This electronic text is used with the kind permission of:
Cosma Shalizi <cshalizi@umich.edu> 

The  text  is  the  translation  of  the  "Tractatus  de Intellectus Emenda- 
tione"  by  R. H. M.  Elwes,  (based  on  Bruder's  1843  Latin Text),  as 
printed   by  Dover Publications (NY: 1955) in Book 1.  This is, the book 
assures us, "an unabridged and  unaltered  republication  of  the  Bohn 
Library edition originally published  by  George  Bell and Sons in 1883.'' 
As  it  is more than a century old, it is incontestably in the public domain. 

8.   TEXT version.  Latin versions; Book III, CD, MEIJER.

9.   For the burden of TEI see  POSIT.

10. The secret to understanding Spinoza is to posit ONE—1D6; its Foundation Rock.

11. For HTML version re-formatted for conversion to an eBook see here.
      For HTML version converted for various eBook Readers see here.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

"Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect"

Book I Page Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Note 3
From Bk.1:v 
< Preface. > 

First Part of Method: Book I Page Numbers
< Part One—Truth, Fiction, Falsity, Doubt >  Bk.III:52.  

Second Part of Method: Rules of Definition.
< Part Two—Definition and the Order of Investigation > 
 Book I Page Numbers

From Book III, Page 19—

Notice to the Reader.

(This notice to the reader was written by the editors of the Opera Postuma in 1677.  
Taken from Book III:19 and Book VIII:6.)


This  Treatise  on the Emendation of the Intellect etc., which we give

you  here,  kind reader, in its unfinished [that is, defective] state, was

written  by  the  author  many years ago now.  He always intended to

finish  it.  But  hindered  by  other  occupations,  and finally snatched

away  by  death,  he  was unable to bring it to the desired conclusion.

But  since  it  contains  many  excellent and useful things, which—we

have no doubt—will  be  of great benefit to anyone sincerely seeking

the  truth,  we  did  not  wish to deprive you of them.  And so that you             Cash Value

would  be  aware of, and find less difficult to excuse, the many things

that are still obscure, rough, and unpolished, we wished to warn you

of them.  

Farewell.

From Bk.III:16:

      Treatise  on  the  Emendation of the Intellect
      and  on  the  way by which it is best directed 
      toward   the   t r u e   knowledge   of   things. 

The Introduction: The General Aim of the Treatise.
[1-11], De Dijn's Commentary Page 30 - The Perspective of Everyman. 

On the Improvement of the Understanding. Page 3          Transforms one's life.

Bk.III:30; Bk.XIB:4418; Bk.XX:101.  
[1]  (1:1)  After experience had taught me  that all the usual surround-             Hampshire:13[3]
           [ ordinary ]          [ empty ]
ings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects
                                                                                          Bk.III:31.
of my fears  contained in themselves  anything either  good or bad,
              < Bk.XV:286182—animus ,     moved >
except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to               Mark Twain
> try to find out <                                       [ true ]
inquire  whether  there might be  some real good  having  power  to          SCR:Dijn'sSalvation 
                                                                                              [ alone ]        [ rejection ]
communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclu-
                                                                                { Deus }                           Spinoza's Religion
sion of all else:  whether,  in fact,  there might be anything of which
                                                                               { more or less }
the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous,               E4:Dijn34
                                       [ joy ] { pleasure } < E1:Bk.XV:2601 > 
supreme,  and  unending  happiness  { better °PcM } Bk.III:238—Salvation.
                                         < Bk.XV:281144 on E4:XXI:203 >
{ EL:[39]:xxiii, E2:XLIX(62):126, E5:XLII(9):270. } 

{ Aristotle "Nicomachean Ethics" Book I: 
       "Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more 
       likely to hit upon what we should?  If so, we must try, in outline 
       at least, to determine what it is, . . . "  } 


                            Bk.XX:10250.
[2]   (2:1)  I say "I finally resolved,''  for at first sight  it seemed unwise

willingly  to lose hold  on what was sure  for the sake  of something
          Bk.III:31.
then uncertain.  (2:2)  I  could  see  the  benefits  which  are  acquired

through fame and riches,  and that I should be  obliged to abandon

the  quest  of  such  objects,  if  I  seriously  devoted  myself  to  the

search for something different and new.   (2:3)  I perceived that if true

happiness chanced to be placed in the former  I should necessarily

miss it; while if, on the other hand, it were not so placed, and I gave

them my whole attention, I should equally fail.

Of the ordinary objects of men's desires.

                                                                                        Bk.III:32—reach 
[3]  (3:1) I  therefore  debated whether it would not be possible to arrive
                      [ goal ]
at  the  new  principle, or at any rate at a certainty concerning its exist-
                       { ^ Foundation Rock }
ence,  without  changing  the  conduct  and usual plan of my life; with

this end in view I made many efforts, but in vain.  (3:2)  For the ordinary

surroundings  of  life  which  are  esteemed  by  men (as their actions

testify)   to  be  the  highest  good,  may  be  classed  under the three      Spinoza's highest good
              [ Bk.VIII:83—Aristotle "Nicomachean Ethics" Book I:4 ]  
               < riches, honour, and sexual love—Bk.XV:286183 > 
heads—Riches,   Fame,   and  the  Pleasures  of  Sense:  with these                Idolatry
   ^ Bk.III:31; Bk.XIV:2:2362.                                               [ thought ] 
three  page 4  the  mind is so absorbed that it has little power to reflect

on any different good {say the Love of G-D, the most immutable love}.                         True Thoughts



[4]   (4:1)  By sensual pleasure the mind is enthralled to the extent of
  [ at peace ]
quiescence, as if the supreme good were actually attained, so that

it  is  quite  incapable  of  thinking  of  any  other object; when such

{irrational}  pleasure  has  been  gratified  it  is followed by extreme
  [ sadness ]
melancholy, whereby  the mind, though not enthralled, is disturbed

and dulled.

(4:2) The  pursuit  of  honors  and  riches  is  likewise very absorbing,
                                                                                       Bk.III:31.
especially  if  such  objects be sought simply for their own sake [a],
                                            [ assumed ]—{ Religion, Idolatry }
inasmuch as they are then supposed to constitute the highest good.



[5]   (5:1)  In  the  case  of  fame  the  mind  is still more absorbed, for

fame is conceived as always good for its own sake, and as the ulti-

mate end to which all actions are directed.   (5:2)  Further,  the attain-
                     Bk.III:31.
ment of riches and fame  is not followed  as in the case  of sensual

pleasures by repentance,  but, the more we acquire,  the greater is

our delight, and, consequently, the more are we incited to increase

both the one and the other; on the other hand, if our hopes happen
                                                                           { loss of PcM }
to be frustrated we are plunged into the deepest sadness.  (5:3) Fame

has  the  further  drawback that it compels its votaries to order their
                           [ powers of understanding ]
lives  according  to the opinions of their fellow-men,  shunning what

they usually shun, and seeking what they usually seek.



[6]   (6:1)  When  I saw that all these  ordinary objects of desire would

be obstacles in the way of a search for something different and new

—nay,  that  they  were  so  opposed  thereto,  that  either they or it

would have to be abandoned,  I was forced  to inquire which would

prove  the most useful  to me:  for, as I say, I seemed to be willingly

losing  hold  on  a  sure  good  for the sake of something uncertain.

(6:2)  However,  after I had reflected on the matter,  I came in the first

place to the conclusion that by abandoning the ordinary objects of

pursuit,  and betaking myself to a new quest,  I should be leaving a

good,  uncertain  by reason of its own nature,  as may be gathered

from what has been said, for the sake of a good not uncertain in its

nature  (for I  sought for a fixed good  {knowledge of G-D} ),  but only in
                                   Bk.III:31.
the possibility of its attainment.


                  ] persistent  meditation [
[7]  (7:1)  Further  reflection  convinced  me that if I could really get to
                              > {and thus} to change my plan of life, <
the root of the matter ^ I should be leaving certain evils for a certain       Transforms one's life
Bk.III:32. 
good.   (7:2)  I thus perceived that I was in a state of great peril, and I
                                                                                              Bk.III:32. 
compelled  myself  to  seek with all my  page 5  strength for a remedy,  

however  uncertain  it  might  be;  as  a  sick  man struggling with a

deadly disease,  when he sees  that death  will surely be upon him                 4P44n
                             Bk.XIB:1835.
unless  a  remedy be found, is compelled to seek a remedy with all

his  strength,  inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein.   (7:3)  All the
                                         < crowd >
objects  pursued  by  the multitude  not  only  bring no remedy  that

tends to preserve our being,  but even act as hindrances,  causing               E4:Dijn:34 

the death not seldom  of those who possess them [b] ,  and always

of those who are possessed by them.



[8]  (8:1) There are many examples of men who have suffered perse-

cution even to death for the sake of their riches, and of men who in

pursuit  of  wealth  have  exposed themselves to so many dangers,

that  they  have  paid  away  their  life  as  a  penalty  for  their folly.

(8:2)  Examples are no less numerous of men, who have endured the

utmost  wretchedness  for  the  sake  of  gaining or preserving their

reputation.   (8:3)  Lastly,  there are  innumerable cases of men,  who

have  hastened  their  death  through  over-indulgence  in  sensual
 Bk.XX:17663, 26254.  
pleasure.



[9]  (9:1) All  these  evils  seem  to have arisen from the fact, that happi-

ness  or unhappiness is made wholly dependent on the quality of the
{ external }
object  which  we love.  (9:2) When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will           Short Treatise

arise  concerning  it—no  sadness  be  felt if it perishes—no envy if it
                                              Bk.III:32. 
is  possessed  by  another—no  fear,  no  hatred,  in short no disturb-

ances of the mind {decrease in °PcM}. (9:3)  All these arise from the love of
             Bk.XIB:22175.
what is perishable, such as the objects already mentioned.
            {attachment}

                      {need}                    Bk.III:32; Bk.XIX:29311. 
[10]  (10:1)  But  love  towards  a  thing {G-D} eternal and infinite feeds             True Thoughts
                   < Bk.XV:286184—E5:XX(2)N:257 > 
the mind {mystically} wholly with joy,  and is itself unmingled with any             Durant:647[6a]160
 D2:2.18ff                                    { ^ better °PcM+1 }
sadness,   wherefore  it  is  greatly  to  be  desired  and  sought  for               Martin Buber 
                    TEI:Bk.XV:xii
with  all  our  strength. (10:2) Yet  it  was  not at random that I used the  

words, "If I could go to the root of the matter,'' for, though what I have
                                                                           < on that account > 
urged  was  perfectly clear to my mind, I could not forthwith lay aside
      [    greed     ]
all love of riches, sensual enjoyment, and fame.


[11]   (11:1)  One  thing  was  evident,  namely,  that while my mind was
                           TEI:Endnote 11:1A   
employed  with  these thoughts it turned away from its former objects
                                                                                           Bk.III:32
of  desire,  and  seriously  considered  the search for a new principle;
                                                                                    { rule of life ^ }
this  state  of  things was a great comfort to me,  for  I  perceived that

the  evils  were not such as to resist all remedies. (11:2) Although these

intervals  were  at  first  rare,  and  page 6   of  very  short duration,  yet
                               {highest good}
afterwards,  as  the  true good became more and more discernible to            Simply Posit 
                                     {^ our proposition - Posit}
me,  they  became  more frequent and more lasting; especially after I                Wolf

had  recognized  that  the acquisition of wealth, sensual pleasure, or

fame,  is  only  a  hindrance,  so long as they are sought as ends not
                                                                                [      have a limit,       ] 
as  means;  if  they  be sought as means, they will be under restraint,
                                        Bk.III:31.
and,   far  from  being  hindrances,  will  further not a little the end for

which they are sought, as I will show in due time.



[12-13], De Dijn's Commentary Page 33 - The Philosophical Perspective.

Of the true and final good.  page 6

Bk.III:33.                                                                          {highest good}
[12]  (12:1)  I  will  here  only briefly state what I mean by true good, and 

also  what  is  the  nature  of the highest good.  (12:2)  In order  that this              TEI:[10]:5 

may  be  rightly  understood,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  the terms
          > Bk.III:33—but only from the perspective of man as inevitably striving to perserve himself. <
good and evil are only applied relatively ^, so that the same thing may
         { ^ are subjective terms }                                    {reference point}
be  called  both  good and bad  according to the relations in view,  in
                                                      {likewise are subjective terms}                              Ferguson
the  same  way  as  it may be called perfect or imperfect.  (12:3) Nothing 

regarded   in   its  own  nature  can  be  called  perfect  nor  imperfect;         Pure nor impure 

especially  when  we  are  aware  that  all things which come to pass,
                                                                  < Bk.XV:288212 on [53]. Determinism > 
come to pass according to the eternal order and fixed laws of Nature.      Chain of Natural Events 


                                                                           [ grasp ]
[13]  (13:1)  However,  human  weakness  cannot  attain to this order in
                                                    < Bk.XV:286186—E4:Prf.(32):189,    human nature >
its  own  thoughts, but meanwhile man conceives a human character
                                                                          Bk.XIX:1293. ^
much  more  stable  than his own,  and  sees  that there is no reason

why  he  should  not  himself acquire such a character.   (13:2) Thus he

is  led  to  seek  for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfec-

tion, {°P}, and calls everything which will serve as such means a true

good.  (13:3) The chief good is that he should arrive, together with other
 {of enlightened self-interest}
individuals  if  possible,  at the possession of the aforesaid character.

(13:4)  What  that character is we shall show in due time, namely, that it
                                {cosmic, mystical}
is  the  knowledge  of  the ^ union  existing  being  the  mind  and  the              Ferguson
 Bk.XX:17764. [ Nature ]
whole  of  Nature {G-D}. [c].



[14-17], De Dijn's Commentary Page 36 - The Program for Real Happiness.

Bk.III:36,142.  
[14]   (14:1)  This,  then,  is  the end for which I strive, to attain to such                E4:Dijn:34 

a  character myself,  and to endeavor  that many  should attain to it

with me. (14:2) In other words, it is part of my happiness to lend a help-
                                                Bk.XIB:4418. 
ing hand,  that many others  may understand  even as I do,  so that

their  understanding  and  desire  may  entirely  agree with my own.

 (14:3)  In  order  to  bring this about,  it  is  necessary  [first]  to  under-
                           [ Nature ]                              Bk.III:173.
stand as much of nature as will enable us to attain to the aforesaid

character,  and  [next]  also  to  form a page 7 social order such  as  is

most  conducive  to the attainment of this character by the greatest
                 <              as safely as possible                 > 
number with the least difficulty and danger {by evolution, not revolution} .
    < Bk.XV:286187—E4:XXXVII:211, E4:Ap. VII, XII, and XIV:237, > 



[15]  [Third,]  (15:1)  We  must  seek the assistance of Moral Philosophy

[d]  and the Theory of Education; further, as health is no insignificant
                                                      [ Fourthly ]    
means for attaining our end, we must also include the whole science
     Bk.XIV:2:2652 on E5:Prf.4:244; Bk.XIA:24109, Bk.XIB:238116.   >ingenuity<, <useful arts> 
of   Medicine,   and,   as   many  difficult  things  are  by  contrivance

rendered  easy, and  we can in this way gain much time and conven-
         [ Fifthly ]
ience,   the  science  of  Mechanics  must  in  no  way  be  despised.     Technological Advancement


Bk.III:39.                                 {G:Note 8, E3:GN(2)n}
[16]  (16:1) But before all things, a means must be devised for improv-

ing the understanding  and purifying it,  as far as may be at the out-               Curley:72

set,  so that it may apprehend things without error,  and in the best
{Neff EL:L42(37):360}
possible way.   (16:2)  Thus it is apparent  to everyone  that  I wish to

direct all science  to one end and aim [e],  so that we may attain to

the supreme human perfection which we have named;  and,  there-            Hampshire:110 

fore,  whatsoever  in  the  sciences  does not serve to promote our
                                      Bk.III:173—E2:Prf:82.  
object  will have  to be rejected  as useless.   (16:3)  To  sum  up  the

matter in a word,  all our actions and thoughts  must be directed to

this one end.


Certain rules of life.  page 7

Bk.III:39—Neff TL:L42(37):360.
[17]   (17:1)  Yet,  as  it  is  necessary  that while we are endeavoring to

attain  our  purpose,  and  bring the understanding into the right path,        Fourth Noble Truth

we should  carry  on our life, we are compelled first of all to lay down

certain  rules  of  life  as provisionally  good,  to  wit  the  following:—

                                                                                 Bk.XIA:53143.  
I.      (17:2)  To  speak   in a manner  intelligible to the multitude,  and to
       comply  with  every  general  custom  that  does  not  hinder  the 
       attainment  of  our  purpose.  (17:3) For we can gain from the multi- 
       tude  no  small  advantages,  provided  that  we  strive to accom-    Enlightened Self-interest
       modate  ourselves  to its understanding as far as possible: more- 
       over,  we  shall in this way gain a friendly audience for the recep- 
       tion of the truth. 

II.    (17:4) To  indulge  ourselves  with  pleasures  only in so far as they
      are necessary for preserving health.  Bk.XX:26358. 

III.   (17:5)  Lastly,  to  endeavor  to obtain only sufficient money or other
      commodities  to  enable us to preserve our life and health, and to 
      follow  such  general customs as are consistent with our purpose. 
                                                                                                 < Bk.XV:286189—goal > 




A Short Survey of the Mind: The Means to Obtain the End.
[18-29] De Dijn's Commentary Page 50.

         < Introduction. The Kinds of Knowledge and the Nature of Method >
                                                             < Bk.XV:286181 >

PAGE 8
                                                                                                    < now prepare >
[18]  (18:1) Having laid down these preliminary rules, I will betake my-
                                                                                    { correction }
self to the first and most important task, namely, the amendment of
          [ intellect ]
the understanding,  and  the rendering it capable of  understanding

things in the manner necessary for attaining our end.  (18:2) In order

to  bring  this  about,  the natural order demands that I should here
 Bk.XIV:2:1312. 
recapitulate  all  the  modes  of  perception,    which I have hitherto

employed for affirming or denying anything with certainty, so that I

may choose the best, and at the same time begin to know my own
                                      Bk.III:50—Neff EL:L42(37):360.  
powers and the nature which I wish to perfect.
                                                             Bk.III:50. 


                                                      knowledge
Of the four modes of perception.  page 8

                 ] persistent  meditation [
[19]  (19:1) Reflection shows that all modes of perception or knowledge              E2:TEI[19-24]
 may be reduced to four:— < but of these four, the first two are clearly sub-forms 
                                                        of  the  first  kind  of  knowledge  in  "The Ethics." > 
                                                        Bk.XV:286190—E2:XL(19)n2:113 >  { I:2.1 ,D:2.2b }

                                                    Bk.XIV:2:1366. 
I.    (19:2)  Perception  arising  from  hearsay  or  from  some sign which
      everyone may name as he please.  Bk.III:51.  
  
                                               Bk.XIV:2:1343—vague.    Bk.XIX:28912,a.
II.    (19:3)   Perception   arising   from   mere   experience—that is,  from
      experience  not  yet  classified by the intellect, and only so called 
      because  the  given  event  has  happened to take place,  and we 
                         < particular experience.  Bk.XV:286191—TEI:[20]:8 >  
      have  no  contradictory  fact  to  set against it,  so that it therefore
      remains  unassailed  in  our  minds. Bk.III:51, 52; Bk.XIX:1574.  
      { See De Dijn's Commentary Page 52. }

                                                             Bk.XIV:1:1639    ] E1:Bk.VII:609 [ 
III.   (19:4)   Perception  arising  when  the  essence  of  one  thing is in-         Third Mode
      ferred from another thing, but not adequately; [f], this comes when 
      from  some  effect  we  gather  its  cause  {induction}, or when it is          by reason
      inferred  from  some  general  proposition  {deduction}  that some 
      < Bk.XV:287192—Bk.XV:27489 on E2:XXXIX:110 >                  ^ Bk.XIV:2:1251. 
      property  is  always  present.      Bk.III:53, 54, 57, 152; Bk.XIX:2929. 
                               Bk.XIV:2:1402. 

IV.   (19:5)  Lastly,  there  is  the  perception  arising  when  a thing is per-        Fourth Mode
      ceived  solely  through  its  essence  {by intuition, i.e. knowing G-D } or
       {then through deduction; by  knowing G-D} the knowledge of its proximate
       cause.  Bk.III:150; Bk.XIV:1:1281; Bk.XIX:13416; 15419; 16014.
      {Called  the  third  kind  of knowledge—intuition—in "The Ethics."}; 
                                                  { ^ the knowledge that comes from a mystical experience.} 
        {See De Dijn's Commentary Page 57.}  {Analogy: Organic Interdependence—knowing the
        body, so that you can understand an arm.}




[20]  (20:1)  All  these  kinds of perception I will illustrate by  examples.

(20:2) By hearsay I know the day of my birth, my parentage, and other
                                                                        Bk.III:51. 
matters  about  which  I have  never  felt  any doubt.   (20:3)  By mere

experience  I  know  that I shall die,  for this I can affirm from having

seen that others like myself have died, though all did not live for the
                                                                               Bk.XIV:2:1343—vague. 
same  period,  or  die by the same disease. page 9 (20:4) I know by mere

experience  that  oil  has  the property of feeding fire,  and water of

extinguishing it.  (20:5) In the same way I know that a dog is a barking
                                                                                  Bk.III:52—useful 
animal,  man  a  rational  animal,  and in fact nearly all the practical

knowledge of life.


Bk.III:54, 55.          [infer]
[21]   (21:1)   We deduce one thing  from another as follows:  when we
                                    < sense.  Bk.XV:287193—TEI:[35]:13 >                [then]
clearly perceive that we feel a certain body and no other, we thence

clearly  infer  that  the  mind  is united to the body [g] , and that their
                                                                                   Bk.III:152.
union  is  the  cause of  the given sensation;  but we cannot thence

absolutely understand the nature of the sensation and the union [h].

(21:2)  Or,  after  I  have  become  acquainted with the nature of vision,
                                   Bk.XIX:13416, 15015, 15421.
and know that it has the property of making one and the same thing

appear smaller when far off than when near, I can infer that the sun

is  larger  than  it  appears,  and  can draw other conclusions of the

same kind.


 
[22]  (22:1) Lastly, a thing may be perceived solely through its essence;

when,  from  the  fact of knowing something, I know what it is to know

that  thing,  or  when,  from  knowing the essence of the mind, I know

that  it is united to the body.   (22:2)  By the same kind of knowledge we

know  that  two and three make five, or that two lines each parallel to

a  third,  are parallel to one another, &c.  (22:3) The things which I have
                                                                                 Bk.III:57, Bk.XIV:2:1591. 
been  able  to  know  by  this  kind  of knowledge are as yet very few.



[23]  (23:1)  In  order  that the whole matter may be put in a clearer light,

I  will  make use of a single illustration as follows.  (23:2) Three numbers

are  given—it  is  required  to find a fourth, which shall be to the third

as  the  second  is  to  the  first. page 10 (23:3) Tradesmen will at once tell

us  that  they  know  what  is  required  to find the fourth number,  for

they  have  not  yet  forgotten the rule which was given  to  them arbi-
                Bk.III:53
trarily  without  proof  by their masters;  others  construct  a universal

axiom  from  their experience  with  simple numbers, where the fourth

number  is  self-evident, as in the case of 2, 4, 3, 6; here it is evident

that  if  the second number be multiplied by the third, and the product

divided  by  the  first,  the quotient is 6;  when  they  see  that  by this

process  the  number is produced which they knew beforehand to be

the  proportional,  they  infer  that  the process always holds good for

finding a fourth number proportional.       Bk.III:56, 57, 228.



[24]  (24:1)  Mathematicians,  however,  know  by  the  proof of the nine-

teenth  proposition  of  the seventh book of Euclid, what numbers are

proportionals,  namely,  from  the  nature and property of proportion it

follows  that  the  product  of  the  first  and  fourth will be equal to the

product  of  the  second  and third:  still they do not see the adequate
< E2:Bk.XV:27596 on E2:XL(30)N2:113. >  
proportionality  of  the given numbers, or, if they do see it, they see it
                                                                                    [ or ]
not  by  virtue of  Euclid's  proposition,  but  intuitively,  without going
         Bk.III:57
through any process.




[25-29], De Dijn's Commentary Page 58 - Conclusion.


Of the best mode of perception.  page 10

[25]  In  order  that  from  these modes of perception the best may be 
selected, it is well that we should briefly enumerate the means neces-
sary for attaining our end. 
  
           I.    To have an exact knowledge of our nature which we desire 
                 to perfect, and to know as much as is needful of nature in 
                 general.         < Bk.XV:287194 >     Bk.III:58—E1 & E2.
 
                       [     infer  rightly       ] 
           II.   To  collect in this way  the differences, the agreements, and
                 the oppositions of  things.        Bk.III:58—E2 & E3. 

           III.   To learn thus exactly how far they can or cannot be modified.
                  Bk.III:58—E3 & E4.                                         { AA Creed } 
         
           IV.  To  compare  this  result  with  the  nature and power of man.
                 We  shall  thus discern the highest degree of perfection { °P }        Calculus:3.2
                 to which man is capable of attaining.  Bk.III:58—E4 & E5.  


[26]  (26:1) We  shall then be in a position to see which mode of percep-

tion we ought to choose.

                    Bk.III:51
(26:2)  As  to  the  first  mode,   it  is evident that from hearsay our know-

ledge  must  always  be  uncertain,  and,  moreover,   can  give us no
                                                                     < clear >
insight  into  the  essence  of a thing, as is manifest in our illustration;

now  one  can only arrive at knowledge of a thing through knowledge

of  its  essence,  as  will  hereafter  appear.   (26:3)  We may,  therefore,

clearly  conclude  page 11   that  the  certainty arising from hearsay can-

not  be  scientific  in  its character.   (26:4)  For  simple  hearsay  cannot
                               > unless his own intellect has gone before. <
affect  anyone  whose  understanding  does not,  so to speak, meet it

half way.



[27] (27:1)  The  second  mode  of  perception [i] cannot  be said to give

us the idea of the proportion of which we are in search. (27:2) Moreover
                                     Bk.III:53           < endless.  Bk.XV:287195 > 
its  results  are  very  uncertain  and  indefinite, for we shall never dis-            Never Proved
                                                                                        Bk.XIV:2:952. 
cover  anything  in  natural phenomena by its means, except acciden-

tal   properties,   which   are   never  clearly  understood,  unless  the

essence  of  the  things  in  question  be known first.   (27:3)  Wherefore

this mode also must be rejected.



[28]  (28:1) Of  the  third  mode  of  perception we may say in a manner

that  it gives us the idea of the thing sought, and that it enables us to
                                                                Bk.III:56,152.
draw  conclusions  without risk of error; yet it is not by itself sufficient

to put us in possession of the perfection we aim at.


                 Bk.III:59, 76.                                       Example: POSIT ONE—1D6                Simply Posit 
[29]  (29:1) The  fourth  mode  {Called  the  third  kind  of  knowledge—intuition         Importance of ONE—1D6
                                               {Bk.XIV:2:101—TEI:L64(60):395.}
—in "The Ethics." } alone apprehends the adequate essence of a thing
                                                                                   ^ Bk.III:150
without  danger  of  error.  (29:2)  This  mode, therefore, must be the one

which  we  chiefly  employ.  (29:3)  How, then, should we avail ourselves

of  it  so  as  to  gain  the fourth  kind of knowledge with the least delay

concerning  things  previously  unknown?  (29:4)  I will proceed to explain.




The Way and the Method: Spinoza's Methodology.
[30-37], De Dijn's Commentary Page 76 - The Possibility of a Method.


[30] (30:1)  Now  that we know what kind of knowledge is necessary for           POSIT ONE—1D6
                       [ teach ]
us,  we  must indicate the Way and the Method whereby we may gain

the  said  knowledge  concerning  the  things  needful  to  be  known.

(30:2) In  order to accomplish this, we must first take care not to commit

ourselves  to  a search,  going back to infinity—that is, in order to dis-

cover  the  best  Method  of finding truth, there is no need of another

Method  to  discover such Method; nor of a third Method for discover-

ing  the  second,  and  so on to infinity.  (30:3) By such proceedings, we
                                                                                       Bk.III:76
should  never  arrive at the knowledge of the truth, or, indeed, at any
 Bk.XIV:1:1392, 2:15304.
knowledge at all.

(30:4)  The matter stands on the same footing as the making of material

tools, which might be argued about in a similar way.  (30:5) For, in order

to  work  iron,  a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forth-

coming  unless  it  has  been  made;  page 12   but,  in  order  to  make it,

there  was  need  of  another  hammer  and other tools,  and so on to

infinity.  (30:6) We  might  thus  vainly endeavor to prove that men have

no power of working iron.



[31]  (31:1)  But as men at first made use of the instruments supplied by

nature  to  accomplish  very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously

and  imperfectly,  and  then, when these were finished, wrought other            Mark Twain 

things  more  difficult  with  less labour and greater perfection; and so

gradually  mounted  from  the  simplest  operations  to  the making of

tools,  and   from  the  making of tools to the making of more complex

tools,  and  fresh  feats  of  workmanship,  till  they  arrived at making,

with  small  expenditure  of  labour,  the  vast  number of complicated

mechanisms  which  they  now possess.   (31:2)  So, in like manner, the
                    Bk.III:56—inborn innate power; Bk.XIX:1319.
intellect,   by   its   native strength,  [k],  makes  for  itself  intellectual             Root Sources
                             {     ^ a priori     }
instruments,   whereby   it   acquires   strength  for  performing  other
                      [ works ]
intellectual  operations,  [l],  and  from  these  operations  gets  again

fresh  instruments,  or  the power of pushing its investigations further,
                                                             Bk.XIV:2:1541—pinnacle.
and   thus   gradually  proceeds  till  it reaches the summit of wisdom.



[32]  (32:1)  That  this is the path pursued by the understanding may be

readily  seen,  when  we  understand  the  nature  of  the  Method for
                                                             [ inborn tools ]
finding  out  the  truth,  and  of  the natural instruments so necessary
                                                          { ^ a priori }
for  the  construction  of more complex instruments, and for the prog-

ress  of  investigation.  (32:1a)   I  thus  proceed  with  my demonstration.

Of the instruments of the intellect, or true ideas. page 12

                    > TEI:Bk.III:129 <                           Bk.III:77, 83; Bk.XIX:1319.
[33]  (33:1) A  true idea,  [m],  (for we possess a true idea) is something
                               [ object ]
different  from  its  correlate  (ideatum);  thus a circle is different from

the  idea of a circle.  (33:2) The idea of a circle is not something having

a  circumference  and  a center,  as  a circle has;  nor is the idea of a

body  that  body  itself.  (33:3)  Now,  as it is something different from its

correlate,  it  is  capable  of being understood through itself;  in other
                                                      [ formal ]      ] Bk.VII:240* [        Bk.III:78
words,  the idea,  in  so  far  as its actual essence (essentia formalis)
                                              [ object ]                           [ objective ]
is  concerned,  may  be  the  subject  of  another  subjective essence
                             < TEI:Bk.XV:287196, E1:Bk.XV:26531 on E1:XVII(21)n:61. >  
(essentia objectiva).   page 13   [33note1]    (33:4)   And,  again,  this  second
 [ objective ]
subjective  essence  will,  regarded in itself,  be something real,  and

capable of being understood; and so on, indefinitely.



[34] (34:1)  For  instance, the man Peter is something real; the true idea
                    [ objective essence ]                       { in modern terms ? }
of  Peter  is  the  reality of Peter represented subjectively, and is in it-

self something real, and quite distinct from the actual Peter. (34:2) Now,
                        {idea of G-D}                                  Bk.III:83.
as  this  true  idea of Peter is in itself something real, and has its own
                      [ essence ]                            something intelligible—Bk.XIV:2:932.
individual  existence,  it  will  also  be capable of being understood—
                                    [ object ]                                                                        [ in 
that  is,  of  being  the  subject  of another idea,  which will contain by
        itself, objectively, ]
representation (objective), [33note1], all that the idea of Peter contains
 [ formally ]                                                           Bk.XIX:12630.
actually  (formaliter).   (34:3)  And,  again,  this idea of the idea of Peter
                        [ essence ]                                                 [ object ] 
has  its  own  individuality,   which  may  become  the  subject  of  yet

another  idea;  and  so on, indefinitely.  (34:4) This everyone may make
[ can experience this ]          < Bk.XV:287197—TEI:[69]:26,  Bk.XV:27597 on E2:XLIII:114. >  
trial  of  for  himself,  by  reflecting  that he knows what Peter is,  and  

also  knows  that he knows, and further knows that he knows that he

knows, &c. {Cash Value—what you think an object is, is not necessarily true; be careful.}


                                                                                [ essence of ]
(34:5) Hence it is plain that, in order to understand the actual Peter, it is

not  necessary  first to understand the idea of Peter, and still less the

idea  of  the  idea  of  Peter.  (34:6)  This  is  the same as saying that, in

order  to  know, there is no need to know that we know, much less to

know  that  we  know  that  we know.  (34:7) This is no more necessary
                              [ essence ]                                                           [ essence ]
than  to  know  the  nature  of a circle before knowing the nature of a
           < Bk.XV:287198—Bk.XV:276101 on E2:XLIX:120. >
triangle. [n]  (34:8)  But,  with  these  ideas, the contrary is the case: for,
   ^ Bk.III:83               Bk.XIX:1318.
in order to know that I know, I must first know.


Bk.III:183.                                        < Bk.XV:288199—Bk.XV:277103 on E2:XLIX(15):121 >
[35]   (35:1)  Hence  it  is  clear  that  certainty  is  nothing  else than the
 [ objective ]   < Bk.XV:287193 on TEI:[21]:9 >                                               Bk.III:83 
subjective   essence   of   a   thing:  in   other   words,   the  mode  in
                                  [ formal essence ]
which we perceive an actual reality is certainty.  (35:2) Further, it is also
                                     Bk.III:127
evident  that,  for  the  certitude  of truth, no further sign is necessary
                             < Bk.XV:288200—E2:XLIII(5)n:114;  Bk.XV:27597 on E2:XLIII:114 >  
beyond  the  possession  of a true idea: for, as I have shown, it is not

necessary  to  know  that  we  know that we know.  (35:3) Hence, again,

it  is  clear  that  no  one can know the nature of the highest certainty,
                                            < Bk.XV:288201—E2:D.IV:82 >      [ objective ] 
unless  he  possesses  an adequate  idea, or the subjective essence
                                              ^ Bk.III:79—TEI:L64(60):395.            [ objective ]
of  a  thing:   for  certainty  is  identical  with  such   page 14    subjective  

essence.  { GN2n }


                                          Bk.XIV:2:1002—mark. 
[36]   (36:1)  Thus,  as the truth needs no sign—it  being  sufficient  to
                     [ objective ]
possess the subjective essence of things,  or,  in other words,  the
< true.  Bk.XV:288202—TEI:[34]:13 > 
ideas of them,  in order  that all doubts may be removed—it follows

that  the  true  Method  does  not consist in seeking for the signs of
                                                 {ONE—1D6}
truth  after  the  acquisition  of  the  idea,  but  that the true Method
                             {First Posit ONE—1D6 and then test for cash values.}                         Simply Posit
teaches  us  the  order  in which  we should seek for truth itself, [o],
           [ objective ]
or the subjective essences of things,  or ideas, for all these expres-

sions are synonymous.


                       TEI:Endnote 37
[37]  (37:1)  Again, Method must necessarily be concerned with reason-
                           ^ Bk.III:181—Neff EL:L42(37):360.    Bk.III:153.
ing  or  understanding—I  mean,  Method is not identical with reason-

ing  in  the search for causes, still less is it the comprehension of the
          Bk.III:84                                 Bk.III:173           {Posit: ONE—1D6}                                   WHY?
causes  of  things:  it is the discernment of a true idea, by distinguish-    Importance of ONE—1D6
                                                                          ^ Bk.XIX:1293.
ing  it from other perceptions, and by investigating its nature, in order
                                                                                  {Posit: ONE—1D6}                  Simply Posit 
that  we  may so train our mind that it may, by a given standard, com-       
                                                          { as a working hypothesis ^ }
prehend  whatsoever  is  intelligible,  by  laying down certain rules as

aids, and by avoiding useless mental exertion.




[38-42], De Dijn's Commentary Page 85 - Further Confirmation and Elaboration.

                   > TEI:Bk.III:129 <                              Bk.III:173.
[38]  (38:1)  Whence  we  may  gather  that  Method is nothing else than
 { meditative, G:Note 8, E3:GN(2)n }    Bk.XIV:2:944; Bk.XIX:1295. 
reflective  knowledge,  or  the  idea of an idea;  and that as there can

be  no  idea  of  an idea—unless  an  idea  exists  previously,— there
                                              { an axiom—a foundation ONE—1D6}                           Burden of TEI
can   be   no   Method  without  a  pre-existent  idea.   (38:2)  Therefore,

that will  be  a good Method which shows us how  the mind should be
                                      {Posit: ONE—1D6}               Idea of G-D
directed, according to the standard of the given true idea.                               Spinozistic Idea
                { as a working hypothesis ^ }

(38:3)  Again,  seeing  that  the  ratio  existing  between two ideas is the
                                                       [ formal essence ]
same  as  the  ratio  between  the  actual  realities  corresponding  to
 < Bk.XV:288203—E2:VII:86 >                  { meditative, G:Note 8, E3:GN(2)n }
those  ideas,  it  follows  that  the  reflective knowledge which has for

its  object  the  most  perfect  Being  is  more excellent than reflective
                                                  [ ideas ]
knowledge  concerning  other  objects—in  other words, that Method
                                                            {Posit: ONE—1D6}
will  be  most  perfect which affords the standard of the given idea of              Simply Posit 
                      Bk.III:85    { as a working hypothesis ^ }                                          Importance of ONE—1D6
the  most  perfect  Being whereby we may direct our mind.



[39]  (39:1)  We thus easily understand how, in proportion as it acquires
 [ more things ]
new  ideas,  the  mind  simultaneously acquires fresh instruments for

pursuing  its  inquiries further.  (39:2) For we may gather from what has
                   > TEI:Bk.III:129 <; Bk.XIX:1291 .            Bk.III:159 
been  said,  that  a true idea must necessarily first of all exist in us as           Hampshire32:98 
                                  { ^ posit: ONE—1D6}
    Bk.XIV:2:1542—innate.   
   Bk.III:76—inborn tool; Bk.XIX:1319. 
a  natural  instrument;  and  that page 15  when this idea is apprehended
       { ^ a priori—Bk.XIV:2:155.}
by  the  mind,  it  enables  us  to  understand  the  difference  existing  

between  itself  and  all other perceptions.  (39:3) In this, one part of the

Method consists.


(39:4)  Now  it  is  clear  that the mind apprehends itself better in propor-

tion  as  it understands a greater number of natural objects; it follows,

therefore,  that  this  portion of the Method will be more perfect in pro-

portion  as  the  mind  attains to the comprehension of a greater num-

ber  of  objects,  and  that  it will be absolutely perfect when the mind

gains  a  knowledge  of  the  absolutely  perfect  Being,  or  becomes

conscious thereof.



[40]   (40:1)  Again,  the  more  things the mind knows, the better does it
    Bk.III:174                   [ powers ]      Bk.XIV:2:1281.         Bk.III:86
understand  its  own  strength  and  the order of Nature; by increased

self-knowledge,  it  can  direct  itself  more easily, and lay down rules

for  its  own guidance; and, by increased knowledge of Nature, it can               Deus
                                                                                           Bk.III:85, 87. 
more  easily  avoid  what  is useless.  (40:2)  And this is the sum total of
 [ the ] 
Method, as we have already stated.  Bk.XIX:14031. 



[41]  (41:1)  We  may  add  that  the idea in the world of thought is in the
                                 [ object ]                              Bk.III:80
same  case  as  its  correlate in the world of reality.  (41:2)  If,  therefore,
                                                                             [ interaction ]
there  be  anything  in  Nature which is  without  connection  with any              Idolatry
                                                          [ objective ]
other  thing,  and if we assign to it a subjective essence, which would
                                                Bk.III:86—formal essence.                [ objective ]
in   every  way  correspond  to  the  objective  reality,  the  subjective

essence  would  have  no  connection,  [p],  with any other ideas—in
                                              [ infer ]
other  words,  we  could  not  draw  any conclusions with regard to it.

(41:3) On the other hand, those things which are connected with others

—as  all  things  that  exist in Nature—will be understood by the mind,
                [ objective ]
and their subjective essences will maintain the same mutual relations
                                                                                 [ deduce ]
as  their  objective  realities—that  is to say, we shall infer from these
             Bk.XX:18067.  
ideas  other  ideas,  which  will in turn be connected with others, and
                                                               Bk.III:86
thus   our   instruments   for   proceeding  with  our  investigation  will

increase.  (41:4) This is what we were endeavoring to prove.



[42]   (42:1)  Further,  from  what  has  just  been  said—namely, that an
                                                                              [   formal  essence    ]
idea  must,  in  all  respects,  correspond  to  its correlate in the world
                                                       { orderly connection ^ } 
of  reality,—it  is  evident  that, in order to reproduce in every respect
        < pattern.  Bk.XV:288204 —E4:Prf.(27):189, Bk.XV:280136 on E4:D.I:190. > 
the faithful image of Nature, our  mind  must  deduce all its ideas from
        [ ^ Bk.VIII:2533—91 ]                   { ^ will be objective } 
the   idea  which  represents  page 16  the origin and source of the whole
  Bk.XIX:13829.                                                  Bk.XIV:2:1051. 
of  Nature{/G-D}, so that it may itself become the source of other ideas.

[43-48], De Dijn's Commentary Page 87 - Objections and Answers.


Answers to objections.  page 16

                    > TEI:Bk.III:129 <            Bk.III:87
[43]   (43:1)  It  may,  perhaps,  provoke  astonishment that, after having

said  that  the  good  Method  is  that  which  teaches us to direct our
                                    {Foundation Rock}
mind  according  to  the  standard  of  the  given true idea, we should
          { was a working hypothesis ^ } 
prove  our  point  by  reasoning,  which would seem to indicate that it

is  not  self-evident.  (43:2)  We  may, therefore, be questioned as to the

validity of our reasoning. (43:3) If our reasoning be sound, we must take
                               < Bk.XV:288205—Bk.XV:288202 on TEI:[36]:14 > 
as a starting-point a true idea. (43:4) Now, to be certain that our starting           Simply Posit 

-point  is  really  a  true  idea, we need proof.  (43:5) This first course of

reasoning  must  be  supported  by  a  second, the second by a third,

and so on to infinity.


                                                      Bk.III:88.
[44]   (44:1)  To  this  I  make answer that, if by some happy chance any-

one  had  adopted this Method in his investigations of Nature—that is,

if  he  had  acquired  new  ideas in the proper order, according to the
{Foundation Rock}
standard  of  the  original  true idea, he would never have doubted [q]
   { ^ as a working hypothesis }
of  the  truth  of  his  knowledge,   inasmuch   as   truth,  as  we  have
                                    self-evident—Bk.XIV:2:1007.        < present itself  > 
shown,  makes   itself   manifest, and all things would flow, as it were,
 [ of its own accord; Bk.VIII:2134—[104] ]
spontaneously towards him. 
   Bk.XIV:2:1545—2P43.

(44:2)  But  as  this never,  or rarely,  happens, I have been forced so to 
                                                    ] persistent  meditation [
arrange  my  proceedings, that we may acquire by reflection and fore-

thought   what   we  cannot acquire by chance, and that it may at the

same  time  appear that, for proving the truth, and for valid reasoning,

we  need  no  other  means  than  the truth and valid reasoning them-

selves:  for  by  valid  reasoning  I  have  established valid reasoning,

and, in like measure, I seek still to establish it.



[45]  (45:1)  Moreover,  this  is  the  order  of  thinking adopted by men in

their  inward  meditations.  (45:2) The reasons for its rare employment in
                        Bk.XIA:3017. <Bk.XV:288206—Bk.XV:26849 on E1:Ap.(3):75. prejudices>
investigations  of  Nature  are  to  be found in current misconceptions,
                                                                                     < TEI:Bk.XV:288207 >
whereof  we  shall  examine  the  causes  hereafter in our philosophy.

(45:3)  Moreover,  it  demands,  as  we shall show, a keen and accurate

discernment.  (4)  Lastly, it is hindered by the conditions of human life,

which  are,  as  we  have  already pointed out, extremely changeable.

(45:5)  There  are  also  other  obstacles, which we will not here inquire

into.


                                        < TEI:Bk.XV:288208 >
[46]  (46:1)  If  anyone asks why I have not at the starting-point set forth
                                                    Bk.XIX:13624.
all  the  truths  of  Nature in their due order, inasmuch  page 17  as truth
   Bk.III:127; Bk.XIV:2:1001.
is  self-evident,  I reply by warning him not to reject as false any para-
    {A seemingly contradictory or absurd statement that expresses a possible truth ^ .}
doxes  he  may  find  here,  but  to  take  the  trouble to reflect on the

chain  of  reasoning  by  which they are supported; he will then be no

longer  in  doubt  that  we have attained to the truth.  (46:2)  This is why

I have begun as above.


                                                                     Bk.III:89
[47]  (47:1) If there yet remains some sceptic, who doubts of our primary            world views       

truth,  and  of all deductions we make, taking such truth as our stand-

ard,  he  must  either be arguing in bad faith, or we must confess that

there  are  men  in complete mental blindness, either innate or due to
    [ prejudices ]                                                                [ chance ]
misconceptions—that  is,  to  some  external influence.  (47:2) Such per-

sons are not conscious of themselves. (47:3) If they affirm or doubt any-

thing,  they  know  not  that  they  affirm  or  doubt: they say that they

know  nothing,  and they say that they are ignorant of the very fact of

their  knowing  nothing.   (47:4)  Even  this they do not affirm absolutely,

they  are  afraid  of  confessing  that they exist, so long as they know
                                                         [ speechless ]
nothing;  in  fact, they ought to remain dumb, for fear of haply suppos-

ing which should smack of truth.



[48]  (48:1) Lastly, with such persons, one should not speak of sciences:
                                                 [ society ]
for,  in  what relates to life and conduct, they are compelled by neces-

sity  to  suppose  that  they  exist, and seek their own advantage, and

often  affirm  and  deny, even with an oath.  (48:2) If they deny, grant, or

gainsay, they know not that they deny, grant, or gainsay, so that they
                                         Bk.III:128                  [ lacking in mind ]
ought to be regarded as automata, utterly devoid of intelligence.                    Mark Twain




[49], De Dijn's Commentary Page 90 - Conclusion.

                                                         {highest good}
[49]  (49:1)  Let  us  now  return  to our proposition.  (2) Up to the present,

> 1-17 <,  we  have,  first,  defined  the end to which we desire to direct

all  our  thoughts;  secondly,  > 18-29 <,  we have determined the mode

of  perception  best  adapted  to  aid  us  in  attaining  our  perfection;
< Bk.XV:288209 >  
thirdly,  > 30-48 <, we have discovered  the way which our mind should

take,  in  order to make a good beginning—namely, that it should use
                                  {Posit: ONE—1D6}
every  true  idea  as  a  standard  in  pursuing  its inquiries according            Simply Posit 
          { as a working hypothesis ^ }
fixed rules.

(49:3)  Now,  in order that it may thus proceed, our Method must furnish

us,  first,  > 50-90 <,  with  a means of distinguishing a true idea from all

other  perceptions, and enabling the mind to avoid the latter; second-

ly,  > 91-98 <, with rules for perceiving unknown things according to the
                                         < Bk.XV:288210—[40] >
standard  of  the  true  idea;  thirdly,  > 99-110 <,  with  an  order  which
                                             Bk.III:172. 
enables  us  to avoid  useless  labor.  page 18   (49:4)  When  we  became
                                                                        < Bk.XV:288210—[38] >
acquainted with this Method, > 38 <, we saw that, fourthly, it would be
 { E3:GN(2)n }                                                               ^ Bk.III:59.
perfect  when  we  had  attained  to the idea of the absolutely perfect

Being.   (49:5)  This  is  an  observation  which  should  be  made at the
     {First Posit ONE—1D6 and then test for cash values. Simply Posit} 
outset, in order that we may  arrive at the knowledge of such a Being 
  Bk.III:86—[105ff]
more quickly.  { G:Note 8. }




First Part of the Method: The Separation between
Intellect and Imagination. [50-90], De Dijn's Page 126.

                      < Part One—Truth, Fiction, Falsity, Doubt >
                                                      < Bk.XV:286181 >    Bk.III:52.

Distinction of true ideas from fictitious ideas.  page 18 

[50]  (50:1)  Let  us  then  make  a  beginning  with  the  first  part of the

Method,  which  is,  as  we have said, to distinguish and separate the
   {G-D}
true idea  from  other  perceptions, and to keep the mind from confus-
   { ^ Cash Value }
ing  with  true  ideas  those  which  are  false,  fictitious, and doubtful.           Speculation
                        {  Posit: ONE—1D6  }
(50:2) I intend to dwell on this point at length, partly to keep a distinction

so  necessary  before  the reader's mind, and also because there are

some  who  doubt  of  true  ideas, through not having attended to the            Cash Value

distinction   between  a  true  perception  and  all  others.   (50:3)  Such

persons  are like men who, while they are awake, doubt not that they

are  awake,  but  afterwards  in  a  dream, as often happens, thinking

that  they  are  surely awake, and then finding that they were in error,
                                       < Bk.XV:288211 > 
become doubtful even of being awake.  (50:4) This state of mind arises

through  neglect  of  the  distinction  between  sleeping  and  waking.



[51]  (51:1)  Meanwhile,  I  give  warning  that  I  shall  not  here give the
                                                                                                Bk.III:126
essence  of  every  perception,  and  explain  it  through its proximate
                                                                               Bk.III:139
cause.  (51:2)  Such  work  lies  in  the province of philosophy.  (3) I shall

confine  myself  to  what  concerns  Method—that is, to the character

of  fictitious,  false  and  doubtful  perceptions, and the means of free-

ing  ourselves  therefrom.  (51:4) Let us then first inquire into the nature
         ] TEI:Bk.VII:245* [ 
of  a  fictitious idea.


Bk.III:52.                   Bk.III:132
[52]  (52:1) Every perception has for its object either a thing considered
                                                                                       Bk.III:81
as  existing,  or solely the essence of a thing.  (2) Now "fiction'' is chief-

ly  occupied  with  things  considered as existing.  (52:3) I will, therefore,

consider  these  first—I  mean  cases where only the existence of an
        { posited fictitiously }
object  is  feigned,   and   the  thing  thus  feigned  is  understood,  or
                                                                               [ suppose ]
assumed  to  be  understood.   (52:4)   For  instance,  I  feign  that Peter,

whom   I   know   to   have   gone  home,  is  gone  to  see  me, [r],  or

something  of  that  kind.  (52:5)  With  what  is  such an idea concerned?

(52:6)   It  is  concerned   page 19   with  things  possible, and not with things

necessary  or  impossible.


                                                   Bk.III:132
[53]  (53:1)  I  call  a  thing impossible when its existence would imply a
    Bk.III:158
contradiction;  necessary,  when its non-existence would imply a con-
                   Bk.III:150                         [ Bk.VIII:2439 ]
tradiction;  possible, when neither its existence nor its non-existence
                    Bk.III:151
imply  a  contradiction,  but  when  the necessity or impossibility of its
            < Bk.XV:288212—[12]; Bk.XV:26738 on E1:XIX:68 >          { posit fictitiously } 
nature  depends  on  causes  unknown  to  us,  while we feign that it
                                                                                              [,]
exists.   (53:2)  If  the  necessity or impossibility of its existence depend-
                                      [,]                                 Bk.XIV:2:1155—imagine. 
ing  on  external  causes  were  known  to  us, we could not form any

fictitious  hypotheses  about  it;


                                                                                            Bk.XIV:2:1156.
[54]   (54:1)  Whence  it  follows  that  if  there  be  a G-D, or omniscient
     { Whose ideas are always adequate, }  < Bk.XV:288213—TEI:[53:2] >; Bk.XIX:13827.
Being, ^  such  an one cannot form  fictitious  hypotheses.  (2)  For, as
                                                           [  ^   Bk.VIII:2440 ]
regards  ourselves,  when  I know that I exist, [s] I cannot hypothesize

that  I  exist  or  do  not exist, any more than I can hypothesize an ele-
                                                          Bk.III:129
phant  that  can  go through the eye of a needle; nor when I know the

nature  of  G-D,  can I hypothesize that He exists or does not exist [t].

(54:3) The same thing must be said of the Chimæra, whereof the nature

implies a contradiction.  (54:4) From these considerations, it is plain, as

I  have  already  stated, that fiction cannot be concerned with eternal
< Bk.XV:289214 >                                                                                { Neff }
truths [u]. [I shall also show immediately that no fiction is concerned with eternal truths.]
                                                                                                    ^ Bk.III:151



[55]  (55:1)  But  before  proceeding  further,  I  must remark, in passing,
                                                                                   { say, G-D }
that   the   difference  between  the  essence  of  one  thing  and  the
                                { say, Man }
essence  of  another  thing  is the same as that which exists between
     [ actuality ]                                                                  [ actuality ]
the  reality  or  existence  of  one thing and the reality or existence of

another;  therefore,  if we wished to conceive the existence, for exam-

ple,  of  Adam,  simply  by  means of existence in general, it would be

the  same  as  if,  in order to conceive his existence, we went back to
                                                                          {a mode}
the  Nature  of Being, so as to define Adam as a being.  (55:2) Thus, the

more  existence  is  conceived  generally,  the  more  is  it  conceived

page 20   confusedly,  and  the  more easily can it be ascribed to a given

object.  (55:3)  Contrariwise,  the  more  it  is conceived particularly, the

more  is  it  understood clearly, and the less liable is it to be ascribed,
                               [ Bk.VIII:2541 ]    Bk.III:132
through  negligence  of  Nature's  order,  to  anything save its proper

object.  (55:4) This is worthy of remark.



[56]  (56:1)  We now proceed to consider those cases which are com-

monly called fictions, though we clearly understood that the thing is
                 [ feign ]
not as we imagine it. (56:2) For instance, I know that the earth is round,
                     ^ picture—Bk.XIV:2:837.
but  nothing prevents my telling people that it is a hemisphere, and
                             [ orange ]
that  it is like a half apple carved in relief on a dish; or, that the sun

moves  round the earth, and so on.  (56:3) However, examination will

show us that there is nothing here inconsistent with what has been

said, provided we first admit that we may have made mistakes, and

be  now  conscious  of them; and, further, that we can hypothesize,

or at least suppose, that others are under the same mistake as our-

selves,  or  can,  like  us,  fall  under  it.  (56:4)  We can, I repeat, thus
   { D:2.8b }
hypothesize  so long as we see no impossibility.  (56:5) Thus, when I

tell anyone that the earth is not round, &c., I merely recall the error

which I perhaps made myself, or which I might have fallen into, and

afterwards  I hypothesize that the person to whom I tell it, is still, or

may still fall under the same mistake.  (56:6) This I say, I can feign so

long  as  I  do  not  perceive  any impossibility or necessity; if I truly

understood  either  one  or  the  other  I should not be able to feign,
                                                        < Bk.XV:289215—not meant what I say >
and  I  should  be  reduced  to  saying  that I had made the attempt.


> TEI:Bk.III:129 < 
[57]  (57:1)  It  remains for us to consider hypotheses made in problems,

which sometimes involve impossibilities.  (57:2)   For instance, when we

say—let  us assume that this burning candle is not burning, or, let us
                                                      < Bk.XV:289216 >
assume  that  it  burns  in  some imaginary space, or where there are
< Bk.XV:289217—Bk.XV:26423 on E1:XV(37)n:58 >  
no physical objects. (3) Such assumptions are freely made, though the

last  is  clearly  seen  to  be  impossible.  (57:4)  But,  though this be so,

there is no fiction in the case.  (57:5) For, in the first case, I have merely

recalled  to  memory,  [x],  another  candle  not  burning, or page 21  con-

ceived  the  candle  before  me  as  without a flame, and then I under-

stand  as  applying  to the latter, leaving its flame out of the question,

all  that  I  think  of the former.  (57:6) In the second case, I have merely