A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL
TREATISE
Hampshire:202-3,
203-5,
205-9
(Published 1670
anonymously)
Benedict de Spinoza
1632
- 1677
Part 4 - Chapters XVI to XX
Part 1 , Part
2 , Part 3 , Part 4
Metaphors,
Metaphor of Commandment
of G-D, Referred
to G-D, G:Bk.XI:42.
JBY Notes:
1. Text was scanned from Book
II and is a translation
from
Bruder's
1843 Latin text by R.H.M.
Elwes (1883).
JBY added sentence
numbers.
2. (y:xx): y = Chapter Number, if
given; xx = Sentence Number.
3. Page numbers are those of Book
II.
4. Citation abbreviations.
5. ( Spinoza's Footnote or the Latin word ),
] Shirley's
Bk. XI (or XIII)
translation variance or note [ ,
{ JBY
comment, emendation, or endnote } . LINKS
6. Please e-mail
errors, clarification requests, disagreement,
or suggestions to josephb@yesselman.com.
7. TEXT
version without links and without commentary.
Latin version on a CD.
8. There is much in this
work that you will not agree with or even
think nonsense—although
keep in mind that Spinoza was under
the constraints
of religious intolerance.
Spinoza was born in the
very year (1632)
that the inquisitorial denunciation of Galileo took
place. However,
partake of the work (and my commentaries) as
you would a
pomegranate; relish the flesh, but spit-out the
pits.
9. EL:[7]:viii, EL:[11]:xi, EL:[17]:xiii, EL:[22]:xvi,
EL:[64]:xxxi, EL:xxxiii:J6
,
L19:296, L20:297,
L23:301, L49:364,
old vocabulary in new bottles.
{Scriptural
Theology} Hampshire:205
10. The chief
aim of the whole
treatise is to separate
faith ^ {Religion} Smith:Divine
Law
from
philosophy. ]Shirley:37—What
emerges in the
TTP, as far as is Spinoza
Hampshire:203
& 205
concerned,
is the possibility of a this-worldly blessedness
for both the rational person TL:L36(23):345
(through
philosophy) and
the common person (through purified religion),[ EL:L21:(73):298
{By
my defining Religion as an hypothesis,
the two are synthesized.} Philosophy
/ Religion
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Table of Contents
Preface (at beginning of Part I)
Part Chapters
| Part 1 | I | II | III | IV | V |
| Part 2 | VI | VII | VIII | IX | X |
| Part 3 | XI | XII | XIII | XIV | XV |
| Part 4 | XVI | XVII | XVIII | XIX | XX |
Author's Notes to Theologico-Political
Treatise - Part 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS: BkII Page Numbers
| CHAPTER XVI.- Of the Foundations
of a State; of the Natural and Civil Rights of Individuals; and of the Rights of the Sovereign Power . . . . . . . 200 |
|
| In Nature right co-extensive with power. | 200 |
| This principle applies to mankind in the state of Nature. | 201 |
| How a transition from this state to a civil state is possible. | 203 |
| Subjects not slaves. | 206 |
| Definition of private civil right—and wrong. | 207 |
| Of alliance. | 208 |
| Of treason. | 209 |
| In what sense sovereigns are bound by Divine law. | 210 |
| Civil government not
inconsistent with religion. |
211 |
| CHAPTER XVII.- It is shown, that
no one can or need transfer all his Rights to the Sovereign Power. Of the Hebrew Republic, as it was during the lifetime of Moses, and after his death till the foundation of the Monarchy; and of its Excellence. Lastly, of the Causes why the Theocratic Republic fell, and why it could hardly have continued without Dissension . . . . . . 214 |
|
| The absolute theory of Sovereignty ideal—No one can in
fact transfer all his rights to the Sovereign power. Evidence of this. |
214 |
| The greatest danger in all States from within, not without. | 216 |
| Original independence of the Jews after the Exodus. | 218 |
| Changed first to a pure democratic Theocracy. | 219 |
| Then to subjection to Moses. | 220 |
| Then to a Theocracy with the power divided between the high priest and the captains. |
221 |
| The tribes confederate states. | 224 |
| Restraints on the civil power. | 226 |
| Restraints on the people. | 228 |
| Causes of decay involved in the constitution of the Levitical priesthood. |
232 |
| CHAPTER XVIII.- From the Commonwealth
of the Hebrews and their History certain Lessons are deduced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 |
|
| The Hebrew constitution
no longer possible or desirable, yet lessons derived from its history. |
237 |
| As the danger of entrusting any authority in politics
to ecclesiastics—the danger of identifying religion with dogma. |
241 |
| The necessity of keeping all judicial power with the
sovereign—the danger of changes in the form of a State. |
242 |
| This last danger illustrated from the history of England—of Rome. | 243 |
| And of Holland. |
244 |
| CHAPTER XIX. It is shown that
the Right over Matters Spiritual lies wholly with the Sovereign, and that the Outward Forms of Religion should be in accordance with Public Peace, if we would worship (OBEY G-D) aright . . . . 245 |
|
| Difference between external and inward religion. | 245 |
| Positive law established only by agreement. | 246 |
| Piety furthered by peace and obedience. | 249 |
| Position of the Apostles exceptional. | 250 |
| Why Christian States, unlike the Hebrew, suffer from
disputes between the civil and ecclesiastical powers. |
254 |
| Absolute power in things spiritual of modern rulers. |
256 |
| CHAPTER XX. That in a Free State
every man may Think what he Likes, and Say what he Thinks. Bk.XIA:15660, Hampshire:208. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 257 |
|
| The mind not subject to State authority. | 257 |
| Therefore in general language should not be. | 258 |
| A man who disapproving of a law, submits his adverse
opinion to the judgment of the authorities, while acting in accordance with the law, deserves well of the State. |
259 |
| That liberty of opinion is beneficial, shown from the
history of Amsterdam. |
264 |
| Danger to the State of withholding it.—Submission of
the Author to the judgment of his country's rulers. |
265 |
Authors Endnotes to the Treatise
Page 200
CHAPTER XVI.
(16:1) Hitherto
our care has been to separate
philosophy from theology, TTP1:Divine
Law
and to show the freedom of thought which such separation insures to
both. (16:2)
It is now time to determine the limits to which
such freedom
Bk.XIA:1212.
of thought and discussion may
extend itself in the ideal state.
(16:3) For the due consideration of this question we must examine the
foundations of a State, first turning our attention to the natural rights
of individuals, and afterward to
religion
and the state
as a whole.
(16:4) By
the right and ordinance of Nature,
I merely mean those natural
laws wherewith we conceive every
individual to be conditioned by
Bk.XIB:11144;
Bk.XIX:2587.
nature, so as to live and act in a given
way. (16:5) For
instance, fishes
are naturally conditioned for swimming, and the greater for devouring Durant:651[2a]164
the less; therefore fishes enjoy the water, and the greater
devour the
less by sovereign natural right.
(16:6) For it is
certain that nature, taken
in the abstract, has sovereign right to do anything, she can; in other
words, her right is co-extensive
with her power. (16:7)
The power
of
Bk.XIA:12311.
Nature
is the power of God,
which has sovereign right over all things;
Referral
and, inasmuch as the power of Nature is simply
the aggregate of the Chain
of Natural Events
Bk.XIV:1:2471.
powers of all her individual
components, it follows that every individ-
Bk.XIA:12417.
ual has sovereign right to do all that
he can; in other words, the rights
of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his
power as it has been
Bk.XIX:2587.
conditioned.
(16:8) Now
it is the sovereign law and right of nature that
each individual should endeavour to preserve itself as it is, without
regard to anything but itself; therefore this sovereign law and page 201
right belongs to every individual, namely, to exist and act according
to its natural conditions. (16:9) We do not here acknowledge any dif-
ference between mankind and other individual natural entities, nor
between men endowed with reason
and those to whom reason is
unknown; nor between fools, madmen, and sane
men. (16:10)
Whatso-
ever an individual does by the laws of its nature it has a sovereign
right to do, inasmuch as it acts as it was
conditioned by nature, and
cannot act otherwise. (16:11)
Wherefore among men, so long as they
are considered as living under the sway of nature, he who does not
yet know reason, or who has not yet acquired the habit of virtue,
acts solely according to the laws of his desire with as sovereign a
right as he who orders
his life entirely by the laws of
reason.
(16:12) That
is, as the wise man has sovereign
right to do all
that
reason dictates, or to live according to the laws of reason, so also
the ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right
to do all that desire
Bk.XIA:12520.
dictates, or to live
according to the laws
of desire.
(17:13) This
is
identical with the teaching of Paul, who acknowledges that previous
to the law—that is, so long as men are considered of as living under
the sway of nature,
there is no sin.
(16:14) The
natural right of
the individual man is thus determined,
not
by sound reason, but by desire and power. (16:15) All are not naturally
conditioned so as to act according to the laws and rules of reason;
nay, on the contrary, all men are born ignorant, and before they can
learn the right way of life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater
part of their life, even if they have been well
brought up, has passed
Bk.XIX:26527.
away. (16:16)
Nevertheless, they are in
the meanwhile bound
to live
and preserve themselves as far as they can by the unaided impulses
of desire. (17:17) Nature has given them no other guide, and has
denied them the present power of living according to sound reason;
so that they are no
more bound to live by the dictates of an enlight-
ened mind, than a
cat is bound to live by the laws of the nature of
a lion.
(16:18) Whatsoever,
therefore, an individual (considered as under the
sway of nature) thinks useful for himself, whether led by sound
reason or impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to
seek and to take for himself as he best page 202 can, whether by
force, cunning, entreaty, or any other
means; consequently he may
Bk.XX:282103.
regard as an enemy anyone who
hinders the accomplishment of his
purpose.
(16:19) It
follows from what we
have said that the right and ordinance
of nature, under which all men are born, and under which they most-
ly live, only prohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can
attain: it does not forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor,
indeed, any of the means suggested by desire.
(16:20) This
we need not wonder at, for nature is not bounded
by the
laws of human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and pre-
servation; her limits are infinitely wider, and have reference to the
eternal order of nature, wherein man is but a speck; it is by the
necessity of this
alone that all
individuals are conditioned for living
and acting in a particular way. (16:21)
If anything, therefore, in nature
seems to us ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we only know in
part, and are
almost entirely ignorant of the order and interdepend-
Bk.XIV:1:2465.
ence
of Nature
as a whole, and also because we
want everything to
be arranged according to the dictates of our human reason; in reality
that which reason considers evil,
is not evil in respect to the order
and laws of
nature as a whole, but only in respect to the laws of our
Durant:640[10]89
nature—Bk.XIA:12626.
reason.
(16:22) Nevertheless,
no one can doubt that it is much better for us to
live according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we
said, they have men's true good for their object. (16:23) Moreover,
everyone wishes to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach
of fear, and this would be quite impossible so long as everyone did
everything he liked, and reason's claim was lowered to a par with
those of hatred and anger; there is no one who is not ill at ease in
the midst of enmity, hatred,
anger, and deceit,
and who does not
seek to avoid them as much as he can. (16:24)
When we reflect that
men without mutual help, or the aid of reason, must needs live most
miserably, as we clearly proved in Chap. V., we shall plainly see that
men must necessarily come to an agreement to live together as
securely and well as possible if they are to enjoy as a whole the
rights which naturally belong to them as individuals, and their life
should be no more conditioned by the force and desire page 203
of individuals, but by the power and will of the whole body. (16:25) This
end they will be unable to attain if desire be their only guide (for by
the laws of desire each man is drawn in a different direction); they
must, therefore, most firmly decree and establish that they will be
guided in everything by reason (which nobody will dare openly to
repudiate lest he should be taken for a madman), and will restrain
any desire which is injurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to
all as they would be done by, and that they will defend their neigh-
bour's rights as their
own.
(16:26) How
such a compact as this should be entered into, how ratified
and established, we will now inquire.
(16:27) Now
it is a universal law of human
nature that no one ever
neglects anything which he judges to be good,
except with the hope
Bk.XIA:13044.
of gaining a greater good,
or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does
anyone endure an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil,
or gaining a greater good. (16:28) That is, everyone will, of two goods,
choose that which he thinks the
greatest; and, of two evils, that
which he thinks the least. (16:29)
I say advisedly that which he thinks
the greatest or the least, for it does not necessarily follow that he
judges right. (16:30) This law is so deeply implanted in the human mind
that it ought to be
counted among eternal truths and axioms.
(16:31) As
a necessary consequence of the
principle just enunciated,
no one can honestly promise to forego the right which he has over
all things (26), and in general no one will abide by his promises,
unless under the fear of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good.
(16:32) An example will make the matter clearer. (16:33) Suppose that a
robber forces me to promise that I will give him my goods at his will
and pleasure. (16:34) It is plain (inasmuch as my natural right is, as I
have shown, co-extensive with my power) that if I can free myself
from this robber by stratagem, by assenting to his demands, I have
the natural right to do so,
and to pretend to
accept his conditions.
(16:35) Or
again, suppose I
have genuinely promised someone that for
the space of twenty days I will not taste food or any nourishment;
and suppose I afterwards find that was foolish, and cannot be kept
without very great injury to myself; as I am bound by natural law and
right to choose the least of two evils, I page 204 have complete right
to break my compact, and act as if my promise had never been
uttered. (16:36) I say that I should have perfect natural right to do so,
whether I was actuated by true and evident reason, or whether I was
actuated by mere opinion in thinking I had promised rashly; whether
my reasons were true or false, I should be in fear of a greater evil,
which, by the ordinance of nature, I should strive to avoid by every
means in my power.
(16:37) We
may, therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid
Bk.XIA:13049.
by its utility, without which it
becomes null and void. (16:38)
It is, there-
fore, foolish to ask a man to keep his faith with us for ever, unless we
also endeavour that the violation of the compact we enter into shall
involve for the violator more harm than good. (16:39) This considera-
tion should have very great weight in forming a state. (16:40) However,
if all men could be easily led by reason alone, and could recognize
what is best and most useful for a state, there would be no one who
would not forswear deceit, for everyone would keep most religiously
to their compact in their desire for the chief good, namely, the preser-
vation of the state, and would cherish good faith above all things as
the shield and buckler of the commonwealth. (16:41) However, it is far
from being the case that all men can always be easily led by reason
alone; everyone is drawn away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambi-
tion, envy, hatred, and the like so engross the mind that reason has
no place therein. (16:42) Hence, though men make promises with all
the appearances of good faith, and agree that they will keep to their
engagement, no one can absolutely rely on another man's promise
unless there is something behind it. (16:43) Everyone has by nature
a right to act deceitfully. and
to break his compacts, unless he be
Bk.XIA:13050; Bk.XIX:26732,33.
restrained by the hope
of some greater good,
or the fear of some
greater evil.
(16:44) However,
as we have shown that the natural
right of the individ-
ual is only limited by his power,
it is clear that by transferring, either
willingly or under compulsion, this power into
the hands of another,
he in so doing necessarily cedes
also a part of his right; and further,
that the Sovereign right
over all men belongs to him who has sover-
eign power, wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them
by threats of the universally feared punishment of page 205 death;
such sovereign
right he will retain only
so long as he can
maintain his
power of enforcing his will; otherwise he
will totter on his throne,
and no one who is stronger than he will be bound unwillingly to obey
him.
Bk.XIA:13153.
(16:45) In
this manner a society can be formed without any violation of
natural right, and the covenant can always be strictly kept—that is,
if each individual hands over the whole of his power to the body
politic, the latter will then possess sovereign natural right over all
things; that is, it will have
sole and unquestioned dominion, and
Bk.XIB:10536.
everyone will be bound
to obey, under pain of the severest punish-
ment. (16:46) A body politic of this kind is called a Democracy, which
may be defined as a society which wields all its power as a whole.
(16:47) The sovereign power is not restrained by any laws, but every-
one is bound to obey it in all things; such is the state of things
implied when men either tacitly or expressly handed over to it all
their power of self-defence, or in other words, all their right.
(16:48) For if they had wished to retain any right for themselves, they
ought to have taken precautions for its defence and preservation; as
they have not done so, and indeed could not have done so without
dividing and consequently ruining the state, they placed themselves
absolutely at the mercy of the sovereign power; and, therefore,
having acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity demand-
ed, they are obliged to fulfil
the commands of the sovereign power,
Bk.XIA:13477.
however absurd these may be, else
they will be public enemies, and
will act against reason, which urges the preservation of the state as
a primary duty.
(16:49) For
reason bids us choose the least of two evils.
(16:50) Furthermore,
this danger of submitting absolutely to the domin-
ion and will of another, is one which may be incurred with a light
heart: for we have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of
imposing their will, so long as they have the full power to enforce it:
if such power be lost their right to command is lost also, or lapses to
those who have assumed it and can keep it. (16:51) Thus it is very rare
for sovereigns to impose thoroughly irrational commands, for they
are bound to consult their own interests, and retain their power by
consulting the public good and acting according to the dictates of
reason, as Seneca says, "violenta
page 206
imperia nemo continuit
Bk.XIA:13366.
diu."
(16:52) No
one can long retain a tyrant's sway.
(16:53) In
a democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared:
for it is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially
if it
Bk.XIA:13368.
be a large one, should
agree in an irrational design: and, moreover,
the basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires
as irrational,
and to bring men as far as possible under the control
of reason,
so
that they may live in peace and harmony: if this basis be removed the
Bk.XIB:103; Bk.XIX:26732.
whole fabric falls to ruin.
(16:54) Such
being the ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty
of subjects is, as I have said, to obey its commands, and to recog-
nize no right save that which it sanctions.
(16:55) It
will, perhaps, be thought that we are
turning subjects into
slaves: for slaves obey commands and free men live as they like;
but this idea is based on a misconception, for the true slave is he
who is led away by his pleasures and can neither see what is good
for him nor act accordingly: he alone is free who lives with free
consent under the entire guidance of reason.
(16:56) Action
in obedience to orders
does take away freedom in a
certain sense, but it does not, therefore, make a man a slave, all
depends on the object of the action. (16:57) If the object of the action
be the good of the state, and not the good of the agent, the latter is
a slave and does himself no good: but in a state or kingdom where
the weal of the whole people,
and not that of the ruler, is
the
Bk.XIB:103.
supreme law,
obedience to the sovereign
power does not make a
man a slave, of no use to himself, but a subject. (16:58)
Therefore, that
state is the
freest whose laws are founded on sound
reason, so that
Bk.XIB:1993.
every member of it may,
if he will, be free (27);
that is, live with full
Bk.XIA:13474, 13684; Bk.XIB:103,
10333;
Bk.XX:282105.
consent under the entire guidance of reason.
(16:59) Children,
though they are bound to
obey all the commands of
their parents, are yet not slaves: for the commands of parents look
generally to the children's benefit.
(16:60) We
must, therefore, acknowledge a great difference
between
a slave, a son, and a subject; their positions
may be thus defined.
(16:61) A
slave is one who is bound to obey his master's orders, though
they are given solely in the master's interest: a son is one who obeys
his father's orders, given page
207 in his own interest; a
subject obeys
the orders of the sovereign power, given
for the common interest,
wherein he is included.
(16:62) I
think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis
of a democ-
racy: I have especially desired to do
so, for I believe it to be of all
forms of government the
most natural, and the most consonant with
Bk.XIA:13683.
individual liberty. (16:63)
In it no one transfers his natural right
so abso-
lutely that he has
no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to
Bk.XIA:13367.
the majority of a society,
whereof he is a unit. (16:63a)
Thus all men Durant
[10] 174
Bk.XIB:10434.
remain as they were in the state
of nature, equals.
(16:64) This
is the only form of government which
I have treated of
at length, for it is the one most akin
to my purpose of showing the
benefits of freedom in a state.
(16:65) I
may pass over the fundamental principles
of other forms of
government, for we may gather from what
has been said whence
their right arises without going into its
origin. (16:66) The
possessor
of sovereign power, whether he be one, or many, or the whole
body
politic, has the sovereign right
of imposing any commands he
pleases: and he who has either voluntarily, or under compulsion,
transferred the right to defend
him to another, has, in so doing,
Bk.XIA:13369.
renounced his natural right
and is therefore bound to
obey, in all
things, the commands of the sovereign power; and will be bound so
to do so long as the king, or nobles, or the people preserve the
sovereign power which formed the basis of the original transfer.
(16:67) I
need add no more.
(16:68) The
bases and rights of dominion being
thus displayed, we
shall readily be able to define private civil right, wrong, justice, and
injustice, with their relations to the state; and also to determine what
constitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason.
(16:69) By
private civil right we can only mean
the liberty every man
possesses to preserve
his existence, a
liberty limited by the edicts
of the sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority: for when
a man has transferred to another his right of living as he likes,
which
was only limited by his power, that is, has transferred his liberty
and
power of self-defence, he is bound to live as that other dictates,
and
to trust to him entirely for his defence. (16:70)
Wrong takes place when
a citizen, or subject, is forced by another to
undergo page 208
some
loss or pain in contradiction
to the authority of the law, or the edict of
the sovereign power.
(16:71) Wrong
is conceivable only in an organized community: nor can
it ever accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has
the
right to do what he
likes. (16:72)
It can only arise, therefore, between
private persons, who are bound by law
and right not to injure one
another. (16:73) Justice
consists in the habitual rendering to every man
his lawful due: injustice
consists in depriving a man, under the pre-
tence of legality, of what the laws,
rightly interpreted, would allow
him. (16:74) These last are also called equity and iniquity, because
those who administer the laws are bound to show no respect of
persons, but to account all men equal, and to defend every man's
right equally, neither envying
the rich nor despising the poor.
(16:75) The
men of two states become allies, when
for the sake of avoid-
ing war, or for some other advantage,
they covenant to do each other
no hurt, but on the contrary, to assist each other if
necessity arises,
each retaining his independence. (16:76)
Such a covenant is valid so
long as its basis of danger or advantage is in force: no one enters
into an engagement, or is bound to stand by his compacts unless
there be a hope of some accruing good, or the fear of some evil:
if this basis be removed the compact thereby becomes void: this has
been abundantly shown by experience. (16:77) For although different
states make treaties not to harm one another, they always take
every possible precaution against such treaties being broken by the
stronger party, and do not rely on the compact, unless there is a suf-
ficiently obvious object and advantage to both parties in observing it.
(16:78) Otherwise they would fear a breach of faith, nor would there be
any wrong done thereby: for who in his proper senses, and aware
of the right of the sovereign power, would trust in the promises of
one who has the will and the power to do what he likes, and who
aims solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion? (16:79) More-
over, if we consult loyalty and religion, we shall see that no one in
possession of power ought to abide by his promises to the injury of
his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without breaking the
engagement he made with his subjects, by which both he and they
are most solemnly bound. page 209 (16:80) An enemy is one who lives
apart from the state, and does not recognize its authority either as a
subject or as an ally. It is not hatred which makes a man an enemy,
but the rights of the state. (16:81) The rights of the state are the same
in regard to him who does
not recognize by any compact the state
Bk.XIX:265d.
authority, as they are
against him who has done the state an injury:
it has the right to force
him as best it can, either to submit, or to
Bk.XIX:26629.
contract an alliance.
(16:82) Lastly,
treason can only be committed by subjects, who by com-
pact, either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights
to the
state: a subject is said to have committed
this crime when he has
attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the sovereign
power, or to
place it in different hands. (16:83)
I say, has
attempted, for if punishment
were not to overtake him till he had succeeded, it would
often come
too late, the
sovereign rights would have been acquired
or transferred
already.
(16:84) I
also say, has attempted, for whatever reason, to
seize the sove-
reign power, and I recognize no difference whether such an
attempt
Bk.XIB:9924.
should be followed by public loss or public
gain. (85)
Whatever be his
reason for acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly
condemned:
in war, everyone would admit
the justice of his
sentence.
(16:86) If a man
does not keep to his post, but approaches
the enemy without the
knowledge of his commander, whatever may be his motive,
so long
as he acts on his own motion, even if he advances with the design of
defeating the enemy, he is rightly put
to death, because he has
violated his oath, and infringed the rights of his commander.
(87) That
all citizens are equally bound by these rights in time of peace, is not
so generally recognized, but the reasons for obedience are in both
cases identical. (16:88) The state must be preserved and directed by
the sole authority of the sovereign, and such authority and right have
been accorded by universal consent to him alone: if, therefore, any-
one else attempts, without his consent, to execute any public enter-
prise, even though the state might (as we said) reap benefit there-
from, such person has none the less infringed the sovereigns right,
and would be rightly punished for treason.
(16:89) In
order that every scruple may be removed,
we may now
answer the inquiry, whether our former assertion that page 210 every-
one who has not the practice of reason, may, in the state of nature,
live by sovereign natural right, according to the laws of his desires,
is not in direct opposition to the law and right of God as revealed.
(16:90) For as all men absolutely (whether they be less endowed with
reason or more) are equally bound by the Divine command to
love their neighbour as themselves, it may be said that they cannot,
without wrong, do injury to anyone, or live
according to their desires.
(16:91) This
objection, so far as the state
of nature is concerned, can be
easily answered, for the state of nature is, both in nature and in
time,
prior to religion.
(16:92) No
one knows by nature that he owes any
Bk.XIX:25912.
obedience
to God
(28), nor
can he attain thereto by any exercise of
Bk.XIX:2904.
his reason,
but solely by revelation confirmed
by signs. (16:93) There-
fore, previous to revelation, no one is bound by a Divine law and
right of which he is necessarily in ignorance. (16:94) The state of nature
must by no means be confounded with a state of religion, but must
be conceived as without either religion or law, and consequently
without sin or wrong: this is how we have described it, and we are
confirmed by the authority of Paul. (16:95) It is not only in respect of
ignorance that we conceive the state of nature as prior to, and lack-
ing the Divine revealed law and right; but in respect of freedom also,
wherewith all men are born endowed.
(16:96) If
men were naturally bound by the Divine law
and right, or if the
Divine law and right were a natural necessity, there would have been
no need for God
to make a covenant with mankind, and to bind them
thereto with an oath and agreement.
(16:97) We
must, then, fully grant that the Divine
law and right originated
at the time when men by express covenant agreed to obey
God in all
things, and ceded, as it were, their natural freedom, transferring their
rights to God in the manner described in speaking of the formation of
a state.
(16:98) However,
I will treat of these matters more at length presently.
(16:99) It
may be insisted that sovereigns are as
much bound by the
Divine law as subjects:
whereas we have asserted that they retain
their natural rights, and may do whatever they like.
page 211
(16:100) In
order to clear up the whole difficulty,
which arises rather
concerning the natural right than the natural
state, I maintain that
everyone is bound, in the state
of nature, to live according to Divine
law, in the same way as he is bound to live according to the
dictates
of sound reason;
namely, inasmuch as it is to his
advantage, and
necessary for his salvation;
but, if he will not so live, he may
do
otherwise at his own risk. (16:101)
He is thus bound to live according
to his own laws, not according to anyone else's, and to recognize
no
man as a judge, or as a superior
in religion.
(16:102) Such,
in my opinion,
is the position of a sovereign, for he may take advice from his fellow-
men, but he is not bound to recognize any
as a judge, nor anyone
besides himself as an arbitrator on any
question of right, unless it
be a prophet sent expressly by God
and attesting his
mission by
indisputable signs. (16:103)
Even then he does not
recognize a man,
but God Himself as His judge.
(16:104) If
a sovereign refuses to
obey God
as revealed in His law, he
does so at his own risk and loss,
but without violating any civil or
natural right. (16:105)
For the civil right is dependent on his own
decree;
and natural right is dependent on the laws
of nature, which latter are
not adapted to religion,
whose sole aim is the good
of humanity, but
to the order of nature—that is,
to God's eternal decree unknown
to us.
(16:106) This
truth seems to be adumbrated in
a somewhat obscurer
form by those who maintain that men can sin
against God's revela-
tion, but not against the eternal decree
by which He has ordained
all things.
Martyr
Laws
Bk.XIB:17578.
(16:107) We
may be asked, what should
we do if the sovereign com-
mands anything contrary to
religion, and the
obedience which
we have expressly vowed to God? should
we obey the Divine law or
the human law? (16:108)
I shall treat of this question at length
hereafter,
and will therefore merely say now, that God should be obeyed before
all else,
when we
have a certain and indisputable revelation
of His will:
but men are very prone to error on religious subjects, and, according
to the diversity of their dispositions, are wont with considerable stir to
put forward their own inventions, as experience more than sufficiently
attests, so that if no one were bound to obey the state in matters
which, in his page 212 own opinion concern religion, the rights of the
state would be dependent on every man's judgment and passions.
(16:109) No one would consider himself bound to obey laws framed
gainst his faith or superstition; and on this pretext he might assume
unbounded license. (16:110) In this way, the rights of the civil authorities
would be utterly set at nought, so that we must conclude that the
sovereign power, which alone is bound both by Divine and natural
right to preserve and guard the laws of the state, should have
supreme authority for making any laws about religion which it thinks
fit; all are bound to obey its behests on the subject in accordance
with their promise which God bids them to keep.
(16:111) However,
if the sovereign power be heathen, we should either
enter into no engagements therewith, and yield up our
lives sooner
than transfer to it any of our rights; or, if the
engagement be made,
and our rights transferred, we should (inasmuch as we should have
ourselves transferred
the right
of defending
ourselves and
our religion)
be bound to obey them, and to keep our word: we might even rightly
be bound so to do, except in those cases where God, by indisputable
revelation, has promised His special aid against tyranny, or given
us
special exemption from obedience. (16:112)
Thus we see that, of all the
Jews in Babylon, there were only three youths who were
certain of
the help of God, and, therefore, refused
to obey Nebuchadnezzar.
(16:113) All
the rest, with the sole exception of Daniel, who was beloved
by the king, were doubtless compelled by
right to obey, perhaps
thinking that they had been delivered up
by God into the hands of
the king, and that the king had obtained and preserved his dominion
{See
Shirley's footnote}
by God's design.
(16:114) On the other
hand, Eleazar,
before his country
had utterly fallen, wished to give a proof of his constancy to his com-
patriots, in order that they might follow in his footsteps,
and go to any
lengths, rather than allow their
right and power to be transferred to
the Greeks, or brave any torture rather than swear allegiance
to the
heathen. (16:115)
Instances are occurring every day
in confirmation of
what I here advance.
(16:116) The
rulers of Christian kingdoms do not
hesitate, with a view to strengthening their dominion, to make treaties
Bk.XIB:23398.
with Turks and heathen,
and to give orders to their subjects
who
page 213
settle among such peoples not to assume
more freedom,
Bk.XIB:6822.
either in things secular
or religious, than is set down in the treaty,
or allowed by the foreign government. (16:117)
We may see this exemp-
lified in the Dutch treaty with the
Japanese, which I have already
mentioned.
CHAPTER XVII.
(17:1) The
theory put forward in the last chapter, of the universal
rights
of the sovereign power, and of the natural rights of the individual
transferred thereto, though it corresponds in many respects with
actual practice, and though practice may be so arranged as to con-
form to it more and more, must nevertheless
always remain in many
Bk.XIA:1451.
respects purely ideal.
(17:2) No
one can ever so utterly transfer
to
another his power and, consequently, his rights, as to cease to be
a man; nor can there ever be a power so sovereign that it can carry
out every possible wish. (17:3) It will always be vain to order a subject
to hate what he believes brings him advantage, or to love what
brings him loss, or not to be offended at insults, or not to wish to be
free from fear, or a hundred other things of the sort, which neces-
sarily follow from the laws of human nature. (17:4) So much, I think,
is abundantly shown by experience: for men have never so far
ceded their power as to cease to be an object of fear to the rulers
who received such power and right; and dominions have always
been in as much danger from
their own subjects as from external
enemies. (17:5) If
it were really the case, that men could be deprived
of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any further influence
on affairs (29), except with the permission of the holders of sovereign
right, it would then be possible to maintain with impunity page 215
the most violent tyranny, which, I suppose, no one would for an
instant admit.
(17:6) We
must, therefore, grant that every man retains some part of his
right, in dependence on
his own decision, and no one
else's.
(17:7) However,
in order correctly to understand the
extent of the
sovereign's right and power, we must take notice that it does not
cover only those actions to which it can compel men by fear, but
absolutely every action which it can induce men to perform: for
it is the fact of obedience, not the motive for obedience, which
makes a man a subject.
(17:8) Whatever
be the cause which leads a man
to obey the com-
mands of the sovereign, whether it be fear or hope, or love of his
country, or any other emotion—the fact remains that the man takes
counsel with himself, and nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders.
(17:9) We must not, therefore, assert that all actions resulting from a
man's deliberation with himself are done in obedience to the rights
of the individual rather than the sovereign: as a matter of fact, all
actions spring from a man's deliberation with himself, whether the
determining motive be love or fear of punishment; therefore, either
dominion does not exist, and has no rights over its subjects, or else it
extends over every instance in which it can prevail on men to decide
to obey it. (17:10) Consequently, every action which a subject performs
in accordance with the commands of the sovereign, whether such
action springs from love, or fear, or (as is more frequently the case)
from hope and fear together, or from reverence. compounded of fear
and admiration, or, indeed, any motive whatever, is performed in
virtue of his submission to the sovereign, and not in virtue of his own
authority.
(17:11) This
point is made still more clear by the
fact that obedience
does not consist so much in the outward act as in the mental state
of the person obeying; so that he is most under the dominion of
another who with his whole heart determines to obey another's
commands; and consequently the firmest dominion belongs to the
sovereign who has most influence over the minds of his subjects;
if those who are most feared possessed the firmest dominion, the
firmest dominion would belong to the subjects of a tyrant, for they
are always greatly feared by their ruler. (17:12) Furthermore, page 216
though it is impossible to govern
the mind as completely as the
Bk.XIA:15764.
tongue, nevertheless minds
are, to a certain extent, under
the
control of the sovereign, for he can in many ways bring about that
the greatest part of his subjects
should follow his wishes in their
Bk.XIA:15765.
beliefs,
their loves, and their
hates. (17:13)
Though such emotions
do not arise at the express command of the sovereign they often
result (as experience shows) from the authority of his power, and
from his direction; in other words, in virtue of his right; we may,
therefore, without doing violence to our understanding, conceive
men who follow the instigation of their sovereign in their beliefs,
their loves, their hates, their contempt, and all &n