV:2:270—intangible, absent and, doubtful.
 Cash Value—Bk.XIV:2:270—The cure for these, says Spinoza, is to expel 
         the ghosts by peopling our mind with living beings—actual causes. }

Proof.— (7:1)  We  do  not  regard  a  thing as absent, by reason of the

emotion  wherewith  we conceive it, but by reason of the body being

affected by another emotion excluding the existence of the said thing
 Durant65:176
(II:xvii.).  (7:2)  Wherefore,  the  emotion,  which  is  referred to the thing

which we regard as absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of

a  man's  activities  and  power  (IV:vi.),  but  is,  on  the contrary, of a

nature  to  be  in some sort controlled by the emotions, which exclude

the  existence of  its  external cause (IV:ix.).  (7:3) But an emotion which
                                                                             { objective }
springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties

of  things  (see  the  def.  of  reason  in II:xl.Note.ii.), which we always

regard  as  present  (for there can be nothing to exclude their present
                                                            imagine—Bk.XIX:29414, 29517.
existence),   and  which  we  always  conceive  in  the  same  manner

II:xxxviii.).  (7:4)  Wherefore  an emotion of this kind always remains the

same;  and consequently (V:Ax.i.) emotions, which are contrary there-

to  and  are not kept going by their external causes, will be obliged to

adapt  themselves  to  it  more  and  more,  until  they  are  no  longer

contrary  to it; to this extent the emotion which springs from reason is

more powerful.  Q.E.D.
 
 

Prop. VIII.  Bk.XIV:2:271; Bk.XVIII:345p8,9,11; Bk.XIX:29519. 

An emotion is stronger in proportion
to  the  number of simultaneous con-
current causes whereby it is aroused.
                                                                                 5P10S, 11.                     
{Cash Value—If understood to be caused by G-D's immanence,                                       Spinoza's G-D
                      the emotion is the strongest and the most active.}

 
Proof.— (8:1) Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few

(III:vii.):  therefore  (IV:v.),  in  proportion  to  the  increased number of

simultaneous  causes  whereby  it  is  aroused,  an emotion becomes

stronger.  Q.E.D.

Note.— (8:2) This proposition is also evident from V:Ax.ii.
 
 

Prop. IX.  Bk.XVIII:345p8,9,11, 350p9; Bk.XIX:29621. 

An  emotion,  which  is attributable to many
and diverse causes which the mind regards      Intellectual contemplation—
as  simultaneous  with the emotion itself, is                 Bk.XIV:2:271.
less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto
and less affected towards each of its causes,
than if it were a different and equally power-    Cease being passion's slave—
ful  emotion  attributable to fewer causes or                  Bk.XIV:2:272.
to a single cause.                                       5P20S

{Cash Value—Combine the concept of your every emotion with the concept of
      the immanence, indwellingness, of G-D—Posit, organic interdependence.}          .

Proof— (9:1)  An  emotion  is  only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders
                                                 { objectively }
the  mind  from  being  able to think ^ (IV:xxvi., IV:xxvii.); therefore, an

emotion,  whereby  the  mind  is  determined  to the contemplation of

several  things  at  once,  is  less page 252  hurtful  than another equally

powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in the single contem-
                                                                    Bk.XVIII:3425p9d.
plation of a few objects or of one, that it is unable to think of anything

else;  this  was  our  first  point.  (9:2)  Again,  as the mind's essence, in

other  words,  its  power  (III:vii.), consists solely in thought (II:xi.), the

mind  is  less  passive  in  respect  to  an emotion, which causes it to
                                                 { best of all the immanence of G-D, its cause, }
think  of  several things at once, ^ than in regard to an equally strong
                                                            { subjective }
emotion,  which keeps it engrossed in the ^ contemplation of a few or

of a single object: this was our second point.  (9:3) Lastly, this emotion

(III:xlviii.),  in  so  far  as  it  is  attributable  to  several  causes, is less

 powerful in regard to each of them. Q.E.D.
 
 

Prop. X.  Bk.III:256; Bk.XII:285; Bk.XVIII:345p1,10; Bk.XIX:24117, 28737.

                                                           Bk.XVIII:3315p10.
So  long as we are not assailed by emotions
contrary to our nature, we have the power of
arranging and associating the modifications            E5:Wolfson:2:272—
of  our  body  according  to  the  intellectual             Fire of our reason
order.                            5P20S. 39.                     < order of the intellect >

{Cash Value—We are thus free. 4P30}

 

Proof.— (10:1)  The  emotions,  which  are  contrary  to our nature, that is

(IV:xxx.), which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from
{ controlling lusts }                      Bk.XII:285
understanding (IV:xxvii.). (10:2) So long, therefore, as we are not assailed
         ^ Bk.XIB:21351, 21866.
by  emotions  contrary  to  our nature, the mind's power, whereby it en-

deavours to understand things (IV:xxvi.), is not impeded, and therefore
                                             Bk.XIX:28325.
it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from
                                                                               ] V:i. [
another  (II:xl.Note.ii. and II:xlvii.Note); consequently   we have in such
               ] ability [        [ ordering and connecting ]            ] affections [
cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the
                                          < order of the intellect >
body according to the intellectual order.  Q.E.D.
                                { reason }; Bk.XIX:28531.

                                                  duly ordering—Bk.XII:285
Note.  (10:3)   By  this  power  of  rightly  arranging and associating  the
 
bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affect-               E4:Dijn:250
                                                           { lesser effort? }
ed by evil emotions. (10:4) For (V:vii.) a greater force is needed for con-
                                                           [   ordered and connected    ]
trolling the emotions, when they are arranged and associated accord-
            {            reason            }             Bk.XVIII:2875p10s.     { confused }
ing  to  the  intellectual  order,   than  when  they  are  uncertain  and
[ random ]                      E5:Dijn:257- 8.
unsettled.  (10:5)  The  best we can do,  therefore, so long as we do not                Conclusion
                                                 < E5:Parkinson:283167 >
possess  a  perfect  knowledge  of our emotions, is to frame a system
            ] method [                                [ maxims ]
of  right conduct,  or  fixed  practical precepts, to commit it to memory,
                         ] continually [
and  to  apply  it  forthwith  (Continuo.  Rendered  "constantly" by Mr. Pollock on the

ground  that  the  classical  meaning  of  the  word does not suit the context. I venture to think,

however,  that  a  tolerable sense may be obtained without doing violence to Spinoza's scholar-

ship.)  to  the  particular  page 253  circumstances  which  now  and  again
                                               ] casual thinking [                       ] permeated [
meet  us  in  life,  so  that  our  imagination  may become fully imbued
                                                                       Bk.XVIII:331p10s.
therewith,  and  that  it  may  be  always  ready  to our hand.  (10:6)  For
                                                                    Bk.XVIII:2795p10s,12,13.
instance,  we  have laid down among the rules of life (IV:xlvi., & Note),
                                                                                [ nobility ]
that  hatred  should  be  overcome with love or high-mindedness, and

not  requited  with  hatred  in  return.  (10:7)  Now,  that  this  precept of

reason  may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should

often  think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by

men,  and  in  what  manner and way they may be best warded off by
 ] nobility of character [
high-mindedness:  we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with the

idea  of  this  precept, which accordingly will always be ready for use

when a wrong is done to us (II:xviii.). (10:8) If we keep also in readiness

the notion of our true advantage, and of the good which follows from

mutual friendships, and common fellowships; further, if we remember
      [ highest satisfaction of mind ]
that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life (IV:lii.),

and  that  men,  no  less than everything else, act by the necessity of

their  nature:  in such case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which com-            Spinoza's Dictum

monly  arises therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagina-

tion and will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a

grievous  wrong  be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be over-

come, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner than if we had

not  thus reflected on the subject beforehand.  (9) As is indeed evident

from  V:vi., V:vii., V:viii. (10:10)  We  should,  in the same way, reflect on
[ tenacity ]
courage  as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life

should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the
                                         ]     resourcefulness       [
means  whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind

we  can  avoid  and  overcome  them.  (10:11)  But  we must note, that in

arranging  our  thoughts  and  conceptions we should always bear in

mind  that  which  is  good in every individual thing (IV:lxiii.Coroll. and

III:lix.),  in  order  that  we  may always be determined to action by an

emotion  of  pleasure.  (10:12) For instance, if a man sees that he is too
                                  [ esteem ]
keen  in the pursuit of honour, let him think over its right use, the end

for  which  it  should  be pursued, and the means whereby he may at-

tain it. (10:13) Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the

fickleness  of  mankind,  and  the  like, whereof no man thinks except
                                    [ sickness of mind ]
through  a  page 254  morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these

do  the  most  ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair

of  gaining  the  distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent
                       [  they wish to seem  ]
to their anger  would fain appear wise.  (14) Wherefore it is certain that

those,  who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honour and the

vanity of the world, are those who most greedily covet it.  (10:15) This is

not  peculiar  to  the  ambitious, but is common to all who are ill-used

by  fortune,  and  who  are  infirm  in  spirit.  (10:16) For a poor man also,

who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the

vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and shows the

world  that  he  is  intolerant,  not  only of his own poverty, but also of

other  people's  riches.   (10:17)   So,  again,  those  who  have  been  ill

received  by  a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy,

treachery,  and  other  stock  faults  of  the  fair  sex; all of which they

consign  to  oblivion, directly they are again taken into favour by their

sweetheart.   (10:18)   Thus   he  who  would  govern  his  emotions  and
                                           Bk.XVIII:371p10s.
appetite  solely  by  the  love  of  freedom strives, as far as he can, to

gain  a  knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit

with  the  joy which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in

no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to
                      Bk.XIX:27142.
revel  in  a  false  show of freedom.  (10:19) Whosoever will diligently ob-

serve and practise these precepts (which indeed are not difficult) will

verily,  in  a  short  space  of time, be able, for the most part, to direct
                                                 rule—E5:Pollock:286 on Idea of G-D
his  actions  according  to  the  commandments  of  reason.
 

Prop. XI.  Bk.III:231; Bk.XII:2871; Bk.XIV:2:273; Bk.XIX:29520.

                                                                                  ] related [ —  {combined—as the effect}
In proportion as a mental image is referred
to  more objects, so is it more frequent, or                  Mysticism
more  often  vivid,  and occupies the mind
more.                       5P12, 16, 20S.
 
{Cash Value—Combine the concept of your every emotion with the concept of      E5:Pollock:286 on Love of G-D
      the immanence, indwellingness, of G-D—Posit, organic interdependence.}  

Proof.—  (11:1)   In  proportion  as  a  mental  image  or  an  emotion  is
 {combined}                                             Bk.XVIII:345p8,9,11.
referred to more objects, so are there more causes whereby it can be

aroused  and  fostered, all of which (by hypothesis) the mind contem-

plates  simultaneously  in  association  with  the given emotion; there-

fore  the emotion is more frequent, or is more often in full vigour, and

(V:viii.) occupies the mind more.  Q.E.D.
 
 

Prop. XII.  Bk.III:231, 256; Bk.XIX:29414. 

The  mental images of things are more
easily   associated   with   the   images
referred to things which we clearly and                      Bk.XIV:2:273
distinctly understand, than with others.
{ The ultimate would be G-D, see 5P14. }                     5P20S.

page 255
Proof.— (12:1)  Things,  which we clearly and distinctly understand, are

either  the common properties of things or deductions therefrom (see

definition of Reason, II:.xl.Note ii.),  and are consequently (by the last

Prop.)  more  often  aroused in us. (12:2) Wherefore it may more readily

happen,  that we should contemplate other things in conjunction with

these  than  in  conjunction  with  something  else, and consequently

(II:xviii.)  that  the  images  of  the  said  things  should be more often

associated  with  the  images  of these than with the images of some-

thing else.  Q.E.D.
 

Prop. XIII.  Bk.III:231, 256. 

A  mental  image  is more often vivid,
in proportion as it is associated with
a  greater  number  of  other  images.       Individual things—Bk.XIV:2:273 
{ The ultimate would be G-D, see 5P14.}                   5P20S
                               

 Proof.— (13:1)  In  proportion  as  an image is associated with a greater

number  of other images, so (II:xviii.) are there more causes whereby

it can be aroused.  Q.E.D.
 
 

Prop. XIV. Bk.III:231, 256; Bk.XIV:2::281ff; Bk.XVIII:346p14; Bk.XIX:30814, 30918, 2916, 29724. 

The  mind can bring it about, that all                              E5:Dijn:257- 8.
bodily  modifications  or  images  of  
things may be referred to the idea of                   E5:Pollock:286
G-D { that is Nature }.                     5P15, 16, 20S, 20S(16), 39.               { The terms G-D and Nature
{Bk.XIV:2:273—The love for G-D is thus the sovereign remedy for                 are interchangeable. }
                         the ailments of the soul—lack of peace-of-mind.}   

 
Proof.— (14:1)  There  is  no modification of the body, whereof the mind

may  not form some clear and distinct conception (V:iv.); wherefore it

can  bring it about, that they should all be referred to the idea of G-D

(I:xv.).  Q.E.D.
 
 

Prop. XV.  Bk.XII:282; Bk.XIV:2:281ff; Bk.XIX:29932. 

He who clearly and distinctly understands
himself  and his emotions loves G-D, and             E5:Pollock:286
so  much  the  more  in  proportion  as he
more    understands    himself    and    his                    E5:Dijn:257- 8.
emotions.                                      5P16, 20S(16), 39.
{Bk.XIV:2:273—The sovereign remedy for the ailments of the soul is really                         Religion
                       nothing  but  the  old  consolation  held out to its faithful by 
                       every religion.  { Prayer }
                        Ps. 55:23. "Cast your burden on the Lord, 
                                          He shall sustain you;"} 

Proof.— (15:1)  He  who  clearly and distinctly understands himself and

his  emotions  feels  pleasure (III:liii.), and this pleasure is (by the last
       Bk.XIV:2:2731; Bk.XVIII:2745p15d, 346p15d; Bk.XIX:29727.
Prop.) accompanied by the idea of G-D; therefore (III:De.vi.) such an

one  loves  G-D,  and  (for  the  same  reason)  so  much  the more in

proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions.  Q.E.D.
 
 

Prop. XVI.  Bk.XVIII:346p16.

        { Need }              { ONE }
This love towards G-D must hold                                  E5:Dijn:257- 8
the chief place in the mind. 5P20S(16), 39.                   Occupy the mind—Bk.XIV:2:283

{"Love G-D" says "be aware that you NEED G-D—everything,
 conceived as a Unity—for your very own PERPETUATION". } 

 {Everything is in G-D as every part of you is in thee. Every part should                        Dawkins:307
  LOVE the other parts. It would obey the Law of Organisms; it would
  insure the flourishing PERPETUATION and evolution of the Organism.}

 Proof.— (16:1)  For  this  love is associated with all the modifications of

the  body (V:xiv.) and is fostered by them all (V:xv.); therefore (V:xi.),

it must hold the chief place in the mind.  Q.E.D.
 
 

Prop. XVII.  Bk.XII:2871; Bk.XIV:1:3294; 2:2075; Bk.XIX:29729.  

Being, Bk.XVIII:17717, 346p17, 370p17, Apparent Contradiction, Analogies,
G-D is without passions,  neither is he                G-D at 100% °P
affected by any emotion of pleasure or                      Durant:63978 
pain {neither love nor hate}.       P17C.                           free from passion—Bk.XIV:2:285  
 
{Since G-D is at 100% in Calc:Fig. 3, there is no emotion.     Analogies,                     Stewart:178.
 G-D/Nature is neutral without passions—species become extinct,                      Durant:640 - neutral 
 or prosper, only as a result of Darwinian natural selection.                            Durant:640 - materialist
 C:Fig.4, C:4.4, 4.6, Calculus:3.2, Dice.}  

page 256
                                                                                       ] related [
Proof.— (17:1)  All  ideas, in so far as they are referred to G-D, are true

(II:xxxii.),  that  is  (II:Def.iv.)  adequate; and therefore (by the general              Bk.XIB:21662.
                                                          { EMOTION }
Def. of the Emotions) G-D is without passions.  (2) Again, G-D cannot
 
pass  either  to a greater or to a lesser perfection { C:Fig. 3 and C:Fig. 4 }                 by hypothesis

(I:xx.Coroll.ii.);  therefore  (by Def. of the Emotions:ii., & iii.)  he is not
                                                   [ joy ]       [ sadness ]
affected  by  any  emotion  of  pleasure  or  pain.  { Calculus:3.2, C:4.4. }

                                                                                          5P19   Bk.XIV:2:3102
Corollary.— (17:3)  Strictly speaking, G-D does not love or hate anyone.           G-D at 100% °P

(4) For  G-D (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of

pleasure  or  pain,  consequently  (Def. of the Emotions:vi., & vii.) he                  E5:Dijn:257- 8
 
does not love or hate anyone {the terms are meaningless}.                              Calculus:4.4, 4.7, E3:GN:2N. 
 
{Since love and hate involve an external cause, and there is nothing external to G-D
 (by hypothesis), G-D does not love or hate anyone. Man can become extinct or prosper, 
 all as determined by natural selection.}
 

Prop. XVIII.  Bk.XIB:21662; Bk.XIV:2:287; Bk.XV:283168. 

 No one can {rationally} hate G-D {or His parts}.
  {The cash value is the organic interdependence of all things.}
 
  {Everything is in G-D as every part of you is in thee. Can one part                        Dawkins:307
   of you intelligently HATE another part? It would violate the Law
   of Organisms; it would be (if reaching a critical mass) the death
   of the Organism, extinction.}

Proof.— (18:1)  The  idea of G-D which is in us is adequate and perfect            E5:Pollock:286
                                                                      [ consider ]
(II:xlvi., II:xlvii.);  wherefore, in so far as we contemplate G-D, we are
                                                                          { no loss of °PcM }
active (III:iii.); consequently (III:lix.) there can be no pain accompanied

by  the idea of G-D, in other words (Def. of the Emotions:vii.), no one
       Bk.XVIII:346p18d.
can hate G-D.  Q.E.D.
 
                                                                                   rationally
Corollary.—  (18:2)  Love  towards  G-D cannot ^ be  turned  into  hate.
 

Note.— (18:3)  It  may  be  objected  that, as we understand G-D as the

cause  of  all things, we by that very fact regard G-D as the cause of

pain.  (18:4)  But  I  make  answer,  that,  in so far as we understand the
  Bk.XVIII:346p18s; Bk.XIX:28636.
causes of pain, it to that extent (V:iii.) ceases to be a passion, that is,
   {     E5:Endnote 18:3       }
it  ceases  to  be  pain  (III:lix.);  therefore, in so far as we understand              Purpose
                            { ^ suffering, loss of PcM}                           { better °PcM }
G-D  to  be  the  cause  of  pain,  we  to  that  extent  feel  pleasure.               Safir:170
 

Prop. XIX.    Bk.XIB:21662; Bk.XIV:2:263; Bk.XVIII:125P6,19, 17717.

                        Bk.XIB:216.
He, who loves G-D , cannot endeavour                           E5:Dijn:257- 8
that  G-D  should  love  him  in  return.             Deny outright—Bk.XIV:2:288
                        E5:Endnote 18:1       Durant:647[7]    Stewart:178. 

Proof.— (19:1)  For,  if  a  man  should  so  endeavour,  he would desire

(V:xvii.Coroll.)  that  G-D,  whom  he  loves,  should  not be G-D, and            G-D at 100% °P

consequently  he  would  desire  to feel pain (III:xix.); which is absurd
                        Bk.XVIII:1755p19d, 346p19d.
(III:xxviii.).  (19:2) Therefore, he who loves G-D, &c.  Q.E.D.
 
 

Prop. XX.   Bk.XIB:21662; Bk.XVIII:2825p20—3p27; Bk.XIX:299—idea of G-D, 30814. 

This  love  towards  G-D  cannot  be
stained  by  the  emotion  of envy or
 Bk.XVIII:346p20.
jealousy: contrariwise, it is the more
fostered,  in  proportion  as  we con-
ceive a greater number of men to be
joined  to  G-D by the same bond of            Bk.XIV:2:288—Mock no one
love. 

Proof.— (20:1)  This  love  towards  G-D  is  the highest good which we
                                                     Durant:649
can seek for under the guidance of reason (IV:xxviii.), it is common to

all  men (IV:xxxvi), and we desire that all  page 257  should rejoice there-
     Bk.XIV:2:2671.
in  (IV:xxxvii.);   therefore  (III:De.xxiii),   it  cannot  be  stained  by  the

emotion  envy  nor  by the emotion of jealousy, (V:xviii. see definition
                                                                     [ by 3P31 ]
of  Jealousy, III:xxxv.Note);  but,  contrariwise,  it  must needs be the
       [ encouraged ]                        Bk.III:128—imagine.
more  fostered,  in  proportion  as  we  conceive a greater number of
           ] be enjoying it  [
men to rejoice therein.  Q.E.D.

                                                                                           Bk.XIV:2:1945.
Note.— (20:2)  We can in the same way, show, that there is no emotion      

directly  contrary  to  this  love,  whereby  this  love can be destroyed;
                                                                      < Bk.XV:286184 on TEI:[10]:5 >
therefore  we  may  conclude,  that this love towards G-D is the most

constant  of all the emotions, and that, in so far as it is referred to the
              <E5:Parkinson:283169 on E5:XX(18)N:257>
body,  it  cannot  be  destroyed,  unless  the  body be destroyed also.              E5:Dijn:257- 8
                                                               ] related  [
(20:3)  As  to  its  nature,  in  so  far as it is referred to the mind only, we

shall presently inquire.`

                     Bk.XII:287                            < E5:Parkinson:283166 on E5:II:248, passions >
(20:4)  I  have  now  gone through all the remedies against the emotions,
                                                                        Bk.XIV:2:1946, 2:2653. ^
or  all  that  the  mind, considered in itself alone, can do against them.
                        ] is clear [
20:5)  Whence it  appears  that  the  mind's  power  over  the  emotions

consists:—  Bk.III:255.

                           ] very [   Bk.XVIII:336p20s.
I.      (20:6)  In  the  actual  knowledge  of  the  emotions  (V:iv.Note).

II.      (20:7)  In  the  fact  that it separates the emotions from the thought
        of  an  external cause,  which we conceive confusedly (V:ii. and
        V:iv.Note).

                   Bk.XVIII:333p20s—p7.
III.    (20:8)  In  the fact, that, in respect to time, the emotions referred to
        things,  which  we distinctly understand, surpass those referred
        to  what  we  conceive  in  a  confused and fragmentary manner
        (V:vii.).

                    Bk.XVIII:343p20s.
IV.    (20:9)   In   the  number  of   causes   whereby  those  modifications
           (Affectiones. Camerer reads affectus—emotions), are fostered, which
         have  regard  to  the  common  properties  of  things  or  to  G-D
         (V:ix., V:xi.).

V.      (20:10) Lastly,  in  the  order  wherein  the  mind can arrange and
         associate,   one  with  another,   its  own  emotions   (V:x.  and
         V:xii., V:xiii., V:xiv.).    Bk.III:256.

VI.      [ Bk. VIII:60512—Bk.XIV:2:266 - Omits reference to E5:VI:250. ]
 

(20:11)  But,  in  order that this power of the mind over the emotions may

be  better  understood,  it  should be specially observed that the emo-

tions  are  called  by us strong, when we compare the emotion of one

man  with  the  emotion  of  another,  and  see  that  one man is more

troubled  than another by the same emotion; or when we are compar-        Calculus:Temperament

ing  the  various  emotions  of  the  same  man one with another, and                 Mark Twain
                                            Bk.XIV:2:1931—or moved.
page 258   find  that  he  is  more affected or stirred by one emotion than
                             ] E4:V:194 [
by another.  (20:12)  For  the  strength  of  every emotion is defined by a

comparison  of  our  own  power with the power of an external cause.

(20:13) Now the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its
   sin, impotence—E3:Wolfson:2:1843 & 5.         [ lack ], defect
infirmity or passion  is  defined  by  the  privation  of  knowledge only:
 
it  therefore  follows,  that  that  mind is most passive, whose greatest            E4:Dijn:250

part  is  made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be characterized

more  readily  by  its  passive  states  than  by  its  activities:  on  the

other  hand,  that  mind  is  most  active, whose greatest part is made
               Bk.XIX:31121.
up  of  adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain as many inad-

equate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily character-

ized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of
           ] weakness [
human  infirmity.   (20:14)    Again,  it  must  be  observed,  that  spiritual
 ]emotional distress and unhappiness[; { loss of °PcM }
unhealthiness;  and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive
                                                                          ]     instability       [
love   for   something   which   is   subject   to   many  variations,  and
 Bk.XVIII:3015p20s; Bk.XX:24086.   ]  truly possess  [
which  we  can  never become masters of.  (15) For no one is solicitous

or anxious about anything, unless he loves it; neither do wrongs, sus-

picions,  enmities,  &c.  arise,  except  in  regard to things whereof no

one can be really master.
 

(20:16) We may thus readily conceive the power which clear and distinct

knowledge,  and  especially that third kind of knowledge (II:xlvii.Note),
{ posited }                                 Bk.XIX:29932.
founded  on  the  actual  knowledge of G-D, possesses over the emo-

tions:  if it does not absolutely destroy them, in so far as they are pas-

sions  (V:iii.  and  V:iv.Note);  at  any rate, it causes them to occupy a
          Bk.III:256; Bk.XIX:2199, 28532.                                 Likewise—Bk.XII:287
very  small  part  of  the mind (V:xiv.).  (20:17)  Further,  it  begets  a love
                      G-D      Bk.XIV:2:2816, 2836; Bk.XVIII:2085p20s.
towards a thing immutable and eternal (V:xv.), whereof we may really
                                                                                [ tainted ]
enter  into  possession  (II:xlv.);  neither  can  it  be defiled with those
[ vices ]
faults  which  are  inherent  in  ordinary  love;  but  it  may  grow from
                          [ by 5P15 ]            ] engage [                              [ by 5P16 ]
strength  to  strength,  and  may engross the greater part of the mind,
       [ affect it extensively ]                [ occupy ]
and deeply penetrate it.

                                                                              Bk.XII:287; Bk.XIV:2:2891, 2:2622;
                                                                            Bk.XVIII:363p20s.
(20:18) And  now  I  have  finished with all that concerns this present life:          E5:Parkinson:283169 

for,  as I said in the beginning of this note, I have briefly described all

the  remedies  against  the  emotions.  (20:19)  And  this  everyone  may

readily have seen for himself, if he has attended to what is advanced

in  the  present  note,  and  also  to the definitions of the mind and its

emotions,  and,  lastly,  to Propositions  III:i. and  III:iii. (20:20)  It  is  now,  
                                     { EL:[60]:xxix. }                                                                                  Santayana—immortality
page 259   therefore,  time  to  pass on to those matters, which appertain        Durant 647—immortality
  { infinite mind of G-D }                                     E5:Dijn:258.                                   E5:Curley:60613—Cambridge:762
to the duration of the mind {Soul or Mind}, without relation to the body.   Troublesome Text—Cash Value
            Durant:647                              Bk.XIV:2:2891, 2:2622.                          
 

Second Section - 5P21-40 
The second deals "with those matters which appertain  
to the duration of the mind without relation to the body."                                                     See Life of Reason.    
Prop. XXI. XXI - XXIII—Bk.XIV:2:292; Bk.XIB:22379, 224; Bk.XIX:2024, 31528. 

The mind can only imagine anything, or                        Damasio:216
remember  what is past, while the body                          Durant:647142
endures.   { EL:[60]:xxix; E5:Dijn:258. }      5P29, 31, 34, 38S, 40C.          Body endures—Bk.XIV:2:293

 

Proof.—  (21:1)  The  mind  does  not express the actual existence of its

body,  nor  does  it  imagine  the  modifications of the body as actual,

except  while  the  body  endures  (II:viii.Coroll.);  and,  consequently

(II:xxvi.),  it  does  not  imagine  any  body as actually existing, except

while its own body endures. (21:2) Thus it cannot imagine anything (for
                                                          Durant65:176
definition  of  Imagination,  see  II:xvii.Note), or remember things past,

except while the body endures (see definition of Memory, II:xviii.Note).

Q.E.D.
 

Prop. XXII. XXI - XXIII—Bk.XIV:2:292, 2952; 3011; Bk.XIB:224;
                                                   Bk.XVIII:1281, 1305p22,35; Bk.XIX:3044.

Nevertheless in G-D there is necessarily                        Dawkins:307
an  idea,  which  expresses  the essence                        Damasio:216
of  this  or  that  human  body  under the              Santayana
form of eternity.  < Bk.XV:27698 on E2:XLIV:117. >   5P23.        Form of eternity—Bk.XIV:2:293
                            <E5:Parkinson:283169. >

                                   Bk.XIX:31125.                     Bk.XIV:2:2922
Proof.— (22:1) G-D is the cause, not only of the existence of this or that

human body, but also of its essence (I:xxv.). (22:2) This essence, there-

fore,  must  necessarily  be  conceived  through  the  very essence of
                                                                                      Bk.XIX:31124.
G-D (I:Ax.iv.),  and be thus conceived by a certain  eternal  necessity

(I:xvi.);  and  this  conception  must  necessarily  exist  in  G-D  (II:iii.).

Q.E.D.
 

Prop. XXIII. XXI - XXIII—Bk.XIV:2:292; Bk.XVIII:3575p23, 3735p23—5p31d, 375p23,5p23-42.
                                                      Bk.III:231; Bk.XIB:22379, 224; Bk.XIV:2:3244; Bk.XX:13142.

                                    < E5:Parkinson:283169 >
The human mind cannot be absolutely                   Hampshire32:175
destroyed  with  the  body,   but  there                            Durant:647145
remains   of  it  something   { the essence }                       Santayana
which is eternal. { E5:Curley:60613, Sham. } 5P29, 31, 38, 40C.       Which is eternal—Bk.XIV:2:293
EL:[60]:xxix; E5:Curley:60613—EL:Pollock:288; Bk.XII:293-295.