ESSAY TWO - Spinoza
Thought as an Attribute of Substance
 

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JBY Notes:

1.  The  text  of  "Dialectical Logic"  has  been  copied  from 
     http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay2.htm
     with the kind permission of Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> 
     to whom I express my appreciation. 

2.  JBY  added  commentaries  and  paragraph  numbers.

3.  Citation abbreviations.

4.  { JBY Comment or endnote }. 
     EB, Britannic—Britannica Online subscription or trail period. 
     RH—Electronic Dictionary. 

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                set your browser options to show links underlined. 

6.  Please  e-mail  errors, clarification requests, disagreement,  
     or suggestions to josephb@yesselman.com. 

7.  There is much in this essay and my commentaries that you will not 
     agree   with   or   even  think  biased  or  nonsense—nevertheless, 
     partake  of  them  as  you  would  a  pomegranate;  relish the flesh, 
     but spit-out the pits.   Bk.XIA:13681. 

8.  The  aim  of the essay is to show that Spinoza's body-mind solution,       E2:Bk.XIV:2:53  
     by removing  prejudices (preconceived ingrained notions)  provides 
     the philosophical foundation for socialism—the organic interdepend- 
     ence of parts.    Def. I, Endnote N8n, and Endnote 73n—Organic.  
 
     I  disagree  with  IIyenkov's premise.   I believe society  evolves  as      Dawkins:192:Genes
     technological  advancement   and   trade    tips   the   scale   toward  
     enlightened self-interest  and  away  from  jungle self-interest.            possibility of conflict
           
     Technological advancement—fire, wheel, writing, electricity, steam           Mark Twain
     engine,  combustion engine,  radio,  television,  computer,  internet,           Kindness
     nuclear power,  space travel, ........—all have tended (and will tend)          cultural lag
     to lead people to be more cooperative; an enlightened one-world.                Christian Dogmas
  
     Perhaps  we are saying the same thing—technological advancement            Millennium
     and  trade  'cures'  the prejudiced mind; an example is say of slavery           Hall:3:16
      (internal combustion engines and electrical motors made slave power
     uneconomical—no slavery).  Another  example:  except  under  water 
     and  in  space,  air  is  plentiful,  and  therefore  free—we don't have
     to fight over it.   Bk.XIA:16396, 165105. 

The  misuse  of  wealth,  causing  slums,  prejudice,  and  uneducated 
     masses, is idolatry. When affluence reaches a critical mass, a decent      { Read and re-read
     minimum income will be guaranteed to all; eradicating slums, prejudice    "The Affluent Society" }
     and uneducated masses. It is not altruism, it is evolution due to evolv-
     ing  technological  advancement  making products cheaper and main-          socialism
     taining aggregate demand.  

      The Consumption Curve is similar to the Reality Curve.   As affluence 
     increases,  enjoyment  of  the  marginal  (urgency of) consumer items
     decreases—as, in normal conditions, for air.
     



From "The Great Thoughts" Compiled by George Seldes; ISDN 034529887X, Page 285.


From Lewis Mumford's "The City in History"; ISDN 156731211X, Page 571. 

 
From Thomas More's "Utopia"; ISDN 0521347971, Page 56. 

     
      WikipediA
     From Marshall McLuhan's "Understanding Media" ISDN 0262631598, Page 108.


 < E1:Bk.XV:2601 >
DEFINITIONS   

Def. I.   dialectics.   {from Britannica - Names}


Def. Ia.  DIALECTICAL LOGIC, The ISM Book 

 
Def. II.  materialism, Britannica, The ISM Book.                                        D2:Bk.III:235 


Def. IIa.  HISTORICAL MATERIALISM - Wikipedia, Britannica - The ISM Book.     


Def. IIb.  DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM - Britannica - The ISM Book.

                                                        

Def. III.  positivism, WikipediA, modern positivism, Britannica.  
        {Einstein remained all his life one of its staunchest critics because of its inference
           that quantum mechanics implied indeterminism.} 


Def. IV.  scholasticism, WikipediA, Britannica. 

 

AXIOMS

                                     mind-body dualism; Bk.XX:18819. 
Axiom I.   Body (extension) and thought (mind, soul) represent opposite sides  
               of the same coin (substance)—G-D sive Nature. 
               {Cash Value—awareness that everything is a part of one organism—G-D.}.  
               [9], [10],[11], [12], [13], [14], [25], [37], [60]. 
            


Essay Two - Spinoza: Thought as an Attribute of Substance. 

[1]   An  immense  role  in  the  development  of  logic,  and  in preparing 
the  ground  for  modern  views on its subject matter, a role far from fully 
appreciated,  was  played  by  Spinoza.  Like Leibniz, Spinoza rose high 
above  the  mechanistic  limitations  of  the  natural  science  of  his time. 
Any  tendency  directly  to  universalise  partial  forms  and  methods  of 
thinking  only  useful  within  the  bounds  of  mechanistic, mathematical 
natural science was also foreign to him. 

[2]   Insofar as logic was preserved alongside the doctrine of substance,  
Spinoza  treated  it  as  an  applied  discipline by analogy with medicine, 
since its concern proved not to be the invention of artificial rules but the 
co-ordination  of human intellect with the laws of thought understood as 
                                      { Nature }
an  'attribute'  of  the natural whole, only as 'modes of expression' of the  
universal  order  and  connection  of  things.  He  also  tried  to work out 
logical problems on the basis of this conception. 

[3]  Spinoza understood thought much more profoundly and, in essence, 
dialectically,  which  is  why  his  figure  presents  special  interest in the 
history  of  dialectics; he was probably the only one of the great thinkers 
of the pre-Marxian era who knew how to unite brilliant models of acutely 
                                                                               { see body-mind? }
dialectical   thought    with   a   consistently   held   materialist   principle          E2:Bk.XIV:2:53
(rigorously  applied  throughout  his  system)  of  understanding thought 
                                                                                               Bk.XIV:2:199.
and  its  relations  to  the  external  world  lying  in the space outside the 
human  head.   The  influence  of  Spinoza's  ideas  on  the  subsequent 
development  of  dialectical  thought  can  hardly  be  exaggerated.  'It is 
therefore  worthy  of note that thought must begin by placing itself at the 
standpoint  of  Spinozism;  to  be  a  follower  of Spinoza is the essential 
commencement of all Philosophy.' 
[Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel] 

                                                             Britannica 
[4]   But  orthodox  religious  scholasticism,  in  alliance  with  subjective 
                                                               { accuse }                  { an atheist } 
idealist  philosophy,  has  not  ceased  to  flog  Spinoza  as a 'dead dog', 
treating  him  as a living and dangerous opponent.  Elementary analysis 
                                                                                                   { How? } 
reveals  that  the main principles of Spinoza's thought directly contradict
                                                                                      Britannica 
the  conception  of  'thought'  developed  by  modern positivism all along 
the  line.  The  most  modern systems of the twentieth century still clash 
in  sharp  antagonism  in  Spinoza;  and  that  obliges  us to analyse the 
theoretical  foundation  of his conception very carefully, and to bring out 
the  principles  in  it that, in rather different forms of expression perhaps, 
remain the most precious principles of any scientific thinking to this day,
                          { Why heatedly? } 
and as such are very heatedly disputed by our contemporary opponents 
of dialectical thought. 
   
[5]   Hegel  once  noted  that  Spinoza's philosophy was very simple and 
easy  to  understand.  And  in  fact  the  principles  of his thinking, which 
constitute   the  essential  commencement of all Philosophy, i.e. the real      Law of Organisms 
foundation  on  which  alone  it  is  possible to erect the edifice of philos-       Golden Rule 
ophy  as  a  science,  are brilliant precisely in their crystal clarity, free of 
all reservations and ambiguities. 
 
[6]   It  is  not  so  easy,  however,  to  bring  these brilliant principles out 
because  they are decked out in the solid armour of the constructions of 
formal  logic  and  deductive  mathematics  that  constitute  the  'shell' of 
Spinoza's system,  its (so to say) defensive coat of mail.  In other words, 
                                                                                         { ? }
the  real  logic  of  Spinoza's  thinking  by  no  means  coincides with the 
formal  logic  of  the  movement  of his 'axioms', 'theorems', 'scholia', and 
their proofs. 

[7]   'Even  with  philosophers  who  gave  their  work  a  systematic form,  
e.g.  Spinoza,  the  real  inner  structure  of  their system is quite distinct 
from  the  form  in which they consciously presented it,'  Karl Marx wrote 
to Ferdinand Lassalle.  { Marx would have wanted Spinoza to explicitly express the 
example I give above. } 

[8]   Our  job  then  cannot  be  once  more to paraphrase the theoretical 
foundations  on  which  Spinoza  built his main work, the Ethics, and the 
conclusions  that  he drew from them by means of his famous 'geometric 
modus'.  In that case it would be more proper simply to copy out the text 
of  the  Ethics  itself  once again.  Our job is to help the reader to under- 
stand  the  'real  inner  structure' of his system, which far from coincides 
with   its   formal  exposition,  i.e.  to  see  the  real  'cornerstone'  of  his 
reflections  and  to  show  what real conclusions were drawn from them, 
or could be drawn from them, that still preserve their full topicality. 

[9]   That  can  only  be  done in one way, and one way only, which is to 
show  the  real  problem  that  Spinoza's  thought  came up against quite 
independently   of  how  he  himself  realised  it  and  in  what  terms  he 
expressed  it  for himself and for others (i.e. to set the problem out in the 
language of our century), and then to trace what were the real principles 
(once  more  independently  of  Spinoza's  own  formulation of them)  on 
which  he  based  the solution of the problem.  Then it will become clear 
that  Spinoza  succeeded  in  finding  the  only  formulation  exact for his 
time  of  a  real  problem that remains the great problem of our day, only 
formulated in another form. 
  
[10]  We formulated this problem in the preceding Essay One.                          Mark Twain

Spinoza found a very simple solution to it, brilliant in its simplicity for our           Bk.XX:18819.  
day  as  well  as  his:  the problem is insoluble only because it has been           Durant3 
wrongly  posed.  There  is  no  need  to  rack one's brains over how the 
Lord G-D 'unites' 'soul' (thought) and 'body' in one complex, represented        E2:Bk.XIV:2:53 
initially  (and by definition)  as  different  and  even contrary principles        Descartes' error
allegedly  existing  separately  from  each  other  before  the 'act' of  this 
'uniting' (and thus, also being able to exist after their 'separation'; which 
is  only  another  formulation  of the thesis of the immortality of the soul, 
one of the cornerstones of Christian theology and ethics).  In fact, there 
simply  is  no  such  situation; and  therefore there is also no problem of 
'uniting' or 'co-ordination'. {Cash Value—awareness that everything is a part of one
organism—G-D.} 

[11]    There  are  not  two  different  and  originally  contrary  objects  of 
investigation body and thought, but only one single object, which is the        Bk.XX:18819. 
thinking  body  of  living,  real  man  (or other analogous being,  if such 
exists  anywhere  in  the  Universe),  only  considered from two different 
and even opposing aspects or points of view.   Living, real thinking man, 
the  sole  thinking  body with which we are acquainted, does not consist 
of  two  Cartesian  halves  'thought lacking a body'  and  a  'body lacking 
thought'.  In  relation  to real man both the one and the other are equally 
fallacious  abstractions, and one cannot in the end model a real thinking 
man from two equally fallacious abstractions. 
  
[12]   That  is  what  constitutes  the real 'keystone' of the whole system,        1D6 - ONE 
a very simple truth that is easy, on the whole, to understand. 

[13]   It is not a special 'soul', installed by God in the human body as in a 
temporary  residence, that thinks, but the body of man itself.  Thought 
is  a  property,   a  mode  of  existence,  of  the  body,  the  same  as  its 
extension,   i.e.  as  its  spatial  configuration  and  position among other 
bodies. 

[14]    This simple and profoundly true idea was expressed this way by 
Spinoza in the language of his time: thought and extension are not two 
special substances as Descartes taught, but only two attributes of one        Bk.XX:18819. 
                    { thing }             ^ Pineal Gland
and  the  same  organ;   not  two special  objects,  capable  of  existing 
separately and quite independently of each other, but only two different 
and  even  opposite  aspects  under  which  one  and  the  same thing 
appears,  two  different modes of existence, two forms of the manifesta- 
           {     substance       }
tion of some third thing.
                     { ^ ? }

                                { ? }            { substance that is G-D that is Nature }
[15]   What  is  this  third  thing? Real infinite Nature, Spinoza answered. 
It is Nature that extends in space and 'thinks'.  The whole difficulty of the 
Cartesian metaphysics arose because the specific difference of the real 
world  from  the  world as only imagined or thought of was considered to 
be  extension,  a  spatial, geometric  determinateness.  But extension as 
such  just  existed  in  imagination,  only  in  thought.  For as such it can 
generally   only   be  thought  of  in  the  form  of  emptiness,  i.e.  purely 
negatively,  as  the  complete  absence  of any definite geometric shape. 
Ascribing  only  spatial,  geometric  properties  to  Nature  is, as Spinoza 
said,  to  think  of it in an imperfect way, i.e. to deny it in advance one of 
its  perfections.  And  then  it  is  asked how the perfection removed from 
Nature can be restored to her again. 
 
[16]   The same argumentation applies to thought.   Thought as such is 
the same kind of fallacious abstraction as emptiness.  In fact it is only a 
property,  a  predicate,  an  attribute of that very body which has spatial 
attributes. In other words one can say very little about thought as such; 
it is not a reality existing separately from,  and independently of, bodies 
                                                                                                   {extension}
but  only  a  mode  of existence of Nature's bodies.  Thought and space 
do  not really exist by themselves, but only as Nature's bodies linked by 
chains  of interaction into a measureless and limitless whole embracing 
both the one and the other. 
                                                                                                       WikipediA 
[17]   By  a  simple  turn  of  thought Spinoza cut the Gordian knot of the 
'psychophysical problem',  the  mystic  insolubility  of which still torments 
the   mass   of   theoreticians  and  schools  of  philosophy,  psychology, 
physiology  of  the  higher  nervous  system, and other related sciences 
that  are  forced  one  way  or another to deal with the delicate theme of 
the  relation  of  'thought'  to 'body',  of  'spiritual' to 'material', of 'ideal' to 
'real', and such like topics. 
  
[18]   Spinoza  showed  that  it  is  only  impossible to solve the problem 
because  it  is  absolutely  wrongly  posed;  and  that such posing of it is 
nothing but the fruit of imagination. 
 
[19]    It is in man that Nature really performs, in a self-evident way, that 
very activity that we are accustomed to call 'thinking'. In man, in the form 
of  man,  in  his person, Nature itself thinks, and not at all some special 
substance,  source,  or  principle  instilled  into  it  from  outside.  In man, 
therefore,  Nature  thinks of  itself,  becomes  aware  of  itself,  senses 
itself,   acts   on   itself.   And   the  'reasoning',  'consciousness',  'idea', 
'sensation',   'will',   and   all  the  other  special  actions  that  Descartes       Pineal Gland 
described  as modi of thought, are simply different modes of revealing 
a  property inalienable from Nature as a whole, one of its own attributes. 

[20]   But  if  thinking  is always an action performed by a natural and so 
by  a  spatially  determined  body,  it  itself,  too,  is an action that is also 
expressed  spatially, which is why there is not and cannot be the cause 
and  effect  relation  between  thinking  and  bodily action for which the 
Cartesians  were looking.  They did not find it for the simple reason that 
no  such  relation  exists in Nature, and cannot, simply because thinking 
and  the  body  are  two  different  things  at  all, existing separately and 
therefore  capable  of  interacting,  but  one  and  the same thing, only 
expressed by two different modes or considered in two different aspects. 

[21]   Between body and thought there is no relation of cause and effect,
but  the  relation  of an organ (i.e. of a spatially determinate body) to the 
mode  of  its  own  action.  The  thinking body cannot cause changes in 
thought,  cannot  act  on  thought,  because  its existence as 'thinking' is 
thought.  If a thinking body does nothing, it is no longer a thinking body 
but  simply  a  body.  But when it does act, it does not do so on thought, 
because its very activity is thought. 
 
[22]   Thought  as  a  spatially  expressed  activity  therefore cannot also
be  secreted from the body performing it as a special 'substance' distinct 
from  the  body,  in  the  way  that bile is secreted from the liver or sweat 
from  sweat  glands.  Thinking  is  not  the  product of an action but the 
action  itself,  considered  at  the  moment  of  its  performance, just as 
walking,  for  example,  is the mode of action of the legs, the 'product' of 
which,  it transpires, is the space walked.  And that is that.  The product 
or  result of thinking may be an exclusively spatially expressed, or exclu- 
sively  geometrically  stated, change in some body or another, or else in 
its  position  relative to other bodies. It is absurd then to say that the one 
gives rise to (or 'causes') the other.  Thinking does not evoke a spatially 
expressed  change  in a body but exists through it (or within it), and vice 
versa; any change, however fine, within that body, induced by the effect 
on  it  of  other bodies, is directly expressed for it as a certain change in 
its mode of activity, i.e. in thinking. 

[23]   The  position  set  out  here  is extremely important also because it 
immediately  excludes  any possibility of treating it in a vulgar materialist, 
mechanistic  key,  i.e.  of  identifying  thought  with immaterial processes 
that  take  place  within  the  thinking  body  (head,  brain  tissue), while 
nevertheless  understanding  that thought takes place precisely through 
these processes. 

[24]   Spinoza  was  well aware that what is expressed and performed in 
the  form  of structural, spatial changes within the thinking body is not at 
all  some  kind  of  thinking  taking place outside of and independently of 
them,  and  vice versa (shifts of thinking by no means express immanent 
movements   of   the   body   within   which   they  arise).  It  is  therefore 
impossible  either  to understand thought through examination, however 
exact  and  thorough,  of  the  spatially geometric changes in the form of 
which  it  is  expressed  within  the  body of the brain, or, on the contrary, 
to  understand  the  spatial,  geometric  changes in the brain tissue from 
the  most  detailed consideration of the composition of the ideas existing 
in the brain. It is impossible, Spinoza constantly repeated, because they 
are one and the same, only expressed by two different means. 

[25]   To  try  to explain the one by the other simply means to double the 
description  of one and the same fact, not yet understood and incompre- 
hensible.  And  although  we  have  two full, quite adequate descriptions 
of  one and the same event, equivalent to one another, the event itself 
falls  outside  both descriptions, as the 'third thing', the very 'one and the 
same'  that  was  not  yet  understood  or  explained.  Because the event 
twice  described  (once  in  the language of the 'physics of the brain' and 
once  in  the  language  of  the  'logic  of  ideas')  can  be  explained and 
                                                                                         { definition }
correspondingly'  understood  only  after bringing out the cause evoking 
the event described but not understood.   { Example: to understand LOVE. } 

                                                                     { a transcendent }
[26]    Bishop  Berkeley   ascribed   the  cause  to ^ God.   And  so  did  
Descartes, Malebranche, and Geulincx.  The shallow, vulgar materialist 
tries  to  explain everything by the purely mechanical actions of external 
things  on  the  sense  organs and brain tissue, and takes for the cause 
the  concrete thing, the sole object, that is affecting our bodily organisa- 
tion  at  a  given  moment  and  causing  corresponding  changes  in our 
body, which we feel within ourselves and experience as our thinking. 

[27]    While   rejecting   the   first   explanation   as   the  capitulation  of  
                                                               { prejudice }
philosophy  before  religious  theological  twaddle,  Spinoza  took a very 
critical  attitude  as  well  toward the superficially materialist-mechanistic 
explanation  of  the  cause  of  thought.  He  very  well understood that it 
was  only  a  'bit'  of an explanation, leaving in the dark the very difficulty .
that Descartes  was forced to bring in God to explain.                                    Refuge of ignorance. 

[28]   For  to  explain  the event we call 'thinking', to disclose its effective 
cause,  it  is necessary to include it in the chain of events within which 
it  arises  of necessity and not fortuitously.  The 'beginnings' and the         My italics.
'ends'  of this chain are clearly not located within the thinking body at all, 
but far outside it. 
 
[29]   To  explain  a separate, single, sensuously perceived fact passing 
momentarily  before  our  eye,  and  even  the whole mass of such facts, 
as  the  cause  of  thought  means  to explain precisely nothing.  For this
very  fact  exerts  its  effect (mechanical,  say,  or  light) on stone as well, 
but  no  action  of any kind that we describe as 'thinking' is evoked in the 
stone.  The  explanation  must consequently also include those relations 
of  cause  and effect that of necessity generate our own physical organ- 
isation  capable  (unlike  a  stone)  of  thinking,  i.e.  of  so refracting the 
external  influences  and  so transforming them within itself that they are 
                                                                               { picture on a panel }
experienced  by  the  thinking  body  not  at  all  only as changes arising 
within  itself,  but  as external things, as the shapes of things outside the 
thinking body. 
 
[30]   For  the  action  produced  on the retina of our eye by a ray of light 
reflected  from  the  Moon  is  perceived by the thinking being not simply 
as  a  mechanical irritation within the eye but as the shape of the thing 
itself,  as the lunar disc hanging in space outside the eye, which means 
that  the  Ego,  the  thinking  substance or creature, directly feels not the 
effect  produced on it by the external thing but something quite different, 
viz.  the  shape  or  form (i.e.  the  spatial,  geometric  configuration) and 
position  of  this external  body,  which  has  been evoked within us as a 
result  of  the  mechanical or light effect. In that lies both the enigma and 
the  whole essence of thinking as the mode of activity of a thinking body 
in distinction to one that does not think. It will readily be understood that 
one  body  evokes  a  change  by  its action in another body; that is fully 
explained  by  the  concepts  of physics. It is difficult, and from the angle 
of  purely  physical  concepts  (and  in  Spinoza's  time  of  even  'purely' 
mechanical,  geometric  concepts)  even  impossible, to explain just why 
and  how  the  thinking  body  feels  and  perceives the effect caused by 
an  external body within itself as an external body, as its, and not as its 
own shape, configuration, and position in space. 
 
[31]   Such was the enigma, in general, that Leibniz and Fichte came up 
against   later—but  Spinoza  had  already  found a fully rational, though 
only   general,   theoretical   solution.   He  clearly  understood  that  the 
problem   could   only   be   fully  and  finally  solved  by  quite  concrete 
investigation  (including  anatomical  and  physiological)  of  the material 
mechanism  by  which the thinking body (brain) managed to do the trick, 
truly  mystically  incomprehensible  (from  the  angle of purely geometric 
concepts).   But  that  it  did  the  trick  that  it saw the thing and not the 
  { picture on a panel—as on a photographic film. }
changes in the particles of the retina and brain that this body caused by
its  light  effect within the brain was an undoubted fact; and a fact calling 
for  fundamental  explanation  and  in  a  general way outlining paths for 
more concrete study in the future. 
 
[32</