JBY Notes:

1.  Text was scanned from Book II and is a translation from
     Bruder's 1843  Latin  text  by  R.H.M.  Elwes  (1883).
     JBY  added  sentence  numbers. 
  
2.   (y:xx):   y = Chapter  Number,  if  given;   xx = Sentence  Number.
 
3.   Page  numbers  are  those  of  Book II.
 
4.   Citation abbreviations.
 
5.  ( Spinoza's Footnote or the Latin word ) , 
     ] Shirley's Bk. XI (or XIII) translation variance or note [ , 
     { JBY comment, emendation, or endnote }.    LINKS 

6.  Please  e-mail  errors,  clarification  requests,  disagreement,
     or  suggestions  to  josephb@yesselman.com. 

7.  TEXT version without links and and without commentary. 
     Latin version on a CD. 
 
8.  There  is  much  in  this  work  that you will not agree with or even          Graetz's Censure
     think  nonsense—although  keep  in mind that Spinoza was under 
     the constraints of religious  intolerance.    Spinoza was born in the 
     very year (1632) that  the inquisitorial denunciation of Galileo took 
     place.  However,  partake  of  the work (and my commentaries) as 
     you  would  a  pomegranate; relish  the  flesh,  but spit-out the pits. 

9.  EL:[7]:viii, EL:[11]:xi, EL:[17]:xiii, EL:[22]:xvi, EL:[64]:xxxi, EL:xxxiii:J6, 
     L19:296, L20:297, L23:301, L49:364,  old vocabulary in new bottles.  
                                                                {Scriptural Theology}         Hampshire:205
10. The  chief  aim  of  the whole treatise is to separate  faith ^ {Religion}          Smith:Divine Law
      from philosophy.  ]Shirley:37—What emerges in the TTP, as far as is Spinoza           Hampshire:203 & 205
      concerned, is the possibility of a this-worldly blessedness for both the rational person               TL:L36(23):345
       (through philosophy) and the common person (through purified religion),[                    EL:L21:(73):298
      {By my defining Religion as an hypothesis, the two are synthesized.}                     Philosophy / Religion
 
11.  Links - To differentiate links from quotations (both blue text) set your
                  browser options to show links underlined. 
 
12.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively      Durant's Story
       as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its        Schorsch
       links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and         EL:[3]:vi
       best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread.  If you do not stick 
       to one thread (idea) at a time,  this Web Site will be very convoluted,       Tickle the Fancy
       confusing, and an annoying maze. 

       If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
       abridged versions, e-book versions, or best, study the printed book—
       book page numbers are given for most scanned books.
 

   Part                   Chapters

Author's Notes to Theologico-Political Treatise - Part 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS:                                  Bk.II Page Numbers

Authors Endnotes to the Treatise

transcends  human  understanding,  so  also do they style Divine, or

the work of G-D, anything of which the cause is not generally known:        Metaphors, Referral 

for the masses think that the power and providence of G-D are most       Chain of Natural Events 

clearly displayed by events that are extraordinary and contrary to the

conception  they  have  formed  of  Nature,  especially if such events
                            Bk.XIA:3341—advantage.
bring  them  any  profit  or  convenience:  they think that the clearest

possible  proof  of  G-D's existence is afforded when nature, as they

suppose,  breaks  her  accustomed  order,  and  consequently  they

believe  that  those  who explain or endeavour to understand pheno-

mena  or  miracles through their natural causes are doing away with

G-D  and  His  providence.  (6:2)  They  suppose, forsooth, that God is               Referral 

inactive  so long as nature works in her accustomed order, and vice

versâ,  that  the power of nature and natural causes are idle so long

as God is acting: thus they imagine two powers distinct one from the

other,  the  power  of God and the power of nature, though the latter

is  in  a  sense  determined by God, or (as most people believe now)

created by Him.  (6:3) What they mean by either, and what they under-

stand by God and nature they do not know, except that they imagine

the  power  of  God  to  be  like  that  of  some  royal  potentate, and

nature's power to consist in force and energy.




(6:4)   The  masses  then  style  unusual  phenomena,  "miracles,"  and            Hampshire:206

partly  from  piety,  partly  for  the  sake  of opposing  the students of

science,  prefer  to  remain  in ignorance of natural causes, and only

to  hear  of  those  things  which  they know least, and consequently

admire  most.  (6:5)  In  fact,  the  common  people can only adore God,

and  refer  all  things  to  His power by removing natural causes, and

conceiving  things  happening  out  of  their  due  course,   and  only

admires  page 82  the  power  of  God  when  the  power  of  nature  is

conceived of as in subjection to it.



(6:6) This  idea  seems  to  have  taken  its  rise among the early Jews

who  saw the Gentiles round them worshipping visible gods such as

the  sun,  the  moon, the earth, water, air, &c., and in order to inspire

the  conviction  that  such  divinities  were  weak  and  inconstant, or

changeable,  told  how  they  themselves were under the sway of an

invisible  God,  and  narrated  their  miracles,  trying  further to show

that  the  God  whom  they worshipped arranged the whole of nature

for  their  sole  benefit:  this  idea  was  so  pleasing to humanity that

men  go  on  to this day imagining miracles, so that they may believe

themselves  God's  favourites,  and  the  final  cause  for  which God

created and directs all things.



(6:7)  What  pretension  will  not  people in their folly advance!  (8) They

have  no  single  sound  idea  concerning either God or nature, they

confound  God's decrees with human decrees, they conceive nature

as  so  limited  that  they  believe  man to be its chief part!  (6:9) I have

spent   enough  space  in  setting  forth  these  common  ideas  and

prejudices  concerning nature and miracles, but  in order to afford a

regular demonstration I will show—   { EL:L20:297, EL:L21:298, EL:L22:299. }

< Parkinson:279118—Neff-L60(56):385, last paragraph. >    { Nature and Miracles } 

                                                     Bk.XIA:3342.
I.        (6:10) That  nature cannot be contravened, but that she preserves
       a  fixed  and immutable order, and at the same time I will explain
       what is meant by a miracle. 

II.     (6:11)  That  God's nature  and  existence,  and  consequently His     Omnipotence & Omniscience 
       providence  cannot  be  known  from miracles, but that they can
       all  be  much  better  perceived  from  the  fixed  and  immutable
       order of nature.

III.    (6:12) That  by  the  decrees  and  volitions, and consequently the
       providence  of  God,   Scripture  (as  I  will  prove  by  Scriptural
       examples)  means  nothing  but  nature's  order following neces-
       sarily from her eternal laws. 

IV.   (6:13)  Lastly,  I  will  treat  of  the  method of interpreting Scriptural
       miracles,   and   the  chief  points  to  be  noted  concerning  the
       narratives of them.


(6:14)  Such  are  the  principal  subjects which will be discussed in this

chapter,  and which will serve, I think, not a little to further the object

of this treatise.



(6:15) Our first point is easily proved from what we showed in Chap. IV.

about  Divine law—namely,  that all that God  page 83  wishes or deter-

mines involves eternal necessity and truth, for we demonstrated that

God's  understanding is identical with His will, and that it is the same

thing  to  say that God wills a thing, as to say that He understands it;

hence,  as  it  follows necessarily from the Divine nature and perfec-

tion  that  God  understands  a thing as it is, it follows no less neces-

sarily  that  He  wills it as it is.  (16) Now, as nothing is necessarily true

save  only  by  Divine  decree,  it  is  plain  that the universal laws of

nature  are  decrees of God following from the necessity and perfec-

tion of the Divine nature.  (6:17) Hence, any event happening in nature

which  contravened  nature's  universal laws, would necessarily also

contravene  the Divine decree, nature, and understanding; or if any-

one  asserted  that  God  acts in contravention to the laws of nature,

he,  ipso facto, would be compelled to assert that God acted against
                                        Bk.XX:27588. 
His  own  nature—an evident absurdity.  (6:18)  One might easily show

from  the  same premises that the power and efficiency of nature are

in  themselves  the  Divine power and efficiency, and that the Divine

power is the very essence of God, but this I gladly pass over for the

present.



(6:19)  Nothing,  then,  comes  to  pass  in  nature  (N.B. I do not mean here by

"nature,"  merely  matter  and  its  modifications,  but infinite other things besides matter.) in

contravention  to  her  universal  laws,  nay,  everything agrees with

them  and  follows from them, for whatsoever comes to pass, comes

to  pass  by  the  will  and eternal decree of God; that is, as we have

just  pointed out, whatever comes to pass, comes to pass according

to  laws  and rules which involve eternal necessity and truth; nature,

therefore,  always  observes  laws  and  rules  which involve eternal

necessity  and  truth,  although they may not all be known to us, and

therefore  she  keeps  a  fixed and immutable order.  (6:20) Nor is there

any  sound  reason for limiting the power and efficacy of nature, and

asserting  that  her  laws  are  fit for certain purposes, but not for all;

for  as  the  efficacy  and  power of nature, are the very efficacy and

power  of  God, and as the laws and rules of nature are the decrees

of  God,  it  is in every way to be believed that the power of nature is

infinite,  and  that her laws are broad enough to embrace everything

conceived  by  the  Divine  intellect;  the  only alternative is to assert

that  God  has  created  nature so weak, and has  page 84   ordained for

her  laws  so barren, that He is repeatedly compelled to come afresh

to  her  aid  if  He  wishes  that  she  should  be  preserved, and that

things  should  happen  as  He  desires: a conclusion, in my opinion,

very  far  removed  from reason.  (6:21) Further, as nothing happens in

nature   which  does  not  follow  from  her  laws,   and  as  her  laws

embrace  everything  conceived  by  the  Divine  intellect, and lastly,

as  nature  preserves  a  fixed  and  immutable  order; it most clearly

follows  that  miracles  are  only  intelligible  as  in  relation to human

opinions,   and  merely  mean  events  of  which  the  natural  cause

cannot  be  explained  by  a  reference  to  any ordinary occurrence,
                                                                                        Bk.XIA:3340.
either  by us, or at any rate, by the writer and narrator of the miracle.



(6:22) We  may,  in  fact,  say  that  a  miracle  is  an event of which the

causes  cannot  be  explained by the natural reason through a refer-

ence  to  ascertained  workings  of  nature;  but  since miracles were

wrought  according  to  the  understanding  of  the masses,  who are

wholly  ignorant  of  the  workings  of  nature,  it  is  certain  that  the

ancients  took  for  a  miracle whatever they could not explain by the

method   adopted   by  the  unlearned  in  such  cases,   namely,  an

appeal  to  the  memory,  a  recalling  of  something  similar, which is  

ordinarily  regarded  without  wonder;   for  most  people  think  they

sufficiently  understand  a  thing  when they have ceased to wonder

at  it.  (6:23)  The  ancients, then, and indeed most men up to the pres-

ent  day,  had  no  other  criterion  for  a  miracle;  hence  we cannot

doubt  that  many  things  are  narrated  in  Scripture  as miracles of

which  the  causes  could easily be explained by reference to ascer-

tained workings of nature.  (6:24) We have hinted as much in Chap. II.,

in speaking of the sun standing still in the time of Joshua, and going

backwards  in  the time of Ahaz; but we shall soon have more to say

on   the  subject  when  we  come  to  treat  of  the  interpretation  of

miracles later on in this chapter.



(6:25)  It  is  now time to pass on to the second point, and show that we

cannot gain an understanding of God's essence, existence, or provi-

dence  by  means  of miracles, but that these truths are much better

perceived   through   the   fixed   and   immutable   order   of  nature.



(6:26)  I  thus proceed with the demonstration.  (27) As God's existence is

not self-evident (6) it must necessarily be inferred from   page 85   ideas

so  firmly  and incontrovertibly true, that no power can be postulated
                                            Bk.XIX:29622.
or  conceived  sufficient to impugn them.  (28) They ought certainly so

to appear to us when we infer from them God's existence, if we wish

to  place  our  conclusion  beyond the reach of doubt; for if we could

conceive  that such ideas could be impugned by any power whatso-

ever,  we should doubt of their truth, we should doubt of our conclu-

sion,  namely,  of  God's  existence,  and should never be able to be

certain of anything.  (6:29) Further, we know that nothing either agrees

with  or  is  contrary  to nature, unless it agrees with or is contrary to

these  primary  ideas;  wherefore if we would conceive that anything

could  be done  in nature  by any power whatsoever which would be

contrary  to  the  laws  of  nature,  it  would  also  be  contrary  to our

primary  ideas,  and  we  should have either to reject it as absurd, or

else  to cast doubt (as just shown) on our primary ideas, and conse-

quently  on  the  existence  of  God,  and  on  everything howsoever

perceived.   (6:30)  Therefore  miracles, in the sense of events contrary

to  the  laws of nature, so far from demonstrating to us the existence
                                                               Bk.XIA:3343.
of God, would, on the contrary, lead us to doubt it, where, otherwise,

we  might  have been absolutely certain of it, as knowing that nature
                   Bk.XIA:3342.
follows a fixed and immutable order.



(6:31)  Let  us  take miracle as meaning that which cannot be explained

through  natural  causes.  (32)  This  may be interpreted in two senses:

either  as that which has natural causes, but cannot be examined by

the  human  intellect;  or  as  that which has no cause save God and

God's  will.  (6:33) But as all things which come to pass through natural

causes, come to pass also solely through the will and power of God,

it  comes to this, that a miracle, whether it has natural causes or not,

is  a  result  which cannot be explained by its cause, that is a pheno-

menon  which  surpasses  human  understanding;  but  from  such a

phenomenon,  and  certainly  from  a  result  surpassing  our  under-

standing,   we   can  gain  no  knowledge.   (6:34)  For  whatsoever  we

understand  clearly  and  distinctly  should  be  plain  to  us  either in

itself  or  by  means  of  something  else  clearly and distinctly under-

stood;  wherefore from a miracle or a phenomenon which we cannot

understand,  we  can  gain no knowledge of G-D's essence, or exist-

ence,  or  indeed  anything  about G-D or Nature; whereas when we

know  that   page 86  all  things  are  ordained  and ratified by God, that

the  operations  of  nature  follow from the essence of God, and that

the  laws  of  nature  are  eternal  decrees  and  volitions of God, we

must  perforce  conclude  that  our  knowledge  of God, and of God's

will  increases in proportion to our knowledge and clear understand-

ing  of  nature,  as  we  see  how  she depends on her primal cause,

and  how  she works according to eternal law.  (6:35) Wherefore so far

as our understanding goes, those phenomena which we clearly and

distinctly  understand  have  much  better right to be called works of

God,  and  to  be  referred  to the will of God than those about which

we  are  entirely  ignorant,  although  they  appeal  powerfully  to the

imagination, and compel men's admiration.



(6:36)  It  is  only  phenomena that we clearly and distinctly understand,

which  heighten  our  knowledge  of  God,  and most clearly indicate

His  will and decrees. (37) Plainly, they are but triflers who, when they

cannot  explain  a  thing,  run  back to the will of God; this is, truly, a

ridiculous  way  of expressing ignorance.  (6:38) Again, even supposing

that  some  conclusion  could  be drawn from miracles, we could not

possibly  infer  from  them  the  existence of God: for a miracle being

an  event  under  limitations  is  the  expression of a fixed and limited

power;  therefore  we  could  not  possibly infer from an effect of this

kind  the  existence  of  a  cause  whose  power  is infinite, but at the

utmost  only  of  a cause  whose  power  is  greater  than  that of the

said  effect.  (6:39)  I  say  at the utmost, for a phenomenon may be the

result  of  many  concurrent  causes, and its power may be less than

the  power  of  the  sum  of  such causes, but far greater than that of

any  one  of  them  taken  individually.   (6:39a)  On  the  other hand, the

laws  of  nature,  as  we  have  shown,  extend  over infinity, and are

conceived  by  us  as,  after  a  fashion, eternal, and nature works in

accordance  with  them  in  a  fixed  and  immutable order; therefore,

such  laws  indicate to us in a certain degree the infinity, the eternity,

and the immutability of God.



(6:40)   We  may  conclude, then, that we cannot gain knowledge of the

existence  and  providence of God by means of miracles, but that we

can  far  better  infer  them  from  the  fixed  and  immutable  order of

nature.  (6:41)  By  miracle,  I  here mean an event which surpasses, or

is  thought  to  surpass,  human  comprehension: for in so far as it is

supposed  to  destroy  or  page 87  interrupt  the  order  of  nature or her

laws,  it not only can give us no knowledge of G-D, but, contrariwise,

takes  away  that  which  we  naturally have, and makes us doubt of

G-D and everything else.



(6:42)  Neither  do I recognize any difference between an event against

the  laws  of  nature and an event beyond the laws of nature (that is,

according  to  some,  an event  which  does  not  contravene nature,

though  she  is  inadequate  to  produce or effect it)—for a miracle is

wrought  in, and not beyond nature, though it may be said in itself to

be  above  nature,  and,  therefore,  must  necessarily  interrupt  the

order  of  nature,   which  otherwise  we  conceive  of  as  fixed  and

unchangeable,   according   to   God's   decrees.   (6:43)   If,   therefore,

anything  should  come to pass in nature which does not follow from

her  laws,  it  would  also be in contravention to the order which God

has  established  in  nature  for  ever through universal natural laws:

it  would,  therefore,  be  in  contravention  to God's nature and laws,

and,  consequently,  belief  in  it would throw doubt upon everything,

and lead to Atheism.



(6:44)  I  think  I  have  now sufficiently established my second point, so

that  we can again conclude that a miracle, whether in contravention

to,  or  beyond, nature, is a mere absurdity; and, therefore, that what

is  meant  in  Scripture  by  a  miracle  can  only be a work of nature,

which  surpasses,  or is believed to surpass, human comprehension. 

(6:45)  Before  passing  on  to  my  third  point,  I  will adduce Scriptural

authority  for  my assertion that God cannot be known from miracles. 

(6:46)  Scripture  nowhere  states the doctrine openly, but it can readily

be  inferred  from  several passages.  (47) Firstly, that in which Moses

commands  (Deut. xiii.)  that  a false prophet should be put to death,

even  though  he work miracles: "If there arise a prophet among you,

and  giveth  thee  a sign or wonder, and the sign or wonder come to

pass,  saying,  Let us go after other gods . . . thou shalt not hearken

unto  the  voice  of  that  prophet; for the Lord your God proveth you,

and  that  prophet  shall  be  put  to  death."  (6:48)  From  this it clearly

follows  that  miracles could be wrought even by false prophets; and

that,  unless  men  are  honestly  endowed  with  the true knowledge

and  love  of  G-D,  they  may  be  as easily led by miracles to follow

false  gods  as  to  follow  the  true  G-D; for these words are added:

"For  the   page 88   Lord  your  God  tempts  you,  that  He  may  know

whether  you  love  Him with all your heart {religion} and with all your

mind {philosophy}."



(6:49)  Further,  the  Israelites,  from  all  their  miracles, were unable to

form  a  sound  conception  of G-D,  as their experience testified: for

when  they  had  persuaded  themselves  that  Moses had departed

from  among  them,  they  petitioned Aaron to give them visible gods;

and  the  idea  of  God  they  had  formed  as  the  result  of  all their

miracles was—a calf {idolatry}!



(6:50)  Asaph,  though  he  had heard of so many miracles, yet doubted

of  the  providence  of  God, and would have turned himself from the

true way, if he had not at last come to understand true blessedness.

(See Ps. lxxiii.)  (6:51)  Solomon,  too, at a time when the Jewish nation

was  at  the  height  of its prosperity, suspects that all things happen

by chance.  (See Eccles. iii:19, 20, 21; and chap. ix:2, 3, &c.)



(6::52)  Lastly,  nearly  all  the  prophets  found  it very hard to reconcile

the  order  of nature and human affairs with the conception they had

formed  of God's providence, whereas philosophers who endeavour

to  understand  things  by  clear conceptions of them, rather than by

miracles,  have  always  found  the  task  extremely  easy—at  least,

such  of  them  as place true happiness solely in virtue and peace of

mind,  and  who aim at obeying Nature, rather than being obeyed by

her.  (6:53) Such persons rest assured that G-D directs nature accord-

ing  to  the  requirements  of  universal  laws,  not  according  to  the

requirements   of   the  particular  laws  of  human  nature,  and  trial,

therefore,  G-D's  scheme  comprehends,  not  only  the human race,

but the whole of Nature.



(6:54)  It  is  plain,  then,  from Scripture itself, that miracles can give no

knowledge  of  G-D,  nor  clearly  teach  us  the  providence  of G-D.                Metaphors

(55)  As  to  the  frequent  statements  in  Scripture,  that  God wrought

miracles  to make Himself plain to man—as in Exodus x:2, where He

deceived  the  Egyptians,  and gave signs of Himself, that the Israel-

ites  might  know  that  He  was God,—it  does  not, therefore, follow

that  miracles  really  taught  this  truth,  but  only  that the Jews held

opinions  which  laid  them  easily  open  to  conviction  by  miracles. 

(6:56)  We  have  shown  in  Chap. II.  that the reasons assigned by the

prophets,   or   those   which   are  formed  from  revelation,  are  not

assigned  in  accordance  with  ideas  universal  and  common to all,

but  in  accordance  with  the  accepted   page 89   doctrines,  however

absurd,  and  with  the opinions of those to whom the revelation was

given, or those whom the Holy Spirit wished to convince.



(6:57)  This  we  have illustrated by many Scriptural instances, and can

further  cite  Paul,  who to the Greeks was a Greek, and to the Jews

a  Jew.  (58)  But  although  these  miracles  could  convince the Egyp-

tians  and Jews from their standpoint, they could not give a true idea

and  knowledge of G-D, but only cause them to admit that there was

a  Deity  more  powerful  than  anything known to them, and that this

Deity  took special care of the Jews, who had just then an unexpect-

edly  happy  issue of all their affairs.  (6:59) They could not teach them

that  G-D  cares  equally for all, for this can be taught only by philos-

ophy:  the  Jews,  and  all  who  took their knowledge of God's provi-

dence  from  the  dissimilarity  of  human  conditions  of  life  and the

inequalities  of  fortune,  persuaded  themselves  that  God loved the

Jews  above  all  men,  though  they  did not surpass their fellows in

true human perfection.



(6:60)  I  now  go  on to my third point, and show from Scripture that the

decrees  and  mandates  of  G-D, and consequently His providence,              Metaphors

are  merely  the  order  of Nature—that  is, when Scripture describes

an  event  as  accomplished  by  G-D  or  G-D's will, we must under-

stand  merely  that  it  was  in  accordance with the law and order of

nature,  not,  as  most  people  believe, that nature had for a season

ceased   to   act,   or   that   her  order  was  temporarily  interrupted. 

(6:61)  But  Scripture  does not directly teach matters unconnected with

its  doctrine,  wherefore  it  has  no  care  to  explain  things  by their
                                                                                           {quibble}
natural   causes,   nor   to   expound   matters   merely   speculative.              Cash Value

(6:62)  Wherefore  our  conclusion  must be gathered by inference from

those  Scriptural  narratives  which  happen  to  be  written  more  at

length  and  circumstantially  than usual.  (63) Of these I will cite a few.



(6:64)  In  the  first  book  of  Samuel, ix:15, 16,  it  is  related  that  God

revealed to Samuel that He would send Saul to him, yet God did not

send Saul to Samuel as people are wont to send one man to another. 

(6:65) His "sending" was merely the ordinary course of nature.  (66)  Saul

was  looking  for  the asses he had lost, and was meditating a return

home  without them, when, at the suggestion of his servant, he went

  page 90  to  the  prophet  Samuel,  to  learn  from  him  where he might

find  them.  (6:67)  From  no  part  of  the  narrative  does  it appear that

Saul   had  any  command  from  God  to  visit  Samuel  beyond  this

natural motive.



(6:68)  In  Psalm cv. 24  it  is  said  that  God  changed the hearts of the

Egyptians,  so  that  they  hated the Israelites.  (69) This was evidently

a  natural  change,  as appears from Exodus, chap. i., where we find

no  slight  reason for the Egyptians reducing the Israelites to slavery.



(6:70)  In  Genesis ix:13,  God tells Noah that He will set His bow in the

cloud;  this  action  of  God's  is  but  another  way  of expressing the

refraction  and  reflection  which the rays of the sun are subjected to

in drops of water.



(6:71)  In  Psalm cxlvii:18,  the  natural  action  and  warmth of the wind,             Metaphors

by  which hoar frost and snow are melted, are styled the word of the

Lord,  and  in  verse 15  wind and cold are called the commandment               Examples

and word of God.



(6:72)  In  Psalm civ:4, wind and fire are called the angels and ministers

of  G-D,  and  various  other  passages of the same sort are found in

Scripture,  clearly  showing that the decree, commandment, fiat, and

word  of  G-D  are  merely  expressions  for  the  action and order of

Nature.



(6:73)  Thus  it  is plain that all the events narrated in Scripture came to

pass  naturally,  and  are  referred directly to G-D because Scripture,

as  we  have  shown,  does  not  aim  at  explaining  things  by  their

natural  causes,  but  only  at  narrating  what appeals to the popular

imagination,  and  doing  so  in  the manner best calculated to excite

wonder,  and  consequently to impress the minds of the masses with             Constitution

devotion.   (6:74)  If,  therefore,  events are found in the Bible which we

cannot  refer  to  their causes, nay, which seem entirely to contradict

the  order  of  nature,  we  must  not  come to a stand, but assuredly

believe   that   whatever   did   really   happen   happened  naturally.            Exodus—freedom

(6:75)  This  view  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  in  the case of every

miracle  there  were  many  attendant  circumstances,  though these

were  not  always  related,  especially  where  the narrative was of a

poetic character.



(6:76)  The  circumstances of the miracles clearly show, I maintain, that

natural  causes  were needed.  (77)  For instance, in order to infect the

Egyptians  with  blains,  it  was  necessary  page 91  that Moses should
                            { ^ an inflammatory swelling or sore}
scatter  ashes  in  the  air (Exod. ix: 10);  the locusts also came upon

the  land  of Egypt by a command of God in accordance with nature,

namely,  by  an  east  wind  blowing  for  a whole day and night; and

they  departed  by  a very strong west wind (Exod. x:14, 19).  (6:78) By

a  similar  Divine  mandate the sea opened a way for the Jews (Exo.

xiv:21),  namely,  by  an east wind which blew very strongly all night.



(6:79)  So,  too, when Elisha would revive the boy who was believed to

be  dead,  he  was  obliged  to bend over him several times until the

flesh  of  the  child  waxed  warm,  and  at  last  he  opened his eyes

(2 Kings iv:34, 35).



(6:80) Again, in John's Gospel (chap. ix.) certain acts are mentioned as

performed  by Christ preparatory to healing the blind man, and there

are  numerous  other  instances showing that something further than

the   absolute   fiat   of   God   is   required   for   working  a  miracle.
                        { ^ an authoritative decree}



(6:81)  Wherefore  we  may  believe  that,  although  the circumstances

attending  miracles  are  not  related  always  or  in  full  detail, yet a

miracle was never performed without them.



(6:82)  This  is  confirmed  by  Exodus xiv:27,  where  it is simply stated

that  "Moses  stretched  forth  his  hand,  and  the  waters of the sea

returned  to  their  strength  in  the morning," no mention being made

of  a  wind;  but  in  the song of Moses (Exod. xv:10) we read, "Thou

didst  blow  with Thy wind (i.e. with a very strong wind), and the sea

covered  them."   (6:83)  Thus  the attendant circumstance is omitted in

the history, and the miracle is thereby enhanced.



(6:84)  But  perhaps  someone  will  insist  that  we  find  many things in

Scripture  which  seem  in  nowise  explicable  by natural causes, as

for  instance,  that  the  sins  of  men  and  their  prayers  can be the

cause  of  rain  and  of  the  earth's  fertility, or that faith can heal the

blind,  and  so  on.   (6:85)  But  I  think  I  have already made sufficient

answer: I have shown that Scripture does not explain things by their

secondary causes, but only narrates them in the order and the style

which  has  most  power  to  move  men, and especially uneducated             Hampshire:202

men,  to  devotion;  and therefore it speaks inaccurately of G-D and

of  events,  seeing  that  its  object  is  not  to  convince  the  reason,
            {bring Peace-of-Mind}
but  to  attract  and  lay hold of the imagination.  (6:86) If the Bible were       Mark Twain's "Little Story"

to  describe  the  destruction   page 92   of an empire in the style of poli-

tical  historians,  the  masses  would  remain  unstirred, whereas the

contrary is the case when it adopts the method of poetic description,

and  refers  all  things immediately to God.  (6:87) When, therefore, the

Bible  says  that  the  earth  is  barren because of men's sins, or that

the  blind  were  healed  by  faith,  we  ought  to take no more notice

than  when  it  says  that  God is angry at men's sins, that He is sad,                5P17 

that  He  repents  of the good He has promised and done; or that on

seeing  a  sign  he  remembers  something  He  had  promised,  and
                                                                                       {allegorically}
other  similar  expressions,  which are either thrown out poetically or

related   according   to   the   opinion  and  prejudices  of  the  writer.



(6:88)  We  may,  then,  be  absolutely certain that every event which is

truly  described  in  Scripture  necessarily happened, like everything

else,  according  to  natural  laws;  and  if anything is there set down

which  can  be proved in set terms to contravene the order of nature,            Durant:64087  

or  not  to  be  deducible  therefrom, we must believe it to have been
                                        {or to be interpreted metaphorically or allegorically}
foisted into the sacred writings by irreligious hands ^ ; for whatsoever 

is  contrary  to  nature  is also contrary to reason, and whatsoever is

contrary   to   reason   is  absurd,  and,  ipso  facto,  to  be  rejected.



(6:89)   There   remain  some  points  concerning  the  interpretation  of

miracles  to  be noted, or rather to be recapitulated, for most of them

have  been  already  stated.   (90)  These  I  proceed  to discuss in the

fourth  division  of  my  subject,  and  I  am  led  to do so lest anyone

should,  by  wrongly  interpreting  a  miracle,  rashly  suspect that he

has   found   something   in   Scripture   contrary   to  human  reason.



(6:91)  It  is  very  rare for men to relate an event simply as it happened,

without  adding  any  element  of  their own judgment.  (92) When they

see  or  hear  anything  new,  they  are, unless strictly on their guard,

so  occupied  with  their own  preconceived  opinions  that  they per-

ceive  something  quite  different  from the plain facts seen or heard,

especially  if  such facts surpass the comprehension of the beholder

or  hearer, and, most of all, if he is interested in their happening in a

given way.



(6:93)  Thus  men  relate  in chronicles and histories their own opinions

rather  than  actual  events,  so  that  one  and  the same event is so

differently  related  by  two  men  of  different  page 93  opinions,  that it

seems  like  two  separate  occurrences;  and, further, it is very easy

from  historical  chronicles  to  gather  the  personal  opinions  of the

historian.



(6:94) I could cite many instances in proof of this from the writings both

of  natural  philosophers and historians, but I will content myself with

one  only  from  Scripture,  and  leave the reader to judge of the rest.



(6:95)  In the time of Joshua the Hebrews held the ordinary opinion that

the  sun  moves  with  a  daily  motion,  and that the earth remains at

rest;  to  this  preconceived  opinion  they adapted the miracle which

occurred  during  their  battle  with  the  five  kings.  (6:96) They did not

simply  relate  that  that day was longer than usual, but asserted that

the  sun and moon  stood  still, or ceased from their motion—a state-

ment  which  would be of great service to them at that time in convin-

cing  and  proving  by  experience  to  the Gentiles, who worshipped

the  sun,  that  the  sun  was  under  the control of another deity who

could  compel  it to change its daily course.  (6:97) Thus, partly through

religious  motives,  partly  through  preconceived opinions, they con-

ceived  of  and  related  the  occurrence as something quite different

from what really happened.



(6:98)  Thus  in  order  to  interpret  the  Scriptural  miracles  and under-

stand  from  the  narration  of  them  how  they  really happened, it is

necessary  to  know  the  opinions  of  those  who  first  related them,

and  have  recorded  them  for  us in writing, and to distinguish such

opinions  from  the actual impression made upon their senses, other-

wise  we  shall  confound  opinions  and  judgments  with  the actual

miracle  as  it  really occurred: nay, further, we shall confound actual

events  with  symbolical  and  imaginary  ones.  (6:99)  For many things

are  narrated  in  Scripture  as  real,  and  were  believed  to  be real,

which   were   in   fact  only  symbolical  and  imaginary.  (6:100)  As, for

instance,  that  God  came  down  from  heaven  (Exod. xix:18,  Deut.

v:28),  and  that Mount Sinai smoked because God descended upon

it  surrounded  with  fire;  or,  again that Elijah ascended into heaven

in  a  chariot of fire,  with  horses of fire;  all these things were assur-

edly  merely  symbols  adapted  to  the  opinions  of  those who have

handed  them down to us as they were represented to them, namely,

as real.  (6:101) All who have any education know that G-D has    page 94

no  right  hand  nor  left;  that  He  is  not  moved nor at rest, nor in a

particular  place,  but  that  He  is  absolutely  infinite and contains in

Himself all perfections.



(6:102)  These  things,  I repeat, are known to whoever judges of things

by  the  perception  of pure reason, and not according as his imagin-

ation  is affected by his outward senses.  (6:103) Following the example

of  the masses who imagine a bodily Deity, holding a royal court with

a  throne  on  the  convexity  of  heaven,  above  the stars, which are

believed to be not very far off from the earth.



(6:104) To these and similar opinions very many narrations in Scripture

are  adapted,  and  should  not,  therefore,  be  mistaken  by philoso-

phers for realities.



(6:105)  Lastly,  in  order  to  understand,  in  the case of miracles,  what

actually  took  place,  we  ought  to  be  familiar  with Jewish phrases         Hebrew expression 

and  metaphors;  anyone  who  did  not make sufficient allowance for

these,   would   be  continually  seeing  miracles  in  Scripture  where

nothing  of  the kind is intended by the writer; he would thus miss the

knowledge  not  only of what actually happened, but also of the mind

of   the   writers  of  the  sacred  text.   (6:106)  For  instance,  Zechariah

speaking  of  some future war says (chap. xiv;7): " It shall be one day

which  shall  be  known  to  the  Lord,  not  day nor night; but at even

time  it  shall  be  light."  (6:106a)  In  these  words  he seems to predict a

great  miracle,  yet  he  only  means  that  the  battle  will be doubtful

the  whole  day,  that the issue will be known only to God, but that in

the  evening  they  will gain the victory: the prophets frequently used

to  predict  victories  and  defeats  of  the  nations  in similar phrases.

(6:107)  Thus  Isaiah, describing the destruction of Babylon, says (chap.

xiii:10): "The stars of heaven, and the constellations thereof, shall not

give  their  light; the sun shall be darkened in his going forth, and the

moon  shall  not  cause  her  light  to  shine."  (6:108)  Now I suppose no

one  imagines  that  at  the destruction of Babylon these phenomena

actually  occurred  any  more than that which the prophet adds, "For

I  will  make  the  heavens  to  tremble,  and  remove the earth out of

her place."



(6:109)  So,  too,  Isaiah  in foretelling to the Jews that they would return

from  Babylon  to  Jerusalem  in  safety,  and  would  not  suffer from
                                     {Isa 48:21}
thirst  on  their  journey,  says: "And they thirsted  page 95 not when He

led  them  through  the  deserts; He caused the waters to flow out of

the  rocks  for them; He clave the rocks, and the waters gushed out."

(6:110)  These  words  merely  mean  that  the  Jews,  like other people,

found  springs  in  the desert, at which they quenched their thirst; for

when  the  Jews  returned  to Jerusalem with the consent of Cyrus, it

is admitted that no similar miracles befell them.



(6:111)  In  this  way  many  occurrences in the Bible are to be regarded

merely  as  Jewish  expressions.  (112)  There  is  no need for me to go

through  them  in  detail;  but  I  will call attention generally to the fact

that  the  Jews employed such phrases not only rhetorically, but also,
                                             {used for mere style or effect ^ }
and indeed chiefly, from devotional motives.  (6:113) Such is the reason

for  the  substitution  of "bless God" for "curse God" in 1 Kings xxi:10,

and  Job  ii:9,  and  for  all  things  being  referred  to God, whence it

appears  that  the  Bible  seems  to relate nothing but miracles, even

when  speaking  of  the  most  ordinary occurrences, as in the exam-

ples given above.



(6:114)  Hence  we  must believe that when the Bible says that the Lord
  {Exo 7:13}
hardened  Pharaoh's  heart,  it  only  means that Pharaoh was obsti-
                                               {Gen 7:11}
nate;  when  it  says that God opened the windows of heaven, it only

means  that  it  rained  very hard, and so on.  (115) When we reflect on

these  peculiarities,  and also on the fact that most things are related

very  shortly,  with  very  little  details  and almost in abridgments, we

shall  see  that  there  is  hardly  anything  in  Scripture which can be

proved  contrary  to  natural  reason, while, on the other hand, many

things  which  before seemed obscure, will after a little consideration

be understood and easily explained.



(6:116)  I  think  I  have  now  very clearly explained all that I proposed to

explain,  but  before  I  finish  this chapter I would call attention to the

fact  that  I  have  adopted a different method in speaking of miracles

to  that  which  I  employed  in treating of prophecy.  (117)  Of prophecy

I have  asserted  nothing  which could not  be inferred from promises

revealed  in  Scripture,  whereas  in  this chapter I have deduced my

conclusions  solely  from  the  principles  ascertained  by  the natural

light  of  reason.  (6:118)  I  have  proceeded  in  this  way advisedly, for

prophecy,  in  that  it  surpasses human knowledge, is a purely theo-

logical  question;  therefore,  I knew that I could not make any asser-

tions  about  it,  nor  learn   page 96  wherein it consists, except through

deductions  from  premises that have been revealed; therefore I was

compelled  to  collate the history of prophecy, and to draw therefrom

certain  conclusions  which would teach me, in so far as such teach-

ing  is  possible, the nature and properties of the gift.  (6:119)  But in the

case  of  miracles,  as  our  inquiry is a question purely philosophical

(namely,  whether  anything  can happen which contravenes or does

not  follow from the laws of nature), I was not under any such neces-

sity:  I  therefore thought it wiser to unravel the difficulty through pre-

mises  ascertained  and  thoroughly  known  by  the  natural  light  of

reason.  (6:119a)  I  say  I  thought  it  wiser,  for  I could also easily have

solved   the  problem  merely  from  the  doctrines  and  fundamental

principles  of  Scripture:  in  order  that  everyone  may acknowledge

this, I will briefly show how it could be done.



(6:120)  Scripture makes the general assertion in several passages that

nature's  course  is  fixed  and  unchangeable.  (121) In Ps. cxlviii:6, for

instance,  and  Jer. xxxi:35.   (6:122) The wise man also, in Eccles. i:10,

distinctly  teaches that  "there is nothing new under the sun,"  and in

verses 11, 12,  illustrating  the  same  idea,  he  adds  that  although

something  occasionally  happens  which  seems new, it is not really

new,  but  "hath  been  already  of  old  time,  which  was  before  us,

whereof   there   is   no  remembrance,  neither  shall  there  be  any

remembrance  of things that are to come with those that come after."

(6:123)  Again  in  chap. iii:11,   he  says,  "God  hath  made  everything
                                                                    {Ecc 3:14}
beautiful in his time,"  and immediately afterwards adds, "I know that

whatsoever  God  doeth,  it shall be for ever; nothing can be put to it,

nor anything taken from it."



(6:124)  Now  all  these texts teach most distinctly that nature preserves

a  fixed  and  unchangeable  order,  and that G-D in all ages, known

and  unknown,  has  been  the same; further, that the laws of Nature

are  so  perfect,  that  nothing can be added thereto nor taken there-

from;   and,   lastly,  that  miracles  only  appear  as  something  new

because of man's ignorance.



(6:125)  Such   is   the  express  teaching  of  Scripture:  nowhere  does

Scripture  assert that anything happens which contradicts, or cannot

follow  from  the  laws  of  Nature; and, therefore, we should not attri-

bute to it such a doctrine.



(6:126)  To  these  considerations  we  must  add,  that  miracles require

 page 97  causes  and  attendant  circumstances,  and  that  they  follow,

not  from  some  mysterious  royal  power which the masses attribute

to  God,  but  from  the  Divine  rule  and  decree, that is (as we have

shown  from  Scripture  itself)  from  the  laws  and  order  of  Nature;

lastly,  that  miracles  can  be  wrought  even by false prophets, as is

proved from Deut. xiii. and Matt. xxiv:24.



(6:127)  The  conclusion,  then, that is most plainly put before us is, that

miracles   were   natural   occurrences,   and  must  therefore  be  so

explained  as  to  appear  neither  new (in the words of Solomon) nor

contrary  to  nature,  but,  as  far as possible, in complete agreement

with  ordinary  events.  (6:128) This can easily be done by anyone, now

that  I  have  set  forth  the  rules  drawn from Scripture.  (6:129)  Never-

theless,  though  I  maintain  that Scripture teaches this doctrine, I do

not  assert  that  it  teaches  it  as  a truth necessary to salvation, but

only  that  the  prophets  were  in  agreement  with  ourselves on the

point;  therefore  everyone  is free to think on the subject as he likes,

according  as  he  thinks  it  best  for  himself, and most likely to con-
                                                              {to lead or contribute to a result ^ }
duce   to   the   worship   of   G-D   and   to   singlehearted   religion.



(6:130)  This  is  also  the  opinion  of Josephus, for at the conclusion of

the  second book of his "Antiquities," he writes: Let no man think this

story  incredible  of  the  sea's  dividing  to save these people, for we

find  it  in  ancient  records  that this hath been seen before, whether

by  God's extraordinary will or by the course of nature it is indifferent.

(6:131)  The same thing happened one time to the Macedonians, under

the  command  of  Alexander,  when for want of another passage the

Pamphylian   Sea   divided  to  make  them  way;  God's  Providence

making  use  of  Alexander at that time as His instrument for destroy-

ing  the  Persian  Empire.  (6:132)  This  is  attested by all the historians

who have pretended to write the Life of that Prince.  (6:133)  But people

are at liberty to think what they please."



(6:134)  Such  are  the  words  of  Josephus,  and such is his opinion on

faith in miracles.

Page 98
CHAPTER VII.

OF THE INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE.


(7:1) When  people declare, as all are ready to do, that the Bible is the

Word  of  G-D  teaching man true blessedness and the way of salva-                Referral 

tion,  they  evidently do not mean what they say; for the masses take

no pains at all to live according to Scripture, and we see most people

endeavouring  to hawk about their own commentaries as the word of

God, and giving their best efforts, under the guise of religion, to com-

pelling  others  to  think  as  they  do: we generally see, I say, theolo-

gians  anxious to learn how to wring their inventions and sayings out

of the sacred text, and to fortify them with Divine authority.  (7:2)  Such

persons  never display less scruple or more zeal than when they are
                                              {Spinoza's intent - roo'-akh} 
interpreting  Scripture  or  the mind of the Holy Ghost; if we ever see
   {the third person of the Trinity. Also called <Holy Spirit> ^ }
them  perturbed,  it  is not that they fear to attribute some error to the

Holy  Spirit,  and  to stray from the right path, but that they are afraid

to  be  convicted  of error by others, and thus to overthrow and bring

into contempt their own authority.  (7:3)  But if men really believed what

they  verbally  testify  of  Scripture, they would adopt quite a different

plan of life: their minds would not be agitated by so many contentions,

nor  so  many  hatreds,  and  they would cease to be excited by such

a  blind  and  rash  passion  for  interpreting  the sacred writings, and

excogitating novelties in religion.  (7:4) On the contrary, they would not

dare  to  adopt,  as  the  teaching  of  Scripture,  anything which they

could not plainly deduce therefrom: lastly, those sacrilegious persons

who have dared, in several passages, to interpolate the Bible, would

have  shrunk  from  so  great  a  crime,  and  would  have stayed their

sacrilegious hands.



(7:5)  Ambition  and  unscrupulousness  have  waxed  so powerful, that

religion  is  thought  to  consist, not so much in respecting   page 99  the

writings  of  the  Holy  Ghost,  as  in defending human commentaries,

so that religion is no longer identified with charity, but with spreading

discord and propagating insensate hatred disguised under the name                Fences

of zeal for the Lord, and eager ardour.



(7:6)  To  these  evils  we must add superstition, which teaches men to

despise  reason  and  Nature,  and  only to admire and venerate that

which  is  repugnant  to  both:  whence it is not wonderful that for the

sake  of  increasing  the  admiration and veneration felt for Scripture,

men  strive  to  explain it so as to make it appear to contradict, as far

as  possible,  both  one  and  the  other:  thus  they  dream that most

profound  mysteries  lie  hid  in  the Bible, and weary themselves out

in  the  investigation  of  these  absurdities,  to  the neglect of what is

useful.   (7:7)  Every  result  of  their diseased imagination they attribute

to  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  strive  to  defend with the utmost zeal and

passion;  for  it  is  an  observed fact that men employ their reason to

defend  conclusions  arrived  at  by  reason,  but conclusions arrived

at by the passions are defended by the passions.



(7:8)  If  we  would separate ourselves from the crowd and escape from

theological  prejudices,  instead of rashly accepting human commen-

taries  for  Divine  documents,  we  must consider the true method of

interpreting  Scripture  and  dwell  upon  it  at  some  length: for if we

remain in ignorance of this we cannot know, certainly, what the Bible
                                 Bk.XIV:2:3283.
and the Holy Spirit wish to teach.


                                                                                     Bk.XIA:5920.
(7:9)  I  may sum up the matter by saying that the method of interpreting
                                                                                 { scientific method }
Scripture does not widely differ from the method of interpreting Nature
                                                                                       ^ Bk.III:179.
—in fact,  it is almost the same.  (10) For as the interpretation of Nature

consists  in  the  examination  of  the history of Nature, and therefrom
                                            Bk.XIA:81128.
deducing  definitions  of  natural  phenomena on certain fixed axioms,

so  Scriptural interpretation proceeds by the examination of Scripture,

and  inferring  the  intention  of  its authors as a legitimate conclusion

from its fundamental principles.  (7:11) By working in this manner every-

one  will  always  advance without danger of error—that is, if they ad-

mit no principles for interpreting Scripture, and discussing its contents

save such as they find in Scripture itself—and will be able with equal

security  to  discuss  what   page 100  surpasses our understanding, and
                                     Bk.XIA:5920; 78117.
what is known by the natural light of reason.


              Bk.XIA:6438
(7:12)  In  order  to  make  clear  that  such a method is not only correct,

but  is  also  the  only  one  advisable,  and  that  it  agrees  with that

employed  in  interpreting  Nature,  I  must remark that Scripture very

often  treats  of  matters  which  cannot  be  deduced from principles

known  to  reason:  for  it is chiefly made up of narratives and revela-

tion:  the  narratives  generally contain miracles—that is, as we have

shown  in  the  last chapter,  relations of extraordinary natural occur-

rences  adapted  to  the opinions and judgment of the historians who

recorded  them: the revelations also were adapted to the opinions of

the  prophets,  as  we  showed  in  Chap. II.,  and  in themselves sur-

passed  human  comprehension.  (7:13) Therefore the knowledge of all

these—that  is,  of  nearly  the  whole  contents of Scripture, must be
                            Bk.XIA:6337.
sought  from  Scripture  alone,  even  as  the knowledge of Nature is
                     Bk.XIA:6438.
sought  from  nature.  (7:14)  As  for  the  moral doctrines which are also           Moral agent 

contained  in  the  Bible,  they  may  be  demonstrated from received

axioms,  but  we  cannot  prove  in  the  same  manner that Scripture

intended to teach them, this can only be learned from Scripture itself.



(7:15)  If  we  would  bear  unprejudiced  witness  to the Divine origin of

Scripture,  we  must  prove solely on its own authority that it teaches

true  moral  doctrines,  for by such means alone can its Divine origin

be  demonstrated:  we have shown that the certitude of the prophets

depended  chiefly  on  their having minds turned towards what is just

and  good,  therefore we ought to have proof of their possessing this

quality  before  we  repose  faith  in  them.  (7:16)  From  miracles God's

divinity  cannot  be  proved,  as  I have already shown, and need not

now   repeat,   for  miracles  could   be   wrought  by  false  prophets.

(7:17) Wherefore the Divine origin of Scripture must consist solely in its

teaching  true virtue.  (7:18) But we must come to our conclusion simply

on  Scriptural  grounds,  for  if we were unable to do so we could not,

unless  strongly  prejudiced  accept the Bible and bear witness to its

Divine origin.



(7:19) Our  knowledge of Scripture must then be looked for in Scripture

only.



(7:20) Lastly,  Scripture does not give us definition of things   page 101  any           Parkinson:2601

more than Nature does: therefore, such definitions must be sought in

in  the  latter  case  from the diverse workings of nature; in the former

case,  from  the  various  narratives  about  the  given  subject  which

occur in the Bible.



(7:21)  The  universal  rule,  then,  in  interpreting Scripture is to accept

nothing  as  an  authoritative  Scriptural  statement  which we do not
                  Bk.XIA:75100.
perceive  very  clearly  when  we  examine it in the light of its history.

(7:22)  What  I  mean by its history, and what should be the chief points

elucidated, I will now explain.



(7:23) The history of a Scriptural statement comprises—


I.    (7:23a)  The  nature  and  properties  of  the  language  in which the

books  of  the  Bible  were  written,  and in which their authors were,

accustomed  to  speak.   (7:24)  We  shall  thus  be  able to investigate

every   expression   by   comparison   with  common  conversational

usages.


I.  Continued
                                     {The Hebrew Bible,}
(7:25)  Now  all  the writers both of  ^  the Old Testament, and the New
                                                                          Bk.XIA:6439; Bk.XIX:10512.
were  Hebrews:  therefore,  a  knowledge of the Hebrew language is

before  all  things  necessary,  not only for the comprehension of the
  {The Hebrew Bible and the, }
Old  Testament,  which  was  written  in  that  tongue, but also of the

New:  for  although  the  latter was published in other languages, yet
         Bk.XX:32413. 
its characteristics are Hebrew.


II.   (7:26)  An  analysis  of  each  book  and arrangement of its contents

under  heads;  so  that we may have at hand the various texts which

treat of a given subject.  (7:27) Lastly, a note of all the passages which
                                                                                  Bk.XIA:6440.
are  ambiguous  or  obscure,  or  which seem mutually contradictory.


II.  Continued

 (7:28)  I  call  passages  clear or obscure according as their meaning is

inferred  easily  or with difficulty in relation to the context, not accord-

ing  as  their  truth  is  perceived  easily  or  the  reverse  by  reason.

(7:29)  We  are  at work not on the truth of passages, but solely on their

meaning.  (7:30)  We  must  take  especial care, when we are in search
                                                                              Bk.XIA:75100.
of  the  meaning  of a text, not to be led away by our reason in so far

as  it  is  founded  on principles of natural knowledge (to say nothing

of  prejudices):  in  order  not  to confound the meaning of a passage

with  its  truth,  we  must  examine it solely by means of the significa-
                                                                                  Bk.XIA:6648.
tion  of  the  words, or by a reason acknowledging no foundation but

Scripture.


II.  Continued

(7:31)  I will illustrate my meaning by an example.  (32) The words  page 102
                            {Exo 3:2}                {Exo 20:5, Exo 34:14}
of  Moses, "God is a fire" and "God is jealous," are perfectly clear so               Metaphors

long  as  we regard merely the signification of the words, and I there-

fore  reckon  them  among  the  clear passages, though in relation to

reason  and  truth  they  are  most  obscure:  still, although the literal

meaning  is  repugnant  to  the  natural  light of reason, nevertheless,

if  it  cannot  be  clearly  overruled on grounds and principles derived

from  its  Scriptural  "history,"  it,  that  is, the literal meaning, must be

the  one  retained:  and  contrariwise if these passages literally inter-

preted  are  found  to  clash  with  principles  derived  from Scripture,

though  such  literal  interpretation  were  in  absolute  harmony  with

reason,  they   must   be   interpreted   in   a   different   manner,   i.e. 

metaphorically.


II.  Continued

(7:33)  If  we  would  know  whether Moses believed God to be a fire or

not,  we  must  on no account decide the question on grounds of the
                                             Bk.XIA:79118; Bk.XX:27995.
reasonableness  or  the  reverse  of such an opinion, but must judge

solely by the other opinions of Moses which are on record.


II.  Continued

(7:34)  In  the  present   instance,   as   Moses   says   in  several  other

passages  that  God  has no likeness to any visible thing, whether in

heaven  or  in  earth,  or  in the water, either all such passages must

be  taken  metaphorically,  or  else  the  one  before  us  must  be so

explained.  (7:35)   However,  as  we  should depart as little as possible

from  the  literal  sense,  we must first ask whether this text, God is a

fire,  admits  of  any  but  the  literal  meaning—that  is,  whether  the

word   fire   ever   means   anything   besides   ordinary   natural  fire.

(7:36)  If  no  such  second  meaning  can  be  found,  the  text  must be

taken  literally,  however  repugnant  to  reason it may be: and all the

other  passages,  though  in complete accordance with reason, must

be   brought   into  harmony  with  it.   (7:37)  If  the  verbal  expressions

would  not  admit  of  being  thus  harmonized, we should have to set

them  down  as  irreconcilable,  and  suspend our judgment concern-

ing  them.  (7:38)  However,  as  we  find the name fire applied to anger

and  jealousy  (see  Job xxxi:12)  we  can  thus  easily  reconcile  the

words  of  Moses,  and  legitimately  conclude  that  the  two proposi-

tions  God  is  a  fire,  and  God  is  jealous,  are in meaning identical.


II.  Continued

(7:39) Further,  as  Moses  clearly  teaches  that  God  is  jealous,  and

nowhere  states  that  God is without passions or emotions, we must                  5P17 

evidently  infer  that  Moses  held  this  page 103 doctrine himself,  or  at
                                {pedagogically}
any rate, that he wished  ^  to  teach it,  nor must we refrain because

such  a  belief  seems  contrary  to  reason:  for  as  we  have shown,

we  cannot  wrest  the  meaning  of  texts  to  suit  the  dictates of our

reason,  or  our  preconceived  opinions.  (7:40)  The  whole  knowledge

of the Bible must be sought solely from itself.



III. (7:41)  Lastly,  such a history should relate the environment of all the

prophetic  books extant; that is, the life, the conduct, and the studies

of  the  author  of  each  book,  who  he was, what was the occasion,

and  the  epoch  of  his  writing,  whom  did  he write for, and in what

language.  (7:42)  Further,  it  should  inquire into the fate of each book:

how   it   was  first  received,  into  whose  hands  it  fell,  how  many

different  versions  there  were of it, by whose advice was it received

into  the Bible, and, lastly, how all the books now universally accept-
                                    Bk.XIA:6441; Bk.XX:27996.
ed as sacred, were united into a single whole.


III.  Continued

(7:43)  All  such  information should, as I have said, be contained in the

"history"  of  Scripture.  (44) For, in order to know what statements are

set  forth  as  laws,  and what as moral precepts, it is important to be

acquainted  with  the  life,   the  conduct,  and  the  pursuits  of  their

author:  moreover,  it  becomes  easier to explain a man's writings in

proportion  as  we  have  more intimate knowledge of his genius and
   Bk.XX:27996.
temperament.


III.  Continued

(7:45) Further,  that  we  may  not confound precepts which are eternal

with  those  which  served  only  a  temporary  purpose, or were only

meant  for  a   few, we should know what was the occasion, the time,

the  age,  in  which each book was written, and to what nation it was

addressed.


III.  Continued

(7:46)  Lastly,  we  should  have  knowledge  on the other points I have

mentioned,  in  order to be sure, in addition to the authenticity of the

work,  that  it  has not been tampered with by sacrilegious hands, or

whether  errors  can  have  crept  in,  and,  if  so, whether they have

been  corrected  by  men  sufficiently skilled and worthy of credence.

(47)  All  these  things  should  be known, that we may not be led away

by  blind  impulse to accept whatever is thrust on our notice, instead

of only that which is sure and indisputable.



(7:48)  Now when we are in possession of this history of Scripture, and

have  finally  decided  that  we  assert  nothing as prophetic doctrine

which  does  not  directly follow from such  page 104  history, or which is

not  clearly  deducible  from  it,  then,  I say, it will be time to gird our-

selves  for  the  task of investigating the mind of the prophets and of

the  Holy Spirit.  (7:49) But in this further arguing, also, we shall require

a  method  very  like  that  employed  in  interpreting nature from her

history.  (7:50)  As in the examination of natural phenomena we try first
                                                                      Bk.XIV:2:126. 
to  investigate  what  is  most  universal  and common to all nature—
                                                                                       Bk.XIV:2:1264. 
such,  for  instance,  as  motion  and  rest,  and  their laws and rules,

which  nature  always  observes,  and through which she continually

works—and  then  we  proceed  to  what is less universal; so, too, in

the  history  of Scripture,  we  seek first for that which is most univer-

sal,  and  serves  for  the  basis  and  foundation  of  all  Scripture, a

doctrine,  in  fact,  that  is commended by all the prophets as eternal
                                    Bk.XIA:79119.
and  most  profitable  to  all  men.  (7:51)  For example, that God is one,

and  that  He  is  omnipotent,  that  He  alone should be worshipped,

that  He  has  a  care for all men, and that He especially loves those 
                                         Bk.XIA:80126; Bk.XX:28097. 
who   adore   Him   and   love   their  neighbour  as  themselves,  &c.           Golden Rule

(7:52)  These  and  similar doctrines,  I repeat, Scripture everywhere so

clearly  and  expressly  teaches, that no one was ever in doubt of its
                     Bk.XIA:81127.
meaning concerning them.



(7:53)  The  nature  of  God, His manner of regarding and providing for

things,  and  similar  doctrines,  Scripture  nowhere teaches profess-

edly  {?, Ps. 145:16},  and  as  eternal  doctrine; on the contrary, we

have  shown  that  the  prophets  themselves  did  not  agree on the

subject;  therefore,  we must not lay down any doctrine as Scriptural

on  such  subjects,  though  it may appear perfectly clear on rational

grounds.



(7:54)  From  a proper knowledge of this universal doctrine of Scripture,

we  must  then  proceed to other doctrines less universal, but which,

nevertheless,  have  regard  to  the  general conduct of life, and flow

from  the  universal  doctrine  like rivulets from a source; such are all

particular  external  manifestations of true virtue, which need a given

occasion  for  their  exercise;  whatever is obscure or ambiguous on

such points in Scripture must be explained and defined by its univer-

sal doctrine; with regard to contradictory instances, we must observe
                                                                          Bk.XIA:80122.
the  occasion  and  the  time  in  which  they  were  written.   (7:55)   For
                               Bk.XIA:80123—Matt. 5:4.
instance,  when  Christ  says, "Blessed are they that mourn, for they

shall  be  comforted"   page 105   we  do  not  know,   from   the   actual

passage,  what  sort  of  mourners  are  meant;  as,  however, Christ

afterwards  teaches  that  we  should  have  care  for  nothing,  save

only  for  the  kingdom  of God and His righteousness, which is com-

mended  as  the  highest  good  (see Matt. vi. 33),  it  follows  that by

mourners  He  only  meant those who mourn for the kingdom of God

and  righteousness  neglected  by  man:  for  this  would be the only

cause  of  mourning  to  those  who love nothing but the Divine king-
                 fairness—Bk.XIA:80123.
dom  and  justice,  and  who  evidently  despise  the  gifts of fortune.
                                                     Matt. 5:39    Bk.XIA:80124—Lam. 3:25-30.
(7:56)  So,  too,  when  Christ says: "But if a man strike you on the right
                                     Bk.XIB:582.
cheek,   turn  to  him  the  left  also,"   and  the  words  which  follow.



(7:57)  If  He  had  given such a command, as a lawgiver, to judges, He

would   thereby  have  abrogated  the  law  of  Moses,   but  this  He

expressly  says  He  did  not  do (Matt. v:17).  (58) Wherefore we must

consider who was the speaker, what was the occasion, and to whom

were  the  words  addressed.  (7:59)  Now  Christ  said  that  He did not

ordain  laws  as  a  legislator,  but  inculcated precepts as a teacher:

inasmuch  as  He  did not aim at correcting outward actions so much
              Bk.XIA:106115.
as  the frame of mind.  (7:60) Further, these words were spoken to men

who  were  oppressed,  who lived in a corrupt commonwealth on the

brink  of  ruin,  where  justice  was  utterly neglected.  (7:61)  The  very

doctrine  inculcated  here by Christ just before the destruction of the

city  was  also  taught  by  Jeremiah  before  the  first  destruction of

Jerusalem,    that   is,   in  similar  circumstances,   as  we  see  from

Lamentations iii:25-30.



(7:62) Now as such teaching was only set forth by the prophets in times

of  oppression, and was even then never laid down as a law; and as,

on  the  other hand, Moses (who did not write in times of oppression,
                                                                            Bk.XIA:105114.
but—mark this—strove   to   found   a well-ordered  commonwealth),             Constitution

while condemning envy and hatred of one's neighbour, yet ordained

that  an  eye  should be given for an eye, it follows most clearly from

these   purely  Scriptural  grounds  that  this  precept  of  Christ  and

Jeremiah  concerning submission to injuries was only valid in places

where justice is neglected, and in a time of oppression, but does not             Martyr Laws

hold good in a well-ordered state.



(7:63)  In  a  well-ordered state where justice is administered every one

is  bound,   if  he  would  be  accounted  just,  to  demand  penalties

before  the  judge  (see Lev:19:15),  not for the   page 106   sake of ven-

geance  (Lev.  xix:17, 18),  but  in  order  to  defend  justice  and  his

country's  laws,  and  to  prevent the wicked rejoicing in their wicked-

ness.   (64)  All  this  is  plainly  in accordance with reason.  (7:65)  I might

cite  many  other  examples  in the same manner, but I think the fore-

going  are  sufficient  to  explain  my  meaning  and  the utility of this

method,  and  this  is  all my present purpose.  (7:66)  Hitherto we have

only  shown  how  to  investigate those passages of Scripture which

treat  of  practical conduct,  and  which,  therefore,  are  more easily

examined,  for  on  such  subjects there was never really any contro-               Sacred

versy among the writers of the Bible.



(7:67)  The  purely  speculative passages cannot be so easily traced to

their  real  meaning: the way becomes narrower, for as the prophets
                                                        Bk.XIA:80125.
differed in matters speculative among themselves, and the narratives
                                                           Bk.XIA:7285
are in great measure adapted to the prejudices of each age, we must

not,  on  any  account  infer the intention of one prophet from clearer

passages  in  the  writings  of  another;  nor  must  we  so explain his

meaning,  unless  it  is  perfectly  plain that the two prophets were at

one in the matter.



(7:68)  How  we  are  to  arrive  at  the intention of the prophets in such

cases I will briefly explain. (69) Here, too, we must begin from the most

universal  proposition,  inquiring  first  from  the most clear Scriptural

statements what is the nature of prophecy or revelation, and wherein

does it consist; then we must proceed to miracles, and so on to what-

ever  is  most  general  till  we  come  to  the  opinions of a particular

prophet,  and,  at  last,  to  the  meaning  of  a  particular  revelation,

prophecy,  history, or miracle.  (7:70) We have already pointed out that

great  caution is necessary not to confound the mind of a prophet or

historian  with  the mind of the Holy Spirit and the truth of the matter;

therefore I need not dwell further on the subject. (71) I would, however,

here  remark  concerning  the meaning of revelation, that the present

method  only  teaches us what the prophets really saw or heard, not

what  they desired to signify or represent by symbols.  (7:72) The latter

may   be   guessed  at  but  cannot  be  inferred  with  certainty  from

Scriptural premises.



(7:73) We  have  thus  shown  the  plan  for  interpreting Scripture, and

have,  at  the  same  time, demonstrated that it is the one and surest

way  of  investigating  its  true  meaning.    (7:74)   I  am   page 107   willing

indeed  to  admit that those persons (if any such there be) would be

more  absolutely  certainly  right,  who  have  received either a trust-

worthy  tradition  or  an  assurance  from  the  prophets  themselves,

such  as  is  claimed  by  the  Pharisees; or who have a pontiff gifted

with  infallibility  in the interpretation of Scripture, such as the Roman

Catholics  boast.  (7:75)  But  as  we can never be perfectly sure, either

of  such  a tradition or of the authority of the pontiff, we cannot found

any  certain  conclusion  on  either:  the  one  is denied by the oldest

sect  of Christians, the other by the oldest sect of Jews.  (7:76)  Indeed,

if   we   consider  the  series  of  years  (to  mention  no  other  point)

accepted  by  the  Pharisees  from  their  Rabbis,  during which time

they  say  they  have  handed  down  the tradition  from  Moses,  we

shall  find  that  it is not correct, as I show elsewhere.  (7:77) Therefore

such  a  tradition  should  be  received  with  extreme suspicion; and

although,  according  to  our  method,  we  are bound to consider as

uncorrupted  the  tradition  of  the  Jews, namely, the meaning of the

Hebrew  words  which  we  received  from  them, we may accept the

latter while retaining our doubts about the former.



(7:78)  No  one  has  ever  been  able to change the meaning of a word

in  ordinary  use,  though  many  have  changed  the  meaning  of  a

particular  sentence.  (7:79)  Such a proceeding would be most difficult;

for  whoever  attempted  to change the meaning of a word, would be

compelled,   at   the   same   time,   to   explain  all  the authors  who

employed  it,  each  according  to  his temperament and intention, or

else, with consummate cunning, to falsify them.



(7:80)  Further,  the  masses  and  the learned alike preserve language,

but  it  is  only  the  learned  who  preserve the meaning of particular

sentences  and  books: thus, we may easily imagine that the learned

having  a  very rare book in their power, might change or corrupt the

meaning  of a sentence in it, but they could not alter the signification

of the words; moreover, if anyone wanted to change the meaning of

a common word he would not be able to keep up the change among
                                              Bk.XIA:74 99.
posterity, or in common parlance or writing.



(7:81) For  these and such-like reasons we may readily conclude that it

would  never  enter  into  the  mind  of anyone to corrupt a language,

though the intention of a writer may  page 108  often have been falsified

by changing his phrases or interpreting them amiss.  (7:82) As then our

method (based on the principle that the knowledge of Scripture must
   
be  sought  from  itself alone) is the sole true one, we must evidently

renounce  any  knowledge  which  it  cannot furnish for the complete

understanding  of  Scripture.  (7:83)  I  will  now  point out its difficulties

and   shortcomings,   which   prevent  our  gaining  a  complete  and

assured knowledge of the Sacred Text.



(7:84)  Its  first  great difficulty consists in its requiring a thorough know-
                              Bk.XIA:6439.
ledge  of  the  Hebrew language.  (85) Where is such knowledge to be

obtained?  (7:86)  The  men  of  old  who  employed the Hebrew tongue

have  left  none of the principles and bases of their language to pos-

terity; we have from them absolutely nothing in the way of dictionary,

grammar, or rhetoric.


                        Bk.XIB:3774.
(7:87) Now the Hebrew nation has lost all its grace and beauty (as one

would expect after the defeats and persecutions it has gone through),

and has only retained certain fragments of its language and of a few

books.  (88) Nearly all the names of fruits, birds, and fishes, and many

other words have perished in the wear and tear of time.  (7:89) Further,

the  meaning  of many nouns and verbs which occur in the Bible are

either  utterly  lost,  or  are subjects of dispute.  (7:90)  And not only are
                                                                                         Bk.XIA:6439.
these  gone,  but we are lacking in a knowledge of   Hebrew phrase-
                                                                    {Biblical ^ }
ology.   (7:91)  The  devouring  tooth  of  time  has  destroyed  turns  of

expression  peculiar to the Hebrews, so that we know them no more.



(7:92)  Therefore  we  cannot investigate as we would all the meanings

of  a  sentence  by  the  uses  of  the  language; and there are many

phrases of which the meaning is most obscure or altogether inexplic-

able, though the component words are perfectly plain.


                                                                                        Bk.XIA:6439.
(7:93) To this impossibility of tracing the history of the Hebrew language

must  be added its particular nature and composition: these give rise

to  so  many  ambiguities  that it is impossible to find a method which

would  enable us to gain a certain knowledge of all the statements in

Scripture (7).  (94) In addition to the sources of ambiguities common to

all languages, there are many peculiar to Hebrew. (7:95) These, I think,

it worth while to mention.



(7:96)  Firstly,  an  ambiguity  often arises in the Bible from our   page 109

mistaking  one letter for another similar one.  (97) The Hebrews divide

the  letters  of  the  alphabet  into  five  classes, according to the five

organs of the month employed in pronouncing them, namely, the lips,

the  tongue,  the  teeth,  the palate, and the throat.  (7:98) For instance,

Alpha,  Ghet, Hgain, He, {Strong: aw'-leph, khayth, ah'-yin, hay} are

called  gutturals,  and  are  barely  distinguishable,  by  any sign that

we  know, one from the other.  (7:99)   Ale {Strong: 413}, which signifies

"to",  is often taken for al, {Strong:5921}, which signifies "above", and

vice versâ.  (7:100)  Hence sentences are often rendered rather ambigu-

ous or meaningless.



(7:101)   A   second   difficulty   arises  from  the  multiplied  meaning  of

conjunctions and adverbs. (7:102)  For instance, vau{v}, {see Gesenius}

serves   promiscuously   for   a  particle  of  union  or  of  separation,

meaning,  and, but, because, however, then:  ki, {kee, Strong:3588},

has  seven  or  eight  meanings,  namely,   wherefore,  although,  if,

when, inasmuch as, because, a burning, &c., and so on with almost

all particles.



(7:103)  The  third  very  fertile  source  of doubt is the fact that Hebrew

verbs  in  the  indicative  mood  lack  the present, the past imperfect,

the  pluperfect,  the  future perfect, and other tenses most frequently

employed  in other languages; in the imperative and infinitive moods

they  are  wanting  in all except the present, and a subjunctive mood

does  not  exist.  (7:104)  Now,  although all these defects in moods and

tenses  may  be supplied  by  certain  fundamental  rules  of the lan-

guage  with  ease  and  even elegance, the ancient writers evidently

neglected  such  rules  altogether,  and employed indifferently future

for  present  and past, and vice versâ past for future, and also indic-

ative  for  imperative and subjunctive, with the result of considerable

confusion.



(7:105)  Besides  these  sources  of ambiguity there are two others, one

very important.  (106)  Firstly, there are in Hebrew no vowels; secondly,

the   sentences  are  not  separated  by  any  marks  elucidating  the

meaning  or  separating the clauses.  (7:107) Though the want of these

two has generally been supplied by points and accents, such substi-

tutes  cannot  be  accepted  by  us, inasmuch as they were invented

and   designed   by  men  of  an  after  age  whose  authority  should

carry  no  weight.   (7:108)  The  ancients  wrote  without points (that  is,

without   vowels   and   accents),   as  is  abundantly  testified;  their

descendants,  {Masoretics:  a  body  of  scribal  notes  that  form  a

textual  guide  to  the  Hebrew Bible, compiled  from the 6th to 10th

centuries},  added what was lacking, according  to their own   page 110

ideas of Scriptural  interpretation; wherefore the existing accents and
  
points  are simply current interpretations, and are  no more authorita-

tive than any other commentaries.



(7:109)  Those  who are ignorant of this fact cannot justify the author of

the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews  for  interpreting  (chap. xi:21) Genesis

(xlvii:31)  very  differently  from  the version given in our Hebrew text

as  at  present  pointed,  as  though the Apostle had been obliged to

learn  the  meaning  of  Scripture  from  those  who added the points.

(7:110) In my opinion the latter are clearly wrong. (111) In order that every-

one may judge for himself,  and also see how the discrepancy arose

simply  from  the  want  of  vowels,   I  will  give  both  interpretations.

(7:112) Those  who  pointed  our  version read, "And Israel bent himself

over,  or  (changing  Hqain  into  Aleph, a similar letter) towards, the

head  of  the bed."  (7:113)  The author of the Epistle reads, "And Israel

bent himself over the head of his staff," substituting  mate, {mat-teh',

Strong:4294-staff}, for mita, {mit-taw', Strong:4296-bed}, from which

it only differs in respect of vowels.  (7:114)  Now as  in this narrative it is

Jacob's  age only that is in question, and not his illness, which is not

touched  on  till the next chapter, it seems more likely that the histor-

ian  intended  to  say  that  Jacob  bent  over  the head of his staff (a

thing  commonly  used  by  men  of  advanced  age for their support)

than  that  he bowed himself at the head of his bed, especially as for

the  former  reading no substitution of letters is required.  (7:115) In this

example  I  have  desired  not  only  to  reconcile the passage in the

Epistle with the passage in Genesis, but also and chiefly to illustrate

how little trust should be placed in the points and accents which are

found  in  our  present  Bible,  and so to prove that he who would be

without  bias  in  interpreting Scripture should hesitate about accept-

ing them, and inquire afresh for himself.   (7:116) Such being the nature
                                          Bk.XIA:6439.
and  structure  of  the Hebrew language, one may easily understand

that many difficulties are likely to arise, and that no possible method

could  solve  all  of  them.  (7:117)  It is useless to hope for a way out of

our  difficulties  in  the  comparison of various parallel passages (we

have  shown that the only method of discovering the true sense of a

passage out of many alternative ones is to see what are the usages

of  the  language), for this comparison of parallel passages can only

accidentally  throw   page 111  light  on  a  difficult point, seeing that the

prophets never wrote with the express object of explaining their own

phrases or those of other people, and also because we cannot infer

the  meaning  of  one  prophet or apostle by the meaning of another,

unless  on a purely practical question, not when the matter is specu-

lative,  or  if  a  miracle,  or history is being narrated.  (7:118) I might illu-

strate  my  point  with  instances,   for  there  are  many  inexplicable

phrases  in  Scripture,  but  I  would  rather  pass  on to consider the

difficulties   and   imperfections   of   the   method  under  discussion.



(7:119)  A  further  difficulty  attends  the  method,  from  the  fact  that it

requires  the  history  of  all  that  has happened to every book in the

Bible;  such  a history we are often quite unable to furnish. (120) Of the

authors, or (if the expression be preferred), the writers of many of the

books,  we  are  either in complete ignorance, or at any rate in doubt,

as  I  will point out at length.  (7:121) Further, we do not know either the

occasions  or  the epochs when these books of unknown authorship

were  written;  we  cannot say into what hands they fell, nor how the

numerous  varying  versions  originated;  nor,  lastly,  whether there

were not other versions, now lost.  (122) I have briefly shown that such

knowledge  is  necessary,  but  I passed over certain considerations

which I will now draw attention to.



(7:123)  If  we  read  a  book  which  contains  incredible  or  impossible
                                                             Bk.XIA:6442.
narratives,  or  is  written  in  a  very  obscure  style, and if we know

nothing  of its author, nor of the time or occasion of its being written,

we  shall  vainly endeavour to gain any certain knowledge of its true

meaning.   (7:124)  For  being  in  ignorance  on these points we cannot

possibly  know  the  aim  or intended aim of the author; if we are fully

informed,  we  so  order  our  thoughts as not to be in any way preju-

diced  either  in  ascribing  to  the author or him for whom the author

wrote  either  more  or  less than his meaning, and we only take into

consideration  what  the  author  may  have  had in his mind, or what

the time and occasion demanded.  (7:125)  I think this must be tolerably

evident to all.



(7:126)  It  often  happens  that  in  different  books  we read histories in

themselves similar, but which we judge very differently, according to

the  opinions  we  have formed of the authors.  (7:127) I remember once

to  have  read  in  some  book   page 112  that  a  man  named  Orlando
 Bk.XIA:6443.
Furioso  used  to  drive  a  kind  of  winged  monster  through the air,

fly  over  any  countries  he  liked,  kill unaided vast numbers of men

and  giants,  and  such  like  fancies, which from the point of view of

reason are obviously absurd.  (7:128) A very similar story I read in Ovid

of  Perseus,  and  also in the books of Judges and Kings of Samson,

who alone and unarmed killed thousands of men, and of Elijah, who

flew  through  the  air,  said at last went up to heaven in a chariot of

fire,  with  horses  of  fire.  (7:129)  All  these stories are obviously alike,

but  we  judge  them  very  differently.  (7:130)  The  first  only sought to

amuse,  the second had a political object, the third a religious object.

 (7:131)  We  gather  this  simply  from  the  opinions we had previously

formed  of  the authors.  (7:132)  Thus it is evidently necessary to know

something  of  the  authors  of writings which are obscure or unintel-
                                               Bk.XIA:6547.
ligible, if we would interpret their meaning; and for the same reason,

in  order  to  choose  the proper reading from among a great variety,

we  ought  to  have information as to the versions in which the differ-

ences  are  found,  and as to the possibility of other readings having

been discovered by persons of greater authority.



(7:133)   A  further  difficulty  attends this method in the case of some of

the  books  of  Scripture,  namely,  that  they are no longer extant in

their original language.  (133a) The Gospel according to Matthew, and

certainly  the  Epistle  to  the Hebrews, were written, it is thought, in

Hebrew,  though  they  no  longer  exist in that form.  (7:134) Aben Ezra

affirms  in his commentaries that the book of Job was translated into
                                                                 Bk.XIA:6547.
Hebrew  out  of  another language, and that its obscurity arises from

this   fact.    (7:135)  I  say  nothing  of  the  apocryphal  books,  for  their

authority stands on very inferior ground.



(7:136) The foregoing difficulties in this method of interpreting Scripture

from its own history, I conceive to be so great that I do not hesitate to
                                                                                  Bk.XIA:6444.
say that the true meaning of Scripture is in many places inexplicable,

or at best mere subject for guesswork; but I must again point out, on

the  other  hand, that such difficulties only arise when we endeavour

to  follow  the  meaning  of a prophet in matters which cannot be per-

ceived,  but  only imagined, not in things, whereof the understanding

can give a clear idea, and which are conceivable through themselves:

(8) matters  page 113  which  by  their nature are easily perceived cannot

be expressed so obscurely as to be unintelligible; as the proverb says,
                                                         Bk.XIA:6444.
"a word is enough to the wise." (7:137) Euclid, who only wrote of matters

very  simple  and easily understood, can easily be comprehended by

anyone in any language; we can follow his intention perfectly, and be

certain  of his true meaning, without having a thorough knowledge of

the language in which he wrote; in fact, a quite rudimentary acquaint-

ance is sufficient.  (7:138) We need make no researches concerning the

life,  the  pursuits,  or the habits of the author; nor need we inquire in

what  language,  nor when he wrote, nor the vicissitudes of his book,

nor  its  various  readings, nor how, nor by whose advice it has been

received.



(7:139)  What  we  here say of Euclid might equally be said of any book

which  treats  of things by their nature perceptible: thus we conclude

that we can easily follow the intention of Scripture in moral questions,

from  the  history  we  possess  of  it,  and  we can be sure of its true

meaning.



(7:140)   The  precepts  of  true  piety  are  expressed  in  very  ordinary
                                                                   Bk.XIA:81129.
language, and are equally simple and easily understood. (141) Further,

as  true  salvation  and  blessedness  consist  in a true assent of the

soul—and  we truly assent only to what we clearly understand—it is

most plain that we can follow with certainty the intention of Scripture

in   matters   relating  to  salvation  and  necessary  to  blessedness;

therefore,   we  need  not  be  much  troubled  about  what  remains:

such  matters,  inasmuch  as  we  generally  cannot grasp them with

our  reason  and  understanding,  are  more  curious  than profitable.



(7:142)  I  think  I  have  now set forth the true method of Scriptural inter-

pretation,  and  have  sufficiently  explained my own opinion thereon.

(143) Besides, I do not doubt that everyone will see that such a method
                                         Bk.XIA:78115.
only requires the aid of natural reason.  (7:144) The nature and efficacy

of  the natural reason consists in deducing and proving the unknown

from the known, or in carrying premises to their legitimate conclusions;

and  these  are  the  very  processes  which  our method desiderates.

(7:145)  Though  we  must admit that it does not suffice to explain every-

thing  in  the  Bible,  such  imperfection  does not spring from its own

nature, but from the fact that the path which it teaches us, as the true

one,  has   page 114  never  been  tended  or  trodden  by men, and has
                                                            Bk.XIX:562.
thus,  by  the lapse of time, become very difficult, and almost impass-

able,  as,  indeed,  I  have shown in the difficulties I draw attention to.



(7:146) There  only remains to examine the opinions of those who differ

from me.



(7:147) The first which comes under our notice is, that the light of nature

has no power to interpret Scripture, but that a supernatural faculty is

required  for the task.  (148)  What is meant by this supernatural faculty

I  will  leave to its propounders to explain.  (7:149) Personally, I can only

suppose  that they have adopted a very obscure way of stating their

complete uncertainty about the true meaning of Scripture.  (7:150) If we

look   at   their   interpretations,  they  contain  nothing  supernatural,

at least nothing but the merest conjectures.



(7:151) Let them be placed side by side with the interpretations of those

who  frankly  confess  that  they have no faculty beyond their natural

ones; we shall see that the two are just alike—both human, both long

pondered over, both laboriously invented.  (152) To say that the natural

reason  is  insufficient for such results is plainly untrue, firstly, for the

reasons   above   stated,  namely,  that  the  difficulty  of  interpreting

Scripture arises from no defect in human reason, but simply from the
                  Bk.XIA:80121—wicked conduct.
carelessness (not to say malice) of men who neglected the history of

the Bible while there were still materials for inquiry; secondly, from the

fact  (admitted, I think, by all) that the supernatural faculty is a Divine

gift  granted  only  to the faithful.  (7:153)  But the prophets and apostles

did  not  preach  to  the  faithful only, but chiefly to the unfaithful and

wicked.  (7:154)  Such  persons,  therefore, were able to understand the

intention  of  the  prophets and apostles, otherwise the prophets and

apostles would have seemed to be preaching to little boys and infants,

not  to men endowed with reason.  (155) Moses, too, would have given

his  laws  in  vain, if they could only be comprehended by the faithful,

who  need  no  law.  (7:156) Indeed,  those  who  demand  supernatural

faculties   for   comprehending   the  meaning  of  the  prophets  and

apostles  seem  truly  lacking  in  natural faculties, so that we should

hardly  suppose  such  persons  the  possessors  of  a  Divine super-

natural gift.



(7:157)  The opinion of Maimonides, {Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, 1135-1204,

physician, philosopher and jurist.}, was widely different.  page 115   (7:158)  

He  asserted  that each passage in Scripture admits of various, nay,
                Bk.XIA:7497, 98.
contrary,   meanings;   but  that  we could  never  be  certain  of  any

particular  one  till  we  knew  that  the passage, as we interpreted it,

contained nothing contrary or repugnant to reason.  (7:159)  If the literal

meaning  clashes  with  reason,  though the passage seems in itself

perfectly  clear,  it  must  be interpreted in some metaphorical sense.

(7:160)  This  doctrine  he  lays down very plainly in chap. xxv. part ii. of
                                              Bk.XIA:75101, 102, 103, & 104 .
his  book,  "More Nebuchim,"  for  he says: "Know that we shrink not

from  affirming  that  the world hath existed from eternity, because of

what  Scripture  saith  concerning the world's creation.  (7:161)  For  the

texts which teach that the world was created are not more in number

than  those  which  teach  that  God  hath  a  body;  neither  are  the

approaches  in  this  matter  of  the  world's creation closed, or even

made  hard  to  us:  so  that we should not be able to explain what is

written,  as  we  did  when  we  showed that God hath no body, nay,

peradventure,  we  could  explain  and  make fast the doctrine of the

world's eternity more easily than we did away with the doctrines that

God hath a beatified body. (7:162) Yet two things hinder me from doing
                                                         Bk.XIA:75101, 102, 103, 104 & 105.
as I have said, and believing that the world is eternal. (7:163) As it hath

been  clearly  shown  that  God  hath  not  a body, we must perforce

explain all those passages whereof the literal sense agreeth not with

the  demonstration,  for  sure  it  is  that  they  can  be  so explained.

(7:164)  But  the  eternity  of  the  world hath not been so demonstrated,

therefore it is not necessary to do violence to Scripture in support of

some  common  opinion, whereof we might, at the bidding of reason,

embrace the contrary."



(7:165)  Such  are  the  words  of  Maimonides,  and  they are evidently

sufficient  to  establish  our  point:  for  if  he had been convinced by
                                                                                          Bk.XIA:76106.
reason that the world is eternal, he would not have hesitated to twist

and explain away the words of Scripture till he made them appear to

teach  this doctrine.  (166) He would have felt quite sure that Scripture,

though  everywhere  plainly  denying  the eternity of the world, really
                                                      Bk.XIA:7184, 7498.
intends  to  teach  it.  (7:167)  So  that,  however  clear  the  meaning of

Scripture  may  be,  he  would  not  feel  certain of having grasped it,
                                                                                          Bk.XIA:7184.
so  long  as  he  remained  doubtful  of the truth of what was written.

(7:168)  For  we  are  in  doubt  whether a  thing  is  page 116 in conformity

with  reason,  or  contrary thereto, so long as we are uncertain of its

truth,  and,  consequently,  we  cannot  be  sure  whether  the literal

meaning of a passage be true or false.


                                                Bk.XIA:77107.
(7:169)  If  such a theory as this were sound, I would certainly grant that

some  faculty  beyond  the natural reason is required for interpreting

Scripture.  (7:170)  For  nearly all things that we find in Scripture cannot

be  inferred  from  known  principles  of  the natural reason  {but are

inferred from intuition}, and,  therefore, we should be unable to come

to any  conclusion  about their truth, or about  the  real meaning and

intention  of  Scripture,  but  should  stand   in  need  of some further

assistance.



(7:171)  Further,  the  truth of this theory would involve that the masses,
                                        Bk.XIA:4076.                       
having  generally  no  comprehension  of,  nor  leisure  for,  detailed

proofs,   would   be   reduced   to  receiving  all  their  knowledge  of

Scripture   on   the  authority  and  testimony  of  philosophers,  and,

consequently,  would  be  compelled  to suppose that the interpreta-

tions given by philosophers were infallible.



(7:172) Truly this would be a new form of ecclesiastical authority, and a

new sort of priests or pontiffs, more likely to excite men's ridicule than
          Bk.XIA:77107.
their  veneration.  (173) Certainly our method demands a knowledge of

Hebrew for which the masses have no leisure; but no such objection

as  the  foregoing  can  be brought against us.  (7:174)  For the ordinary

Jews or Gentiles, to whom the prophets and apostles preached and

wrote, understood the language, and, consequently, the intention of

the  prophet  or  apostle addressing them; but they did not grasp the

intrinsic   reason   of   what   was   preached,   which,   according  to
  Bk.XIB:3775.
Maimonides,   would   be   necessary   for   an  understanding  of  it.



(7:175)  There  is  nothing,  then, in our method which renders it neces-
                                                                            Bk.XIA:77112
sary  that  the  masses should follow the testimony of commentators,

for  I  point  to  a  set  of  unlearned  people who understood the lan-

guage of the prophets and apostles; whereas Maimonides could not

point  to  any  such  who  could  arrive  at  the prophetic or apostolic

meaning    through   their   knowledge   of   the   causes   of   things.



(7:176) As to the multitude of our own time, we have shown that whatso-

ever is necessary to salvation,  though its reasons may be unknown,

can  easily  be  understood  in  any  language,   page 117   because it is
                    Bk.XIA:78113—familiar.
thoroughly ordinary and usual; it is in such understanding as this that

the  masses  acquiesce,  not  in  the testimony of commentators; with            unlearned

regard  to  other  questions,  the  ignorant  and the learned fare alike.



(7:177)  But  let  us  return to the opinion of Maimonides, and examine it

more  closely. (177a)  In  the  first place, he supposes that the prophets

were  in  entire  agreement  one  with  another,  and  that  they were

consummate philosophers and theologians; for he would have them

to have based their conclusions on the absolute truth.   (7:178)  Further,

he  supposes that the sense of Scripture cannot be made plain from

Scripture  itself,  for  the  truth  of things is not made plain therein (in

that  it  does  not  prove  any thing,  nor teach the matters of which it

speaks through their definitions and first causes), therefore, accord-

ing  to  Maimonides,  the  true  sense  of  Scripture  cannot be made

plain from itself, and must not be there sought.



(7:179)  The  falsity of such a doctrine is shown in this very chapter, for

we  have  shown  both by reason and examples that the meaning of

Scripture  is  only  made  plain  through  Scripture itself, and even in

questions  deducible  from ordinary knowledge should be looked for

from no other source.



(7:180) Lastly,  such  a theory supposes that we may explain the words

of  Scripture  according  to our preconceived opinions, twisting them

about,  and  reversing or completely changing the literal sense, how-

ever  plain  it  may be.  (7:181)  Such  licence  is  utterly  opposed to the

teaching  of  this and the preceding chapters, and, moreover, will be

evident to everyone as rash and excessive.



(7:182)  But  if  we  grant  all  this  licence,  what  can  it  effect after all?

Absolutely nothing.  (7:183)  Those  things which cannot be demonstrat-

ed,  and  which  make  up  the  greater  part  of Scripture, cannot be

examined by reason, and cannot therefore be explained or interpret-

ed  by  this  rule;  whereas,  on  the  contrary,  by  following our own

method,  we can explain many questions of this nature, and discuss

them  on  a  sure  basis,  as we have already shown, by reason and

example.   (7:184)  Those matters which are by their nature comprehen-

sible  we  can  easily  explain,  as  has  been  pointed out, simply by

means of the context.



(7:185)  Therefore,   the   method   of   Maimonides  is  clearly  useless:

 page 118  to which we may add,  that it does away with all the certainty

which  the  masses acquire by candid reading, or which is gained by

any  other  persons  in  any  other way.  (7:186)  In conclusion, then, we
                 Bk.XIB:3775.
dismiss   Maimonides'   theory   as   harmful,   useless,  and  absurd.



(7:187) As to the tradition of the Pharisees, we have already shown that

it  is  not consistent, while the authority of the popes of Rome stands

in  need  of more credible evidence; the latter, indeed, I reject simply

on  this ground, for if the popes could point out to us the meaning of

Scripture  as  surely as did the high priests of the Jews, I should not

be  deterred  by  the  fact  that  there have been heretic and impious

Roman pontiffs; for among the Hebrew high-priests of old there were

also  heretics  and  impious  men who gained the high-priesthood by

improper means,  but  who, nevertheless, had Scriptural sanction for

their  supreme  power  of  interpreting the law. (See Deut. xvii:11, 12,

and xxxiii:10, also Malachi ii:8.)



(7:188) However, as the popes can show no such sanction, their author-

ity remains open to very grave doubt, nor should anyone be deceived

by the example of the Jewish high-priests and think that the Catholic

religion  also  stands in need of a pontiff; he should bear in mind that

the  laws  of  Moses  being  also  the  ordinary  laws  of  the  country,

necessarily required some public authority to insure their observance;

for,  if  everyone  were  free to interpret the laws of his country as he

pleased,  no  state  could  stand,  but  would  for that very reason be

dissolved  at  once,  and  public  rights  would become private rights.



(7:189) With religion the case is widely different. Inasmuch as it consists
                                                            Bk.XIA:81130—sincerity of heart.
not so much in outward actions as in simplicity and truth of character,

it stands outside the sphere of law and public authority. (190) Simplicity

and truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws, nor

by  the  authority  of  the  state,  no one the whole world over can be

forced  or  legislated into a state of blessedness; the means required

for such a consummation are faithful and brotherly admonition, sound

education,   and,   above   all,   free  use  of  the  individual judgment.


 
(7:191)Therefore, as the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion,

is in every man's power,  and as it is inconceivable    page 119  that such
                         Bk.XIA:15345.
power could be alienated, it is also in every man's power to wield the

supreme  right  and  authority  of  free judgment in this behalf, and to
                         Bk.XIA:81134,15346; Bk.XX:28097.  
explain  and  interpret  religion  for  himself.  (7:192) The only reason for
                                                                        Bk.XIA:15448.
vesting  the  supreme  authority in the interpretation of law, and judg-

ment  on  public  affairs  in  the  hands  of  the  magistrates,  is that it

concerns questions of public right.  (7:193) Similarly the supreme author-

ity  in explaining religion, and in passing judgment thereon, is lodged

with  the  individual  because it concerns questions of individual right.

(7:194) So far, then, from the authority of the Hebrew high-priests telling

in  confirmation  of  the  authority  of  the  Roman pontiffs to interpret

religion,  it  would  rather tend to establish individual freedom of judg-

ment.  (7:195) Thus in this way also, we have shown that our method of

interpreting  Scripture  is  the best.  (7:196)  For as the highest power of

Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man, the rule for such inter-

pretation  should  be  nothing  but the natural light of reason which is
 Bk.XIA:78115; Bk.XX:27892.
common  to all—not any supernatural light nor any external authority;

moreover,  such  a  rule ought not to be so difficult that it can only be

applied  by  very  skilful  philosophers,  but should be adapted to the
                                                              Bk.XIA:78116.
natural and ordinary faculties and capacity of mankind.  (197) And such

I  have  shown  our  method  to be, for such difficulties as it has arise

from men's carelessness, and are no part of its nature.

Page 120
CHAPTER VIII. 

(8:1) In the former chapter we treated of the foundations and principles

of Scriptural knowledge, and showed that it consists solely in a trust-

worthy  history  of  the  sacred  writings;  such a history, in spite of its

indispensability, the ancients neglected, or at any rate, whatever they

may  have  written  or handed down has perished in the lapse of time,

consequently  the  groundwork for such an investigation is to a great

extent, cut from under us.  (8:2) This might be put up with if succeeding

generations  had  confined  themselves within the limits of truth, and

had  handed  down  conscientiously  what  few  particulars they had

received  or  discovered  without any additions from their own brains:

as  it  is,  the history of the Bible is not so much imperfect as untrust-

worthy:  the  foundations  are  not  only  too scanty for building upon,

but  are  also  unsound.  (8:3)  It  is part of my purpose to remedy these

defects,  and to remove common theological prejudices.  (4) But I fear

that  I  am  attempting  my  task  too late, for men have arrived at the

pitch  of  not  suffering contradiction, but defending obstinately what-

ever  they  have  adopted  under  the  name of religion.  (5) So widely

have  these  prejudices  taken possession of men's minds, that very

few, comparatively speaking, will listen to reason.  (8:6) However, I will

make  the  attempt,  and  spare no  efforts,  for  there  is  no positive

reason for despairing of success.



(8:7)  In  order  to  treat  the  subject  methodically,  I will begin with the

received  opinions  concerning the true authors of the sacred books,

and  in  the first place, speak of the author of the Pentateuch, who is

almost  universally supposed to have been Moses.  (8) The Pharisees

are  so firmly convinced of his identity, that they account as a heretic

anyone  who  differs  from them on the subject.  (8:9) Wherefore, Aben
Bk.XIB:3776. 
Ezra,    page 121   a   man   of   enlightened  intelligence,  and  no  small
 Bk.XIA:5714.  
learning,  who  was  the first, so far as I know, to treat of this opinion,

dared  not  express his meaning openly, but confined himself to dark

hints  which  I  shall  not  scruple to elucidate, thus throwing, full light

on the subject.



(8:10)  The  words  of  Aben  Ezra  which  occur  in  his commentary on

Deuteronomy  are as follows: "Beyond Jordan, &c. . . . . If so be that

thou  understandest the mystery of the twelve . . . . moreover Moses

wrote  the law . . . . .The Canaanite was then in the land . . . . it shall

be  revealed on the mount of God . . . . then also behold his bed, his

iron  bed,  then  shalt thou know the truth."  (11) In these few words he

hints,  and  also  shows  that it was not Moses who wrote the Penta-

teuch,  but  someone  who  lived  long  after  him,  and  further,  that

the  book which Moses wrote was something different from any now

extant.



(8:12) To prove this, I say, he draws attention to the facts:


I.    (8:13)   That  the  preface  to  Deuteronomy  could  not  have  been

written  by  Moses,  inasmuch  as  he had never crossed the Jordan.


II.   (8:14)  That  the  whole  book of Moses was written at full length on

the  circumference  of  a  single altar (Deut. xxvii:6, and Josh. viii:30),

which   altar,   according  to  the  Rabbis,  consisted  of  only  twelve

stones:  therefore  the  book  of  Moses  must  have been of far less

extent  than  the  Pentateuch.  (8:15)  This  is  what  our  author means,

I  think,  by  the  mystery  of  the  twelve, unless he is referring to the

twelve   curses   contained  in  the  chapter  of  Deuteronomy  above

cited,  which  he  thought  could  not have been contained in the law,

because  Moses  bade  the  Levites read them after the recital of the

law,  and  so  bind  the  people  to  its observance.  (8:16)  Or again, he

may  have  had  in  his  mind  the last chapter of Deuteronomy which

treats  of  the  death  of  Moses,  and  which  contains twelve verses.

 (817)   But  there  is  no  need  to  dwell  further  on  these  and  similar

conjectures.


                                                                                         Bk.XIA:6755.
III.   (8:18)  That  in  Deut. xxxi:9,  the  expression  occurs,  "and  Moses

wrote the law:"  words  that  cannot  be  ascribed to Moses, but must

be  those  of  some  other  writer narrating the deeds and writings of

Moses.



IV.  (8:19)  That   in   Genesis xii:6,   the  historian,  after  narrating  that

Abraham  journeyed  through  the  land  of  Canaan,  adds,   page 122

"and  the  Canaanite  was  then  in the land,"  thus  clearly excluding
                                Bk.XIA:6758.
the  time  at  which  he  wrote.   (8:20)  So  that this passage must have

been  written  after  the  death  of  Moses, when the Canaanites had

been driven out, and no longer possessed the land.


IV Continued

(8:21)  Aben  Ezra,  in  his  commentary  on the passage, alludes to the

difficulty  as  follows:-  "And  the  Canaanite  was  then in the land: it

appears  that  Canaan,  the  grandson  of  Noah,  took  from another

the  land  which  bears  his  name;  if  this  be  not  the true meaning,

there  lurks  some  mystery  in  the  passage,  and let him who under-

stands  it  keep  silence."   (8:22)   That  is,   if  Canaan  invaded  those                 Heresies 

regions,  the  sense  will  be,  the Canaanite was then in the land, in

contradistinction  to  the  time  when  it  had  been  held  by  another:

but   if,   as   follows  from  Gen.  chap. x.  Canaan  was  the  first  to

inhabit  the  land,  the  text  must  mean  to exclude the time present,

that  is  the  time  at  which  it  was written; therefore it cannot be the

work   of   Moses,  in  whose  time  the  Canaanites  still  possessed

those  territories:  this  is  the  mystery  concerning  which  silence is  

recommended.


                                                     Bk.XIA:6759.
V.   (8:23)  That  in  Genesis  xxii:14  Mount  Moriah is called the mount

of  God (9),  a  name  which it did not acquire till after the building of

the  Temple;  the  choice  of  the mountain was not made in the time

of  Moses,  for  Moses  does  not  point  out  any  spot as chosen by

God;  on  the  contrary, he foretells that God will at some future time

choose a spot to which this name will be given.



VI.  (8:24)   Lastly,  that  in  Deut. 3:11,  in  the  passage  relating  to Og,

king  of  Bashan,  these  words  are  inserted:  "For  only  Og king of

Bashan  remained  of  the  remnant  of  giants: behold, his bedstead

was  a  bedstead  of  iron:  is  it  not  in  Rabbath  of  the  children of

Ammon?  nine  cubits  was  the  length  thereof,  and  four cubits the

breadth  of  it,  after  the  cubit of a man."  (8:25) This parenthesis most

plainly  shows  that  its  writer  lived  long  after Moses; for this mode

of  speaking  is  only  employed  by  one  treating of things long past,

and  pointing  to  relics  for  the  sake of gaining credence: moreover,

this  bed  was  almost  certainly  first  discovered by David, who con-
                      Bk.XIA:6760.  
quered  the  city of Rabbath (2 Sam. xii:30.)  (8:26) Again, the historian
                                                                                         {Num 32:41}
a  little  further  on  inserts  after  the  words of Moses, "Jair, the son

 page 123   of   Manasseh,   took  all  the  country  of   Argob   unto   the

coasts  of  Geshuri  and  Maachathi;  and  called  them after his own

name,  Bashan-havoth-jair,  unto  this day."  (8:27) This passage, I say,

is   inserted   to   explain   the   words   of  Moses  which  precede  it.
        {Deu 3:13}
(8:28)  "And  the  rest  of  Gilead, and all Bashan, being the kingdom of

Og,  gave  I  unto  the half tribe of Manasseh; all the region of Argob,

with  all  Bashan,  which  is  called  the land of the giants."  (8:29)  The

Hebrews  in  the time of the writer indisputably knew what territories

belonged  to  the  tribe  of  Judah,  but  did not know them under the

name   of   the   jurisdiction   of   Argob,   or  the  land  of  the  giants.

(8:30)  Therefore  the  writer  is compelled to explain what these places

were  which  were  anciently so styled, and at the same time to point

out  why  they  were  at the time of his writing known by the name of

Jair, who was of the tribe of Manasseh, not of Judah.



(8:31)  We  have  thus  made  clear the meaning of Aben Ezra and also

the  passages  of  the  Pentateuch which he cites in proof of his con-

tention.  (8:32)  However,  Aben  Ezra  does  not  call attention to every

instance,  or  even  the  chief  ones;  there  remain  many  of greater

importance, which may be cited.



Namely:


I.    (8:33)   that  the  writer  of  the books in question not only speaks of
                            Bk.XIA:6756.
Moses  in  the  third  person,  but also bears witness to many details

concerning  him;  for  instance,  "Moses talked with God;" "The Lord

spoke  with  Moses  face to face; " "Moses was the meekest of men"

(Numb. xii:3);"  "Moses  was  wrath  with  the  captains  of  the host;"

"Moses,  the  man  of  God,"  "Moses, the servant of  the Lord, died;"

"There was never a prophet in Israel like unto Moses,"  &c.   (8:34)  On

the  other  hand,  in  Deuteronomy, where the law which Moses had

expounded  to  the  people  and  written  is  set forth, Moses speaks

and  declares  what  he  has  done  in  the  first person: "God spake

with me" (Deut. ii:1, 17, &c.),  " I prayed to the Lord," &c.  (8:35) Except

at  the  end  of the book, when the historian, after relating the words

of  Moses, begins again to speak in the third person, and to tell how

Moses  handed over the law which he had expounded to the people

in  writing,  again admonishing them, and further, how Moses ended

his life.  (8:36)  All these details, the manner of narration, the testimony,

and  the  context  of  the  whole  story  lead  to  the  plain conclusion

  page 124   that  these  books  were  written  by  another,   and  not  by

Moses in person.



II.    (8:37)  We  must  also  remark  that  the history relates not only the

manner  of  Moses'  death  and  burial, and the thirty days' mourning

of  the  Hebrews,  but  further  compares  him  with  all  the prophets

who   came   after   him,   and  states  that  he  surpassed  them  all.
            {Deu 34:10}
(8:38) "There was never a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the

Lord  knew face to face."    (8:39)   Such  testimony  cannot  have  been

given  of  Moses by himself, nor by any who immediately succeeded

him,  but it must come from someone who lived centuries afterwards,
                                                               Bk.XIA:6757.              {Deu 34:6}
especially,  as  the  historian  speaks of past times.  (8:40)  "There was

never a prophet," &c.  (8:41) And of the place of burial, "No one knows

it to this day."



III.    (8:42)  We  must  note  that  some  places  are  not  styled  by  the

names  they  bore  during  Moses'  lifetime, but by others which they

obtained  subsequently.  (8:43)  For  instance, Abraham is said to have

pursued  his  enemies  even  unto Dan, a name not bestowed on the

city  till  long  after the death of Joshua (Gen. xiv;14, Judges xviii;29).



IV.  (8:44)  The  narrative  is  prolonged after the death of Moses, for in

Exodus xvi:35  we  read  that  " the  children of  Israel did eat manna

forty  years  until  they  came  to  a  land  inhabited,  until  they came

unto  the  borders  of  the  land of Canaan."  (8:45) In other words, until

the time alluded to in Joshua vi:12.


IV Continued

(8:46)  So,  too,  in  Genesis xxxvi:31  it  is stated, "These are the kings

that  reigned  in  Edom  before there reigned any king over the chil-

dren of Israel."  (8:47) The historian, doubtless, here relates the kings

of  Idumæa  before  that  territory was conquered by David (10) and

garrisoned, as we read in 2 Sam. viii:14.



(8:48) From what has been said, it is thus clearer than the sun at noon-

day  that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses, but by someone

who  lived  long  after Moses.  (8:49)  Let  us  now  turn our attention to

the books  which  Moses  actually  did  write,  and which are cited in

 the  Pentateuch;  thus,  also,  shall  we  see that they were different

from the Pentateuch.  (8:50) Firstly, it appears from Exodus xvii:14 that

Moses,  by  the  command  of  God,  wrote  an  account  of  the  war

against  Amalek.  (8:51)  The  book  in  which he did so is not named in

 page 125  the   chapter   just  quoted,   but  in  Numb. xxi:12  a  book  is

referred  to  under  the  title  of  the  wars of God, and doubtless this

war  against  Amalek  and  the castrametations said in Numb. xxxiii:2

to  have  been written by Moses are therein described.  (8:52) We hear

also  in  Exod. xxiv:4  of  another  book  called  the  Book of the Cov-

enant,  which Moses read before the Israelites when they first made
    Strong:1285 from 1262   
a covenant with God.  (53) But this book or this writing contained very

little,  namely,  the  laws  or commandments of God which we find in

Exodus xx:22  to  the  end  of  chap. xxiv.,  and  this no one will deny

who  reads  the  aforesaid chapter rationally and impartially.  (8:54) It is

there  stated  that  as  soon  as  Moses  had learnt the feeling of the

people  on  the  subject  of making a covenant with God, he immedi-

ately  wrote  down  God's  laws  and utterances, and in the morning,

after some ceremonies had been performed, read out the conditions

of  the  covenant  to  an  assembly  of  the whole people.  (8:55) When

these had been gone through, and doubtless understood by all, the

whole people gave their assent.



(8:56)  Now from the shortness of the time taken in its perusal and also

from  its  nature  as  a  compact,  this  document evidently contained

nothing more than that which we have just described.  (8:57) Further, it

is  clear  that Moses explained all the laws which he had received in

the fortieth year after the exodus from Egypt; also that he bound over

the  people  a  second time to observe them, and that finally he com-

mitted  them  to  writing  (Deut. i:5; xxix:14; xxxi:9),  in  a  book which

contained  these  laws  explained,  and  the  new covenant, and this

book  was  therefore  called  the  book  of  the law of God: the same

which  was  afterwards  added  to  by  Joshua when he set forth the

fresh  covenant  with  which he bound over the people and which he

entered into with God (Josh. xxiv:25, 26).



(8:58)  Now,  as  we  have  extent  no  book containing this covenant of

Moses and also the covenant of Joshua, we must perforce conclude

that  it has perished, unless, indeed, we adopt the wild conjecture of
       { See Shirley's footnote }
the  Chaldean  paraphrast  Jonathan,  and  twist  about the words of

Scripture to our heart's content. (8:59) This commentator, in the face of

our present difficulty, preferred corrupting the sacred text to confess-

ing his own ignorance.  (60) The passage in the book of Joshua which
                        {Josh. xxiv:26}
runs,    page 126   "and Joshua wrote these words in the book of the law
                                {in his Aramaic translation}
of God," he changes ^ into "and Joshua wrote these words and kept

them with the book of the law of God."  (8:61)  What  is to be done with

persons  who  will  only  see what pleases them?  (62) What is such a

proceeding if it is not denying Scripture, and inventing another Bible

out of our own heads?  (63) We may therefore conclude that the book

of  the  law  of God which Moses wrote was not the Pentateuch, but

something  quite  different,  which the author of the Pentateuch duly

inserted  into  his book.  (8:64)  So  much  is abundantly plain both from

what  I  have  said  and  from what I am about to add.  (8:65)  For in the
                                               {Deu 31:9}
passage  of  Deuteronomy  above  quoted,  where  it  is  related that

Moses wrote the book of the law,  the historian adds that he handed
  {say nowadays, Judges}
it over to the priests and bade them read it out at a stated time to the
  {Would that parts of all righteous Constitutions be publicly read at stated times.}
whole people. (8:66) This shows that the work was of much less length

than  the  Pentateuch,  inasmuch  as it could be read through at one

sitting  so  as  to  be  understood  by all; further, we must not omit to

notice  that out of all the books which Moses wrote, this one book of
                                            {Deu 32.1}
the second covenant and the song (which latter he wrote afterwards
                                           {Talmud evolved into modern-day law libraries.}
so  that  all  the  people  might  learn  it),  was the only one which he

caused  to  be  religiously  guarded  and  preserved.   (8:67)  In the first

covenant he had only bound over those who were present, but in the

second  covenant  he  bound  over  all  their descendants also (Deut.

xxix:14),  and  therefore ordered this covenant with future ages to be
                                                              {Deu 32.1}
religiously  preserved,  together with the Song, which was especially

addressed to posterity: as, then, we have no proof that Moses wrote

any book save this of the covenant, and as he committed no other to

the  care of posterity; and, lastly, as there are many passages in the

Pentateuch  which  Moses  could not have written, it follows that the

belief  that  Moses  was the author of the Pentateuch is ungrounded

and  even  irrational.  (8:68) Someone will perhaps ask whether Moses

did  not  also write down other laws when they were first revealed to

him—in  other  words,  whether,  during the course of forty years, he

did not write down any of the laws which he promulgated, save only

those few which I have stated to be contained in the book of the first

covenant.  (69) To this I would answer, that although it seems reason-

able to suppose  page 127  that Moses wrote down the laws at the time

when  he wished to communicate them to the people, yet we are not

warranted  to take it as proved, for I have shown above that we must

make  no  assertions  in  such  matters  which we do not gather from

Scripture,  or  which do not flow as legitimate consequences from its

fundamental  principles.  (70) We must not accept whatever is reason-

ably probable. (8:71) However even reason in this case would not force

such a conclusion upon us: for it may be that the assembly of elders

wrote  down  the  decrees  of Moses and communicated them to the

people,  and  the historian collected them, and duly set them forth in

his  narrative of the life of Moses.  (8:72)  So much for the five books of

Moses:  it  is  now  time  for  us  to  turn  to the other sacred writings.



(8:73)  The  book  of  Joshua may be proved not to be an autograph by

reasons  similar to those we have just employed: for it must be some

other  than Joshua who testifies that the fame of Joshua was spread

over  the  whole  world;  that  he  omitted nothing of what Moses had

taught  (Josh. vi:27; viii. last verse; xi:15);  that he grew old and sum-

moned an assembly of the whole people, and finally that he departed

this  life.  (8:74)  Furthermore,  events are related which took place after

Joshua's death.  (75) For instance, that the Israelites worshipped God,

after his death, so long as there were any old men alive who remem-

bered him; and in chap. xvi:10, we read that "Ephraim and Manasseh

did  not  drive  out  the  Canaanites  which  dwelt  in  Gezer,  but  the

Canaanite  dwelt  in the land of Ephraim unto this day, and was tribu-

tary to him." (76) This is the same statement as that in Judges, chap. i.,

and  the  phrase  "unto this day"  shows that the writer was speaking

of ancient times. (8:77) With these texts we may compare the last verse

of  chap. xv.,  concerning  the  sons of Judah, and also the history of

Caleb  in  the  same  chap. v:14.  (8:78) Further, the building of an altar

beyond  Jordan  by  the  two  tribes  and  a  half,  chap. xxii:10,  sqq.,

seems  to  have  taken  place  after  the  death  of Joshua,  for in the

whole  narrative  his  name is never mentioned, but the people alone

held  council  as  to  waging  war,  sent  out  legates, waited for their

return, and finally approved of their answer.


                                             {on}
(8:79)  Lastly,  from  chap. x:14.  ^ ,  it is clear that  the book  page 128  was

written  many  generations  after   the  death  of  Joshua,  for it bears

witness "there was never any day like unto that day, either before or

after, that the Lord hearkened to the voice of a man," &c.  (80) If, there-

fore,  Joshua wrote any book at all, it was that which is quoted in the
                                {to}
work now before us, ^ chap. x:13.



(8:81)  With regard to the book of Judges, I suppose no rational person

persuades  himself  that  it was written by the actual Judges.  (82)  For

the  conclusion  of  the  whole  history  contained  in  chap. ii. clearly

shows  that it is all the work—of a single historian.  (8:83) Further, inas-

much  as  the writer frequently tells us that there was then no king in

Israel,  it  is evident that the book was written after the establishment

of the monarchy.



(8:84)  The  books  of Samuel need not detain us long, inasmuch as the

narrative in them is continued long after Samuel's death; but I should

like to draw attention to the fact that it was written many generations

after  Samuel's  death.   (8:85)  For  in  book i.  chap. ix:9,  the  historian

remarks in a parenthesis, "Beforetime, in Israel, when a man went to

inquire  of  God,  thus he spake: Come, and let us go to the seer; for

he  that  is  now  called  a  prophet  was  beforetime  called  a  seer."



(8:86)  Lastly,  the books of Kings, as we gather from internal evidence,

were  compiled  from the books of King Solomon (I Kings xi:41), from

the  chronicles  of  the  kings  of  Judah (1 Kings xiv:19, 29), and the

chronicles of the kings of Israel.



(8:87)  We  may,  therefore,  conclude  that  all  the books we have con-

sidered  hitherto  are  compilations,  and  that  the events therein are

recorded  as  having  happened  in old time.  (8:88)  Now, if we turn our

attention to the connection and argument of all these books, we shall

easily see that they were all written by a single historian, who wished

to  relate the antiquities of the Jews from their first beginning down to

the  first  destruction  of  the  city.  (8:89)  The  way in which the several

books  are connected one with the other is alone enough to show us

that  they  form  the narrative of one and the same writer.  (8:90)  For as

soon  as  he  has related the life of Moses, the historian thus passes
                                            {Jos 1:1}
on  to  the story of Joshua: "And it came to pass after that Moses the

servant of the   page 129  Lord was dead, that God spake unto Joshua,"

&c.,  so  in  the same way, after the death of Joshua was concluded,

he  passes with identically the same transition and connection to the
                                         {Jdg 1:1}
history  of  the  Judges:  "And  it came to pass after that Joshua was

dead,  that  the  children of Israel sought from God," &c.   (8:91)  To  the

book  of  Judges  he adds the story of Ruth, as a sort of appendix, in
                       {Ruth 1:1}
these  words: "Now it came to pass in the days that the judges ruled,

that there was a famine in the land."


                                                                                {1sam 1:1}
(8:92) The first book of Samuel is introduced with a similar phrase; and
                      {2sam 1:1}
so  is  the  second  book  of Samuel.  (8:93) Then, before the history of

David is concluded, the historian passes in the same way to the first
            {1ki 1:1}                                                        {2ki 1:1}
book of Kings, and, after David's death, to the Second book of Kings.



(8:94)  The  putting together, and the order of the narratives, show that

they  are  all  the work of one man, writing with a definite aim; for the                Ezra

historian  begins  with  relating  the  first origin of the Hebrew nation,

and  then  sets  forth  in  order the times and  the occasions in which

Moses put forth his laws, and made his predictions. (8:95) He then pro-

ceeds  to  relate  how  the  Israelites  invaded  the  promised  land in

accordance  with  Moses'  prophecy (Deut. vii.);  and  how, when the

land was subdued, they turned their backs on their laws, and thereby

incurred many misfortunes (Deut. xxxi:16, 17).  (8:96)  He tells how they

wished to elect rulers, and how, according as these rulers observed

the  law,  the  people  flourished  or  suffered (Deut. xxviii:36); finally,