SPINOZISTIC  INSIGHTS - 2

CHAPTER TWO – HYPOTHESES

ENDNOTES:

Endnote 2.1— From Bk.VII:17 - Reason, Intuition, and Eternity.

                        reason                                                                             {Better°PcM}
The  second  level  of  knowledge  requisite  for  our  happiness  has to

do  with  our  place  within  the  whole  of  Nature,  or,  in religious terms,
   {Analogy--relation of your lung to you }
with   our  relation  with  G-D.   Indeed,  Spinoza  claims  that  adequate

self-knowledge   is   the   first   step   toward   a   manifestation   of  our

love of G-D (E5:XIV, XV:255).  Remember  that  to  understand  oneself

is  to  see  oneself  as  a  particular  mode  within Nature, or G-D.  Self-

knowledge is then knowledge of G-D.  But love for Spinoza is an affect,
                                                                                    {need}
or  emotion,  that  involves  knowledge; for love is "joy accompanied by

an  idea  of  is  cause"  (E3:De.VI:175).   All knowledge, especially in so

far  as it is defined as adequate ideas,  can be related to the idea of the

whole  system  of Nature, or G-D. To know is then to love G-D, and the

more  we  know the more we love G-D (E5:XV, XXIV:255).  It is this love
                                                                                     highest or chief good
of  G-D  that  constitutes  for  Spinoza  the summum bonum, that which
                                   {Better°PcM}
makes for human happiness.  Because of the essential role in Spinoza's

philosophy a special term is used by Spinoza to characterize it: scientia

intuitiva  or  "intuitive knowledge."  From an epistemological   {a branch of
philosophy that investigates the origin, nature, methods, and limits of human knowledge}
vantage-point this kind of knowledge is superior to both sense-percep-

tion and inference. It is complete and systematic, unlike the fragmentary

and partial character of sense-experience; it is synthetic and categorical,

unlike the discursive and hypothetical nature of inference. Intuitive cogni-
                    { ^ proceeding by reasoning or argument rather than intuition}
tion enables us to perceive the whole of reality in a comprehensive grasp,

wherein  everything  is clear and distinct."  From this insight we are then

able  to  "descend"  to  the  individual  elements  of nature and see their
{ organic interdependence }
mutual relationships  in a way that was only dimly, partially, or sequenti-

ally perceived heretofore. With intuitive knowledge everything becomes

systematically intelligible (E2:XL(24)n2:113; E5:XXV:260).
 

From  the  ethical  perspective  intuitive  cognition  results  in  an under-

standing  of  man  and  his  place in the universe such that life becomes

not  only  intelligible  but  livable.  For the scientia intuitivia gives us the
      LT:L34(21):337
"highest  possible  peace  of  mind"   (E5:XXVII; 32p).   Why  is  this  so?
                              {Better              °PcM}
Happiness  or,  if  we  prefer,  salvation, is the attainment of such know-

ledge  because  intuitive knowledge shows us why things happen in the

ways  they  do  happen,  that they cannot be otherwise,  that man is not

some extraterrestrial visitor who temporally inhabits this planet and then

returns  to  some  foreign domain, and that as an integral element of this
                                                    {Cash Value}
one  and  only  world  he must learn to live in it.  This knowledge can be

characterized,   Spinoza   claims,   as   an   insight  of  and  into  eternity,

whereby  the  whole  universe  and  everything  within  it  are  perceived

"under a form of eternity."
 

Now  we  have  reached  one  of  the  more  famous Spinozistic notions,

but  at  the  same  time  a difficult one.  For what does Spinoza mean by

'eternity'?  He  tells  us  explicitly  that he does not mean thereby infinite

duration,  which  is  how  Aristotle  and  some  of  his medieval disciples

construed   this  idea  (E5:XXIX:261).    For  Spinoza,  to  say  that  G-D,

or Nature,  is  eternal  is  not  to  imply merely that G-D exists for infinite

time.  Rather,  there  is  a  sense  in  which,  according to Spinoza, G-D,

or Nature,  is timeless.  This latter notion is also, admittedly, not without

its  problems.   But  Spinoza  tells  in  his initial list of definitions in Part I

that eternity implies the kind of existence that characterizes a being that

is  totally  self-sufficient  and  necessary.  Indeed,  given his definition of

freedom,  it  turns  out  that  for Spinoza  the  being  that  is  free  is also

eternal,  and  conversely;  for  both  of these attributes are features of a

being  whose  existence and activity follow necessarily and only from its
 LT:L34(21):336
own nature.  The key term here is 'necessity': that which exists and acts
                                                                    <E1:Parkinson:2627, E1:XVII(7)N:60.>
necessarily  in  complete  conformity  to  its  own nature is both free and

eternal.  For Spinoza only G-D, or Nature, satisfies totally this condition.

In this sense then G-D is not subject to time; for a being that falls within

time  is one that is not self-sufficient and perfect.  Such entities are truly
                                                             LT:L34(21):336
changeable,  whereas  G-D  is immutable {changeless}.
 

i2:Endnote 2.5— From Bk.XVII:10 - Scientific Method, Hypothesis, Knowledge, Understanding.
                    Preceded by EL:Hawking:8 - Realm of Science.  

In   order   to  talk  about  the  nature  of  the  universe   and  to discuss          Prof. Hall
questions  such  as  whether  it  has a beginning or an end, you have to      William James
be clear about what a scientific theory is.  I shall take the simpleminded
view  that a theory is just a model of the universe, or a restricted part of       {Scientific Method
it,  and  a set of rules that relate quantities in the model to observations            for Study
that  we  make.  It exists only in our minds and does not have any other        of Religion }
reality  (whatever  that  might  mean).   A  theory  is  a  good  theory if it
satisfies two requirements.   It must accurately describe a large class of              Hypothesis
observations  on  the basis of a model that contains only a few arbitrary
elements,  and  it  must  make  definite  predictions  about the results of
future  observations.    For  example,  Aristotle  believed  Empedocles's
theory  that  everything  was  made  out of four elements, earth, air, fire,
and  water.  This  was  simple  enough,  but  did  not  make any definite
predictions.  On  the  other hand, Newton's theory of gravity was based
on  an  even simpler model, in which bodies attracted each other with a
force that was proportional to a quantity called their mass and inversely
proportional to the square of the distance between them.  Yet it predicts
the  motions  of  the sun, the moon, and the planets to a high degree of
accuracy. 

            { or philosophical }
Any  physical ^  theory is always provisional, in the sense that it is only
a  hypothesis:  you  can never prove it.  No matter how many times the
results  of  experiments agree with some theory, you can never be sure
that  the next time the result will not contradict the theory.  On the other
hand,  you  can disprove a theory by finding even a Single observation
that  disagrees with  the  predictions  of  the  theory.  As philosopher of
science  Karl  Popper  has  emphasized, a good theory is characterized
by  the  fact that it makes a number of predictions that could in principle
be  disproved  or  falsified  by observation.  Each time new experiments
are  observed to agree with the predictions the theory survives, and our
confidence  in  it  is increased; but if ever a new observation is found to
disagree, we have to abandon or modify the theory.  

i2:Endnote 2.5a— From Tape 1: Prof. Hall's Lecture 14:TB2:20—Scientific Method: 

Secondly, it probably is time for me to stop talking in 17th and 18th century terms about inferring God from the world, and turn it around and state it in more contemporary language in terms of hypothesis construction.

If we're going to construct a hypothesis in terms of which we are going to explain the world, how big a hypothesis do we need? It's looking at the same enterprise, but it's looking at it from the other end, not what we can infer out of it, but we have hypothesized, from which hypothesis we can then infer the characteristics of the world as we observe it. Here's the point: If I make that shift and do start talking about the hypothesis of divine existence as an attempt to explain the world, we need to realize that we are opening the door, in any discussion of hypothesis construction, to hypothesis testing. 

The big difference--the really, really big difference--between ancient philosophers who worked more or less a priori (and you'll remember that term as meaning independent of experience, independent of experimentation) and contemporary scientific researchers who work in terms of hypothesis construction and testing is that, if you're working a priori, you are never obliged to bring the results of your inferences up against any kind of field test. 

On the other hand, if you are constructing hypotheses and seeing what you can spin out of them, then the bottom line will always be going to be: Are the implications of your hypothesis confirmed in the field or are they not? Hypotheses are perpetually tested that way and, over and over again, they get shot down in just that way. You spin a hypothesis to explain some data. You figure out, if this hypothesis is so, what would it imply? Are those implications fulfilled? No, they're not. Back to the drawing board; modify the hypothesis.   

Just a footnote in passing an that score: A hypothesis is never proved to be true in field testing. It's interesting, but that is the case. If I figure out the implications of a hypothesis and those implications are all fulfilled, that doesn't prove that my hypothesis is correct because page 21 there might be an alternative hypothesis that would have equally confirmed output.  

Hypotheses are supported by testing. They are typically said to be rendered more probable by testing. They're never "slammed the door" closure, settled in the affirmative by testing, but they can be shot down by testing and are again and again. That, in a nutshell, is why the method of contemporary science is as effective as it is, because it's self-correcting. It is perpetually putting itself in the field to be tested, forcing itself into a situation where the predictions that are generated by its hypotheses can be defeated in experience and, consequently, in perpetual revision in an attempt to get closer and closer and closer to the mark. {Scientific Method for Study of Religion.}

i2:Endnote 2.5 - James, "The Will to Believe," reprinted in Klemke, Philosophy, 0312084781
        —Hypothesis.  

page 71 ... Let us give the name of hypothesis to anything that may be proposed to belief; and just as the electricians speak of live and dead wires, let us speak of any hypothesis as either live or dead. A live hypothesis is one which as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed. If I ask you to page 72 believe in the Mahdi (In Mohammedanism, an expected spiritual and temporal ruler), the notion makes no electric connection with your nature—it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all. As an hypothesis it is completely dead. To an Arab, however (even if he be not one of the Mahdi's followers), the hypothesis is among the mind's possibilities: It is alive. This shows that deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the individual thinker. They are measured by his willingness to act. The maximum of liveness in an hypothesis means willingness to act irrevocably. Practically, that means belief; but there is some believing tendency wherever there is willingness to act at all.

i2:Endnote 2.5a— From Will Durant's "Story of Philosophy"; 18th Printing; 1965;
Page 139—Scientific Method.  

But then again, is the Baconian method correct? Is it the method most fruitfully used in modern science? No: generally, science has used, with best result, not the accumulation of data ("natural history") and their manipulation by the complicated tables of the Novum Organum, but the simpler method of hypothesis, deduction and experiment. So Darwin, reading Malthus' Essay on Population, conceived the idea of applying page 140 to all organisms the Malthusian hypothesis that population tends to increase faster than the means of subsistence; deduced from this hypothesis the probable conclusion that the pressure of population on the food-supply results in a struggle for existence in which the fittest survive, and by which in each generation every species is changed into closer adaptation to its environment; and finally (having by hypothesis and deduction limited his problem and his field of observation) turned to "the, unwithered face of nature" and made for twenty years a patient inductive examination of the facts. Again, Einstein conceived, or took from Newton, the hypothesis that light travels in curved, not straight lines; deduced from it the conclusion that a star appearing to be (on the straight-line theory) in a certain position in the heavens is really a little to one side of that position; and he invited experiment and observation to test the conclusion.  

i2:Endnote 2.5a—Scientific Method for Study of Religion.                       Durant Tribute [12}
From Encyclopædia Britannica Online—"religions, classification of"
See also Grace AND Britannica on Grace, and Roman Religion.  

... Although a perfect classification lies at present beyond scholars' grasp,   {All Religions seek
certain  criteria,   both positive and negative in nature, may be suggested      Peace of Mind.
for  building  and  judging classifications.  First, classifications should not    Twain's "Little Story"}
be  arbitrary,  subjective,  or  provincial.  A  first  principle  of the scientific
method  is  that  objectivity  should be pursued to the extent possible and          Understanding
that   findings  should  be  capable  of  confirmation  by  other  observers.      Talmud and Miracles 
Second,  an  acceptable  classification should deal with the essential and
typical  in  the  religious  life,  not with the accidental and the unimportant.
The  contribution  to  understanding  that  a  classification may make is in
direct  proportion to the penetration of the bases of religious life exhibited
in  its  principles of division.  A good classification must concern itself with
the  fundamentals  of  religion  and  with  the most typical elements of the
units   it  is  seeking  to  order.  Third,  a proper  classification  should  be
capable  of  presenting  both that which is common to religious forms of a      Seeking Peace of Mind
given  type  and  that  which  is  peculiar or unique to each member of the
type.  Thus, no classification should ignore the concrete historical individ-
uality  of  religious  manifestations  in  favour  of  that which is common to
them  all,  nor  should  it  neglect to demonstrate the common factors that
are  the  bases  for  the  very  distinction  of types of religious experience,
manifestations, and forms.  Classification of religions ....
 

End.

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Since November 6, 1997  hits.

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 SPINOZISTIC  INSIGHTS - 2
Chapter 2 - Hypotheses