A THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE
Hampshire:202-3, 203-5, 205-9 
 
(Published 1670 anonymously)


Benedict de Spinoza
1632 - 1677

JBY Notes:

1.  Text was scanned from Book II and is a translation from
     Bruder's 1843  Latin  text  by  R.H.M.  Elwes  (1883). 
     JBY  added  sentence  numbers. 

2.  (y:xx):  y = Chapter Number, if given;  xx = Sentence Number.
 
3.  Page numbers are those of Book II.
 
4.  Citation abbreviations. 
 
5.  ( Spinoza's Footnote or the Latin word ), 
      ] Shirley's Bk. XI (or XIII) translation variance or note [ , 
      { JBY comment, emendation, or endnote } .    LINKS 
 
6.  Please  e-mail  errors,  clarification  requests,  disagreement,
     or  suggestions  to  josephb@yesselman.com. 

7.  TEXT version without links and without commentary.
     Latin version on a CD. 
 
8.  There  is  much  in  this  work  that you will not agree with or even
     think  nonsense—although  keep  in mind that Spinoza was under 
     the constraints of religious  intolerance.    Spinoza was born in the 
     very year (1632) that  the inquisitorial denunciation of Galileo took 
     place.  However,  partake  of  the work (and my commentaries) as 
     you  would  a  pomegranate; relish  the  flesh,  but spit-out the pits. 

9.  EL:[7]:viii, EL:[11]:xi, EL:[17]:xiii, EL:[22]:xvi, EL:[64]:xxxi, EL:xxxiii:J6 ,
     L19:296, L20:297, L23:301, L49:364,  old vocabulary in new bottles. 
                                                             {Scriptural Theology}              Hampshire:205
10. The  chief  aim  of  the whole treatise is to separate  faith ^ {Religion}          Smith:Divine Law
      from philosophy.  ]Shirley:37—What emerges in the TTP, as far as is Spinoza           Hampshire:203 & 205
      concerned, is the possibility of a this-worldly blessedness for both the rational person               TL:L36(23):345
       (through philosophy) and the common person (through purified religion),[                    EL:L21:(73):298
      {By my defining Religion as an hypothesis, the two are synthesized.}                     Philosophy / Religion

11. Links - To differentiate links from quotations (both blue text) set your
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12.  Suggestion:  Do  not  read this Spinoza electronic text consecutively        Durant's Story
       as  you  would a novel, but rather follow a thread  by following all its          Schorsch
       links  in  turn.   You will then be putting hypertexting to its fullest and           EL:[3]:vi
       best advantage—the fuller discussion of a thread.  If you do not stick 
       to one thread (idea) at a time,  this Web Site will be very convoluted,         Tickle the Fancy
       confusing, and an annoying maze. 

       If you prefer to read linearly, read these plain vanilla text versions,
       abridged versions, e-book versions, or best, study the printed book—
       book page numbers are given for most scanned books.

Table of Contents

Preface (at beginning of Part I)

   Part                   Chapters

Author's Notes to Theologico-Political Treatise - Part 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS:                                     BkII Page Numbers

   
  Authors Endnotes to the Treatise

Page 200
CHAPTER XVI.

(16:1)  Hitherto our care has been to separate philosophy from theology,        TTP1:Divine Law

and to show the freedom of thought which such separation insures to

both.  (16:2) It is now time to determine the limits to which such freedom
                                                                                            Bk.XIA:1212. 
of   thought   and   discussion  may  extend  itself  in  the  ideal  state.

(16:3)  For  the  due consideration of this question we must examine the

foundations  of  a State, first turning our attention to the natural rights

of  individuals,  and  afterward  to  religion  and  the  state as a whole.



(16:4)  By the right and ordinance of Nature, I merely mean those natural

laws  wherewith  we  conceive  every  individual to be conditioned by
                                   Bk.XIB:11144; Bk.XIX:2587.
nature, so as to live and act in a given way.   (16:5)  For instance, fishes

are naturally conditioned for swimming, and the greater for devouring            Durant:651[2a]164 

the less; therefore fishes enjoy the water, and the greater devour the

less by sovereign natural right.  (16:6)  For it is certain that nature, taken

in  the  abstract, has sovereign right to do anything, she can; in other

words,  her  right  is  co-extensive with her power.  (16:7)  The power of 
                                                                                          Bk.XIA:12311.
Nature is the power of God, which has sovereign right over all things;                Referral 

and,  inasmuch  as the power of Nature is simply the aggregate of the      Chain of Natural Events 
                                               Bk.XIV:1:2471. 
powers  of  all her individual components, it follows that every individ-
                 Bk.XIA:12417.
ual has sovereign right to do all that he can; in other words, the rights

of an individual extend to the utmost limits of his power as it has been
 Bk.XIX:2587.
conditioned.   (16:8)   Now it is the sovereign law and right of nature that

each  individual  should  endeavour  to preserve itself as it is, without

regard to anything but itself; therefore this sovereign law and   page 201

right  belongs  to  every individual, namely, to exist and act according

to  its  natural  conditions.   (16:9)  We do not here acknowledge any dif-

ference  between  mankind  and  other  individual natural entities, nor

between  men  endowed  with  reason  and  those to whom reason is

unknown; nor between fools, madmen, and sane men.   (16:10) Whatso-

ever  an  individual  does  by the laws of its nature it has a sovereign

right  to  do, inasmuch as it acts as it was conditioned by nature, and

cannot  act  otherwise.   (16:11)  Wherefore among men, so long as they

are  considered  as living under the sway of nature, he who does not

yet  know  reason,  or  who  has  not  yet  acquired the habit of virtue,

acts  solely  according  to  the  laws of his desire with as sovereign a

right   as   he  who  orders  his  life  entirely  by  the  laws  of  reason.



(16:12)  That  is,  as  the  wise  man  has  sovereign  right  to  do  all that

reason dictates, or  to  live  according  to the laws of reason, so also

the  ignorant and foolish man has sovereign right to do all that desire
                                                                   Bk.XIA:12520.
dictates,  or  to  live  according  to  the  laws  of  desire.   (17:13)  This is

identical  with the teaching of Paul, who acknowledges that previous

to the law—that is, so long as men are considered of as living under

the sway of nature, there is no sin.



(16:14)  The  natural  right  of  the individual man is thus determined, not

by sound reason, but by desire and power.   (16:15)  All are not naturally

conditioned  so  as  to  act according to the laws and rules of reason;

nay,  on  the contrary, all men are born ignorant, and before they can

learn  the  right way of life and acquire the habit of virtue, the greater

part  of their life, even if they have been well brought up, has passed
                                                                                          Bk.XIX:26527.
away.  (16:16)  Nevertheless, they  are  in  the  meanwhile  bound to live

and preserve themselves as far as they can by the unaided impulses

of  desire.   (17:17)  Nature  has  given  them  no  other  guide,  and  has

denied  them  the present power of living according to sound reason;

so  that  they  are  no more bound to live by the dictates of an enlight-

ened  mind,  than  a  cat  is  bound to live by the laws of the nature of

a lion.



(16:18) Whatsoever,  therefore,  an  individual (considered as under the

sway  of  nature)  thinks  useful  for  himself,  whether  led  by sound

reason  or  impelled by the passions, that he has a sovereign right to

seek  and  to  take  for  himself  as  he  best   page 202   can, whether by

force,  cunning,  entreaty,  or any other means; consequently he may
                                                  Bk.XX:282103. 
regard  as  an enemy anyone who hinders the accomplishment of his

purpose.



(16:19)   It  follows  from  what  we have said that the right and ordinance

of  nature, under which all men are born, and under which they most-

ly  live,  only prohibits such things as no one desires, and no one can

attain:  it  does not forbid strife, nor hatred, nor anger, nor deceit, nor,

indeed, any of the means suggested by desire.



(16:20)  This  we  need  not  wonder at, for nature is not bounded by the

laws of human reason, which aims only at man's true benefit and pre-

servation;  her  limits  are  infinitely  wider,  and have reference to the

eternal  order  of  nature,  wherein  man  is  but  a  speck;  it is by the

necessity  of  this  alone  that  all individuals are conditioned for living

and  acting  in  a particular way.  (16:21)  If anything, therefore, in nature

seems  to us ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we only know in

part,  and  are  almost  entirely ignorant of the order and interdepend-
                    Bk.XIV:1:2465. 
ence  of  Nature as a whole, and also because we want everything to

be arranged according to the dictates of our human reason; in reality

that  which  reason  considers  evil,  is not evil in respect to the order
  
and  laws  of nature as a whole, but only in respect to the laws of our              Durant:640[10]89
 nature—Bk.XIA:12626.
reason.



(16:22)  Nevertheless,  no  one  can doubt that it is much better for us to

live  according to the laws and assured dictates of reason, for, as we

said,  they  have  men's  true  good  for  their  object.  (16:23)  Moreover,

everyone wishes to live as far as possible securely beyond the reach

of  fear,  and  this  would be quite impossible so long as everyone did

everything  he  liked,  and reason's  claim  was  lowered to a par with

those  of  hatred  and  anger;  there is no one who is not ill at ease in

the  midst  of  enmity,  hatred,  anger,  and  deceit, and who does not

seek  to  avoid  them  as  much as he can.  (16:24)  When we reflect that

 men  without  mutual help, or the aid of reason, must needs live most

miserably,  as we clearly proved in Chap. V., we shall plainly see that

men  must  necessarily  come  to  an  agreement  to  live  together as

securely  and  well  as  possible  if  they  are  to enjoy as a whole the

rights  which  naturally  belong  to  them  as  individuals, and their life

should  be  no  more  conditioned  by  the  force  and  desire  page 203

of individuals, but by the power and will of the whole body. (16:25)  This

end  they  will  be unable to attain if desire be their only guide (for by

the  laws  of  desire  each  man is drawn in a different direction); they

must,  therefore,  most  firmly  decree  and  establish that they will be

guided  in  everything  by  reason  (which  nobody will dare openly to

repudiate  lest  he  should  be  taken for a madman), and will restrain

any  desire  which  is  injurious to a man's fellows, that they will do to

all  as  they  would  be done by, and that they will defend their neigh-

bour's rights as their own.



(16:26)  How such a compact as this should be entered into, how ratified

and established, we will now inquire.



(16:27)  Now  it  is  a  universal  law  of  human  nature that no one ever

neglects  anything which he judges to be good, except with the hope
                                                                            Bk.XIA:13044.  
of  gaining a greater good, or from the fear of a greater evil; nor does

anyone  endure  an evil except for the sake of avoiding a greater evil,

or  gaining a greater good.  (16:28)  That is, everyone will, of two goods,

choose  that  which  he  thinks  the  greatest;  and,  of  two evils, that

which  he  thinks  the least.  (16:29)  I say advisedly that which he thinks

the  greatest  or  the  least,  for  it  does not necessarily follow that he

judges right.  (16:30) This law is so deeply implanted in the human mind

that   it   ought   to   be  counted  among  eternal  truths  and  axioms.



(16:31)  As  a  necessary  consequence  of  the principle just enunciated,

no  one  can  honestly  promise to forego the right which he has over

all  things  (26),  and  in  general  no  one  will  abide by his promises,

unless  under the fear of a greater evil, or the hope of a greater good.

(16:32)  An  example  will  make the matter clearer.  (16:33)  Suppose that a

robber  forces  me  to promise that I will give him my goods at his will

and  pleasure.  (16:34)  It  is  plain  (inasmuch as my natural right is, as I

have  shown,  co-extensive  with  my  power)  that if I can free myself

from  this  robber  by  stratagem, by assenting to his demands, I have

the  natural  right  to  do  so,  and  to pretend to accept his conditions.

(16:35)  Or  again,  suppose I have genuinely promised someone that for

the  space  of  twenty  days  I  will  not taste food or any nourishment;

and  suppose  I  afterwards  find that was foolish, and cannot be kept

without  very great injury to myself; as I am bound by natural law and

right  to  choose  the least of two evils,  I   page 204  have  complete right

to  break  my  compact,  and  act  as  if  my  promise  had never been

uttered.  (16:36)  I  say  that  I  should  have perfect natural right to do so,

whether I was actuated by true and evident reason,  or whether I was

actuated  by  mere opinion in thinking I had promised rashly; whether

my  reasons  were  true  or  false, I should be in fear of a greater evil,

which,  by  the  ordinance  of nature, I should strive to avoid by every

means in my power.



(16:37)  We  may,  therefore, conclude that a compact is only made valid
    Bk.XIA:13049.
by  its utility, without which it becomes null and void.  (16:38)  It is, there-

fore, foolish to ask a man to keep his faith with us for ever, unless we

also  endeavour  that  the violation of the compact we enter into shall

involve  for  the  violator  more harm than good.  (16:39)  This considera-

tion should have very great weight in forming a state.   (16:40)  However,

if  all  men  could  be easily led by reason alone, and could recognize

what  is  best and most useful for a state, there would be no one who

would  not forswear deceit, for everyone would keep most religiously

to their compact in their desire for the chief good, namely, the preser-

vation  of  the state, and would cherish good faith above all things as

the  shield  and buckler of the commonwealth.  (16:41)  However, it is far

from  being  the case that all men can always be easily led by reason

alone;  everyone is drawn away by his pleasure, while avarice, ambi-

tion,  envy,  hatred, and the like so engross the mind that reason has

no  place  therein.  (16:42)  Hence,  though  men make promises with all

the  appearances of good faith, and agree that they will keep to their

engagement,  no  one  can absolutely rely on another man's promise

unless  there  is  something  behind  it.  (16:43)  Everyone has by nature

a  right  to  act  deceitfully.  and  to break his compacts, unless he be
                                                                 Bk.XIA:13050; Bk.XIX:26732,33.
restrained  by  the  hope  of  some  greater good, or the fear of some

greater evil.


(16:44)  However,  as we have shown that the natural right of the individ-

ual  is  only  limited by his power, it is clear that by transferring, either

willingly  or  under  compulsion,  this power into the hands of another,

he  in  so doing necessarily cedes also a part of his right; and further,

that  the  Sovereign  right over all men belongs to him who has sover-

eign  power, wherewith he can compel men by force, or restrain them

by  threats  of  the  universally  feared  punishment  of     page 205   death;

such  sovereign right he will retain only so long as he can maintain his

power  of  enforcing  his  will;  otherwise  he  will  totter on his throne,

and  no one who is stronger than he will be bound unwillingly to obey

him.

                                  Bk.XIA:13153.
(16:45)  In  this  manner a society can be formed without any violation of

natural  right,  and  the  covenant can always be strictly kept—that is,

if  each  individual  hands  over  the  whole  of  his power to the body

politic,  the  latter  will  then  possess  sovereign natural right over all

things;  that  is,  it  will  have  sole  and  unquestioned dominion, and
                                  Bk.XIB:10536.
everyone  will  be  bound to obey, under pain of the severest punish-

ment.  (16:46)  A  body  politic  of  this kind is called a Democracy, which

may  be  defined  as  a  society which wields all its power as a whole.

(16:47)  The  sovereign  power  is not restrained by any laws, but every-

one  is  bound  to  obey  it  in  all  things;  such  is  the state of things

implied  when  men  either  tacitly  or  expressly  handed over to it all

their   power   of   self-defence,   or   in   other  words,  all  their  right.

(16:48)  For  if  they  had  wished to retain any right for themselves, they

ought  to have taken precautions for its defence and preservation; as

they  have  not  done  so, and indeed could not have done so without

dividing  and  consequently ruining the state, they placed themselves

absolutely   at  the  mercy  of  the  sovereign  power;  and,  therefore,

having  acted (as we have shown) as reason and necessity demand-

ed,  they  are  obliged  to fulfil the commands of the sovereign power,
        Bk.XIA:13477.
however  absurd these may be, else they will be public enemies, and

will  act  against reason, which urges the preservation of the state as

a primary duty.  (16:49)  For reason bids us choose the least of two evils.



(16:50)  Furthermore,  this  danger of submitting absolutely to the domin-

ion  and  will  of  another,  is  one  which  may be incurred with a light

heart:  for  we  have shown that sovereigns only possess this right of

imposing  their  will,  so long as they have the full power to enforce it:

if  such  power be lost their right to command is lost also, or lapses to

those who have assumed it and can keep it.  (16:51)  Thus it is very rare

for  sovereigns  to  impose  thoroughly  irrational commands, for they

are  bound  to  consult  their  own interests, and retain their power by

consulting  the  public  good  and  acting  according to the dictates of

reason,  as  Seneca  says,  "violenta    page 206 imperia nemo continuit
                                    Bk.XIA:13366.
diu."  (16:52) No one can long retain a tyrant's sway.



(16:53)  In  a  democracy, irrational commands are still less to be feared:

for  it is almost impossible that the majority of a people, especially if it
                                                                Bk.XIA:13368.
be  a  large  one, should agree in an irrational design: and, moreover,

the basis and aim of a democracy is to avoid the desires as irrational,

and  to  bring  men  as far as possible under the control of reason, so

that they may live in peace and harmony: if this basis be removed the
    Bk.XIB:103; Bk.XIX:26732.
whole fabric falls to ruin.



(16:54)  Such  being  the  ends in view for the sovereign power, the duty

of  subjects  is,  as  I  have said, to obey its commands, and to recog-

nize no right save that which it sanctions.



(16:55) It  will,  perhaps,  be  thought  that  we  are  turning subjects into

slaves:  for  slaves  obey  commands  and  free men live as they like;

but  this  idea  is  based  on  a misconception, for the true slave is he

who  is  led  away by his pleasures and can neither see what is good

for  him  nor  act  accordingly:  he  alone  is  free  who  lives with free

consent under the entire guidance of reason.



(16:56)  Action  in  obedience  to  orders  does  take  away  freedom in a

certain  sense,  but  it  does  not,  therefore,  make a man a slave, all

depends  on  the  object of the action.  (16:57)  If the object of the action

be  the  good  of the state, and not the good of the agent, the latter is

a  slave  and  does  himself no good: but in a state or kingdom where

the  weal  of  the  whole  people,  and  not  that  of  the  ruler,   is  the
    Bk.XIB:103.
supreme  law,  obedience  to  the  sovereign power does not make a
                 
man a slave, of no use to himself, but a subject.  (16:58)  Therefore, that

state  is  the freest whose laws are founded on sound reason, so that
                                                        Bk.XIB:1993.
every  member  of  it  may,  if he will, be free (27); that is, live with full
     Bk.XIA:13474, 13684; Bk.XIB:103, 10333; Bk.XX:282105. 
consent under the entire guidance of reason.



(16:59) Children,  though  they  are  bound  to obey all the commands of

their  parents,  are  yet  not slaves: for the commands of parents look

generally to the children's benefit.



(16:60)  We  must,  therefore,  acknowledge  a great difference between

a  slave,  a  son,  and  a subject; their positions may be thus defined.

(16:61)  A slave is one who is bound to obey his master's orders, though

they are given solely in the master's interest: a son is one who obeys

his father's orders, given   page 207  in his own interest;  a subject obeys

the  orders  of  the  sovereign  power,  given for the common interest,

wherein he is included.



(16:62) I think I have now shown sufficiently clearly the basis of a democ-

racy:  I  have  especially  desired  to  do so, for I believe it to be of all

forms  of  government  the most natural, and the most consonant with
    Bk.XIA:13683.
individual liberty.  (16:63)  In it no one transfers his natural right so abso-

lutely  that  he  has no further voice in affairs, he only hands it over to
                                                           Bk.XIA:13367.
the  majority  of  a  society,  whereof he is a unit.   (16:63a)  Thus all men             Durant [10] 174  
                                                                   Bk.XIB:10434.
remain as they were in the state of nature, equals.



(16:64)  This  is  the  only  form  of  government  which  I have treated of

at  length,  for  it  is  the  one most akin to my purpose of showing the

benefits of freedom in a state.



(16:65)  I  may  pass  over  the  fundamental  principles of other forms of

government,  for  we  may  gather  from  what has been said whence

their  right  arises  without  going  into  its origin.  (16:66)  The possessor

of  sovereign  power, whether he be one, or many, or the whole body

politic,   has   the   sovereign  right  of  imposing  any  commands  he

pleases:  and  he  who  has  either  voluntarily,  or under compulsion,

transferred  the  right  to  defend  him  to  another,  has,  in  so doing,
                                                                                Bk.XIA:13369.
renounced  his  natural  right  and  is  therefore  bound  to obey, in all

things,  the  commands  of the sovereign power; and will be bound so

to  do  so  long  as  the  king,  or  nobles,  or  the people preserve the

sovereign  power  which  formed  the  basis  of  the  original  transfer.

(16:67)  I need add no more.



(16:68)  The  bases  and  rights  of  dominion  being  thus  displayed, we

shall  readily  be  able  to define private civil right, wrong, justice, and

injustice,  with  their relations to the state; and also to determine what

constitutes an ally, or an enemy, or the crime of treason.



(16:69)  By  private  civil  right  we  can  only mean the liberty every man

possesses  to  preserve  his  existence,  a liberty limited by the edicts

of the sovereign power, and preserved only by its authority: for when

a  man has transferred to another his right of living as he likes, which

was  only limited by his power, that is, has transferred his liberty and

power  of self-defence, he is bound to live as that other dictates, and

to trust to him entirely for his defence.  (16:70)  Wrong takes place when

a  citizen,  or  subject,  is forced by another to undergo   page 208   some

loss  or pain in contradiction to the authority of the law, or the edict of

the sovereign power.



(16:71)  Wrong  is  conceivable only in an organized community: nor can

it  ever accrue to subjects from any act of the sovereign, who has the

right  to  do  what  he likes.  (16:72)  It can only arise, therefore, between

private  persons,  who  are  bound  by  law and right not to injure one

another.  (16:73)  Justice consists in the habitual rendering to every man

his  lawful  due:  injustice  consists in depriving a man, under the pre-

tence  of  legality,  of  what  the  laws, rightly interpreted, would allow

him.  (16:74)  These  last  are  also  called  equity  and  iniquity, because

those  who  administer  the  laws  are  bound  to  show  no respect of

persons,  but  to  account  all  men  equal, and to defend every man's

right   equally,   neither   envying   the   rich  nor  despising  the  poor.



(16:75) The men of two states become allies, when for the sake of avoid-

ing war, or for some other advantage, they covenant to do each other

no  hurt,  but  on the contrary, to assist each other if necessity arises,

each  retaining  his  independence.  (16:76)  Such a covenant is valid so

long  as  its  basis  of  danger or advantage is in force: no one enters

into  an  engagement,  or  is  bound  to stand by his compacts unless

there  be  a  hope  of  some  accruing  good,  or the fear of some evil:

if  this basis be removed the compact thereby becomes void: this has

been  abundantly  shown  by experience.  (16:77)  For although different

states  make  treaties  not  to  harm  one  another,  they  always take

every  possible  precaution against such treaties being broken by the

stronger  party, and do not rely on the compact, unless there is a suf-

ficiently  obvious object and advantage to both parties in observing it.

(16:78)  Otherwise  they  would fear a breach of faith, nor would there be

any  wrong  done  thereby:  for  who in his proper senses, and aware

of  the  right  of  the  sovereign  power, would trust in the promises of

one  who  has  the  will  and  the  power to do what he likes, and who

aims solely at the safety and advantage of his dominion?  (16:79)  More-

over,  if  we  consult  loyalty  and religion, we shall see that no one in

possession  of  power  ought to abide by his promises to the injury of

his dominion; for he cannot keep such promises without breaking the

engagement  he  made  with  his subjects, by which both he and they

are  most  solemnly  bound.   page 209  (16:80)   An  enemy  is one who lives

apart  from  the state, and does not recognize its authority either as a

subject  or  as  an ally. It is not hatred which makes a man an enemy,

but  the  rights of the state.  (16:81)  The rights of the state are the same

in  regard  to  him  who  does not recognize by any compact the state
                                                                                   Bk.XIX:265d.
authority,  as  they  are against him who has done the state an injury:

it  has  the  right  to  force  him  as  best  it can, either to submit, or to
  Bk.XIX:26629.
contract an alliance.



(16:82)  Lastly, treason can only be committed by subjects, who by com-

pact,  either tacit or expressed, have transferred all their rights to the

state:  a  subject  is  said  to  have committed this crime when he has

attempted,  for  whatever  reason, to seize the sovereign power, or to

place it in different hands.  (16:83) I say, has attempted, for if punishment

were  not  to  overtake him till he had succeeded, it would often come

too late, the sovereign rights would have been acquired or transferred

already.



(16:84) I also say, has attempted, for whatever reason, to seize the sove-

reign  power,  and I recognize no difference whether such an attempt
                                                  Bk.XIB:9924.
should be followed by public loss or public gain.   (85)  Whatever be his

reason  for  acting, the crime is treason, and he is rightly condemned:

in war, everyone would admit the justice of his sentence.  (16:86) If a man

does  not  keep  to  his  post,  but  approaches the enemy without the

knowledge  of  his  commander, whatever may be his motive, so long

as he acts on his own motion, even if he advances with the design of

defeating  the  enemy,  he  is  rightly  put  to  death,  because he has

violated his oath, and infringed the rights of his commander.  (87)  That

all  citizens  are equally bound by these rights in time of peace, is not

so  generally  recognized,  but  the reasons for obedience are in both

cases  identical.  (16:88)  The  state  must be preserved and directed by

the sole authority of the sovereign, and such authority and right have

been  accorded  by universal consent to him alone: if, therefore, any-

one  else  attempts,  without his consent, to execute any public enter-

prise,  even  though  the  state  might (as we said) reap benefit there-

from,  such  person  has  none the less infringed the sovereigns right,

and would be rightly punished for treason.



(16:89)  In  order  that  every  scruple  may  be  removed,  we  may  now

answer the inquiry, whether our former assertion that   page 210   every-

one  who  has  not  the practice of reason, may, in the state of nature,

live  by  sovereign  natural  right, according to the laws of his desires,

is  not  in  direct  opposition  to  the law and right of God as revealed.

(16:90)  For  as  all  men  absolutely (whether they be less endowed with

reason   or   more)  are  equally  bound  by  the  Divine  command  to

love their neighbour  as  themselves,  it may be said that they cannot,

without  wrong,  do injury to anyone, or live according to their desires.



(16:91) This objection, so far as the state of nature is concerned, can be

easily  answered, for the state of nature is, both in nature and in time,

prior  to  religion.  (16:92)  No  one  knows  by  nature  that he owes any
           Bk.XIX:25912.
obedience  to  God (28),  nor can he attain thereto by any exercise of
                                                                Bk.XIX:2904.
his  reason,  but solely by revelation confirmed by signs.  (16:93) There-

fore,  previous  to  revelation,  no  one  is  bound by a Divine law and

right of which he is necessarily in ignorance.  (16:94) The state of nature

must  by  no  means  be confounded with a state of religion, but must

be  conceived  as  without  either  religion  or  law, and consequently

without  sin  or  wrong:  this  is how we have described it, and we are

confirmed  by  the  authority  of  Paul.  (16:95)  It is not only in respect of

ignorance  that  we  conceive the state of nature as prior to, and lack-

ing  the  Divine revealed law and right; but in respect of freedom also,

wherewith all men are born endowed.



(16:96)  If men were naturally bound by the Divine law and right, or if the

Divine law and right were a natural necessity, there would have been

no  need for God to make a covenant with mankind, and to bind them

thereto with an oath and agreement.



(16:97) We must, then, fully grant that the Divine law and right originated

at the time when men by express covenant agreed to obey God in all

things, and ceded, as it were, their natural freedom, transferring their

rights to God in the manner described in speaking of the formation of

a state.



(16:98)  However,  I  will  treat  of these matters more at length presently.



(16:99)  It  may  be  insisted  that sovereigns  are  as much bound by the

Divine  law  as subjects:  whereas  we have asserted that they retain

their natural rights, and may do whatever they like.


page 211
(16:100)  In  order  to  clear  up  the  whole  difficulty, which arises rather

concerning  the  natural  right  than  the  natural state, I maintain that

everyone  is  bound, in the state of nature, to live according to Divine

law,  in the same way as he is bound to live according to the dictates

of  sound  reason;  namely,  inasmuch  as  it is to his advantage, and

necessary  for  his  salvation;  but,  if  he  will  not  so live, he may do

otherwise  at  his  own  risk.  (16:101)  He is thus bound to live according

to  his own laws, not according to anyone else's, and to recognize no

man as a judge, or as a superior in religion.  (16:102) Such, in my opinion,

is  the position of a sovereign, for he may take advice from his fellow-

men,  but  he  is  not  bound to recognize any as a judge, nor anyone

besides  himself  as  an  arbitrator  on  any question of right, unless it

be  a  prophet  sent  expressly  by  God  and  attesting his mission by

indisputable  signs.  (16:103)  Even  then  he  does  not recognize a man,

but God Himself as His judge.



(16:104)  If  a  sovereign  refuses  to obey God as revealed in His law, he

does  so  at  his  own  risk  and  loss, but without violating any civil or

natural right.  (16:105) For the civil right is dependent on his own decree;

and  natural right is dependent on the laws of nature, which latter are

not  adapted  to religion, whose sole aim is the good of humanity, but

to the order of nature—that is, to God's eternal decree unknown to us.



(16:106) This  truth  seems  to  be  adumbrated  in a somewhat obscurer

form  by  those  who  maintain that men can sin against God's revela-

tion,  but  not  against  the  eternal decree by which He has ordained

all things.


                                                   Martyr Laws                   Bk.XIB:17578.
(16:107)  We  may  be  asked,  what should we do  if  the sovereign com-

mands   anything   contrary   to   religion,  and  the  obedience  which

we have expressly vowed to God? should we obey the Divine law or

the human law?  (16:108)  I shall treat of this question at length hereafter,

and will therefore merely say now, that God should be obeyed before

all else, when we have a certain and indisputable revelation of His will:

but men are very prone to error on religious subjects, and, according

to the diversity of their dispositions, are wont with considerable stir to

put forward their own inventions, as experience more than sufficiently

attests,  so  that  if  no  one  were  bound to obey the state in matters

which,  in  his   page 212  own opinion concern religion,  the rights of the

state  would  be  dependent  on  every man's judgment and passions.

(16:109)  No  one  would  consider  himself  bound  to  obey laws framed

gainst  his  faith  or superstition; and on this pretext he might assume

unbounded license.  (16:110) In this way, the rights of the civil authorities

would  be  utterly  set  at  nought,  so  that we must conclude that the

sovereign  power,  which  alone  is bound both by Divine and natural

right  to  preserve  and  guard  the  laws  of  the  state,  should  have

supreme  authority  for making any laws about religion which it thinks

fit;  all  are  bound  to  obey  its behests on the subject in accordance

with their promise which God bids them to keep.



(16:111)  However,  if the sovereign power be heathen, we should either

enter  into  no  engagements therewith, and yield up our lives sooner

than  transfer  to  it  any of our rights; or, if the engagement be made,

and our rights transferred, we should (inasmuch as we should have

ourselves transferred the right of defending ourselves and our religion)

be  bound to obey them, and to keep our word: we might even rightly

be bound so to do, except in those cases where God, by indisputable

revelation,  has promised His special aid against tyranny, or given us

special exemption from obedience.  (16:112)  Thus we see that, of all the

Jews  in  Babylon,  there were only three youths who were certain of

the  help  of  God,  and,  therefore, refused to obey Nebuchadnezzar.

(16:113)  All the rest, with the sole exception of Daniel, who was beloved

by  the  king,  were  doubtless  compelled  by  right  to obey, perhaps

thinking  that  they  had  been  delivered up by God into the hands of

the  king, and that the king had obtained and preserved his dominion
                                                                             {See Shirley's footnote}    
by God's design.  (16:114) On the other hand, Eleazar, before his country

had utterly fallen, wished to give a proof of his constancy to his com-

patriots, in order that they might follow in his footsteps, and go to any

lengths,  rather  than  allow  their right and power to be transferred to

the  Greeks,  or brave any torture rather than swear allegiance to the

heathen.  (16:115)  Instances  are  occurring every day in confirmation of

what  I  here  advance.  (16:116) The rulers of Christian kingdoms do not

hesitate, with a view to strengthening their dominion, to make treaties
                Bk.XIB:23398.
with  Turks  and  heathen,  and  to  give  orders to their subjects who

 page 213  settle  among  such  peoples  not  to  assume  more freedom,
                                    Bk.XIB:6822.
either  in  things  secular  or  religious,  than is set down in the treaty,

or allowed by the foreign government.  (16:117) We may see this exemp-

lified  in  the  Dutch  treaty  with  the  Japanese, which I have already

mentioned.

Page 214

CHAPTER XVII.


(17:1)  The theory put forward in the last chapter, of the universal rights

of  the  sovereign  power,  and  of  the  natural rights of the individual

transferred  thereto,  though  it  corresponds  in  many  respects with

actual  practice,  and  though practice may be so arranged as to con-

form  to  it more and more, must nevertheless always remain in many
                  Bk.XIA:1451.
respects  purely  ideal.  (17:2)  No  one  can  ever  so  utterly  transfer to

another  his  power  and,  consequently,  his rights, as to cease to be

a  man;  nor can there ever be a power so sovereign that it can carry

out  every possible wish.  (17:3)  It will always be vain to order a subject

to  hate  what  he  believes  brings  him  advantage,  or  to  love what

brings  him  loss,  or not to be offended at insults, or not to wish to be

free  from  fear,  or  a  hundred  other things of the sort, which neces-

sarily  follow  from  the laws  of  human  nature.  (17:4)  So much, I think,

is  abundantly  shown  by  experience:  for  men  have  never  so  far

ceded  their  power  as  to  cease to be an object of fear to the rulers

who  received  such  power  and  right;  and  dominions  have always

been  in  as  much  danger  from  their  own subjects as from external

enemies.  (17:5)  If  it  were  really the case, that men could be deprived

of their natural rights so utterly as never to have any further influence

on affairs (29), except with the permission of the holders of sovereign

right,  it  would  then  be  possible  to  maintain with impunity  page 215

the  most  violent  tyranny,  which,  I  suppose,  no  one  would for an

instant admit.



(17:6) We must, therefore, grant that every man retains some part of his

right,   in   dependence   on   his  own  decision,  and  no  one  else's.



(17:7)   However,  in  order  correctly  to  understand  the  extent  of  the

sovereign's  right  and  power,  we  must  take  notice that it does not

cover  only  those  actions  to  which  it  can  compel men by fear, but

absolutely  every  action  which  it  can  induce  men  to  perform:  for

it  is  the  fact  of  obedience,   not  the  motive  for obedience,  which

makes a man a subject.



(17:8)  Whatever  be  the  cause  which  leads  a  man to obey the com-

mands  of  the  sovereign,  whether  it  be fear or hope, or love of his

country,  or  any  other emotion—the fact remains that the man takes

counsel  with  himself, and nevertheless acts as his sovereign orders.

(17:9)   We  must  not,  therefore,  assert that all actions resulting from a

man's  deliberation  with  himself  are done in obedience to the rights

of  the  individual  rather  than  the  sovereign:  as a matter of fact, all

actions  spring  from  a  man's  deliberation  with himself, whether the

determining  motive  be  love  or fear of punishment; therefore, either

dominion does not exist, and has no rights over its subjects, or else it

extends  over every instance in which it can prevail on men to decide

to obey it.  (17:10)  Consequently, every action which a subject performs

in  accordance  with  the  commands  of the sovereign, whether such

action  springs  from  love, or fear, or (as is more frequently the case)

from  hope and fear together, or from reverence. compounded of fear

and  admiration,  or,  indeed,  any  motive  whatever,  is performed in

virtue of his submission to the sovereign, and not in virtue of his own

authority.



(17:11)  This  point  is  made  still  more  clear by the fact that obedience

does  not  consist  so  much in the outward act as in the mental state

of  the  person  obeying;  so  that  he  is  most  under the dominion of

another   who  with  his  whole  heart  determines  to  obey  another's

commands;  and  consequently  the  firmest  dominion belongs to the

sovereign  who  has  most  influence  over  the minds of his subjects;

if  those  who  are  most  feared  possessed the firmest dominion, the

firmest  dominion  would  belong  to  the subjects of a tyrant, for they

are  always  greatly  feared by their ruler.  (17:12)  Furthermore,   page 216

though  it  is  impossible  to  govern  the  mind  as  completely  as the
 Bk.XIA:15764.
tongue,   nevertheless   minds   are,  to  a  certain  extent,  under  the

control  of  the  sovereign,  for  he can in many ways bring about that

the  greatest  part  of  his  subjects  should  follow  his wishes in their
                                           Bk.XIA:15765.
beliefs,  their  loves,  and  their  hates.  (17:13)  Though  such  emotions

do  not  arise  at  the  express  command  of the sovereign they often

result  (as experience shows)  from  the  authority  of  his power, and

from  his  direction;  in  other  words,  in  virtue  of  his  right; we may,

therefore,  without  doing  violence  to  our  understanding,  conceive

men  who  follow  the  instigation  of  their  sovereign  in  their beliefs,

their   loves,   their   hates,  their  contempt,  and  all &n