A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL
TREATISE
Hampshire:202-3,
203-5,
205-9
(Published 1670
anonymously)
Benedict de Spinoza
1632
- 1677
Part 3 - Chapters XI to XV
Part 1 , Part
2 , Part 3 , Part 4
Metaphors,
Metaphor of Commandment
of G-D, Referred
to G-D, G:Bk.XI:42.
JBY Notes:
1. Text was scanned from Book
II and is a translation
from
Bruder's
1843 Latin text by R.H.M.
Elwes (1883).
JBY added sentence
numbers.
2. (y:xx): y = Chapter Number, if
given; xx = Sentence Number.
3. Page numbers are those of Book
II.
4. Citation abbreviations.
5. ( Spinoza's Footnote or the Latin word ),
] Shirley's
Bk. XI (or XIII)
translation variance or note [ ,
{ JBY
comment, emendation, or endnote }. LINKS
6. Please e-mail
errors, clarification requests, disagreement,
or suggestions to josephb@yesselman.com.
7. TEXT
version without links and without commentary.
Latin version on a CD.
8. There is much in this
work that you will not agree
with or even Graetz's
Censure
think nonsense—although
keep in mind that Spinoza was under
the constraints
of religious intolerance.
Spinoza was born in the
very year (1632)
that the inquisitorial denunciation of Galileo took
place. However,
partake of the work (and my commentaries) as
you would a
pomegranate; relish the flesh, but spit-out the
pits.
9. EL:[7]:viii, EL:[11]:xi, EL:[17]:xiii, EL:[22]:xvi,
EL:[64]:xxxi, EL:xxxiii:J6,
L19:296, L20:297,
L23:301, L49:364,
old vocabulary in new bottles.
{Scriptural
Theology} Hampshire:205
10. The chief
aim of the whole
treatise is to separate
faith ^ {Religion} Smith:Divine
Law
from
philosophy. ]Shirley:37—What
emerges in the
TTP, as far as is Spinoza
Hampshire:203
& 205
concerned,
is the possibility of a this-worldly blessedness
for both the rational person TL:L36(23):345
(through
philosophy) and
the common person (through purified religion),[ EL:L21:(73):298
{By
my defining Religion as an hypothesis,
the two are synthesized.} Philosophy
/ Religion
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Table of Contents
Preface (at beginning of Part I)
Part Chapters
| Part 1 | I | II | III | IV | V |
| Part 2 | VI | VII | VIII | IX | X |
| Part 3 | XI | XII | XIII | XIV | XV |
| Part 4 | XVI | XVII | XVIII | XIX | XX |
Author's Notes to Theologico-Political
Treatise - Part 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS: BkII
Page Numbers
| Chap. XI.—An
Inquiry whether the Apostles wrote their Epistles as Apostles and Prophets, or merely as Teachers, and an Explanation of what is meant by an Apostle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .157 |
|
| The epistles not in the prophetic style. | 157 |
| The Apostles not commanded to write or preach in particular places. | 159 |
| Different methods of teaching adopted by the Apostles. |
163 |
| CHAPTER XII.- Of the true Original
of the Divine Law, and wherefore Scripture is called Sacred, and the Word of G-D. How that, in so far as it contains the Word of G-D, it has come down to us uncorrupted . . . 165 |
|
| CHAPTER XIII.- It is shown, that
Scripture teaches only very Simple Doctrines, such as suffice for right conduct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 |
|
| Error in speculative
doctrine not impious—nor knowledge pious. Piety consists in obedience. |
180 |
| CHAPTER XIV.—Definitions
of Faith, the True Faith, and the Foundations of Faith, which is once for all separated from Philosophy. TTP1:Divine Law ]Bk.XIII:341377[ ..... 182 |
|
| Danger resulting from the vulgar idea of faith. | 182 |
| The only test of faith; obedience and good works. | 184 |
| As different men are disposed to obedience by different
opinions, universal faith can contain only the simplest doctrines. |
186 |
| Fundamental distinction between faith
and philosophy—the key- stone of the present treatise. |
189 |
| CHAPTER
XV.- Theology is shown not to be subservient to Reason, nor Reason to Theology: a Definition of the reason which enables us to accept the Authority of the Bible . . . . . . . . . . . 190 |
|
| Theory that Scripture must be accommodated to Reason—maintained
by Maimonides—already refuted in Chapter vii. |
190 |
| Theory that Reason must be accommodated to Scripture—maintained
by Alpakhar—examined. |
191 |
| And refuted. | 194 |
| Scriptur{al Theology} and Reason independent of one another. | 195 |
| Certainty of fundamental faith not mathematical but moral. | 196 |
| Great utility of Revelation. | 198 |
Author's Notes to the Theologico-Political
Treatise
Page
157
CHAPTER XI.
(11:1) No
reader of the New Testament can doubt that the Apostles
were prophets; but as a prophet does not always speak by revela-
tion, but only at rare intervals, as we showed at the end of Chap. I.,
we may fairly inquire whether the Apostles wrote their Epistles as
prophets, by revelation
and express mandate, as Moses, Jeremiah,
Bk.XIX:2916.
and others did, or whether
only as private individuals or teachers,
especially as Paul, in Corinthians xiv:6, mentions two sorts of
preaching.
(11:2) If
we examine the style of the Epistles,
we shall find it totally
different from that employed by the prophets.
(11:3) The
prophets are continually asserting that they speak
by the
command of G-D: "Thus saith the Lord," "The Lord of hosts saith," Metaphors
"The command of the Lord," &c.; and this was their habit not only Chain of Natural Events
in assemblies of the prophets, but also in their epistles containing
revelations, as appears from the epistle of Elijah to Jehoram,
2
Chron. xxi:12, which begins, "Thus saith
the Lord."
(11:4) In
the Apostolic Epistles we find nothing
of the sort. (5)
Con-
trariwise, in I Cor. vii:40 Paul speaks according to his own opinion
and in many passages we come across doubtful and perplexed
phrase; such as, "We think, therefore," Rom. iii:28; "Now I think,"
(24) Rom. viii:18, and so on. (11:6) Besides these, other expressions
are met with very different from those used by the prophets. (11:7) For
instance, 1 Cor. vii:6, "But I speak this by permission, not by com-
mandment;" "I give my judgment as one that hath obtained mercy
of the Lord to be faithful" (1 Cor. vii:25), and so on in many other
passages. (11:8) We must also remark that in the page 158 aforesaid
chapter the Apostle says that when he states that he has or has
not the precept or commandment of G-D, he does not mean the
precept or commandment
of G-D revealed to himself, but only the Metaphors
Mat
5:3-12
words uttered by Christ
in His Sermon on the Mount. (11:9)
Further-
more, if we examine the manner in which the Apostles give out
evangelical doctrine, we shall see that it differs materially from the
method adopted by the prophets. (11:10) The Apostles everywhere
reason as
if they were arguing rather than prophesying; the proph-
ecies, on the other hand, contain only
dogmas and commands.
Smith:108135
(11:11) G-D is therein introduced not as speaking to reason, but as Metaphors
issuing decrees by His absolute fiat. (11:12) The authority of the
prophets does not submit to discussion, for whosoever wishes to
find rational ground for his arguments, by that very wish submits
them to everyone's private judgment. (6:13) This Paul, inasmuch as
he uses reason, appears to have done, for he says in 1 Cor. x:15,
"I speak as to wise men, judge ye what I say." (11:14) The prophets,
as we showed at the end of Chapter I., did not perceive what was
revealed by virtue of their natural reason, and though there are
certain passages in the Pentateuch which seem to be appeals to
induction, they turn out, on nearer examination, to be nothing but
peremptory commands. (11:15) For instance, when Moses says,
Deut. xxxi:27, "Behold, while I am yet alive with you, this day ye
have been rebellious against the Lord; and how much more after
my death," we must by no means conclude that Moses wished to
convince the Israelites by reason that they would necessarily fall
away from the worship of the Lord after his death; for the argument
would have been false, as Scripture itself shows: the Israelites
continued faithful during the lives of Joshua and the elders, and
afterwards during the time of Samuel, David, and Solomon.
(11:16) Therefore the words of Moses are merely a moral injunction,
in which he predicts rhetorically the future backsliding of the people
so as to impress it vividly on their imagination. (11:17) I say that Moses
spoke of himself in order to lend likelihood to his prediction, and not
as a prophet by revelation, because in verse 21 of the same chap-
ter we are told that G-D revealed the same thing to Moses in differ- Metaphors
ent words, and there was no need to make Moses certain by argu-
ment of G-D's prediction and decree; page159 it was only necessary
that it should be vividly impressed on his imagination, and this could
not be better accomplished than by imagining the existing contu-
macy of the people, of which he had had frequent experience, as
likely to extend into the future.
(11:18) All
the arguments employed by Moses in the five books are to
be understood in a similar manner; they are not drawn from the arm-
oury of reason, but are merely modes of expression calculated to
instil with efficacy, and present vividly to the imagination the Smith:108138
commands of G-D. Metaphors
(11:19) However,
I do not wish absolutely to deny that
the prophets
ever argued from revelation; I only maintain that the prophets made
more legitimate use of argument in proportion as their knowledge
approached more nearly to ordinary knowledge, and by this we
know that they possessed a knowledge above the ordinary, inas-
much as they proclaimed absolute dogmas, decrees, or judgments.
(11:20) Thus Moses, the chief of the prophets, never used legitimate
argument, and, on the other hand, the long deductions and argu-
ments of Paul, such as we find in the Epistle to the Romans, are in
nowise written from supernatural revelation.
(11:21) The
modes of expression and discourse adopted by the Apos-
tles in the Epistles, show very clearly that the latter were not written
by revelation
and Divine command, but merely by
the natural
powers and judgment of the authors. (11:22)
They consist in brotherly
Smith:108137
admonitions and courteous expressions such as would never be
employed in prophecy, as for instance, Paul's excuse in Romans
xv:15, "I have written the more boldly unto you in some sort, Smith:108136
my brethren."
(11:23) We
may arrive at the same conclusion from observing that we
never read that the Apostles were commanded to write, but only
that they went everywhere preaching, and confirmed their words
with signs. (11:24) Their personal presence and signs were absolutely
necessary for the conversion and establishment in religion of the
Gentiles; as Paul himself expressly states in Rom. i:11, "But I long
to see you, that I may impart to you some spiritual gift, to the end
that ye may be established."
(11:25) It
may be objected that we might prove in similar
fashion that
the Apostles did not preach as prophets, for they did not go to par-
ticular places, as the prophets did, by the page 160 command of G-D. Metaphors
(11:26) We read in the {Hebrew Bible} that Jonah went to Nineveh to
preach, and at the same time that he was expressly sent there, and
told that he must preach. (11:27) So also it is related, at great length,
of Moses that he went to Egypt as the messenger of G-D, and was Metaphors
told at the same time what he should say to the children of Israel
and to king Pharaoh, and what wonders he should work before
them to give credit to his words. (11:28) Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel
were expressly commanded to preach to the Israelites.
(11:29)
Lastly, the prophets only
preached what we are assured by
Scripture they had received from God, whereas this is hardly ever
said of the Apostles in the New Testament when they went about
to preach. (11:29a) On the contrary, we find passages expressly
implying that the Apostles chose
the places where they should
preach on their own responsibility,
for there was a difference Smith109142
amounting to a quarrel between Paul and Barnabas on the subject
(Acts xv:37, 38). (11:30) Often they wished to go to a place, but
were prevented, as Paul writes, Rom. i:13, "Oftentimes I purposed
to come to you, but was let hitherto;" and in I Cor. xvi:12, "As touch-
ing our brother Apollos, I greatly desired him to come unto you with
the brethren, but his will was not at all to come at this time: but he
will come when he shall have convenient
time."
(11:31) From
these expressions and differences of opinion among the
Apostles, and also from the fact that Scripture nowhere testifies of
them, as of the ancient prophets, that they went
by the command of Metaphors
G-D, one
might conclude that they preached as
well as wrote in
their capacity of teachers, and not as prophets: but the question is
easily solved if we observe the difference between the mission of
an Apostle and that of an {Hebrew Bible} prophet. (11:32) The latter
were not called to preach and prophesy to all nations, but to certain
specified ones, and therefore an express and peculiar mandate was Constitution
required for each of them; the Apostles, on the other hand, were
called to preach to all men absolutely, and to turn all men to religion.
(11:33) Therefore, whithersoever they went, they were fulfilling Christ's
commandment; there was no need to reveal to them beforehand
what they should preach, for they were the disciples of Christ to
whom their Master Himself said (Matt. X:19, 20): "But, when page161
they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak,
for shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak."
(11:34) We therefore conclude that the Apostles were only indebted
to special revelation in what they orally preached and confirmed
by signs (see the beginning of Chap. 11.); that which they taught in
speaking or writing without any confirmatory signs and wonders
they taught from their natural knowledge. (See I Cor. xiv:6.) (35) We
need not be deterred by the fact that all the Epistles begin by citing
the imprimatur of the Apostleship, for the Apostles, as I will shortly
show, were granted, not only the faculty of prophecy, but also the
authority to teach. (11:36) We may therefore admit that they wrote
their Epistles as Apostles, and for this cause every one of them
began by citing the Apostolic imprimatur, possibly with a view to the
attention of the reader by asserting that they were the persons who
had made such mark among the faithful by their preaching, and had
shown by many marvelous works that they were teaching true
religion and the way of salvation. (11:37) I observe that what is said in
the Epistles with regard to the Apostolic vocation and the Holy Spirit
of God which inspired them, has reference to their former preaching,
except in those passages where the expressions of the Spirit of
God and the Holy Spirit are used to signify a mind pure, upright,
and devoted to God. (11:38) For instance, in 1 Cor. vii:40, Paul says:
"But she is happier if she so abide, after my judgment, and I think
also that I have the Spirit of God." (11:39) By the Spirit of God the
Apostle here refers to his mind, as we may see from the context:
his meaning is as follows: "I account blessed a widow who does not
wish to marry a second husband; such is my opinion, for I have
settled to live unmarried, and I think that I am blessed." (11:40) There
are other similar passages which I need not now quote.
(11:41) As
we have seen that the Apostles wrote their Epistles
solely
by the light of natural reason, we must inquire how they were
enabled to teach by natural knowledge matters outside its scope.
(11:42) However, if we bear in mind what we said in Chap. VII. of this
treatise our difficulty will vanish: for although the contents of the
Bible entirely surpass our understanding, we may safely discourse
of them, provided page 162 we assume nothing not told us in
Scripture: by the same method the Apostles, from what they saw
and heard, and from what was revealed to them, were enabled to
form and elicit many conclusions which they would have been able
to teach to men had it been permissible.
(11:43) Further,
although religion, as
preached by the Apostles, does
not come within the sphere of reason, in so far as it consists in the
narration of the life of Christ, yet its essence, which is chiefly moral,
like the whole of Christ's doctrine, can readily be apprehended by
the natural faculties
of all.
(11:44) Lastly,
the Apostles had no lack of supernatural illumination for
the purpose of adapting the religion they had attested by signs to
the understanding of everyone so that it might be readily received;
nor for exhortations on the subject: in fact, the object of the Epistles
is to teach and exhort men to lead that manner of
life which each of
the Apostles judged best for confirming them
in religion. (11:45)
We
may here repeat our former remark, that the Apostles had received
not only the faculty of preaching the history of Christ as prophets,
and confirming it with signs, but also authority for teaching and ex-
horting according as each thought best. (11:46) Paul (2 Tim. i:11), Smith:110149
"Whereunto I am appointed a preacher, and an apostle, and a
teacher of the Gentiles;" and again (I Tim. ii:7), "Whereunto I am
ordained a preacher and an apostle (I speak the truth in Christ and
lie not), a teacher of the Gentiles in faith and verity." (11:47) These
passages, I say, show clearly the stamp both of the apostleship and
the teachership: the authority for admonishing whomsoever and
wheresoever he pleased is asserted by Paul in the Epistle to Phile-
mon, 1:8: "Wherefore, though I might be much bold in Christ to en-
join thee that which is convenient, yet," &c., where we may remark
that if Paul had received from God as a prophet what he wished to
enjoin Philemon, and had been bound to speak in his prophetic
capacity, he would not have been able
to change the command of
God into entreaties. (11:48)
We must therefore understand
him to
refer to the permission to admonish which he had received as a
teacher, and not as a prophet. (11:49)
We have not yet made it quite
clear that the Apostles might each choose
his own page163
way of Smith:110
teaching, but only that by virtue of their Apostleship they were
teachers as well as prophets; however, if we call reason to our aid
we shall clearly see that an authority to teach implies authority to
choose the method. (11:50) It will nevertheless be, perhaps, more sat-
isfactory to draw all our proofs from Scripture; we are there plainly
told that each Apostle chose his particular method (Rom. xv: 20):
"Yea, so have I strived to preach the gospel, not where Christ was
named, lest I should build upon another man's foundation." (11:51) If
all the Apostles had adopted the same method of teaching, and had
all built up the Christian religion on the same foundation, Paul would
have had no reason to call the work of a fellow-Apostle "another
man's foundation," inasmuch as it would have been identical with
his own: his calling it another man's proved that each Apostle built
up his religious instruction on different foundations, thus resembling
other teachers who have each their own method, and prefer in-
structing quite ignorant people who have never learnt under anoth-
er master, whether the subject be science,
languages, or even the
indisputable truths of mathematics.
(11:52) Furthermore,
if we go
through the Epistles at all attentively, we shall see that the Apostles,
while agreeing about religion itself, are at variance as to the founda-
tions it rests on. (11:53) Paul, in order to strengthen men's religion,
and show them that salvation depends solely on the grace of God,
teaches that no one can boast of works, but only of faith, and that
no one can be justified by works (Rom. iii:27,28); in fact, he preach- Smith:110150.
es the complete doctrine of predestination
{the
foreordination by God of
whatever comes to pass, esp. the salvation and damnation
of souls.}.
(11:54) James,
on the other hand, states that man is
justified by works, and not
by faith only (see his Epistle,
ii:24), and omitting all the disputations
Smith:110150.
of Paul, confines religion
to a very few elements.
(11:55) Lastly,
it is indisputable that from these
different ground; for
religion selected by the Apostles, many quarrels and schisms dis-
tracted the Church, even in the earliest times, and doubtless they
will continue so to distract it for
ever, or at least till religion is
sepa-
rated from philosophical speculations,
and reduced to the few
simple doctrines taught by Christ to His disciples; such a task was Smith:110151.
impossible for the Apostles, because the Gospel was then unknown
to mankind, and lest its novelty should offend page 164 men's ears it
had to be adapted to the disposition of contemporaries (2 Cor.
ix:19,
20), and built up on the groundwork most familiar and accept-
ed at the time. (11:56)
Thus none of the Apostles philosophized
more
than did Paul, who was called to preach to the Gentiles;
other Apos-
disdained
tles preaching to
the Jews, who despised
philosophy, similarly Smith:109143
adapted themselves to the temper of their hearers (see Gal. ii. 11),
and preached a religion
free from all philosophical speculations.
(11:57) How
blest would our age be if it
could witness a religion
freed also from all the trammels
of superstition
{ any blindly
accepted Smith:109144
belief or notion }.!
Page 165
CHAPTER XII.
OF THE TRUE ORIGINAL OF THE DIVINE
LAW,
AND WHEREFORE SCRIPTURE IS CALLED
SACRED,
AND THE WORD OF G-D.
HOW THAT, IN SO FAR
AS IT CONTAINS THE WORD
OF GOD, IT HAS COME
DOWN TO US UNCORRUPTED.
(12:1) Those who look upon the Bible as a message sent down by
God from Heaven to men, will doubtless cry out that I have commit-
ted the sin against
the Holy Ghost because I have asserted that the
Bk.XIX:57b,
575.
Word of
God is faulty, mutilated,
tampered with, and inconsistent; Metaphors
that we possess it only in fragments, and that the original of the
covenant which God made with the Jews has been lost. (12:2) How-
ever, I have no doubt that a little reflection will cause them to desist
from their uproar: for not only reason but the expressed opinions of
prophets and apostles openly proclaim that G-D's
eternal Word
and
hearts, that is, in the human mind, and that this is the true
original of Smith:109139
G-D's covenant, stamped with His own seal, namely, the idea of
Himself, as it were, with the image of His Godhood.
(12:3) Religion
was imparted to the early Hebrews as
a law written Constitution
down, because they were at that time in the condition of children,
but afterwards Moses (Deut. xxx:6) and Jeremiah (xxxi:33) predicted
a time coming when the Lord should write His law in their hearts. Evolution
(12:4) Thus only the Jews, and amongst them chiefly the Sadducees,
struggled for the law written on tablets; least of all need those who Smith:108139
bear it inscribed on their hearts join in the contest. (12:5) Those,
therefore, who reflect, will find nothing in what I have written repug-
nant either to the Word of God or to true religion and faith, or calcu-
lated to weaken either one or the other: contrariwise, they will see
that I have strengthened religion, as I showed at the end of Chap-
ter X.; indeed, page 166 had it not been so, I should certainly have
decided to hold my peace, nay, I would even have asserted as a
way out of all difficulties that the Bible contains the most profound
hidden mysteries; however, as this doctrine has given rise to gross
superstition and other pernicious results spoken of at the beginning
of Chapter V., I have thought such a course unnecessary, especial-
ly as religion stands in no need of superstitious adornments, but is,
on the contrary, deprived by such trappings of some of her
splendour.
(12:6) Still,
it will be said, though the law
of G-D is written in the heart, Yovel's
Mtaphors
the Bible is none the less the Word of G-D, and it is no more lawful
to say of Scripture than of G-Ds Word that it is mutilated and cor-
rupted. (12:7) I fear that such objectors are too anxious to be pious,
and that they are in danger of turning religion
into superstition, and
Bk.XX:27284.
worshipping
paper and ink in place of G-D's Word.
(12:8) I
am certified of thus much: I have
said nothing unworthy of
Scripture or God's Word, and I have made no assertions which I pejorative
could not prove by most plain argument to be true. (12:9) I can, there-
fore, rest assured that I have advanced nothing which is impious or
even savours of impiety.
(12:10) I
confess that some profane men, to whom
religion is a burden,
may, from what I have said, assume a licence to sin, and without
any reason, at the simple dictates of their lusts conclude that Scrip-
ture is everywhere faulty and falsified, and that therefore its author-
ity is null; but such men are beyond the reach of help, for nothing,
as the proverb has it, can be said so rightly that it cannot be twist-
ed into wrong. (12:11) Those who wish to give rein to their lusts are at
no loss for an excuse, nor were those men of old who possessed
the original Scriptures, the ark of the covenant, nay, the prophets
and apostles in person among them, any better than the people of
to-day. (12:12) Human nature, Jew as well as Gentile, has always
been the same, and in every age virtue
has been exceedingly rare.
(12:13) Nevertheless,
to remove every scruple, I will here show in what
{Infinity}
sense the Bible or any inanimate
thing should be called sacred and I-thee
Divine; also wherein the law of G-D consists, and how it cannot be
contained in a certain number of books; and, lastly, I will show that
Scripture, in so far page 167 as it teaches what is necessary for
obedience and salvation cannot have been corrupted. (12:14) From
these considerations everyone will be able to judge that I have
neither said anything against the Word of God nor given any
foothold to impiety.
(12:15) A
thing is called sacred
and Divine when it is designed for pro-
moting piety, and continues sacred so long as it is religiously used:
if the users cease to be pious, the thing ceases to be sacred: if it be
turned to base uses, that which was formerly sacred becomes un-
clean and profane. (12:16) For instance, a certain spot was named by
the patriarch Jacob the house of God, because he worshipped God
there revealed to him: by the prophets the same spot was called the
house of iniquity (see Amos v:5, and Hosea x:5), because the Israel-
ites were wont, at the instigation of Jeroboam, to sacrifice there to
idols. (12:17) Another example puts the matter in the plainest light.
(12:18) Words gain their meaning solely from their usage, and if they
are arranged according to their accepted signification so as to move
those who read them to devotion, they will become sacred, and the
book so written will be sacred also. (12:19) But if their usage after-
wards dies out so that the words have no meaning, or the book
becomes utterly neglected, whether from unworthy motives, or
because it is no longer needed, then the words and the book will
lose both their use and their sanctity: lastly, if these same words be
otherwise arranged, or if their customary meaning becomes pervert-
ed into its opposite, then both the words and the book containing
them become, instead of sacred, impure and profane.
(12:20) From
this it follows that nothing is in itself absolutely sacred, or JBYnote1
profane, and unclean, apart from the mind, but only relatively thereto.
(12:21) Thus much is clear from many passages in the Bible. (12:22) Jer-
emiah (to select one case out of many) says (chap. vii:4), that the
Jews of his time were wrong in calling Solomon's Temple, the Tem-
ple of God, for, as he goes on to say in the same chapter, God's
name would only be given to the Temple so long as it was frequent-
ed by men who worshipped Him, and defended justice, but that, if it
became the resort of murderers, thieves, idolaters, and other wicked
persons, it would be turned into a den of malefactors.
PAGE 168
(12:23) Scripture,
curiously enough, nowhere tells us what became of
the Ark of the Covenant, though there is no doubt that it was des-
troyed, or burnt together with the Temple; yet there was nothing
which the Hebrews considered more sacred, or held in greater
reverence. (12:24) Thus Scripture is sacred, and its words Divine
so long as it stirs mankind to devotion towards G-D: but if it
be utterly neglected, as it formerly was by the Jews, it becomes
nothing but paper and ink, and is left to be desecrated or corrupted:
still, though Scripture be thus corrupted or destroyed, we must not
say that the Word of God has suffered in like manner, else we shall
be like the Jews, who said that the Temple which would then be
the Temple of God had perished in the flames. (12:25) Jeremiah tells
us this in respect to the
law, for he thus chides the ungodly of his
Jer
8:8
time, "Wherefore, say you
we are masters, and the law of the Lord
is with us? (12:26) Surely it has been given in vain, it is in vain that
the pen of the scribes" (has been made)—that is, you say falsely
that the Scripture is in your power, and that you possess the law of
God; for ye have made it of none effect.
(12:27) So
also, when Moses broke the first tables of
the law, he did
not by any means cast the Word of God from his hands in anger
and shatter it—such an action would be inconceivable, either of
Moses or of God's Word—he only broke the tables of stone, which,
though they had before been holy from containing the covenant
wherewith the Jews had bound themselves in obedience to God,
had entirely lost their sanctity when the covenant had been violated
by the worship of the calf, and were, therefore, as liable to perish as
the ark of the covenant. (12:28) It is thus scarcely to be wondered at,
that the original documents of Moses are no longer extant, nor that
the books we possess met with the fate we have described, when
we consider that the true original of the Divine covenant, the most
sacred object of all, has totally perished.
(12:29) Let
them cease, therefore, who accuse us of impiety,
inasmuch
as we have said nothing against the Word of God, neither have we
corrupted it, but let them keep their anger, if they would wreak it
justly, for the ancients whose malice desecrated the Ark, the
Temple, and the Law of God, and all that was held sacred, subject- Yovels's Metaphors
ing them to corruption. (12:30) Furthermore, page 169 if, according to
the saying of the Apostle in 2 Cor. iii:3, they possessed "the Epistle
of Christ, written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God,
not in tables of stone, but in the fleshy tables of the heart," let them
cease to worship the
letter, and be so anxious concerning
it.
(12:31) I
think I have now sufficiently shown in what respect Scripture
should be accounted sacred and
Divine; we may now see what
Bk.XIX:57b,
575.
should rightly be understood
by the expression, the Word
of the
Lord; debar (the Hebrew original), {daw-vawr'—Strong:1697}, signifies Chain of natural events
word, speech, command, and thing. (12:32) The causes for which a
thing is in Hebrew said to be of G-D, or is referred to Him, have
been already detailed in Chap. I., and we can therefrom easily
gather what meaning Scripture attaches to the phrases, the word,
the speech, the command, or the thing of God. (12:33) I need not,
therefore, repeat what I there said, nor what was shown under the
third head in the chapter on miracles. (12:34) It is enough to mention
the repetition for the better understanding of what I am about to
say—viz., that the Word of the Lord when it has reference to anyone
but G-D Himself, signifies that Divine law treated of in Chap. IV.; in
other words, religion, universal and catholic to the whole human
race, as Isaiah describes it (chap. i:17), teaching that the true
way of life consists, not in ceremonies, but in charity, and a true
heart, and calling it
indifferently G-D's Law
and G-D's Word.
(12:35) The
expression is also used metaphorically
for the order of
nature and destiny (which, indeed, actually depend and follow from
the eternal mandate of the Divine nature), and especially for such
parts of such order as were foreseen by the prophets, for the proph-
ets did not perceive future events as the result of natural causes,
but as the fiats and decrees of God. (12:36) Lastly, it is employed for
the command of any prophet, in so far as he had perceived it by his
peculiar faculty or prophetic gift, and not by the natural light of
reason; this use springs chiefly from the usual prophetic conception
of God as a legislator, which we remarked in Chap. IV. (12:36a) There
are, then, three causes for the Bible's being called the Word of God:
because it teaches true religion, of which God is the eternal
Founder; because it narrates predictions of future events as though
they were page 170 decrees of God; because its actual authors gen-
erally perceived things not by their ordinary natural faculties, but by
a power peculiar to themselves, and introduced these things per-
ceived, as told them by
G-D.
(12:37) Although
Scripture contains much
that is merely historical and
can be perceived by natural reason, yet its name is acquired from its
chief subject matter.
(12:38) We
can thus easily see how God can be said to be the Author
of the Bible: it is because of the true religion therein contained, and
not because He wished to communicate to men a certain
number of
books. (12:39)
We can also learn
from hence the reason
for the
division into {Christian and Hebrew Bibles}. (12:40) It was made because
the prophets who preached religion
before Christ, preached it as a
{
Exo
2:24 }
national law
in virtue of the
covenant entered into under Moses;
while the Apostles who came after Christ,
preached it to all men as
a universal religion solely in virtue of Christ's Passion:
the cause for
TTP3:Bk.XIA:106116.
the division is not that the two parts are different in doctrine,
nor that they were written as originals of the covenant, nor, lastly,
that the catholic religion (which is in entire harmony with our nature)
was new except in relation to those who had
not known it: "it was in
the world," as John the Evangelist says, "and
the world knew it not."
{NKJ
(1982) John 1:10 He was in the world, and the world was made through Him,
and
the world did not know Him.}
{Hebrew
Bible,}
(12:41) Thus,
even if we had fewer books of the ^ Old,
and New Testa-
ment than we have, we should
still not be deprived of the Word of Yovel's
Metaphors
{
EL:[64]:xxxi.
}
God (which, as we have said,
is identical with true religion),
even as
we do not now hold ourselves to be deprived of it, though we lack
many cardinal writings such as the Book of the Law, which was
religiously guarded in the Temple as the original of the Covenant,
also the Book of Wars, the Book of Chronicles, and many others,
from whence the extant {Hebrew Bible} was taken and compiled.
(12:42) The
above conclusion may be supported by
many reasons.
I. (12:43)
Because the books
of both Testaments were not written by
express command at one place for all ages, but are a fortuitous
collection of the works of men, writing each as his period and dispo-
sition dictated. (12:44) So much is clearly shown by the call of the
prophets who were bade to admonish the ungodly of their time, and
also by the Apostolic Epistles.
II. (12:45)
Because it is one thing to understand
the meaning of page 171
Scripture and the prophets, and quite another thing to understand
the meaning of G-D, or the actual truth. (12:46) This follows from what G-D sive Natura
we said in Chap. II. (12:47) We showed, in Chap. VI., that it applied to
historic narratives, and to miracles: but it by no means applies to
questions concerning true religion
and virtue.
III. (12:48)
Because the books of
the {Hebrew
Bible} were selected
from many, and were collected and sanctioned by a council of the
Pharisees, as
we showed in Chap. X.
(12:49) The
books of the {Christ-
ian Bible} were also chosen from many by councils
which rejected
as spurious other books held sacred by many. (12:50) But these
councils, both Pharisee and Christian, were not composed of
prophets, but only of learned men and teachers. (1251) Still, we must
grant that they were guided in their choice by a regard for the
Word of God; and they must, therefore, have known what the law of
God was.
IV. (12:52)
Because the Apostles
wrote not as prophets, but as teach-
ers (see last Chapter), and chose whatever method they thought
best adapted for those whom they addressed: and consequently,
there are many things in the Epistles (as we showed at the end of
the last Chapter) which
are not necessary to salvation.
V. (12:53)
Lastly, because there
are four Evangelists in the New Test-
ament, and it is scarcely credible that God can have designed to
narrate the life of Christ four times over, and to communicate it thus
to mankind. (12:54) For though there are some details related in one
Gospel which are not in another, and one often helps us to under-
stand another, we cannot thence conclude that all that is set down
is of vital importance to us, and that God chose the four Evangelists
in order that the life of Christ might be better understood; for each
one preached his Gospel in a separate locality, each wrote it down
as he preached it, in simple language, in order that the history of
Christ might be clearly told, not with any view of explaining his
fellow-Evangelists.
(12:55) If
there are some passages which can be
better, and more
easily understood by comparing the various versions, they are the
result of chance, and are not numerous: their continuance in obscur-
ity would have impaired neither the clearness of the narrative nor
the blessedness of
mankind.
(12:56) We
have now shown that Scripture can
only be called page
172
the Word of God in so far as it affects religion, or the Divine law; we metaphors
must now point out that, in respect to these questions, it is neither
faulty, tampered with, nor corrupt. (12:57) By faulty, tampered with,
and corrupt, I here mean written so incorrectly that the meaning
cannot be arrived at by a study of the language, nor from the author-
ity of Scripture. (12:58) I will not go to such lengths as to say that the
Bible, in so far as it contains the Divine law, has always preserved
the same vowel-points, the same letters, or the same words (I leave
this to be proved by the Massoretes and other worshippers of the
letter), I only maintain that the meaning by which alone an utterance
is entitled to be called Divine, has come down to us uncorrupted,
even though the original wording may have been more often
changed than we suppose. (12:59) Such alterations, as I have said
above, detract nothing from the Divinity of the Bible, for the Bible
would have been no less Divine had it been written in different
words or a different language. (12:60) That the Divine law has in this
sense come down to us uncorrupted,
is an assertion which admits
of no dispute. (12:61)
For from the Bible
itself we learn, without the
smallest difficulty or ambiguity, that its cardinal precept is: To
love God above all things, and one's neighbour as one's self.
(12:62) This cannot be a spurious passage, nor due to a hasty and
mistaken scribe, for if the Bible had ever put forth a different doctrine
it would have had to change the whole of its teaching, for this is the
corner-stone of religion, without which the whole fabric would fall
headlong to the ground.
(12:63) The
Bible would not be the work we
Bk.XIA:81133.
have been examining, but something quite
different.
(12:64) We
remain, then, unshaken in our belief
that this has always
been the doctrine of Scripture, and, consequently, that no error
sufficient to vitiate it can have crept in without being instantly
observed by all; nor can anyone have succeeded in tampering with
it and escaped the discovery of his malice.
(12:65) As
this corner-stone is intact, we must perforce admit
the same
of whatever other passages are indisputably dependent on it, and
are also fundamental, as, for instance, that a God exists, that He
foresees all things, that He is Almighty, that by His decree the good
prosper and the wicked page 173 come to naught, and, finally, that
our salvation
depends solely on His grace.
(12:66) These
are doctrines which Scripture
plainly teaches through-
out, and which it is bound to teach, else all the rest would be empty
and baseless; nor can we be less positive about other moral doc-
trines, which plainly are built upon this universal foundation—for
instance, to uphold justice, to aid the weak, to do no murder, to
covet no man's goods, &c. (12:67) Precepts, I repeat, such as these,
human malice and the lapse of ages are alike powerless to destroy,
for if any part of them perished, its loss would immediately be sup-
plied from the fundamental
principle, especially the doctrine of
loving kindness—Bk.XIA:81131.
charity,
which is everywhere in both Testaments extolled above
all
others. (12:68) Moreover, though it be true that there is no conceivable
crime so heinous that it has never been committed, still there is no
one who would attempt in excuse for his crimes to destroy the law,
or introduce an impious doctrine in the place of what is eternal and
salutary; men's nature is so constituted that everyone (be he king
or subject) who has committed a base action, tries to deck out his
conduct with spurious excuses, till he seems to have done nothing
but what is just
and right.
(12:69) We
may conclude, therefore, that the whole
Divine law, as
taught by Scripture, has come down to us uncorrupted. (12:70) Besides
this there are certain facts which we may be sure have been trans-
mitted in good faith. (12:71) For instance, the main facts of Hebrew
history, which were perfectly well known to everyone. (12:72) The
Jewish people were accustomed in former times to chant the ancient
history of their nation in psalms. (12:73) The main facts, also, of
Christ's life and passion were immediately spread abroad through
the whole Roman empire. (12:73a) It is therefore scarcely credible,
unless nearly everybody consented thereto, which we cannot sup-
pose, that successive generations have handed down the broad
outline of the Gospel narrative
otherwise than as they received it.
(12:74) Whatsoever,
therefore, is spurious or faulty can only have ref-
erence to details—some circumstances in one or the other history
or prophecy designed to stir the people to greater devotion; or in
some miracle, with a view of page 174 confounding philosophers; or,
lastly, in speculative matters after they had become mixed up with
religion, so that some individual might prop up his own inventions
with a pretext of Divine authority. (12:75) But such matters have little
to do with salvation, whether they be corrupted little or much, as I
will show in detail in the next chapter, though I think the question
sufficiently plain from what I have said already, especially in
Page 175
CHAPTER XIII.
IT IS SHOWN THAT SCRIPTURE TEACHES
ONLY VERY SIMPLE DOCTRINES,
SUCH AS SUFFICE FOR RIGHT
CONDUCT.
] It is
shown that Scripture teaches only very simple doctrines,
and inculcates nothing but obedience,
and that concerning
the nature of God it teaches
only what men can imitate by a
definite code of
conduct. [ {
Constitution }
Bk.XIV:2:3283.
(13:1) In
the second chapter of
this treatise we pointed out that
the
prophets were gifted with extraordinary powers of imagination, but
not of understanding; also that God only revealed to them such
things as are very simple—not philosophic mysteries,—and that He
adapted His communications to their previous opinions. (13:2) We
further showed in Chap. V. that Scripture only transmits and teaches
truths which can readily be comprehended by all; not deducing and
concatenating its conclusions from definitions and axioms, but nar-
rating quite simply, and confirming its statements, with a view to in-
spiring belief, by an appeal to experience as exemplified in miracles
and history, and setting forth its truths
in the style and phraseology
sluggish—Bk.XX:28098.
which would most appeal
to the popular mind (cf. Chap.
VI., third
division).
(13:3) Lastly,
we demonstrated in Chap. VIII. that the
difficulty of under-
standing Scripture lies in the language only, and not in the abstruse-
ness of the argument.
(13:4) To
these considerations we may add that the Prophets did
not
preach only to the learned, but to all Jews, without exception, while
the Apostles were wont to teach the gospel doctrine in churches
where there were public meetings; whence it follows that Scriptural
doctrine contains no lofty speculations nor philosophic reasoning,
but only very simple matters,
such as could be understood by the
Bk.XIA:82136.
slowest intelligence.
(13:5) I
am consequently lost in wonder at the ingenuity of those whom
I have already mentioned, who detect in the Bible mysteries so
profound that they cannot be explained in human language, and who
have introduced so many philosophic speculations into religion that
the Church page
176 seems like an academy,
and religion like a
Bk.XIA:6649.
science, or rather a dispute.
(13:6) It
is not to be wondered at that men, who boast of
possessing
supernatural intelligence, should be unwilling to yield the palm of
knowledge to philosophers who have only their ordinary faculties;
still I should be surprised if I found
them teaching any new specula-
Bk.XIA:77110—pagan.
tive doctrine, which was not a commonplace
to those Gentile philos-
ophers whom, in spite of all, they stigmatize as blind; for, if one
inquires what these mysteries lurking
in Scripture may be, one is
Bk.XIA:77109.
confronted with nothing but
the reflections of Plato or Aristotle, or
the like, which it would often be easier for an
ignorant man to dream
Bk.XIA:7180.
than for the most accomplished
scholar to wrest out of the Bible.
(13:7) However,
I do not wish to affirm absolutely that Scripture
con-
tains no doctrines in the sphere of philosophy, for in the last chapter
I pointed out some of the kind, as fundamental principles; but I go so
far as to say that such doctrines are very few and very simple.
(13:8) Their precise nature and definition I will now set forth. (13:9) The
task will be easy, for we know that Scripture does not aim at impart-
ing scientific knowledge, and, therefore, it demands from men
nothing but obedience,
and censures obstinacy, but not ignorance.
(13:10) Furthermore,
as obedience to G-D
consists solely in love to our
neighbour—for whosoever
loveth his neighbour,
as a means of
Bk.XIA:81132.
obeying God, hath, as St. Paul says (Rom.
xiii:8), fulfilled the law,—
it follows that no knowledge is commended in the Bible save that
which is necessary for enabling all men to obey God in the manner
stated, and without which they would become rebellious, or without
the discipline of obedience.
(13:11) Other
speculative questions, which
have no direct bearing on
this object, or are concerned with the knowledge of natural events,
do not affect Scripture, and should be entirely separated from TTP1:Divine Law
religion.
]
quite obvious [
(13:12) Now,
though everyone, as we have said, is now quite
able to
see this truth for himself, I should nevertheless wish, considering
that the whole of Religion
depends thereon, to explain the entire
question more accurately and clearly.
(13:13) To
this end I must first
]demonstrate[ Bk.XIV:2:3062.
Bk.XIV:2:3063. Bk.XIV:2:306.
prove that the intellectual
page 177
or accurate knowledge of God is
]
shared by all the faithful, [
not a gift, bestowed
upon all good men like obedience; and, further,
that the knowledge of God, required by Him through His prophets
from everyone without exception, as needful
to be known, is simply
Bk.XIV:2:3067.
a knowledge of His Divine
justice and charity.
(13:14) Both
these
points are easily proved from
Scripture. (13:15)
The first plainly
follows from Exodus vi:2, where God, in order to show the singular
grace bestowed upon Moses, says to him: "And I appeared unto
Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob by the name of El Sadai (A. V.
Almighty) but by
my name Jehovah was I
not known to them"— Bk.XIV:1:144.
for the better
understanding of which passage I may
remark that
HirPent:
Exo 6:3
El Sadai, in Hebrew,
signifies the God who suffices, in that He
gives HirPent:Gn
43:14
to every man that which suffices for him; and, although Sadai is
often used by itself, to signify
God, we cannot doubt that the word
El (God)
is everywhere understood. (13:16)
Furthermore, we must
note that Jehovah is the only
word found in Scripture with the mean-
Bk.XIV:2:3065.
Bk.XIV:2:3068.
ing of the absolute essence
of God, without reference to created
things. (13:17) The Jews maintain, for this reason, that this is, strictly
speaking, the only name of God; that the rest of the words used are
merely titles; and, in truth, the other names of God, whether they be
substantives or adjectives, are merely attributive, and belong to Him,
in so far as He is conceived of in relation to created things, or mani-
fested through them. (13:18) Thus El, or Eloah, signifies powerful, as
is well known, and only applies to God in respect to His supremacy,
as when we call Paul an apostle; the faculties of his power are set
forth in an accompanying adjective, as El, great, awful, just, merciful,
&c., or else all are understood at once by the use of El in the plural
number, with a singular signification, an expression frequently
adopted in Scripture.
(13:19) Now,
as God tells Moses that He was not known
to the patri-
archs by the name of Jehovah,
it follows that they were not cogni-
Bk.XIV:2:3066.
zant of any attribute
of God which expresses His absolute essence,
but only of His deeds and promises
that is, of His power, as mani-
Bk.XIV:2:3071.
fested in visible things.
(13:20) God
does not thus speak to Moses in
order to accuse the patriarchs of infidelity, but, on the contrary, as a
means of extolling their belief and faith, inasmuch as, though they
page 178 possessed no extraordinary knowledge of God (such as
Moses had), they yet accepted His promises as fixed and certain;
whereas Moses, though his thoughts about God were more exalted,
nevertheless doubted about the Divine promises, and complained to
God that, instead of the promised deliverance, the prospects of the
Israelites had darkened.
(13:21) As
the patriarchs did not know the distinctive name of
God, and
as God mentions the fact to Moses, in praise of their faith and
single-heartedness, and in contrast to the extraordinary grace grant-
ed to Moses, it follows, as we stated at first, that men are not bound
by decree to have knowledge of the attributes of God, such know-
ledge being only granted to a few of the faithful: it is hardly worth
while to quote further examples from Scripture, for everyone must
recognize that knowledge of God is not equal among all good men.
(13:22) Moreover, a man cannot be ordered to be wise any more than
he can be ordered to live and exist. (13:23) Men, women, and children
are all alike able to obey by commandment, but not to be wise. If any
tell us that it is not necessary to understand the Divine
attributes, but
Bk.XIX:2224,g.
that we must believe
them simply without proof, he is plainly trifling.
(13:24) For what is invisible and can only be perceived by the mind,
cannot be apprehended by any other means than proofs;
if these are
Bk.XIX:2122.
absent
the object remains ungrasped; the repetition
of what has
been heard on such subjects no more indicates or attains to their
meaning than the words of a parrot or a puppet speaking without
sense or signification.
(13:25) Before
I proceed I ought to explain how it
comes that we are
often told in Genesis that the patriarchs preached in the name of
Jehovah, this being in plain contradiction to the text above quoted.
(13:26) A reference to what was said in Chap. VIII. will readily explain
the difficulty. (13:27) It was there shown that the writer of the Penta-
teuch did not always speak of things and places by the names they
bore in the times of which he was writing, but by the names best
known to his contemporaries. (13:28) God is thus said in the Penta-
teuch to have been preached by the patriarchs under the name of
Jehovah, not because such was the name by which the patriarchs
knew Him, but because this name was page 179 the one most rever-
enced by the Jews. (13:29) This point, I say, must necessarily be
noticed, for in Exodus it is expressly stated that God was not known
to the patriarchs by this name; and in chap. iii:13, it is said that
Moses desired to know the name of God. (13:30) Now, if this name
had been already known it would have been known to Moses.
(13:31) We must therefore draw the conclusion indicated, namely, that
the faithful patriarchs did not know this name of God, and that the
knowledge of God is bestowed and
not commanded by the Deity.
(13:32) It
is now time to pass on to our
second point, and show that
God through His prophets required from men no other knowledge
of Himself than is contained in a knowledge of His justice and charity
—that is, of attributes which a certain manner of
life will enable men
Bk.XIX:5118.
to imitate. (13:33)
Jeremiah states this
in so many words (xxii:15,
16):
"Did not thy father eat, and drink, and do judgment and justice? and
then it was well with him. (13:34) He judged the cause of the poor and
needy; then it was well with him: was not this to know Me? saith the
Lord." (13:35) The words in chap. ix:23 of the same book are equally
clear. (13:36) "But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he under-
standeth and knoweth Me, that I am the Lord which exercise
loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth; for in
these things I delight, saith the Lord." (13:37) The same doctrine may-
be gathered from Exod. xxxiv:6, where God revealed to Moses only
those of His attributes which display the Divine justice and charity.
(13:38) Lastly, we may call attention to a passage in John which we
shall discuss at more length hereafter; the Apostle explains the
nature of God (inasmuch as no one has beheld Him) through charity
only, and concludes that he who possesses charity possesses, and
in very truth knows God.
(13:39) We
have thus seen that Moses, Jeremiah, and John sum up in
a very short compass the knowledge of God needful for all, and that
they state it to consist in exactly what we said, namely, that God is
supremely just, and supremely merciful—in other words, the one
perfect pattern of the true life. (13:40) We may add that Scripture
nowhere gives an express definition of God, and does not point out
any other of His attributes which should be apprehended save
these, nor page 180 does it in set terms praise any others.
(13:41) Wherefore
we may draw the general conclusion that an intel-
Bk.XIV:2:306.
lectual
knowledge of God, which takes cognizance of His nature
in
so far as it actually is, and which cannot by any manner of living be
imitated by mankind or followed
as an example, has no bearing
Bk.XIV:2:3064.
whatever on true rules
of conduct, on faith, or on revealed religion;
consequently that men may be in complete error on the subject
without incurring the charge of sinfulness. (13:42) We need now no
longer wonder that God adapted Himself to the existing opinions
and imaginations of the prophets, or that the faithful held different
ideas of God, as we showed in Chap. II.; or, again, that the sacred
books speak very inaccurately of God, attributing to Him hands, feet,
eyes, ears, a mind, and motion from one place to another; or that
they ascribe to Him emotions, such as jealousy, mercy, &c., or,
lastly, that they describe Him as a Judge in heaven sitting on a
royal throne with Christ on His right hand. (13:43) Such expressions
are adapted to the understanding of the multitude, it being the
object of the Bible
to make men not learned
but obedient.
(13:44) In
spite of this the general run of theologians, when they
come
upon any of these phrases which they cannot rationally harmonize
with the Divine nature, maintain that they should be interpreted
metaphorically, passages they cannot understand they say should
be interpreted literally. (13:45) But if every expression of this kind in
the Bible is necessarily to be interpreted and understood metaphor-
ically, Scripture must have been
written, not for the people and
the unlearned masses, but chiefly for accomplished
experts and
philosophers.
(13:46) If
it were indeed a sin to hold piously and
simply the ideas about
God we have just quoted, the prophets ought to have been strictly
on their guard against the use of such expressions, seeing the
weak-mindedness of the people, and ought, on the other hand, to
have set forth first of all, duly and clearly, those attributes of God
which are needful to be understood.
(13:47) This
they have nowhere done; we cannot,
therefore, think
that opinions taken in themselves without respect to actions are
either pious or impious, but must maintain that a man is pious or
impious in his beliefs only in so far as page 181 he is thereby incited
to obedience, or derives from them license to sin and rebel.
(13:48) If a man, by believing what is true, becomes rebellious, his
creed is impious; if by believing what is false he becomes obedient,
his creed is pious; for the true knowledge of God comes not by com-
mandment, but by Divine gift. (13:49) God has required nothing from
man but a knowledge of His Divine justice and charity, and that not
as necessary to scientific accuracy, but to obedience.
Page 182
CHAPTER XIV. ]
Bk.XIII:341377. [
DEFINITIONS OF
FAITH, THE FAITH,
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF FAITH,
WHICH IS ONCE FOR ALL SEPARATED TTP1:Divine
Law
FROM PHILOSOPHY.
(14:1) For
a true knowledge
of faith it is above all things necessary to
understand that the Bible
was adapted to the intelligence, not only
Bk.XIX:2589.
of the prophets, but
also of the diverse and fickle Jewish multitude.
(14:2) This will be recognized by all who give any thought to the sub-
ject, for they will see that a person who accepted promiscuously
everything in Scripture as being the universal and absolute teaching
of God, without accurately defining what was adapted to the popular
intelligence, would find it impossible to escape confounding the
opinions of the masses with the Divine doctrines, praising the judg-
ments and comments of man as the teaching of God, and making a
wrong use of Scriptural authority. (14:3) Who, I say, does not perceive
that this is the chief reason why so many sectaries teach contra-
dictory opinions as Divine documents, and support their contentions
with numerous Scriptural texts, till it has passed in Belgium into
a proverb, geen ketter sonder letter—no heretic without a text?
(14:4) The sacred books were not written by one man, nor for the
people of a single period, but by many authors of different tempera-
ments, at times extending from first to last
over nearly two thousand
years, and perhaps much longer.
(14:5) We
will not, however, accuse
the sectaries of impiety because they have adapted the words of
Scripture to their own opinions; it is thus that these words were
adapted to the understanding of the masses originally, and every-
one is at liberty so to treat them if he sees that he can thus obey
God in matters relating to justice and charity with a more full consent:
but we do accuse those who will not grant this freedom to their
fellows, but who persecute all who differ from page 183 them, as
God's enemies, however honourable and virtuous be their lives;
while, on the other hand, they
cherish those who agree with them,
however foolish they may be, as God's elect. (14:6)
Such conduct is
Bk.XIA:113158.
as wicked and dangerous to the state
as any that can be conceived.
(14:7) In
order, therefore, to establish the limits to which individual free-
dom should extend, and to decide what persons, in spite of the diver-
sity of their opinions, are to be looked upon as the faithful, we must
define faith
and its essentials. (14:8)
This task I hope to accomplish in TTP1:Divine
Law
{ See
Einstein endnote }
the present chapter, and also
to separate faith from
philosophy, Darwin
which is the chief
aim of the whole treatise.
Resurrection
(14:9) In
order to proceed duly to the demonstration let us recapitulate
the chief aim and object of Scripture; this will indicate a standard by
which we may define faith.
(14:10) We
have said in a former chapter
that the aim and object of
Scripture is
only to teach obedience.
(14:11) Thus
much, I think, no
Bk.XIA:113156.
one can question.
(14:12) Who
does not see that both Testaments
are nothing else but schools for this object, and have neither of them
any aim beyond inspiring mankind with a voluntary obedience?
(14:13) For (not to repeat what I said in the last chapter) I will remark
that Moses did not seek to convince the Jews by
reason,
but bound
{a
constitution} Hampshire:181[2]
them by a covenant, by oaths, and by conferring
benefits; further, he
threatened the people with punishment if they should infringe
the law,
Bk.XIB:12057.
and promised rewards if
they should obey it. (14:14)
All these are
not means for teaching knowledge, but for inspiring obedience.
(14:15) The doctrine of the Gospels enjoins nothing but simple faith,
namely, to believe in God and to honour Him, which is the same
thing as to obey him. (14:16) There is no occasion for me to throw
further light on a question so
plain by citing Scriptural
texts com-
Bk.XIA:113156.
mending obedience, such as may be
found in great numbers in both
Bk.XIA:6649.
Testaments. (14:17)
Moreover, the Bible teaches
very clearly in a
great many passages what everyone ought to do in order to obey
God; the whole duty is summed up in love to one's neighbour.
(14:18) It cannot, therefore, be denied that he who by God's command
loves his neighbour as himself is truly obedient and blessed accord-
ing to the law, whereas he who hates
his neighbour or neglects him
Bk.XIA:113158.
is rebellious and obstinate.
PAGE 184
(14:19) Lastly,
it is plain to everyone that the Bible was not written and
disseminated only for the learned, but for men of every age and race;
wherefore we may rest assured that we are not bound by Scriptural
command to believe anything beyond what is absolutely necessary
for fulfilling its main precept.
(14:20) This
precept, then, is the only standard of the whole
Catholic
faith, and by it alone all the dogmas needful to be believed should be
determined. (14:21) So much being abundantly manifest, as is also the
fact that all other doctrines of the faith can be legitimately deduced
therefrom by reason alone, I leave it to every man to decide for him-
self how it comes to pass that so many divisions have arisen in the
Church: can it be from any other cause than those suggested at the
beginning of Chap. VIII.? (14:22) It is these same causes which compel
me to explain the method of determining the dogmas of the faith from
the foundation we have discovered, for if I neglected to do so, and
put the question on a regular basis, I might justly be said to have
promised too lavishly, for that anyone might, by my showing, intro-
duce any doctrine he liked into religion, under the pretext that it was
a necessary means to obedience: especially would this be the case
in questions respecting the Divine
attributes.
(14:23) In
order, therefore, to set forth the whole
matter methodically,
I will begin with a definition
of faith, which on the principle
above
given, should be as follows:—
(14:24) Faith
consists in a knowledge of God,
without which obedience
to Him would be impossible, and which the mere fact of obedience to
Him implies.
(14:25) This
definition is so
clear, and follows so plainly
from what we have already
proved, that it needs no explanation.
(14:26) The
consequences involved therein I will now
briefly show.
I. (14:27)
Faith is not salutary
in itself, but only in respect to the obedi-
ence it implies, or as James puts it in his Epistle,
ii:17, "Faith without
works is dead" (see
the whole of the chapter quoted).
Bk.XIA:116171.
II. (14:28)
He who is truly
obedient necessarily possesses true and
saving faith; for if obedience be granted, faith must be granted
also,
as the same Apostle expressly says in these words
(ii:18), "Show me
thy faith without
thy works, and I will show thee
my faith by my
works." (14:29)
So also John,
I Ep. iv:7: "Everyone that loveth is born
of
God, and page
185 knoweth God:
he that loveth not, knoweth not God;
for God is love."
(14:30) From
these texts, I repeat, it follows that we
can only judge a man faithful
or unfaithful by his works. (14:31)
If his
works be good,
he is faithful, however much his doctrines may differ
from those of the rest of
the faithful: if his works be evil, though
he
may verbally conform, he is
unfaithful. (14:32)
For obedience
implies
faith, and faith
without works is dead.
4:13
(14:33) John,
in the 13th verse of the chapter above quoted, expressly
teaches the same doctrine: "Hereby,"
he says, "know we that we
Bk.XIA:116172.
dwell in Him
and He in us, because He hath given us of His
Spirit,"
i.e. love. (14:34) He had said before that God is love, and therefore he
concludes (on his own received principles), that whoso possesses
love possesses truly the Spirit of God. (14:35) As no one has beheld
God he infers that no one has knowledge or consciousness of God,
except from love towards his neighbour, and also that no one can
have knowledge of any of God's attributes, except this of love, in so
far as we participate therein.
(14:36) If
these arguments are not conclusive, they, at any rate,
show
the Apostle's meaning, but the words in chap. ii:3, 4, of the same
Epistle are much clearer, for they state in so many words our pre-
cise contention: "And hereby we do know that we know Him, if we
keep His commandments. (14:37) He that saith, I know Him, and keep-
eth not His commandments,
is a liar, and the truth is not in him."
(14:38) From
all this, I repeat, it follows that they are the true
enemies
of Christ who persecute honourable and justice-loving men because
they differ from them, and do not uphold the
same religious dogmas
{
Spinoza
Hebrew }
as themselves: for whosoever loves
justice and charity
we know, by
that very fact, to be faithful:
whosoever persecutes the faithful, is an
Bk.XIA:116170.
enemy to Christ.
(14:39) Lastly,
it follows that faith does not demand
that dogmas should
Bk.XIA:115164.
be true
as that they should be pious—that
is, such as will stir up the
heart to obey; though there be many such which contain not a
shadow of truth, so long as they be held in good faith, otherwise
their adherents are disobedient, for how can anyone, desirous of
loving justice and obeying God, adore as Divine what he knows to
be alien from the Divine nature? (14:40) However, men may err from
page 186 simplicity of mind, and Scripture, as we have seen, does
not condemn ignorance, but obstinacy. (14:41) This is the necessary
result of our definition of faith, and all its branches should spring
from the universal rule above given, and from the evident aim and
object of the Bible, unless we choose to mix our own inventions
therewith. (14:42) Thus it is not true doctrines which are expressly
required by the Bible, so much as doctrines necessary for obedi-
ence, and to confirm in
our hearts the love of our neighbour,
wherein Lev
19:18
]
1
John 4:7-8. [
(to adopt the words of John) we
are in G-D, and
G-D in us.
(14:43) As,
then, each man's faith must be judged
pious or impious
only in respect of its producing obedience or obstinacy, and not in
respect of its truth; and as no one will dispute that men's disposi-
tions are exceedingly varied, that all do not acquiesce in the same
things, but are ruled some by one opinion some by another, so that
what moves one to devotion moves another to laughter and con-
tempt, it follows that there can
be no doctrines in the Catholic, or
Bk.XIA:115167.
universal, religion, which
can give rise to controversy among good
men. (14:44) Such doctrines might be pious to some and impious to
others, whereas they should
be judged solely by their fruits.
Bk.XIB:17579;
Bk.XIX:2916. Bk.XIX:564.
(14:45) To
the universal religion,
then, belong only such dogmas as are
absolutely required in order to attain obedience to G-D, and without
which such obedience would be impossible; as for the rest, each
man—seeing that he is the best
judge of his own character should
Bk.XX:280100.
adopt whatever he thinks
best adapted to strengthen his love
of Need
justice. (14:46) If this were so, I think there would be no further occa-
sion for controversies in the Church.
(14:47) I
have now no further fear in enumerating the dogmas
of univer-
sal faith or the fundamental dogmas of the whole of Scripture, inas- Universal Religion
much as they all tend (as may be seen from what has been said) to
this one doctrine, namely, that there exists a G-D, that is, a Supreme
Being, Who loves justice and charity, and Who must be obeyed by
whosoever would be saved; that the worship of this Being consists
in the practice of justice
and love towards one's neighbour,
and that
they contain nothing beyond the following doctrines :—
I. (14:48)
That G-D
or a Supreme Being exists, sovereignly
just
Posit
and
merciful, the Exemplar
of the true life; that whosoever
page
187 is ignorant of
or disbelieves in His existence
cannot
Immanent
obey
Him or know Him as a Judge.
II. (14:49)
That He is One.
(14:50) Nobody
will dispute that this doctrine
is absolutely necessary
for entire devotion, admiration, and love
{
Organic
towards
G-D. (14:51)
For devotion, admiration, and
love spring
interdependence
}
from the superiority
of one over all else.
III. (14:52)
That He is omnipresent,
or that all things are open to Him, {
Analogy.
You know
for
if anything could be supposed to be concealed from Him, or
when
one of your
to
be unnoticed by Him, we might doubt or be
ignorant of the organs
don't function. }
equity
of His judgment as directing all things.
IV. (14:53)
That He has supreme
right and dominion over all things, {
Free
}
and
that He does nothing under compulsion, but by His
abso-
lute
fiat and grace. (14:54)
All things are bound to obey Him,
He is {
Fear
}
not
bound to obey any.
V. (14:55)
That the worship
of G-D consists only
in justice and
charity,
or love towards one's
neighbour.
VI. (14:56)
That all those, and
those only, who obey
G-D by their {
Metaphors
}
manner
of life are saved;
the rest of mankind, who live under
the
sway of their pleasures,
are lost. (14:57) If
we did not believe
this,
there would be no reason
for obeying G-D rather than
pleasure.
VII. (14:58)
Lastly, that G-D
forgives the sins of
those who repent. { Analogy.
}
(14:59)
No one is free from sin, so that
without this belief all would
despair
of salvation, and there would
be no reason for
believing
in
the mercy of G-D.
(14:60) He
who firmly believes that G-D,
out { Pragmatism
}
of
the mercy and grace with which He directs all things, forgives
the
sins of men, and who feels his
love of G-D kindled thereby,
he,
I say, does really know Christ
according to the Spirit, and
Christ
is in him.
Bk.XIA:114160,
163.
Bk.XIA:15341.
(14:61) No
one can deny that all these doctrines are before
all things
necessary to be believed, in order that every man, without exception,
may be able to obey G-D according to the bidding of the Law above
explained, for if one
of these precepts be disregarded obedience
is
{ Model }
destroyed. (14:62)
But as to what G-D,
or the Exemplar of the true life,
may be, whether fire, or spirit, or light, or thought, or what not, this,
I say, has nothing to do with faith any more than has the question
how He comes to be the Exemplar of the true life, whether it be
because He has a just and merciful mind, or because all things exist
and act through Him, and consequently page 188 that we understand
through Him, and through Him see what is truly just and good.
(14:63) Everyone
may think on such questions as he likes.
(14:64) Furthermore,
faith is not
affected, whether we hold that G-D
is
omnipresent essentially or potentially; that He directs all things by
absolute fiat, or by the necessity of His Nature; that He dictates laws
like a prince, or that He sets them forth as eternal truths; that man
obeys Him by virtue
of free will, or by virtue of
the necessity of the
Bk.XIB:1528,
29.
Divine
decree { Bk.X:54 };
lastly, that the reward of the good
and the
punishment of the wicked is natural or supernatural: these and such
like questions have no bearing on faith, except in so far as they are
used as means to give us license to sin more, or to obey G-D less. { Metaphors }
(14:65) I will go further, and maintain that every man is bound to adapt
these dogmas to his own way of thinking, and to interpret them
according as he feels that he can give them his fullest and most
unhesitating assent, so that he may
the more easily obey G-D with
Bk.XIA:118179;
Bk.XIB:17579;
Bk.XX:281101.
his whole heart.
(14:66) Such
was the manner, as we have already
pointed out, in
which the faith was in old time revealed and written, in accordance
with the understanding and opinions of the prophets and people of
the period; so, in like fashion, every man is bound to adapt it to his
own opinions, so that he may accept it without any hesitation or men-
tal repugnance. (14:67)
We have shown that faith
does not so much
Bk.XIA:115165.
require truth as piety,
and that it is only quickening and pious through
obedience, consequently no one is faithful save by obedience alone.
(14:68) The
best faith is not necessarily possessed
by him who displays
Bk.XIA:115166.
the best reasons,
but by him who displays the best fruits of justice
and charity. (14:69)
How salutary and necessary
this doctrine is for a
state, in order that men may
dwell together in peace
and concord;
{ inner
cities }
and how many and how
great causes of disturbance and crime
are
thereby cut off, I leave everyone to judge for himself!
(14:70) Before
we go further, I may remark that we can,
by means of
what we have just proved, easily answer the objections raised in
Chap. I., when we were discussing God's speaking with the Israelites
on Mount Sinai. (14:71) For, though the voice heard by the Israelites
could not give page 189 those men any philosophical or mathematical
certitude of God's existence, it was yet sufficient to thrill them with
admiration for God, as they already knew Him, and to stir them up to
obedience: and such was the object of the display. (14:72) God did not
wish to teach the Israelites the absolute attributes of His essence
(none of which He then revealed), but to break down their hardness
of heart, and to draw them to obedience: therefore He did not appeal
to them with reasons, but with the sound of trumpets, thunder, and
lightnings.
(14:73) It
remains for me to show that between faith
or theology, and
Bk.XIA:116168.
will dispute the fact
who has knowledge of the aim and foundations
of the two subjects,
for they are as wide apart as
the poles.
(14:75) Philosophy
has no end in view save truth:
faith, as we have
{ peace-of-mind }
{ Mark
Twain }
abundantly proved, looks
for nothing but obedience
and piety.
{ See
Einstein endnote }
(14:76) Again,
philosophy is based on axioms
which must be sought
from nature alone: faith is based on history and language, and must
be sought for only in Scripture and revelation, as we showed in
Chap. VII. (14:77) Faith, therefore, allows the greatest latitude in philo-
sophic speculation,
allowing us without blame to think what we like
Bk.XIA:116169.
about anything, and only condemning, as
heretics and schismatics,
those who teach opinions which tend to produce obstinacy, hatred,
strife, and anger; while, on the other hand, only considering as
faithful those who persuade us, as far as their reason and faculties
will permit, to follow justice
and charity.
(14:78) Lastly,
as what we are now setting forth are the most important
subjects of my treatise, I would most urgently beg the reader, before
I proceed, to read these two chapters with especial attention, and to
take the trouble to weigh them well in his mind: let him take for grant-
ed that I have not written with a view to introducing novelties, but in
order to do away with abuses, such as I hope I may, at some future
time, at last see reformed.
Page 190
CHAPTER XV.
] It
is demonstrated that neither is theology ancillary to reason nor reason
to theology.
The reason why we are convinced of the authority of the Holy
Scripture. [
Bk.XIV:2:2647,
2:3283.
(15:1) Those
who know not that philosophy and reason
are distinct,
dispute whether Scripture should be made subservient to reason, Resurrection
or reason to Scripture: that is, whether the meaning of Scripture
should be made to agreed with reason; or whether reason should
be made to agree with Scripture: the latter position is assumed by
the sceptics who deny the certitude of reason, the former by the
dogmatists. (15:2) Both parties are, as I have shown, utterly in the
wrong, for either doctrine would
require us to
tamper with reason
Bk.XIA:7180.
or with Scripture.
(15:3) We
have shown that Scripture
does not teach philosophy, but
merely obedience,
and that all it contains has been adapted to the
Bk.XIA:6653.
understanding and established opinions
of the multitude. (15:4)
Those,
therefore, who wish to adapt it to philosophy, must needs ascribe to
the prophets many ideas which they never even dreamed of, and
give an extremely forced interpretation to their words: those on the
other hand, who would make reason and
philosophy subservient to
Bk.XIA:104107.
theology,
will be forced to accept as Divine utterances
the prejudices
Bk.XIA:6651.
of the ancient Jews,
and to fill and confuse their mind
therewith.
(15:5) In short, one party will run wild with the aid of reason, and the
other will run wild without the aid of reason.
(15:6) The
first among the
Pharisees who openly
maintained that
Bk.XIA:7181. Bk.XIA:107124;
Bk.XIII:241230.
Scripture
should be made to agree with reason,
was Maimonides,
whose opinion we reviewed, and abundantly refuted in Chap. VII.:
now, although this writer had much authority among his contempor-
aries, he was deserted on this question by almost all, and the major-
ity went straight page
191 over to the opinion of
a certain R. Jehuda
{ See
Shirley's footnote }
Alpakhar,
who, in his anxiety to avoid the error of Maimonides,
fell
^ Bk.XIA:6654.
Bk.XIA:6652.
into another, which was
its exact contrary. (15:7)
He held that reason
should be made subservient, and entirely give way to Scripture.
(15:8) He thought that a passage should not be interpreted metaphori-
cally, simply because it was repugnant to reason, but only in the
cases when it is inconsistent with Scripture itself—that is, with its
clear doctrines. (15:9) Therefore he laid down the universal rule, that
whatsoever Scripture teaches dogmatically, and affirms expressly,
must on its own sole authority be admitted as absolutely true: that
there is no doctrine in the Bible which directly contradicts the gener-
al tenour of the whole: but only some which appear to involve a dif-
ference, for the phrases of Scripture often seem to imply something
contrary to what has been expressly taught. (15:10) Such phrases,
and such phrases only, we may interpret metaphorically.
(15:11) For
instance, Scripture clearly teaches the unity
of God (see
Deut. vi:4), nor is there any text distinctly asserting a plurality of
gods; but in several passages God speaks of Himself, and the
prophets speak of Him, in the plural number; such phrases are
simply a manner of speaking, and do not mean that there actually
are several gods: they are to be explained metaphorically, not
because a plurality of gods is repugnant to reason, but because
Scripture distinctly asserts that there is only one.
(15:12) So,
again, as Scripture asserts (as Alpakhar
thinks) in Deut.
iv:15, that God is incorporeal, we are bound, solely by the authority
of this text, and not by reason, to believe that God has no body:
consequently we must explain metaphorically, on the sole authority
of Scripture, all those passages which attribute to God hands, feet,
&c., and take them merely as figures of speech. (15:13) Such is the
opinion of Alpakhar. (13a) In so far as he seeks to explain Scripture
by Scripture, I praise him, but I marvel that a man gifted with reason
should wish to debase that faculty. (15:14) It is true that Scripture
should be explained by Scripture, so long as we are in difficulties
about the meaning and intention of the prophets, but when we have
elicited the true meaning, we must of necessity make use of our
judgment and reason in order to assent thereto. (15:15) If reason,
however, much as page 192 she rebels, is to be entirely subjected to
Scripture, I ask, are we to effect her submission by her own aid, or
without her, and blindly? (15:16) If the latter, we shall surely act foolish-
ly and injudiciously; if the former, we assent to Scripture under
the dominion of reason, and should not assent to it without her.
(15:17) Moreover, I may ask now, is a man to assent to anything against
his reason?
(15:18) What
is denial if it be not reason's
refusal to assent?
(15:19) In
short, I am astonished that anyone
should wish to subject
reason, the greatest of gifts and a light from on high, to the dead
letter which may have been corrupted by human malice; that it
should be thought no crime to speak with contempt of mind, the true
handwriting of God's Word, calling it corrupt, blind, and lost, while it
is considered the greatest of crimes to say the same of the letter,
which is merely the reflection and image of God's Word. (15:20) Men
think it pious to trust nothing to reason and their own judgment, and
impious to doubt the faith of those who have transmitted to us the
sacred books. (15:21) Such conduct is not piety, but mere folly. (21a) And,
after all, why are they so anxious? What are they afraid of? (15:22) Do
they think that faith and religion cannot be upheld unless—men
purposely keep themselves in ignorance,
and turn their backs on
Bk.XIA:6865.
reason?
(15:22a) If
this be so, they have but a timid trust in
Scripture.
(15:23) However,
be it far from me to say that religion
should seek to
enslave reason, or reason religion, or that both should not be able
to keep their sovereignty in perfect harmony. (15:24) I will revert to
this question presently, for I
wish now to discuss Alpakhar's rule.
(15:26) He
requires, as we have stated, that we should accept as
true,
or reject as false, everything asserted or denied by Scripture, and he
further states that Scripture never expressly asserts or denies
anything which contradicts its assertions or negations elsewhere.
(15:27) The rashness of such a requirement and statement can escape
no one. (15:28) For (passing over the fact that he does not notice that
Scripture consists of different books, written at different times, for
different people, by different authors: and also that his requirement
is made on his own authority without any corroboration from reason
or Scripture) he would be bound to show that all passages which are
indirectly contradictory page 193 of the rest, can be satisfactorily
explained metaphorically through the nature of the language and the
context: further, that Scripture has come down to us untampered with.
(15:29) However,
we will go into the matter at length.
(15:30) Firstly,
I ask what
shall we do if reason prove recalcitrant?
(15:31) Shall we still be bound to affirm whatever Scripture affirms,
and to deny whatever Scripture denies? (15:32) Perhaps it will be
answered that Scripture contains nothing repugnant to reason.
(15:33) But I insist that it expressly affirms and teaches that God is
jealous (namely, in the decalogue itself, and in Exod. xxxiv:14, and
in Deut. iv:24, and in many other places), and I assert that such
a doctrine is repugnant to reason. (15:34) It must, I suppose, in spite
of all, be accepted as true. If there are any passages in Scripture
which imply that God is not jealous, they must be taken metaphor-
ically as meaning nothing
of the kind.
(15:35) So,
also, Scripture
Bk.XIA:6863.
expressly states (Exod. xix:20,
&c.) that God came down to Mount
Sinai, and it attributes to Him other movements from place to place,
nowhere directly stating that God does not so move. (15:36) Where-
fore, we must take the passage literally, and Solomon's words
(I Kings viii:27), "But will God dwell on the earth? (15:37) Behold the
heavens and earth cannot contain thee," inasmuch as they do not
expressly state that God does not move from place to place, but only
imply it, must be explained away till they have no further semblance
of denying locomotion to the Deity. (15:38) So also we must believe
that the sky is the habitation and throne of God, for Scripture express-
ly says so; and similarly many passages expressing the opinions
of the prophets or the multitude, which reason and philosophy, but
not Scripture, tell us to be false, must be taken as true if we are to
follow the guidance of our author, for according to him, reason has
nothing to do with the matter. (15:39) Further, it is untrue that Scripture
never contradicts itself directly, but only by implication. (15:40) For
Moses says, in so many words (Deut. iv:24), "The Lord thy God is a
consuming fire," and elsewhere expressly denies that God has any
likeness to visible things. (Deut. iv. 12.) (15:41) If it be decided that the
latter passage only contradicts the former by implication, and must
be adapted thereto, lest it seem to negative it, let us grant that God
is a fire; or rather, lest page 194 we should seem to have taken leave
of our senses, let us pass the matter over and take
another example.
(15:42) Samuel
expressly denies that God ever repents, "for
he is not a
man that he should
repent" (I Sam. xv:29).
(15:43) Jeremiah,
on the
Bk.XIA:6761.
other hand, asserts
that God does repent, both of the evil
and of the
good which He had intended to do (Jer. xviii:8-10). (15:44) What?
(15:45) Are not these two texts directly contradictory? (15:46) Which of
the two, then, would our author want to explain metaphorically?
(15:47) Both statements are general, and each is the opposite of the
other—what one flatly affirms, the other flatly denies. (15:48) So, by his
own rule, he would be obliged at once to reject them as false, and
to accept them as true.
(15:49) Again,
what is the point of one passage, not being contradicted
by another directly, but only by implication, if the implication is clear,
and the nature and context of the passage preclude metaphorical
interpretation? (15:50) There are many such instances in the Bible,
as we saw in Chap. II. (where we pointed out that the prophets held
different and contradictory opinions), and also in Chaps. IX. and X.,
where we drew attention to the contradictions in the historical nar-
ratives. (15:51) There is no need for me to go through them all again,
for what I have said sufficiently exposes the absurdities which would
follow from an opinion and rule such as we are discussing, and
shows the hastiness of its propounder.
(15:52) We
may, therefore, put this theory, as well as that of Maimoni-
des, entirely out of court; and we may take it for indisputable that
theology is not bound to serve reason, nor reason
theology, but that
Bk.XIA:82138.
each has her own domain.
Bk.XIA:274.
(15:53) The
sphere of reason
is, as we have
said, truth and wisdom;
the sphere of theology is piety and obedience. (15:54) The power of
reason does not extend so far as to determine for us that men may
be blessed
through simple obedience, without
understanding.
Bk.XIA:275.
(15:55) Theology
tells us nothing else, enjoins
on us no command save
obedience, and has neither the will nor the power to oppose reason:
she defines the dogmas of faith (as we pointed out in the last chapter)
only in so far as they may be necessary for obedience, and leaves
reason to determine their precise truth: for reason is the page 195
light of the mind, and without her all things are dreams
and phantoms.
(15:56) By
theology,
I here mean, strictly speaking, revelation,
in so far
as it indicates the object aimed at by Scripture—namely,
the scheme
and manner of obedience, or the true dogmas of piety and faith. Smith:13993—Scriptural Theology
(15:57) This may truly be called the Word of God, which does not con-
sist in a certain number of books (see Chap. XII.). (58) Theology thus
understood, if we regard its precepts or rules of life, will be found in
accordance with reason; and, if we look to its aim and object, will be
seen to be in nowise repugnant thereto, wherefore it is universal to
all men.
(15:59) As
for its bearing on Scripture, we have
shown in Chap. VII. that
the meaning of Scripture should be gathered from its own history,
and not from the history of nature in general, which is the basis of
philosophy.
(15:60) We
ought not to be hindered if we find that our investigation
of
the meaning of Scripture thus conducted shows us that it is here and
there repugnant to reason; for whatever we may find of this sort in
the Bible, which men may be in ignorance of, without injury to their
charity, has, we may be sure, no bearing on theology or the Word of
God, and may, therefore, without blame, be viewed by every one as
he pleases.
(15:61) To
sum up, we may draw
the absolute conclusion that the Bible
must not be accommodated to reason,
nor reason
to the Bible. Scriptural
Theology
(15:62) Now,
inasmuch as the basis of theology—the
doctrine that man
Bk.XIA:82139.
may be saved
by obedience alone—cannot
be proved by reason
whether it be true or false, we may be asked, Why, then, should we
believe it? (15:63) If we do so without the aid of reason, we accept it
blindly, and act foolishly and injudiciously; if, on the other hand, we
settle that it can be proved by reason, theology becomes a part of
philosophy, and inseparable therefrom. (15:64) But I make answer that
I have absolutely established that this basis of theology cannot be
investigated by the natural light of reason, or, at any rate, that no
one ever has proved it by such means, and, therefore, revelation
was necessary. (15:65)
We should,
however, make use of our reason,
Bk.XIA:82139.
in order to grasp with
moral certainty what is revealed—I say, with
moral page 196 certainty, for we cannot hope to attain greater certain-
ty than the prophets: yet their certainty was only moral, as I showed
in Chap. II.
(15:66) Those,
therefore, who attempt to set forth the authority of Scrip-
ture with mathematical demonstrations
are wholly in error: for the
Bk.XIA:83140.
authority of the Bible
is dependent on the authority of the prophets,
and can be supported by no stronger arguments than those em-
ployed in old time by the prophets for convincing the people of their
own authority. (15:67) Our certainty on the same subject can be found-
ed on no other basis than that which served as foundation for the
certainty of the prophets.
(15:68) Now
the certainty of the prophets consisted (as we pointed out)
in these elements:—
I. (69) A distinct and vivid imagination.
II. (70) A sign.
III. (71)
Lastly, and chiefly,
a mind turned to what is just
and good.
(71a)
It was based on no other reasons
than these, and consequent-
ly they cannot prove
their authority by any other reasons, either to
the multitude
whom they addressed orally, nor to us whom they
address in writing.
(15:72) The first of these reasons, namely, the vivid imagination, could
be valid only for the prophets; therefore, our certainty concerning re-
velation must, and ought to be, based on the remaining two—namely,
the sign and the teaching. (15:73) Such is the express doctrine of
Moses, for (in Deut. xviii.) he bids the people obey the prophet who
should give a true sign in the name of the Lord, but if he should pre-
dict falsely, even though it were in the name of the Lord, he should
be put to death, as should also he who strives to lead away the
people from the true religion, though he confirm his authority with
signs and portents. (15:74) We may compare with the above Deut. xiii.
(15:75) Whence it follows that a true prophet could be distinguished
from a false one, both by his doctrine and by the miracles he
wrought, for Moses declares such an one to be a true prophet, and
bids the people trust him without fear of deceit. (15:76) He condemns
as false, and worthy of death, those who predict anything falsely
even in the name of the Lord, or who preach false gods, even
though their miracles be real.
(15:77) The
only reason, then, which we have for belief in Scripture
or
the writings of the prophets, is the doctrine we find page 197 therein,
and the signs by which it is confirmed. (15:78) For as we see that the
prophets extol charity and justice above all things, and have no other
object, we conclude that they did not write from unworthy motives,
but because they really thought
that men might become blessed
Bk.XIA:6649.
through obedience
and faith: further,
as we see that they confirmed
their teaching with signs and wonders, we become persuaded
that they did not speak at random, nor run riot in their prophecies.
(15:79) We are further strengthened in our conclusion by the fact that
the morality they teach is
in evident agreement with reason,
for it is
Bk.XIA:82137.
accidental coincidence that
the Word of God
which we find in
the prophets coincides with the Word of God written in our hearts.
(15:80) We may, I say, conclude this from the sacred books as certainly
as did the Jews of old from the living voice of the prophets: for we
showed in Chap. XII. that Scripture has come down to us intact in
respect to its doctrine and main narratives.
(15:81) Therefore
this whole basis
of theology and Scripture, though it
does not admit of mathematical proof, may yet be accepted with the
approval of our judgment. (15:82) It would be folly to refuse to accept
what is confirmed by such ample prophetic testimony, and what has
proved such a comfort to those whose reason is comparatively weak,
and such a benefit to the state; a doctrine, moreover, which we may
believe in without the slightest peril or hurt, and should reject simply
because it cannot be mathematically proved: it is as though we
should admit nothing as true, or as a wise rule of life, which could
ever, in any possible way, be called in question; or as though most
of our actions were not full of uncertainty and hazards.
(15:83) I
admit that those who believe that theology
and philosophy
are mutually contradictory, and that therefore either one or the other
must be thrust from its throne—I admit, I say, that such persons are
not unreasonable in attempting to put theology on a firm basis, and
to demonstrate its truth mathematically. (15:84) Who, unless he were
desperate or mad, would wish to bid an incontinent farewell to
reason, or to despise the arts and sciences, or to deny reason's
certitude? (15:85) But, in the meanwhile, we cannot wholly absolve
them from blame, inasmuch as they invoke the aid of reason for
her own defeat, and attempt infallibly to prove her fallible. page 198
(15:86) While they are trying to prove mathematically the authority and
truth of theology, and to take away the authority of natural reason,
they are in reality only bringing theology under reason's dominion,
and proving that her authority has no weight unless natural reason
be at the back of it.
(15:87) If
they boast that they themselves assent because of the inward
testimony of the Holy Spirit, and that they only invoke the aid of
reason because of unbelievers, in order to convince them, not even
so can this meet with our approval, for we can easily show that they
have spoken either from emotion or vain-glory. (15:88) It most clearly
follows from the last chapter that the Holy Spirit only gives its testi-
mony in favour of works, called by Paul (in Gal. v:22) the fruits of
the Spirit, and is in itself really nothing but the mental acquiescence
which follows a good action in our souls. (15:89) No spirit gives testi-
mony concerning the certitude of matters within the sphere of specu-
lation, save only reason, who is mistress, as we have shown, of the
whole realm of truth. (15:90) If then they assert that they possess this
Spirit which makes them certain of truth, they speak falsely, and
according to the prejudices of the emotions, or else they are in great
dread lest they should be vanquished by philosophers and exposed
to public ridicule, and therefore they flee, as it were, to the altar; but
their refuge is vain, for what altar will shelter a man who has out-
raged reason? (15:91) However, I pass such persons over, for I think
I have fulfilled my purpose, and shown how philosophy should be TTP1:Divine Law
separated from theology, and wherein each consists; that neither
should be subservient to the other, but that each should keep her
unopposed dominion. (15:92) Lastly, as occasion offered, I have
pointed out the absurdities, the inconveniences, and the evils
following from the extraordinary confusion which has hitherto
prevailed between the two
subjects, owing to their not
being
properly distinguished and separated. (15:93)
Before I go further
I
would expressly state (though I have
said it before) that I consider
Bk.XIV:2:2647.
the utility
and the need for
Holy
Scripture or Revelation
to be very Philosophy/Religion
great. (15:94)
For as we cannot perceive by
the natural light of reason
that simple obedience is the path of salvation (25), and are taught by
revelation only that it is so by the special grace of G-D, which our TTPI:CI(65)
reason cannot attain, it follows that the Bible has page 199 brought a
very great consolation to mankind. (15:95) All are able to obey, where- Religion
as there are but very few, compared with the aggregate of humanity,
who can acquire the habit of
virtue under the unaided guidance of
Bk.XIB:20626.
reason. (15:96)
Thus if we had not
the testimony of Scripture,
we
Bk.XIA:83141.
should doubt of the salvation
of nearly all men.
End of PART 3 - Chapters XI to XV incl.
AUTHOR'S NOTES TO THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL
TREATISE
CHAPTER XI.
Note 24 (p.
157) (1)
"Now I
think." (2)
The translators
render the
{Greek}
word "I infer", and assert that
Paul uses it as synonymous
with {a
Greek word}. (3)
But the former word
has, in Greek, the same
meaning as the Hebrew word rendered to
think, to esteem, to judge.
(4) And
this signification would be in entire agreement with the Syriac
translation. (5)
This Syriac translation
(if it be a translation, which is
very doubtful, for we know neither the time of its
appearance, nor the
translators and Syriac was the
vernacular of the Apostles) renders
the text before us in a way well explained by
Tremellius as "we think,
therefore."
PAGE 276
CHAPTER XV.
Note 25 (p.
198) (1)
"That simple
obedience is the path of salvation."
(2) In
other words, it is enough for salvation
or blessedness,
that we
should embrace the Divine
decrees as laws or commands;
there is or
else
no need to conceive them as eternal
truths. (3)
This can be taught us
by Revelation,
not Reason,
as appears from the demonstrations
given in Chapter IV.
JBY'S NOTES TO THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE - Part 3
CHAPTER XI.
{Continued
from TTP1:Harbinger}
TTP3:XI(48):162 -
From Smith's
Bk.XIA:110—Legerdemain.
Before showing how Spinoza intends to accomplish this
feat of legerdemain, I need to
show how he deconstructs Christianity
as the alleged foundation of rational
morality. The first
and most serious weakness of Christianity stems
precisely from what Spinoza had previously appeared to praise as its chief
virtue. The apostles, we are
told, reasoned more freely than the prophets and expressed their own opinions
and beliefs on their own initiative.
Spinoza draws once again on the authority of Paul
to indicate that the apostles took upon themselves the responsibility
not only for teaching and exhorting but for admonishing
whenever and whomever it pleased them to do so (1Tim
2:7; 2Tim
1:11).149
Each apostle, then,
developed his own method and style of teaching, with the result that these
differences came to affect the very "foundations" of religion.
The apostles soon became like the wrangling dogmatists
of different philosophical sects, each
attempting to initiate people into the inner workings of his private creed.
Paul, for example, maintained that faith, not works,
is necessary for salvation (Rom.
3:27-28), whereas James upheld
precisely the opposite, that
man is justified by works and not by faith alone (James
2:24).150
The differences between the apostles over the
teachings of Christ were thus
the cause of the schisms and quarrels
within the early church. These
conflicts were traceable directly back to the authority of the individual
apostles in propagating the new faith: "Finally,
there is no doubt but what the
fact that the apostles built religion on different foundations [diversis
fundamentis religionem] gave rise to many disputes and schisms,
which have tormented the church incessantly from the
time of the apostles to the present day, and
will surely continue to torment it forever, until
at last someday religion is separated from philosophic speculations
and reduced to those very few and very simple tenets
[paucissima et simplicissima dogmata] Christ
taught to his followers."151
{Continue with "The quarrels."}
TTP3:XI(55):163 - From Smith's Bk.XIA:110—Simple Doctrines.
The quarrels and schisms
supplied the ideological grounds for
the later policies of religious persecution and intolerance.
Paul
here ironically bears the greatest share of blame for turning "the
very few and very simple
tenets" taught by Christ
into a scholastic {narrow
adherence to traditional teachings, doctrines, or methods.}
system based on "philosophic speculations."
Christianity is
held responsible for inaugurating an era of confusion about philosophy
and religion, which is the
peculiarly modern form of superstition.
Christianity ceased to offer a few simple truths regarding
justice and charity
and was turned into a pseudo-philosophy.
With the multiplication of religious dogmas and creeds,
the interpretation of religion
became the preserve of professional
ecclesiastics with the skills of a philosopher and
leisure for "a great many useless
speculations."152-XIX:254
The result was a grotesque melange
that confused the moral truths of religion
with the rational truths of philosophy.
From Encyclopædia
Britannica Online. [Accessed
October 18, 2003].
The
Cultural Background: Christianity.
1. The Christian legacy
[1:1] The spread of rationalistic and scientific
ideas since the 18th century
has undermined many aspects of religion
{Mark
Twain},
including many Christian beliefs. The
church, moreover, although still seeking to exert its influence,
has ceased to
dominate civil life in the way it once
did. Religion is no longer
the pivot of all social
relations as it once was in ancient Egypt and still is in some Islamic
countries. The decline of the
church is epitomized by the fact that, while it is still prepared to speak
of the symbolic significance of
the death of Jesus Christ
(and of human death in general),
it has ceased to emphasize many aspects of its initial
eschatology {any
system of religious doctrines concerning last or final matters, as death,
judgment, or an afterlife}
and to concern itself, as in the past, with the particular
details of individual death. In
the age of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the elaborate descriptions of heaven,
purgatory, and hell in Dante's
Divine Comedy, while remaining beautiful literature,
at best raise a smile if thought of as outlines for
humanity's future.
{EB
Christianity} Hampshire:202a
[1:2] Death is at the very core
of the Christian religion.
Not only is the cross to be found in cemeteries and
places of worship alike, but
the premise of the religion is that, by their own action, humans have forfeited
immortality. Through abuse of
the freedom granted in the Garden of
Eden, Adam and Eve not only sinned and
fell from grace, but they also
transmitted sin to their descendants: the sins of the fathers are visited
on the children. And as “the
wages of sin is death” (Rom.
6:23), death became the universal fate: “Therefore
as sin came into the world through one man and death through sin, and so
death spread to all men” (Rom.
5:12). Christian theologians
spent the best part of two millennia sorting
out these implications and devising ways out of the dire prognosis implicit
in the concept of original sin. The
main salvation was to be baptism into the death of Jesus
Christ (Rom.
6:3–4). {Anti-Semitism}
{EB
Christianity}
[1:3] Among
early Christians, delay in the
promised Second
Coming of Christ led to an increasing preoccupation with what happened
to the dead as they awaited the
resurrection and the Last Judgment.
One view was that there would be an immediate individual
judgment and that instant justice would follow: the
deceased would be dispatched forthwith to hell or paradise.
This notion demeaned the impact of the great prophecy
of a collective mass resurrection, followed by a public mass trial on a
gigantic scale. Moreover, it
deprived the dead of any chance of a postmortem (i.e., very belated) expiation
of their misdeeds. The Roman
Catholic notion of purgatory {a
place or state following death in which penitent souls
are purified of venial sins or undergo the temporal punishment still remaining
for forgiven mortal sins and
thereby are made ready for heaven}
sought to resolve the latter problem; regulated
torture would expiate some of the sins of those not totally beyond redemption.
{The
unlearned take all this literally;
the learned take it metaphorically
or allegorically.}
{EB Christianity}
[1:4] The
second view was that the dead just slept, pending the mass resurrection.
But as the sleep might last for millennia,
it was felt that the heavenly gratification of the
just was being arbitrarily, and somewhat unfairly, deferred.
As for the wicked, they were obtaining an unwarranted
respite. The Carthaginian theologian
Tertullian,
one of the Church Fathers, outlined the possibility of still further adjustments.
In his Adversus Marcionem, written about 207,
he described “a spatial concept that may be called
Abraham's bosom for receiving the soul
of all people.” Although not
celestial, it was “above the lower regions and would provide refreshment
(refrigerium) to the souls of the just until
the consummation of all things in the great resurrection.”
The Byzantine Church
formally endorsed the concept, which inspired some most interesting art
in both eastern and western Europe.
{EB Christianity}
[1:5] During
its early years, the Christian Church debated death in largely religious
terms. The acerbitas mortis
(“bitterness of death”) was very real, and
pious deathbeds had to be fortified by the acceptance of pain as an offering
to God. Life
expectancy fell far short of the promised threescore years and 10.
Eastern medicine remained for a long time in advance
of that practiced in the West, and the church's interventions were largely
spiritual. It was only during
the Renaissance and the later age of Enlightenment
that an intellectual shift became perceptible.
{EB
Christianity}
2. Descartes,
the pineal
soul,
and brain-stem death
{EB Christianity}
[2:1] The first attempts to localize the
soul go back to classical antiquity. The
soul had originally been thought
to reside in the liver, an organ
to which no other function could, at that time, be attributed.
Empedocles,
Democritus,
Aristotle,
the Stoics, and the Epicureans
had later held its abode to be the heart. Other
Greeks (Pythagorus, Plato, and Galen) had opted for the brain.
Herophilus (flourished c. 300 BC), a famous physician
of the Greek medical school of Alexandria, had sought to circumscribe its
habitat to the fourth ventricle of the brain; that
is, to a small area immediately above the brain stem.
Controversy persisted to the very end of the 16th
century.
{EB
Christianity}
[2:2] The
departure of the soul from the body
had always been central to the Christian concept of
death. But the soul had come
to mean different things to various classical and medieval thinkers.
There was a “vegetative soul,” responsible for what
we would now call autonomic {internally
caused; spontaneous}
function; a “sensitive soul,”
responsible for what modern physiologists would describe as reflex responses
to environmental stimuli; and,
most importantly, a “reasoning soul,” responsible
for making a rational entity (res cogitans) of human beings.
The reasoning soul was an essentially human attribute
and was the basis of thought, judgment, and responsibility for one's actions.
Its departure implied death. The Anatome Corporis
Humani (1672) of Isbrand van Diemerbroeck, professor at Utrecht,
appears to have been the last textbook of anatomy
that discussed the soul within a routine description
of human parts. Thereafter, the soul disappeared from the scope of anatomy.
{EB
Christianity}
[2:3] The
modern and entirely secular concept of brain-stem death can,
perhaps rather surprisingly,
find both a conceptual and a topographical {the
features, relations, or configuration of a structural entity, as the mind}
foundation in the writings of René
Descartes (1596–1650), the great French philosopher and mathematician
who sought to bring analytical geometry, physics,
physiology, cosmology, and religion into an integrated conceptual framework.
Descartes considered the body and the soul
to be ontologically
{the
branch of metaphysics that studies the nature of existence or being as
such} separate
but interacting entities, each
with its own particular attributes. He then sought to specify both their
mode and site of interaction; the
latter he deduced to be the pineal gland. The
pineal {gland}
was to become, in the words of Geoffrey Jefferson, “the nodal point of
Cartesian dualism.”
{EB
Christianity}
[2:4] Before
Descartes, the prevailing wisdom, largely derived from Greece,
had regarded the soul
both as the motive force of all human physiological functions
and as the conscious agent of volition, cognition,
and reason. Descartes
succeeded in eliminating the soul's general physiological role altogether
and in circumscribing its cognitive role to the human
species. Descartes's writings about death show
that his concept of the soul clearly implied both mind and the immaterial
principle of immortality. It
had to mean both things, for no one had ever conceived of survival after
death without a mind to verify
the fact of continued existence, to enjoy its pleasures, and to suffer
its pains.
{EB
Christianity}
[2:5] The
relation between body and soul had been
discussed in patristic
{of
or pertaining to the fathers of the Christian church or their writings}
literature, and, because of his
Jesuit education, Descartes would have been familiar with these discussions.
The church's interest in these matters was strictly
nonmedical, seeking only to reconcile
earlier Greek theories with its own current doctrines.
Descartes was the first to tackle these problems in
a physiological way. With one foot still firmly on consecrated ground
(and with Galileo's difficulties with the Inquisition
very much in mind), he sought to give a materialistic, even mechanistic,
dimension to the discussion. In this sense, his De
Homine (On Man; published posthumously in 1662)
can be thought of as an updating of Plato's
Timaeus. His contemporaries
viewed Descartes as having delivered the coup de grace to an earlier Greek
tradition (dating back to several
centuries before Christ) that had claimed that animals, as well as humans,
had souls. This had been the
subject of much discussion in the early Christian Church.
During the 4th century, St. John Chrysostom (onetime
archbishop of Constantinople) had denounced the idea {that
animals had souls},
attributing it to the devil, who had allegedly managed
by various maneuvers to deceive
people as varied as Pythagoras, Plato, Pliny, and even Zoroaster.
{EB
Christianity}
[2:6] Descartes
probably was impressed by the central location of
the unpaired pineal gland, situated
where neural pathways from the retinas converge with
those conveying feelings from the limbs. This
“general reflector of all sorts of sensation” is, moreover, sited in the
immediate proximity of the brain ventricles, from
which (according to the wisdom of the day) “animal spirits” flowed into
the hollow nerves, carrying instructions
to the muscles. In his Excerpta
Anatomica, Descartes had even likened the pineal to a penis
obturating {to
stop up; close}
the passage between the third and fourth ventricles.
{EB
Christianity}
[2:7] Descartes
proved wrong in his beliefs that
all sensory inputs focused on the pineal
gland and that the pineal itself was a selective motor organ,
suspended in a whirl of “animal
spirits,” dancing and jigging “like a balloon captive above a fire,”
yet capable in humans of scrutinizing inputs and producing
actions “consistent with wisdom.” He
was also wrong when he spoke of the “ideas formed on the surface” of the
pineal gland, and in his attribution
to the pineal of such functions as “volition, cognition, memory, imagination,
and reason.” But he was uncannily
correct in his insight that a
very small part of this deep and central area of the brain was relevant
to some of the functions he stressed. We
now know that immediately below the pineal gland there lies the mesencephalic
tegmentum (the uppermost part of the brain stem),
which is crucial to generating alertness (the capacity
for consciousness), without which,
of course, there can be no volition, cognition, or reason.
{EB
Christianity}
[2:8] It
is a matter of vocabulary whether
one considers the mesencephalic tegmentum either as being involved in generating
a “capacity for consciousness”
or as preparing the brain for the exercise of what
Descartes would have considered the “functions of the soul”
(volition, cognition, and reason).
In either case, the total and irreversible loss of
these functions dramatically alters the ontological
status of the subject. Descartes
specifically considered the example of death. In
“La Description du corps humain” (1664) he wrote that “although
movements cease in the body when it is dead and the soul
departs, one cannot deduce from
these facts that the soul produced the movements.”
In a formulation of really modern tenor, he then added
“one can only infer that the same single cause (a)
renders the body incapable of movement and (b) causes the soul to absent
itself.” He did not, of course,
say that this “same single cause” was the death of the brain stem.
Some 300 years later, in 1968, the Harvard Committee
spoke of death in terms of “irreversible coma” (where
Descartes had spoken of the “now absent soul”)
and stressed, as had Descartes, the immobility of the comatose body.
The religious and secular terms seem to describe the
same reality.
{EB
Christianity}
[2:9] There
have been other neurological controversies concerning the locus of the
soul. Early in the 18th century
Stephen Hales, an English clergyman
with a great interest in science, repeated an experiment originally reported
by Leonardo da Vinci. Hales tied
a ligature around the neck of a frog and cut off its head.
The heart continued to beat for a while, as it usually
does in the brain dead. Thirty
hours later, the limbs of the animal still withdrew when stimulated. In
fact, the elicited movements
only ceased when the spinal cord itself had been destroyed. This observation
gave rise to a great controversy. Reflex
action at spinal cord level was not then fully understood, and it was argued
that the irritability implied sentience, and
that sentience suggested that the soul was still present.
The “spinal cord soul” became the subject of much
debate. It is now known that
such purely spinal reflex movements may occur below a dead brain. It was
shown during the 19th century that
individuals executed on the guillotine might retain the knee jerk reflex
for up to 20 minutes after decapitation.
{EB
Christianity}
[2:10] The
church is still concerned with the diagnosis of death,
but the theological argument has, during the last
half of the 20th century, moved to an entirely different plane.
As mentioned earlier, in 1957 Pope Pius XII raised
the question whether, in intensive
care units, doctors might be “continuing the resuscitation process,
despite the fact that the soul may already have left
the body.” He even asked one
of the central questions confronting modern medicine, namely whether “death
had already occurred after grave trauma to the brain,
which has provoked deep unconsciousness and central
breathing paralysis, the fatal
consequences of which have been retarded by artificial respiration.”
The answer, he said, “did not fall within the competence
of the Church.”
[End] {EB
Christianity}
TTP3:XI(57):164 -
From Smith's Bk.XIA:109—Synthesis,
Harbinger, This-worldly.
TTP1:V(53):75 -
From Smith's
Bk.XIA:108138
. . . None of the apostles
"philosophized" more than Paul when
called to preach to the Gentiles, although
they changed tactics
when speaking to the Jews, who, as such, "disdained"
philosophy.143
[Smith:2]
Nothing would be easier than to read these passages
as evidence
of Spinoza's
anti-Semitism, his deep-seated antipathy to Jews and Hampshire:205
Judaism. His statement that the
Jews disdained philosophy con-
cludes with the exclamation:
"How happy
our age would surely
be now, if we saw religion
again free of all superstition!"144
Yet even
as the Treatise appeals to an age blessedly
free of superstition, it Not
quite
appeals to those very prejudices
and superstitions from which it
would ostensibly liberate us! Spinoza surely knew
that his frequent
distortions and caricatures of Judaism played
to some of the worst
forms of anti-Jewish bigotry. His continual
depiction of Judaism as
a legalistic,
carnal, and authoritarian religion
helped to lay the basis
for Kant's later conception of
Judaism as a "statutory"
religion,
Hegel's
attack on religious "positivity,"
and Marx's invidious assaults
on Jewish "egoism" and "materialism".145
Why, then, does he
do it?
[Smith:3]
One answer is that
the contrasts between Judaism and Christianity
represent something more than anti-Semitism
or Spinoza's desire
to seek revenge for his excommunication.
They were intended as
markers of historical
progress. Spinoza sets up the figures
of
Moses and
Jesus to mark the change from an
ethic of law and
external authority
to one of love
and individual moral
autonomy.
Judaism and Christianity are way
stations on the road from sacred
Evolution
to secular
{devoid
of Scriptural Theology} history.
Both are theologically
aufgehoben in Spinoza's own
dialectical synthesis.
{Bk.XIA:109146}
[Smith:4]
But Spinoza does more than prepare the reader
for the overcoming
of Judaism by Christianity. As I suggested earlier, he
prepares the
reader for the overcoming
of both Judaism and Christianity by the
secular democratic
state. After depicting Christ
as the teacher of a
universal rational
morality (a kind of Spinoza avant
la lettre),
he shows how Christianity
did not possess the true moral teaching.
In particular, he shows that Christianity,
not Judaism, became the
cause of the persecution and
intolerance to which the Treatise
takes itself to be the answer. In Spinoza's recasting
of sacred history,
if Christ takes the place that Maimonides
had accorded to Moses,
Spinoza now assumes the place that had previously
been accorded
to Christ. He {Spinoza}
is the bringer of
a new theologico-political
dispensation every bit as far-reaching as the historical
religions that
he claims to
overcome.
{Bk.XIA:110148—
Levinas, "Spinoza Case," p. 108: "Within the history of
ideas, [Spinoza] subordinated the truth of Judaism to the revelation of
the New Testament. The latter
is of course surpassed by the intellectual
love of G-D,
but Western being involves this Christian experience,
even if it is
only a stage."}.
{Continued with Smith:110—Legerdemain.}
CHAPTER XII.
TTP3:XII(39):170 -
From Smith's Bk.XIA:106—Distinction
of Bibles:
The distinction between the law of Moses and the teachings of Christ runs through the Treatise. Whereas the legislator seeks to bring about obedience through social control, the teacher is an inculcator of moral norms and principles. Spinoza leaves no doubt as to which of the two he considers superior {for a government or a Utopia?}. "For example, Moses does not teach the Jews as a teacher or prophet that they should not kill or steal, but commands these things as a lawgiver and prince. For he does not prove these teachings by reason, but adds a penalty to the commands, which can and must vary according to the temperament of each nation.117 As evidence for this proposition, Spinoza claims that the Mosaic injunction against adultery is given merely with reference to "the advantage of the body politic and the state"; Jesus, however, is concerned with, the peace of mind and true blessedness of each person." Moses condemned the "external action," leaving the intention or "consent of the mind" untouched, whereas {mat 5:17ff} Christ {Paul, Christianity}, who promised a spiritual rather than a temporal reward, "was sent, not to preserve the state and institute laws, but only to teach the universal law. 118 As evidence Spinoza cites the famous claim in Matthew 5:28 "everyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart."
{As a practical matter, preserving
the State is more important; imagine
your peace of mind without a Police
Department. Even the Vatican has a Police Department.}
CHAPTER XIII.
Note XIII:15 (p.
177) Exodus
vi:,3; "And I
appeared unto Abraham,
unto Isaac, and unto Jacob by the name
of El Sadai (A. V. Almighty)
but by my name Jehovah
was I not known to them." Bk.XIV:1:144.
{a.
Elohim— El-o-heem,
Strong:0430,
Plural of El; unifying all
powers.
El
— ale, Strong:0410—power,
might, god;
from
ah'-yil, Strong:0352—strength,
strong, a
chief,
a
ram, an oak.
b. Sh-dai
— shad-dah'ee, Strong:7706—Almighty;
Bk.XIV:1:144.
root shaw-dad ', Strong:7703—powerful,
impregnable,
ravage,
destroyer.
c.
J---vah — yeh-ho-vah ', Yahweh,
Strong:3068— Bk.XIV:1:144,
145.
self-Existent
or Eternal (E1:Def.1:45)
from
haw-yaw ', Strong:1961—to exist, to
be,
become,
continue. Being.}
JPs
Exodus
3:14 "And God
said unto Moses, TTP1:2:24
I
AM THAT I AM {J---vah
is a tenseless form of the Hebrew
verb
"to be." Wienphal:3.}: and
he said, Thus shalt thou
say
unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me
unto
you."
d.
Adonay — ad-o-noy ', Strong:0136—Lord
an
emphatic form of Strong:0113; the Lord (used as
a
proper name of G-D only):—(my) Lord.
Ges:12— The
Jews from an over scrupulous super-
stition
and reverence for the name of G-D, when-
ever
in the sacred text yeh-ho-vah '
occurs, read it
ad-o-noy
', .... {as a circumlocution.}
CHAPTER XIV.
14:47 (p.186) From
Popkin's "Spinoza"; 2004; ISBN 1851683399; Page 71—Universal
Religion
From his analysis of Scripture as an object to be evaluated historically and textually, Spinoza then considers its cognitive {of or pertaining to the mental processes of perception, memory, judgment, and reasoning, as contrasted with emotional and volitional processes} {cash} value for modern society. While Spinoza asserts that it has no truths that cannot be known independently from careful study and reasoning, Scripture can make people accept and obey some basic moral principles. These are found by careful reasoning with or without any reference to the Bible. Spinoza lists these principles under seven headings as a kind of basic religion for rational people:
1. "G-D,
or a Supreme Being, exists";
{Posit
1D6}
2.
"G-D is One"; {Posit
ONE}
3. G-D "is
omnipresent"; {Pantheism}
4. G-D has
"supreme right and dominion over all
things" and "does nothing under compulsion,"
only by "fiat and grace" {Freedom};
5. The "worship
of G-D consists only in justice
and charity, or love
towards one's neighbor";
{Golden
Rule} {Sacred
Scripture}
6. All "who obey G-D by their
manner of life are saved {have
PcM}";
and
7. G-D "forgives the sins
of those who repent:" {No
Praise / no Blame}
Spinoza offers several possibilities as to how one can understand G-D, including the Quaker belief that G-D is light {knowledge, enlightenment}.
These rules are not offered as statements cut into parchment centuries ago but as views that a rational person in the mid-seventeenth century would find made reasonable sense. Thus one did not need an ancient text to justify these views {Hall} but simply to clarify perceptions at the present time.
For Spinoza the critical point is what leads people to obey universal moral law as exemplified in the proposition, "do unto others as you would have them do unto you:" Purely rational people will comprehend that this is the way people must act if they want to live in a harmonious{ly interacting} society. People who do not have the rational ability to reach this conclusion are led to obey by the force of scriptural text. Thus, for Spinoza, the role of traditional and organized religion becomes one of keeping people in a moral world whether they understand it or not {Hall—Technological Advancement}. Religion becomes subservient to political-social policy and when reduced to this position it can then play an important role as long as it stays within its legitimate bounds.
14:8 (p.
183)
14:75 (p.
189)
{See Einstein's definition
of the proper realms of science and religion;
and is "Religion and Science: Irreconcilable?"
}
CHAPTER XV.
15:6 (p.
190) From Shirley's
Bk.XI:2281 {Shirley
adds this footnote}
Bk.XIA:76.
] R. Jehuda
Alpakhar was the able philosopher of an anti-Maimonidean
movement, which was influential for a moment.
Many orthodox Jews
considered that Maimonides
was setting reason
above the revealed
word
of God. [
15:56—From
Smith's Bk.XIA:139.
The rules circumscribing the exemplary
way of life are set out in
the fourth
chapter of the Treatise in
Spinoza's account of philosophical theology or
the Divine
Law. Even to attribute a doctrine of philosophical
theology to
Spinoza might appear to be an oxymoron.
In the preface to the Treatise
he urges the strongest possible
separation between truth or philosophy
and faith or religion.
A philosophical
theology would seem to be premised
on a fundamental confusion, a category
mistake, as it were, between the
realms of truth and obedience.
On the basis of later statements, however,
a new or at least different
teaching emerges. What Spinoza means by
the separation
of religion and philosophy turns out to be the separation
{literal
biblical views of God}
of philosophy from scriptural
theology. Only scriptural religion, not religion
Philosophy/Religion
as such, is inimical to truth.
At the highest level, philosophy and religion,
far from being incompatible, are
identical. Perhaps no thinker—with
the
possible exception of
Plato—has endowed religion with a higher claim
to
truth, or philosophy with a
greater share in the redemption
of mankind.
It is no exaggeration to say that Spinoza's
divine law lays the basis
for a
new
kind of religion and a new kind of church: the church
of reason and
the cult of the rational
individual.
End of Part 3 of 4 - Chapters XI to XV.
josephb@yesselman.com
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